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dc.contributor.authorRenjie, RW
dc.contributor.authorVerwijmeren, P
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-06T01:39:01Z
dc.date.available2021-01-06T01:39:01Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationRenjie, R. W. & Verwijmeren, P. (2020). Director attention and firm value. Financial Management, 49 (2), pp.361-387. https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12259.
dc.identifier.issn0046-3892
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/258571
dc.description.abstractIn this article, we show that exogenous director distraction affects board monitoring intensity and leads to a higher level of inactivity by management. We construct a firm-level director “distraction” measure by exploiting shocks to unrelated industries in which directors have additional directorships. Directors attend significantly fewer board meetings when they are distracted. Firms with distracted board members tend to be inactive and experience a significant decline in firm value. Overall, this article highlights the impact of limited director attention on the effectiveness of corporate governance and the importance of directors in keeping management active.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWiley
dc.titleDirector attention and firm value
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/fima.12259
melbourne.affiliation.departmentFinance
melbourne.source.titleFinancial Management
melbourne.source.volume49
melbourne.source.issue2
melbourne.source.pages361-387
melbourne.elementsid1384208
melbourne.internal.embargodate2021-06-01
melbourne.contributor.authorVerwijmeren, Patrick
dc.identifier.eissn1755-053X
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


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