Using 'Bill and Keep' Internconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competition
AuthorGans, Joshua S.; King, Stephen P.
AffiliationEconomics and Commerce: Department of Economics
CitationsGans, Joshua S. and King, Stephen P. (2000) Using 'Bill and Keep' Internconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competition.
Access StatusOpen Access
This paper demonstrates that low (below marginal cost) interconnect or access charges can be used to sustain high subscription prices in an environment of network competition with two-part tariffs and price discrimination. This result stands in contrast to other results in the literature suggesting that high interconnect charges can play a collusive role.
Keywordsnetwork competition; interconnection; bill and keep; two part tariffs; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L41; L96.
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