Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference

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    Author
    Priest, G
    Date
    2010-01-01
    Source Title
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
    Publisher
    University of Notre Dame
    University of Melbourne Author/s
    Priest, Graham
    Affiliation
    Historical and Philosophical Studies
    Metadata
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    Document Type
    Journal Article
    Citations
    Priest, G. (2010). Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 51 (1), pp.69-84. https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2010-005.
    Access Status
    Access this item via the Open Access location
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/11343/31066
    DOI
    10.1215/00294527-2010-005
    Open Access URL
    https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1273002110
    Abstract
    In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues— especially so called “higher order” vagueness.
    Keywords
    Philosophy

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