Safety assurance for automated systems in transport: A collective case study of real-world fatal crashes
No Preview Available
Citations
Scopus:
Altmetric:
Altmetric::
Associated Records
Authors
File Licence
Editors
Date
2025-02-01
Source Title
Journal of Safety Research
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
Melbourne Authors
Affiliation
Infrastructure Engineering
Document Type
Journal Article
Subject Code
Citation
Ballingall, S., Sarvi, M. & Sweatman, P. (2025). Safety assurance for automated systems in transport: A collective case study of real-world fatal crashes. Journal of Safety Research, 92, pp.27-39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2024.11.008.
Access Status
Access this item via the Open Access location
Access URL
Open Access URL
Open Access at PMC
Linked Resource URL
NHMRC Grant Code
ARC Grant Code
Description
Abstract
INTRODUCTION: Traditional vehicle safety assurance frameworks are challenged by Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) that enable dynamic driving tasks to be performed without active involvement of a human driver. Further, an ADS's driving functionality can be changed during in-service operation, using software updates developed using Machine Learning (ML). Learnings from real-world cases will be a key input to reforming current regulatory frameworks to assure ADS safety. However, ADSs are yet to be deployed in mass volumes, and limited data are available regarding their in-service safety performance. METHOD: To overcome these limitations, a collective case study was undertaken, drawing upon three relevant real-world cases involving automated control systems that were a causative factor in major transport safety incidents. RESULTS: A range of findings were identified, which informed recommendations for reform. The study found some assurance processes, decisions and oversight were not commensurate with risk or safety integrity levels, including a lack of independence with reviews and approvals for safety-critical system components. Two cases were also impacted by conflict or bias with regulatory approvals. Other commonalities included a lack of safeguards to ensure systems were not operated outside their design domain, and a lack of system redundancy to ensure safe operation if a system component fails. Further, the identification and validation of system responses to scenarios that could be encountered within design domain boundaries was lacking. For the two cases in which safety-critical functionality was developed using ML, it's concerning no regulator reports provided detailed findings regarding the role of ML models, algorithms, or training data.