Incentives for boundedly rational agents
Source TitleTopics in Theoretical Economics
PublisherBerkeley Electronic Press
University of Melbourne Author/sBasov, Suren
AffiliationEconomics and Commerce: Department of Economics
Document TypeJournal Article
CitationsBASOV, S. (2003). Incentives for boundedly rational agents. Topics in Theoretical Economics, 3 (1), pp.1-14
Access StatusOpen Access
ISBN 0734024681, Working paper 813.
Keywordsbounded rationality; incentives; principal-agent model; JEL classification numbers C60; general; D82; asymmetric and private information; D83; search; learning and information.
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