A reliabilist strategy for solving the problem of induction
AuthorPrien, Fergus Dale
AffiliationSchool of Historical and Philosophical Studies
Document TypeMasters Research thesis
Access StatusThis item is currently unavailable from this repository
© 2019 Fergus Dale Prien
In this thesis I develop a two-stage strategy in which a simple reliabilist theory of knowledge and justification can be employed so as to solve David Hume’s famous ‘problem of induction’. In so doing, the key arguments I make include: (i) that justification possesses an externalist character so we do not need to show how we know that we possess inductive knowledge, and (ii) that an inductivist rule-circular justification of induction is defensible if induction is understood in terms of a reliabilist theory of knowledge and justification.
KeywordsInduction; Problem of Induction; David Hume; Uniformity of Nature; Theory of Knowledge; Theory of Justification; Particularism; Externalism; Internalism; Scepticism; Reliabilism; Simple Reliabilism; Realism
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