Show simple item record

Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games

dc.contributor.authorDindoš, M
dc.contributor.authorMezzetti, C
dc.date.available2014-05-21T23:09:50Z
dc.date.issued2006-02-01
dc.identifier.citationDindoš, M. & Mezzetti, C. (2006). Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games. Games and Economic Behavior, 54 (2), pp.261-292. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.12.001.
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/29477
dc.languageen
dc.publisherElsevier BV
dc.subjectEconomic Theory
dc.titleBetter-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2004.12.001
melbourne.peerreviewPeer Reviewed
melbourne.affiliationThe University of Melbourne
melbourne.affiliation.departmentEconomics
melbourne.source.titleGames and Economic Behavior
melbourne.source.volume54
melbourne.source.issue2
melbourne.source.pages261-292
dc.research.codefor1401
dc.description.pagestart261
melbourne.publicationid159058
melbourne.elementsid331957
melbourne.contributor.authorMezzetti, Claudio
melbourne.accessrightsThis item is currently not available from this repository


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record