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dc.contributor.authorSankey, H
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-25T22:23:39Z
dc.date.available2020-11-25T22:23:39Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationSankey, H. (2021). Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science. Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy, 35 (1), pp.5-20. https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0002.
dc.identifier.issn1019-8288
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/251907
dc.description.abstractThe paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherDe Gruyter
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
dc.titleRealism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.1515/krt-2021-0002
melbourne.affiliation.departmentSchool of Historical and Philosophical Studies
melbourne.source.titleKriterion – Journal of Philosophy
melbourne.source.volume35
melbourne.source.issue1
melbourne.source.pages5-20
dc.rights.licenseCC BY
melbourne.elementsid1451943
melbourne.contributor.authorSankey, Charles
dc.identifier.eissn1019-8288
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


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