LUCK AND HISTORY-SENSITIVE COMPATIBILISM
Source TitleThe Philosophical Quarterly
PublisherOXFORD UNIV PRESS
University of Melbourne Author/sLEVY, NEIL
AffiliationPhilosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry
Document TypeJournal Article
CitationsLevy, N. (2009). LUCK AND HISTORY-SENSITIVE COMPATIBILISM. PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 59 (235), pp.237-251. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.568.x.
Access StatusAccess this item via the Open Access location
Open Access at PMChttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2696473
Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, in contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote - constitutive - luck.
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