TY  - GEN
AU  - Basov, S.
Y2  - 2014/05/22
Y1  - 2002/03
SN  - 0734024959
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/11343/33614
AB  - In this paper I propose a model where social skills of a manager signal the workers that their effort is productive. In this model firms with a high productivity of effort hire a socially skilled manager and pay higher wages, and workers hired by these firms exert higher effort. In a broader context, the paper argues the employees are compensated with a higher wage and better working conditions for higher levels of effort.
N1  - application/pdf
LA  - eng
KW  - social skills
KW  - managers
KW  - productivity
KW  - wage differentials
T1  - Why do social skills matter?
L1  - /bitstream/handle/11343/33614/65740_00000013_01_840.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
ER  -