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dc.contributor.authorKing, Stephen P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-22T09:43:48Z
dc.date.available2014-05-22T09:43:48Z
dc.date.issued2000-10en_US
dc.date.submitted2002-11-11en_US
dc.identifier.citationKing, Stephen P. (2000) Does structure dominate regulation? The case of an input monopolist.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn0-7340-1708-1en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/33648
dc.descriptionISBN 0-7340-1708-1, Working Paper 767en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper constructs a simple repeated game model to analyze how industry outcomes alter if a regulated input monopolist is allowed to integrate into the downstream retail market. Integration helps overcome double marginalization — a feature well known in the existing literature. Unlike existing static models, however, integration also makes tacit collusion more difficultin a repeated game framework. If the regulated input price exceeds marginal cost, an integrated monopolist has an incentive to increase retail sales as this raises upstream profits. It will be less willing to engage in any tacitly collusive conduct in the downstream market and it has a greater incentive to cheat on any collusive arrangement. We show that these effects may dominate input price regulation. A social planner may prefer the upstream monopoly toparticipate in the downstream market, even if integration leads to a higher regulated input price. The anti-competitive effects of the higher input priceare more than offset by the pro-competitive effects of integratien_US
dc.formatapplication/pdfen_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/research/workingpapers/wp00_01/767.pdfen_US
dc.subjectInput monopolyen_US
dc.subjectregulationen_US
dc.subjectutility industriesen_US
dc.subjectJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L12en_US
dc.subjectL51en_US
dc.subjectmonopolyen_US
dc.subjectmonopolization strategiesen_US
dc.subjecteconomics of regulationen_US
dc.titleDoes structure dominate regulation? The case of an input monopolisten_US
dc.typePreprinten_US
melbourne.peerreviewNon Peer Revieweden_US
melbourne.affiliation.departmentEconomics and Commerce: Department of Economicsen_US
melbourne.source.month10en_US
melbourne.elementsidNA
melbourne.contributor.authorKing, Stephen
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


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