School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
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ItemTruth-Tellers in Bradwardine’s Theory of Truth(Peeters, 2018)
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ItemAssertion, Denial, Accepting, Rejecting, Symmetry and Paradox(Oxford University Press, 2015)Proponents of a dialethic or “truth-value glut” response to the paradoxes of self-reference argue that “truth-value gap” analyses of the paradoxes fall foul of the extended liar paradox: “this sentence is not true.” If we pay attention to the role of assertion and denial and the behaviour of negation in both “gap” and “glut” analyses, we see that the situation with these approaches has a pleasing symmetry: gap approaches take some denials to not be expressible by negation, and glut approaches take some negations to not express denials. But in the light of this symmetry, considerations against a gap view point to parallel considerations against a glut view. Those who find some reason to prefer one view over another (and this is almost everyone) must find some reason to break this symmetry.
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ItemDecorated Linear Order Types and the Theory of Concatenation(Cambridge University Press, 2010)
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ItemProof Theory and Meaning: the context of deducibility(Cambridge University Press, 2010)
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ItemTruth-makers, entailment and necessity(Acumen Publishing Limited, 2011-01-01)
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ItemAlways more(COLLEGE PUBLICATIONS, 2010)
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ItemBarriers to Implication(Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)
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ItemNot Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once)(Oxford University PressOxford, 2010-09-01)Abstract According to the ‘knowability thesis’, every truth is knowable. Fitch's paradox refutes the knowability thesis by showing that if we are not omniscient, then not only are some truths not known, but there are some truths that are not knowable. This chapter proposes a weakening of the knowability thesis (called the ‘conjunctive knowability thesis’) to the effect that for every truth p there is a collection of truths such that (i) each of them is knowable and (ii) their conjunction is equivalent to p. It shows that the conjunctive knowability thesis avoids triviality arguments against it, and that it fares very differently depending on another thesis connecting knowledge and possibility. If there are two propositions, inconsistent with one another, but both knowable, then the conjunctive knowability thesis is trivially true. On the other hand, if knowability entails truth, the conjunctive knowability thesis is coherent, but only if the logic of possibility is weak.