

From national sacrifice to compensation claims: changing Indonesian representations of the Westerling massacres in South Sulawesi (1946-1947)

Katharine McGregor

Contact details

School of Historical and Philosophical Studies

Arts West

Melbourne University

Victoria, 3010

Tel. 03 83443379

k.mcgregor@unimelb.edu.au

Biographical notes

Katharine McGregor is a Senior Lecturer in Southeast Asian History in the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies at the University of Melbourne and an Australian Research Council Future Fellow for the project ‘Confronting historical injustice in Indonesia: memory and transnational human rights activism’ (FT130100957). She has published extensively on Indonesian historiography and memory debates. Her recent publications include ‘Memory studies and human rights in Indonesia’, *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2013, pp. 350–61; ‘Time, memory and historical justice: an introduction’, *Time and Society*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-16 and *The Contours of mass violence in Indonesia 1965-1968* (SEAP Series Singapore University Press, University of Hawaii Press and KITLV, Singapore, 2012) co-edited with Douglas Kammen. Katharine co-founded the Network for Historical Justice and Memory with Professor Klaus Neumann in 2011, and is co-editor with Jemma Purdey of the recently launched monograph series: *Translating accounts of the 1965 mass violence in Indonesia*.

From national sacrifice to compensation claims: changing Indonesian representations of the Westerling massacres in South Sulawesi (1946-1947)

On 8 August 2013, the Dutch government agreed to pay compensation to the families of victims of massacres committed by Dutch troops in South Sulawesi in 1946-1947 and made an open apology for the crimes committed. Ten widows of victims were awarded \$27,000 US dollars each. Drawing upon an entrenched Indonesian myth about the killings the Dutch lawyer representing the case, Liesbeth Zegveld, claimed that there were approximately 40,000 victims in the so-called Westerling massacres.¹ The apology and compensation payment mirrored those of the 2011 Rawagede case, the first successful compensation claim brought by Indonesians against the Dutch government for crimes committed during the independence struggle of 1945-1949.² The Westerling massacres were more well-known than the Rawagede case and unlike Rawagede they were often included in national histories of the struggle. The compensation case has, however, introduced far greater emphasis on the individual suffering and loss experienced by surviving families to satisfy the legal requirements for compensation. Although those who died were represented in earlier histories of the massacres, they were largely represented as lives lost for the collective cause of the nation rather than in terms of the personal loss and suffering of families.

This chapter examines how Indonesians—from the late 1940s until 2013—have remembered or at times forgotten the Westerling massacres. Although a number of scholars have examined the Westerling massacres and/or their importance in the history of South Sulawesi, there has yet to be a detailed study of Indonesian representations of these massacres.³

The first part of this chapter establishes the enduring nationalist framings of the massacres. The sources used include government-authorized commemorative publications from the Ministry of Information and the State Secretariat, textbooks and records of national commemorations of the massacres. Through these sources I establish some of the main themes in state commemoration of the massacres. Because this violence took place in an outer island of Indonesia with a complex

relationship with the central government, memories of the violence have been claimed by a variety of actors over time for a range of purposes. In addition to state-authorized histories, I analyze local efforts in South Sulawesi to remember the massacres through a monument complex and a campaign for a national day of remembrance. From the 1940s to the 1990s although there were instances of locals recounting their horrific experiences, the overwhelming emphasis in commemorative sources was on the lives lost as part of a national contribution to the independence struggle and therefore as national sacrifice.

The second part of the chapter focuses on new framings of individual suffering oriented towards human rights claims, which have not totally replaced nationalist framings. Here I examine representations of the Westerling massacres in press reporting as the compensation case developed and as the Dutch government decided to formally apologize. I argue that the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 opened up new possibilities for more individualized framings of the suffering caused by the Westerling massacres. This was in part due to Indonesia's democratization and a new emphasis on human rights, but also the beginning of a free press. In this period Indonesian journalists became more engaged in the project of narrating cases of past human rights abuses. We began to see the emergence of more testimonies from the widows, or children, of those killed. They provided these testimonies in the context of a developing legal case driven by the Dutch lawyer, Zegveld.

The transition from an emphasis on nationalist to individualized framings mirrors a shift in global memory practices identified by Levy and Sznajder from state-centric histories to collective supra- and sub-national collective memory centering on past injustices and human rights ideals.⁴ The growing emphasis on individual suffering is a product of a global human rights revolution driven by activists from the 1970s onwards. Samuel Moyn describes this revolution as a utopian program focused on the promise of a better life for victims, and a promise to challenge the state where necessary if norms have been violated.⁵ By the 1990s, this movement had been so effective that it led to new international human rights laws, new human rights treaties and the revival of

international criminal adjudication, especially in response to the ethnic cleansing and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.⁶ All these legal instruments focus on establishing violations of individual rights, and for this reason, persons wanting to make legal claims must narrate their individualized suffering.⁷ This process can in turn change public discourse about past violence. Despite the new global emphasis on human rights and on narrating individualized suffering, it took particular historical conditions and ‘memory activists’ such as Zegveld and the (Indonesian-run) Dutch Debt of Honor Committee to push for the Westerling case to be reconceptualized in Indonesia as a human rights violation.⁸

The Westerling massacres

In the mid 1940s, the population in South Sulawesi (then Celebes) encapsulated many contradictions within the Indonesian struggle for independence. Historian Barbara Harvey describes the region as both the site of most intense resistance outside the Republic to the return of Dutch rule and at the same time the most fully developed Dutch-sponsored federal state.⁹ After the war the NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) and Australian troops arrived on 21 September 1945 as a temporary administration. Local nationalists tried to convince the Australians of their support for the Republic versus the Dutch. Indonesian youths led attacks on police barracks and wore red and white colors to symbolize support for the Republic. The Dutch and Australians used these incidents to justify continued NICA control.¹⁰ By mid October there were 400-500 KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) soldiers in the capital of Makassar, most of whom were Ambonese. At the same time locals formed an increasing number of nationalist militias.

On 28-29 October 1945, pemuda (youths) led an attack on the Dutch police and government buildings, captured two radio stations and placed a Republican flag in front of the government office building.¹¹ In the context of demonstrated support, General Sudirman, the Commander of the Indonesian Republican Army, authorized a division of the army for Sulawesi. Andi Mattalatta, Mohammad Saleh La Hade and Kahar Muzakkar trained in Java and sent 1,000 expeditionary

troops to Sulawesi to join local troops. Resistance was strongest where local rulers supported the Republic and worked with the youths in areas such as Suppa (near Pare Pare), Luwu and Polongbangkeng (south of Makassar). LAPRIS (*Lasykar Pemberontak Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi*, Fighting Militia of Indonesian People of Sulawesi) was the most effective guerilla unit.

In February 1946 at the Linggajati conference the Dutch proposed a federal United States of Indonesia in a commonwealth relationship to the Netherlands. The state of Eastern Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timur*, NIT) was to be the first state within this structure along with the state of Borneo and the Republic of Indonesia. The Republicans accepted this agreement in return for Dutch recognition of the Republic's de facto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra.¹² In Sulawesi locals questioned whether they should participate in the NIT government because the Republic had agreed to this, or whether this agreement meant that the Republic was abandoning them.¹³

In April 1946 the Dutch arrested and jailed the Republican Governor Dr Sam Ratulangie, his staff and most of the local leaders who supported the Republic. In July they sponsored a conference in Malino, South Sulawesi to further develop the concept of the new state. On 24 December at the Denpasar conference, the Dutch proclaimed the foundation of the state of Eastern Indonesia. Some pro-Republican collaborators, however, used the NIT cabinet to influence politics as an alternative to accepting the NICA government.¹⁴ Because the Dutch wanted this state to succeed as a model for future pro-Dutch states, the government in Batavia authorized a 'pacification' campaign to quell opposition to NIT. The campaign began in December 1946 and lasted till February 1947. The Dutch government sent Captain Raymond Westerling of the Special Forces (*Depot Speciale Troepen*, DST), a counter-terrorism unit, to South Sulawesi and declared Makassar to be in a state of 'war and siege' so that military powers would be enhanced.¹⁵ To co-opt locals the Dutch made the council of local leaders issue a statement requesting the 'elimination of the extremist groups that were disturbing law and order'.¹⁶ In his 1952 memoirs Westerling repeatedly describes those he targeted as bandits, terrorists, 'destroyers of order'.¹⁷ He represents himself as heroically attempting to save the people of South Sulawesi.

Based on military and civilian archives of the East Indies, interviews in the Netherlands with former military men who served in the DST and reports filed by Westerling, Willem IJzereef provides one of the most thorough analyses of the methods used by Westerling and his troops. IJzereef reports that the campaigns in the East and South of Makassar including Pare Pare, Bonthian and Mandar districts involved thorough searches, rounding up and purging people from these villages, shooting on sight anyone with a weapon and burning down houses where weapons were found.¹⁸ During this process there were numerous summary executions. Bystanders were shot when attempting to flee or if they resisted. De Moor notes that gradually, the method started to include 'exemplary' executions, for example, by shooting common criminals dragged from prisons to the village square.¹⁹ IJzereef reproduces a 1947 account of a Javanese man from the village of Djongaya, which was published in the Dutch newspaper, *Vrij Nederland* on 5 July 1947. This account claims people were called upon to identify the pro-Republican guerillas among them. Westerling tortured and shot at point blank range those identified. Their bodies were then discarded in a pit.²⁰ IJzereef's work, however, includes no interviews with the people of South Sulawesi.

During his fieldwork in South Sulawesi in 1949, when it was still under Dutch control, the American scholar Raymond Kennedy visited many areas where massacres had taken place including Pare Pare, Pinrang and Makassar. In his detailed field notes he reported that there was a lot of fear about discussing politics, especially Republican politics. The most frank disclosure about the violence that he recorded in his notes was made to him by a local official who stated there had been 'a great deal of political trouble here involving extremists, and many were killed'.²¹ Based on interviews with locals in the 1970s, Harvey concludes that 'the cruelty and suffering endured during those months constituted, for most of the people of South Sulawesi, their personal experiences of the revolution'.²² It is hard to underestimate the trauma of this brutal campaign.

Almost immediately there were debates about the number of people killed by Westerling and his troops, and by other commandos who used his methods throughout the region. In December 1947, a representative of the Indonesian Republic reported to the United Nations that there were

20,000-40,000 deaths, whereas the 1948 Dutch Enthoven report suggested the death toll as being 3,114 deaths.²³ IJzereef estimates that there were approximately 6,500 deaths, including insurgents and civilians.²⁴ Republicans quickly adopted the upper estimate of 40,000 deaths. There were early protests over this incident. Prominent women of South Sulawesi petitioned the Dutch about the severity of the tactics leading again to claims the women were ‘terrorists and bandits’.²⁵ According to Remy Limpach (this volume) a 1949 investigation by the Dutch civil jurists Van Rij and Stam concluded that ‘the applicable legal principles among civilized states’ had been completely violated in this case, the Round Table agreement of 1949 included a provision that there would be no claims for damages related to the struggle for either side (see Remco Raben this volume). This created lasting ambiguity around possible legal prosecutions or compensation claims relating to these killings.

Remembering and commemorating the Westerling massacres 1947 to 1962

In Indonesia the killings became iconic and Westerling became the personification of Dutch malice. At the time of the struggle Indonesians emphasized Dutch terror and Indonesian suffering for the purposes of their political cause. On 11 December 1947, in the Republican capital of Yogyakarta people from Sulawesi commemorated a year since the massacres. Indonesian high officials attended the commemoration and Lieutenant Colonel Kahar Muzakkar, head of Brigade XVI, recounted the cruelty of the Westerling operation.²⁶ Muzakkar critiqued the government for not paying enough attention to this incident asking: ‘Is the government of the Republic of Indonesia only struggling for the defacto areas of Sumatra and Java and Madura after the Linggajati agreement? Does it not want to know anymore what happens in other areas of Indonesia?’²⁷ President Sukarno responded solemnly stating ‘they died so we could live’, but it seems that the massacres were only raised by the Republic at the UN in December 1947.

In 1949 the Republic’s Ministry of Information published a commemorative album entitled *Portraits of the revolution of the Indonesian people*.²⁸ This album features a now famous poster

with the title '11 December 1946 40,000 victims in Sulawesi' (Figure 1).²⁹ The poster depicts Indonesians standing in continuous rows fading into the background to evoke the 40,000 dead. Seven soldiers in Dutch commando uniforms point their rifles at the Indonesians. One soldier, presumably Westerling, appears to be interrogating an Indonesian in the front of the crowd. In the background are Dutch military jeeps.³⁰ The caption reads 'Blood Flowed, Spirits Drifted Away, It Was a Cruel Never Ending, Cleansing'. The poster appears frequently in subsequent accounts. The accompanying caption notes that before the Dutch established the state of Eastern Indonesia Captain Westerling oversaw a slaughter in which 'sinless people were killed'.³¹ This album, published at the conclusion of the struggle, includes images of Dutch destruction and Indonesian suffering during the military aggressions, such as burnt houses and a young woman shot by Dutch troops.³² Cartoon caricatures of the Malino and Denpasar conferences to found the state of Eastern Indonesia, and captioned photographs of street rallies opposing the removal of pro Republican Governor Ratulangie, characterize the people of South Sulawesi as strongly pro-Republican with only a few Dutch 'puppets', such as the President and Foreign Minister of the State of Eastern Indonesia (respectively Nadjamudin Daeng Malewa and Sukawati), both of whom are mocked. In a clever pun on the acronym NIT, these 'puppets' are described as participating in the 'Follow your Master State' (Negara Ikut Tuan).³³ Carol Gluck suggests that nationalist narratives are typically simplistic and framed in terms of 'heroic narratives'.³⁴ Here, nationalist representations of the massacres serve to highlight the heroic narrative of the people of South Sulawesi supporting the Republic and to dismiss local support for the state of Eastern Indonesia.

Insert Figure 1

From 1950, there were signs of dissatisfaction in South Sulawesi with the Republican government and its move to embrace a unitary state. After returning from Java Kahar Muzakkar clashed with the military commander of Eastern Indonesia, Colonel Kawilarang over the proposed demobilization of local troops and plans to exclude most of them from the national army.³⁵ Muzakkar retreated with his troops to the interior areas of South Sulawesi, beginning a long revolt.

In 1952, the movement joined the larger House of Islam (*Darul Islam*) movement that was strongest in West Java, but it was largely driven by regionalist sentiments.³⁶

Against this background the central government made concerted efforts to recognize the contributions of people from this region to the struggle. In 1950, for example, on his tour to South Sulawesi just before the transition from a federal to unitary state Sukarno visited the graves of Walter Monginsidi, a LAPRIS leader who was executed by the Dutch in 1949, and earlier hero Sultan Hassanudin whom the Dutch trading company, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), defeated in 1669.³⁷ In the context of the dispute between local soldiers and the central government Esther Velthoen notes ‘[t]he central memory of the revolution, that of the 40,000 souls or victims was cherished and claimed by both sides’.³⁸ A battalion called the 40,000 Battalion, for example, fought under Muzakkar’s comrade, Bahar Mattalioe, until 1959.³⁹ As early as 1950, there were also petitions by locals to have the 40,000 souls recognized as national heroes.⁴⁰ This was part of an on-going struggle for greater recognition of the South Sulawesi massacres as a contribution to the national struggle.

In 1953, four years after the transfer of sovereignty the Ministry of Information published a series of volumes on the recent history, economy and governance of every Indonesian province.⁴¹ These volumes, sponsored by a key government ministry, can be taken as early representations of the history of the nation. The authors of the South Sulawesi volume explain that because the interior areas especially in the south were still in state of turmoil they could not gather complete information.⁴² The volume charts continuing resistance to the Dutch from pro-Republican groups such as LAPRIS listing the names of all commanders who died and detailing the heroic October 1945 attack on Makassar.⁴³

In a section entitled ‘the Westerling Purges’ the authors explain that not only *pejuang* (independence fighters), but also citizens were targeted and ‘South Sulawesi flowed with blood’.⁴⁴ All the areas targeted in Westerling’s campaign are listed: Kalukuang, Djongaja, Mariso, Pabaeng-Baeng and other areas of Makassar, Bonthain, Bulukumba, Bone, Soppeng, Wadjo, Luwu, Pare-

Pare Mandar. The text explains that these areas ‘were sprawled with corpses killed by the spikes of bayonets of Westerling and his followers. Their belongings, their houses, farm animals and other belongings were destroyed by fire and the destruction of Westerling and his troops’.⁴⁵ This emotive description evokes the horror of the campaign and recognizes the loss of civilian lives. The authors provide one account drawn from the writing of the survivor Mohammad Sjaraf on a campaign in Kalukuang, located on the outskirts of Makassar who describes Dutch soldiers coming to the *kampung* (village) early in the morning and forcing locals to gather in a location outside the city. He describes tens of people from the *kampung*s gathered together facing Dutch soldiers who readied their weapons. He alleges Westerling shot a friend of Ali Malaka in the calf and then again until he fell down and then ‘other soldiers came and gouged out his stomach with their bayonets and lifted it up. Only after this were they satisfied and did they stand back in their places’.⁴⁶ It is difficult to verify this account, but it is consistent with the type of barbarity alluded to in the Van Rij and Stam report.

Four pages of pictures provide further representations of the campaign. The first is the poster featured in the 1949 volume.⁴⁷ The second is a photograph of small headstones on a hillside with the caption reading ‘The graves of 40,000 victims are located in the villages of Kalukuang’.⁴⁸ The third and fourth pictures relate to Andi Makkasau, a *datu* (local leader) in Suppa who was head of the Centre for People’s Security (*Pusat Keamanan Rakyat*, PKR) in Pare-Pare and executed in January 1947.⁴⁹ The last image features a photograph of Andi’s grave in a ‘Garden of Happiness’ (*Taman Bahagia*) in Pare-Pare.⁵⁰ It became common practice to bury Indonesians killed during the independence struggle in burial grounds sometimes called Gardens of Happiness or Gardens of Martyrs.⁵¹ This photograph features his family surrounding the grave looking at the camera. Together, these images connect the mass deaths with an example of an individual martyr, but at the same time this account indirectly acknowledges personal suffering through the gravesites.

The section on the Westerling purges ends with the line ‘South Sulawesi gave 40,000 victims for the cruelty of Westerling as a loyal devotion to defending the Republic of Indonesia that

was proclaimed on 17 August 1945'.⁵² Here the lesson to be drawn by Indonesian readers is that the people of South Sulawesi are loyal to the Republic. In the context of the rebellion underway there is also a sense of trying to counter the perception that national leaders did not value the contribution of the people of South Sulawesi to the struggle, and that the soldiers from this region in particular had been discarded after 1949.⁵³ What cannot be mentioned in this text is the internal fractures that the Westerling campaign set in motion, including revenge not only against those who pointed out others for execution, but also against the local leaders who sanctioned the pacification campaign and officials who had participated in the NIT government.⁵⁴

In 1957 President Sukarno began the tradition of formally venerating national heroes and establishing national commemorative days. 10 November, for example, began to be observed as Heroes' Day to commemorate the 1945 Battle of Surabaya against British troops in that city.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, Kahar Muzakkar continued to battle the national army. One of Muzakkar's key critiques of the Sukarno regime was on-going Javanese dominance over the central government.⁵⁶ In this context, the Republic continued to emphasize the participation of the people of South Sulawesi in the national independence struggle. Another reason, however, for a new emphasis on the Westerling campaign, was the struggle for the handover of Western New Guinea by the Netherlands to Indonesia and associated rising hostility towards the Dutch.⁵⁷ After years of no progress despite having taken this case to the UN, the government nationalized all Dutch assets in Indonesia and expelled Dutch citizens. In 1961 when the Dutch tried to prepare the territory for self-rule President Sukarno formed the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian (Trikorra) and began small-scale military incursions into the region.

In the same year the government initiated national commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of the massacres at the Youth Building in Jakarta on 11 December 1961.⁵⁸ In his speech, entitled 'Remember the Westerling victims nationally', President Sukarno stated:

Today we all remember the deaths of 40,000 people of South Sulawesi as victims of the inhumanity of the Dutch colonial army under the command of Westerling. The inhumanity of the right hand of imperialism is part of the ruthless imperialism to uphold colonialism on Indonesian soil. The deaths of 40,000 souls in this one episode prove that the people of Indonesia paid for Indonesian independence.⁵⁹

Sukarno used representations of the Westerling massacres to motivate Indonesians to support the Trikora campaign and end Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. In his speech Sudibyo, the Secretary General of the Indonesian Front, an organization created in 1959 for the purposes of furthering the Indonesian revolution, makes a more explicit connection between the state of Eastern Indonesia and the West New Guinea case noting 'it is as if history is repeating itself'.⁶⁰ Mocking the Dutch promise of self-determination for Western New Guinea Sudibyo claims 'this new song is also colonial politics and is underpinned by the desire to exploit the people and undermine the rest of Indonesia'. He warns Indonesians are now readying themselves to carry out Trikora in the hope that Western New Guinea will be quickly 'returned' to Indonesia.⁶¹

The booklet resulting from this commemoration contains a brief account of the Westerling killings.⁶² It describes local resistance and details his campaigns in Limbung, Bulukumba, Kalukuang, Djongaja, Suppa and Mandar as well as incidents closer to Makassar. According to the report not one person would name the members of the Republican army when asked. Again no fractures within the nation are revealed. The report explicitly describes Westerling burning down houses, torturing people and animals. There are accounts of people being forced to dig holes, being shot and falling in to them. In the second national commemoration, the victims of the Westerling massacres are thus used to emphasize national unity in light of the on-going rebellion and to motivate Indonesians to support the campaign for Western New Guinea. In October 1962 the Dutch handed Western New Guinea over to UN supervision for a year. The territory was then transferred to Indonesia in May 1963.

Remembering the Westerling campaign in New Order Indonesia 1972-1995

The rebellion in South Sulawesi ended in 1965 when the Indonesian military killed Kahar Muzakkar. The year 1965 was also the beginning of a significant transformation in Indonesian politics commencing with the September 30th Movement, which kidnapped and killed members of the senior army leadership. The army quickly crushed the movement and blamed it on the Communist Party. Between 1965 and 1968 the army and anti-communist vigilantes killed approximately half a million Indonesians on the political left and slowly removed Sukarno from office.⁶³ The regime of his successor Suharto encompassed a complete reorientation of the Indonesian economy away from economic self-sufficiency towards open markets and the return of foreign investment. Ideologically, the regime was anti-communist and became a firm Cold War ally of the United States and most of the Western world. This included a mending of relations with the Netherlands. The military expanded its role to politics with the new 1966 doctrine of *dwifungsi* (the dual function) and took an increasing interest in producing new national histories that would serve to legitimize their political role. In 1972, for example, the army sponsored a seminar on how the so-called 1945 values (meaning at this time the values of the military men who participated in the independence struggle) could be transferred to the youth by means of new monuments, museums and publications on Indonesian heroes.⁶⁴

A year before this national initiative, the Mayor of Makassar Daeng Patompo, proposed the idea for a Monument to 40,000 Souls of South Sulawesi (Figure 2).⁶⁵ Interestingly this proposal was made in the same year the central government decided to rename the capital as Ujung Pandang when its boundaries were significantly extended.⁶⁶ This was not a popular move as the name Makassar is connected with the former kingdom of Gowa and thus had more historical resonance. In this context, it is likely that the monument was a local reassertion of the importance of this province.

Insert Figure 2

The monument, which was built at the location of one of the massacres, is an important site of memory for survivors and veterans, as well as an assertion by the city government of the local contribution to the national independence struggle. The dedication on the monument, located at the edge of Kalukuang district in the north of Makassar reads: ‘At this place on 11 December 1946 a number of *pejuang* and people died because they sacrificed their souls for Indonesian independence and for that purpose this monument was built so that their sacrifice will inspire the coming generations of the history of the nation and state of the Republic of Indonesia’.⁶⁷ The monument was built as a permanent reminder to locals of these events. Thereafter, locals commemorated 11 December with a small ceremony at the site.

The monument incorporates references to local history and culture as well as the national struggle for independence (Figure 3). The major ethnic groups in South Sulawesi are the Muslim Buginese and Makassarese. The base takes the form of a large bier, a framework comprised of bamboo or wooden laths, which is used to carry corpses wrapped in cloth to the grave in Islamic burial traditions. Six statues of men in military uniform are shown holding the weight of the bier, as if they are part of the funeral procession. In the monument guidebook the martyrs are described as *syuhada*, an Islamic word designating that they died fighting for their beliefs.⁶⁸ In the middle of the monument is a flagpole flying the Indonesian flag. The message is that these 40,000 lives were an integral part of the nation’s struggle for independence.

Insert Figure 3

The relief on the outside wall of the bier connects the Westerling killings with the longer history of resistance to the Dutch in Sulawesi. It depicts a crowing rooster symbolizing the Dutch nickname for the King of Gowa, Sultan Hasanuddin: ‘the rooster from the East’. It features traditional sailing boats evoking the region’s great maritime history and the waves, which according to the monument guidebook, symbolize the connection between freedom fighters from Java and South Sulawesi. The other side of the relief depicts nine corpses lying around with one clutching a rifle and local militias and the people in the background.⁶⁹ There are statues to those who were

disabled in the attacks including men with amputated legs. The monument was funded by the regional parliament at a cost of over 9 million rupiah.⁷⁰ In the 1970s, further monuments to the 40,000 souls were built at Galung Lombok, a village in Polewali regency (formerly Mandar) at the site of a February 1947 massacre,⁷¹ and at Pare-Pare and Bacukiki.⁷² These monuments reflect a regional aspiration for recognition from the central government especially after the end of *Darul Islam* rebellion.

In 1975 the Department of Education and Culture released a national history textbook edited by historians Sartono Kartodirdjo, Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and the military historian Nugroho Notosusanto. The sixth volume of this textbook encompasses the Japanese Occupation onwards, with approximately thirty pages covering the independence struggle. The only reference to the State of Eastern Indonesia is indirect, with a passing mention of the Malino conference as an example of Dutch attempts to create their own states to balance out the Republic of Indonesia.⁷³ The Westerling massacres are not mentioned and there is little recognition of human suffering throughout the struggle. Following the regime's emphasis on the Indonesian military as the central historical force in modern Indonesian history the volume, however, provides considerable coverage of both the Andi Aziz rebellion against the National Army and Kahar Muzakkar's rebellion against the central government and the successful military repressions of these revolts. In both these accounts South Sulawesi is thus positioned as a troublesome province.⁷⁴

The massacres were not, however, consistently ignored in state-sponsored histories during the New Order period. In the same year as this textbook the State Secretariat published a three-volume commemorative album for thirty years of independence in 1975. In one volume, devoted to the independence struggle, the authors note that from their arrival in December 1946 Westerling's troops 'killed with rage thousands of people' in order to 'cleanse South Sulawesi of pro-independence fighters from the Republic and crush the opposition to the formation of the state of Eastern Indonesia'.⁷⁵ Consistent with the New Order's reverence for martial culture the album emphasizes armed resistance and male *pejuang* such as A Rivai Paersi and Wolter Monginsidi from

LAPRIS.⁷⁶ Two poor quality photos are presented featuring villagers lined in rows and one showing Dutch troops questioning locals. The shared caption reads ‘The people of South Sulawesi gathered by Westerling to be brutally killed’.⁷⁷ A third photo of such poor quality it is blurred appears to show executions in process. It is captioned: ‘Dutch troops under Westerling carrying out executions in South Sulawesi on December 11 1946’.⁷⁸ Interestingly there are no details about Westerling’s methods, including the terrifying round-up of those accused, forcing others to point out suspects, the use of torture, execution and the burning down of houses, all by now common practices of the Indonesian military in the 1965-68 massacres. The authors chose not to narrate the details of Westerling’s campaigns, possibly because of the direct parallels with the Indonesian military’s methods. Thus no attention is given to the loss and suffering of the local community. Furthermore the language is less emotive than official accounts in the pre-1965 period, due to the emphasis on martial values.

Local governments and national government departments were of course not the only commentators on this history. Both in Sulawesi and in the diaspora community in Java people connected to this history continued to commemorate the massacres and to demand increased national recognition. In 1976, South Sulawesi elders Manai Sophian and Haji M Saad, together with twenty-four others, founded the social organization KKSS (Harmony of the Families of South Sulawesi) to preserve the cultural values of the people of South Sulawesi and promote development of this area.⁷⁹ They commenced an annual commemoration of the Westerling massacres at the Kalibata National Heroes’ Cemetery in Jakarta. They invited victims and members of their families to attend and visited the graves of those from South Sulawesi who ‘died to defend the Republic’.⁸⁰ The staging of this ceremony at Kalibata is highly symbolic, given that the cemetery was made the national heroes’ cemetery in the same year and had recently been enlarged with the addition of a monument to an unknown military hero of the Battle of Surabaya of 10 November 1945.⁸¹ According to Klaus Schreiner, during the New Order Kalibata was ‘one of the most important ritual

sites for Indonesian hero worship'.⁸² The society has continued annual commemoration of 11 December at Kalibata.

Veterans of the struggle for the Republic in South Sulawesi also lobbied for greater recognition in the 'heroic narrative' of the independence struggle by calling on the government to make 11 December a national commemorative day. Mohammad Saleh La Hade, who, as noted above, was one of the founders of the South Sulawesi division of the Indonesian army spoke about the massacres in a seminar held on 8-11 December in 1982 to commemorate the victims. In a strong critique of Dutch actions, he notes that they shot people on the spot without due process, in contravention of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit attacks on civilians or persons not wearing military uniform. In contrast to official accounts, La Hade considers the legal conventions broken in this case and what measures it might be possible to take to achieve justice, although he does not push for the case to be pursued. Instead La Hade states: 'It was a cruel mass killing of the people who had carried out resistance and the defence of their most fundamental right, the right to live as a nation and state'.⁸³ This is a curious prioritization of the right to be a nation even above the right to life.

He ends his address to the conference with an appeal on behalf of the people of South Sulawesi for 11 December to be considered a national day of mourning. He claims this day 'should be valued just as much as Heroes' Day on 10 November or Sacred Pancasila Day, 1 October'.⁸⁴ The reference to Heroes' Day suggests resentment that this battle, which took place in Java, receives so much attention. Sacred Pancasila Day commemorates the military's alleged salvation of the national philosophy Pancasila in 1965 with the repression of the 30 September Movement and was the most important day in the New Order calendar.⁸⁵ Here a claim for regional recognition thus underpins this account from a veteran.

On the fiftieth anniversary of Indonesian independence the government published a large two-part commemorative album authorized by Harmoko, the Minister of Information. This tome contains only a small photograph of the 1947 commemoration in Yogyakarta of the 40,000 victims

of the Westerling Affair.⁸⁶ A four-page spread entitled ‘for the sake of the nation and motherland’ covers the funerals of select heroes from around Indonesia, including Wolter Monginsidi.⁸⁷ Again the emphasis in this state-authorized history is on a heroic narrative of national sacrifice and military values.

In 1998, following student protests amidst the Asian financial crisis, the spiraling costs of basic necessities and horrific riots in Jakarta and Solo, President Suharto resigned, thus ushering in a new era of reform. Following years of military impunity for kidnappings, torture and executions in multiple cases the new governments made a commitment to human rights. Firstly, in 2000 the government revised the Indonesian constitution to include provisions from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and passed Law No. 26 which allowed for the formation of Ad Hoc Human Rights Courts to deal retrospectively with gross violations of human rights, including genocide and crimes against humanity. Despite many obstacles to the implementation of these provisions and the prosecution of cases, including the continuing influence of the military (despite its formal withdrawal to the barracks) and a lack of political will from politicians, these new measures have, at the very least, allowed survivors of violence greater autonomy to pursue cases of historical injustice. Furthermore the democratization of the media, including the disbandment of the Ministry of Information, which previously controlled press licences, has allowed more independent reporting on cases of human rights abuses.⁸⁸ Almost immediately after the fall of Suharto, victims of many cases of violence, including the 1965 case, the Tanjung Priok case of 1984 and the student kidnappings of 1998, began to form advocacy groups and worked together with human rights organizations to demand legal redress.

The Westerling case gains momentum 2002-2013

As Stef Scagliola notes in this volume, Indonesian activists Batara Hutagalung and Jeffry Pondaag, together with the Dutch lawyer Zegveld, were the driving force behind the claims against the Dutch government for the Rawagede and Westerling cases. Preceding the founding of the Dutch Debt of

Honour Committee (*Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda*) in 2007, an organization called the National Committee for the Defence of the Dignity of the Indonesian Nation (*Komite Nasional Pembela Martabat Bangsa Indonesia*) created in 2002, performed similar advocacy work.⁸⁹ Both organizations held seminars in different regions of Indonesia annually to address the so-called ‘problems with the Dutch’. They staged demonstrations at the Dutch embassy in Jakarta and delivered petitions to the Dutch government. The stimulus for the first petition was the 2005 speech of the Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot at the sixtieth anniversary of Indonesian independence.⁹⁰ Hutagalung explains that many people mistakenly believed Bot acknowledged *de jure* independence on 17 August 1945, whereas he had only stated his ‘political and moral acceptance’ of the proclamation date. On this basis, both organizations have petitioned the Dutch government to acknowledge the independence date and to apologize for crimes committed during colonization and the 1945-1949 struggle.⁹¹ Underpinning both organizations is a strong nationalist sentiment combined with the goal ‘to struggle for the rights of Indonesian civilian victims of Dutch crimes in the colonial period especially 1945-1950’.⁹²

This new emphasis on the rights of victims is part of a broader shift in Indonesia towards claims for recognition of past violations of human rights. At the same time, it is part of a much more global process of the demand by formerly colonized and continually marginalized peoples for redress for colonial violence including, for example, the campaigns of the Herero minority in former German South West-Africa (now Namibia) for redress for the Herero genocide of 1904, which resulted in a formal German apology in 2004.⁹³ Smith and Schaffer argue that ‘ongoing processes or decolonization have led people released from their colonized status to struggle with the communal and psychic legacies of colonization’.⁹⁴ The Dutch Debt of Honour Committee seems to be a manifestation of this process.

Alongside this new emphasis on Dutch crimes during the independence struggle by the Dutch Debt of Honour Committee, official framings of Dutch violence during the independence struggle remained largely unchanged. In volume six of the 2008 revised version of the National

History of Indonesia textbook series the section on the independence struggle was significantly expanded. Compared to the 1975 edition this version provides greater regional coverage of the struggle throughout Indonesia. The textbook, however, provides no coverage of the Westerling massacres or indeed of other cases of Dutch violence during the independence struggle with the exception of a discussion of the two Dutch military campaigns against the Republic. New accounts of other human rights abuses have, however, been added such as the case of the Indonesian ‘comfort women’ during the Japanese Occupation.⁹⁵ Furthermore a new section dealing with military directed violence throughout the New Order and with the National Commission of Human Rights has been added. This new section is indicative of greater state openness about Indonesian human rights crimes, although its coverage of particular cases remains contentious.

As historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes, textbooks are, however, of increasingly less relevance today as ‘more than ever we learn about the past from a multiplicity of media’.⁹⁶ In Indonesia particularly, the liberalized media reporting on historical events gained increasing attention over textbooks, due to the well-founded perception that textbooks remained too influenced by New Order thinking. The stories of ‘victims’ in history also gained increased prominence as a way of countering long-established official histories.⁹⁷ In one of the first major studies of human rights and memory, Levy and Sznajder argue that the increasing emphasis on historical memories of human rights violations constitutes a new form of cosmopolitanism, a shared global practice.⁹⁸ They argue that, when groups remember past grievances, they are ‘now frequently set in relation and with reference to the legitimating purchase of cosmopolitan values and attendant ideals of human rights’.⁹⁹ The new framings of the Westerling case were influenced by both increased global and local emphases on human rights but also the pressure exerted by particular memory activists in the lead-up to the compensation claim.

More extensive media coverage of the Westerling massacres and the experiences of surviving family members began in 2011 following the settlement of the Rawagede case. In September 2011, for example, *Tempo* magazine featured the story of Andi Mondji whose father

(Andi Monjong), grandmother (Andi Wenda Daeng Pagoli) and uncle (Andi Saleng) were killed in front of him by Dutch troops.¹⁰⁰ This is a highly emotional account and reflects the perspective of loss for those more directly linked to the victims. The journalist Suardi Gattang notes that Mondji ‘looked sad when he was asked to tell about the event that touched his heart sixty-five years ago. He watched the people closest to him become victims of cruelty of Dutch troops, the Depot Speciale Troepen, under Raymond Westerling’.¹⁰¹ Mondji recounts how the corpses were collected and brought to a pre-prepared pit. Then the people carrying the corpses were also shot and left in the pit. The cruelty began with the burning down of houses along coastal areas in Sabbang Paru. People were accused of hiding the guerillas and forced to give away the locations of the hideouts.

In May 2012, BBC Indonesia and several other news outlets covered the joint efforts of representatives of the victims’ families and Dutch Debt of Honour Committee to demand compensation and an apology from the Dutch government for the crimes committed by Westerling and his troops. The Dutch lawyer, Liesbeth Zegveld, revealed that she drew upon the findings of a 1954 Dutch commission that found the Dutch government had ‘used illegal means and executions’ as a basis for this case.¹⁰² Some of the villagers represented by Zegveld were from the village of Galung Lombok where Dutch troops had burnt down their houses and executed 364 people. The article briefly reported the story of one of Zegveld’s clients, Asia Sitti, who was twelve years old when her father, a village elder, was shot in front of her. In the village of Bulukumba, Zegveld suspected 250 men were executed in January 1947. In her case to the Dutch government Zegveld emphasized ‘people were shot from behind so that they fell straight into the hole’ and that ‘[t]he majority of the victims were farmers or fishermen’.¹⁰³

Zegveld has played a crucial part in the way the Rawagede and Westerling cases have been framed. She is a professor in law at the University of Leiden, focusing on international humanitarian law, in particular the rights of women and children and the rights of war victims. In 2011, together with other international humanitarian law experts, she established the Nuhanovic Foundation, an organization dedicated to ‘assist war victims who seek access to justice to obtain a

remedy in the form of reparation, restitution or compensation'.¹⁰⁴ The Foundation funds investigations and legal representation. Zegveld worked closely with the Dutch Debt of Honor Committee on the Westerling case to collect testimonies that satisfy the legal requirements for compensation.

Once the case was underway, media reporting intensified. In July 2012 the history magazine *Historia* ran a lengthy special feature on Westerling's service in the Dutch army and his victims. This magazine features testimonies from survivors of the violence. Sitti, a political prisoner, was made to witness her father and others being shot on Westerling's orders in the jungle.¹⁰⁵ She testified that when she was returned to prison a Dutch officer and two of his friends raped her. This is the only account I have read of sexualized violence during this campaign. As in all cases of testimony it is difficult to verify this account many years later, but sexualized violence has only recently been discussed in public in Indonesia, as evidenced by the recent inclusion of the 'comfort women' in textbooks.

Historia profiles the stories of many surviving family members who witnessed the massacres.¹⁰⁶ On 28 January 1947, the residents of Suppa were rounded up and heard the sound of a pistol. Sikati, who was twenty-five at the time, recalls troops yelling for everyone to come outside. At the same time at other locations the same thing was happening. She recalls that people were gathered together on a field. The men were inspected and shot in the head with a pistol by a Dutch soldier. From morning till dusk 208 men were killed without opposition on the Suppa field. Their wives and children witnessed this. The article goes on to recount stories of children and wives who saw their fathers and husbands for the last time that day and features photographs of the surviving families (Figures 4 and 5). Reflecting a new empathy for victims of human rights abuses the journalists note that the suffering continued far beyond the killings in the form of on-going fear of Dutch military jeeps and a reluctance to talk about this period.

Insert Figures 4 and 5

In August 2012, Batara Hutagalung announced that the Dutch Debt of Honor Committee would hold a congress in February 2013 for the people of Polewali Mandar, who intended to bring the Westerling case to the International Criminal Court.¹⁰⁷ He stated they would hold a walking pilgrimage for more than 1,000 participants and requested the Dutch ambassador and Dutch media attend. When February arrived Sabriah Hasan, the Coordinator of the Committee in Sulawesi revealed the Committee had been gathering data from widows and families of the victims as the basis for a legal claim.¹⁰⁸

Upon the announcement from the Dutch foreign minister on 26 April 2013 that he personally favoured apologizing to victims and paying compensation, Sabriah commented to a local newspaper in Makassar that based on data collected since 2010 she and her team had found seventeen widows who were still alive and hundreds of children whose father's were victims of the shootings.¹⁰⁹ She believed that the intended compensation of 20,000 Euros per claimant was insufficient and she questioned why only ten widows were designated to receive the compensation.

In a statement released on 8 August 2013 the government of the Netherlands apologized openly for the cruelty of its army in the Westerling case and agreed to compensation. Lawyer Zegveld stated that 'although they were happy with the outcome this was only a small step in a large process: the government of the Netherlands must apologize for all cases of killings and execution in Indonesia'.¹¹⁰ Jeffry Pondaag similarly noted 'the most important thing for victims is not the compensation, but the open apology'.¹¹¹ The rise of the politics of regret, including the expression of apologies since the 1990s is, according to Olick, tied to the decline of the nation state. He notes 'a general willingness to acknowledge collective historical misdeeds has disseminated throughout the world, leading to more and more frequent official and unofficial apologies to both internal and external victims'.¹¹² This apology was made by the Dutch state to individuals. This reflects the new way in which a state's legitimacy is in part determined by its 'adherence to a set of nation-transcending human rights ideals' and the related encroachment on sovereignty in this

process'.¹¹³ State leaders increasingly feel compelled to act due to increased global surveillance of their human rights records.

Indonesian citizens and government representatives responded enthusiastically to news of the forthcoming apology. Journalist Nadya Isnaeni stated that 'although decades have past, the bitter memories are still clear in the hearts of the victims left behind, especially the wives who became widows'.¹¹⁴ In a post to a citizen's media site a history and sociology teacher from Bandung, Muhammad Nurdin, praised the Dutch for the second apology to Indonesians.¹¹⁵ He then asked: 'What will the attitude of Indonesia be to this acknowledgement? Will Indonesia do the same thing for the cases of human rights abuses in Papua, East Timor, Aceh, Lampung, Jakarta, West Java and many other cases including those around the 30 September event?' He noted that human rights abuses in the regions of Indonesia have until now still not been seriously handled and the perpetrators still roam free. He concluded: 'If the Dutch as a foreign country acknowledge their cruelty and officially apologize and pay compensation to the widows of Westerling, then why is Indonesia unwilling to acknowledge cruelty towards its own citizens?' One solution he mused would be to take these cases to the International Criminal Court because 'the Indonesian judicature cannot be trusted'.¹¹⁶ This scathing commentary reflects the cynicism of sections of the population towards the continuing impunity of the Indonesian military for past human rights abuses and the failure of the justice system. Meanwhile Teuku Faizasyah, a special staff adviser to the president on international relations, claimed the government gave legal assistance to Indonesians who had pursued these cases noting 'this is one thing that we also oversee. In the sense of protecting our citizens'.¹¹⁷ This curious statement simply does not match with the government's repeated lack of support for legal justice in domestic cases.

In a remarkable development, and no doubt in response to the continuing efforts of the Dutch Debt of Honor Committee, Prime Minister Mark Rutte announced on 30 August 2013 that the Dutch government would make a public apology for all executions carried out by the Dutch army in the former colony between 1945-1949.¹¹⁸ In addition, the Dutch government would pay a

maximum compensation of 20,000 Euros (US\$ 27,000) to every widow of those killed. Rutte qualified his remarks, however, by stating: ‘We are talking about horrendous events in cases of execution’ and that they would not apologize for all Dutch military actions in Indonesia.

Reflecting on why the Dutch were only now apologizing Indonesian commentator Aboeprijadi Santoso pointed to the rising economic strength of the Indonesian economy with six per cent GDP growth per annum alongside the faltering European economy and the rising value of trade with Indonesia worth 3.5 billion Euros.¹¹⁹ He noted that the apology could open up other issues like war crimes committed by Indonesian youths against Dutch civilians and interned POWs especially in the *bersiap* period 1945-1946. The Deputy Head of Commission I of the Indonesian parliament (which is responsible for defence, intelligence and international relations), retired General Tubagas Hasanuddin, expressed appreciation for the Dutch government’s apologies.¹²⁰ This politician from the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (PDI-P) stated in parliament on 2 September ‘the Dutch attitude could be a lesson for Indonesia in how to deal with the problem of past human rights abuses. The Rawagede case occurred because the Dutch killed members of society who were not the Indonesian military’.¹²¹ Here he emphasized military violence against civilians as an ongoing problem in Indonesia.

Another member of Commission I, Hayono Isman, similarly stated: ‘This is important for Indonesia’. He noted that violence will always upset people and offend their honour. Because of this perpetrators of violence must apologize. Taking this further he stated: ‘It is a requirement of anyone for a president and a country that has committed violence to say sorry. Indonesia is the same in the case of the violence in East Timor, Indonesia must also apologize. It is a sign of a great soul to apologize’.¹²² What is particularly interesting is that he is a member of the advisory board of the Democrat Party (the President’s party). In the lead up to the 2012 anniversary of Indonesian independence it was widely rumoured by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s own adviser on human rights, Albert Hasibuan, that the president wanted to address human rights before the end of his term in 2014 and that he would apologize for all past cases of human rights abuse in

Indonesia.¹²³ Following public pressure, however, he did not issue an apology as expected on 17 August 2012.

On 12 September 2013, the Dutch Ambassador to Indonesia, Tjeerd de Zwaan, delivered an apology to a select group of family members representing widows from the Westerling massacres for the Westerling massacres and all other executions during the struggle at the Dutch embassy in Jakarta.¹²⁴ It seems that this apology marks a move towards a more critical attitude in the Netherlands to its past human rights record. In the week prior to this the Dutch supreme court ruled on a case in process for ten years, also overseen by Zegveld, that the Netherlands was responsible for the deaths of three Bosnian men in the Srebrenica massacre, because Dutch peacekeeping troops had ordered them to leave a UN compound just before the massacre.¹²⁵

Indonesian responses to this blanket apology have, however, been mixed. Although they were invited, no officials from the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the apology ceremony at the embassy.¹²⁶ This time politician Tubagus Hasanuddin reacted critically to the apology, stating that he felt it was not enough because the Dutch had not yet acknowledged that Indonesian independence fell on 17 August 1945. Following the same reasoning as the Dutch Debt of Honor Committee he stated that the Dutch therefore considered their actions from 1945 to 1949 as legitimate and legal.¹²⁷ Anhar Gonggong, an historian at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) whose father was shot by Westerling's troops in Pinrang, reacted bitterly to the apology.¹²⁸ In his view the apology was meaningless if it was only given to representatives of the families. He asked 'When will they apologize to me?' He also felt the Dutch apology had to be evaluated from the point of view of whether the Dutch considered those who died 'as people of their colony or members of another country that was independent?' Reflecting a strong nationalist viewpoint he stated 'If the answer is as a country that was colonized, I reject that'. He insisted that if the Dutch government was serious about apologizing for gross crimes in the past, then it had to acknowledge the independence of the Republic on 17 August 1945. Following discussions about the fate of the widows and families of victims of Westerling, member of Commission I of the DPR RI, M Basri

Sidehabi suggested the formation of a special government working team to mediate the controversy over the apology, and to resolve the fate of the family members of victims comprehensively.¹²⁹

Conclusions

So what does this survey of changing Indonesian representations of the Westerling Massacres reveal? The Indonesian government in official publications has either framed this case as one of national sacrifice, in an attempt to secure the loyalty of citizens of this province, or marginalized the massacres in national memory. In representations of the massacres during the democratic era of 1949 to 1959 greater attention was paid to the personal suffering of those left behind, than in the representations by the more authoritarian regimes of Guided Democracy (1959-1961) and the New Order (1966-1998), perhaps due to the recentness of the violence and the intense emphasis on national loyalty in these regimes. There has been an on-going struggle over how much importance the central government has ascribed to the massacres from the late 1940s to the present. Locals have used monuments and campaigns for a national day of mourning to continue to draw attention to the contribution of the people of South Sulawesi to the independence struggle. This has been particularly important due to the lasting assumption of divided loyalties in this province, which was exacerbated by the regional rebellion from the 1940s to 1960s.

It is largely due to the efforts of people from South Sulawesi that the memory of this brutal campaign has been kept alive. Whatever their earlier purposes, as Andreas Huyssen acknowledges, the settlement of claims for historical justice crucially depends on ‘the strength of memory discourses in the public sphere’.¹³⁰ In addition increased national and global emphases on human rights claims have aided a reconceptualization of the massacres as a case of historical injustice.

In the more democratic post-Suharto era activists who were broadly concerned with settling Dutch ‘debts of honour’ campaigned on behalf of the family members of victims of the Westerling campaigns. This movement for compensation and redress seems to have been propelled by the opportunities presented in Indonesia for human rights based activism and a general proliferation of

human rights claims. The timing of these campaigns coincided with Indonesia's improved economy and its new international stature as one of the world's largest democracies. Internationally this has meant that Indonesian voices have perhaps been louder on the world stage than they ever have in the past. One of the most interesting effects of the Westerling case and now the blanket apology for all executions during the independence struggle is the domestic debate that it has triggered about Indonesia's efforts to deal with its own cases of historical injustice.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dirk Moses and Bart Luttkhuis for the invitation to write this chapter and for their guidance and patience along the way. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their detailed and useful comments and suggestions, Faye Chan for her research assistance and the following people for assisting with images and further information: Bart Luttkhuis, Bonnie Triyana, Taufik Ahmad and Remco Raben.

Captions for Figures 1-5

Figure 1

The poster that appears in the album, *Portraits of the revolution of the Indonesian people*. The source of the image used here is the Ministry of Information image reproduced with permission from <http://www.sukarnoyears.com/420dutchatrocities1.htm>.

Figure 2

A photograph of the entrance to the Monument to 40,000 Souls of South Sulawesi located in the north of Makassar city at the edge of Kalukuang district, photograph by Bart Lutikhuis.

Figure 3

A photograph of the main relief and form of the Monument to 40,000 Souls of South Sulawesi located in the north of Makassar city at the edge of Kalukuang district, photograph by Taufik Ahmad.

Figure 4

Example of a photograph of a family member of victims, used in the special edition of *Historia* magazine on Westerling. Andi Mundji (whose father, uncle and grandparents were killed by Westerling's troops). Eko Rusdiyanto copyright Majalah Historia 2012.

Figure 5

Example of a photograph of a family member of victims, used in the special edition of *Historia* magazine on Westerling. Sikati (who lost her father and husband). Eko Rusdiyanto copyright Majalah Historia 2012.

Endnotes

¹ Kistyarini, 'Janda korban Westerling dapat ganti rugi dari Belanda', *BBC Indonesia/Kompas Internasional*, 10 August 2013, available at:

<http://internasional.kompas.com/read/2013/08/10/0941360/Janda.Korban.Westerling.Dapat.Ganti.Rugi.dari.Belanda>. Retrieved 13 August 2013.

² See Scagliola in this volume.

³ Willem IJzereef, *De Zuid-Celebes affaire* (Dieren: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984); Jaap de Moor, *Westerling's Oorlog: Indonesië 1945-1950* (Leiden: Balans, 1999); and Barbara Harvey, 'South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots', in Audrey R. Kahin (ed.), *Regional dynamics of the Indonesian revolution: unity from diversity* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 207-235.

⁴ Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *Human rights and memory* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).

⁵ Samuel Moyn, *The last utopia: human rights in history* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

⁶ Moyn, *The last utopia*, pp. 176-177.

⁷ Sidonie Smith and Kay Schaffer, *Human rights and narrated lives: the ethics of recognition* (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 2.

-
- ⁸ The term ‘memory activist’ is borrowed from Carol Gluck, ‘Operations of memory “comfort women” and the world’, in Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter (eds.), *Ruptured histories: war, memory, and the post-cold war in Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 57.
- ⁹ Harvey, ‘South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots’, p. 207.
- ¹⁰ Harvey, ‘South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots’, pp. 212-213.
- ¹¹ This paragraph draws on Harvey, ‘South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots’, pp. 213, 216-217.
- ¹² George Kahin, *Nationalism and revolution* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 196-198.
- ¹³ Harvey, ‘South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots’, p. 208.
- ¹⁴ Harvey, ‘South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots’, p. 220.
- ¹⁵ IJzereef, *De Zuid-Celebes affaire*, p. 95.
- ¹⁶ Harvey, ‘South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots’, p. 218.
- ¹⁷ Raymond Westerling, *Challenge to terror* (London: William Kimber and Co, 1952), p. 86.
- ¹⁸ IJzereef, *De Zuid-Celebes affaire*, pp. 99-103.
- ¹⁹ de Moor, *Westerling’s Oorlog*, pp. 128-159.
- ²⁰ IJzereef, *De Zuid-Celebes affaire*, p.103.
- ²¹ Raymond Kennedy, *Field notes on Indonesia: South Celebes, 1949-1950*, ed. Harold C. Conklin (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1953), p. 97. These are Kennedy’s words.
- ²² Harvey, ‘South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots’, p. 207.
- ²³ B. J. Boland, *The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 63, footnote 137.
- ²⁴ IJzereef, *De Zuid-Celebes affaire*, p. 141.
- ²⁵ Harvey, ‘South Sulawesi: puppets and patriots’, p. 218. footnote 38.
- ²⁶ Lahadjdji Patang, *Sulawesi dan pahlawannya* (Jakarta: Yayasan Kesejahteraan Generasi Muda Indonesia, 1975).
- ²⁷ Patang, *Sulawesi dan pahlawannya*, p. 292.

-
- ²⁸ *Lukisan revolusi rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949* (n.p: Kementerian Penerangan, 1949).
- ²⁹ *Lukisan revolusi rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949*, p. 115.
- ³⁰ Locals became highly fearful of these jeeps as a forewarning of impending danger.
- ³¹ *Lukisan revolusi rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949*, p. 115.
- ³² *Lukisan revolusi rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949*, p. 157.
- ³³ *Lukisan revolusi rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949*, p. 118.
- ³⁴ Gluck, 'Operations of memory', p. 50.
- ³⁵ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia*, p. 64.
- ³⁶ Esther Velthoen, 'Hutan and kota: contested visions of the nation-state in Southern Sulawesi in the 1950s', in Samuel Hanneman and Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds.), *Indonesia in transition: rethinking 'civil society', 'region', and 'crisis'* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), p. 156.
- ³⁷ Velthoen, 'Hutan and kota', p. 152.
- ³⁸ Velthoen, 'Hutan and kota', p. 154.
- ³⁹ Terance W. Bigalke, *Tana Toraja: A social history of an Indonesian people* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), p. 217.
- ⁴⁰ Velthoen, 'Hutan and kota', p. 154, footnote 22.
- ⁴¹ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi* (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953), p. 17.
- ⁴² *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 17.
- ⁴³ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, pp. 218, 225-226.
- ⁴⁴ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 243.
- ⁴⁵ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 243.
- ⁴⁶ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 243.
- ⁴⁷ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 244.
- ⁴⁸ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 245.

-
- ⁴⁹ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 246. Harvey notes that Andi Makassau was killed along with Andi Abdullah and Bau Massepe by the Dutch. He was the founder of the PKR branch in Pare-Pare. Harvey, 'Puppets and patriots', p. 216.
- ⁵⁰ *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 247.
- ⁵¹ Klaus H. Schreiner, 'National ancestors: the ritual construction of nationhood', in Henri Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid (eds.), *Potent dead: ancestors, saints and heroes in contemporary Indonesia* (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia, National University of Singapore, 2002), p. 184.
- ⁵² *Republik Indonesia propinisi Sulawesi*, p. 248 (my emphasis).
- ⁵³ Harvey, 'Puppets and patriots', pp. 227-228.
- ⁵⁴ For more on this topic see Husain Ibrahim, 'Rivalitas, dendam dan pembaharuan dlm Masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan', *Ensensi*, I/ 5-6 (August 1971), pp. 105-106 cited in Harvey, 'Puppets and patriots', p. 233, footnote 39,
- ⁵⁵ Schreiner, 'National ancestors', p. 188.
- ⁵⁶ Kahar Muzakar, 'Down with the new Majapahitism!', in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds.), *Indonesian political thinking 1945-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 330-334.
- ⁵⁷ On this campaign see C. L. M Penders, *The West New Guinea debacle: Dutch decolonization and Indonesia, 1945-1962* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- ⁵⁸ *Empat puluh ribu pahlawan Sulawesi Selatan* ([Jakarta], Bagian Indoprop PB Front Nasional, 1962), pp. 2-3.
- ⁵⁹ Sukarno, 'Peringatilah korban-korban Westerling setjara nasional', in *Empat puluh ribu pahlawan Sulawesi Selatan*, p. 5.
- ⁶⁰ Sudibyoy, 'Sambutan Menteri/SEKDJEN Front Nasional' in *Empat puluh ribu pahlawan Sulawesi Selatan*, p. 6.
- ⁶¹ Sudibyoy, 'Sambutan Menteri/SEKDJEN Front Nasional', p. 7.
- ⁶² *Empat puluh ribu pahlawan Sulawesi Selatan*, p. 9.

-
- ⁶³ See Douglas Kammen and Katharine McGregor, 'Introduction to the contours of mass violence in Indonesia', in Douglas Kammen and Katharine McGregor (eds.), *The contours of mass violence in Indonesia* (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia, National University of Singapore Press, Singapore, 2012), pp. 1-24.
- ⁶⁴ Katharine E. McGregor, *History in uniform: military ideology and the construction of the Indonesian past* (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Asian Studies, National University of Singapore Press, 2007), pp. 144-162.
- ⁶⁵ Mukhlis, M Nur Baso, Suryadi Mapangra, Ratnawati, *Monumen perjuangan di Sulawesi Selatan* ([Jakarta]: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, 1987), p. 63.
- ⁶⁶ Elizabeth Morrell, 'Strengthening the local in national reform: a cultural approach to political change', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3, October 2001, p. 440.
- ⁶⁷ Mukhlis et al, *Monumen perjuangan di Sulawesi Selatan*, p. 64.
- ⁶⁸ Mukhlis et al, *Monumen perjuangan di Sulawesi Selatan*, p. 64.
- ⁶⁹ Mukhlis et al, *Monumen perjuangan di Sulawesi Selatan*, pp. 65-66.
- ⁷⁰ Mukhlis et al, *Monumen perjuangan di Sulawesi Selatan*, p. 67.
- ⁷¹ Mukhlis et al, *Monumen perjuangan di Sulawesi Selatan*, pp. 68-71.
- ⁷² Muhammad Arfah, ST. Nuraeah, Muhammad Amir, *Monumen sejarah perjuangan bangsa daerah Sulawesi Selatan* (Makassar: Seri II, Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan, 2005), pp. 83-86, 90-93.
- ⁷³ Sartono Kartodirdjo, Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, *Sejarah nasional Indonesia* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1975), p. 40.
- ⁷⁴ Kartodirdjo et al, *Sejarah nasional Indonesia* pp. 76-78, 84-85.
- ⁷⁵ *30 Tahun Indonesia merdeka*, Vol. 1, 1945-1949 (Jakarta: Tira Pustaka, 1983 first printed 1975), p. 126.
- ⁷⁶ *30 Tahun Indonesia merdeka*, p. 127.

⁷⁷ *30 Tahun Indonesia merdeka*, p. 127.

⁷⁸ *30 Tahun Indonesia merdeka*, p. 128.

⁷⁹ Komunitas KKSS Facebook page, available at: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Komunitas-KKSS/70379022681>. Retrieved 30 October 2013.

⁸⁰ Muhammad Taufik, 'Menkum HAM jadi inspektur upacara hari korban 40.000 jiwa di Kalibata, *Tribun Timur*, 8 December 2011, available at:

<http://makassar.tribunnews.com/2011/12/08/menkum-ham-jadi-inspektur-upacara-hari-korban-40.000-jiwa-di-kalibata>. Retrieved 30 October 2013.

⁸¹ Schreiner, *National ancestors*, pp. 198-199.

⁸² Schreiner, *National ancestors*, p. 185

⁸³ La Hade, 'Korban 40.000 jiwa di Sulawesi Selatan', p. 383.

⁸⁴ La Hade, 'Korban 40.000 jiwa di Sulawesi Selatan', p. 394.

⁸⁵ Katharine E. McGregor, 'Commemoration of 1 October, hari kesaktian Pancasila: a post-mortem analysis?', *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2002, pp. 39-72.

⁸⁶ *50 Years of Indonesian independence*, Volume 1: 1945-1965 (Jakarta: PT Citra Media Persada, 1995), p. 117.

⁸⁷ *50 Years of Indonesian independence*, pp. 256-260.

⁸⁸ Noamita Royan, 'Increasing press freedom in Indonesia: the abolition of the lese majeste and 'hate sowing' provisions,' *Australian Journal of Asian Law*, Vol. 10, 2008, p. 292.

⁸⁹ Gagasan Nusantara, available at <http://batarahutagalung.blogspot.com.au>. Retrieved 8 August 2013.

⁹⁰ Speech by Minister Ben Bot during the 60th Anniversary of the Republic of Indonesia's independence declaration, available at: <http://batarahutagalung.blogspot.com.au>. Retrieved 8 August 2013.

⁹¹ For the original petition see the trilingual (Indonesian, Dutch and English) webpage of the Dutch Debt of Honour Committee, available at: <http://www.kukb.nl/indo.php?id=12>. Retrieved 30 August 2013.

⁹² <http://www.kukb.nl/indo.php?id=12>.

⁹³ See Karie Morgan, 'Remembering against the nation state: Hereros' pursuit of restorative justice', *Time and Society*, Vol. 21, No 1, March 2012, pp. 21-38.

⁹⁴ Smith and Schaffer, *Human rights and narrated lives*, p. 18.

⁹⁵ Raden Panji Soejono and R. Z Leirissa, *Zaman Jepang dan zaman Republik Indonesia*, Vol. 6 of *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, ed. Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2008), pp. 68-74.

⁹⁶ Tessa Morris Suzuki, *The past within us: media, memory, history* (London and New York: Verso, 2005), p. 15

⁹⁷ Gerry van Klinken, 'The battle for history after Suharto: beyond sacred dates, great men and legal milestones', *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2001, pp. 326-7.

⁹⁸ Levy and Sznajder, *Human rights and memory*, pp. 6-12.

⁹⁹ Levy and Sznajder, *Human rights and memory*, p. 23.

¹⁰⁰ Suardi Gattang, 'Melihat orang tua dibantai Westerling', *Tempo*, 23 September 2011.

¹⁰¹ Gattang, 'Melihat orang tua dibantai Westerling'.

¹⁰² 'Korban Westerling menuntut kompensasi', *BBC Indonesia*, 8 May 2012, available at:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/05/120508_dutchwar.shtml. Retrieved 4 March 2013.

¹⁰³ 'Korban Westerling menuntut Kompensasi'.

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.nuhanovicfoundation.org>. Retrieved 13 October 2013. The Foundation is named after the plaintiff in the case against the Dutch UN peacekeeping troops whose family members were murdered after being asked to leave the Dutch compound where they had sought refuge.

-
- ¹⁰⁵ Bonnie Triyana, Hendri F Isnaeni and M F Mukthi, 'Atas nama ketertiban', *Historia*, No. 7, 2012, pp. 42-44.
- ¹⁰⁶ Bonnie Triyana, Hendri F Isnaeni and M F Mukthi, 'Teror subuh di timur matahari', *Historia*, No. 7, 2012, pp. 45-48.
- ¹⁰⁷ Priyatno, 'Kasus Westerling akan diajukan ke ICC', *VHR Media*, 29 January 2013, available at: http://www/vhrmedia.com/new/berita_detail.php?id.=1219. Retrieved 15 August 2013.
- ¹⁰⁸ Suardi Gattang, 'Korban Westerling siap menuntut Belanda', *Tempo*, 3 February 2013.
- ¹⁰⁹ '10 Janda korban Westerling peroleh kompensasi Rp 252 juta', *Fajar*, 27 April 2013, available at: http://www.fajar.co.id/metromakassar/2618837_5662.html. Retrieved 30 October 2013.
- ¹¹⁰ Kistyarini, 'Janda korban Westerling dapat ganti rugi dari Belanda'.
- ¹¹¹ Kistyarini, 'Janda korban Westerling dapat ganti rugi dari Belanda'.
- ¹¹² Jeffrey K Olick, *The politics of regret: on collective memory and historical responsibility* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 139.
- ¹¹³ Levy and Sznajder, *Human rights and memory*, p. 4.
- ¹¹⁴ Nadya Isnaeni, 'Korban pembantaian Westerling dapat santunan', *Liputan.com*, 11 August 2013, available at: <http://news.liputan6.com/read/662662/korban-pembantaian-westerling-dapat-santunan>. Retrieved 20 August 2013.
- ¹¹⁵ Muhammad Nurdin, 'Belanda santuni janda korban Westerling, bagaimana sikap NKRI terhadap pelanggaran HAM?', *Kompasiana*, 10 August 2013, available at: <http://hukum.kompasiana.com/2013/08/10/belanda-santuni-janda-korban-westerlingbagaimana-sikap-nkri-terhadap-pelanggaran-ham--582691.html#ust> 2013. Retrieved 20 August 2013.
- ¹¹⁶ Nurdin, 'Belanda santuni janda korban Westerling'.
- ¹¹⁷ Fidel Ali Permana, 'Pemerintah Belanda minta maaf, istana negara klaim dukung korban Westerling', *metrotvnews.com*, 12 August 2013, available at: <http://www.metrotvnews.com/metronews/read/2013/08/12/1/174394/Pemerintah-Belanda-Minta-Maaf-Istana-Negara-Klaim-Dukung-Korban-Westerling>. Retrieved 20 August 2013.

¹¹⁸ ‘Belanda akan minta maaf kepada Indonesia’, *Tempo*, 1 September 2013.

¹¹⁹ Aboeprijadi Santoso, ‘Di balik permohonan maaf’, *Historia*, 4 September 2013, available at: http://historia.co.id/artikel/modern/1269/Majalah-Historia/Di_Balik_Permohonan_Maaf. Retrieved 10 September 2013.

¹²⁰ ‘DPR apresiasi permintaan maaf Belanda’, *JPNN*, 2 September 2013, available at: <http://www.jpnn.com/read/2013/09/02/188958/DPR-Apresiasi-Permintaan-Maaf-Belanda->. Retrieved 8 September 2013.

¹²¹ ‘DPR apresiasi permintaan maaf Belanda’.

¹²² ‘DPR apresiasi permintaan maaf Belanda’.

¹²³ Rabby Pramudatama, ‘SBY to apologize for rights abuses’, *Jakarta Post*, 26 April 2012.

¹²⁴ ‘Belanda minta maaf atas pembantaian Westerling’, *Tempo*, 12 September 2013.

¹²⁵ ‘Dutch peacekeepers are found responsible for deaths’, *New York Times*, 6 September 2013.

¹²⁶ ‘Uang maaf Rp 301 juta dari Belanda’, *Waspada Online*, 12 September 2013, available at <http://www.waspada.co.id/index.php/view=article&catid=77:fokuredaksi&Itemid=131>. Retrieved 4 October 2013.

¹²⁷ ‘Uang maaf Rp 301 juta dari Belanda’.

¹²⁸ ‘Uang maaf Rp 301 juta dari Belanda’.

¹²⁹ Salviah Ika Padmasari, ‘Di DPR RI perlu “panja” tengahi kontroversi permintaan maaf Belanda’, *Rakyat Sulsel Online*, 27 September 2013, available at: <http://www.raykatsulsel.com/di-dpr-ri-perlu-panja-tengahi-kontroversi-permintaan-maaf-belanda.html>. Retrieved 4 October 2013.

¹³⁰ Andreas Huyssen, ‘International human rights and the politics of memory: limits and challenges,’ *Criticism*, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2011, p. 612.