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dc.contributor.authorBASOV, S
dc.date.available2014-05-22T09:38:21Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.date.submitted2002-11-10
dc.identifier.citationBASOV, S. (2003). Incentives for boundedly rational agents. Topics in Theoretical Economics, 3 (1), pp.1-14
dc.identifier.issn1534-598X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/33619
dc.descriptionISBN 0734024681, Working paper 813.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.publisherBerkeley Electronic Press
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/research/workingpapers/wp00_01/813.pdf
dc.subjectbounded rationality
dc.subjectincentives
dc.subjectprincipal-agent model
dc.subjectJEL classification numbers C60
dc.subjectgeneral
dc.subjectD82
dc.subjectasymmetric and private information
dc.subjectD83
dc.subjectsearch
dc.subjectlearning and information.
dc.titleIncentives for boundedly rational agents
dc.typeJournal Article
melbourne.peerreviewNon Peer Reviewed
melbourne.affiliation.departmentEconomics and Commerce: Department of Economics
melbourne.source.titleThe BE Journal in Theoretical Economics
melbourne.source.month09
melbourne.source.volume3
melbourne.source.issue1
melbourne.source.pages1-14
melbourne.publicationid20783
melbourne.elementsid258976
melbourne.contributor.authorBasov, Suren
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


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