- School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
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ItemSCIENTIFIC METHODSankey, H ; Psillos, S ; Curd, M (ROUTLEDGE, 2008)
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ItemScientific Realism: An Elaboration and a DefenceSANKEY, H ; Carrier, M ; Roggenhoffer, J ; Kuppers, G ; Blanchard, P (Springer Verlag, 2004)This paper describes the position of scientific realism and presents the basic lines of argument for the position. Simply put, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is knowledge of the truth about observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent, objective reality. Scientific realism is supported by several distinct lines of argument. It derives from a non-anthropocentric conception of our place in the natural world, and it is grounded in the epistemology and metaphysics of common sense. Further, the success of science entitles us to infer both the approximate truth of mature scientific theories and the truth-conduciveness of the methods of science.
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ItemWhy is it rational to believe scientific theories are true?Sankey, H ; Cheyne, C ; John, W (Springer, 2006-12-01)
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ItemRealism, method, and truthSANKEY, H ; MARSONET, M (Ashgate, 2002)Rational scientific inquiry is governed by the rules of scientific method. Adherence to the rules of scientific method warrants the rational acceptance of experimental results and scientific theory. Scientists who accept results or theories licensed by the rules of method do so on a rational basis. This chapter assumes a traditional view of the relation between scientific method and rational justification in science. On such a view, there is a close connection between scientific method and the rational acceptance of scientific theories and experimental results. In particular, compliance by a scientist with the rules of scientific method rationally justifies the scientist's acceptance of a theory or result. The chapter discusses a realist bridge between method and truth. Scientific theories make claims about both observable and unobservable states of affairs. Among the claims which theories make about observable states of affairs are predictions of observable phenomena that are made on the basis of hypotheses about unobservable portions of reality.