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dc.contributor.authorYoung, G
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-18T02:53:47Z
dc.date.available2020-12-18T02:53:47Z
dc.date.issued2017-09-01
dc.identifierpii: 9819
dc.identifier.citationYoung, G. (2017). A Response to Coren's Objections to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility. PHILOSOPHIA, 45 (3), pp.1365-1380. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9819-y.
dc.identifier.issn0048-3893
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/255544
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I respond to Coren's argument against my 2016 paper in which I present a case for the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility (PAP(S)). I concede that Coren has identified aspects of my original position that are vulnerable to counter-examples. Nevertheless, through a simple amendment to my original argument I am able to respond to these counter-examples without undermining the foundations on which my 2016 paper was built. Moreover, it is my contention that the main challenge Coren presents to my original paper involves making explicit that which is already implied within PAP(S). Therefore, while I acknowledge that my argument for PAP(S) requires further clarification, this can be achieved (as I demonstrate here) without undermining my original position.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherSPRINGER
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
dc.titleA Response to Coren's Objections to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11406-017-9819-y
melbourne.affiliation.departmentSchool of Historical and Philosophical Studies
melbourne.source.titlePhilosophia
melbourne.source.volume45
melbourne.source.issue3
melbourne.source.pages1365-1380
dc.rights.licenseCC BY
melbourne.elementsid1287725
melbourne.contributor.authorYoung, Garry
dc.identifier.eissn1574-9274
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


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