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dc.contributor.authorBalbuzanov, I
dc.contributor.authorKotowski, MH
dc.date.available2019-11-13T01:50:20Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifierhttp://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000488189200009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=d4d813f4571fa7d6246bdc0dfeca3a1c
dc.identifier.citationBalbuzanov, I. & Kotowski, M. H. (2019). Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 87 (5), pp.1663-1692. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15676.
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/230893
dc.description.abstractWe propose a new solution for discrete exchange economies and resource‐allocation problems, the exclusion core. The exclusion core rests upon a foundational idea in the legal understanding of property, the right to exclude others. By reinterpreting endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights, rather than as bundles of goods, our analysis extends to economies with qualified property rights, joint ownership, and social hierarchies. The exclusion core is characterized by a generalized top trading cycle algorithm in a large class of economies, including those featuring private, public, and mixed ownership. It is neither weaker nor stronger than the strong core.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherEconometric Society
dc.titleEndowments, Exclusion, and Exchange
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/ecta15676
melbourne.affiliation.departmentEconomics
melbourne.source.titleEconometrica: journal of the Econometric Society
melbourne.source.volume87
melbourne.source.issue5
melbourne.source.pages1663-1692
melbourne.elementsid1415460
melbourne.contributor.authorBalbuzanov, Ivan
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0262
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


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