A History of Cultural Psychology: Cultural Psychology as a Tradition and a Movement

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Abstract

Cultural psychology that the current *Handbook of Cultural Psychology* embodies is an intellectual movement located in cultural psychology as an intellectual tradition whose historical roots can be found in the Enlightenment and Romantic schools of thought, and their conceptions of the person, in the 18th and 19th Century Western Europe. The chapter traces their influence in the history of psychology as an academic discipline in the form of natural scientific *versus* cultural scientific models of psychological investigation – emergence, entrenchment, and ebbing of this structure – in interaction with global history, and describes the historical context in which contemporary cultural psychology appeared as an approach that regards humans as meaning seeking and meaning making beings. The chapter then observes an emerging conception of the person that challenges the Enlightenment-Romantic assumption that separates culture from nature, and notes its reflection in cultural psychology's recent push to naturalize culture in the early 21st century against the backdrop of the global challenges to humanity including climate change and intergroup conflict. The chapter concludes with a call for new conceptions of the person that regard culture *in* nature, which can help orient cultural psychology for the future.

Cultural psychology has two senses. In one sense, it is an intellectual movement that has come into prominence in the late 20th century; in the other sense, it is a primarily Western European intellectual tradition that has continued since the 19th century. The publication of *Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development* (Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt, 1990) marked the start of the former with Richard Sheweder's (1990) essay, *Cultural Psychology – What is It?* The first edition of *The Handbook of Cultural Psychology* (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007) was very much a product of this movement. However, it finds its inspiration in the early writings of the Romantics of the 19th century. To wit, Shweder's (1984a) essay, *Anthropology's romantic rebellion against the enlightenment, or there is more to thinking than reason and evidence*, links Shweder's thinking on psychological anthropology to the Romantic intellectual tradition, which cultural psychology as a tradition draws from.

In many ways, these two senses of cultural psychology – movement and tradition – are thematically intertwined despite the time that separates them. Yet, their implications for the future of psychology may differ a great deal. Believing that a reconstruction of history is most useful when conducted in order to understand the present and contemplate a future, I will attempt to outline a history of cultural psychology in these two senses, while bringing out their thematic continuities and discontinuities, so as to point to risks and opportunities for cultural psychology. To anticipate, it is my contention that the role of cultural psychology in the future of psychology depends on how culture, nature, and the person are construed, and how the conception of the person inform the practice of cultural psychology. The conceptions of the person underlying much of the history of cultural psychology, and indeed psychology more generally in the past, assumed that nature and

culture are separate, and even in conflict; however, the concept of culture is now beginning to be *naturalized* – culture is no longer in opposition to nature, but a critical aspect of human nature – and the changing conception of the person implies that being naturally cultured is what it means to be human.

But for now, we need to go upstream in the latter half of the 19th century Central Europe to begin this time travel.

Cultural Psychology as a Tradition

Arguably, cultural psychology as an intellectual tradition can find its institutional origin in Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) and Hajim Steinthal's (1823-1899) publication of *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* in 1860, a journal whose name may be translated as the *Journal of Cultural Psychology and Philology*. According to Gustav Jahoda (1992), a native speaker of German, the German word, *Völkerpsychologie*, is difficult to translate to English. Literally speaking, it may be translated as folk psychology, that is, "psychology of a people." In paraphrasing Lazarus and Steinthal's first article in the journal, Jahoda (1992, p. 148) explains that it was meant to be a study of *Volksgeist*, that is, *Geist* (spirit, mind, or mentality) of a *Volk*, which Lazarus and Steinthal characterized as a group of people who have common "subjective views … about themselves, their shared identity and feeling of belonging together (translated and cited in Jahoda, 1992, p. 149)." Roughly speaking, then, *Völkerpsychologie* was a study of collective mental phenomena, or the psychological processes and their products shared by a people.

Historical Backdrop. Cultural psychology in this sense can be seen as an outgrowth from the European intellectual tradition of the 18th and 19th centuries (see Jahoda, 1992). There are two broad currents that permeate the past three centuries of intellectual discourse, which are often glossed as Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment (or Romantic) thoughts. The age of Enlightenment emerged during the period in which natural science and technology made a great stride, and the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century changed the landscape of the production of goods, the provision of services, and the movement of people. The well-known lines attributed to Alexander Pope attest to the optimism and faith heaped on the progress brought about by natural science.

> Nature and nature's law lay hid in night;
> God said, 'Let Newton be', and all was light.
> Nature is dictated by the law of nature; it is science that reveals it.

The Enlightenment conception of the person endows humanity with the innate and universal capacity to reason. That is, *all humans* share the universal rationality. Jahoda (1992, p. 33) translated a prototypical exemplar from *Essai sur les mœurs* by François-Marie Arouet (1694-1778), better known as Voltaire:

> God has given us a principle of universal reason, just as he has given feathers to birds and fur to bears; and this principle is so constant that it persists in spite of all the passions that oppose it, in spite of the tyrants wanting to drown it in blood, in spite of the impostors who want to destroy it with superstition.

This passage illustrates the Enlightenment's epistemic and political dimensions. On the one hand, humans are beings that *naturally* have the capacity for rational reason, which enables humans to think rationally, arrive at the truth, and make a rational decision. Either by rational deduction (i.e., rationalism) or by observation, experimentation, and rational induction (i.e., empiricism), humanity is to uncover the law of nature. On the other hand, because every human has the same universal faculty to reason, everyone is equal. Therefore, the natural law dictates that all humans have the universal and inalienable human rights and that they should be treated equally – the doctrine that

echoes through the Declaration of Independence of the 13 states, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and so on to this day (see Kashima & Gelfand, 2012).

Nevertheless, confronted by human diversity across the globe – after all, the Enlightenment period was also the age of a European expansion to all corners of the world, for exploration, trade, and colonization – many thinkers of the Enlightenment adopted an explicit or implicit social evolutionary thinking. That is, they believed that all human societies and cultures *progress* through the same stages of evolution over time to higher and more advanced stages. As Klineberg (1980) noted, the Enlightenment's preoccupation with progress made the social evolutionary thinking a natural explanation of human diversity, placing diverse world cultures into different levels of progress, some as "primitive savages" (or in Rousseau's case, "noble savages") and others as "advanced and civilized." This placement of cultures along a temporal dimension is not, however, the only solution to the diversity problem. Another class of explanation can make use of spatial placements in diverse natural environments as a mechanism for cultural diversification – human cultures are different because they are in different natural environments (see Jahoda & Krewer, 1997). Whether one takes a temporal or spatial explanation of human diversity, the underlying conception of the person is one of universality – the underlying essence of humanity – rationality – is the same across space and time; it is the temporal or spatial variability that explains their apparent variations.

The counterpoint to the Enlightenment thought is called Counter-Enlightenment, or the *Romantic* thought. Its main source of inspiration is often traced to Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), an Italian political philosopher. In *The New Sciences* (Vico, 1725/1948), he portrayed human history not as the linear upward movement of progress, but as a cyclical pattern of progress and regress, going through the divine, heroic, and human phases. His analysis of cultural groups and human history made use of symbolic representations of various forms including poems, narratives, and arguments (Berlin, 1980). It was then taken up and expanded on by German thinkers such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), whose philosophy included an emphasis on a national language as an expression of a people and their mentality, and an argument against purely rational thought as seen from his criticism of Kantian philosophy of pure reason (Barnard, 2003). In this Romantic view, culture represents a deep and unchangeable essence of a people. A people, or a nation, constructs their unique culture with their unique language and unique customs. To put it simplistically, a people share their mentality, which enables them to have a deep understanding of each other's thoughts and actions, and their meaning.

The Romantic thought too has both epistemic and political dimensions. Epistemically, Herder introduced the concept of *Einfühlungsvermögen*, "the capacity to feel oneself into" the mentality of a people (Barnard, 2003, pp. 5-6) as critical to an investigation of history. More generally, the investigation of the mores and customs of diverse peoples is to achieve an empathic understanding (*Verstehen*) of these peoples through their languages, arts, and symbolic creations. Because a people constitutes their culture, and a culture, a people, it is only through an empathetic understanding of their culture that one can fathom their mentality – not just rational reason, but also emotionality, aspirations, and purposes – and their way of life. Politically, this conception of the person can have a nationalistic implication though it is not a logical necessity (Kashima & Gelfand, 2012; see Barnard, 2003, on Herder's political philosophy as a complex mixture of nationalism and humanism). That is to say, those who share their culture and mentality belong to a nation, but those who do not do not, thereby drawing a sharp boundary around the group that shares a culture in clear exclusion of the others who do not.

Psychology as Natural Science or Cultural Science. The cultural divide between the Enlightenment and the Romantic intellectual traditions has played out in the history of psychology as epistemological and methodological controversies. It was probably Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) who formulated this most clearly. By contrasting *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften* (sometimes translated as natural sciences and human sciences), Dilthey (1883/1988) suggested that what we now call humanities and social sciences are to be distinguished from natural sciences in his

Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (original published in 1883), which Betanzos (1988) translated as *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. In introducing the term, *Geisteswissenschaften*, or "sciences of the mind", Dilthey justified their distinction from natural sciences by citing "the depth and fullness of human self-consciousness. … [A] man finds in this self-consciousness a sovereignty of will, a responsibility for actions, a capacity for subordinating everything to thought and for resisting any foreign element in the citadel of freedom in his person: by these things he distinguishes himself from all of nature. [T]he actions of the will – in contrast with the mechanical process of changes in nature … – really produce something and achieve true development both in the individual and in humanity as a whole (p. 79)." To Dilthey, it was self-reflexive agency – or what appears to be the operation of the agentic and spontaneous mind – that distinguished the realm of human activities and the socio-historical processes that they generate.

Dilthey begins his analysis from the "psycho-physical" individual, who is at once a physically embodied and mentally self-aware being. He characterizes psychology as a scientific discipline that examines this human individual. Dilthey recognizes human individuals as subject to and contributing to both the natural processes and to the processes of human activities and their products cumulated over the course of history. Noting that the whole of "historico-social life" consists of those socio-historically situated human individuals' purposive activities, he first distinguishes a *system of culture*, complex dependencies among those purposes discernible from concrete human individual actions. As an example of such "purpose-complexes", he alludes to religion – an analysis of a religion and its dogmas is to uncover "how dependence of dogmas on one another is grounded in the nature of religion (Dilthey, 1988, p. 103)." Next, Dilthey distinguishes the *external organization of society*, which he characterizes as "the structure which arises out of an association of wills, … communities, … associations, and … the framework which arises out of relationships of domination and external constraint of will (Dilthey, 1988, p. 104)." These roughly correspond to the domains of investigation of what we now call anthropology and sociology. To him, human sciences were to consist of the trifecta of psychology, anthropology, and sociology thus conceived.

At the expense of oversimplification, let me provide a thumbnail sketch of the two models of psychology that Dilthey's Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften exemplify (see Table 1). On the one hand, epistemologically, the natural science model takes an empiricist (or *positivist*) stance, where observations of a subject matter are regarded as primary. Logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, and its counterpoint, Popper's falsificationism, may be regarded as prototypical examples of this school of thought. Using physics as a model, universal laws are to be axiomatized, hypotheses are deduced by propositional logic, tested against empirical observations – especially within experiments – and theories are verified (logical positivist verificationism) or falsified (Popperian falsificationism). The goal of research in the natural science model has been the establishment of causal explanations of psychological phenomena. The key concept here is causality – how a cause produces an effect, and how psychological process emerges from a complex interaction among cause-effect relationships. This is a familiar model for those who have been trained in contemporary personality and social psychology. It is a *de facto* model of psychological inquiry.

On the other hand, the cultural science model takes what may be called an *interpretivist* stance. It takes interpretation of human cultural artefacts (e.g., languages, poems, stories, paintings, music, rituals) as a starting point of inquiry and by means of hermeneutic or semiotic methods, an inquirer develops a theoretical interpretation, or potentially even an empathetic understanding, or *Verstehen*, of the subject matter. Simply put, the goal of inquiry has been to bring out the *meaning* discernible in human action and its product in the cultural science model. Geertz (1973), Taylor (1971), and Ricoeur (1971) are examples of this line of thinking, and they championed the "interpretive turn" (Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979) in social sciences and humanities. Universality tends to recede in the background, and what is often emphasized is the particularity of a people and their culture. The key concept here is intentionality – how a mind is directed towards things, events, and the world, and how it captures the meaning of the object of construal and the world in which it is

situated. This model tends to encourage the use of qualitative methodology – ethnographic observations, interviews, and systematic investigations of texts, paintings, or any other forms of cultural artifacts.

Implicitly underlying these methodological and epistemological differences were a metaphysical opposition between materialism and idealism. The natural science model has tended towards a materialist view – human beings are nothing but material beings, and human minds are something like "machines" that carry out operations. Culture then supplies a mere content that is processed by the material mechanisms. The cultural science model has tended towards an idealist view, regarding human mind and culture – ideas and meaning – as constituting a stratum that is essentially different from the material objects and substances. This stance tends to imply a kind of mind-body dualism. For, if the mind consists of something that is not material, it must be made of something else.

Table 1. Schematic Contrast between Natural and Cultural Science Models of Psychology

	Natural Science Model	Cultural Science Model
Intellectual Background	Empiricism	Interpretivism
Theoretical Presupposition	Universality	Particularity
Goal of Investigation	Explanation	Understanding (Verstehen)
Key Concept	Causality	Intentionality
Method of Investigation	Experimentation	Hermeneutics
Ontology	Materialism	Idealism

There is, however, one presupposition that the two models of psychological inquiry seem to share. That is the fundamental *separation between culture and nature*. This can be best understood as the conception of the person – an understanding about what it means to be human – that they both presuppose. In the natural science model, culture is an add-on; it is regarded as something that makes a surface difference that grafted on top of the deep universal human nature. In contrast, in the cultural science model, culture is essentially human; culture and meaning largely constitute the person. Nonetheless, in its tenacious gaze at the cultural, the material brain, body, and organism – the natural if you like – tend to recede in the background of inquiry. It follows then that the natural science model is inclined to exclude culture from the core domain of inquiry, whereas the cultural science model would regard culture as its central concern.

These general ideas and practices have been embodied in the quantitative and qualitative research methods, and the methodological differences continue to exist in contemporary psychology. One terminological caveat is in order, however. When I say empiricism, I use the term in the sense of the British empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, not in the broader sense of respect for data. In this latter sense, both natural and cultural scientific approaches, and quantitative and qualitative methods, can be (and dare I say, should be) empirical. What is noteworthy is that the intellectual traditions of the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment resonate through to this day in the ideas and practices of psychological research. These cultural legacies exist in contemporary writings and the conduct of psychological inquiries, and from time to time, differences in these ideas and practices emerge in the form of theoretical debates. Nonetheless, it is probably fair to say that the mainstream psychology, as understood as the majority of psychology programs at university departments, has adopted the natural science model, and for much of the history of psychology, the cultural science model has survived at the periphery of psychology as an academic discipline.

Culture in Psychology

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) is credited to have established the modern academic discipline of psychology when he founded the first laboratory of psychology in 1879 at the University of Leipzig. He conducted experimental research on consciousness by introspection, but also engaged in research on a variety of cultural products including myths and folktales. His overall conception of

psychology may be discernible in his introductory book on psychology called *Outlines of Psychology* (Wundt, 1897/1907). He draws a sharp distinction between the method of analysis for mental *processes* and the method of analysis for mental *products*. He argues that experimentation is possible for introspective psychology; however, it is also possible to observe the mental products such as speech, myths, and customs because they are more or less enduring objects produced by collective processes. His mental products, e.g., speech, myths, and customs, are to be interpreted. In this writing, he regarded the latter to be investigated by social psychology – not unlike contemporary research on cultural artefacts. Thus, he not only embraced the natural science model of psychology, but also the cultural science model of psychology. This latter aspect was called *Völkerpsychologie* or folk psychology.

Nevertheless, it appears that his folk psychology was not to be an investigation of the unique mentality of a people, but rather an attempt to uncover the "law of history" of humanity. Not unlike his contemporary social evolutionists, Wundt appears to have believed that human history has its indigenous regularity – in the last sentence of his *Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind* (Wundt, 1916), he wrote:

> Humanity … included within itself all antecedent social phenomena – peoples and States, religion and culture. This entire social complex has been subsumed under the principle that law is immanent in all history (p. 523).

Still, it is noteworthy that elements of Dilethey's Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften were both present at the official start of psychology as an academic discipline.

In retrospect, the Interwar era of the 1920's and 1930's was a significant period for culture in psychology. It was not necessarily in the academic discipline of psychology that many of the significant developments took place in the works of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939) in France, Frederick Bartlett (1886-1969) in the UK, and Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) in Russia. Also noteworthy is Sigmund Freud's (1856-1939) psychoanalysis. Although the psychoanalytic influence has waned in contemporary culture and psychology, Lévy-Bruhl's, Vygotsky's, and Bartlett's work has contemporary resonance and are briefly touched on below.

Based on the Durkheimian notion of collective representations, Lévy-Bruhl (1922/1923, 1985/1910) argued Western collective representations or cultures emphasize the law of contradiction according to which A and not A cannot be true at the same time, and therefore concepts are defined as mutually exclusive; in contrast, "primitive" cultures emphasize the law of participation in which A and not A can both be true at the same time, and concepts are understood as mutually complementary. When the use of the term, primitive, is discounted (and the racist connotation ignored), his theory can be construed as a precursor to contemporary cognitive and symbolic anthropology (Littleton, 1985), and finds a more recent counterpart in cultural psychology in the research on naïve dialecticism (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

Vygotsky's (1978; also see Wertch's, 1985, scholarly explications of his work) influences are substantial, not yet in personality and social psychology, but already in developmental psychology and education. Best known insights from his work include the idea that children acquire adults' cognitive skills and practices as they work together with their caretakers using psychological tools *in situ*, and that children have a *zone of proximal development*, which defines the area of cognitive and motor activities that they can learn with more skilled others' scaffolding – when a skill is outside this area, a child cannot learn it even with practise. The strongly situated nature of his theorizing – an influence from Marx's theory of praxis – finds its contemporary expression in Michael Cole's (1996) cultural psychology.

Bartlett (1923) is better known as a cognitive psychologist who introduced the schema concept to memory research in his classic, *Remembering* (Bartlett, 1932). However, inspired by his mentor, an anthropologist, W. H. R. Rivers, he regarded remembering as fundamentally cognitive and social processes in which original information is interpreted and later reconstructed for

reproduction. Whereas Bartlett's work has laid foundation for cognitive psychology, the relevance of his work for contemporary culture and psychology is now recognized (Kashima, 2000a) both in the theoretical formulation of dynamic constructivism (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000) and in empirical research with the method of serial reproduction (Kashima, 2000b) in which the transformation of cultural information is explored as it is transmitted from one generation to next.

Despite these pioneering works, culture was very much out in the cold within the academic scene of psychology. Cole (1996) observed that, when Boring (1950) wrote a 777-page tome, *A History of Experimental Psychology*, he expended one sentence on Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie*. In fact, the period of the 1930s to 1950s coincided with the heyday of behaviourism by John B. Watson (1878-1958) and B. F. Skinner (1904-1990), with their exclusive emphasis on the observables and theoretical descriptions of psychological processes in terms of external stimulus or reinforcement on the one hand and behaviour on the other. While logical positivism and behaviourism, and the natural science model of psychology with them, became a dominant paradigm in psychology, so much so that culture and meaning, and indeed the concept of mind itself, was pushed to the periphery or outside of the academic discipline of psychology in the form of Freudian psychoanalysis and its offshoots, the Object Relations.

In the meantime, the narrative of Enlightenment (Progress!) would have looked very much like the right description of human history, at least from the Western European perspective. After WWII ended in Japan's defeat in 1945, the world entered a period of relative calm. Science and technology was providing greater powers and increasing human control over the environment although the Cold War and the threat of a nuclear winter acted as a reminder of its potential danger. Whichever side of the Iron Curtain one was on, the signs of scientific advances and material prosperity were increasingly visible in the 1950's and 60's. 1957 saw the orbiting of Sputnik 1 around the Earth and the start of the Space Race; the mass production of consumer goods became a standard order, and domestic goods and services – cars, TV sets, and other appliances – became increasingly accessible to a greater proportion of society at least in the so-called First World (Western Bloc) and perhaps to a lesser extent in the Second World (Eastern Bloc).

The natural science model of psychology predominated throughout this period. Although the Cognitive Revolution – by Jerome Bruner, Norm Chomsky, Roy D'Andrade, and others to name a few – brought the mind back in the 1960's, cognition was construed very much in the vein of the natural science model of psychology. The von Neumann serial computer provided a powerful metaphor of the mind – the universal hardware driven by the Central Processing Unit manipulates symbols, and software can be written to program the computer to do human-like operations even more efficiently than the human mind itself. According to Bruner (1990), the aim of the Cognitive Revolution was "to discover and to describe formally the meanings that human beings created out of their encounters with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what meaning-making processes were implicated. It focused upon the symbolic activities that human beings employed in constructing and in making sense not only of the world, but of themselves (p. 2)." He laments that its impulse was "technicalized", for instance, as its emphasis began to shift from the construction of meaning to the processing of information (p. 3).

Intersection of Culture and Psychology in the 1940's to 1970's

This is not to say that there was no academic research on culture and psychology between the 40's and 70's. While psychology as an academic discipline has largely adopted the natural science model as its *modus operandi* and moved out of culture, the Boas-Sapir school of North American anthropology began to explore the intersection of culture and psychology. Of these two, the latter has a more direct influence on the contemporary development in cultural psychology. Broadly known as Culture and Personality, this area of research took Freudian psychoanalysis as a source of inspiration and made some classic contributions to the area. Margaret Mead (1928), Ruth Benedict (1934), Kardiner (psychiatrist) and Linton (anthropologist) (Kardiner & Linton, 1944; Kardiner et al., 1945), John Whiting and Irvin Child (1953), Anthony Wallace (1961), and others

began to examine culture's influence on personality (Mead), personality's influence on culture (Bennedict, so to speak), and the interaction of the two (Kardiner & Linton). Regarding both culture and personality as *integrated systems*, they sought to characterize them as some form of *central tendency* in the distribution of patterns of behaviours, whether one calls them basic personality structure (Kardiner), modal personality structure (Wallace), or custom complex as a configuration of customary behaviours performed by a typical member of a culturally defined category of persons (Whiting & Child).

Without going into a great detail, a brief sketch of Kardiner and Linton's (1944) broad scheme may help convey the general contour of their theorizing. They distinguish society and culture: "a society is a permanent collection of human beings; the institutions by which they live together are their culture (p. 7)." By institution, they mean "any fixed mode of thought or behaviour held by a group of individuals … which can be communicated, which enjoys common acceptance, and infringement of, or deviation from which creates some disturbance in the individual or in the group (p. 7)." They distinguished primary and secondary institutions, and postulated *basic personality structure* that is common to the group as a mediating mechanism between the two. The primary institutions largely consist of the child-rearing practices (i.e., how children are socialized) while not completely neglecting the importance of subsistence systems as in the ecological approach. The basic personality structure is seen to be a psychological adaptation to the primary institutions. The secondary institutions are a variety of symbolic forms such as art and religion. While Linton regarded culture as a system of social heredity that is transmitted across generations, Kardiner understood the basic personality structure as a deep psychological stratum conceptualized in line with Freudian psychodynamics. The projections of the basic personality structure constitute the secondary institutions, which in turn satisfy the psychosexual needs and desires experienced by the basic personality structure.

In the 1960s and 1970s, several research programs began to develop at the intersection of culture and psychology. Surveying this development, Jahoda (1980) lists seven broad programs. Although all are of historical significance in their own right (e.g., cross-cultural research on Piagetian cognitive development, cross-cultural research on achievement motivation), only three are selected, renamed, and somewhat modified for further discussion here because of their direct relevance for the current literature on culture and psychology in the early 21st century.

Ecological Approach. The impact of ecology on psychological processes, especially perception, began to be investigated. Following the pioneering work by such notable researchers as Rivers (1901), and Allport and Pettigrew (1957), Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits (1966) conducted a project in which susceptibility to perceptual illusions such as Müller-Lyer, Perspective Drawing, and Horizontal-Vertical illusions was investigated. They conducted experiments in several different areas of sub-Sahara Africa as well as in North America with varying degrees of exposure to the cultural artefacts in which the built environment consists of vertical and horizontal straight lines intersecting with each other at right angles ("carpentered-world") and the 3 dimensional perceptual experiences being represented in 2 dimensional space (perspective drawing). They report strong support for the hypothesis that Western people are more susceptible to these perceptual illusions than non-Westerners.

Further inquiring into the ecological and cultural impact on perception, a productive line of research emerged exploring field dependent and independent cognitive style (e.g., Witkin, 1967; Witkin & Berry, 1975). Field independence (vs. field dependence) means that perception and cognition are not very much influenced by context. So, for instance, when people are required to adjust a rod vertically when it is placed within a tilted frame (rod-in-frame test), field independents make less errors than field dependents (see Witkin, 1967). Furthermore, cultural groups that showed perceptual field independence were often found to exhibit social independence in the Asch-style social conformity task (e.g., Berry, 1968). The conceptual and empirical link between perceptual field independence and social independence is particularly intriguing in light of the fact that Solomon Asch and Herman Witkin's research on context effect on perception (Asch & Witkin, 1948a, 1948b;

Witkin & Asch, 1948a, 1948b) gave rise to the theory and research on field independence and dependence.

Thus, Berry's (1966) work on Temne rice farmers in Sierra Leone and Eskimos in the Canadian Arctic, Dawson's (1967a, 1967b) research in West Africa (again mainly Temne people), Witkin and his colleagues' (1974) in the Netherlands, Mexico, and Italy, and others culminated in a synthesis that links ecology, culture, and psychological processes. Relative to those cultures that rely on subsistence-level farming, the hunter-gatherer cultures tend to be looser in enforcing norms, socialize children to become more self-reliant, and consequently promote field independence, encouraging individuals to be both perceptually and socially independent (Witkin & Berry, 1975). Berry (1976, 1979) further emphasized the cultural dynamics that result from cultural contacts, wherein the traditional ecology-culture complex interacts with typically Industrialized, market economy driven, and formally educated Western cultural groups. In many ways, this research program anticipated the recent development in culture and cognition research (Kashima & Gelfand, 2012; Masuda, CHAPTER, this volume; Talhelm & Oishi, CHAPTER, this volume).

Developmental Approach. A major research program emerged, which highlighted child development within a socio-cultural milieu as a critical focus of research culture and psychology. Within a theoretical framework akin to Kardiner and Linton's, J. W. M. Whiting and Child (1953) developed their framework that links ecology, child-rearing practices, and adult personality and behaviour. Although theirs was a model inspired by psychodynamics, it also took its theoretical ideas from Hull's learning theory on habit formation, reflecting the influence of Neal Miller and John Dollard's attempt to integrate psychoanalysis and learning theory (LeVine, 2010). The main method of their empirical test was systematic analyses of ethnographic data in the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), which was envisaged and compiled under the leadership of an anthropologist, William Murdoch (now available online, eHRAF: http://hraf.yale.edu/). They would code numerous ethnographies from different cultures collected in the HRAF in terms of their diverse cultural practices (e.g., punitive or nurturing child rearing) and cultural ideas (e.g., malevolent or benevolent deity), and correlate them across multiple cultures. For instance, Lambert, Triandis, and Wolf (1959) reported cultural beliefs in malevolent supernatural beings tend to go with a punitive child rearing style.

Whereas the HRAF enabled them to investigate relationships between the relevant variables across a number of cultural groups, the ethnographic data available at the time had been collected in the past, and not all relevant data could be brought to bear on the theory. Noting a large gap in the empirical data, John Whiting (anthropology), Irvin Child (psychology), and William Lambert (psychology) launched a massive effort to collect relevant data on socialization (LeVine, 2010), which later came to be known as the Six Cultures Study. Beatrice and John Whiting, and their colleagues (e.g., Minturn & Lambert, 1964; B. B. Whiting, 1963; B. B. Whiting & Whiting, 1975) examined a variety of child rearing practices and their psychological correlates within their Model of Psycho-Cultural Research at six locations around the world: Taira, Okinawa, Japan; Tarong, Luzon, the Philippines; Khalapur, Uttar Pradesh, India; Nyansongo, Kenya; Juxtlahuaca, Oaxaca, Mexico; and Orchard Town, New England, the USA.

Looking back at Whiting and Whiting, and their colleagues' sustained effort to capture children's socialization in their socio-cultural milieu, Edwards and Bloch (2010) listed as their key ideas (a) the assumption of the psychic unity of human kind, (b) the cultural learning environment, (c) the psychocultural model, (d) the synergistic relationship of the disciplines of psychology and anthropology, and (e) the role of mothers as agents of social change, and concluded that their legacy is well and alive in the contemporary research on culture and child development. What is perhaps most significant in the context of cultural psychology is their developmental approach to the mutual constitution of culture and psychology, and their attempt to capture the social and cultural context in which psycho-cultural ontogenesis occurs.

Cognitive Approach. If the ecological and developmental approaches are concerned with processes that are relatively far or medium distance away from the culture-psychology nexus, the

cognitive approach to culture and psychology is much closer to home. While behaviourism dominated the mainstream psychology, some domains of inquiry retained strong interest in non-observable mental processes. They included social psychology. With the influences of a large number of scholars including Kurt Lewin (1890-1947), Fritz Heider (1896-1988), Solomon Asch (1907-1996), Carl Hovland (1912-1961), and Leon Festinger (1919-1989), social psychology as a subdiscipline of psychology retained a conceptual curiosity for cognition especially in the form of the attitude concept and Gestalt psychology. In a sense, social psychology provided a niche in which cognitively oriented research in culture and psychology could survive.

One example is Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957)*The Measurement of Meaning*. Based on Osgood's associationist (and almost S-R behaviourist) theory of meaning, they developed a measurement technique, Semantic Differential, and examined connotative meanings of a variety of concepts. Noting that a concept has a denotative meaning (i.e., what the concept refers to), it has additional meaning that it connotes. It was factor analysis developed in psychology that gave a powerful data analytic technique by which to extract and reduce the vast and complex connotations to a relatively simple three dimensions – evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA). In particular, the first of its dimensions, evaluation, mapped neatly on to the social psychological concept of attitudes. Osgood, May, and Miron's (1975) *Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning* is a massive exercise to examine connotative meaning across 25 cultural groups. In the end, the first three dimensions turned out to be EPA, hence the claim of universality. Osgood suggests the universality of these dimensions reflect their evolutionary significance – whether an object is good or bad (evaluation) for the actor, and strong or weak (potency) and active or passive (activity) in relation to the actor.

Triandis and his colleagues' (Triandis, 1964, 1972, 1973; Triandis, Vassiliou, & Nassiakou, 1968) work on *subjective culture* developed concurrently with Osgood's research program. In the first article of the first volume of *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* Triandis (1964) reviewed the then current literature in the emerging field of cognitive psychology and began to develop a list of psychological constructs that seemed useful for psychological analyses about how people perceive their social environment. Fundamental to Triandis's analysis was *categorizations*. Categories cognitively curve up the world into meaningful chunks. However, categories are related to each other in some way, and culture influences both categories and relationships among them. Based on this basic scheme, Triandis developed a set of psychological constructs eventually incorporated into his theory of interpersonal behaviour (Triandis, 1977). They included the relationships between a category and evaluation *a la* Osgood (evaluation understood as a special set of categories), a category and a category of behaviours directed towards the category judged in terms of intention (behavioural intention) or appropriateness (behavioural norm) to perform the latter, and so on. Triandis et al. (1968) conducted a systematic cross-cultural comparison between the USA and Greece, and later expanded this line of research to other cultures such as India and Japan (Triandis, 1972).

This research program was an inductive attempt at a systematic description of cultural differences in how people cognized their social environment, i.e., who does what to whom. It yielded both culture-general and culture-specific insights into the cognitive representations about the social world. For instance, they noted that, generally across cultures, the dimensions of evaluation and intimacy are critical for interpersonal behaviours. Yet, they noted that there is some cultural specificity, noting that a culturally available concept such as *amae* in Japanese may capture an *emic* (taken from phon*emic*) aspect of a culture. In particular, Triandis (1972) provided some interpretive ideas to make the largely descriptive data intelligible: in some cultures, one's group (ingroup) is much more sharply distinguished from other groups (outgroup), and one's self-concept may be more importantly defined by the ingroup's perception, rather than by one's own perception, foreshadowing the later development in the research on individualism and collectivism, and independent and interdependent self-construal (Kashima & Gelfand, 2012).

Institutionalization of Cultural Research in Psychology. In the latter half of 1960's and early part of 1970's, a number of international conferences were held and journals were established with an explicit intent to foster cross-cultural research in psychology. In January, 1967, a conference was held in Ibadan, Nigeria, under the program committee co-chairmanship of M. Brewster Smith and Henri Tajfel with Henri Tajfel's initiative and Herbert Kelman's leadership. Although Tajfel was unable to attend the conference, its attendees included Donald Campbell (USA), Henri Collomb (Senegal), Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero (Mexico), Gustav Jahoda (UK), Marshall Segall (USA), and Harry Triandis (USA) among others. The purpose was to foster collaboration among psychologists across the world, especially with a view to contributing to the national development of less industrialized countries including those in the Sub-Sahara Africa (Kelman, 1968). In 1972, the first conference of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology was held in Hong Kong with Jerome Bruner as its first president. Journals such as *International Journal of Psychology* (1966), *Cross-Cultural Research* (1966), and *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* (1970) began their publications, thus providing an outlet for culture-minded psychologists.

In 1980 to 1981, a six-volume *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology* appeared, which compiled much of the culture relevant research in psychology up to the 1970's. It contained not only the historical and theoretical background and methodology, but also the substantial empirical research about cultural influences on basic psychological processes such as perception, cognition, and motivation as well as child development, social behaviour, and psychopathology. In particular, the methodological discussion and ethical consideration about cross-cultural research stand out (Kashima & Gelfand, 2012). For instance, extensively discussed was the enduring methodological question about whether a theoretical construct used in psychology is in fact doing justice to the culture to which it is applied. Just as pronunciations in a language can be described by a universal set of *phonetic* sounds, but there is a set of *phonemes*, i.e., sounds that are unique to and meaningful in a linguistic community, Pike (1954) called universally applicable cultural constructs *etic*, whereas culturally specific constructs *emic*. Berry (1968) was concerned that what may be regarded as etic constructs and methodological tools based on these constructs may in fact be *imposed etic* – researchers' own emic constructs masquerading as etic, or metaphorically trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. In addition, cross-cultural research ethics was tackled by a committee headed by June Tapp – Tapp, Kelman, Wrightsman, Triandis, and Coelho's (1974) report stands to this day as a first self-conscious effort to consider the ethicality of cross-cultural research.

The Emergence of Culture as a Research Focus

In the 1970's, world affairs outside of academia and theoretical and empirical developments inside the discipline of psychology began to set a scene for a sea change – the natural science model of psychology and its Enlightenment worldview that goes with it began to be questioned. To begin, outside academia, a number of world events began to cast doubt on the Enlightenment grand narrative of progress. On the Western side of the Iron Curtain, the USA and its allies were involved in a prolonged warfare of which many of their citizens failed to see its legitimacy, student anti-war protests, the hippie movement, and a loosening of their traditional lifestyle went hand in hand, and the Vietnam War ended in the fall of Saigon and the defeat of the US backed South Vietnam in 1975. On the Eastern side, the economic decline of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies became apparent despite the deepening Cold War. The Cultural Revolution in People's Republic of China (1966-1976) was beginning to be seen not so much a progressive pathway towards a Maoist ideal society as a setback of its cause as evidenced in its official denouncement in 1981.

Inside academia, scholars including Clifford Geertz, Paul Ricoeur, and Charles Taylor began to criticize the natural science model of human action, and ushered in an "interpretive turn" in which a cultural science model was began to be noticed as a potentially viable alternative. In psychology proper, Kenneth Gergen and others launched a social constructionist movement and argued for the historically contingent nature of social psychological knowledge. More generally, there was a discussion about Postmodernism (e.g., Lyotard, 1979/1984), according to which the

Enlightenment grand narrative of progress that legitimized the knowledge and culture of modernity collapsed. Perhaps most symptomatically, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman began their full scale assault on human rationality, the hallmark of the Enlightenment conception of the person, by undermining the belief that human mind operates in a logically coherent manner – human reasoning was not rational after all! The irony of it all is that they used the trademark of the natural science model of psychology – axiomatic theory and experimental method – to challenge the very foundation of the Enlightenment ideology of universal human rationality.

In the meantime, the global economy began to expand and the material prosperity was further extended, especially in North America, Western Europe, and East Asia. This was fuelled in the 1980's by the transatlantic alliance between Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1979-1990) and Ronald Reagan (President of the United States, 1981-1989), so much so that some have announced "the End of History (Fukuyama, 1992)," or the Western capitalist democracy as a final form of human institutional development. With the increasing volume of exchange not only of capital, goods, and services, but also people, the world-wide process of Globalization began to be apparent. Many a business deals began to be made across national borders, business people began to travel to foreign countries, more citizens began to travel to distant parts of the world, and people began to be exposed to diverse cultural elements from the parts of the world hither to largely irrelevant to their everyone life.

It is symptomatic of the era that Geert Hofstede, who worked for a multinational company, produced one of the catalytic publications, *Culture's Consequences* (Hofstede, 1980). Using work values data from IBM employees from more than 40 countries around the world, he constructed four dimensions of culture: power distance (extent to which power differences in hierarchy are tolerated), individualism (extent to which individuals are separated from their organizational context), masculinity (extent to which gender roles are differentiated), and uncertainty avoidance (extent to which uncertainty is disliked and clear rules are preferred). Of these four, individualism was to become a major focus of the research in culture and psychology later on. Hofstede's individualism and its opposite, collectivism, distantly echoed Ferdinand Tönnies's *Geselschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*, or Emile Durkheim's organic and mechanical solidarity, which these founding fathers of social sciences used to characterize what they regarded as a socio-cultural change of the Western Europe from the traditional community to the modern society. With this social change, the material wealth of Western Europe dramatically increased. Consistent with this, Hofstede's index of individualism highly correlated with GDP per capita across countries.

If Hofstede's was an empirical inspiration for cross-cultural research, Shweder and Bourne's (1984a; 1982) provided a theoretical framework and an intellectual allure for culture in psychology. Shweder and Bourne abstracted three prototypical explanations of cultural diversity: universalism, evolutionism, and relativism. In universalism, cultural differences are de-emphasized, and similarities are highlighted; in evolutionism, cultural variants are placed along the ladder of evolution with a normative model at the end point of development (e.g., propositional calculus as the end point of rational reasoning); and in relativism, cultural variations are understood within their contexts as all equally valid and reasonable. They then reported empirical evidence of cross-cultural differences in person description, while approvingly quoting Clifford Geertz's unforgettable description of the Western conception of the person (Geertz, 1975, p. 48):

> [T]he Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures .

Reporting some evidence of person descriptions from North America and India, they claimed that Indian descriptions contextualize a person by providing rich contexts in which the action takes place

(sociocentric organic), while North American descriptions decontextualize a person by using personality trait terms (egocentric reductionist). Examining universalist, evolutionist, and relativist explanations of this phenomenon, Shweder and Bourne concluded in favour of a relativist interpretation of the phenomenon, suggesting that the Indian concrete contextualized person description can be understood as holism as a mode of thought.

Although Hofstede's and Shweder and Bourne's contributions differ greatly in their theoretical orientation, empirical data base, and worldly practical implications, they both pointed to the conceptualization about the individual person and the individual's relationship to his or her social context as a focal point of cultural differences. Together with the theoretical and empirical impetus, the continuing globalization and the human curiosity about and real need for knowledge about world cultures prepared a fertile ground for further research on culture and psychology.

Cultural Psychology as a Movement

Beginning. On March 14, 1980, a conference was held at the University of California, San Diego, where a number of notable anthropologists gathered. Those present included Roy D'Andrade, Clifford Geertz, Melford Spiro, Robert LeVine, Theodore Schwartz, and Richard Shweder. Its product, an edited volume, *Culture Theory*, was described by Shweder (1984b) as representing "a stage in the development of the so-called symbols-and-meanings conception of culture (p. 1)," quoting Geertz's (1973, p. 89) definition of culture as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life." Clearly signalling the intellectual lineage to the Counter-Enlightenment tradition, Shweder (1984a) characterizes this line of thinking as "Anthropology's romantic rebellion against the enlightenment." Subsequently, in 1986 and 1987, the Committee on Human Development at the University of Chicago, with which Shweder was affiliated, hosted the Chicago Symposia on Human Development, culminating in the publication in 1990 of a volume, *Cultural Psychology* – arguably the beginning of cultural psychology as a self-conscious academic movement.

In it, Shweder (1990, p. 1) wrote:

> A discipline is emerging called "cultural psychology." It is not general psychology. It is not cross-cultural psychology. It is not psychological anthropology. It is not ethnopsychology. It is cultural psychology. And its time may have arrived, once again.

Shweder defined this emerging discipline as

> the study of the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, transform, and permute the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion. Cultural psychology is the study of the ways … psyche and culture … require each other, and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make each other up (p. 1).

Shweder's cultural psychology takes the view of humans as meaning seeking and meaning making beings who collectively constitute their *intentional world*. Intentionality in this context does not exclusively mean the notion of intention as in a person's intention to do something, but rather a philosophical notion of intentionality, in which mental activities are said to be *about* something. Most of the mental verbs in English (e.g., believe, want, intend) take a propositional object. For instance, to say that "John believes it is raining" implies that John has a certain mental inclination towards the proposition that "It is raining." More generally, the mind is said to have certain inclinations (often called propositional attitudes) towards a proposition about the world. These inclinations (e.g., believing, wanting, and intending) are the operations of the mind. According to Shweder (1990, p. 2), a sociocultural envionment is an intentional world because "its existence is

real, factual, and forceful, but only as long as there exists a community of persons whose beleifs, desires, emotions, purposes, and other mental representations are directed at it, and are thereby influenced by it."

As Shweder notes himself, this conception of cultural psychology tends towards relativism – there is no logical necessity that objects and events in one intentional world are the same in another. This is not to say that there are no universals. Indeed there may be, but it is not logically necessary in this perspective. Nonetheless, this conception rejects a view that there is no ontological reality – an intentional world is real, and psychological processes can operate within it rationally in the sense that they are internally coherent and consistent with the ontology of the intentional world. Shweder's cultural psychology examines personal function, interpersonal maintenance of an intentional world, and psychosomatic, sociocultural, and divergent realities (Shweder, 1990, p. 3). Echoing Dilthey (1883/1988), he suggests that cultural psychology is an interdisciplinary *human science*.

A Variety of Cultural Psychologies. In parallel with this development, Jerome Bruner (1990) was conceiving of a cultural psychology that also takes meaning seriously. His *Acts of Meaning* was based on a series of lectures delivered at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in December, 1989. In the very first pages of this slendar book, Bruner, one of the central figures of the Cognitive Revolution wrote:

> [T]he Cognitive Revolution….was intended to bring "mind" back into the human sciences after a long cold winter of objectivism. … [T]hat revolution has been diverted into issues that are marginal to the impulse that brought it into being. …. I want to turn directly to a preliminary exploration of a renewed cognitive revolution – a more interpretive approach to cognition concerned with "meaning-making" (pp. 1-2).

Thus, Bruner's cultural psychology too had intellectual roots in the Romantic tradition and the cultural science model of psychology. He suggests that folk psychology – culturally available concepts and naïve theories used to understand and describe psychological states and processes (e.g., beliefs, desires, and itentions), and ideas and practices derived from or based on them – and narrative explanations of actions and events are fundamental to cultural constitution of the world. In his view, construction of narrative interpretations are a cultural achievement through phylogeny, history, and ontogeny, and not only mediated by individuals' cognitive activities, but also negotiated and renegotiated in social interactions with others. A result is the construction of a moral world in which one's self is understood and constituted as a moral agent. The emphasis on narrative has inspired cultural research that examines the role of cultural narratives in maintaining cultural values and cultural stereotypes (e.g., Imada & Yussen, 2012; Lyons & Kashima, 2003).

It was also in 1990 that Michael Cole (1990) published an article, *Cultural Psychology: A Once and Future Discipline?,* as part of the 1989 *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*. Its content was expanded and further developed in a book with the same title minus the question mark (Cole, 1996). Cole is a cognitive psychologist trained in mathematical learning theory. After conducting a field study in Liberia, however, he began to develop a research program on cognitive development informed by Vygotsky, Luria, and the Russian sociohistorical tradition of psychology. According to him, psychological processes are a product of phylogeny, cultural history, and ontogeny, and thus evolution, history, and lifetime development through childhood, adulthood, and beyond. The distinctive characteristic of Cole's cultural psychology is its tenatious focus on *context*. Recalling the Latin root of the word, *contexere*, which means "to weave together", he approvingly cited the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of context as "the connected whole that gives coherence to its parts" (Cole, 1996, p. 135). To him, context is a complex whole that connects cultural artifacts as well as culturally informed concrete practices and activities *in situ*. For instance, Chavajay and Rogoff (1999) videotaped children's interactions with their caretakers and others in their homes, coded their patterns of attention to examine cultural differences in whether children would alternate their

attention to different events that compete for their attention (i.e., looking at one thing and then the other) or pay simultaneous attention to both at the same time, and found that Guatemalan Mayan children tend to engage in simultaneous attention more than American children from Salt Lake City, Utah. To be sure, psychological processes – both their mental and behavioural aspects – are inseparable from their concrete enactments, which are inevitably imbued with historically generated cultural meanings. Nevertheless, Cole's cultural psychology is a study of situated artefacts-activities nexus thus construed.

Ernst Boesch's (1991) *Symbolic Action Theory and Cultural Psychology* also deserves attention. Drawing on an action theoretic tradition of Kurt Lewin and others, Boesch characterized culture as:

> a field of action, whose contents range from objects made and used by human beings to institutions, ideas and myths. Being an action field, culture offers possibilities of, but by the same token stipulates conditions for, action; it circumscribes goals which can be reached by certain means, but establishes limits, too, for correct, possible and also deviant action. The relationship between the different material as well as ideational contents of the cultural field of action is a systemic one; i.e. transformations in one part of the system can have an impact in any other part. As an action field, culture not only induces and controls action, but is also continuously transformed by it; therefore, culture is as much a process as a structure (p. 29).

Boesh's *symbolic* action theory extends the action theoretic notion of action as goal-directed human activities in a field of activities, and takes the view that action has *connotations* or *symbolisms* – implied meanings that go beyond its denotation. Symbolic action is not only informed by culture, but also transforms culture as it is performed. As Jahoda (1991) noted in his Foreword to Boesch's book, it is his insistence on the dynamics of cultural meaning that places his cultural psychology broadly in the tradition of Dilthey's human science.

Finally, it is important to note *indigenous psychology* (e.g., U. Kim & Berry, 1993b; U. Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006) as an intellectual movement in parallel to the variety of cultural psychologies described above. In the edited volume that bears the name of indigenous psychology, (U. Kim & Berry, 1993a) defined it as "the scientific study of human behavior (or the mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and that is designed for its people (p. 2)." Its prototypical operation is to use the concepts indigenous to a given culture to investigate the psychological processes of the people for the people with that cultural background. The 1993 volume includes chapters by Durganand Singh on India, Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero on Mexico, James Georgas on Greece, Pawel Boski on Poland, Fathali Moghaddam on Iran, Virglio Enriquez on the Philippines, David Ho on China among others – they are investigations of each of the cultures by a well known scholar indigenous to the culture. The initial aspiration of this intellectual movement shares much of its themes with other cultural psychologies. It endorses *a* scientific approach, but shuns the Enlightenment conception of psychology as a natural science. Whereas it does not necessarily deny a cross-cultural comparative approach, its ultimate aim is to gain an understanding of and causal knowledge about the psychological processes within a cultural millieu. As Kashima and Gelfand (2012) noted, if cultural psychologies are indigenous to North America and Western Europe, indigenous psychology is indigenous to the rest of the world. Arguably, Nisbett and Cohen's (1996) culture of honor is an intriguing example of indigenous psychology of the Southern USA.

Prehistory. The foregoing may seem to suggest that all these variants of cultural psychology sprang up all of a sudden around 1990. However, the term, *cultural psychology*, is not a neologism of the 90s. Already in the 60s, in the second edition of *Handbook of Social Psychology,* George DeVos (DeVos & Hippler, 1969), a psychological anthropologist of renown, wrote a chapter titled, *Cultural Psychology: Comparative Studies of Human Behavior*. He wrote:

> A distinct theoretical orientation various called by anthropologists "personality and culture," "psychological anthropology," or "cultural psychology" has evolved around a dual theoretical framework applied to the study of human behavior as determined both by cultural and by personality variables (p. 323).

DeVos began his extensive review with his reflection on the broad concepts of "culture" and "personality." First, he cited Kroeber and Kluckhohn's (1952, p. 181) well known formulation:

> Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior, acquired and transmitted by symbols constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of future action.

He then characterized "personality" as equally "broad in scope (p. 324)":

> [T]he same behavior viewed as a part of culture can also be considered in terms of a psychological structure deriving from man's (sic) biological and physiological potentials and limitations. Personality "structures" are learned patterns dependent on a cultural environment, but they are no more reducible to analysis only in cultural terms than cultural patterns are reducible to psychological patterns (p. 324).

Discernible from this passage is DeVos's broad understanding of "personality" as including all spectrums of psychology from physiological through perceptual and cognitive to developmental, personality and social psychology. In line with his broad definition, his review touches on all these aspects of the then current research on cultural influences on psychology. Cultural psychology, as described by DeVos, was meant to cover the entire terrain of psychology as it intersects with culture.

Nonetheless, it was in the nexus of culture and "personality" more narrowly conceived where a next chapter of prehistory of cultural psychology as academic movement began to unfold. A flagbearer of the Cognitive Revolution from anthropology, Roy D'Andrade (1965) challenged the trait conception of personality:

> One of the hazards of science is the ease with which it is possible to confuse propositions about the world with propositions about language. Such a confusion appears to have occurred with respect to personality and behavior classifications in the field of psychology (p. 215).

This coincided with Mulaik's (1964) self-criticism of trait psychology within the discipline of psychology itself, both pointing to the possibility that what appears to be a coherent pattern of behaviour attributable to a person (e.g., extraverted behavours) may in fact be more a reflection of the conceptual structure (i.e., extraversion) than a reflection of the structure of behaviours.

Emerged in this academic climate was the person-situation debate in personality and social psychology. To put it simply, the debate can be framed in terms of two questions: is there a coherent pattern of behaviour that is stable across different situations, or is someone's behaviour largely determined by the situation in which it occurs? Against the traditional assumption of personality psychology, a personality psychologist, Walter Mischel (1968) took a strong stance on the side of situationism, challenging the existence of stable personality. If there is no cross-situationally stable behavioural pattern in an individual, where does "personality" exist? Does it exist only in "the eyes of the beholder" (Cantor & Mischel, 1977)? At about the same time, an individual person's psychological coherence began to be conceptualized in cognitive terms as in Markus's

(1977) self-schema. Is it cognition that gives the appearance of an individual person as possessing coherent personality? This line of reasoning was further extended in light of the then developing literature on Tversky and Kahneman's heuristic reasoning and human judgmental biases that cast doubt on human rationality. Some social psychologists (Ross, 1977) reduced the attribution of an individual's behaviour to a stable personality disposition to a "fundamental attribution error", suggesting that it is a grave error to see a stable disposition in a human individual. Nisbett and Ross's (1980) *Human inference* captured much of the research in this vein.

It was against this backdrop, Shweder published a series of essays that have set a scene for the subsequent development of cultural psychology. In 1975, a paper appeared in *Journal of Personality*. It revisited pre-existing data from previous psychological studies, drawing on the then current literature on judgmental heuristics and cognitive biases *a la* Kahneman, Tversky, and others, and providing support for D'Andrade's (1965) suggestion that cognitive conceptual structures underlie much of the assumed coherence in personality, and that the concepts represented by personality trait terms such as extraversion and introversion may be biasing personality ratings and behaviour observations. It was followed by an article in *Current Anthropology* (Shweder, 1977), and a three part series in *Ethos,* a journal dedicated to psychological anthropology, which provided a critical reflection on the literatrure on Culture and Personality (Shweder, 1979a, 1979b, 1980). In the last essay of this series, Shweder (1980) drew on Popper's notion of World 3 (Popper & Eccles, 1977) to justify his view that takes meaning – or products of the human mind, particularly rules that regulate human conduct – as constituting a domain separable from the worlds of the objective things and events (World 1) and the subjective psychological state (World 2). This conceptualization connects to the view of cultural psychology as a study of intentional world, which he later espoused in 1990.

The Standard Theory of Cultural Psychology. On both sides of 1990, in which Stigler, Shweder, and Herdt's *Cultural Psychology* was published, two articles appeared in *Psychological Review*: Harry Triandis's (1989) *The Self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural Contexts* and Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama's (1991) *Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation*, both focusing on the psychological construct of *self* and its implications for culture and social psychology. Ten years later, Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan's (2001) *Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic versus Analytic Cognition* also appeared in *Psychological Review*, extending the discussion about cultural variability to cognition more generally. It seems fair to say that these three articles together constructed a platform from which much of the contemporary contributions in culture and psychology was launched.

Triandis (1989), drew a distinction between the cultural and psychological levels of analysis by suggesting that "[c]ulture is to society what memory is to the person (p. 511)." Starting with the importance of ecology as a distal cause of cultural variability, he highlighted three dimensions that capture cultural variations – cultural complexity, individualism-collectivism, and tight-loose cultures – and three types of self-concept – private, public, and collective self, and theorized relationships between cultural dimension and the likelihood with which these different self-concepts is activated to influence social behaviour. Broad cultural differences dictate the types of self-concepts prevalent in culture, and situational differences make different self-cognitions salient. Markus and Kitayama (1991), while acknowledging a universal aspect of self-cognition, drew an elegant distinction between two types of self-construal, independent and interdependent, as the extent to which people "see themselves as *separate* from others or as *connected* with others (p. 226; emphasis in original)." They explicated these two types of self-construal and reviewed the then available research on cultural differences in self-construal and their psychological implications in terms of cognition, emotion, and behaviour. Thus, the two papers theorized three classes of psychological constructs, culture, self, and psychological processes, and hypothesized potential relations among them.

Nisbett et al. (2001) theorized cognition as fundamentally embedded in social organization of everyday life. To the extent that culture and self shape ways of life and humans relate to each

other, they too should shape cognition. In particular, they argued that social organization and social practices that go with it direct selective attention, which influences beliefs about the nature of the world and causality (metaphysics), which in turn guides beliefs about what to know and how to know (epistemology), with these beliefs dictating the development and application of cognitive processes. Drawing a broad distinction between holistic and analytic cognition, they argued that social organization and practices characterized by independence and separation (vs. interdependence and connectedness) between individual persons tend to promote analytical (vs. holistic) cognition, which separates an object of construal from its background (vs. embeds an object of construal within its field).

In retrospect, the three papers pivoted around the main theme that has been variously called individualism-collectivism, independence-interdependence, and analyticism-holism, which all find their conceptual ancesters, as noted earlier, in various past writings in culture and psychology in particular, and social sciences more broadly. What is remarkable is that these threads of theoretical lineages converged at the rich conceptual nexus of the self and causal attribution research in personality and social psychology. They collectively hinted at the significant analytical distinction among culture, social organization, and psychology; sharply directed researchers' attention to the individual in social context; the domain particularly rich with meaning, history, and intellectual implications beyond personality and social psychology narrowly conceived; and directly and indirectly addressed the growing need for a broad framework to aid cross-cultural understanding, especially between the West and the rapidly developing East Asia, in the globalizing world. In so doing, they provided a generative conceptual apparatus for empirical research.

Postscript. The rhetoric to differentiate cultural psychology in opposition to other traditions of research in psychology enabled a clear focus and rallying point for culture relevant psychological research. Research at the intersection of culture and psychology significantly increased in quantity and scope. While academic journals in psychology with cultural emphases continued to be published in some cases with more issues per year, new journals with cultural themes, *Culture and Psychology* (1995) and *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* (1998; published by the Asian Association of Social Psychology founded in 1995), began to appear. All in all, since 1990 or so, the publication that includes "culture" or "cultural" as a keyword increased rapidly and nearly doubled by now (2015) from about 5% to 10% of the total publications in psychology included in PsycINFO (Kashima, 2016). In addition, going beyond the narrow East-West comparison on individualism and collectivism or independent and interdependent self-construal, cultural research in psychology began to cover much greater geographical areas – Latin America, Middle East, and South Asia – and cultural phenomena – religion, socio-economic status, and others – as covered in this second edition of *Handbook of Cultural Psychology*.

However, the explosion of research in the nexus of culture and psychology prompted further soul-searching and self-reflections among the researchers. Recall that Shweder distinguished cultural psychology from cross-cultural psychology; the indigenous psychology movement claimed its distinctiveness from both as a research orientation, of the people, by the people, and for the people who share a cultural background. Debates and discussions about similarities and differences between the research perspectives began to take shape. A concrete instance of this took place at the third conference of the Asian Association of Social Psychology, in Taipei, Taiwan, August 4-7, 1999. Scholars representing three perspectives were brought together: Richard Shweder and Patricia Greenfield for cultural psychology, Harry Triandis and John Berry for cross-cultural psychology, and Kuo-shu Yang and Uichol Kim for indigenous psychology. Further adding an article by Sik Hung Ng and James Liu, Kwang-Kuo Hwang and Chung-Fang Yang guest-edited a special issue of the *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* (2000, issue 3) that collects seven papers, presenting seven distinct, sometimes complementary, and at times antagonistic, perspectives on the three approaches. The turn of the century was a vibrant time for culture and psychology.

Emerging Consensus in Conception of the Person in Psychology

Even if the tension between the Enlightenment and Romantic conceptions of the person has driven the dynamics of the natural science and cultural science models of psychology in the 20th century, towards its *fin de ciecle*, the methodological tensions between the natural and cultural science models (for instance, see what Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996, called experimental ethnography) as well as metatheoretical tensions (see what Kashima & Haslam, 2007-2008, called experimental semiotics) began to ease, and it is possible to see an emerging consensus in how psychologists came to see what it means to be human (Kashima, 2000a). It is characterized by four fundamental assumptions: ontological physicalism, Darwinian evolutionism, cultural ontogenesis, and mind-culture constitutionism.

First of all, the question about the nature of the mind – whether it consists of a material matter just like any other physical things and events in the world or a "mind" matter that's fundamentally different from the material – seemed to have become obsolete. Few psychologists, if any, were seriously asking this question, and most took it for granted that it is a physical matter, by its material composition and complex organization, gives rise to the phenomenon of the mind. It is the physical brain – and the brain is not in a vat, but there is the body to go with it! – that does the thinking, feeling, and wanting. In a way, this ontological question seems to have been an implicit underlying layer for the meta-theoretical question about how to conceptualize psychological processes and the nature of cognition, and the methodological question about how to investigate them – causal explanation or hermeneutic interpretation. If the mind is made up of a mind matter and the rest of the world is made up of a material matter, it makes sense to approach them differently, by different methods. However, if cognition – and interpretation is obviously an instance of cognition – is understood as a physical process, there is no reason why interpretation itself cannot be causally explained. Thus, the physicalist ontology took much of the vexation from the methodological question.

Second, the Grand Synthesis of Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics became a taken-for-granted assumption of the phylogenetic origin of humanity, and the view that culture is a species-typical property of *Homo sapiens* came to be taken seriously. That is to say, there is DNA-coded genetic information that is passed along from parents to their offspring; blind variation and selective retention of this genetic information has cumulatively generated *Homo sapiens* as a biological species; and the genetic make-up of human beings enables humans to acquire and transmit culture. Thus, in the case of human beings, genetic information presupposes cultural information. In this sense, humans are a *cultural animal*.

Third, human ontogenesis is necessarily a process of enculturation. That is to say, human newborns are endowed with the brain and body that is not only receptive to cultural input, but also presumes it. The newborn without cultural input is incomplete at best; Human adults are also endowed with the brain and body that inclines them to teach. Cultural information travels not only from parents to their genetic offspring, but also from other adults to children, from other children to children, or even from children to adults (see how youngsters teach older adults how to use Facebook and Twitter!). Thus, the generation, transmission, and retention of cultural information while interacting with conspecifics throughout lifespan is a natural part of human development.

Fourth, cultural-historical context and human mind are mutually constitutive. As humans with their genetically endowed brain and body interact with each other in their everyday life, they construct cultural context partly by design and partly by unintended consequences of their actions; the cultural context cumulatively forms human history over time; and thus constructed cultural-historical context further makes up the human mind for their future activities. Human psychological processes and cultural-historical processes are inexorably interwoven with each other to constitute human history and ways of life.

Towards Naturalization of Culture. The emerging consensus diverges from the Enlightenment-Romantic opposition. Recall that the natural science and cultural science models of psychology both presupposed a nature-culture separation: culture is either an add-on to the universal machinery, which can be safely ignored in an investigation of the mind for the natural

science model, or a domain that has a life of its own independently of the brain-body machinery for the cultural science model. In contrast, in the contemporary discourse, culture is not only ontologically and phylogenetically enabled by nature, but also ontogenetically and historically influence nature. Human beings are cultural by nature, and human nature includes culture as its integral aspect. Nature and culture are no longer separated in this conception of the person; they are interwoven with each other in the ever-changing temporal dynamics of human evolution, history, lifespan development, and situated sociality. In short, the new conception of the person takes nature, culture, and time very seriously indeed (Kashima, 2000a), thus an emphasis on *cultural dynamics* (Kashima, 2008, 2014) and an inclination to *naturalize culture* (Kashima, 2016).

This trend is aligned with an increasing emphasis on both nature and nurture in psychology together with a growing recognition of epigenesis. Its reflection in cultural psychology is perhaps most discernible in the variety of ways in which theoretical concepts and research methods from biology have been braught to bear on the culture-mind nexus.

- Gene-culture co-evolutionism – Darwinian mechanisms can be used to explain cultural evolution, which in turn affect genetic evolution (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Mesoudi, CHAPTER, this volume).
- Cultural evolutionary account of religion – although religions have been considered a quintessential cultural element that defies scientific investigation, recent approaches regard religion as a cultural solution to the evolutionary problem of human cooperation (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2001; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008).
- Embodied culture – culture is not just abstract disembodied representations or "the brain in the vat", but embodied and practiced (e.g., Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007).
- Cultural neuroscience – neuroscientific methods such as EEG and fMRI can be used to shed light on cultural influences on psychological processes (e.g., Chen, Burton, Greenberger, & Dmitrieva, 1999; Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010; Han & Humphreys, 2016; Y.-H. Kim, Chiu, Peng, Cai, & Tov, 2010) and the genetic make-up of individuals can explain the outcome of culture learning (e.g., Han & Northoff, 2008; Kim, CHAPTER, this volume; Kitayama, King, Hsu, & Liberzon, 2016; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; Kitayama, CHAPTER, this volume).
- Cultural adaptationism – the natural environment significantly shapes cultures because cultures represent an adaptation to environmental threats (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011; Van de Vliert, 2008, 2013) including pathogen threats (e.g., Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008), as well as to the economic system for extracting resources from the natural environment (e.g., Talhelm et al., 2014; Talhelm & Oishi, CHAPTER, this volume; Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008).

Naturalization of culture is most obviously discernible in niche constructionism in evolutionary biology (e.g., Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles, 2010; Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003). In this view, organisms do not directly adapt to the natural environment, but construct their niche that enables them to adapt to the natural environment. A niche is like a beaver's dam – a beaver constructs its nest as part of the dam that it creates, and it is well adapted to survive in this beaver-constructed environment, which in turn almost seamlessly intermeshes with the rest of nature. Likewise, humans construct our own niche in the form of the built environment supported by the human-made production, distribution, consumption, and waste disposal system of goods and services, supported by the financial, educational, social, and other institutional arrangements. Thus created human-made environments have structures and dynamics largely of their own (see Cohen, 2001); Human minds adapt to these niches. Humans adapt to the natural environment directly, but also indirectly through the culture-imbued human-made environment. It is through the double loops of adaptation – one with the human-made environment and the other with the natural environment, which intermeshes with the former – that human evolution takes place. The

construction of these human niches obviously implicates cultural processes. In this way, culture is integral to evolution in niche constructionism.

These developments in academic research naturalize culture, but events outside the academia also began to fuel a need to naturalize the culture concept (Kashima, 2016). In 2001, two events ushered in a volatile period of human history. One is the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, the USA. Two highjacked airplanes were crashed into a symbol of global capitalism by al-Qaeda inspired individuals who apparently justified their deeds with their religious beliefs. It signalled an increasing likelihood of intergroup conflicts along the religious lines that we witness today. The other is the third assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a world body of climate scientists that provide a periodical report of the state of the climate on the Earth (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2001). It is the latter that is much less attention grabbing, but potentially even more threatening than the former to humanity.

The IPCC warned that the global average temperature has increased over the past 200 years relative to the long term average temperature during the geological epoch known as the Holocene. Since the Industrial Revolution, by burning fossile fuels such as coal and oil, the human production and consumption of goods and services have generated much more greenhouse gasses (e.g., CO_2) than before. When trapped in the atmosphere, these gasses increase the temperature on the planet, thus affecting the climate. Some have argued that, given the disproportionate impact human activities now have, geology has entered a new epoch that should be prefixed by humanity, that is, the *Anthropo*cene (e.g., Crutzen, 2002). In a way, this is human niche construction gone awry (Kashima, 2016). The amount of material goods and energy that culture-imbued human activities now harness is so large, that it inevitably affects the biosphere of the planet (IPCC, 2007, 2014) without so intending. This realization – although there are some lingering debates about the veracity, extent, and consequences of climate change – has reminded humanity (and psychologists, one might add) of the need to take nature seriously in conceptualizing culture and the culture-imbued human mind.

Climate change can further amplify the intergroup conflict that the 9/11 attacks so dramatically symbolized. Climate variability has been known to worsen human violence and intergroup conflict – when the temperature deviates from the local long-term average, it tends to increase conflicts (for a meta-analysis of the relation between climate and conflict, see Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013). Apart from the direct impact of climate change, extreme weather events (e.g., hurricanes, floods, droughts, large scale fires) deplete the economic and social resources within communities, and resource scarcities can further exacerbate conflicts of interest between human groupings (e.g., Zhang, Brecke, Lee, He, & Zhang, 2007). Climate change and human conflict can go hand in hand, further underlining the need to take nature seriously in the cultural dyanamics of the 21st century and beyond.

Concluding Comments

Cultural psychology started as a tradition that takes *meaning* seriously; cultural psychology as a movement revived it around the 1990's. While natural science models dominated mainstream psychology, thin threads of research traditions kept alive various cultural science models at the periphery of psychology or in the liminal region of psychology and other human science disciplines. These diverse threads of theoretical ideas and methodological innovations began to converge in personality and social psychology in the late 70's and 80's. It was a confluence of theoretical developments in psychology – cognitivism, heuristics and biases in judgment and choice, meaning rich research in personality and social psychology – as well as world events outside psychology – the end of the Cold War, advances in Information Technology, deepening Globalization – that cast doubt on the research agenda of natural science models, and highlighted a need for greater understanding of human diversity and cultural meaning. These historical trends came to a head, and its most visible events took shape in the form of academic activities and products such as workshops and conferences as well as the publications of books and articles.

Here, it is the researchers – often trained in the institutionalized academic discipline of psychology, but very frequently in anthropology or even biology – who carry out these academic activities and produce these products that we can now access in the historical archival records. It goes without saying that these are embodied people who live their lives in their own cultural and hisotorical context, enabled by the societal, economic, and governance apparatuses. Their thoughts, feelings, and actions are obviously shaped by the on-going events in the world. I hope this chapter has illustrated that, despite all the powerful events and happenings that affect the ever-changing field of culture and psychology, these researchers' sometimes explicit, but often tacit conceptions of the person – their ontology of what the person is and what it means to be human – are at least in part the driver of their research activities, and it is the researchers' conceptions of the person that define their perspectives, approaches, and, in many ways, their outcomes and future potentialities for psychology (Kashima, 2000a, 2016; Smith, 1991).

Conceptions of the person were once divided between the natural science and cultural science models, which both tacitly presupposed the ontological division between nature and culture. In my view, the currently emerging conceptions of the person no longer take this ontology, but locate culture as integral to human nature. Clifford Geertz (2000), a champion of the cultural science model, once warned that bringing culture into psychology would cause "a fair amount of noise and upheaval (p. 196)" and "do more to toss things around than to arrange them in order (p. 197)." If one's conception of the person presupposes the nature-culture separation, this warning makes perfect sense – water and oil don't mix, and natural scientific psychology would not mix with a cultural scientific psychology. As far as I can tell, however, an upheaval has not eventuated – at least not yet. Perhaps part of the reason is the emerging conception of the person that naturalizes culture. As a tradition and a movement, cultural psychology takes the meaning as a focal point of investigation. It is a definitional character of cultural psychology, and its retention is critical. However, at the same time it needs to consider the implication of culture for human psychology in nature. How we conceptualize culture *in* nature, rather than culture *versus* nature, may point our way into the uncharted waters that is our common future.

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