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dc.contributor.authorBorland, Jeffen_US
dc.contributor.authorWILKINS, ROGERen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-22T10:07:02Z
dc.date.available2014-05-22T10:07:02Z
dc.date.issued2003-09en_US
dc.date.submitted2003-10-20en_US
dc.identifier.citationBorland, Jeff and Wilkins, Roger (2003) Effects of activity test arrangements on exit from payments: the 9-month intensive review.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn0734031386en_US
dc.identifier.issn1328-4991en_US
dc.identifier.issn1447-5863en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/33770
dc.descriptionISSN 1328-4991 (Print) ISSN 1447-5863 (Online) ISBN 0734031386 MIWP no. 25/03en_US
dc.description.abstractSince 1996, recipients of unemployment-related welfare payments in Australia have been subject to a review process when their payment spell duration reaches 9 months. This review process is both a monitoring and counselling device: payment recipients are required to provide details of job search activity, while the payments administrator (Centrelink) provides job search advice and assistance. Using Centrelink administrative data over the period 1995 to 2000, this study examines the effects of these reviews on exit from unemployment-related payments. Limitations of the administrative data – in particular, the absence of information on the review process and the nature and precise timing of the review for each recipient – constrain the choice of empirical method. We therefore use duration analysis methods – specifically, estimation of empirical hazards and hazard models – to indirectly infer the impact of the review. Two alternative empirical approaches are taken. The first compares the hazard rate at the 9-month spell duration with hazard rates at 'nearby' spell durations. The second approach exploits a policy change which occurred in March 1996, when the review timing changed from 12 months to 9 months spell duration. For this approach, we compare the 9-month hazard rate in the post-March 1996 period with the 9-month hazard rate in the pre-March 1996 period. We do not find compelling evidence of a substantial or significant effect of the 9-month review using either of the empirical approaches.en_US
dc.formatapplication/pdfen_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www1.ecom.unimelb.edu.au/iaesrwww/wp/wp2003n25.pdfen_US
dc.subject9-month Intensive Reviewen_US
dc.subjecthazard modelsen_US
dc.subjecthazard rateen_US
dc.subjectunemployment paymentsen_US
dc.subjectCentrelinken_US
dc.subjectexit from paymentsen_US
dc.subjectactivity testsen_US
dc.subjectpayment recipientsen_US
dc.subjectpayment spellsen_US
dc.subjectexit rates from unemployment for payment recipientsen_US
dc.titleEffects of activity test arrangements on exit from payments: the 9-month intensive reviewen_US
dc.typePreprinten_US
melbourne.peerreviewNon Peer Revieweden_US
melbourne.affiliation.departmentEconomics and Commerce: Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Researchen_US
melbourne.source.month09en_US
melbourne.elementsidNA
melbourne.contributor.authorBorland, Jeffrey
melbourne.contributor.authorWilkins, Roger
melbourne.accessrightsOpen Access


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