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dc.contributor.authorGans, Joshua S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKing, Stephen P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-22T10:01:08Z
dc.date.available2014-05-22T10:01:08Z
dc.date.issued2003-04en_US
dc.date.submitted2003-05-23en_US
dc.identifier.citationGans, Joshua S. and King, Stephen P. (2003) Anti-insurance: analysing the health insurance system in Australia.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn073403122Xen_US
dc.identifier.issn1328-4991en_US
dc.identifier.issn1447-5863en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/33739
dc.descriptionISSN 1328-4991 (Print) ISSN 1447-5863 (Online) ISBN 073403122X MIWP No. 10/03en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a model to analyse the Australian health insurance system when individuals differ in their health risk and this risk is private information. The Australian system involves mixed public and private health insurance with private insurance both duplicating and supplementing public insurance. We show that, absent any other interventions, the Australian system implicitly transfers wealth from those most at risk of adverse health to those least at risk. When considered over society as a whole, these transfers represent a mean preserving spread of income, creating social risk and lowering welfare. We refer to these implicit transfers as anti-insurance. Further, we use comparative statics to show that a decline in the take-up of private insurance may lead to a reduction in the welfare of all members of society. Increased take-up of private health insurance may be Pareto improving. We consider the recently introduced rebate on private health insurance and show that this alleviates this welfare reducing anti-insurance. However, its ad valorem nature distorts insurance premiums. We demonstrate that a lump sum rebate could achieve the same reduction in anti-insurance while avoiding additional dead weight losses. Nonetheless, we conclude by suggesting that more significant reform of the Australian system is needed, for example by moving to a system of supplementary private health insurance.en_US
dc.formatapplication/pdfen_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www1.ecom.unimelb.edu.au/iaesrwww/wp/wp2003n10.pdfen_US
dc.subjectAustralian health insurance systemen_US
dc.subjectanti-insuranceen_US
dc.subjectprivate health insuranceen_US
dc.subjectpublic health insuranceen_US
dc.subjectrebateen_US
dc.titleAnti-insurance: analysing the health insurance system in Australiaen_US
dc.typePreprinten_US
melbourne.peerreviewNon Peer Revieweden_US
melbourne.affiliation.departmentEconomics and Commerce: Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Researchen_US
melbourne.source.month04en_US
melbourne.elementsidNA
melbourne.contributor.authorGANS, JOSHUA
melbourne.contributor.authorKing, Stephen
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


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