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dc.contributor.authorBennett, Peter H.
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-24T03:35:25Z
dc.date.available2014-11-24T03:35:25Z
dc.date.issued1989
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11343/42450
dc.descriptionMaster of Education
dc.description.abstractINTRODUCTION - on the intentions of the author and a consideration of significant presuppositions to the argument. CHAPTER ONE - a proposed thesis, being a philosophical analysis of the concept of indoctrination in which four necessary conditions are put up for the application of the concept. An elucidation of the task-achievement distinction and the applicability of this distinction in respect of the concept of indoctrination. An account of the difficulties encountered in analyses of the concept of indoctrination in the task sense and a proposal for an analysis of the concept in the achievement sense. CHAPTER TWO - being an argument in support of the view that the concept of indoctrination (achievement sense) is logically prior to the application of the concept in the task sense. CHAPTER THREE- being an argument in support of the thesis that the concept of indoctrination (achievement sense)is applied in respect of X (a person), when it is true that X believes that p (a proposition or set of propositions). CHAPTER FOUR - being an argument in support of the thesis that in the application of the concept of indoctrination an indoctrinated person (X) will not consider the possibility that not-p; p being a belief or set of beliefs attributable to X's indoctrination. CHAPTER FIVE - an epistemological consideration of the beliefs (p) held by X in virtue of his indoctrination. An argument for a distinction between 'true knowledge claims' and 'justified knowledge claims'. A consideration of John Hardwig's[1] notion of epistemic dependence and the consequences of these reflections for the analysis of the concept of indoctrination. CHAPTER SIX - Being an argument in support of the view that the beliefs X has in virtue of his indoctrination are (a) beliefs of deferred epistemic independence, (b) beliefs held with inadequate evidence and (c) beliefs learned from another person or group of people. CHAPTER SEVEN- A reiteration of the proposed thesis and the consequences of this analysis for the application of the concept of indoctrination in the task sense.
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dc.subjectEducation
dc.subjectInfluence (Psychology)
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleA philosophical analysis of the concept of indoctrination
dc.typeMasters Coursework thesis
melbourne.affiliationUniversity of Melbourne
melbourne.affiliation.departmentMelbourne Graduate School of Education
melbourne.library.holdings.b1669315
melbourne.contributor.authorBennett, Peter H.
melbourne.accessrightsOnly available to University of Melbourne staff and students, login required


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