Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
Source TitleMathematical Social Sciences
University of Melbourne Author/sBalbuzanov, Ivan
Document TypeJournal Article
CitationsBalbuzanov, I. (2020). Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences, 104, pp.78-87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.08.005.
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I study kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences and with constraints on the lengths of the exchange cycles. Efficient deterministic mechanisms have poor fairness properties in this environment. Instead, I propose an individually rational, ordinally efficient and anonymous random mechanism for two-way kidney exchange based on Bogomolnaia and Moulin’s (2001) Probabilistic Serial mechanism. Individual rationality incentivizes patient-donor pairs who are compatible with each other to participate in the exchange, thus increasing the overall transplantation rate. Finally, individual rationality, ex-post efficiency and weak strategyproofness are incompatible for any mechanism.
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