False alarm? terror alerts and reelection
AuthorHODLER, ROLAND; LOERTSCHER, SIMON; Rohner, Dominic
AffiliationEconomics and Commerce: Department of Economics
CitationsHodler, Roland and Loertscher, Simon and Rohner, Dominic (2007) False alarm? terror alerts and reelection.
Access StatusOpen Access
D72 - Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior C72 - Noncooperative Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
We study a game with asymmetric information to analyze whether an incumbent can improve his reelection prospects using distorted terror alerts. The voters’ preferred candidate depends on the true terror threat level, and the voters are rational and therefore aware of the incumbent’s incentive to distort alerts. In equilibrium, a moderately “Machiavellian” incumbent reports low and high threat levels truthfully, but issues the same distorted alert for a range of intermediate threat levels. He thereby ensures his reelection for some threat levels at which he would not be reelected under full information.
Keywordsterror alerts; voting and elections; signalling; political economics
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