Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science
Source TitleKriterion – Journal of Philosophy
University of Melbourne Author/sSankey, Charles
AffiliationSchool of Historical and Philosophical Studies
Document TypeJournal Article
CitationsSankey, H. (2021). Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science. Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy, 35 (1), pp.5-20. https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0002.
Access StatusOpen Access
The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement.
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