School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
Permanent URI for this collection
Search Results
1 - 10 of 11
-
ItemConditionals: A Debate with Jackson(Oxford University PressOxford, 2010-05-01)Abstract This chapter presents a number of concerns about Jackson's approach to conditionals. The first section discusses the view defended by Frank Jackson in his book Conditionals; it describes his account and notes some of its shortcomings. There are good reasons for doing this. Views of the kind defended there are, if not orthodox, still very common. And Jackson defends the view in, arguably, its most cogent form. The second section sketches a rather different account, which avoids these shortcomings. It proposes a general framework for an account of conditionals, one that leaves plenty of parameters to be adjusted for fine tuning.
-
ItemDecorated Linear Order Types and the Theory of Concatenation(Cambridge University Press, 2010)
-
ItemProof Theory and Meaning: the context of deducibility(Cambridge University Press, 2010)
-
ItemTruth-makers, entailment and necessity(Acumen Publishing Limited, 2011-01-01)
-
ItemCounting on One Another(Mohr Siebeck, 2010)
-
ItemNon-Transitive Identity(Oxford University PressOxford, 2010-05-01)Abstract This chapter defines a notion of identity in the second-order paraconsistent logic LP. The notion does not have the properties of transitivity or substitutivity, but these may be regained in consistent contexts. The chapter then discusses applications of this notion of identity, especially to entities involved in change. Soritical changes come in for special consideration.
-
ItemAlways more(COLLEGE PUBLICATIONS, 2010-01-01)
-
ItemBarriers to Implication(Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)
-
ItemBeyond the Limits of Knowledge(Oxford University PressOxford, 2010-09-01)Abstract This chapter develops the Routley/Beall proposal by countenancing the mere possibility of truth-value gluts and appealing to a paraconsistent logic with excluded middle.
-
ItemJackson's Classical Model of Meaning(Oxford University PressOxford, 2010-05-01)Abstract Jackson often writes as if his account of public language meanings in terms of descriptivist conventions were just plain common sense. How else are we to explain how different speakers manage to communicate using a public language? And how else can we explain how individuals arrive at confident judgments about the reference of their words in hypothetical scenarios? This chapter shows just how controversial the psychological assumptions behind Jackson's semantic theory really are. First, it explains how Jackson's theory goes well beyond the commonsense platitudes he cites in its defence. Second, it sketches an alternative explanation of those platitudes, the improvisation model of meaning, which seems psychologically more realistic. The chapter concludes that the psychological picture presupposed by Jackson's semantic theory stands in need of a more substantial defence than he has so far offered.