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dc.contributor.authorJohn, A
dc.contributor.authorKing, I
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-07T01:54:06Z
dc.date.available2020-02-01T01:22:29Z
dc.date.issued2020-02-01
dc.identifier.citationJohn, A. & King, I. (2020). SECRET SEARCH. International Economic Review, 61 (1), pp.3-35. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12415.
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/286923
dc.description.abstractFor high‐profile positions, should applicant identities be made public within the organisation (“open search”) or kept confidential (“secret search”)? We construct a model where an organisation seeks to hire, but where candidates' abilities are private information unless it uses open search. Rejected applicants, under open search, suffer disutility. We find: salaries are lower under secret search, the expected ability of applicants decreases as the posted (open search) salary increases, secret search is preferred by organisations where quality of candidate is relatively unimportant, and organisations will, for some parameter values, choose secret search even when open search is more efficient.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.titleSECRET SEARCH
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/iere.12415
melbourne.affiliation.departmentBusiness Administration
melbourne.affiliation.facultyBusiness & Economics
melbourne.source.titleInternational Economic Review
melbourne.source.volume61
melbourne.source.issue1
melbourne.source.pages3-35
melbourne.elementsid1426503
melbourne.internal.embargodate2022-02-01
melbourne.contributor.authorJohn, Alun
dc.identifier.eissn1468-2354
melbourne.accessrightsThis item is embargoed and will be available on 2022-02-01.


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