Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMartin, CF
dc.contributor.authorBhui, R
dc.contributor.authorBossaerts, P
dc.contributor.authorMatsuzawa, T
dc.contributor.authorCamerer, C
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-22T02:44:49Z
dc.date.available2020-12-22T02:44:49Z
dc.date.issued2014-06-05
dc.identifierpii: srep05182
dc.identifier.citationMartin, C. F., Bhui, R., Bossaerts, P., Matsuzawa, T. & Camerer, C. (2014). Chimpanzee choice rates in competitive games match equilibrium game theory predictions. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 4 (1), https://doi.org/10.1038/srep05182.
dc.identifier.issn2045-2322
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/257703
dc.description.abstractThe capacity for strategic thinking about the payoff-relevant actions of conspecifics is not well understood across species. We use game theory to make predictions about choices and temporal dynamics in three abstract competitive situations with chimpanzee participants. Frequencies of chimpanzee choices are extremely close to equilibrium (accurate-guessing) predictions, and shift as payoffs change, just as equilibrium theory predicts. The chimpanzee choices are also closer to the equilibrium prediction, and more responsive to past history and payoff changes, than two samples of human choices from experiments in which humans were also initially uninformed about opponent payoffs and could not communicate verbally. The results are consistent with a tentative interpretation of game theory as explaining evolved behavior, with the additional hypothesis that chimpanzees may retain or practice a specialized capacity to adjust strategy choice during competition to perform at least as well as, or better than, humans have.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherNATURE PUBLISHING GROUP
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
dc.titleChimpanzee choice rates in competitive games match equilibrium game theory predictions
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.1038/srep05182
melbourne.affiliation.departmentFinance
melbourne.source.titleScientific Reports
melbourne.source.volume4
melbourne.source.issue1
dc.rights.licenseCC BY
melbourne.elementsid999725
melbourne.contributor.authorBossaerts, Peter
dc.identifier.eissn2045-2322
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record