Routledge Contemporary Japan Series

NEW FRONTIERS IN JAPANESE STUDIES

Edited by
Akihiro Ogawa and Philip Seaton

ROUTLEDGE

New Frontiers in Japanese Studies

Over the last 70 years, Japanese Studies scholarship has gone through several dominant paradigms, from ‘demystifying the Japanese’, to analysis of Japanese economic strength, to discussion of global interest in Japanese popular culture. This book assesses this literature, considering future directions for research into the 2020s and beyond.

Shifting the geographical emphasis of Japanese Studies away from the West to the Asia-Pacific region, this book identifies topic areas in which research focusing on Japan will play an important role in global debates in the coming years. This includes the evolution of area studies, coping with ageing populations, the various patterns of migration and environmental breakdown. With chapters from an international team of contributors, including significant representation from the Asia-Pacific region, this book enacts Yoshio Sugimoto’s notion of ‘cosmopolitan methodology’ to discuss Japan in an interdisciplinary and transnational context and provides overviews of how Japanese Studies is evolving in other Asian countries such as China and Indonesia.

New Frontiers in Japanese Studies is a thought-provoking volume and will be of great interest to students and scholars of Japanese and Asian Studies.

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To our students

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Notes on the text

Rendering Asian people's names in English often causes confusion. It is a widespread convention in Japanese Studies to respect Japanese name order, in other words family name followed by given name (e.g. Nakasone Yasuhiro). However, in this book we have preferred to use the English order of given name followed by family name (i.e. Yasuhiro Nakasone) because the majority of names in the text are best known in that order either as people regularly in English-language news or as scholars who publish in English. There was one chapter in which it felt right to preserve the Asian name order, Chapter 10 by Mooam Hyun, owing to the large number of ordinary Korean and Japanese people mentioned in his chapter who are completely unknown outside the context of the historical events Hyun describes.

In the Romanisation of Japanese names and words, macrons indicate long vowel sounds. However, they are often omitted on words that are familiar in English, such as Tokyo.

It is also customary to note that we as authors and editors have done all we can to ensure an error-free volume. We apologise if any mistakes have slipped in unnoticed.

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The idea of this book originally came from the participants in the International Conference on New Frontiers in Japanese Studies in Melbourne on 17–19 September 2018, which received generous support from the Japan Foundation Grant Program for Japanese Studies Projects for fiscal 2018–2019. At the conference, presenters were asked to consider new approaches and ideas in Japanese Studies scholarship, focusing in particular on the global challenges we face in the twenty-first century.

We also received grants from the University of Melbourne's Asia Institute as part of the centenary celebration of Japanese language teaching, which took place at the University of Melbourne from 2017 to 2019. In 1917, Senkichi 'Moshi' Inagaki began teaching Japanese privately in Melbourne; in 1918 the Reverend Thomas Jollie Smith commenced teaching classes in Japanese language; and in 1919, the two officially began teaching at the University of Melbourne, pioneering Japanese Studies. The centenary was celebrated over three years to acknowledge these consecutive milestones.

The University of Melbourne Law School's Asian Law Centre and Hokkaido University Research Faculty of Media and Communication also provided grants for the above-mentioned conference.

A number of individual chapter contributors have wished to acknowledge providers of their individual research funding, their informants or readers of early versions of their papers. We have left such individual acknowledgements in notes in the chapters. As a research team, we also want to extend our collective thanks to the editorial team at Routledge for all their help and support throughout the process.

This book is a milestone for the Modern Japanese Studies Consortium – a new academic initiative institutionalising collaboration of research hubs in Japanese Studies. The founding institutions of the Consortium are the University of Melbourne Asia Institute and Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS), School of Japan Studies. The Consortium aims to deepen collaborative international research in Japanese Studies and expand student exchange opportunities.

Akihiro Ogawa, *University of Melbourne*
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Introduction

Envisioning new frontiers in Japanese Studies

Akihiro Ogawa and Philip Seaton

Japanese Studies is defined in this book as the interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary study of Japan in the social sciences and humanities, in which analysis of Japan in domestic, international or comparative contexts using both Japanese and non-Japanese sources is disseminated to an international audience. More than simply the 'study of Japan', therefore, Japanese Studies is one of the area studies within academia and higher education. The above definition may be inferred from the professional activities and standards of researchers and teachers within Japanese Studies. The *Journal of Japanese Studies*, for example, calls itself a 'multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary forum for communicating new information, interpretations, and research on Japan' and further states that '[a]uthors are expected to engage with Japanese-language sources and scholarship' (*Journal of Japanese Studies* n.d.).

This focus on language is crucial. While there may be researchers in any disciplinary department who write about Japan, the clear expectation in Japanese Studies is that researchers are proficient to a professional level in the Japanese language, and engage as both readers and writers with scholarly discourse in Japanese. Furthermore, they play a role in interpreting the discourse occurring in Japanese to those unable to access the original Japanese-language debate. Many Japanese Studies academics also consider translation of significant works to be a major component of their work, even if it goes largely unrewarded by the present employee evaluation systems in place in particularly English-speaking universities. On an educational level, the major Japanese Studies departments around the world include intensive language training in the Japanese language alongside a range of social sciences and humanities classes taught in the language of the host country and/or English and/or Japanese.

Early in the twenty-first century, Japanese Studies is in the somewhat strange position of having a sense of crisis while at the same time going from strength to strength. The sense of crisis emanates from a number of factors: Japan's perceived diminishing presence or relevance on the world economic stage, particularly in relation to a rising China; a dearth of higher education funding which has contributed to Japan's universities tumbling down international rankings and denting the perceived quality of research/education in Japan; the general disadvantage that area studies face in comparison to disciplines in the neoliberal competitive frameworks of rankings and impact; and lingering perceptions of Japan as a 'unique' case whose lessons are not necessarily transferable to others. At the same time, Japanese Studies has tremendous potential. Japan remains a world leader in many areas of technological innovation – including disaster prevention, artificial intelligence, robotics and others – which means there is great scope within Japanese Studies to explore the future implications of technological innovation for human society, particularly in ageing advanced industrialised nations. Furthermore, the large global following of Japanese popular culture has meant that demand from students wishing to learn about the language and culture of Japan has never been stronger. Between 1 May 2012 and 1 May 2018 (the period since the Tohoku earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant disaster), total international students in Japan have risen from around 160,000 to 300,000 (JASSO 2019). Combined with rapid growth in inbound tourism to Japan, from 5.2 million people in 2003 to 31.2 million people in 2018 (JNTO 2019), learning about and experiencing Japan have never been more popular. Given that most of this growth in Japan-related interest is generated from within Asia, another priority for Japanese Studies in the twenty-first century becomes apparent: to place Asian scholars and students at the heart of Japanese Studies and to engage in a degree of 'de-Westernisation'.

This book examines 'new frontiers' within Japanese Studies. By 'new frontiers' we are referring partly to this shift in geographical emphasis. Two major publications on the state of Japanese Studies have done so in their own explicitly national contexts: Patricia Steinhoff (2007) has examined the field from an American perspective, while Hugh Cortazzi and Peter Kornicki (2016) have done an equivalent study on Britain. In envisioning Japanese Studies for the next generation, we will build on the work of Kaori Okano, Yoshio Sugimoto and the contributors to the edited volume *Rethinking Japanese Studies: Eurocentrism and the Asia-Pacific Region* (Okano and Sugimoto 2018) and shed light on emerging places and scholars in Japanese Studies in the Asia Pacific region, since the field is still dominated by Western scholars in the United States and Europe. We need to aim to integrate multiple perspectives on Japanese society, particularly those hitherto considered or treated as 'peripheral' (see Ben-Ari 2017), into the field. In so doing, our efforts will push back the existing boundaries of scholarship and generate a more inclusive field of Japanese Studies. To this end, this book includes scholars from a wide range of national backgrounds – Japan, China, South Korea, Russia, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh, as well as the United Kingdom, Germany and Austria – who all have extensive experience living both inside and outside Japan. This is an important prerequisite for creating dialogue on future scholarship about Japan.

We also envision 'new frontiers' as part of a repositioning of Japanese Studies from 'outsiders looking in' to 'insiders looking out'. In other words, the challenge for Japanese Studies is to leave behind the antiquated paradigm of 'unlocking the mysteries of the Japanese and presenting this fascinating and unique culture to the world', and to normalise discussion of Japan as one of the major world economies/cultures and integrate it more fully into global and transnational discourses. This runs slightly against one of the current political trends in Japan, which is to cling somewhat to the antiquated paradigm and see the role of Japanese Studies in Japan as disseminating 'accurate' knowledge about Japan to the world. Instead, while reviewing the history of the distinctive conceptual framework of Japanese Studies, we want to explore new approaches with a particular focus on how the ideas and issues that arise in our research about Japan provide direct solutions to common global challenges in the twenty-first century. Without exploring these new approaches, Japanese Studies will be in perpetual crisis, isolated like a creature that survives on only one of the Galapagos Islands.

Finally, we perceive a 'new frontier' in Japanese Studies as a decisive movement away from the idea that people working in Japanese Studies are primarily presenting case studies while eschewing theoretical contributions to knowledge. In making the case for the wealth of media theory emanating from Japan, Marc Steinberg and Alexander Zahlten (2017, pp. 2–3) note the 'familiar structural imbalance in knowledge production itself … between a West that is figured as the site of Theory, and the Rest as the site of history or raw materials ("texts")'. Japanese Studies scholarship, we argue, has the potential to make important theoretical contributions with broader applications outside Japan, too, if only the broader academy can dispel notions (perhaps 'prejudices' is more accurate) that Japanese Studies is a peripheral area of scholarship that needs only be engaged by 'Japan specialists'. However, this is not simply a question of expecting others to pay attention. Steven Vlastos has made the somewhat harsh critique that, 'The irrelevance of Japan Studies to American academia, I believe, is partly self-imposed: the consequence of indifference if not hostility toward theory' (cited in Tansman 2004, p. 191). This statement may be a little stark, but the new frontier we aim for in this book adheres to its underlying logic: research in Japanese Studies *should* be relevant well beyond those interested in Japan *precisely because* it is making an important theoretical contribution of international relevance. In particular, these theoretical contributions will relate to the most pertinent global issues of our age: wealth, power and inequality in the neoliberal world order; environmental collapse; emerging power rivalries and their historical roots; and the social changes caused by ageing societies, transnational mobility, automation, technological advancement and artificial intelligence.

The history of Japanese Studies

Area studies, including Japanese Studies, have only a relatively short history within the overall history of academia. Patricia Steinhoff (2007) has presented a three-paradigm history of Japanese Studies in the United States. In this section we develop and expand upon her work in both temporal and geographical scope to present a broad picture of where Japanese Studies came from, and therefore where its future trajectories might lie. As indicated in Table 0.1, we consider Japanese Studies from the perspectives of the actors involved in it (divided into Japanese, non-Japanese and, in recent times, multicultural) and the sites of their activities (inside Japan, outside Japan). Broadly speaking, Japanese Studies divides into pre-1945 and post-1945 eras. The prewar era is the foundational stage, while the postwar stage is when professionalised Japanese Studies at universities emerges.

Table 0.1 The phases of Japanese Studies

	Non-Japanese researchers, teachers, students	*Japanese researchers, teachers, students*
Early imperial (to c.*1905)*		
Outside Japan	Japan research largely the preserve of ‘amateurs’ with some experience in Japan. Authorities on the distant, mysterious orient. Development of oriental learned societies.	Japanese travel abroad to learn from the West; treated there as ‘representative living examples’ of the culture.
Inside Japan	The colonial adventurer or expat; the eccentric who has ‘gone native’; invited foreign experts (*o-yatoi gaikokujin*).	Objects of anthropological study introduced by Japanologists to their domestic audience.
Late imperial (to c.*1945)*		
Outside Japan	Beginnings of Japanese language teaching in Western universities. Shift from ‘understanding the culture’ to ‘understanding the enemy/ally’ amidst increasing confrontation and ultimately war.	Handful of Japanese language teachers at Western universities; mass language education in Japan’s colonies.
Inside Japan	The scaling down of the Western presence as war approaches; Japan’s imperial power status and Pan-Asianism bring Asian students/intellectuals to Japan.	Intellectuals (e.g. Kyoto School) ended up supporting and disseminating nationalist positions on the road to war.
Postwar (to 1960s)		
Outside Japan	Pioneers of area studies at Western universities. Professionalisation of Japanese Studies. Cultural interpreters whose training and perspectives are rooted in the war years.	Era of restrictions on travel abroad by ordinary Japanese. Japan largely represented abroad by prewar migrants and their descendants.
Inside Japan	Occupation era workers, and post-occupation area studies pioneers in Japan for fieldwork.	An introspective era as Japan debates defeat and seeks new intellectual directions in the postwar.
Internationalisation (from 1970s to 1980s)		
Outside Japan	Proliferation of Japanese Studies journals and academic societies. Researchers are authorities on a distant but fast-growing economy. Pioneers of area studies in Asia look to Japan as a model.	Pioneers of autonomous study abroad; expatriate researchers teaching language and/or the social sciences and humanities. Subordinate status as ‘foreign lecturers’.

	Non-Japanese researchers, teachers, students	*Japanese researchers, teachers, students*
Inside Japan	Mainly Western language teachers who also write on Japanese society/culture. Subordinate status as 'foreign lecturers'.	*Nihonjinron* discourse; domestic interpreters of the secrets of Japanese success whose voices reach abroad.
Globalisation (from 1990s to 2010s)		
Outside Japan	Holding the reins of academic power in Japanese Studies during the neoliberal educational era of rankings and 'impact factor journals'.	Emergence of the discipline-based Japanese researcher making their career abroad. Breakthrough of some into management.
Transnational	Massive increase in connectivity in the Internet era. Erosion of distinctions between 'Japanese' and 'foreign'. Increasing numbers of multicultural, multilingual researchers build international research careers with a focus on Japan in its international environment.	
Inside Japan	Interest in pop culture displaces interest in economic secrets of success as Japan grows into a major study abroad destination. Emergence of the discipline-based researcher making their career in Japan. Breakthrough of some into management.	Japan-based scholars as international voices either via translation or publishing their work online (mainly) in English. Political and financial backing for 'Japanese Studies in Japan'.
New frontiers (2020s onwards)		
Outside Japan	Diffusion of centres of power to scholars in countries outside the West, particularly in Asia. De-Westernisation of Japanese Studies. Increased collaboration between Japanese Studies and the natural sciences.	The internationally mobile scholar whose reputation and seniority are increasingly unchained from nationality.
Transnational	Japanese Studies becomes ever more multicultural, multilingual, interdisciplinary and transnational in nature. Japan's role in combatting climate breakdown (environment), ageing society and migration (human mobility) emerge as core issues.	
Inside Japan	The internationally mobile scholar whose reputation and seniority are increasingly unchained from nationality.	Japanese Studies reoriented towards global rather than domestic issues. Deepened relationships with Asia. Increased collaboration with researchers from the natural sciences.

Japanese Studies traces its roots back to the earliest learned journals focusing on Japan. The Asiatic Society of Japan is Japan's oldest learned society publishing research on Japan, but its website (ASJ n.d.) in 2019 says:

> ASJ's members have met regularly since the first meeting in Yokohama in 1872. As in Hepburn's day, we come from many professions and occupations. What unites us is our aspiration to scholarliness by how we pursue our investigations and discoveries about Asiatic Countries, most especially Japan.

This places the Society outside modern academic Japanese Studies, but this pioneering organisation and its journal clearly occupy important positions in the history of Japanese Studies. The oldest of the major academic journals within the contemporary field of Japanese Studies is *Monumenta Nipponica* (established at Sophia University in 1938), but most other key journals date from the 1970s onwards. There was another key turning point in the 2000s with the emergence of online journals such as the *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*.

There is a similarly long gestation of Japanese language teaching. Masaaki Seki identifies three main periods: assisting foreigners in Japan to learn Japanese (up to the end of the nineteenth century), Japanese language education as a tool of imperialism (to 1945) and Japanese language teaching as part of international exchange (the postwar period) (Seki 1997, p. 5). During the first few decades of the twentieth century, Japanese language classes started to be offered at some Western universities. In Britain the School of Oriental Studies (now SOAS, University of London) had the first Japanese language courses from 1917 (Oba 1995, p. 3; Gerstle and Cummings 2016), while in Australia, Moshi Inagaki started teaching at the University of Melbourne in 1917 and, in the United States, Princeton University founded the Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures in 1927 and Japanese language classes started at Harvard University in the 1930s. The main practice of Japanese language education, however, was in primary and secondary schools in Japan's prewar and wartime colonies. Here, teaching new imperial subjects the Japanese language was integral to imperial policy.

While these foundations of modern Japanese Studies were laid before the Second World War, interdisciplinary area studies primarily began in the United States after the Second World War. As Alan Tansman notes, 'Before the war, the field was dominated by part-time practitioners and amateurs offering only the bare beginnings of training' (2004, p. 186). After the war, the creation of new area studies was a response to American demand for knowledge about enemies and external threats, for example, the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the United Kingdom, too, Asian Studies departments emerged. For example, the University of Sheffield's School of East Asian Studies started in 1963 and was 'a pioneer of the "dual degree" system, in which East Asian languages are taught together with the social sciences and other disciplines – an approach which is now standard throughout the UK' (University of Sheffield n.d.).

Japanese Studies was a frontrunner in this context. Published in 1946, Ruth Benedict's classic anthropological work *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*:

Patterns of Japanese Culture (1946) was originally a product of wartime research that aimed to understand and even predict the so-called irrational behaviour of Japanese people. Into the postwar era, the war continued to play a role in shaping Japanese Studies. Many of the big names of these early postwar years, such as Donald Keene, Ian Nish, Ronald Dore or Edwin Reischauer, either received their language training in the context of war- or occupation-era needs, or their lives in Japan (often as the children of missionaries) had been greatly disrupted by the war (see Oguma 2018).

Benedict's book significantly shaped American perceptions of Japanese culture by using what we call a 'national character approach', a form of stereotyped characterisation of a nation that focuses on only one or a few of the attributes of its people. Key descriptors included *bushido*, *kabuki*, *noh* and *geisha*. Along with Ruth Benedict, we should not forget John Embree's pioneering work with his wife Ella on Suye Mura (Embree 1939). He conducted fieldwork in rural Kumamoto in the mid-1930s, which culminated in the first ethnographic study of Japan by a Westerner. Embree's project was part of a larger study conducted at the University of Chicago under the direction of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown on societies in East Asia. The early research tradition seemed to adhere to 'essentialism', the claim that scholars ought to work from the assumption that certain cultural features have always been present in any society, and that their job is simply to find and record these essential features and document how they have persisted over centuries virtually unchanged. However, in the postwar context with Japanese views and voices weakened or discredited following defeat, it would take a couple of decades (perhaps until Yasunari Kawabata's Nobel Prize for Literature in 1968) before the Western academy felt it needed to listen more carefully again to Japanese voices.

By the 1970s, the Japanese economic miracle was in full swing and Japan was once again an economic and cultural force to be reckoned with. During this period, a genre called *Nihonjinron* (literally, theories of the Japanese) developed within Japan that had significant impact on scholarship by non-Japanese. *Nihonjinron* works were in the model of Ruth Benedict's cultural relativism, which states that each culture has its own moral imperatives that can be understood only if one studies that culture as a whole. This idea was originally advocated by Franz Boas, a pioneer of modern anthropology who has been called the 'father of American anthropology' in the early twentieth century. During this time, the *Nihonjinron* type of literature enjoyed a heyday as Japan expanded its economic presence globally into the asset-inflated bubble economy of the late 1980s. The Japanese language also received considerable attention as a medium for business communication.

The *Nihonjinron* framework addressed the distinctive characteristics of Japanese personality, culture and society. Its underlying claims were that Japan is 'uniquely unique', or fundamentally and qualitatively different from Western societies. Chie Nakane's argument on Japan's vertically structured society (1970) and Takeo Doi's *amae* (roughly 'dependency orientation' [1973]) are two important contributions to Japanese Studies scholarship. They also represent the two major routes by which Japanese scholars were contributing to the emerging field of Japanese Studies from the 1960s: either as internationally respected scholars publishing in English (Nakane's seminal *Japanese Society* appeared in 1970) or as scholars publishing in Japanese whose work was considered important to the field and published in English translation.

A further characteristic of work in this period is that Japan was frequently contrasted with 'the West' and particularly America. The so-called 'group model' and the 'general middle-class society model' drew on generalisations about Japanese society, presenting it as a uniform entity with little internal variation. This contrasted with the more individualistic West. Contrasts with other Asian countries were conspicuous by their absence. Out of such discourse came some of the words frequently associated with Japan even to this day, such as 'unique' and 'homogeneous'. *Nihonjinron* discourse – either works by Japanese or works presenting similar arguments in English and other languages – has been extensively criticised for its essentialism and resorting to stereotype (for example, Dale 1986/2011; Befu 2001), although as Ian Littlewood has argued, the enduring power of stereotypes is that there is often a heavy element of truth to them which resonates clearly with many people (1996, p. xiii).

Japan's emerging economic presence was a significant issue in Japanese Studies. Pioneers of area studies in Asia looked to Japan as a model. For example, Harvard scholar Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One* (1979) also brought Japan's management cases to the global convergence debate, which was originally started by Ronald Dore's book *British Factory: Japanese Factory* (1973). These works argue that the world is converging on patterns that are prevalent in Japanese society, as evidenced by the widespread adoption of various elements of the Japanese management model by multinational corporations of Western origin. Chalmers Johnson's book *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (1982), which is a study on the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, is in line with this tradition. Johnson coined the term 'developmental state', which refers to a state that is focused on economic development and takes necessary policy measures to accomplish that objective. He argued that Japanese capitalism was a different kind of capitalism based on the 'developmental state' model, in which the national bureaucracy played a pivotal role in shaping national policy in Japan's national interests only. American universities have indeed played a significant role in Japanese Studies over the past century. Many universities, including Ivy League schools, established area studies departments and programmes to promote understanding as well as to enhance knowledge about Japan and thus produced many prominent Japan specialists.

These two paradigms of Steinhoff's (2007) model equate to the phases we have called 'Postwar' and 'Internationalisation' in Table 0.1. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Ruth Benedict type of Japanology paradigm flourished. The second paradigm was led by the *Nihonjinron* scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s and featured groupist Japan, including lifetime employment, enterprise unions, *kanban* for lean manufacturing and elite bureaucrats. In Asia, meanwhile, countries were winning their independence from former colonial masters and looking increasingly to Japan as an example of a non-Western economic success story. Relations between Japan and other Asian countries remain deeply affected by the events of Japanese imperialism, but this has always coincided with admiration for Japan's achievements. Chapters 4 by Yi Zou and Chapter 5 by Himawan Pratama and Antonius R. Pujo Purnomo focus on the two countries with the largest number of learners of the Japanese language in 2015, China and Indonesia, according to surveys conducted by the Japan Foundation. These surveys, selections from which are presented in the Appendix, indicate the massive growth in Japanese language education in Asia since the Japan Foundation was established in 1972. The simple fact that more people study the Japanese language at the higher education level in mainland China than in all of the other countries of the world put together indicates clearly why a focus on Japanese Studies in Asia is long overdue. Asia also has a history of Japan area studies going back almost as far as area studies in the West. The Japanese Studies Program at Ateneo de Manila University, established in 1966, calls itself the first Japanese Studies Program in Southeast Asia (Ateneo de Manila University n.d.). This places the beginnings of Japanese Studies in universities in Asia just after the equivalent launches of area studies in the United States and Europe.

Steinhoff's third paradigm, what we have called 'Globalisation' (Table 0.1) started around the new millennium, as Japanese cultural commodities – in particular, pop culture goods and materials, including manga, anime, sushi, karaoke and J-pop – spread around the world, displacing academic interest in the economic secrets of Japan's success. The development was in tandem with the Cool Japan initiative, a Japanese government-sponsored campaign to create a new global image of Japan. Non-elite, young people were at the forefront of the analysis. Yoshio Sugimoto, a major critic of *Nihonjinron* discourse, points out an important paradigm shift observed in Japanese Studies in his recent article entitled 'Japanese society: Inside out and outside in', which was published in *International Sociology* in 2014, saying that 'Since the 1990s, … a paradigm has been in progress and the self-glorifying *Nihonjinron* discourse has shown signs of waning.… Japanese society is now increasingly characterized by internal variations and class rivalries, comparable to advanced economies' (2014: 194). As the globalisation process accelerates, Sugimoto continues: 'Japanese society came from being a group-oriented society to a more "multi-ethnic" or multicultural society, as well as a "multiclass", or as we call it, a *kakusa* or divided class society.'

This changing focus of Japan-related scholarship has taken place against the background of major changes across academia. Various developments in the profession – such as the concentration of academic power in Japanese Studies during the neoliberal era (clustered around the leading journals), the establishment of international university rankings, the prominence of metrics and 'impact' in research, and the role of the Internet in transforming the ways that knowledge is produced and disseminated – have all had arguably an impact on Japanese Studies equally as great as the changing subjects of Japan-related research in each era. Area studies journals tend to be weak in terms of citation counts and ranking points, so scholars often face institutional pressure to publish in discipline journals with higher impact factors. Challenges to area studies have also emerged, such as the concept of 'anti-area studies' proposed by Tessa Morris-Suzuki. In this view, a propensity to analyse from centres of political and cultural power overlooks, indeed hardens, the borders where people and cultures meet. Morris-Suzuki (2004, p. 101) writes:

> 'Anti-Area Studies' seeks to examine a specific social, political or historical *problem* from *widely differing* geographical vantage points. In this way, it aims to promote cross-border exchanges of ideas about common problems faced by many countries and regions in our complex and globalized world.

However, while scholars may find ideas such as 'anti-area studies' attractive and entirely intuitive on an intellectual level, at the same time universities remain highly dependent on public money and accreditation under national educational laws. National government, therefore, has a major say in the structure, and in some cases curriculum, of higher education institutions. A notable political trend in Japan since the 1980s is to develop 'Japanese Studies in Japan' as what might even be called part of Japan's soft power strategy. The International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) was established in 1987 under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. It is funded directly by central government and disseminates research via its in-house journals (*Japan Review*, *Nihon Kenkyū*) and book series. The *Social Science Japan Journal*, meanwhile, was established in 1998 at the University of Tokyo, and the Japan Library book publishing project takes seminal works in Japanese and organises their translation into English. In all these publication initiatives, the funding for translation or proof-reading provided to non-native English speakers is a conspicuous feature. Taken together these various projects constitute a key indication that Japanese actors – researchers, publishers, institutions – want a central role in how Japan is presented abroad, primarily but not exclusively in the English language.

Furthermore, since the Global 30 initiative of 2007, an Education Ministry-led project that aims to promote internationalisation of the academic environment of Japanese universities, leading Japanese universities have been encouraged to produce courses in English aimed at international students focusing on Japan, for example the Japan in East Asia degree as part of the PEAK (Programs in English at Komaba) initiative at the University of Tokyo. According to the programme website (University of Tokyo 2019), 'The Japan in East Asia Program aims to provide students with a wide range of social science and humanities courses to develop an advanced understanding of Japanese/East Asian politics, economy, society and culture in a global context.' The trend has quickly shifted from 'courses in English' to 'bilingual courses', and others have created projects independently. For example, the pioneering bilingual degree at Hokkaido University, the Modern Japanese Studies Program (MJSP), requires international students to take regular content classes in Japanese alongside Japanese classmates as a graduation requirement. Students can choose one of two modules: (1) history and culture and (2) society and political economy (Hokkaido University 2019). The latest stage of this process is the establishment of the first full department of Japanese Studies at a national university, the School of Japan Studies, at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in April 2019. This department, again bilingual, accepts students via three entry routes – a standard university entrance exam for domestic students, the Examination for Japanese University Admission for International Students (EJU) for overseas high school graduates with advanced Japanese, and an interview-based selection process for English-speaking candidates without Japanese language skills.

In such endeavours, Japan is not acting alone but merely doing what other nations do as part of cultural diplomacy. Central governments provide funding for organisations such as the British Council, the Confucius Institute and the Japan Foundation, and provide funding and administrative backing to universities for language teaching and area studies. Scholars, therefore, must find a balance between fulfilling their job descriptions as people who 'work for' Japanese Studies, but at the same time retain their independence and integrity as researcher-teachers. This can be especially difficult when researching and teaching internationally politicised topics, such as the 'comfort women' issue.

The final major change in Japanese Studies in the past two decades has been the rapid emergence of Asian Japanese Studies. Eyal Ben-Ari concludes his study of 'Peripherality and provinciality in Japanese Studies' with the comment, 'For the foreseeable future, however, younger scholars seen to achieve global acknowledgement have to play by the rules of the dominant English-using academic system' (2017, p. 40). However, while English-language scholarship continues to dominate, in terms of raw numbers of students and researchers of Japan, Asian students already greatly outnumber all other learners of the Japanese language. According to the Japan Foundation's 2015 survey, 48.2 per cent of overseas Japanese learners are in East Asia and a further 29.9 per cent are in Southeast Asia (Japan Foundation 2017, p. 10). Of the 298,980 international students in Japan on 1 May 2018, 93.4 per cent were from Asia, of whom 114,950 (38.4 per cent) were Chinese (JASSO 2019). Given these numbers, it is inconceivable that the present Western-dominated field of Japanese Studies can continue indefinitely, especially given the meteoric rise of Chinese universities up international university rankings on the back of heavy financial investment by the Chinese government. Other nations are emerging fast, too, particularly countries like Indonesia and Vietnam where there is strong interest in Japan. So, while the English language has been predominant, it is likely that trilingualism will soon be the new normal in Asian area studies, or Japanese Studies in Asian languages will become less 'peripheral' and more 'central', to use Ben-Ari's (2017) terminology. Most Asian researchers are already there, speaking their mother tongue, English and Japanese. English-speaking and Japanese-speaking researchers (not usually renowned for their multilingual capabilities) will find it increasingly necessary to speak a third language in order to keep up. And while the current university rankings systems (particularly the Times Higher Education rankings) confer considerable advantages on the English-speaking world, the day when citation rates for ranking journals in Chinese eclipse those in English-language journals is surely not too far off.

Going beyond methodological nationalism

As discussed at the beginning of this introduction, this book aims to create a future-oriented discussion, addressing global challenges and Japan's relevance to them. We Japan specialists need to make a major effort to locate or directly connect Japanese Studies scholarship to the dynamism of global state-of-the-art studies on social sciences and humanities. For this purpose, while observing the strong legacy of previous research traditions in Japanese Studies, we propose the need to actively go beyond the traditionally dominant conceptual framework. We have identified reorienting the geographical scope of Japanese Studies towards the Asia Pacific, the importance of linking Japan into global discourses and prioritising the theoretical contributions that can be made by scholars working in Japanese Studies. If we were to summarise this in one phrase it would be 'going beyond methodological nationalism'.

Methodological nationalism can be defined as an assumption that the nation-state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity (Beck 2000, pp. 21–24). Because of methodological nationalism, Japanese Studies has limited its audience as well as its academic potentiality. In the 1970s, Anthony Giddens (1973, p. 265) had already made the following claim:

> The primary unit of sociological analysis, the sociologists' 'society' – in relation to the industrialised world at least – has always been, and must continue to be, the administratively bounded nation-state. But 'society' in this sense, has never been the isolated, the 'internally developing' system which has normally been implied in social theory.

He continues:

> In fact, any adequate understanding of the development of the advanced societies presupposes the recognition that factors making for 'endogenous' evolution always combine with influences from 'the outside' in determining the transformations to which a society is a subject.

The principle of modernity has been mainly articulated within a discussion of nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the cornerstones of a social sciences analysis. Indeed, it has governed our research imagination. The nationally bounded structure of the research imagination incapacitates it from making sense of a world that is no longer organised around the nation-state.

Probably the most salient critique of methodological nationalism's contribution to contemporary scholarship has come from Ulrich Beck. It is none other than Beck himself who brought methodological nationalism back into the current debate, and references to it became more prominent in his later publications. Beck says, '[S]uch theorists as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and even Karl Marx shared a territorial definition of modern society, and thus a model of society centred on the national-state, which has today been shaken by globality and globalization' (Beck 2000, p. 24). Beck further says:

> Social science must be re-established as a transnational science of the reality of denationalization, transnationalization, and 're-ethnification' in a global age – and this on the levels of concepts, theories and methodologies as well as organizationally. This entails that the fundamental concepts of 'modern society' must be re-examined.
>
> (2002, pp. 53–54)

Methodological nationalism, which subsumes society under the nation-state, has until now made this task almost impossible. The alternative, a 'cosmopolitan outlook', is a contested term and project (Beck and Sznaider 2006). To re-conceptualise Japanese Studies, we need to open up new horizons by demonstrating how we can make the empirical investigation of border crossings and other transnational phenomena possible. Beck calls such investigations 'methodological cosmopolitanism' (2006, p. 17), stating that a nation-based outlook is inadequate and too 'soft' a category to 'capture the cosmopolitan challenge of the twenty-first century' (2012, p. 7). This approach can tackle 'what had previously been analytically excluded as a sort of silent cartel of divided fundamental convictions' (Beck 2002, p. 52). Beck raises topics that we need to re-examine, including 'household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, politics' (2002, p. 52). We believe our epistemology must change so that it matches the ways in which the contemporary world is being transformed.

Japan finds itself amidst the fierce global interactions of people and ideas as our scholarship moves towards 'new frontiers' in the 2020s. The methodology we employ in this book is in line with what Sugimoto proposed – *cosmopolitan methodology* (2018, p. 181) as the new cornerstone of Japanese Studies. Sugimoto argues, '[I]t is multiversal universalism, an attempt to bring a variety of non-Western frameworks into global conversation without contending that there should be one single mode of analysis'. He continues, '[I]t is cosmopolitan in transcending national borders and national interests while searching for indigenous, native and homegrown ideas and insights for worldwide dialogue'.

In the case of Japanese Studies, we can recapitulate a battery of questions inspired by such a vision. Which Japanese homegrown concepts and theories deserve international debate? How can we circumvent institutional and structural impediments to the transnational circulation of Japanese social science scholarship? How can marginal and provincial scholars in Japanese Studies collaborate to counter the Eurocentric dominance? Japanese Studies is becoming ever more multicultural, multilingual, interdisciplinary and transnational in nature.

Japan also has an emerging role in addressing the issues of climate breakdown (global heating), ageing society and migration (human mobility), and we foresee these being the new research paradigms of Japanese Studies in the upcoming decades, largely replacing the current focus on pop culture. The research will directly address Japan's policymaking, exploring practical solutions for 'real-world' problems in and between organisations, communities and networks through the analysis of the state, business and civil society. Japan has accumulated substantial knowledge to deal with these emerging issues over the past decades, and through scholarly commitments, Japan specialists, who are increasingly unchained from nationality nowadays, are able to actively contribute to innovative collaborations to make actual changes. With this in mind we have assembled a collection of papers that share this vision of 'new frontiers' in Japanese Studies.

Structure of the book

This introductory chapter is followed by 16 chapters in four parts: 'Rethinking Japanese area studies in the twenty-first century', 'Coping with an ageing society', 'Migration and mobility' and 'The environment'.

The first part (Chapters 1–5) envisions potential directions for Japanese Studies in the twenty-first century. Mihalopoulos (Chapter 1) argues that the call for new approaches to Japanese Studies poses a series of interesting challenges such as what should be its unit of analysis. To answer this question, he refers to a body of recent scholarship on the *Maria Luz* Incident which some have heralded as the de-Westernising of world history. He claims that this scholarship relies heavily on an area studies approach, and constructs an understanding of Japanese modern history based on its adaption and evolution via Western encounters. He views the *Maria Luz* Incident from the lens of the global history of labour migration and human trafficking. Seaton (Chapter 2) offers another provocative argument to make Japanese Studies relevant in the twenty-first century. He says topics should be identified that not only feature Japan as an important case study on a theme of global relevance, but also in which Japan takes a lead in theoretical discussions and identifying global implications. One such topic is the Japanese concept of 'contents tourism' (tourism induced by works of popular culture). Seaton's chapter discusses how tourism scholars with little prior focus on Asia have started incorporating contents tourism theory into their work on other regions/countries. Ohashi and Ohashi (Chapter 3), meanwhile, scrutinise teaching practices. They shed light on the interrelations of teaching 'Japanese language' and 'Japanese Studies' in an attempt to suggest a new direction addressing current global challenges. Defining 'intercultural learning' as a space where learners position themselves beyond national boundaries and identities, their chapter illustrates some examples of teaching Japanese language and Japanese Studies which maximise the benefits of intercultural learning.

In the final two chapters of the opening part, three emerging scholars from China and Indonesia document a new dynamism in Japanese Studies in their countries. Zou (Chapter 4) claims that the nature of Japanese Studies in China significantly mirrors key trends of Sino-Japanese relations. She also highlights the domestic challenges faced by Chinese scholars in researching Japan and presenting their research against the backdrop of fluctuating Sino-Japanese relations. Pratama and Purnomo (Chapter 5) argue the importance of maintaining a balance in the patron–client relationship between Indonesia and Japan within academic contexts, as well as incorporating insights from Indonesia in the study of Japan.

The second part (Chapters 6–8) focuses on ageing and demographic change. Although Tokyo is branded as a city of youth and hope after the 2020 Olympic Games, Sneep (Chapter 6) points out that in the coming decades well over a third of its residents will be over 65. Governmental bodies have been actively seeking solutions for anticipated ageing-related problems for decades. One solution being discussed, highlighted by the 2020 Olympics, is the implementation of universal design in public spaces for easier access; in other words, making Tokyo 'barrier-free'. Sneep critically analyses the history and current implementation of the concept, pointing out that it seems to be increasingly commercialised. In the next two chapters, while engaging discussion of the government's policy for combating an ageing society, both Navallo and Jabar look at elderly care from the perspective of Filipino immigrants in Japan. Navallo (Chapter 7) discusses Filipino carers of the elderly in long-term care facilities. She explores care as embodied interaction in the context of institutional elderly care settings in Japan. She finds that the relational nature of care expands the institutionalised individuals' experience of long-term care. Moreover, caregiving by Filipino workers expands elderly people's interactions with foreign migrants to a more intimate nature. Jabar (Chapter 8), meanwhile, examines the role of a Catholic Church-based organisation of Filipino immigrants (specifically, Filipina wives of Japanese husbands) in Japan providing care to their fellow Filipino immigrants. Care in this regard is not only health care but also spiritual, psychological and financial care. He argues that issues of health, ageing and death should be dealt with beyond their biomedical aspects, meaning that there are cultural nuances surrounding such issues, and only those who understand the culture can provide for the specific health, ageing and death care needs of immigrants.

The third part (Chapters 9–14) discusses migration and mobility in both historical and contemporary contexts. Both Paichadze and Hyun look at human mobility in the early post-Second World War period. Paichadze (Chapter 9) focuses on returnees from Sakhalin who arrived in Japan from the 1960s, presenting the characteristics of each period of repatriation/return. Based on extensive interviews with the first and especially second generation of Sakhalin returnees, she analyses their experiences upon returning to Japan and the processes of their integration into Japanese society. Further, Hyun (Chapter 10) explores the lives of Japanese women in South Korea during the postwar period, and considers their movement and settlement while tracing the political negotiations between Japan and South Korea. He further points out the postwar landscape of the Japanese empire, distorted by the consequences of colonial policy involving the Japanese and Koreans colliding with the 'border' of the nation-state.

The next two accounts by Horiguchi and Rahman discuss the non-Japanese population in Japan. Drawing on interviews with previous Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme participants, Horiguchi (Chapter 11) reveals how these Western scholars are ‘wanted’ as symbols of ‘internationalisation’ and hence enjoy ‘privileged’ status in Japan, while finding themselves marginalised in scholarly communities at global and local levels. By critically examining how these JET-alumni scholars perform and negotiate their academic and personal identities, she highlights tensions and connections between the ‘core’ and ‘peripheries’ of the twenty-first century academic ‘world system’, as well as those between area studies and disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Rahman (Chapter 12) provides an analysis of the opportunities and challenges faced by Bangladeshi language students, one of the smaller national groupings in Japan. He argues that language students are subject to economic exploitation by migration agents due to their lack of knowledge about language school admission, visa applications and settlement in Japan. Rahman claims that student migration comprises a significant subset of international migration, and contributes to previous debates centring on the brain drain/gain in the sending and receiving countries.

The next two chapters discuss Japanese people going abroad. Steele (Chapter 13) examines the Supreme Court of Japan’s overseas training and research programme since the early 2000s, hosted by Melbourne Law School’s Asian Law Centre. Analysing the visiting judges’ responses to a questionnaire about their experiences, she considers the potential longer-term benefits to the Japanese judiciary that such a programme offers, and also the challenges inherent in engaging in meaningful judicial and intellectual cross-cultural exchange. Klien’s ethnography (Chapter 14) documents the trajectories of Japanese individuals who have relocated to Europe and opt for self-created work in the creative sector. She argues that Japanese migrants relocate for reasons of self-growth, inspiration and change. While expressing high satisfaction with their daily lives, having eschewed conventional careers and familial engagement, they also mention their sense of liminality and pressure to turn their lives overseas into a personally fulfilling experience. By focusing on transnational Japanese who seek to pursue global careers, yet refer to Japan in multiple ways, her chapter explores new directions for Japanese Studies beyond Japan.

The last part (Chapters 15–16) is about the environment and proposes ways of locating Japanese experiences within transnational/global contexts. Avenell (Chapter 15) examines the transnational activism born out of Japan’s domestic experience with industrial pollution as a possible new frontier in the study of Japan. Moreover, Japan’s experience with industrial pollution and other environmental challenges can potentially enrich our understanding of these issues within our own backyards, as well as globally. He argues that one departure point for producing new knowledge on Japan may lie in a conceptual dissolution of the rigid borders of the country, and an embrace of regional and global perspectives. Meanwhile, Ogawa (Chapter 16) argues that Japan has assumed a central position within global discourses on energy since the 2011 catastrophic earthquake and tsunami that caused radiation leakage from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. One of the major issues Japanese society faces today is revising its energy policy and production. He documents a strong grassroots movement towards renewability and sustainability, and for greater local control over energy production and more extensive public participation. People referred to such renewable-energy-derived electricity as 'community power'.

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Part I

Rethinking Japanese area studies in the twenty-first century

1 Rethinking the *Maria Luz* Incident

Methodological cosmopolitanism and Meiji Japan

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This chapter is a response to a call for new approaches to Japanese Studies. The call posed a series of interesting challenges. Here I would like to focus on one of these challenges: What is the unit of analysis for Japanese Studies and how does this unit of analysis fit into the problems of the twenty-first century? Embedded in this challenge is a tacit assumption that requires revisiting. Can we assume in the current phase of globalisation that all societies exist on a plateau of equivalence and that by studying Japan we simultaneously map the forces of change that shape the modern world?

We take up this question by returning to recent scholarship in Japanese history on the *Maria Luz* Incident which some have heralded as the de-Westernising of world history. This scholarship has linked the freeing of Japanese licensed prostitutes to a 'shared global culture of modernity' as the idea of freedom moves from the West to Japan – 'within the great "master narrative" of nineteenth-century liberalism' – culminating with the Japanese drawing up constitutions that guarantee individual rights (Botsman 2011, p. 1347). In the process, the articulation of individual rights becomes the definition of modernisation.

Many see this type of scholarship as the future of Japanese Studies. I am sceptical of such claims.

The *Maria Luz* Incident (1872) was a colourful diplomatic episode that involved two civil suits brought in front of a hastily arranged court in the Kanagawa Prefectural Office. The court was created for the specific purpose of adjudicating the *Maria Luz* captain's treatment of his Chinese 'passengers' while the ship was anchored for repairs in Yokohama Port (Kanagawa Kencho 1874, pp. 9–10; Foreign Department 1872, pp. 1–2). From the outset the court faced intense scrutiny from the local foreign community. The consensus among the foreign consuls was that the Japanese government did not have the authority to intervene (Gaimushō 1953, p. 443). Ships played a dual role in nineteenth century international law. The *Maria Luz* was a vector of Peruvian law traversing the ocean space, which made dealings onboard the *Maria Luz* outside Japanese jurisdiction (Benton 2005, p. 704). The Kanagawa court also faced other legitimacy constraints. The hearing had to follow international legal norms. Japanese authorities and their advisers were highly vigilant in ensuring that the court paid obeisance to the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*: a person should not face punishment for an act that was not prohibited by existing law.

The first civil action was by nine of the 230 Chinese indentured labourers, the 'passengers' of the Peruvian ship *Maria Luz*, against Captain Hereira. The suit claimed that Hereira subjected the men to beatings and chains; forced them to travel in overcrowded conditions with insufficient food; and that a significant number of men were kidnapped and forced to sign indentured contracts after the ship had sailed from Macao. The second lawsuit was by Hereira. He petitioned the ad hoc court to enforce the indenture contracts and order all bonded Chinese labourers to complete their journey to Peru. The Chinese labourers were no longer passengers but cargo that he had been commissioned to deliver from Macao to Peru.

Yuriko Yokoyama and Daniel Botsman have framed the *Maria Luz* Incident as the moment Japan embraced rights discourse and practice. This research, especially the scholarship by Botsman, has been well received and touted as the future direction of Japanese Studies. Both authors stress that the incident was a pivotal moment in the transition of Meiji Japan from a pre-modern status society to a modern political and economic order (Yokoyama 2016, pp. 161–198; Botsman 2011, pp. 1323–1347).[2] The shared inference is that the modern coalesces with the origins of liberalism. The modern constitutes a rupture in time when rigid kinship obligations, feudal duties and inflexible hierarchical structures dissipate, replaced by a secular state rooted in legalism that gives free play to individual interests and spontaneous horizontal associations. But there are also distinct analytical differences which need to be highlighted.

As an alternative to the epochal narrative posited by Yokoyama and Botsman, this chapter argues Japan was already integrated into a global labour regime in which contract and consent formed interrelated ideas and practices prior to the *Maria Luz* Incident. This will be done by redirecting focus to the compatibility of narrower ideas of freedom (the freedom to enter into contracts) with seemingly 'traditional' relationships of subordination, in this case of women engaged in licensed prostitution.

Convergence: Japan in the world

The recent historical revision of the *Maria Luz* Incident relies heavily on an area studies template that takes the Japanese nation as the unit of analysis, and historical time as unified, directed and meaningful. History plays a specific role in area studies; it signifies the fruit of linear progress and follows the model of growth called modernisation and convergence theory (Harootunian 2019, p. 27). Following area studies convention, Botsman confines the history of slavery to the boundaries of the Japanese nation-state. Trading in people (*jinshin baibai*) was banned in sixteenth century Japan but the practice of 'hereditary servants' continued to exist. The idea of slavery as a model of economic development, however, had not lost currency, coming to the fore again in proposals to the deliberative assembly (*Kōgisho*) established by the Meiji government in 1869 (Botsman 2011, pp. 1325–1328).

According to Botsman, the abolition of slavery in the United States served as the outlet for the idea of freedom to spread across the globe. In the context of Japan, the *Maria Luz* Incident introduced the language of US abolition struggles to Japanese domestic politics (Botsman 2011, pp. 1325, 1344). The metaphor of slavery became attached to the domestic issue of licensed prostitution. During the *Maria Luz* hearings, the court's attention was drawn to the similarities between the Chinese labourers' indenture contracts and the terms of service of Japanese licensed prostitutes (*Japan Weekly Mail* 1872b, pp. 613–614). Both sets of contracts were for a duration of six to eight years, transferable to a third party, and gave the employer/brothel keeper the right to use various forms of coercion including corporeal punishment to enforce the performance of the contract (Yokoyama 2016, pp. 174–178; Hansard 1872).

The court ruled to free the bonded Chinese labourers from their contracts. For Botsman, the verdict held great significance. The judgment allowed the Meiji government to 'push ahead with reforms' that otherwise may have proceeded more slowly (Botsman 2011, p. 1341). On 2 October, the Council of State (*Dajōkan*) issued what has come to be known as the *Geishōgi kaihōrei*, which Botsman translates as the '*Emancipation* Edict [my emphasis] for the Female Performers and Prostitutes'. For Botsman, the ratification of the edict was momentous. The 'emancipation' of prostitutes acted as a conduit for the introduction of the ideas of freedom and liberation to Japan that flowered into 'a powerful new opposition movement, the "Movement for Freedom and Popular Rights" (*jiyū minken undō*)', which successfully pressured the ruling oligarchy to 'promulgate a modern constitution that enshrined in law the principle of popular representation' (Botsman 2011, pp. 1324, 1343–1344).

For Botsman, the watershed moment in Japan's historic modernisation makeover was the instant the idea of emancipation travelled from the American civil war to Europe to Asia, culminating with the Japanese drawing up constitutions and legal frameworks guaranteeing the rights of individuals. His ability to insert Meiji Japan firmly in 'the "master narrative" of nineteenth-century liberalism' has understandably received much attention (Botsman 2011, p. 1346). But this kind of attitude presupposes a dogmatic view of history as the progress of human spirit. It anticipates the primacy of individual interest, rights and self-determination as the markers of Japan's modernisation makeover.

Yokoyama shares many of Botsman's assumptions. However, she is at variance with him around the issue of gender. Yokoyama does not see the *Geishōgi kaihōrei* as an emancipation moment. She believes the *Geishōgi kaihōrei* is better understood as an 'Edict for the *Release* [my emphasis] of Female Performers and Prostitutes' because it exonerated licensed prostitutes from their 'sexual-debt' contracts (Yokoyama 2016, p. 183). Yokoyama stresses that in pre-Meiji Japan the brothel owner and pleasure quarter (*yūkaku*) associations or guilds had the authority to enforce 'sexual-debt slavery' contracts (*miuri-bōkō*). This authority was a concession for ensuring the management and policing of the sex industry inside and outside the designated pleasure quarters (Yokoyama 2016, pp. 178–182). For Yokoyama, the significance of the *Geishōgi kaihōrei* was that it dissolved the arbitrary powers the brothel owner possessed over the body of the licensed prostitute and gave them the mobility and freedom to choose where they worked. The edict along with the introduction of the 'room rental' (*kashizashiki*) licensing system made the selling of sex a matter of individual will. Women wanting to engage in licensed prostitution had the capacity to choose where they wanted to work.

While Yokoyama sees the edict as a 'reaction by Japan to the dilemma and development of the 19th century's new human-rights thinking with regard to slavery' (2016, p. 193), she disagrees with Botsman over the origins of the new consciousness in human rights entering Japan. Yokoyama links the 1872 release of Japanese licensed prostitutes from service to the Contagious Disease Act repeal campaigns led by Josephine Butler in the United Kingdom, which highlighted how compulsory venereal examinations were a violation of a woman's dignity and constituted what 'we would now call human-rights abuse' (2016, pp. 192–193).

The strengths of Yokoyama's work are her exceptional archival research and empirical depth. Yokoyama's methodological grid, however, is a reworking of the tradition-versus-modernity distinction that has defined Japanese Studies. Yokoyama too anticipates rights and self-determination as the markers of modernisation. Her research echoes the observations Maine made over 150 years ago: history was the movement from 'premodern' status societies to 'modern' contractual societies (1983, pp. 172–173).

The critique of Yokoyama and Botsman highlights the major challenge found even in the most accomplished research when it comes to studying Meiji Japan: namely, that more often than not, the default analytical setting is an evolutionary model of development which anticipates rights and self-determination as the markers of modernity. Alternative perspectives can refine both understandings of the *Maria Luz* Incident and analyses of the relation between Meiji Japan and global historical change.

Transnational Japan

Here I would like to write about the same series of events from a 'methodological cosmopolitanism' perspective advocated by Ogawa and Seaton in the introduction to this volume. A first step is to contextualise the *Maria Luz* Incident beyond the boundaries of the Japanese nation-state and approach the subject from a transnational labour perspective. The indentured Chinese labourers onboard the *Maria Luz* were part of an industrial-scale labour migration that began around the 1830s and continued until the 1920s. Asian, African and Pacific migrant labourers were recruited to work the tropical plantations and mines of the colonial new world. Despite a ban on overseas emigration by the Qing Empire, the trade in Chinese 'coolie labour' took-off in 1847 when 800 labourers were shipped to Cuba (Morse 1900, p. 165). The profit in the supply and transport of Chinese labour saw the trade in 'coolies' grow rapidly, with a high number of Chinese workers shipped to Cuba and Peru. From 1849 to 1874 an estimated 100,000 Chinese labourers were transported to Peru with a further 125,000 shipped to Cuba (Young 2014, pp. 32–34).

The longevity of indentured labour migration lay in the way work relations were defined as a contractual arrangement. But the contract relationship bound the parties in very different ways. For the labourer, the contract specified the hours, the work to be performed and the terms of remuneration. For the employer, the contract granted legal rights to enforce the performance of service. The contractual relationship gave the employer the 'freedom' to discipline the labourer for refusing to work. The 'freedoms' accorded to the employer included corporeal punishment, fines, forfeiture of all wages and, in extreme instances, imprisonment (Jung 2005, pp. 681–682).

By the time of *Maria Luz* Incident, Japan was already integrated into a global labour regime in which contract and consent formed interrelated ideas and practices. When the Tokugawa shogunate lifted the ban on overseas travel in 1866, Japanese were journeying to China or Korea as itinerant merchants or menial labourers, often recruited by Western merchants and consuls (Yamamoto 2017, p. 1002). In 1868 Eugene van Reed, an American merchant based in Yokohama who also doubled as the Hawaiian consul, recruited 150 Japanese labourers to work on the sugar plantations of Hawai'i on indenture service contracts (Conroy 1978, pp. 15–31).

The way the court dealt with the Japanese government's confiscation of the *Maria Luz* and release of the Chinese labourers onboard makes it difficult to see the incident as the ideological genesis for inalienable rights or human rights discourse in Japan. The hearings were based almost entirely on English legal principles, while the acting Kanagawa governor, Taku Ōe, who presided over the trial, relied heavily on the expertise of British consular judges, British legal commentaries and maritime Acts for his judgment (Roberts 2013, p. 154). The legal tenets for the court, too, were already well established. Since the 1830s, British efforts to police pirates and slave traders entailed instituting legal tenets for municipal courts to confiscate vessels and release captives. However, at the same time, British law did not give local courts the authority to pursue criminal action against the crews or owners because they were accountable to the authority of the flag the ships travelled under. Moreover, the tenets for adjudication were based on British prize law, meaning that the focus of the courts fell on property rights rather than the protection *cum* rights of the rescued slaves/labourers (Benton and Ford 2016, p. 125). The *Maria Luz* hearing in the Kanagawa Prefectural Office followed suit.

The arguments of the first trial, held from 17 to 24 August 1873, centred around the lack of international consensus regarding legal jurisdiction on the high seas. The trial focused on two core issues. For the English barrister John Davidson representing the Chinese labourers suing Hereira, the key issue was Japanese jurisdiction. Davidson argued that: (i) Japan had the jurisdiction to take action against Hereira, without the consent of the Peruvian government; (ii) Japanese authorities have the right to visit vessels in times of peace, no matter the jurisdiction; and (iii) Hereira had flogged and shackled a score of Chinese labourers who attempted to escape to make an example of them, and had confined the rest of the labourers in the hold of the ship using iron gratings over the opening despite the searing summer heat (Dickins 1872). Davidson's argument focused on Hereira's use of excessive force and abuse of authority (Dickens 1872; Hornby 1872).

In contrast, Frederick Dickins, another British barrister and Hereira's counsel, focused on the illegality of seizure. The gist of his argument was summarised in a letter to the editor of the *Japan Weekly Mail* in late August, most likely written by Dickins himself. The letter claimed the Japanese court did not have the authority to seize the *Maria Luz* or take the Chinese labourers off the ship as it was tantamount to the 'total confiscation of the ship and cargo'. It is significant to note that Dickins' argument focused on rights of property ownership and not the rights of the individual. The Japanese authorities, moreover, lacked the authority to impound the *Maria Luz*. According to international law, Captain Hereira was 'entitled to freedom from officious intermeddling', and was within his rights to seek 'assistance in regaining possession of his vessel' (*Japan Weekly Mail* 1872a, pp. 527–528).

The trial concluded by the court finding the claims of 'mistreatment and acts of cruelty' against Hereira were substantiated. However, as the hearing was a civil suit, there were no clear remedies. Hereira was let off with a severe reprimand: the cost and delay caused by his enforced stay in Yokohama was considered apt punishment by the court. He was free to return to his ship and resume his journey with any of the Chinese labourers who wanted to continue their journey to Peru.

The second trial was held almost a month later, from 18 to 27 September. This time Hereira petitioned the Kanagawa Prefectural Court to enforce the indenture contracts and order the bonded Chinese labourers return to the ship so that he could complete his commission.

In this hearing, Dickins presented a multilayered argument to make Hereira's case. He contended the Kanagawa court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate on the contracts of the Chinese labourers travelling to Peru. Japanese municipal (domestic) law did not apply to contracts signed by Chinese labourers in Macao. Moreover, the contracts were recognised under Macao law, and the Japanese court was thus obliged to enforce them (*Japan Weekly Mail* 1872b, p. 613). It was Dickins' second point, however, that posed the most significant challenge to the authority of the Japanese court. He argued that the indenture contracts of the Chinese labourers were enforceable according to Japanese law and custom. Dickins pointed to the fact that the Japanese government recognised and enforced assignable, indenture contracts for six-to-eight-year service between brothel owners and women employed as female performers (*geisha*) and licensed prostitutes (*shogi*) (pp. 613–614).

Despite Dickins' argument, the court ruled once more in favour of the Chinese labourers. The ruling, however, did not formally recognise the natural rights of the Chinese labourers or Japanese licensed prostitutes. Rather, judgment centred on the nature of the contractual agreement. The court found the arrangements under which the Chinese labourers travelled abroad were invalid and unenforceable. The reason for this was twofold: (i) the contracts were based on deception – the labourers were unaware of the nature of the work they were to perform until after they signed the contract; and (ii) the contracts were rendered void by the captain's cruel treatment of the indentured men onboard the *Maria Luz*. The court was additionally reluctant to enforce the contracts because they were assignable and had 'features of personal servitude' that were open to abuse once the labourers left Japanese jurisdiction (Kanagawa Kencho 1874, p. 55; Gaimushō 1953, p. 506). The court, drawing on the precedents set by the Japanese government for the return of Japanese workers taken to Hawai'i in 1868 and the banning of Japanese children being sold by their parents to Chinese merchants (1870), ruled that 'it was [the] well settled policy' of the Japanese government to ensure labourers 'enjoying its protection' were not 'taken beyond its jurisdiction against their free and voluntary consent, nor without the express consent of the Government' (Kanagawa Kencho 1874, p. 54; Gaimushō, 1953, p. 505; Hornby 1872). In the wake of the trial, Hereira deserted ship. The Chinese labourers returned to China.

Japanese officials within the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Justice were uneasy about the judgment handed down by the Kanagawa Prefectural Court, however. They feared the judgment would leave Japan open to the censure of the 'civilised world' and to claims of liability from the Peruvian government if contracts binding young women to serve in tea-houses and licensed brothels continued to be enforced (Hannen 1872). In response, the Council of State issued the 'Edict for the *Release* [my emphasis] of Female Performers and Prostitutes' (*Shōgi kaihōrei*) on 2 October 1872.

As we have seen, Botsman, like many others before him, sees the Council of State's proclamation as an 'emancipation' edict. This chapter argues that the *Geishōgi kaihōrei* edict is best understood in tandem with the ordinance issued on 9 October by the Ministry of Justice infamously known as the *Gyūba kirihodokirei* (Ordinance for the Release of Oxen and Horses). On the surface the rulings look contradictory: an edict releasing women from indenture contracts and an ordinance that compares licensed prostitutes to beasts of burden. Looks are deceiving, however. The *Geishōgi kaihōrei* prohibited all indentured contracts binding apprentices and agricultural labourers to work for a term of seven years or longer claiming such labour employment was 'a breach of human ethics'. The ordinance also stipulated that all licensed prostitutes bound to a fixed term of service were henceforth released, and that the courts would not entertain suits by brothel owners on their debts (Ichikawa 1978, p. 195).

The ruling to void licensed prostitution and long-term agricultural labour contracts was based on British legal opinion at the time that stressed the importance of consent in labour contracts as the means to curtail the employer's authority and protect the indentured labourer from abuse and the use of excessive force, and not on any notion of inherent individual rights. This point is clarified further in Article Two of the *Gyūba kirihodokirei*:

> The aforementioned prostitutes and geisha are people deprived of their rights. [Indenture contracts] reduce them to horses and oxen. As one cannot demand that horses and oxen repay their debts, neither can one demand that prostitutes and geisha repay their acquired loans.
>
> (Ichikawa 1978, p. 195)

The legal premise of the ordinance is highly instructive. The release of women in service as licensed prostitutes from any outstanding loans acknowledged that the existing service type contracts, commonly known as *naganenki bōkō*, treated the women as chattel. The brothel owner had unhindered control over the women's lives. They had the power to assign the terms of service and were free to transfer the service contract to another party (Kanagawa Kencho 1874, p. 55; Gaimushō 1953, p. 506). The analogy to beasts of burden is also highly significant in another legal register. It formally introduces the notion of consent into contractual agreements for service type contracts. One did not expect compensation from animals for not carrying out a service because they lacked the capacity to consent. Likewise, one could not expect licensed prostitutes to be liable for any outstanding debt without their acknowledged consent. Existing licensed prostitution contracts were said to be invalid because the contractual arrangements were not a consensual exchange of services.

The *Geishōgi kaihōrei* and *Gyūba kirihodokirei* were an attack by the Meiji authorities on the power of the brothel owner and household head. The target of the reforms was the existing custom amongst poor household heads of placing children in other families as indentured servants/labourers. This attempt to curtail the authority by the household head had begun a few years earlier. In 1870, two years before the *Maria Luz* Incident, the Meiji government issued decrees prohibiting children from travelling abroad to prevent trafficking and abuse. These decrees framed the children 'abducted' to China as existing in a state of slavery. The children's displacement abroad placed them in circumstances where they were deprived of a capacity to consent to the work they would do in the future (Ambaras 2018, pp. 29–30).

The hasty discharge of licensed prostitutes from designated 'pleasure quarters' opened a Pandora's box of practical problems for Japanese legislators. The most pressing was: How were the women released from indenture to earn their livelihood? Government bureaus offered competing solutions. The Minister of the Left (*Sadaijin*) interpreted the ordinance as heralding the closure of licensed prostitution as an occupation. Operating on the assumption that the women working in the licensed 'pleasure quarters' came from destitute families, the Minister of the Left advised the Council of State that the government was morally obliged to offer some form of poor relief to women for taking away their immediate livelihood. The Minister of the Left proposed the construction of orphanages (*ikushi-in*) for children and young women now left without means (Hayakawa 1998, p. 195; Obinata 1992, p. 282). In contrast, the Ministry of Justice determined that the ordinance placed prostitution beyond any kind of government intervention. The intention of the *Shōgi kaihōrei* gave female performers and prostitutes the freedom to carry out their trade without any restrictions on their movement or place of abode.[3]

The Ministry of Finance (*Ōkurashō*) argued that the meaning of the ordinance was much more modest. The *Geishōgi kaihōrei* gave women the right to enter or leave prostitution at their own volition, nothing more. The Ministry of Finance proposed that women could work as licensed prostitutes if they lived within the boundaries of the designated 'pleasure quarters'. Moreover, each woman making a living as a licensed prostitute was to pay a levy for the upkeep of roads and bridges, and for the cost of a local police force to ensure public order (Obinata 1992, pp. 286–289).

It was the Ministry of Finance's utilitarian proposal that prevailed. By the early months of 1873, the Ministry of Finance had implemented a 'room rental' licensing system in Tokyo and other cities and towns in Japan. Under this system, the prostitute was a licensed 'independent contractor' who entered into a contract with a 'room letting service' (a.k.a. a licensed brothel) to work as a prostitute (Kim 1960, pp. 104–105; Takemura 1982, pp. 6–7). The advancement of a loan by a brothel owner was to be repaid by either the woman herself or her guarantor, which in most cases was her immediate family (Ramseyer 1991, pp. 97–100).

Highlighting the importance of consent in the terms of service, the ministry maintained that the women 'chose' to work as licensed prostitutes (Obinata 1992, pp. 286–289; Yokoyama 2016, pp. 186–187). The Ministry of Finance effectively transformed licensed prostitution into two different types of contractual arrangements based on a specific and narrow understanding of consent and choice: a service contract between a woman and a brothel owner which outlined the agreed upon services to be provided and the terms they were to be carried out, and the option for the woman to enter into a separate loan contract with the brothel owner, which would enable her to cover the initial costs required for her work (Ramseyer 1991, pp. 97–98) The contractual agreements were very similar to the employment contracts of indentured labourers displaced across the globe at an industrial scale. The contractual relationship was the instrument that defined the formal freedom for the women to enter the work place as a licensed prostitute via the notion of consent. Simultaneously, the contract was also the mechanism for determining the duress that could be brought against her if she could not fulfil the terms of her service. A woman was formally free to enter and nullify her service contract. If she was unable repay her debt, the brothel owner had recourse to the full power of the law to enforce the performance of her service contract.

Conclusion

As we have seen through the example of the *Maria Luz* Incident, situating Meiji Japan in world history is a tricky business. One approach is to mediate our understanding of Japanese history by following the dominant academic convention of area studies and anticipate human rights and freedom as the definition of modernisation. However, as we have seen, often this type of analysis misrecognises normative ideals for lived labour practice. As an alternative, this chapter has proposed a methodological cosmopolitanism approach. This involves situating the incident within the broader transnational history of changing global labour regimes and practices driven by the reality of labour needs and shortages in European colonies and the ‘new world’.

We have seen that when we rely heavily on an area studies template the historically specific cultural creations of the West – the primacy of individual interest, rights and self-determination – tacitly re-emerge as the standard of progress and the watershed moment of transition from pre-modern to modern. In contrast, this chapter has argued that the *Maria Luz* incident was not a seminal moment when rights talk was introduced to Japan. Rather, the confiscation of the *Maria Luz* by Japanese authorities and consequent mechanisms of arbitration demonstrate the degree to which Japan was already legally integrated within a global labour regime in which contract was king. Scholarship that identifies the origins of Japanese rights discourse in the *Maria Luz* Incident confuses abstract human rights talk with a historical specific legal discourse concerning the importance of contractual status in the development of labour laws to regulate the harsh circumstances of indentured agricultural labourers when they were treated as a unit of labour rather than a person.

A strength of the methodological cosmopolitanism approach is that it provincialises the West and calls into question the process of modernity as the history of Europe and the transmission of European values throughout the world (Chakrabarty 2000). This chapter has argued that abstract concepts of human rights and individual freedom as an index of the trajectory of history are insensitive to the different risks, cultural investment and political desires that constitute the rich tapestry of the past. Within the field of Japanese Studies, this insensitivity is entrenched in the dominant academic convention where the modern coalesces with the origins of liberalism and makes ‘modernisation’ synonymous with the origins of individual rights while being blind to the dark and unseen underside which sustains liberalism – the mechanisms of control needed in the extraction of labour and profit. To side-step this conundrum, this chapter has tried to offer an alternative view by showing how Western models of freedom have their own historicity. Judgments of ‘freedom’ and ‘non-freedom’ are not based upon neutral and value-free criteria. The enjoyment of ‘free behaviour’ is not a sign of a mature society but conditional upon an institutional milieu necessary for the formation of people who have mastered appropriate ways of behaving as ‘autonomous’ agents.

Notes

1 I am indebted to Harry Harootunian, Stephen Vlastos and Lauren Benton for their close reading and feedback. Any mistakes are mine.

2 Other recent research on the *Maria Luz* Incident includes Douglas Howland (2014) and Tomiko Morita (2005).

3 Prior to the ruling, licensed prostitutes were confined to designated areas ‘strictly defined and separated by high fences and deep canals’. No licensed prostitute could live outside the designated ‘pleasure quarter’. They also needed a permit to travel beyond the walls of the quarter (Newton 1870, pp. 3–4).

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2 Exporting theory ‘made in Japan’

The case of contents tourism

Philip Seaton

In 2004, the Japanese higher education system underwent its ‘big bang’ (Eades, Goodman and Hada 2005). The national universities, previously under the direct control of the Ministry of Education, became quasi-privatised institutions that still received much of their funding from central government but became nominally more independent. The higher education system that began in the 1870s had served its purpose in two major phases: catching up with the West after the Meiji Restoration (1868) and being part of Japan’s rise to the world’s number two economy after defeat in the Second World War. However, the pressure for change was building. The buzzword of internationalisation (*kokusaika*) that had dominated in the 1980s was being superseded by globalisation (*gurōbaruka*). Against the backdrop of Japan’s stagnating economic performance in the 1990s and the neoliberal winds blowing through other university sectors, particularly Thatcherite Britain (since the 1980s a closely watched and followed example of university reform), Japanese universities were poised to adopt the competitive mindset that now characterises much of the international higher education sector (Okada 2005, pp. 42–48). Japan seemed hardly ready for such a leap. In the years preceding the ‘big bang’, a number of searing international critiques of Japanese universities was published. Ivan Hall (1998, pp. 80–122) slammed Japan’s ‘academic apartheid’ by which foreigners were excluded from tenure track positions. Robert L. Cutts analysed the ways in which Japan’s most elite institutions were involved in the ‘molding of a national power elite’ rather than serious education and critiqued Japan’s ‘Ivory basement’ (1997, pp. 58–98). And Brian J. McVeigh simply titled his 2002 book *Japanese Higher Education as Myth*. Or perhaps ‘readiness’ was irrelevant. Change was long overdue.

My career in the Japanese university sector has been shaped by these forces. I took up my first position at a Japanese national university in 1998 after the long-term incumbent of a *gaikokujin kyōshi* (contracted foreign lecturer) position was told his contract would not be renewed, causing precisely the furore surrounding arbitrary dismissal of foreigners described by Hall (1998, pp. 92–94). Twenty-one years later I am vice-dean of the School of Japan Studies at another national university, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS). I have seen many changes in the sector during these two decades, not least the recent opportunities for non-Japanese to rise into senior management. I mention this brief autobiographical note at the outset to clarify that I am not simply a researcher of Japanese Studies but a manager of Japanese Studies programmes. My professional life has been dominated since 2012 by setting up, promoting and running two Japanese Studies bachelor's degrees: the Modern Japanese Studies Program at Hokkaido University and the School of Japan Studies at TUFS.

The main argument of this chapter will probably sound incongruous for someone in my position. As a researcher I am attracted to the interdisciplinarity and multilingualism of Japanese Studies; and as an educator I believe strongly that Japanese Studies programmes – or 'liberal arts + foreign languages + a focus on Japan' as I prefer to think of them – are worthy and attractive educational experiences for students. But, ultimately, people employed as researcher-educators in Japanese Studies need to move beyond the area studies mindset, especially if they are based in Japan, where so much of the rationale for Japanese Studies seems to be based on 'communicating correctly to non-Japanese what Japan is really like'. There are two main reasons for shedding the area studies mindset: one philosophical, and one pragmatic. The philosophical reason relates to arguments already made in our editors' introduction and the first chapter of this volume. In the introduction we cited Tessa Morris-Suzuki's idea of 'anti-area studies' (the benefit of analysing problems from multiple geographical vantage points) and, drawing on the ideas of Yoshio Sugimoto and Ulrich Beck, we argued for the need to move from 'methodological nationalism' to 'methodological cosmopolitanism'. In Chapter 1, Bill Mihalopoulos has offered a practical example of this by showing how a national history lens rooted in area studies thinking obscured insights from the *Maria Luz* Incident that could be gained when using disciplinary thinking and the framework of transnational labour practices. Beyond this philosophical reason, there is a second more practical reason. Around the same time that the Japanese higher education system underwent its 'big bang', international competition in the higher education sector was unleashed by the establishment of world university rankings. Rankings are now part of the 'great game' of higher education and drive national/institutional policy. To be 'a player', you must learn the rules and do what you can within them to succeed. For the mercenary aim of improving rankings via research impact and citations, focusing research energy in area studies is not necessarily the right strategy.

Published research on the effects of rankings on higher education can be withering. David Robinson, for example, refers to the 'corrosive effect of university rankings' (2013). The methodologies are extremely debatable; rankings make the big assumption that the same set of criteria is appropriate for judging widely divergent institutions in terms of size, disciplinary focus, cultural milieu and institutional goals; and the rankings clearly favour English-speaking nations, which effectively results in Anglo-American intellectual neo-imperialism in research and higher education, especially in the social sciences and humanities. But, when considering the future of Japanese Studies, the philosophical arguments regarding methodological cosmopolitanism and the pragmatic arguments regarding rankings strategies lead to the same conclusion: for both Japanese

Studies as an area study and Japanese universities as research/education institutions it is important to go beyond analysing 'Japan' (or even Japan within Asia) as a case study and to focus on how theory, knowledge and technology originating in Japanese contexts connect into and contribute to global discourses. I will make this case in two stages. First I will analyse the challenges facing the Japanese university sector through analysis of its performance in the era of neoliberalism and rankings. Second, I will present insights from a research project I have been involved in over the past decade, contents tourism, as an example of theory 'Made in Japan' and the benefits of going beyond area studies.

Japanese universities in the neoliberal/rankings era

Japan has a large number of universities. On the eve of the 'big bang' in 2004, 'there were 88 national, 77 public and 545 private four-year institutions, an overall increase of 31.9 percent [since 1992]' (Goodman 2005, p. 5). In 2017 the numbers were 86, 90 and 604 respectively (Statistics Bureau 2018, p. 172), so despite Japan's shrinking/ageing population there is still a decades-long trend for the establishment of new universities. These universities exist within a two-tier system. First, there is a group of a few dozen elite universities. In the 2000s these universities have received extra money and the stamp of 'elite' status via various competitive bidding processes organised by the Ministry of Education, most notably the Center of Excellence Program (to establish elite research institutes), Global 30 (to establish degrees in English), the Global Human Resources Education Program (for outbound student exchange programmes), and the Top Global Universities initiative (to enhance research and rankings). The universities in this group are predominantly Japan's national universities, which were quasi-privatised in the 2004 reforms. They are the highest-ranked Japanese universities in both world rankings and Japanese rankings systems. Graduates of these universities typically go on to elite-track jobs in local/national government, business and education. The remaining universities have little ambition to compete internationally. They typically offer more vocational education and/or send their graduates into local employment in small- and medium-sized firms. As Jerry Eades (2005, pp. 298–299) observes, many of the criticisms levelled at universities in Japan are directed at these smaller private institutions rather than national universities. In this chapter, the discussion refers primarily to the group of elite national universities that appear, or aspire to appear, in world university rankings.

In many ways the Japanese national universities were unprepared for both privatisation and international competition. In 2004 they were highly bureaucratic and had a strong sense of entitlement derived from their historical roles in training Japan's political and bureaucratic elites (Okada 2005). Based on the characteristics of neoliberal (private) universities and liberal (public) universities outlined by Mark Olssen and Michael Peters (2005, p. 329), even in 2019 the quasi-privatised national universities are still closer to the 'liberal, public' model. For example, their goals seem more akin to 'Knowledge; research;

inquiry; truth; reason; elitist; not-for-profit' than 'Maximize outputs; financial profit; efficiency; massification; privatization'. Through continued government regulation of staffing levels, student quotas and tuition fee levels, all amidst annual funding cuts and penalties for over-recruiting students, seeking financial profit via education is impractical. Top-down management and significant elements of the audit culture have entered the Japanese system, but there is typically resistance at every stage from the powerful faculty senates. And Japanese national university presidents are usually elected from within faculty ranks rather than parachuted in as a CEO with remuneration and perks on a completely different scale from the rank and file, as often happens in strongly neoliberal universities. National universities, therefore, fit poorly Gregory Hadley's definition of a neoliberal university: 'a self-interested, entrepreneurial organization offering recursive educational experiences and research services for paying clients' where academics are 'managed knowledge producers' and 'research and pedagogic output must be justified as beneficial to the university through quantitative measures' (2015, p. 6).

Japan's national universities may have been hardly ready for privatisation and international competition, but paradoxically the early years of Japan's rankings performance were the golden years. There are now three major global university rankings systems: Times Higher Education World Rankings (THEWR, from 2004–2009 these were jointly produced with Quacquarelli Symonds, but since 2010 have operated independently), QS World University Rankings (QSWUR, produced independently by Quacquarelli Symonds since 2010) and the Academic Ranking of World Universities based at Jiao Tong University, China (ARWU, since 2003). In 2004–2008, the THEWR–QSWUR had serious teething problems, including widespread omissions and fundamental computational errors (Holmes 2010). However, in 2008, just before Times Higher Education and Quacquarelli Symonds parted ways to form their own separate rankings, Japan had ten universities in the top 200 (Table 2.1). After the split, THEWR downgraded the weighting of reputation (gauged via a survey of academics) and enhanced the importance of research output and citations. The effects were brutal for Japanese universities, whose THEWR rankings crashed through the floor, in most cases by hundreds of places. Under the QSWUR methodology, which continues to employ the reputation survey, Japanese universities perform about as well as they did in 2004–2009, although these rankings are treated as suspect given the impressionistic nature of the academic reputation survey data. The third major set of rankings, ARWU, places Japan's top ten universities somewhere between their positions in THEWR and QSWUR. However, like THEWR, the ARWU methodology rests heavily on citations in scientific journals. The across-the-board decline in these two rankings systems indicates a systemic rather than an institutional problem in playing 'the rankings game'.

There are multiple reasons for Japan's rankings meltdown, but they ultimately connect to the Japanese system's collective, relative inability to publish research internationally (i.e. in English) and be widely cited. First, historically

Table 2.1 Japan's top ten universities according to international rankings

	2008				*2018–2019*					
Rank within Japan	*University*	*THE-QS world rank 2008*	*University*	*ARWU 2008*	*University*	*THE world rank 2019*	*University*	*QS world rank 2019*	*University*	*ARWU 2018*
1	University of Tokyo	17	University of Tokyo	19	University of Tokyo	42	University of Tokyo	23	University of Tokyo	22
2	Kyoto University	25	Kyoto University	23	Kyoto University	65	Kyoto University	35	Kyoto University	35
3	Osaka University	44	Osaka University	68	Osaka University	251–300	Tokyo Institute of Technology	58	Nagoya University	83
4	Tokyo Institute of Technology	61	Tohoku University	79	Tohoku University	251–300	Osaka University	67	Osaka University	101–150
5	Tohoku University	112	Kyushu University	101–151	Tokyo Institute of Technology	251–300	Tohoku University	77	Tohoku University	101–150
6	Nagoya University	120	Nagoya University	101–151	Nagoya University	301–350	Nagoya University	111	Hokkaido University	151–200
7	Kyushu University	158	Tokyo Institute of Technology	101–151	Fujita Health University*	401–500	Kyushu University	126=	Tokyo Institute of Technology	151–200
8	Hokkaido University	174=	Hokkaido University	152–200	Hokkaido University	401–500	Hokkaido University	128=	Kyushu University	201–300
9	Waseda University*	180=	University of Tsukuba	152–200	Kyushu University	401–500	Keio University*	198	University of Tsukuba	201–300
10	Kobe University	199	Hiroshima University	201–302	Teikyo University*	401–500	Waseda University*	208=	Chiba University	301–400

Sources: Compiled by the author from the *Guardian* (2008), Academic Ranking of World Universities (2018), Times Higher Education (2019), QS Top Universities (2019).

Note
*All universities apart from Waseda, Keio, Teikyo and Fujita Health are national (*kokuritsu*).

speaking, Japanese universities are primarily education institutions, and today, even at research-intensive universities, the holders of major research grants cannot buy out their teaching or shed committee duties. In the social sciences and humanities, there is much care given to the equitable distribution of departmental administrative and teaching duties, but research output, while incentivised and recorded in employee evaluations, is effectively treated as one's hobby or 'voluntary overtime'. Then there is the language barrier. The hurdles for publishing in English are much higher for non-native speakers, and given Japanese people's well-publicised difficulties in using English, they have struggled more than most.

But the principal reason for Japan's rankings meltdown is funding. The Japan of the 'economic miracle' is long gone. Reducing both government expenditure and the number of public servants amidst economic recession in the 1990s were key driving factors behind the 2004 reforms (Okada 2005, p. 45). Writing in *Nature*, Ichiko Fuyuno presents a good overview of the problem. There is a 1 per cent annual cut in the management expenses grant programme, which is forcing even large research-intensive universities like Hokkaido University to propose drastic staff cuts. The government budget for science and technology 'has essentially remained flat since 2001'. There is a lack of post-doc and early career positions because there is no money available to hire them (Fuyuno 2017). In defence of those working within the system, the story is actually one of efficiency gains and absolute improvement amidst relative decline. Academics at Japanese universities are publishing more in the major international journals (despite funding stagnation), but slip down rankings because the rate of increase is slower than in other countries, particularly neighbouring China and South Korea. The government's high profile programmes to inject money into higher education, the most recent iteration being the Top Global University Project 2014–2023 (https://tgu.mext.go.jp/en/index.html), have failed to arrest the slide. The project homepage explicitly states that the 13 top type universities are 'Universities aiming to rank in the top 100 in the world' (Top Global University Project n.d.), but the total budget of seven billion yen (roughly 70 million US$ shared among 37 institutions) in 2016 barely scratches the surface of the financial needs of universities to hire the staff and procure the resources needed to make any headway in improving global rankings.

The inability of Japan's higher education sector to compete within the THEWR in a manner commensurate with being the world's number three economy is so stark, one might even say embarrassing, that Japan has the ignominy of becoming the first nation to be given its own set of national rankings by THEWR calculated using a completely different methodology. This potentially reinforces a trope of Japan-related research that Japan is isolated – a higher education 'closed nation' (*sakoku*) beset by 'Galapagos syndrome' – or somehow 'uniquely' unsuited to being discussed within global norms of higher education. However, the establishment of the Japan rankings could also be viewed as tacit admission of the failure of the THEWR methodology, and more generally the entire principle of rankings. Not all university systems may be judged meaningfully by the same yardstick. Japan is a popular study abroad destination and major contributor to global research. Its education system has provided the nation with highly educated citizens, and in economic terms Japan punches way above its weight given the population and natural resources at its disposal. If a primary function of university rankings is to help students make informed choices about which university to study at, in Japan's case world rankings are of marginal use.

From 2017 Times Higher Education has joined forces with a local company, Benesse, to create alternative rankings that compare Japanese universities against each other using 16 indicators – each typically accounting for 6 to 8 per cent of the total – for things that matter within the Japanese context, such as reputation among high school teachers and employer evaluations (https://japanuniversityrankings.jp). The research component of the rankings remains based on the Scopus database, so the same pressures to publish internationally exist. The weight for output, i.e. the number of articles per faculty member in the Scopus database, is 7 per cent in 2019 – about the same as world rankings. The key difference is citations, which count for 30 per cent in the THEWR but are not counted at all in the Japanese rankings. There is a profound 'closed country' message in here that research output from Japanese universities need not have any worldwide impact, as measured by citations. Research income scores, meanwhile, are based on Japan Society for the Promotion of Science grants, which more accurately reflect the research funding options open to academics in Japanese institutions. The result is a very different set of top universities. TUFS, for example, does not even qualify to appear in THEWR. The university has only about 260 academic staff and cannot meet the minimum requirement of 1000 Scopus-listed outputs per year, in other words a completely unrealistic target of four Scopus-listed outputs per year, year-on-year, for every single member of faculty. But TUFS is recognised domestically as a leading institution for language and culture studies, with many graduates going on to work in education, the media and international organisations. It ranks in the top 20 in the Japan rankings (in 2018–2019).

Arguably, therefore, Japan's greatest 'contribution' to the rankings debate is as an eye-opener: it exposes just how arbitrary and frequently inappropriate rankings are. Where you rank depends entirely on what is being ranked. Particularly in the social sciences and humanities, the advantages enjoyed by the English-speaking world are so pronounced that rankings' main effect is entrenching Anglo-American academic/cultural neo-imperialism. In the 2019 THEWR by subject (social sciences), the highest position of a university in a non-English-speaking country is ETH Zurich, which comes in at number 20.[1] Universities in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia occupy 36 of the top 50 places. Eight universities are in Western Europe and three are in Anglophone Asia (Hong Kong and Singapore). Only three universities – Peking University (23), Tsinghua University (36) and University of Tokyo (44) – are outside 'the West' and/or Anglophone zone. It may be argued that top researchers from around the world congregate at leading research universities, so Anglo-American universities are simply international centres of excellence rather than 'American' or 'British' institutions. But the brain drain from peripheral areas into centres of power through gates open only to those who meet the cultural and linguistic expectations of the Anglophone centre is itself a modern version of archetypal imperial scientific practices (see Harari 2015, pp. 307–340), namely resource and knowledge extraction from the colonies for the empowerment of the centre.

On many grounds, therefore, rankings need to be treated with caution. It is also tempting to say that extensive discussion of rankings is of marginal relevance in discussions of area studies focusing on language learning, the social sciences and humanities. After all, it is scientific research that really underpins world rankings, and citation rates in area studies are low even within the humanities and social sciences. But, by accident rather than design, the rankings do send an important and valid message to the Japanese higher education sector about the need to connect, where possible and appropriate, Japanese scholarly discourse more into global discourse in the twenty-first century. Here the goals of going beyond methodological nationalism and inching Japanese institutions up the rankings come together in the same action: exporting theory 'Made in Japan'.

Contents tourism

It has been a long preamble through the dynamics of rankings, area studies and the challenges facing the Japanese university sector. I will now connect the future of Japanese Studies to discussion of contents tourism, a research project I have been involved in since around 2010. Contents tourism is 'travel behaviour motivated fully or partially by narratives, characters, locations and other creative elements of popular culture forms, including film, television dramas, manga, anime, novels and computer games' (Seaton *et al.* 2017, p. 3). It is closely related to the concepts of film-induced tourism, literary tourism and other forms of media-induced tourism, which have gained considerable media and academic attention since the 1990s. Around the same time, the concept of 'contents' (*kontentsu*) emerged in Japan's creative industries in the 1990s to refer to the characters, narratives, locations and other creative elements of Japan's pop culture products that were disseminated across various platforms simultaneously. Japan has a rich history of multiuse and the media mix rooted in anime and manga culture (Steinberg 2012), a phenomenon also known in English as 'convergence culture' (Jenkins 2006; for Japan see – Galbraith and Karlin 2016). In 2005, the idea that local 'contents' – including local stories, history, myths, authors and film locations – should be utilised by local authorities as tourism resources entered government policy. The pioneers of contents tourism research in Japan – such as Toshiyuki Masubuchi, Takayoshi Yamamura and Takeshi Okamoto – had published extensively in Japanese before the first publication that defined and introduced contents tourism to an English-speaking audience, which was a book chapter co-authored by Sue Beeton, Takayoshi Yamamura and Philip Seaton (2013).[2]

A contents tourism approach frequently offers a conceptual advantage over the taxonomies of tourism based on media formats – such as film-induced tourism or literary tourism – that became mainstream in the English-language literature from the 1990s. There remain many instances of tourism induced by popular culture which are best analysed using media-format-based terms. Tourism at shooting locations for films such as *The Beach*, for example, are best discussed as film-induced tourism. However, in the digital age, the distribution of a franchise is commonly across multiple media platforms, and in the Internet age online fan-produced videos, spinoff works and social media groupings also proliferate. The tourism-inducing capabilities of the original work on its own cannot be separated from the broader 'narrative world' which was started by an original creator and then expanded by copyright holders, licensees and fandoms. In these circumstances focusing on 'the contents' as the trigger of the tourism phenomenon is most logical. But, given that in many countries there are clear examples of tourism induced by works of popular culture going back decades, even centuries, why did Japanese scholars settle on 'contents' tourism while English-speaking scholars settled on 'literature' tourism or 'film' tourism?

The answer probably lies in the early maturity and contemporary richness of the media mix in Japan, particularly emanating from anime and manga culture. It is not known exactly when the terms 'contents' or 'contents tourism' emerged, or who coined them. It is theory 'Made in Japan' that has been refined by various scholars and practitioners, particularly since 2005. However, what the research group based at Hokkaido University did differently was to position contents tourism as a concept of international relevance. This approach involved publishing in English in both area studies (Asian/Japanese studies) and disciplinary (tourism studies) outlets. There have been open access and Japanese-language publications too, but many key papers are Scopus-listed, thereby contributing to rankings. The result is a research project gradually gaining international attention. While reliable comparisons are difficult to make, citation rates seem relatively high (compared to my war memories work, for example). A more concrete indication of the project's reach within the area studies context is that the introduction to the *Japan Forum* special edition on contents tourism (Seaton and Yamamura 2015) was, as of 2018, *Japan Forum*'s most downloaded article ever with over 10,000 downloads.

In an absolute sense, these download and citation numbers are a drop in the ocean. Given that media articles and YouTube videos easily reach millions of people, overblown statements about the impact of academic research are inappropriate. But, there is an important principle here beyond the rankings and citations game. As may be checked simply by putting some project publication names into Google Scholar, contents tourism research is being cited in tourism journals and/or by people with little or no prior research focus on Japan. This indicates it is a concept with relevance beyond the Japanese context. Discussion by well-known scholars in the field such as Sue Beeton (2016, pp. 31–33), Stijn Reijnders and Sean Kim (2018), Rodanthi Tzanelli (2019) and Dean MacCannell (2018)[3] indicates that contents tourism is breaking out of its Japanese context and entering global tourism studies discourse. This is the only way to generate the sort of decisive levels of citation that will make a difference to rankings. Of course, one research project on its own is not enough to change the rankings fortunes of one university, let alone the Japanese university sector as a whole. But if this process is replicated widely across Japanese Studies and the Japanese university sector on any topic where Japanese theory and cases studies can be of global interest, a fundamental shift in Japan's rankings fortunes becomes possible.

The more important philosophical issue, however, is that contents tourism is an example of research going beyond methodological nationalism. Theory may be born in a particular cultural context, but ultimately it must transcend that cultural context. The contents tourism project raises a tantalising, perhaps even 'subversive', prospect. In the editors' introduction, we cited remarks by Steinberg and Zahlten about how the West is perceived as a site of theory and 'the rest' as a site of texts (Steinberg and Zahlten 2017, pp. 2–3). Contents tourism theory offers a chance to turn this relationship on its head. There are cases studies for which contents tourism theory and concepts offer a better framework for analysing tourism phenomena in the West than 'indigenously developed' Western theoretical concepts. For example, the boom in Jane Austen screen adaptations in the mid-1990s turned Austen-related tourism from a literary tourism phenomenon pre-1995 into predominantly a contents tourism phenomenon post-1995 (Seaton 2020). Clothilde Sabre (2017) has demonstrated that contents tourism is an appropriate framework for discussing tourism related to Marcel Proust in France. There are many other Western examples of tourism phenomena that are clearly contents tourism: modern franchises, such as Harry Potter; classical literature that has been adapted for the screen, such as Jane Austen, Charles Dickens and Arthur Conan Doyle; and any set of 'historical contents' that has been used repeatedly in period dramas and other works of entertainment, from the Tudors through to Second World War stories.

Ultimately, to have theory 'Made in Japan' offering pertinent insights into tourism dynamics in the West is a much more significant issue than a few extra points in the rankings game. Furthermore, it challenges the endemic power imbalances that are so ingrained within the academic system they can often no longer be seen for what they are. The prospect that research pertaining to a quintessentially English author like Jane Austen may be done more effectively using approaches and frameworks developed among Japanese researchers might be unsettling to some. But in that unsettling moment, there is a window into the feelings that Japanese and other non-Western academics might have at being analysed constantly with respect to 'Western' theories. And if Anglophone researchers were told that in order to count as 'global scholarship' they would have to write their articles about Shakespeare in Chinese with reference to Chinese theory, we get close to the sentiment of those academics being constantly pushed to publish on their own culture/society but in a foreign language. Through the act of accepting and utilising theory 'Made in Japan', one's eyes are opened to the hegemonic forces within English-dominated academia.

I have used the term theory 'Made in Japan' throughout this chapter as a kind of provocative catchphrase. But, the aim should be to focus on 'Made in Japan' for absolutely no longer than is necessary. Ultimately such theoretical concepts originating in Japan must, like Japanese Studies as a whole, aspire to be transnational. Theoretical ideas that are of transnational merit ultimately exist on their own strengths rather than constantly being tied to their national origins and cultural baggage, just as Benedict Anderson's seminal work on nationalism, *Imagined Communities*, is rarely discussed in relation to Anderson's training and career as a Southeast Asia specialist (1991, p. ix). In the same way, one day contents tourism can become a concept that does not need to be discussed with reference to its genesis in Japan's creative industries and universities.

It is such theoretical concepts – either those already out there but languishing behind an Asian language barrier, or those yet to be created by scholars within Asia and/or Asian Studies – that constitute perhaps the boldest new frontier of Japanese and Asian Studies in the twenty-first 'Asian' century. In this vision, Asia is not simply the globe's most populous continent and a key hub of economic activity. It is also a key fount of ideas. As long as English remains the de facto global language of science and academia, area studies in its present form will have a vital role in helping those ideas, theories and technologies be disseminated worldwide in English. But, this system may in fact be on borrowed time. As the chapters about 'Japanese Studies in China' (Chapter 4 by Zou) and 'Japanese Studies in Indonesia' (Chapter 5 by Pratama and Purnomo) reveal (see also the Appendix), by dint of the sheer numbers of people studying about Japan in Asia, the new frontiers of Japanese Studies most probably lie in Asia, not the West.

Notes

1 ETH Zurich (20), University of Amsterdam (21), NUS (22), Peking University (23), University of Hong Kong (26), University of Mannheim (33=), Tsinghua University (36), Paris Sciences et Lettres (38), Humbolt University of Berlin (39), Utrecht University (41), University of Tokyo (44), KU Leuven (46), Chinese University of Hong Kong (47), Free University of Berlin (49). Available from: www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2019/subject-ranking/social-sciences#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats [accessed 1 May 2019].

2 Early in the project we made contact with Sue Beeton, who wrote the seminal first book-length study of film-induced tourism (Beeton 2005). She immediately saw the strengths of the contents tourism approach and joined the project, leading to that first co-authored book chapter in 2013.

3 The section discussing contents tourism is around 0:27:00.

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3 Japanese language education and Japanese Studies as intercultural learning

Jun Ohashi and Hiroko Ohashi

This chapter explores models for teaching 'Japanese language' (*Nihongo kyōiku*) and 'Japanese Studies' (*Nihongaku/Nihon jijō*) in the Anglophone university context, particularly in the United Kingdom and Australia, and revisits their interrelations in an attempt to suggest a new direction which addresses the global challenges we currently face. The authors have taught the Japanese language in the UK and Australia for the past 30 years and have witnessed various models for delivering 'Japanese language' and 'Japanese Studies' subjects and have experienced how these subjects identify themselves and relate to each other. For example, in a UK university in the 1990s, the Jorden method[1] was employed, whereby the introduction of the writing system was delayed until a series of set phrases, vocabulary and fundamental grammar structures had all been covered. Learners' language input was strictly controlled so that they were not confused by incidental encounters with unknown grammar structures and vocabulary. Teachers prepared a script of conversational dialogue which clearly prescribed what to say to learners and how they would respond to it, and also how the teacher should react, using which grammar structure and lexical items, etc. This was to ensure that all the target grammar and vocabulary were communicatively used and to avoid the incidental use of untargeted linguistic materials, while also providing the learners with target-grammar-rich input for them to learn the language efficiently. The use of grammar and vocabulary outside the textbook was entirely avoided, and the learners' interaction with Japanese students outside the classroom was discouraged as that would interfere with the strict learning order. In this particular environment, Japanese Studies and Japanese language teaching were totally disconnected in terms of curriculum and educational objectives. They used a dichotomous categorisation to describe Japanese language teaching as an 'act' and teaching about Japanese society and culture as teaching 'facts'. While native Japanese speakers perform an 'act', non-native Japanese English speakers with a background in Japanese Studies explain Japanese cultural and social phenomena, which they understood to be 'facts'.

During nearly 25 years at a university in Australia, our views about 'learners', 'native speakers' and 'non-native speakers' have all been challenged. These have never been homogeneous groups; however, they have become increasingly diverse, reflecting our twenty-first century globalising world. We have seen a drastic change in the demography of students in the last ten years. At present, international students make up nearly half the student population, and half of the international students come from mainland China. Japanese language classrooms also reflect this trend. With the domestic students, who are already culturally diverse, international students have made the classroom more dynamic than ever before. The learners routinely expose themselves to Japanese language and cultural materials on the Internet, which may shape their image of Japanese culture. Learning outside the classroom is to be expected and welcomed, and teachers cannot expect to control all aspects of learning. Furthermore, learners ask questions in English about aspects of Japanese society which they find intriguing. Their questions cover wide-ranging topics from popular culture, food and environmental issues to highly controversial political conflicts. Some students share the new knowledge they have learnt in Japanese Studies subjects, but they are not exposed to Japanese discourse (how a chosen topic is discussed in the media and Internet forums, for example) and are also aware that they lack the Japanese vocabulary to say ‘Article 9’, ‘comfort women’ or ‘Tepco’, for example, in Japanese. Although it seems that they are ready to cross the border between ‘Japanese language’ and ‘Japanese Studies’, as language teachers we have increasingly felt the need to have an organised approach linking the two.

As briefly illustrated, in the typical higher education classroom now there is greater diversity in learners’ cultural backgrounds than was seen in Japanese language teaching back in the 1990s. This provides us with opportunities to rethink our model of teaching so that it maximises benefits and potential educational outcomes. We believe that Japanese language and studies subjects can create a space where intercultural learning takes place, in other words, a ‘third place’ (Kramsch 1993).

In what follows, first, we briefly review previous studies investigating the relation between Japanese language education and Japanese studies in order to identify underdeveloped areas and underline the relevance or significance of intercultural learning. The fundamental premise of our argument, which is intercultural learning and trans-culturality, is then explained through post-colonial notions of ‘contact zones’ (Pratt 1992) and a ‘third space’ (Bhabha 1994), as well as the ‘third place’, which Kramsch (1993) conceptualises in the context of language learning. Second, some examples of teaching Japanese language and Japanese Studies which demonstrate intercultural learning in practice are illustrated.

The relation between Japanese language education and Japanese studies in the past

Three paradigms of Japanese studies in the past, which Steinhoff (2007) classifies as Japanology (1950s and 1960s), *Nihonjinron* (1970s and 1980s) and Japanese cultural commodities (2000s), reflect some of the trends in Japanese language education. The *Nihonjinron* scholarship in particular appears to be influential.

Segawa (2005) surveys all the articles published in the *Journal of Japanese Language Education*, a leading academic journal which focuses on the theory and practice of Japanese language education inside and outside Japan, between 1962 and 2004. She reports that 'Japanese thought patterns' or 'Japanese ways of thinking' (*Nihonjin no kangae kata*) started gaining wider currency in the published articles between the 1970s and 1980s. She explains that there is a common assumption that understanding 'Japanese thought patterns' becomes inevitable when learning the Japanese language. She refers to Tomita's (1982, p. 25) argument that 'nihonjin no kokoro wo gakushūsha ni motasenakereba hontōni oshieta to iu koto ni wa naranai' (you cannot claim that you have taught Japanese language unless you have the learners hold a Japanese mindset or *kokoro*). Segawa (2005) summarises that in the 1990s, understanding 'Japanese thought patterns' became an objective when learning the language because doing so was considered an important factor when communicating with Japanese people. It is clear that academic papers published during these periods assume that 'Japanese thought patterns' are unique, monolithic and stable. She also states that it was not until the late 1990s that intercultural communication and the learners' cultural backgrounds started to be mentioned. In a similar vein within books published about Japan, Boyé Lafayette De Mente popularised essentialist views of Japanese language and society through publications including *Kata: The Key to Understanding and Dealing with the Japanese* (De Mente 2003), *Japan's Cultural Code Words* (De Mente 2004) and *The Japanese Samurai Code: Classic Strategies For Success* (De Mente 2005) aimed at a mass audience. As Befu (1999, p. 196) argues, both Japanese and non-Japanese scholars are responsible for *Nihonjinron*, discourse on Japan's uniqueness.

Japanese Studies is commonly understood as an interdisciplinary area study focusing on Japan and her relations with other countries that involves both teaching and research activities. The teaching of Japanese studies takes many forms, but within the Japanese university context it is associated with *nihon jijō*, which is literally translated as 'the situations in Japan' or 'the Japanese situation', but is commonly interpreted as 'Japanese culture and society'. Unlike Japanese Studies, *nihon jijō* cannot stand alone as a research discipline. *Nihon jijō* was originally mandated by the Ministry of Education in 1962 as an academic subject for international students in Japanese universities (Mizutani *et al.* 1995; Otake 2000). It was intended to help them understand Japanese culture so that they could adapt themselves to Japanese society (Nishii 2002). Since then there has been no standardised curriculum, and thus teachers are not clear about the subject and how to teach it. However, in many cases, *nihon jijō* focuses on 'Japanese culture' in conjunction with Japanese language education (Otake 2000, pp. 25–26). It is easy to imagine that the subject delivers *Nihonjinron*. Liddicoat (2007, p. 3) states that 'the cultural approaches tend to present culture as an idealised version of national culture, which is manifestly homogenised and frequently archaised'.

However, the Japanese Studies subjects mentioned in this chapter are conventionally taught in English in Anglophone universities, and are flexible in terms of content. They can be any subject based on multidisciplinary area studies associated with Japan or subjects consisting of topics such as social issues, historically significant events and/or popular culture in Japan.

Intercultural learning

'Contact zone' is the post-colonial notion with which Pratt highlights 'the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect' (1992, p. 7). Both the 'contact zone' and the similar concept of a 'third space' (Bhabha 1994) have influenced the goals of second/foreign language education in Europe, the United States and Australia. These two concepts have much in common in terms of the dynamic site of power negotiation and identity formation, however, Pratt's 'contact zone' acknowledges asymmetrical power relations among those who are in contact, while Bhabha's 'third space' rejects primordial fixity such as 'assumed or imposed hierarchy' (1994, p. 4). Hybridity and transcending a cultural identity – as defined through membership of (typically) a nation and/or state – are common features of the two notions of the 'contact zone' and the 'third space', which stem from post-colonial discourse.

In the context of language teaching, Kramsch (1993) uses the term 'third place', which emphasises the interpersonal process of understanding otherness. In her recent publications, she adopts a post-modern model of 'third place' or interculturality and emphasises:

> the relationality of self and other across multiple timescales in a decentered perspective, where the meaning of events emerges in a non-linear way in interactions with others, and social reality is constructed minute-by-minute in the ongoing discourse. In this perspective, language learners do not change their identity by learning a foreign language but they might be led to change subject positions.
>
> (2013, p. 67)

Intercultural learning takes place in a 'third place' where learners of different backgrounds and historicities bring in various viewpoints, expectations and repertoires of semiotic resources (linguistic and extra-linguistic). Intercultural learning can play an important role in teaching Japanese language and studies, and teachers can utilise the students' diverse cultural backgrounds to enhance learning. Japanese language and studies classrooms can create a space where learners of different backgrounds are temporarily emancipated from the power relations of native and non-native speakers of English in Anglophone universities.

Asymmetry in power relations between international students and domestic students has been recognised in Anglophone universities (Goldbart, Marshall and Evans 2005; Marginson 2012, 2014), undermining what a 'third place' can potentially bring.[2] But, emancipation can occur in foreign language classes because the Japanese language (in this instance) is a common foreign language for the learners. In fact, some Asian students at Anglophone universities might even have an advantage (power relations reversal). If they come from a Chinese background they have advantages in learning *kanji*. Korean students, meanwhile, benefit from grammatical proximity between Japanese and their own language.

As one of the most popular LOTE (Languages Other Than English) subjects in tertiary education in Australia, Japanese language education has a potentially significant impact on and responsibility for the learners' broader educational experiences in the universities. Through the 'third place', Japanese language and Japanese Studies subjects can encourage learners to break down boundaries of many kinds and reimagine themselves freed from their inherited cultural histories. This is an essential part of intercultural learning, and Rizvi (2008) emphasises that its importance is in its contribution towards becoming cosmopolitan, which he explains from a social constructionist point of view.

> Learning about others requires learning about ourselves. It implies a dialectical mode of thinking, which conceives cultural differences as neither absolute nor necessarily antagonistic, but deeply interconnected and relationally defined. It underscores the importance of understanding others both in their terms as well as ours, as a way of comprehending how both our representations are socially constituted.
>
> (p. 32)

Being open to the other, questioning/challenging stereotypes and establishing common ground are all necessary, but mutual trust is of paramount importance. We employ Goffman's ground rules of social interaction as the basis of intercultural learning and in our classes demand that learners take responsibility for observing the rules. Goffman (1967) postulates the ground rules of social interaction as follows:

> The combined effect of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that the person tends to conduct himself [*sic*] during an encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants. This means that the line taken by each participant is usually allowed to prevail, and each participant is allowed to carry off the role he appears to have chosen for himself.… This kind of mutual acceptance seems to be a basic structural feature of interaction, especially the interaction of face-to face talk.
>
> (p. 11)

Mutual trust or mutual acceptances are preconditions for intercultural learning.

In the twenty-first century globalised world, any domestic issue has some international context and consequences, and transnational imagination and notions of transnational responsibility increasingly permeate academic and political discourse. One way of furthering intercultural learning is to encourage learners to think about global issues. Any identified Japanese local issue may have international consequences, and in a similar way learners can be encouraged to share their own relevant local issues and to relate them to global issues as part of intercultural learning. Naval, Print and Veldhuis (2002, p. 108) state that 'we are faced with increased incidence of violence in schools, outbreaks of racism and xenophobia in the face of multiculturalism, political absenteeism, and even the resurgence of extremist separatist movements', and since then the situations have been exacerbated with a long list of issues of concern, including social inequality, global refugee crisis, global warming and growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific, just to name a few. Intercultural learning can act as a bulwark against rising nationalism, xenophobia or nativism by promoting cosmopolitanism and developing a sense of responsibility by focusing on common issues that are to be solved.

Classroom examples of intercultural learning in Japanese language teaching

Thus far we have discussed the theoretical potential of intercultural learning. In the following examples, we show how these insights may be used in practical classroom settings to enhance language learning and intercultural awareness.

Beginners' Japanese

The introduction of the simple affirmative sentence, 'A *wa* B *desu*' (A is B), and routine greeting tokens are commonly introduced at the outset of beginners' Japanese courses. Japanese language textbooks usually present conversational dialogues based on a hypothetical scenario where international students from various cultural backgrounds and local Japanese students meet and introduce themselves to one another on a Japanese university campus. Such sentence patterns as 'Watashi wa amerikajin desu' (I am American) and 'watashi wa chūgokujin desu' (I am Chinese) are introduced and practised so individual learners talk about their country of origin. However, labelling each other according to country of origin at the initial encounter has a lasting negative impact in a classroom context. Learners tend to form groups with other co-nationals, and they are not easily broken down once formed. We decided to try something different as strengthening national consciousness undermines intercultural learning. Rather than focusing on traits linked to national identities ('Taro is Japanese. He likes sushi.'), we eschew the national frame and foreground the diversity that individual learners bring to the class. Google Maps is useful for achieving this. The map is projected on a front screen, and individual learners in turn zoom on to the place where they come from. Students are asked to focus on the names of their towns/regions rather than countries. Doing this shifts attention to locality and diversity. As one of the objectives of self-introduction is to establish common grounds, learners concentrate on finding similarities shared by their home towns/regions rather than lapsing into a familiar pattern of contrasting national differences. In this exercise, English may be used to compensate for the learners' lack of linguistic knowledge in Japanese, and the teacher can introduce new vocabulary accordingly. The use of English does not affect the focus on the local or national. It merely facilitates the information exchange.

It is not uncommon for some learners to find it difficult to identify a single place where they come from as they have moved multiple times across national borders. Some Australians with Chinese heritage self-identify as Chinese and some as Australian. Anglo-Australian students also have diverse ancestral roots. We argue in Ohashi and Ohashi (2015) that foregrounding the complexity of learners' backgrounds and identity is necessary for them to feel comfortable talking about them. We use the story of Mary (a pseudonym) to relieve the learners' inhibitions against disclosing their backgrounds.

> Mary's mother is Korean and her father is Iranian. Mary was born in Melbourne but she and her parents moved to Botswana when she was three. Mary came back to Melbourne to study. She is an Australian citizen, but she is more attached to Botswana.
>
> (Ohashi and Ohashi 2015, p. 147)

Mary's transnational identity as reality resonates with those who have crossed national borders and encourages the learners to talk about their stories.

Creating an environment where the learners feel at ease disclosing their stories is important to establish mutual trust so as to maximise their intercultural learning and help them transcend national boundaries and celebrate diversity. Prior to the class, learners are asked to send the teacher some digital images associated with any aspects of their hometowns or places where they are attached to so that these images can be shared with classmates. Visual images are useful tools for eliciting adjectives, such as *kirei* (beautiful), *samui* (cold) and *oishii* (delicious), which are also used in marking any commonalities and differences among their hometowns. If visual images presented by the learners include habitual practices, such as going to a certain place or eating certain food, verbs can be elicited and introduced, too. Conversational exchanges involved in the self-introduction at the beginners' level are rather simplistic, however, this activity encourages learners' self-reflection and their reimagining of themselves in the 'third place' through Japanese language learning.[3]

Intermediate Japanese

In our intermediate Japanese class, we use the textbook *Jōkyū e no Tobira* (Gateway to advanced Japanese). Lesson 14, for example, introduces the electoral system, democracy and democratic values in Japan. The reading material of this lesson includes information about the Japanese political system and the three key factors, *jiban*, *kanban* and *kaban*, for a candidate to be elected.

These are, respectively, established personal connections in the constituency, popularity and money. The text explains that increasing numbers of hereditary and celebrity politicians confirm the significance of the three factors, but it also discusses the growing significance of manifestos of individual politicians. Although the textbook assumes that learners share democratic values, international students from mainland China, who make up half of the class, for example, are not necessarily familiar with them. The challenge is to build common ground and mutual trust, an environment where intercultural learning can take place, and where the learners can freely position their selves beyond national boundaries. So, further discussion of the notion of 'democracy' becomes necessary.

According to the *Oxford Dictionary of English* (2010), the etymology of democracy is *dēmokratía* (*dēmos* 'the people'+*kratía* 'power, rule'), meaning 'rule by the people'. Democracy is 'a system of government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a state, typically through elected representatives' and 'control of an organisation or group by the majority of its members'. People's voices and power are represented by voting, and thus it entails 'the practice or principles of social equality'.

First, common issues in democratic societies, such as the widening gap between rich and poor and low voting rates, are highlighted using statistical data. For example only about 56 per cent of eligible voters cast ballots in the 2016 American presidential election (Desilver 2018), and only 54.7 per cent in the 2016 Lower House election in Japan (Yomiuri Shimbun 2016). These data are then used to question critically the view that democracy, *minshushugi*, as a system of US or Japanese government, delivers social equality, *minshutekina shakai*. Based on the content of the textbook which illustrates that personal connections, popularity and money are essential for the candidates to be elected, the teacher critiques the Japanese model of democracy first, using target grammar points which include 'mondai ni naru/mondai ni suru' ([something] becomes an issue/ be critical about [something]), and ~ *towa kagiranai* (not necessarily be ~). Learners are then formed into groups of no more than four with mixed cultural backgrounds to talk about political systems and issues in their countries. It is important to elicit learners' critical comments against the political systems of their own countries and local issues while avoiding critical comments to those of others. Goffman's 'ground rules of social interaction' is of value here. Mutual face-work with which learners consider and respect the needs of others is of paramount importance. Being critical about the political system of one's own country does not only reduce the defensive attitudes of others but also elicits others' critical comments about their own countries.[4] Issues regarding political donations, corruption and people's lack of interest in politics are commonly raised across national borders. Students from mainland China often raise the fact that in practice political candidates have to be approved by the Communist Party, and the people's voices are not reflected in the electoral process in China. In fact, many students from mainland China are not familiar with the electoral system in their own country. This is due to the lack of transparency and law enforcement in the Chinese electoral system.[5]

The teacher plays a significant role in creating mutual trust and common ground based on their comments and s/he also ensures that learners use target grammar and vocabulary. One recent example from our classroom is an occasion on which we challenged learners by raising concerns about the lack of interest in politics among young people. We asked the class to form groups of four or less and discuss why young people are not interested in politics (*naze wakamono wa seiji ni kyōmi ga nai no ka*). A local student reminded her group that voting is compulsory in Australia, and she told them that young Australians are interested in politics. Another local student interrupted and said, 'the high voting rate because of compulsory voting does not necessarily mean that we are interested in politics'. The teacher asked him to phrase it in Japanese using target grammar, ~ *towa kagiranai* (not necessarily be ~), and tried to elicit a sentence, 'tōhyōritsu ga takai kedo seiji ni kyōumi ga aru to wa kagiranai' from him. He admitted that he picked the most ridiculous political party's name and voted for a candidate who belongs to it. He was again reminded to use 'mondai ni naru' ([something] becomes an issue), and with the help of the teacher and other learners, he came up with 'kōhosha no manifesuto ga wakaranai to mondai ni naru' (it becomes an issue if you do not know candidates' manifestos). Under the Australian compulsory voting rules, the individual voter's responsibility is significant, which we sum up with the phrase 'hitori hitori no sekinin ga ōkii'. We then asked a student from mainland China the same question. She hesitantly said, 'Chūgoku de senkyo wo mita koto ga arimasen' (I have never seen an election in China) and added, 'nanimo kawarimasen kara seiji ni kyōmi ga arimasen' (I am not interested in politics as nothing changes).

Acquisition of grammar items and vocabulary is important in language class. However, it can also create space for intercultural learning where learners position themselves without simply affirming whatever they have inherited.

Inclusion of emic (insider) understanding in the vernacular in Japanese Studies subjects

As discussed, what we mean by Japanese Studies subjects is quite flexible in terms of the content. On any chosen topic or issue, teachers can include emic understandings of cultural insiders. This is to address Eelen's (2001) warning about researchers'/outsiders' accounts of a chosen phenomenon of social practitioners using a priori categorisations.

> A situation in which the scientific account contradicts informants' claims and dismisses them as being 'wrong' does not represent a healthy situation. Such a practice immediately leads to a rupture between scientific and common sense notions, causing the theory to lose its grasp on the object of analysis. In an investigation of everyday social reality informants can never

> be ‘wrong’ for the simple reason that it is their behaviour and notions we set out to examine in the first place.
>
> (Eelen 2001, p. 253)

Ogawa and Seaton (this volume) echo Sugimoto’s (2018) proposal of ‘cosmopolitan methodology’ advocating that Japanese studies should comprise intermeshing Western-led and non-Western conventional theoretical frameworks in a manner ‘transcending national borders and national interests’ (p. 181). Although Eelen’s argument focuses on the importance of situated cultural insiders’ understanding of a phenomenon, while informing us of the potential danger of analysts imposing a priori assumptions of any conventional theory, Sugimoto’s focus is, in fact, on putting an end to Anglo-West-led universalism in order to enjoy transnational dialogue. The advocacy of both Eelen and Sugimoto has much in common, and we subscribe to it.

Gender and Japanese society is one of the common topics in Japanese Studies, and we use this topic as an example. In order to avoid outsiders, including teachers and learners, imposing a priori assumptions or categorisation on chosen phenomena in Japanese societies, naturally occurring data such as online blog sites and forums where cultural insiders exchange opinions ‘here and now’ can be integrated into the teaching. This is a response to Eelen’s warning, but the inclusion of naturally occurring data does not necessarily remove the danger of imposing a priori assumptions. The inclusion of natural data is not a bias-proof solution as teachers can cherry pick data which fit their a priori assumptions. Nevertheless, naturally occurring interactional data are situated and dialogically co-constructed meaning-making products and they are not generalisable. Therefore, the provision of rich descriptions about the context behind the meaning-making is of paramount importance. For example, the descriptions of micro-cultures of any chosen blog sites and long stretches of dialogues are useful for helping the learners to interpret the data.

As the Japanese language proficiency requirements for Japanese Studies subjects vary, teachers usually see diverse levels of Japanese competency in class. Learners attempt to interpret Japanese texts if they are confident, and teachers can always assist them in comprehending them. If learners are not proficient enough, teachers can provide them with a guided discourse analysis. In any case, Japanese Studies teachers need to be highly proficient in analysing Japanese language sources, as Ogawa and Seaton (this volume) argue.

In Ohashi and Ohashi (2013) we investigated gender-related images in an online forum, focusing on the use of the Japanese suffix *rashii*/*rashisa* (likely/likeliness), which attaches to a noun. For example, *otoko* (man)+*rashii* (likely→quintessentially) means a typical example of a man, and thus it means ‘manly’ or ‘masculine’. *Onna* (woman)+*rashii* therefore means woman-like or feminine. We found a thread discussing ‘Onna rashisatte nani?’ (What counts as femininity?) in one of the largest Japanese mainstream online bulletin boards, *Hatsugen Komachi* in the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, and investigated all 43 comments posted during the period between 8 September and 25 September 2007. A person with the handle *Kugatsu* (literally 'September') posted a message seeking advice. She identified herself as a 35-year-old female with no boyfriend and stated that she was told by one of her friends that she lacked *onna rashisa* (femininity). She goes on to write:

> How do you define femininity? From one's gestures? Use of language? Fashion? Personality? It would be easier for me to understand if you could give me specific examples by referring to celebrities or specific feminine attributes. I also welcome your advice on whatever you think is most desirable. I want to become a charming woman.

Images about femininity discursively emerged in the online forum. The contributors first assumed that what they understand to be feminine/masculine were shared by the other commenters, however, different viewpoints and comments questioning the conventional understanding of femininity were presented. The contributors then attempted to define femininity, first identifying external features such as appearance, common gestures and ways of speaking, then gradually referring to internal attributes such as attentiveness, consideration and kindness. Images and meanings were discursively created in the discourse.

Through such examples, learners can be introduced to the discursive struggle of meaning-making, and they learn that there is no pre-existing unified Japanese-culture-specific image of femininity and that individual contributors to the forum have diverse views. After this they are invited to share their views. It is expected that learners of various cultural backgrounds and historicity bring in various views and expectations. The diverse meanings and practices that Japanese people exhibit in the blog site remind learners of the fact that they themselves are social beings who contribute to meaning-making. Realisation that there is no unified Japanese pattern of thinking encourages learners to imagine themselves beyond national boundaries. The inclusion of a natural discourse of emic understanding on a chosen topic, therefore, offers space for intercultural learning.

Conclusion

We argue that 'Japanese Studies' subjects can benefit from Japanese language discourses which grant teachers and learners access to an emic understanding of the issues and phenomena in question. Learners are encouraged to relate insider views of a chosen topic found in a Japanese Internet forum to their own local context, as well as the global one. We also argue that both Japanese language and Japanese studies subjects can promote intercultural learning through which the learners can imagine self beyond national boundaries. Intercultural learning, in which learners are introduced to cosmopolitan views of the world, is essential to tackle the twenty-first century issues we are facing. Australian universities promote cosmopolitanism and they often include such buzzwords as 'global citizen', 'cross-cultural awareness' and 'intercultural perspectives' in their graduate attributes (see Arkoudis *et al.* 2012). However, they are not necessarily articulated at the curriculum level.

The chapter presents practical examples of the integration of intercultural learning using Japanese language and Japanese Studies subjects as examples. Foreign/second language learning is a powerful tool to foster intercultural learning, through which learners question their conventional understanding of the world from others' perspectives. Japanese Studies, like other area studies, can also include intercultural learning. It can go beyond *nihon jijō*, in which a monolithic and fixed 'Japanese culture' tends to be imagined and a *Nihonjinron* ideology can creep in. Intercultural learning broadens the horizons of the learners' repertoire of thought and expression through their participation in the 'third place' where they encounter other perspectives and learn to question their own.

As discussed, self-introductions while teaching the Japanese language to beginners can be used to challenge learners' conventional views and cultural stereotypes about cultural otherness and broaden students' understanding to appreciate diversity and complexity of unfamiliar otherness. Self-introductions illustrate learners' diverse cultural backgrounds, both internationally and intranationally, and provide ample materials for intercultural learning. In discussing the Japanese electoral system and democratic values in an intermediate Japanese language class, we question democracy and democratic systems and evaluate how the current system is coping with twenty-first century challenges. Such a critical approach can extend to other systems of government elsewhere. And while teaching gender and Japanese society in Japanese Studies, for example, a component of guided Japanese discourse analysis provides learners with space for intercultural learning. Comments and ideas exchanged in an online forum form a long stretch of dialectic meaning-making that contains agency and structure; in other words, institutional constraints (Giddens 1979; Block 2013). The meaning-making process itself is an aspect of situated culture which is fluid and discursively co-constructed. Learners are encouraged to inquire into others' beliefs and question their own. Thus, the educational objectives go beyond language acquisition and understanding and the critiquing of Japanese socio/cultural phenomena; they include intercultural learning and transnational dialogue not only for the purpose of knowing but also for the purpose of building transnational relationships.

Notes

1 A textbook, *Japanese: The Spoken Language* by Eleanor Jorden with Mari Noda, was used.

2 Fincher and Shaw (2011) discuss how international and local students create separate spaces for socialising in Melbourne.

3 Self-introduction is cyclically introduced as the learners' level of the language progresses. At the beginners' level, the 'A is B' structure is predominantly utilised, but as the learners progress to intermediate and advanced levels, the focus is given to content and strategies to engage with interlocutors.

4 One of the authors' experiences helped us come to this realisation. In the second semester in 2015, one of the Anglo-Australian students started talking in English in

class about the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989, when many pro-democracy protesters were killed by Chinese military forces. Students from mainland China suddenly became silent and disengaged and the teacher had to intervene to explain what he witnessed from BBC coverage back in 1989. After the class, a few students from mainland China came to see the teacher to explain why they were uncomfortable. They were not confident in talking about it as it was a taboo topic in China and it still divides them.

5 According to Lisheng and Elklit (2008), the Provisional Organic Law of Villagers' Committees was passed in 1987 in China. The law defines general principles for direct elections to villages' committees and their responsibilities, however, a mere '25 per cent of the more than 658,000 villages in China had experienced direct elections in full accordance with the law' (p. 145).

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4 Japanese Studies in China and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1945–2018

Yi Zou

Japanese language proficiency is commonly identified as a prerequisite for conducting research about Japan and Japan-related studies. Universities worldwide have established Japanese language courses alongside content-based courses on Japan, although as the chapter by Ohashi and Ohashi (in this volume) demonstrates, at a pedagogical level the two frequently become intertwined. In the Chinese higher education system, Japanese language education (*riyu jiaoyu*) and Japanese Studies (*riben yanjiu*) programmes are popular means of getting know Japan and Japanese people. Indeed, as the statistics in the Appendix indicate, there are considerably more Japanese learners at the higher education level in China than in the rest of the world put together. By sheer weight of numbers, therefore, China is a major player within global Japanese Studies, although only a relatively small proportion of those Chinese voices are heard within English-language discourse on Japan.

However, relations between these geographical neighbours have been strained in the aftermath of Japan's invasions of China during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. This chapter charts the changes and developments within Japanese language education and Japanese Studies in China from 1945 to 2018 against the backdrop of postwar Sino-Japanese relations. Via both quantitative and qualitative research, this chapter concludes that trends in both Japanese language education and Japanese Studies in China, the nature of academic study mirrors to a significant degree the key trends of Sino-Japanese relations. The chapter also highlights, therefore, the domestic challenges that Chinese scholars have faced while researching Japan and presenting their research results globally in the context of often widely fluctuating moods in Sino-Japanese relations.

Sino-Japanese relations, 1945–2018

There is a huge literature in Chinese, Japanese and English discussing relations between the world's number two and number three economies (Rose 2005; Bu and Kitaoka 2014; Sang 2015; Takahara and Hattori 2012). Relations until the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) were largely amicable, before the half century of warfare that underpins the current 'history issue' between the two nations. Following Japan's defeat in 1945, Sino-Japanese relations were largely disconnected as Japan was occupied and China returned to a state of civil war. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 precipitated a hostile period of Sino-Japanese relations against the backdrop of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s. But, US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972 paved the way for diplomatic normalisation between China and Japan (Hattori 2012).

After Sino-Japanese relations were normalised, maintaining long-term friendship was based on the 'shelving policy', namely an agreement to remove historical disputes from peace negotiations (Wakatsuki 2012). This mutual understanding built the platform for the smooth development of Sino-Japanese relations into the 1980s. In this decade, deepening economic ties and the return to Japan of many war orphans (*zanryū koji*), who had been raised by Chinese foster parents, created considerable momentum for Sino-Japanese friendship. At the same time, however, the 1982 textbook crisis and 1985 official worship at Yasukuni Shrine by Yasuhiro Nakasone mark the beginning of the contemporary 'history issue' between the countries. These disputes formed the backdrop to the construction of China's major war museums, such as the Memorial Hall of the Victims of Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders (opened in 1985) and Museum of the War of Chinese Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing (opened in 1987). History issues also had a role in the development of so-called 'patriotic education' during the tenure of Zemin Jiang, which was often criticised as 'anti-Japanese' education by the political right in Japan. From the late 1980s, Japanese opinion towards China cooled as a result of this perceived 'anti-Japanese' drift in China, but also because of concern over human rights and democracy issues.

In 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fell from power in Japan and the coalition government of Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa and subsequent coalition governments took a more apologetic stance on Japan's past aggression, culminating with the Murayama statement of 1995 (Yoshida 1995; Seaton 2007). After the LDP returned to government in 1996, there was a nationalist backlash against the shift to the more progressive official view of war history in the Murayama statement. In 1996, Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, the establishment of the Japan Society for History Textbook Reform and a Japanese politician's controversial comments regarding the war triggered concern among Asian countries.

In the same decade, China enacted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) and claimed the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands as affiliated islands belonging to the People's Republic of China. Territorial disputes over the islands, therefore, were 'off-shelved' and triggered Japanese government protests. There were parallel issues in bilateral relations between Japan and other Asian countries, most notably South Korea, too. In 1991, South Korean 'comfort women' launched legal proceedings against the Japanese government demanding compensation and an apology for Japan's wartime actions, triggering a diplomatic dispute that continues to this day. With historical disputes deepening between China and Japan, as well as between South Korea and Japan in the late 1990s, Sino-Japanese relations were moving away from what both governments had envisaged in the 1970s.

In the period from 2001 to 2013, bilateral relations cooled to freezing point. The deterioration was due to the controversy over Japanese history textbooks in 2001, debates over the Japanese prime minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine between 2001 and 2006, and the territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in 2010 and 2012. There were glimmers of warmer ties in 2009–2010 when the Democratic Party of Japan government pursued a China-friendly policy, but it collapsed in September 2010 over the collision between a Chinese trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Chinese people's negative image of Japan and Japanese people rose from 36.5 per cent in 2007 to 92.8 per cent in 2013 (NPO Genron 2017, p. 4). Thereafter, between 2013 and 2017, diplomatic confrontation between China and Japan expanded into broader disputes regarding national defensive strategy. While Japan repeatedly condemned Chinese fishing boats for violating Japan's territorial waters, China persistently said that its maritime activities were completely legitimate (Ministry of Defense 2019). In 2017, Sino-Japanese relations returned to a more positive orbit after China's General Secretary Jinping Xi and Japan's Prime Minister Shinzō Abe held a meeting on 11 November in Da Nang, Vietnam. Both Xi and Abe expressed their expectations of improved Sino-Japanese relations and, by the end of 2017, Chinese people's positive image towards Japan and Japanese people had slightly increased from 21.7 per cent to 31.5 per cent (NPO Genron 2017, p. 4).

Despite the growing disputes over history in Sino-Japanese relations, there has also been massive growth in trade and tourism between the two countries. Alongside one of the world's largest bilateral trading relationships and extensive academic exchange (described below), according to Japan National Tourism Organization (2019) statistics, the number of mainland Chinese visitors to Japan (excluding those from Taiwan and Hong Kong, who are counted separately) increased from 448,782 in 2003 to 8,380,034. Japanese Studies in China, therefore, exists against the backdrop of escalating political confrontation but deepening social and economic engagement between the world's number two and number three economies.

Japanese language education in China from 1945 to 2018

The long-term trend in Japanese language education in China is of massive long-term growth, with numbers tripling between 1998 and 2012 despite the persistent disputes over history and territory (see Appendix). Nevertheless, the development of Japanese language education and Japanese Studies in China sometimes clearly reflects the difficulties within Sino-Japanese relations. Before diplomatic relations between China and Japan were normalised in 1972, Russian and English language education in the 1950s and 1960s were the most common courses of foreign language education in Chinese universities and colleges

(Wang and Liang 2016, p. 302). When Sino-Japanese relations warmed in the 1980s, the number of Chinese Japanese-language-learners overtook the number of Russian-language-learners (Wang and Liang 2016, p. 302). However, at times of particularly acrimonious confrontation, such as at the height of the dispute regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in 2010 and 2012, the number of Chinese Japanese-language-learners dropped from 1,046,490 (2012) to 953,283 (2015) (Japan Foundation Los Angeles 2015).

The current state of Sino-Japanese relations can also affect Chinese students' willingness to study in Japan. Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated in the period 2001–2006, when there were disputes over a nationalistic junior high school textbook passed for use in junior high schools and Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. The confrontation peaked in 2005, when there were widespread anti-Japanese protests in China. This confrontation is reflected in Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO) statistics of the number of Chinese students in both universities and language institutions, which dropped from 80,592 in 2005 to 71,277 in 2007. Similarly, when disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands triggered fierce diplomatic confrontations in 2010 and 2012, the number of Chinese students who studied in Japan dropped from 87,533 in 2011 to 81,884 in 2013 (Figure 4.1).

Cooling Sino-Japanese relations also affected the number of Japanese language courses offered in China's universities and colleges. Amidst deteriorating



Figure 4.1 Numbers of Chinese students studying in Japan, 1999–2018.

Source: JASSO (2019).

relations between 2001 and 2006, a reduction in the number of Japanese courses was observed in 2003 (Wang and Liang 2016, p. 304). Similarly, the number of Japanese majors declined in 2013, leading some universities to cut their enrolment numbers and others to shut down Japanese majors altogether (Wang and Liang 2016, p. 303). In the five years from 2013 to 2018, alongside the recovery in bilateral relations, the number of Japanese language institutions in China increased. In 2015, there were 315 institutions which were newly established in mainland China between 2012 and 2015, with total numbers increasing from 1800 institutions to 2115 (Japan Foundation Los Angeles 2015).

Japanese Studies in China from 1945 to 2018

Japanese Studies (*riben yanjiu*) in China refers to Japan-related research conducted in graduate schools in universities and in national research institutions. Similar to the changes in Japanese language education in China, trends in Japanese Studies somewhat mirror the trends of Sino-Japanese relations, too. A report about Japanese Studies in China, 1997–2009, authored by scholars across various disciplines concluded that Japanese studies were drastically transformed in both theme and content in the 12 years after 1997. The most visible transformation was a gradual shift from 'learning from Japan' to 'learning from Japan's mistakes' (Zhonghua Riben Xuehui 2010, pp. 8–9). Positive interpretations of Japan reduced markedly, and critical perspectives increased accordingly.

Much has happened in Sino-Japanese relations since these results ten years ago. This chapter brings the discussion up to date and fills in other gaps in previous research through analysis of article content as a means of assessing Chinese scholars' changing interests towards Japan over the period 1945–2018 by looking at articles relating to Japan in China's authoritative online database, China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). The topics within Japanese Studies (primarily social science) in China are divided into 'Japanese politics' (*riben zhengzhi*), 'Sino-Japanese relations' (*zhongri guanxi*), 'Japanese economy' (*riben jingji*), 'Japanese history' (*riben lishi*), 'Japanese culture' (*riben wenhua*) and 'Japanese society' (*riben shehui*). Studies of Japanese literature exhibit little correlation with the trends in Sino-Japanese relations and have not been studied in detail here, although many such articles appear in the 'Japanese Culture' category, which also includes film and animation.

As of the database survey date (19 June 2019), according to the search engine on the CNKI database there were 162,992 journal articles in both the social sciences and natural sciences which included the keyword 'Japan' in the titles between 1945 and 2018 (see Figure 4.2). The number of published journal articles shows a marked drop in periods immediately following some of the key flashpoints in Sino-Japanese relations, for example 1986 to 1989 (after Nakasone's Yasukuni Shrine visit, when article numbers dropped from 3285 to 2881). Between 1995 and 1998, the number of journal articles dropped from 5059 to 4032 after the bilateral relations cooled due to China's suspicions of Japan's re-militarisation, some Japanese politicians' denial of Japanese responsibility for



Figure 4.2 Number of journal article titles containing the word 'Japan' in the CNKI database (Survey date 19 June 2019).

the ‘comfort women’ issue and Japanese Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto’s worship at Yasukuni Shrine in 1996. When bilateral relations stray from expectations, therefore, it can constrain Chinese scholars’ publications within Japanese Studies. Similarly, the drops in 2003 and 2006 (from 5081 to 4703) were related to the history textbook issue and Koizumi’s Yaskuni Shrine visits. However, while the total number of articles dropped in certain periods, overall Chinese scholars’ interests in the above-mentioned six topics increased from the early 1970s to 2011, since when there has been significant decline again. The period since 2011 is when the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute has been most severe, and 2011 was also the year when it was announced that China had overtaken Japan as the world’s second-largest economy as measured by GDP.

Before the diplomatic normalisation between China and Japan in 1972, Chinese research about Japan focused on Japan’s academic activities, including the content of Japanese academic conferences and Japanese perspectives regarding socialism (cf. Ding 1961; Qi 1962). After normalisation, research increased as many Chinese scholars viewed Japan during this period as a ‘teacher’ or ‘leader’ for China in the development of industry, chemicals, medicine, agriculture, manufacturing and other economic sectors.

In the 1980s, research focused on specific areas of Japanese culture and society. Many articles about religion, tea ceremony, language, literature and history were published in the 1980s. Comparative studies between China and Japan during this period were popular, in particular China’s Tang Dynasty (AD 618–907) was often compared to Japan’s culture and tradition (cf. Tang 1984; Wang 1989).

Comparative research about China and Japan regarding culture shifted to comparisons over war-related issues in the second half of the 1990s. During this period, historical consciousness in Japan and Germany, the relationship between bushido and Japanese militarism, and the connections between the Asian financial crisis and Sino-Japanese relations gained more attention from Chinese scholars (cf. Jiang 1995; Feng 1998). Chinese scholars’ concerns during this period were more focused on Japan’s ‘mistakes’ and ‘bad examples to follow’. What China needs to learn from Japan’s ‘valuable experiences’ was mentioned less by Chinese scholars.

Into the 2000s, historical issues took Sino-Japanese relations to freezing point. Chinese scholars paid more attention to the legacies of Sino-Japanese conflict from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War. In the journal articles published in the 2000s, articles with keywords such as ‘Yasukuni Shrine’ (91 articles), ‘Japanese textbooks’ (165 articles), ‘Japanese militarism’ (145 articles) proliferated. In those articles, the duality of Japanese politics and Japanese society – based on the analysis of *Ju Yu Dao* (the Chinese translation of Ruth Benedict’s *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*) – was frequently cited by Chinese scholars in order to demonstrate the cultural roots of Japanese behaviours (cf. Jia 2005; Li 2009).

In the first half of the 2010s the territorial dispute over what China calls the Diaoyu Islands and Japan calls the Senkaku Islands dragged Sino-Japanese relations to their worst level since normalisation. Between 2010 and 2014, Chinese scholars conducted research from the angles of history, geography, culture and politics to analyse the history of the islands, the nature of the dispute, the causes of the collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessel in 2010, and Japan's nationalisation of the islands in 2012. In those articles, Japan's 'political shift to the right', 'oceanic strategy' and 'political culture' were connected with the territorial disputes over the islands (cf. Bao and He 2012). Although, aspects of Japan such as food security, environmental issues and animation continued to be discussed in positive terms by Chinese scholars, overall, alarm and anxiety regarding future relations between China and Japan became conspicuous within Chinese scholarship.

Japanese politics

According to the CNKI database, there were only 11 journal articles published between 1945 and 1979 including the keywords 'Japanese politics' (*riben zhengzhi*) in the titles. During this period Chinese scholars were interested in Japan's domestic political movements and stances towards socialism (cf. Pei 1963). In the 51 journal articles published in the 1980s, Chinese scholars paid attention to Japan's political consciousness from the perspective of political economics, particularly how political institutions promoted Japan's economic development (cf. Wan 1980). Into the 1990s, Chinese scholars' attention gradually switched to analysing Japan's shift to the right and its re-militarisation, particularly in the wake of the conservative LDP's return to power after the hiatus of 1993–1996 (cf. Wu 1996). In these articles, Japan's 'political corruption', 'money politics' and 'Japan's political instability and economic recession' were common research topics among Chinese scholars.

From 2000 to 2009, when bilateral relations between China and Japan turned cold as a result of Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits and history textbook controversies, Chinese scholars presented fierce criticisms of Japanese political institutions in journal articles related to Japan. In the 332 articles which were marked as 'Japanese politics', 'Japan's political shift to the right' (*riben zhengzhi youqinghua*), 'Japan's political nationalism' (*riben zhengzhi zhong de minzu zhuyi*)

Table 4.1 Numbers of articles in the CNKI database by topic

Years	*Japanese politics*	*Sino-Japanese relations*	*Japanese economy*	*Japanese history*	*Japanese culture*	*Japanese society*
1945–1949	0	0	0	0	0	0
1950–1959	3	3	19	7	0	6
1960–1969	6	0	11	4	1	7
1970–1979	2	6	30	8	2	9
1980–1989	51	104	436	166	55	229
1990–1999	174	448	732	361	154	361
2000–2009	332	1024	862	646	351	703
2010–2018	346	738	444	628	502	915

and 'Japan's militarism and Machtpolitik' (*riben de junguo zhuyi he qiangquan zhengzhi*) received much attention. From 2010 to 2018, Chinese scholars' research about Japanese politics broadened to include 'Japan's political education in high schools', 'Japanese women's participation in the political agenda', 'Japan's shift to the right' and its connections to Japan's nationalisation of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Within those journal articles titled 'Japanese politics', there was a clear trend of Chinese scholars shifting the scope of their research from the history of Japan's political institutions, to comparing Chinese and Japanese political institutions, to a more critical view of why and how Japan's political institutions were involved in the perceived 'shift to the right'.

Sino-Japanese relations

In the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese scholars focused their research on the obstacles to normalisation that existed between China and Japan (cf. Guo 1954; Mei 1955). After normalisation in 1972, in the 110 journal articles published in the 1970s and 1980s that included the keyword 'Sino-Japanese relations' (*zhongri guanxi*) in the title, most of the articles argued that China and Japan had opened 'a new chapter' and 'a new historical period'. Chinese scholars conducted comprehensive analysis of Sino-Japanese relations from a largely positive standpoint. In particular, Nakasone's diplomacy and how to promote further development in Sino-Japanese relations were common topics of research among Chinese scholars. In contrast with later years, the 'history issue' played a less prominent role. Nakasone's worship at Yasukuni Shrine was only mentioned in the title/keywords of three articles in 1985 (cf. Huang 1985; Qian 1985), two in 1986 and two in 1987, in contrast to seven articles in 1996 (the year of Hashimoto's visit) and 18 in 2005 (Koizumi's visit on the sixtieth war-end anniversary).

In the late 1990s, the negative impact of the Asian financial crisis and the return of the LDP to power in 1996 re-directed Chinese scholars' interests away from more idealistic perspectives to more realistic discussions on topics such as the obstacles and challenges facing Sino-Japanese relations in the future. In the 448 articles published in the 1990s, Chinese scholars' alarm regarding Japan's possible re-militarisation (Yan 1995), their worries about how the financial crisis might damage bilateral relations (Feng 1998) and their concerns regarding how to maintain the friendship between China and Japan while stressing the importance of remembering the war (Shu 1997) were characteristics of Japanese Studies.

The 2000s and 2010s (until 2018) are recognised as a transformative period in bilateral relations during which history and territorial issues took the relationship to freezing point. During this period, the studies of Sino-Japanese relations divided into problem-oriented analysis (focusing on the analysis of historical facts), contextualisation of the problem (for example, analysis from external angles and the role of the United States in territorial disputes) and analysis of solutions. While the territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dragged diplomatic relations to their lowest levels, Chinese academia during this period conducted quantitative research that connected the Diaoyu Islands and Sino-Japanese relations. In the database, there were 575 journal articles containing the keywords 'Diaoyu Islands' and 'Sino-Japanese relations' published between 2010 and 2014. In these articles, Chinese scholars consistently and firmly asserted China's sovereignty over the islands.

The Japanese economy

In the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese scholars focused on the influence of the United States in Japan's postwar economic transformation and demonstrated suspicion towards Japan's capitalistic economy. Although Sino-Japanese relations were normalised in 1972, Chinese scholars' perspectives of Japan's economy were less optimistic. In 1975, a publishing house called *Nan Yang Wen Ti Yan Jiu* (Studies of South Asia) released a series of journal articles regarding Japan's economic crisis in the 1970s which included analysis of Japan's declining GDP, problems in Japanese markets and enterprises, the national deficit, national debt and inflation (Nan Yang Wen Ti Yan Jiu Chu Ban She 1975).

When Sino-Japanese relations returned to a warmer state in the 1980s, Chinese scholars started seeking explanations for why and how the Japanese economy grew so fast. There were 436 articles about the transformation of Japan's economic structure, the banking system, Japan's industrial revolution and how education promoted Japan's economic development. These were written with a view to what China needed to learn from Japan. This positive evaluation of Japan's economy continued until the first half of the 1990s. However, when the financial crisis hit Japan in 1997, articles shifted their tone to research of Japan's 'foam economy' and argued that it was due to the easy monetary policy, the government's failure to prevent the devaluation of the Yen and non-transparent financial institutions (cf. Zheng 1998). From the second half of the 1990s, learning from Japan's 'mistakes' and economic recession became the main topics in studies of the Japanese economy.

The subprime crisis in 2008 extended Japan's economic recession into the 2010s. During the 2000s, the means and potential of recovery in the Japanese economy became hot topics discussed by Chinese scholars. Many argued that trade with China would promote Japanese economic growth (cf. Li 2005). In the 2010s, Shinzō Abe's policy dubbed Abenomics was widely discussed in Chinese academia. There were 141 journal articles containing the keyword 'Anbei Jingjixue' (Abenomics) between 2013 and 2018, and 'Japan's traditional economic structure cannot help the situation' and 'Japan's ineffective economic transformation' were the main arguments made by Chinese scholars regarding Abenomics (cf. Yi 2013; Ceng 2018).

Japanese history

In 2019, Chinese scholars Dongliang Yang and Xunchun Guo published a paper titled 'A "Big Data" Analysis of China's Japanese History Studies During the

Reform Era between 1978 and 2018'. In this article, the authors concluded that although the histories of Japanese thought and colonialism have always been regarded as central to the study of Japanese history, when Sino-Japanese relations were affected adversely by historical issues Chinese scholars focused their research on the history of the Japanese military and Japan's diplomacy (Yang and Guo 2019).

History studies cannot be separated from the contemporary social environment. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, analysis of the history of capitalism and research into the history of communism in Japan took place against the backdrop of the Cold War and the global narrative of the confrontation between socialism and capitalism. After China and Japan normalised diplomatic relations, cultural exchange activities between the two countries inspired researchers to conduct their studies with a greater focus on cultural issues. In 1995, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War, the history of Japan's aggression in China and Southeast Asia became hot topics for Chinese scholars (cf. Huang 1996). When Sino-Japanese relations dropped below freezing point due to the disputes regarding Japanese history textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine in the 2000s, the history of Yasukuni Shrine, the history of Japan's 'new liberalism' (*shin jiyūshugi*, or neo-nationalist revisionism) and the history of Japan's militarism were heavily researched (cf. Bu 2001). In the 2010s, when the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands became a major territorial dispute between China and Japan, the history of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) gained attention from Chinese scholars (Tian and Liu 2017).

Japanese culture

Before studies of Japanese culture boomed in the 1980s, Chinese scholars were primarily interested in pro-China and anti-US perspectives within Japanese culture. For example, a book by Japanese scholar Shōichirō Kamei that worried about Japan's collapse under US occupation in the postwar era was translated into Chinese and gained much attention in Chinese academic circles in the 1960s (Kamei and Li 1964). Alongside the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, Chinese scholars started to conduct research on Japan's Meiji Restoration and sought to link Japanese thought and Japanese culture in the modern era. Into the 1980s, comparative studies about Chinese and Japanese culture, for example Chinese characters and Japanese kanji, and the connections between Chinese thinkers and Japanese culture became the new concerns of Chinese academia (cf. Yu 1988).

However, from the second half of the 1990s, the perceived faults of Japanese culture were presented more than in the 1980s. When Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated in the 2000s, questions regarding how Japanese popular culture affected Chinese youngsters and why Japan's culture was so popular among them generated concern about a 'cultural invasion' among some Chinese scholars. Nevertheless, the key characteristic of this period is greater diversity in the topics relating to Japanese culture addressed in Chinese scholarly studies in the 2010s. But, Japan's cultural production and its connection to Japanese thought remain at the centre of Japanese cultural studies. Japanese culture has been consistently regarded as an 'extremely relativistic culture' – that is, incorporating both 'chrysanthemum-like loyalty' and 'sword-like sacrifice' – meaning an unconscious collective loyalty and a conscious idealistic sacrifice that fails to distinguish good and evil and guided Japan to the war (cf. Zhou 2016).

Japanese society

Chinese studies of Japanese society in the 1950s and 1960s were similar to the studies in other disciplines in the same period in that they focused on how Japanese society regarded China's socialism (cf. Pei 1963). Studies of Japanese society were connected to Japan's economic transformation in the 1970s and how Japanese society responded to economic crises (cf. Kijima and Zhang 1979). Studies of Japan's social welfare system, the development of information technology and fashion attracted the attention of Chinese scholars in the 1980s and 1990s. Alongside the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in the 2000s and 2010s, studies of Japanese society were more dynamically connected with historical issues, for example the response of Japanese society regarding the issues. In a different vein, Japan's proposal to establish a low-carbon society and the encouragement of an ecologically sustainable circular-type of economy were praised by Chinese scholars. Furthermore, the problems currently affecting Japanese society stimulated Chinese scholars to seek solutions for equivalent issues that China will have to face in the coming years. The principal examples include Japan's ageing society and low birth rate.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented an overview of the trends in Chinese research relating to Japanese language education and Japanese Studies in the period 1945 to 2018. The trends in broader Sino-Japanese relations greatly affect the research scope and agendas of Chinese scholars in any given period. But, whereas the global situation and bilateral relations help shape Chinese scholars' research on Japan, at the same time this chapter highlights how the Chinese academy needs to escape the framework of Japanese Studies refracted through the lens of Sino-Japanese relations and to adopt more global perspectives in China's scholarly contributions to our understanding of Japan. Although Japanese language education and Japanese Studies in China have developed rapidly, particularly during the past four decades, both in terms of quantity and quality, the connections with Japanese academia and the incorporation of the most recent research on Japan are still somewhat lacking. This suggests that constructing and strengthening ever-closer ties between Chinese and Japanese scholars is the key to the continued development of Japanese Studies in China.

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5 Japanese Studies in Indonesia

Himawan Pratama and
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By the 2010s, Indonesia had become the country with the second largest number of Japanese language learners after China (see Appendix). Most of these learners are at secondary education institutions and only approximately 4 per cent learned at higher education institutions (universities and institutes). However, the production and dissemination of knowledge about Japan are mainly carried out at higher education institutions via the nation's network of departments that may be broadly classified as teaching Japanese Studies, as defined in Ogawa and Seaton's introductory chapter as the study of the Japanese language alongside Japan-related classes in the social sciences and the humanities. Japanese Studies began in Indonesian higher education institutions not long after the commencement of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan in 1958. During the 1960s, degrees in Japanese Studies were offered by several Indonesian state universities for the first time. In 2017, the database of the Directorate General of Higher Education of Indonesia recorded that the number of Japan-related programmes established in Indonesian higher education institutions had reached 88, of which 65 were active (the others were discontinued, or undergoing review or merger). Two of the active programmes were master's degrees, 43 were four-year bachelor's degrees at universities and 20 were three-year bachelor's degrees at junior colleges. These programmes – through their educational activities, research and community outreach – play an important role in enhancing mutual understanding between Indonesia and Japan. They are expected to produce knowledge about Japan and, at the same time, to offer Indonesian perspectives regarding Japan.

However, as this chapter argues, criticisms have been made regarding Japanese Studies programmes for their tendency to be self-limiting in their potential for producing comprehensive studies of Japan that incorporate insights from Indonesia. Into the 2010s, curriculum development has been used as a means of rethinking and reconstructing the significance of Japanese Studies. First, therefore, this chapter explains the chronological development of Japanese Studies in Indonesian higher education institutions against the backdrop of relations between Indonesia and Japan. Then, it portrays efforts to develop Japanese Studies programmes in the 2010s through their curricula. Particular focus is given to the Japanese Studies Program of the Faculty of Humanities Universitas

Indonesia and the Japanese Studies Department of the Faculty of Humanities Universitas Airlangga. The curricula of these two programmes reflect the current trend of adopting critical thinking skills and incorporating Indonesian perspectives into the study of Japan in Indonesia. The curricula reveal the efforts being made to create practical or even vocational Japanese Studies by not only focusing educational content on the specificities of Japan (such as ‘traditional culture’ or ‘Japanese philosophy’) but also by enabling deeper discussion on the significance of Japan to Indonesia and vice versa.

Postwar Indonesia–Japan diplomatic relations

‘From occupation to cooperation’ is a simple way to describe the shift in the relationship between Indonesia and Japan in the early postwar era (Khoiriati 2013). The countries signed a peace treaty on 20 January 1958, which entered into force on 15 April 1958. This marks the beginning of diplomatic relations between the two countries. During the following decade, the two countries were engaged in infrastructure projects in Indonesia funded through reparation payments from Japan totalling 80.3 billion yen in the form of ‘products of Japan and the services of Japanese people’ (Treaty of Peace Between Japan and Indonesia 1958). Aside from the 90 per cent of the reparation payment which was allocated to developing infrastructure, such as dams, tourism facilities (hotels and shopping centres) and factories, 5 per cent was utilised for education and training. This included sending 389 Indonesian students to attend higher education courses in Japanese universities (from 1960 to 1965), and technical training in Japan for 238 Indonesian engineers in 1960–1963 (Nagai 2008, pp. 26–28). Many of these Japan-educated students later became prominent decision makers in Indonesia and contributed to the development of relations between the two countries.

The first regime change in Indonesia, from the presidency of Soekarno (1945–1966) to Soeharto (1966–1998), transformed the relationship between Indonesia and Japan. Unlike Soekarno’s anti-foreign investment policy, Soeharto encouraged the flow of foreign investment to Indonesia. This resulted in an expansion in numbers of foreign companies, including Japanese. After Soeharto’s promulgation of the 1967 Foreign Investment Policy, the number of Japanese companies operating in Indonesia increased from only 11 to 40 in 1970. In the same year, the value of foreign investment in Indonesia reached 710 million US$, of which 12.7 per cent was from Japan. In the 1970s, Japan’s total investment to Indonesia reached 1.768 billion US$, or 53.5 per cent of total foreign investment (Nagai 2008, pp. 31–32).

The Soeharto regime’s policies enabled Japan to increase its presence in Indonesia in the form of an investment rush and the export of Japanese products. Japan’s increasing presence was criticised by some Indonesians as ‘economic aggression’ or for a lack of understanding towards local culture (Nagai 2008, p. 53). Student movements protesting the threat to national integrity stemming from foreign investments spread at the end of 1973 (Jazimah 2013). On 15 January 1974, during Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s visit, a student-led demonstration began which eventually turned into an anti-Japanese riot (known as *Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari*, the Fifteenth of January Catastrophe) or *Malari* (Pratama 2019). The incident not only made the Indonesian government revise the foreign investment law to address people's concerns about national integrity, but also triggered Japan's initiative to not only pursue economic profit but also build stronger cultural ties with Indonesia.

Anti-Japan movements in the early 1970s within Southeast Asian countries taught Japan how sensitive their presence was in the region and how it could be perceived as arrogance. Under Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda (1976–1978), Japan tried to create a positive and more open image by assuring others that it 'would reject its militaristic history' (Zakowski, Bochorodycz and Socha 2018). In 1977 Fukuda introduced his foreign policy which later became famous as the 'Fukuda Doctrine'. Japan would take the initiative in creating harmonious relations with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries by refraining from becoming a military power, seeking multidimensional relationships of mutual trust ('heart to heart'), building solidarity with ASEAN countries on the basis of equal partnership and pursuing mutual understanding with Indochinese countries (*Japan Times* 2008). The Fukuda Doctrine changed the state of relations between Indonesia and Japan from economic 'dependence' to 'complex interdependence', which includes political and socio-cultural interdependence (Khoiriati 2013). On 12–14 August 1977 Fukuda visited Indonesia. Unlike Kakuei Tanaka's visit in January 1974, this time Fukuda was warmly welcomed by Indonesian people (Nagai 2008, pp. 62–63).

At the end of the Soeharto regime in the late 1990s, the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries hard. The government of Japan announced the New Initiative to Overcome the Asian Currency Crisis, also known as the New Miyazawa Initiative, in October 1998. The plan aimed to support Southeast Asian countries by providing a package of support amounting to 30 billion US$ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2000). This initiative was highly welcomed by the recipient countries, including Indonesia (Nagai 2008, p. 86).

In short, from 1958 to the end of the Soeharto regime in 1998, the primary structure of the relationship between the two countries' relations was patron–client, technology supplier–raw material supplier, aid donor–aid recipient and trainer–trainee. Economic relations were undoubtedly significant. However, in terms of people-to-people relations, this structure did not seem to accommodate much cultural exchange in the two countries. Japan was present and known to Indonesian people through its economic power. However, at least until the early 2000s, for Japanese people Indonesia seemed to remain unknown, even though the two countries had a long history of interaction (Iimura 2013).

In the decade of the 2000s, Japan's ailing economy and the world geopolitical situation stimulated initiatives to broaden the country's relations with Southeast Asian countries. Japan's reliance on so-called 'checkbook diplomacy' via Official Development Assistance (ODA) reached its limits at the beginning of the new millennium (Hadi 2009). On 14 January 2002, Prime Minister Junichirō

Koizumi made a speech titled 'Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership'. Koizumi announced the promotion of cooperation between Japan and ASEAN in education and human resources development, intellectual and cultural exchanges, economic partnership, improvements in people's standard of living, and regional security (Prime Minister's Office of Japan 2002). This initiative, known as the 'Koizumi Doctrine', tried to add more depth to Japan–ASEAN relations by broadening the scope to cover security issues and people exchanges.

Following Japan's initiative, on 10 August 2007 the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Prime Minister Shinzō Abe signed the Indonesia–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA). Through IJEPA both countries enjoyed an increase in exports to the other country as a result of tariff reductions (Setiawan 2012). The agreement also opened the door for human resources flows from Indonesia to Japan and vice versa. Indonesian nurses and care workers went to Japan from 2008 in one of the most attention-grabbing examples of the implementation of IJEPA.

The new millennium also saw Japan's rising soft power and public diplomacy through popular culture. On 25 November 2013 the government of Japan launched the Cool Japan Fund. Its role is to 'promote the sale of Japanese cultural products abroad through the "Cool Japan" campaign' (Green 2015). In Indonesia, the Cool Japan Fund's projects include the broadcast of a Japanese entertainment programme channel called Wakuwaku Japan from February 2014, the sending of artists (for example the Sumimasu Asia Geinin project), Anime Festival Asia and many more. Wahyuni Kartikasari (2018) argues that Japanese popular culture has played a role as a means of public diplomacy in Indonesia by attracting the younger generations to Japanese products. Another means of public diplomacy is people exchange. For example, agencies such as the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), Japan Foundation (JF) and Japan International Cooperation Center (JICE) have been helping the Indonesian younger generations to pursue their education in Japan (Mubah 2019).

Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan celebrated their sixtieth anniversary in 2018. As shown by the dynamics in the relationship – through war reparations payments, investment flows, checkbook diplomacy, the Economic Partnership Agreement and to Cool Japan – the two countries have constantly maintained important relations. However, the nature of the relationship between Japan and Indonesia reflects an ongoing power imbalance, with Japan tending to give while Indonesia tends to receive. This inevitably influences the nature of Japanese Studies in Indonesia.

Japanese Studies in Indonesian higher education (1960s to 2010s)

Japanese Studies programmes began in Indonesian higher education institutions in the 1960s. In 1963 the first programme was established at Padjadjaran University. In the following years two programmes were founded, at the Institute of Teacher and Education Science (IKIP) Manado in 1964, and at IKIP Bandung in 1965.[1]

In 1967 Universitas Indonesia began its Japanese Studies Program. During the early years, these pioneering programmes of Japanese Studies put more focus on educational activities, thus the volume of notable research was limited (Surajaya 1994). In the early 1970s anti-Japanese sentiments triggered reconstruction of the relations between the two countries, especially at the grassroots level. This period is when the importance of building not only a strong economic partnership but also cultural understanding was recognised. The Japan Foundation, Jakarta, which later played a significant role in promoting Japanese language education and Japanese Studies, was established in January 1974. In the 1980s, ten new programmes were opened, including at North Sumatra University (1980), IKIP Surabaya[2] (1981), Universitas Nasional (1984), Darma Persada University (1988) and Gadjah Mada University (1989). The first attempt to create a Japanese Studies scholars' network was made in 1982 at the first National Seminar of Japanology (*Seminar Nasional Japanologi*), which took place at Padjadjaran University, Bandung. The seminar continued biannually until 1990.

In the 1990s there were numerous innovations in the development of Japanese Studies in Indonesia. At Universitas Indonesia, the Japanese Area Studies Program, the first graduate programme in the field of Japanese Studies was established (the master's programme in 1990, and the doctoral programme in 1995).[3] At the same university, the Center for Japanese Studies Universitas Indonesia was founded in 1995 with the support of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Two associations were formed during this decade, the Indonesian Association for Japanese Studies (ASJI) in 1990 and the Association of Japanese Language Education Studies Indonesia (ASPBJI), which was established in 1999. These associations enable researchers, practitioners and students in the field of Japanese Studies to enhance their networks as well as to share knowledge.

In the 2000s, the Japanese popular culture boom in the Indonesian media raised the attention of Japan among Indonesian youth. The growing presence of Japanese companies in Indonesia convinced the younger generations to learn the Japanese language and culture in order to enhance their career prospects. The 2000s witnessed the establishment of 41 new Japanese Studies programmes in various higher education institutions, including at Universitas Airlangga (2006). Fascination with Japanese popular culture also diversified the research of Japanese Studies scholars. In addition to the prior academic attention towards Japan's 'hard power', particularly economic and political, research about manga, anime and other kinds of popular culture began in this period. The decade of the 2000s was also marked by initiatives to broaden and strengthen regional cooperation between Japanese Studies scholars. In 2005, the Japanese Studies Association in Southeast Asia (JSA-ASEAN) was established. This association enables Southeast Asian scholars to gather, exchange ideas and initiate collaborations (Chua 2017).

As indicated in Figure 5.1, from the 1960s to the 2000s a total of 76 programmes related to Japanese Studies began in Indonesian higher education institutions, and by 2017 the number had increased to 88. Among the 65 active programmes, there are eight names of programme which collectively fall within Japanese Studies (Figure 5.2). In 2015, in an effort to create national standard competencies



Figure 5.1 Number of newly established Japanese Studies programmes in Indonesian higher education institutions, 1960–2018.

Source: Database of the Directorate General of Higher Education of Indonesia. Available from: https://forlap.ristekdikti.go.id/prodi/search [Accessed 26 June 2019].



Figure 5.2 The eight names used for programmes that may be classified as Japanese Studies.

for Japanese Studies programme students, a new association, the Association of Japanese Studies Programs in Indonesia (APSJI) was established. APSJI concentrates on the development of the administration of Japanese Studies programmes, such as formulating standard competencies and curricula. The 2010s was also when scholars started to rethink the role of academia in building not only bilateral cultural understanding between Indonesia and Japan but also regional and international friendship. In 2016, APSJI convened its annual symposium under the theme 'The Half Century of Japanese Studies in Indonesia: Reflecting the Past, Envisioning the Future'. Prominent Japanese Studies scholars from Indonesia, Southeast Asian countries, Japan and Australia were invited to share their insights. This decade was also characterised by an initiative by the Japan Foundation, especially through its Asia Center, in accommodating Southeast Asian scholars to build a broader Japanese Studies network. Programmes such as the Japan Foundation Summer Institute and travel grants to participate in the annual conference of the Association for Asian Studies have brought new opportunities for scholars in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, to disseminate their research, as well as to develop international collaborations.

To sum up, these past five decades have witnessed the beginning and large-scale expansion of Japanese Studies in Indonesian higher education institutions. Japanese Studies in Indonesia has assumed a growing role promoting closer relations not only between Indonesia and Japan but also with global academia. However, the development of Japanese Studies in Indonesia has relied heavily on support from Japan via organisations such as the Japan Foundation and JICA. This reflects the power relationship between Japan and Indonesia as discussed in the previous section. There are arguably limited efforts on the Indonesian side (primarily the Indonesian government) to develop Indonesia-initiated Japanese Studies. The growth in Japanese Studies, therefore, might be perceived as Japanese Studies practitioners attempting to prove their significance for Indonesia in general. The following section introduces critiques of these efforts, and thereby some of the challenges encountered in the development of Japanese Studies in Indonesian higher education institutions.

Critiques of Japanese Studies

In Indonesian higher education institutions, apart from Japanese Language Education programmes, most Japanese Studies programmes belong to humanities faculties (for example, Faculty of Humanities, Faculty of Letters, Faculty of Language and Art). Typically Japanese Studies programmes focus on the study of the Japanese language, art, cultural artefacts, philosophy, literature, history and socio-cultural phenomena.

The subjects of bachelor's degree theses in the Japanese Studies Program of Universitas Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s reveal that students' interests were mainly concerned with identifying the particular characteristics of Japan. Japanese religions, rituals, traditional family structure, classic literature and performances, the Meiji Restoration and Japan's modernisation, philosophy, and the characteristics of the Japanese language were the popular topics of that period. From the 2000s, research into various forms of popular culture increased. Interest in contemporary social issues, such as Japan's ageing society and the education system, also began to flourish. These tendencies among bachelor's theses show that Indonesian student interest mirrors broader trends in research about Japan. However, at least until the 2000s, the tendency was to investigate the particular characteristics of Japan, or, in other words, to separate Japan from the bigger regional/global context and to neglect the possibility of adopting insights from Indonesia into the study of Japan (Wibawarta 2010). Furthermore, Japanese Studies in Indonesia, especially in the humanities, is characterised by the pervasive existence of 'Japanese hegemony', namely considering Japan as superior to Indonesia. Such views stem from Indonesia's dependency on Japanese economic power (assistance and investment) and the younger generation's fascination with Japanese popular culture (Wibawarta and Yovani 2012). Tjandra (2012) also observes that students tend to decide their thesis topic based on personal interest. This is especially true for students who made Japanese popular culture their thesis topic. These students start their research as fans of their objects of research. Therefore, it is relatively difficult for them to make critical observations regarding their objects of research as they cannot maintain distance. Ensuring distance with Japan as the research object, therefore, is another challenge for the development of Japanese Studies in Indonesia.

The students' thesis topics reflect the education process and information exposure in the Japanese Studies programmes in Indonesian higher education institutions. The sole pursuit of Japanese characteristics, the Indonesia–Japan power imbalance and the tendency to be too close to the object of research (particularly regarding popular culture research) leads to doubt regarding the significance of Japanese Studies for Indonesia and the contribution of Indonesian scholars to global Japanese Studies. This problem is also related to methodological issues. Many research projects are descriptive in nature and explain the existence of particular aspects of Japan. The result is a tendency to replicate the arguments of previous research (Wibawarta and Yovani 2012). Moreover, there has been a lack of critical reading of that previous research. 'Classic' texts, such as Inazo Nitobe's *Bushido* (1900), Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946) and others have been overly used to make sense of Japan without sufficient consideration of their contexts and limitations (Pratama 2017).

As already explained, power relations between Japan and Indonesia also affect the development of Japanese Studies in Indonesia. One manifestation is the dependency of Japanese Studies activities on financial support from Japan. This dependency has led to difficulties in conducting Indonesia-initiated Japanese Studies. Problems include limited research funding (Surajaya 1994), prior literature (Wibawarta 2010) and the lack of opportunities to initiate cultural and academic exchanges with Japanese counterparts (Pratama 2015). Japanese Studies should contribute towards maintaining friendly relations between Indonesia and Japan (Purnomo 2019). Therefore, maintaining balance in the relationship between Indonesia and Japan within Japanese Studies is crucial. Incorporating insights from Indonesia in the study of Japan, and putting Japanese Studies in its regional and international contexts ensure the significance of Japanese Studies for Indonesia. As Wibawarta (2010) puts it, Indonesian scholars have the 'privilege' of distance in their observations of Japan. This 'privilege' should be maximised in order to produce nuanced Japanese Studies.

Critical thinking in Japanese Studies: Universitas Indonesia and Universitas Airlangga

Critical reviews of the state of Japanese Studies in Indonesian higher education institutions indicate eagerness to rethink how the study of Japan in Indonesia could and should benefit Indonesia, and at the same time contribute to global Japanese Studies by offering perspectives from Indonesia. Consequently, it is important to consider what kind of 'benefit' is under question. As explained earlier, most Japanese Studies programmes in Indonesian higher education institutions belong to humanities and/or cultural studies faculties (especially at the undergraduate level). Discussing the 'benefit' of Japanese Studies means discussing the significance of humanities in general.

Daniela Dumitru argues that studying the humanities, arts and cultural studies is necessary for developing critical thinking. She introduces the concept of 'creating meaning', which is defined as 'the link between creative thinking and critical thinking and as the first attribute of a critical thinker' (Dumitru 2019, p. 870). Studying the humanities, arts and cultures is the way to nurture the skill of creating meaning. The expected output or 'benefit', therefore, of the humanities is nurturing critical thinking skills, including the skill of creating meaning. Until the end of the 2000s it cannot be said that nurturing critical thinking was a priority of Japanese Studies programmes in Indonesia. The necessity of developing critical thinking in Indonesia, of course, has not gone unnoticed. In 2014 the Directorate General of Learning and Student Affairs in the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education released the 'Guidelines for Creating Learning Competencies in Higher Education Institutions'. In these guidelines, among nine other learning outcomes, the first for bachelor programmes (*program sarjana*) is

> to be able to apply logical, critical, systematic, and innovative thinking in the context of the development or implementation of science and technology that incorporates and applies the values of humanities in accordance with their (the students') fields of expertise.
>
> (Directorate General of Learning and Student Affairs 2019)

In accordance with the guideline, numerous efforts to develop critical thinking in Japanese Studies programmes began from the mid-2010s.

The other challenge for Japanese Studies in Indonesia is contextualising its contribution to the advancement of cultural understanding between Indonesia and Japan as well as its endeavours to analyse Japan in a broader scope (regional and international). In the previous section, we mentioned the previous trend of Japanese Studies research in Indonesia to explain characteristic features of Japan. The perception of the 'uniqueness' of Japan has resulted in an academic myth of the superiority of analysis of Japan originating in Japan, namely the Japanese are the people who understand the most about Japan. Japanese Studies in Indonesia tied itself to the national boundaries of Japan, or, in a limited sense, of bilateral ties with Indonesia. Thus, it was difficult to see Japanese Studies in Indonesia in, as Seaton puts it in Chapter 2, a 'transnational' sense. Reflecting the power imbalance between Japan and Indonesia, initially Japanese Studies scholars in Indonesia positioned themselves as faithful pupils of their Japanese counterparts. It became more difficult to demonstrate how Japanese Studies was significant for Indonesia, as it was seen as the study of a faraway 'unique' culture and society.

The need to clarify what Japanese Studies could and should contribute to Indonesia is now actively discussed by Japanese Studies scholars. The Japanese Studies Program of the Faculty of Humanities Universitas Indonesia (hereafter, UI) and the Japanese Studies Department of the Faculty of Humanities Universitas Airlangga (hereafter, Unair) are good examples of how critical thinking and the contextualisation of Japanese Studies are being developed through the curriculum. These programmes are also currently the only ones (in 2019) to use 'Japanese Studies' in their name. Their names indicate an effort to broaden the scope of Japanese Studies by breaking away from a focus solely on the study of language and literature. The vision and mission of both programmes as outlined on their websites in 2019 indicate that the name 'Japanese Studies' refers to ways of creating a broader understanding of the complex socio-cultural elements of Japan. The department names also emphasise the presence of Indonesia as a practitioner of Japanese Studies, and thus implies Indonesian agency.

In terms of the curriculum structure, both UI and Unair have typical Japanese Studies programmes. There is a high portion of Japanese language and linguistics subjects in the curriculum. UI's curriculum has 14 subjects (all compulsory), while Unair has 44 subjects. There are also several introductory subjects dedicated to the specificities of Japan, such as Introduction to Japanese History, Introduction to Japanese Society and Introduction to Japanese Literature. These standard courses are central to the broader identity of Japanese Studies and set the foundations for the advanced study of Japan.

The curricula of UI and Unair show that the scope of Japanese Studies has developed to include current socio-cultural issues (including gender, demography, the education system, minority groups) and the relationship between Indonesia and Japan at both government-to-government and people-to-people levels. The curricula also highlight the expansion of Japanese Studies to incorporate popular culture. For example, in Japanese literature-related subjects, not only the 'classics' are discussed, but also contemporary works including manga, anime and contemporary film. Analysis of the influx of Japanese popular culture and the popularity of Indonesian-produced 'Japanese popular culture' (such as cosplay – see Rastati 2020) receive attention in the curriculum. Popular culture is also frequently used as the object of analysis in linguistics subjects.

UI and Unair try to distinguish themselves by putting their own characteristics within the curriculum. For example, UI provides the subject Japanese Geography and Tourism covering tourism policy and its relevance for Indonesia. UI's curriculum is also characterised by a focus on modern Japanese history with courses offered on the History of Modern Japan, Japanese Philosophy, History of the Diplomacy of Japan and History of Contemporary Japan. Meanwhile, Unair includes urban studies in its curriculum, with Introduction to Urban Culture Studies as a compulsory subject and Japanese Urban Society as an elective subject.

In short, the curricula of UI and Unair blend subjects that focus on the specificities of Japan and subjects discussing the significance of Japan to Indonesia. The curriculum structure is intended to induce deeper and broader discussions about the relationship between Indonesia and Japan, and discussions about Japan from the Indonesian perspective. The recent trend in the attention to Japanese popular culture within the curricula could be interpreted as the emergence of a new way of seeing subjects which have been perceived as frivolous matters by earlier generations of Japanese Studies scholars in Indonesia. The curricula of UI and Unair enable their students to engage with popular culture and to think about them critically. The inclusion of popular culture in the curriculum signifies that the dichotomy between 'high' and 'low', or the 'classics' and 'pop', is gradually being rejected by Japanese Studies in Indonesia.

Further research is needed to measure the effectiveness of these programmes for the development of students' critical thinking skills. However, our observations and interactions with students during our duties as members of faculty have convinced us that Japanese Studies in Indonesia is on the right path towards making a broader contribution towards Indonesian higher education than simply enhanced knowledge about Japan.

Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the curriculum of UI and Unair in the 2010s as a means of reflecting on half a century of development of Japanese Studies in Indonesian higher education institutions. The central focus of Japanese Studies has shifted from the pursuit of the specificities ('uniqueness') of Japan to critical thinking regarding Japan by incorporating the Indonesian perspective. The former sees Japan as a distant entity, with much energy used in discovering 'unique' (or superior) qualities of Japan. Examples include the study of Japanese traditional culture and Japanese management style. This approach has triggered doubts about the broader significance of Japanese Studies for Indonesia. By contrast, the latter tries to situate Japan in an Indonesian context. It focuses on how Japan and Japanese culture affect the everyday lives of Indonesian people. The popularity of the study of Japanese popular culture can be understood in this context. It also focuses attention on the relationship between Indonesia and Japan, and how the contemporary socio-culture conditions and politics in the two countries impact on each other.

Through this new direction, Japanese Studies in Indonesia has been reconstructed by situating it within the context of the relationship between Indonesia and Japan. This direction invites active participation from Indonesia in the meaning-making process of what is perceived as 'Japan'. Furthermore, this new direction for Japanese Studies can be seen as part of the continual efforts to ensure the ongoing development of friendly relations between Indonesia and Japan.

Notes

1 IKIP Manado became Manado State University (Universitas Negeri Manado) in 2000. IKIP Bandung became Indonesia University of Education (Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia) in 1999.
2 IKIP Surabaya became Surabaya State University (Universitas Negeri Surabaya) in 1999.
3 The doctoral programme closed in the mid-2000s.

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Part II

Coping with an ageing society

6 Discover tomorrow

Tokyo's 'barrier-free' Olympic legacy and the urban ageing population

Deirdre A.L. Sneep

In 2020 Tokyo will host the Olympic and Paralympic Games for the second time in history. With a strong emphasis on the future – Tokyo's slogan for the Olympic Games is 'Discover Tomorrow' – Tokyo is branded as a city of youth and hope. Promoting Tokyo as a city of the young generation started during the bidding process. Then governor, Naoki Inose, described Tokyo as 'A global landmark for young people' during the presentation for the International Olympics Committee (IOC) during the 125th IOC session in 2013. The one aspect that was repeatedly emphasised throughout the bid was that Tokyo is a *young* city. Images of children playing sports and street views of shopping districts full of young people set the tone for the image of Tokyo that the national and metropolitan government, as well as the Japanese Olympic Committee, wanted to convey. When discussing the Fukushima disaster and how it would relate to the 2020 Olympics, Prime Minister Abe illustrated his speech with a story about the children he met there during the reconstruction of the area.

Those in charge of marketing Tokyo for the 2020 Olympics chose an image of youth and hope strategically, but this image is far from reality. Tokyo is the capital of one of the fastest ageing societies in the world: in 2016, about 28 per cent of the population is older than 65, and this number is expected to reach 40 per cent within the coming two decades. In a country that is both depopulating and struggling with a rapidly expanding elderly population, the fact that the capital chose to showcase a youthful image towards the outside world is somewhat paradoxical. While it is true that the city of Tokyo is ageing at a slower rate than the countryside, it is still expected that in 2020 about a quarter of the population of 13 million Tokyoites will be older than 65, and of those about half will be older than 75. At the same time, children under 15 will only make up 11 per cent of the city's population in 2020. Even though Tokyo has a vast influx of migrants from other cities in Japan as well as a relative high percentage of immigrants compared to the rest of Japan, there will be considerable population decline over the coming years. By 2060, rather than a 'global landmark for young people', Tokyo will most likely rather be a landmark for the elderly, as those over the age of 65 will comprise 39 per cent and children a meagre 7 per cent of the city's population (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 2016).

Despite the focus on a youthful image, Tokyo is well aware of the fact that its demographics are rapidly shifting. Governmental bodies have been actively trying to find solutions for anticipated problems related to the ageing population for decades. One of the solutions that is being discussed and implemented is highlighted by the 2020 Olympics: the implementation of universal design in public spaces in the city in order to make it more easily accessible – in other words, making Tokyo 'barrier-free' (*bariafurī*). By 2020, the city aims to have all of the parts of Tokyo that are connected to the Olympic venues, as well as public transportation, taxis and the city's airports, completely barrier-free. While this is heavily motivated by the Paralympics at the 2020 Olympic Games, the objective to make Tokyo more accessible is in large part a continuation of previous efforts to equip the city for the rapidly expanding elderly demographic. Upper House lawmaker Seiichi Etō stated in an interview with the *Japan Times* in 2015:

> [w]e have entered an era where it is now possible to create a society that helps the elderly and those with disabilities lead fulfilling lives…. People from all over Japan and the world will come to Tokyo (between now and 2020). It's a great opportunity for the city to show how unique, innovative and advanced it really is.
>
> (Ito 2015)

This chapter looks at the efforts to make a barrier-free Tokyo and their relation to the elderly demographic of Japan. After becoming a 'super-ageing society' (*chōkōreika shakai*) in 2007 by passing the mark of more than 21 per cent of the population being over 65, Japan can hardly be called a newcomer to the idea of an ageing demographic (Coulmas 2007; Campbell 2014). Research into Japan as an ageing society started in the 1960s and 1970s (Linhart 2008) and the body of research has increased significantly in the past two decades. The making of a barrier-free Tokyo and the vision of being an inclusive city for all ages is perpendicular to the idealised vision of Tokyo as a 'global landmark for young people'. On one hand, Tokyo is creating an image of youthfulness for the rest of the world to see in 2020. On the other hand, they acknowledge the fact that they are a rapidly ageing society by placing an emphasis on making cities 'barrier-free', and this, too, seems to be a vital part of the Olympic brand for 2020. Within the context of a super-ageing society, how are the 2020 Olympic Games related to the image of age and elderly in Japan, and how does the making of a barrier-free Tokyo fit into this?

The Olympic Games and Tokyo

For Tokyo, 2020 will be the second time that the city will have hosted the Olympic and Paralympic Games, which also makes Tokyo the first city in the world to host the Paralympics for a second time. The 1964 Summer Games are generally regarded as one of the most impactful events in Japan's postwar history, and they accelerated the postwar reconstruction of the capital city (Tagsold 2002). The social and infrastructural impact of the 2020 Games cannot be compared to the 1964 Games, which happened less than two decades after the widespread destruction in Tokyo caused by the war. Nevertheless, Tokyo is still undertaking several large construction projects for the 2020 Games, most of them related to the sport venues and connecting infrastructure. For the Games, Tokyo will be symbolically divided into two halves, the 'Heritage Zone' and the 'Tokyo Bay Zone'. The 'Heritage Zone' has primarily existing venues, many of which were built for the 1964 Olympics. The 'Tokyo Bay Zone' has primarily new venues, showing off the more innovative and modern side of the city with venues that are described as a 'model for future urban development' (Bureau of Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020 Preparation 2015). From the announcement that Tokyo would host the Games until shortly before the games started, the Olympics and the accompanying urban renovations were discussed widely in the national and international media.

Although the new National Stadium has by far dominated the news, about half of the roughly 13 trillion yen (roughly 18 billion AUD) budget of the 2020 Olympic Games was allocated to various construction and renovation projects related to the event (Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games 2019). The main focus of these projects is to create a so-called 'physical legacy' for future generations. This not only means investing in sports venues for the Games, it also involves major adaptations in infrastructure and public space. The idea of leaving a physical legacy has in recent years become increasingly important for Olympic cities as part of a marketing strategy developed by the Olympic Committee to increase the historical importance of the Games – or at least, the perceived importance (Weed 2011). Leaving a physical legacy that is of use years after the Games is also a way of reassuring citizens that the expenditures are not a one-time waste of tax money, but a careful investment in the future of the city (Masumoto and Homma 2014; Kassens-Noor *et al.* 2015). At the same time, creating a more intangible 'legacy' in terms of social and historical impact is a chance for local and national government to (re-)brand the host city's image in the eyes of the rest of the world in order to boost their standing in the international hierarchy of cities and as a tourist destination (Zhang and Zhao 2009; Ward 2011).

The legacy that Japan hopes to leave after the Olympics is one that is specifically tied to the Paralympics, rather than the Olympics – it is the promotion of urban universal design, or, as it is referred to more commonly in the 2020 discourse, 'barrier-free design' (*bariafurī dezain*). In their 2017 White Paper the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism announced that they would set up a special council 'in order to promote the precepts of universal design and Mental barrier-free and Universal design town building and implement measures to leave behind a concrete legacy after the Games come to an end' (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 2017a). Mainly, through barrier-free design, Tokyo aims to become a city that is elderly friendly (Masaki 2014; Ito 2015). The main points are accentuated in the Tokyo 2020 slogans 'Unity in Diversity' and 'City of Tomorrow', emphasising the accessibility and inclusiveness of the city through the means of modern design. Japan, having already crossed the line of becoming a super-ageing society and with a reputation for technological innovations, is using the Games as an opportunity to showcase their barrier-free designs as a solution to the problems of population ageing (Masaki 2014) – specifically urban ageing, which is becoming one of the most pressing issues of the twenty-first century.

Japan and barrier-free

The case for making public space accessible has been a topic of discussion for several decades in Japan. The term 'barrier-free' has even become somewhat trendy and is sometimes even used as a marketing tool. As a form of urban innovative design, it has become an export product, with Japanese companies effectively selling their designs and technologies to foreign companies. As Michael Peckitt noted in an article on accessibility and public discourse in Japan: 'being "barrier-free" is becoming as Japanese as sushi' (2016). In the late 1980s it became clear that cities would be facing severe challenges in several areas and would need to change many aspects in order to adapt to the growing body of elderly citizens. Researchers, politicians, and urban planners and designers have been working towards finding suitable solutions ever since (Kose 1987). In 1995, the Ministry of Construction revealed for the first time the Design Guidelines of Dwellings for the Aging Society, in which they encouraged and advised home makers and real estate companies on how to adapt houses to become suitable for the elderly, triggering immediate positive responses from the elderly (Kose 1994, 1997). At first, research focused on individual housing, but since the turn of the millennium there has been more attention on the adaptations that can be made in public spaces, public buildings and public transportation. In 2000, several further measures were taken by the government to prepare Japan to be a super-ageing society. First, Japan implemented a lifelong health-care system, ensuring all citizens older than 65 have long-term social benefits, a measure that put Japan among the most progressive countries in the world when it comes to elderly care (Campbell and Ikegami 2000; Tsutsui and Muramatsu 2005). In the same year, the Accessible and Usable Transportation Act was introduced in an effort to make public transportation more accessible. Also in 2000 the Ministry of Health and Welfare established the 'Barrier-free City Community Development Project'[1] (*Bariafurī no machizukuri no katsudō jigyō*). While previously being more commonly referred to as 'universal design' (*yunibāsaru dezain*) or as being designed for people with physical impairments, the specific term 'barrier-free' became more widely used from this point on. One of the reasons behind the term becoming more mainstream was the popularity of a television drama, *Beautiful Life* (*Byūtifuru raifu*) (2000), which featured a heroine in a wheelchair and showed the (in)accessibility of Tokyo through her eyes. The drama used the phrase 'barrier-free' rather than 'universally accessible' (Stevens 2007). A few years later, in 2006, the Barrier-Free

Act was passed in Japan, which specifically aimed to create elderly friendly cities and communities (Mizumura 2017). The Act not only promotes the development and implementation of facilities and services for elderly and disabled people, but also aims to raise awareness and change the mentality of Japanese people towards those who are less mobile due to age or other physical constraints (Nippon.Com 2016).

After the Accessible and Usable Transportation Act and the Barrier-free Act, urban planning in Japan moved towards making urban space and housing accessible for the elderly and those with physical impairments (Kose 2010; Kusumi 2012; Murayama 2016). As Japan actively worked on the inclusiveness of its buildings since the mid-1990s, the market for constructing universal design or barrier-free facilities also grew significantly (Coulmas 2007; Yashiro 2008). But the city still had a long way to go (Murata 1994; Stevens 2007). Internationally, Japanese planners have been applauded for their innovative approach towards inclusiveness (see Gilroy 1999; Ostroff 2011). Tokyo was way behind most other cities in terms of universal accessibility in the 1980s, but has become a global frontrunner in the past decade (Ito 2015). However, making a barrier-free, elderly friendly city out of a city like Tokyo is no easy task. As facilities that help people move smoothly often require more space (think of wide stairs and pavements, and extra space for items such as handrails), Tokyo is facing a struggle. Narrow streets, ramps, slopes and footpaths make Tokyo into 'a narrow maze' (Stevens 2007, p. 267) that is difficult to navigate for those who are less mobile. 'Japanese cities are amongst the most densely populated in the world. Thus the utilisation of this scarce resource – space – is problematic due to competition among varied interests and a high rate of usage', argues Carolyn Stevens (2007, p. 266). To put it bluntly, when space is as expensive as it is in cities like Tokyo, it is more lucrative for land developers to leave as little space for pedestrians as possible.

Moreover, views regarding what is actually 'barrier-free' differ in some areas between government officials and researchers. While the official statistics on houses where citizens who are older than 65 live being barrier-free indicate that close to 60 per cent in Japan and 70 per cent in the metropolitan area of Tokyo live in such houses (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 2013), expert in universal design Satoshi Kose argues the number of truly barrier-free houses of the elderly is closer to 10 per cent (Kose 2011). And while Tokyo scores highly on liveable housing according to the official statistics, it should also be noted that there is a difference between what is 'barrier-free' for the elderly and 'barrier-free' for those with physical impairments. Most elderly in Japan are active and very autonomous (Coulmas 2007; Manzenreiter 2008; Ogawa 2008). Only a small percentage is bed-ridden or use wheelchairs to move around, and therefore they cannot be classified as physically impaired (Kose 1994). Despite their relatively active lifestyles, however, the elderly do encounter difficulties in public spaces. However, these difficulties are often of a different kind from, for example, what wheelchair users would encounter. For instance, small ramps can pose a big hurdle for many elderly as they are a main cause for falls, while these are not per se an issue for wheelchair users (Kose 1994). In a 2017 survey on what cities in Japan were the most ‘elderly friendly’, Tokyo (with the exception of the Sugamo district) did not score particularly well, and several central districts scored poorly on being elderly friendly (Home’s 2017). The winner of the survey was Nagoya, which not only has a very accessible and well-connected public transportation network, but also has large wheelchair-friendly toilets that can be found anywhere, sufficient escalators as well as elevators in public spaces, signs targeted at the elderly pointing out the best routes and facilities, easy hospital access from anywhere in the city and even a system that automatically gives citizens older than 65 a special ‘Respect for the Aged Pass’ (*keirō pasu*), with which they can ride free on buses and metro lines within the city. On the other hand, while Sugamo district in Tokyo scored highly as well, the main reason was not the accessibility per se, but rather the *social* aspects of the district: Sugamo is a communal hub for the elderly, and the district has many shops and cafes that specifically target elderly consumers. Thus, an elderly friendly city is not the same as a barrier-free city, although there are undeniably many overlapping points.

The effectiveness of the measures that are being taken in order to create a barrier-free city of the future also needs discussion. According to the guidelines published by the Cabinet Office, Japan will work on three aspects of realising this barrier-free society. First, they will stimulate the construction of universal design ‘city community development’ (*machizukuri*) initiatives and projects specifically in Tokyo. They will then continue to do so in all urban areas in Japan. Finally, they aim to establish a so-called national ‘barrier-free spirit’ (*kokoro no bariafurī*), meaning to create a more open mind-set towards accessibility (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 2017b). These aspects resulted in several measures being taken in the run up to the games. First, the organisers aimed to ensure that all access and venues would be universally accessible and offer sufficient space for visitors with physical impairments. Second, the organisers strove to make sure all main public transportation terminals around the city centre and the venues are ‘world-class’ (emphasising the leading position they wish Japan to take in barrier-free design) and ‘top-level barrier-free’ (Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games 2015) by making sure all sites are equipped with elevators, have security fences on the platforms and have levelled floors throughout. Buses around the airports would be equipped with lifts for carriages and 28,000 wheelchair-accessible taxis would be in service by 2020. As for ‘making one’s heart barrier-free’, the government started campaigns at national and local levels to spread awareness for the idea of ‘barrier-free’ living and organised training courses for all staff of the 2020 Olympics on the topic of ‘barrier-free’ and ‘barrier-free’ service.

It should be noted that almost all of these efforts, including the ones to make the entire country barrier-free, were specifically oriented towards *foreign visitors*: what is being made barrier-free is the city centre, the sport venues and Tokyo’s tourist attractions. Furthermore, many of the places mentioned in the policy plan to become barrier-free already had a relatively high level of accessibility: about

90 per cent of railway and bus terminals in Japan are considered universally accessible and ship and airport terminals have virtually a 100 per cent accessibility rate (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 2017a, p. 227; see also Grisdale 2015). Furthermore, the mentality regarding what constitutes 'barrier-free' is ambivalent – the accessibility of public spaces should be seen as a basic human right rather than something 'special'. Some have argued that the government's guideline to promote a 'barrier-free spirit' is dangerous as it posits barrier-free as an act of friendliness, and thereby makes discrimination against people with physical impairments the norm (*Sankei News* 2018).

Perhaps the most remarkable part of the campaign to construct a barrier-free Tokyo is the promotional images. As the transformation into a barrier-free city was one of the 'physical legacies' of the 2020 Olympic Games, there were promotional posters in many stations after March 2017 to show the general public what kind of reconstruction work was being done. The 'Go beyond 2020' campaign, for example, showed the benefits of a barrier-free metro station. This campaign was designed by the Tokyo Olympic Committee in cooperation with Tokyo Metro to promote barrier-free aspects of the metro stations and posters were showcased in metro stations all throughout Tokyo. The campaign comprised four photographs, each showing a barrier-free aspect of the metro (an elevator, an extra wide ticket gate, a public toilet with handrails and a train compartment that is accessible for wheelchairs) that were to be put in place for the Olympics. 'For a more barrier-free Tokyo, for a safer route for everyone', it says. In every picture people were shown making use of one of these handy, barrier-free aspects of the metro station. The photos show two people in wheelchairs, one of whom is dressed as a para-athlete and the other is wearing normal clothes. Both seem to be in their 30s. The other pictures showed how barrier-free facilities are also useful for able-bodied individuals. None of the individuals in the posters, however, were elderly – despite helping the elderly being one of the main reasons for making Tokyo barrier-free by 2020. Remarkably, two of these images show parents with their infant(s). The wide ticket gate poster, for example, shows how barrier-free facilities are useful for those with baby strollers, and are even wide enough for baby strollers for twins.

Elderly and the behind the scenes

The absence of the elderly in imagery is evident in other aspects of the 2020 Olympic brand as well. In theory, the Olympic Games are intended to promote sports for all ages. Moreover, in recent years the Japan government has been encouraging sports among the elderly as part of promoting a healthy lifestyle (Manzenreiter 2008). However, in the material published by the Japan Olympic Committee thus far, there is mostly a strong focus on encouraging sport activities among children and teenagers, for example in the 'Young Athletes' project and the Tokyo 2020 Education Programmes taught in elementary schools (Bureau of Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020 Preparation 2018). There were little to no representations of the elderly in materials published by the Committee, perhaps with the sole exception of the music video for the special Tokyo 2020 dance routine (*Tōkyō gorin ondo*), which is an adapted version of the song written for the 1964 Olympics featuring Enka singer Sayuri Ishikawa (born in 1958) and singer and actor Yūzō Kayama (born in 1937). On the one hand, prioritising the younger generations is very much in line with the usual promotional activities of an Olympic host city: an emphasis on children and youth underscores the future potential of a city (Ward 2011). Furthermore, the image of old age in Japan is still predominantly negative (Formanek 2005, 2008) and the elderly are still significantly underrepresented in media (Prieler *et al.* 2015; Prieler and Kohlbacher 2016).

Despite the elderly not being very present in the Olympic brand that Tokyo is presenting towards the outside world, the elderly themselves generally follow the event with much interest. Research has indicated that there is a relatively high interest among the older generations to follow and participate in the preparation for the sports event because many of them have fond memories of the 1964 Olympic Games (Kietlinski 2013; Tsurushima and Saitō 2018), and elderly people are playing an important role in the preparations for the event. Among the people who signed up in 2017 to become part of the 90,000-strong group of volunteers for the event, for example, a significant number was retirees, according to an early count of the applicants (*Japan Times* 2017). This can partly be explained by the fact that retirees would be easily able to make time to work the minimum hours required to be a volunteer (and attend training sessions in the run up towards the event) – and many complaints have been voiced against the Olympic volunteering programme, arguing that the long work hours and zero compensation are unethical (see for example Homma 2018a, 2018b). Groups that have flexible work hours such as the elderly, students and housewives are more likely to end up applying to become a volunteer. Some are worried that this will result in exploitation of the goodwill of such groups, and have stressed the misleading terms that are being used to lure people into applying (Norihiro 2018; Homma 2018b, 2018a). The elderly are a particularly vulnerable group in this aspect, as the labour-intensive volunteering work (often taking place outside, in the heat of the Japanese summer) might take a toll on their health.

Volunteering work might attract the elderly for reasons of nostalgia, but the lack of compensation for their work seems unfair, despite their enthusiasm to take part in the event. On the other hand, there has also been a group of elderly people that have been particularly duped in the preparations for the Games. For the venues that have been built for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, several apartment complexes in the centre of Tokyo had to be demolished and inhabitants had to be relocated, resulting in over 200 tenants being relocated from what had been their home for decades. The evictions were rushed and caused many of the inhabitants great suffering (Morita 2016; Suzuki, Ogawa and Inaba 2018). According to a survey among the relocated tenants, the relocation happened in a manner that gave them little say in the matter and many felt great distress when moving out. About a quarter of the tenants stayed in their houses until the very end.

Those that initially refused to move out of their houses were all over 60 years old, and had lived in their apartments for years, if not decades (Suzuki, Ogawa and Inaba 2018). Financially, the tenants were compensated with 171,000 yen, about which one of them commented:

> The compensation was not enough at all. It cost me nearly 300,000 yens [*sic*]. I thought [the apartment complex] was going to be my final place to live … I was disappointed that we had to get evicted because of the Olympics.
>
> (Suzuki, Ogawa, and Inaba 2018, p. 94)

Some of the elderly had been living there since 1964 after being relocated from their previous houses to make way for the 1964 Olympics, making the matter extra difficult.

Conclusions

Tokyo 2020 will be the first time that a super-ageing society organises the international sports event. Elderly citizens of Tokyo are playing important roles in the preparation for the Olympic and Paralympic Games by, for example, being active as volunteers, as well as voicing opposition to the event through protesting against the relocation of their houses for the construction of Olympic venues. The elderly are also one of the main reasons behind one of the Olympic Games' most important physical 'legacies': the pursuit of making Tokyo a 'barrier-free', age-friendly city. In a city that is as rapidly ageing as Tokyo, it is to be expected that elderly citizens would play prominent roles in the organisation and execution of the international sports event. However, there is one aspect of the 2020 Olympics where elderly citizens are unfortunately still missing: the imagery of the Olympic brand – the image of Tokyo that is being promoted towards foreign countries and foreign visitors. Instead of choosing an Olympic brand that would be as inclusive as the 'barrier-free' project and the Olympic slogan 'unity in diversity', the imagery of the Olympics misses a more age-inclusive approach. Despite the staggeringly low birth rate, the young generation was chosen to become the 'face' of Japan that is presented to the outside world. And while Japan is taking a proactive stance to stimulate healthy living and sports participation among the elderly, they are largely missing from Olympic promotional images and publicity.

'Barrier-free' is strongly emphasised as being part of the Paralympic legacy of Tokyo 2020. But by strategically implementing barrier-free facilities at the most touristic places, here, again, it shows that the focus is on outward appearance. While Japan is internationally increasingly thought of as a gerontocracy, it seems as if the youthful Olympic brand was deliberate in showing a more youthful side of the country. However, by doing so, it missed a chance to show that having an ageing population should not always be seen as a 'barrier'.

Note

1 The term in question, ‘machizukuri’ in Japanese, refers to more than physical aspects (infrastructure, built environment) of the city, and encompasses both the physical and social/communal aspects of the environment. ‘Bariafurii no machizukuri’ should hence be translated more as ‘city community development’ (see also Sorensen and Funck 2011).

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7 Foreign care workers in ageing Japan

Filipino carers of the elderly in long-term care facilities

Katrina Navallo

The lights turned off and a wave of hushed silence swept across the small room as a movie clip of Filipino and Vietnamese care workers flashed on to the screen. In the middle of a bright wood panelled hallway, a Filipina worker clad in a purple scrub suit was shown pushing the wheelchair of an elderly Japanese resident. The camera then shifted to show her soft, charming smile, and she said in Japanese, 'Isshōkenmei hatarakitai, kōreisha no sewa wo shitai desu' (I want to work hard and care for the elderly). This promotional video of a Japanese company portrays an image and imagining of migrant care workers in Japan's elder care.

This chapter explores care work as embodied interaction in the context of institutional elderly care settings in Japan. It discusses what happens when care tasks, which in themselves are of a culturally embodied nature, are performed between Filipino care workers and the Japanese elderly.[1] In a study of Indonesian care workers in Japan who came through the economic partnership agreement (EPA) between Japan and Indonesia in 2009, initial reluctance and discomfort to be 'touched' by foreign hands was attributed to carers' lack of Japanese cultural knowledge as symbolic of their 'otherness' (Switek 2016). Since then, there have been more encounters with foreign care workers, not only through the EPA, but also with long-term migrant residents, such as Filipina wives of Japanese men and former entertainers who have been working in the care sector since before the implementation of the EPA in 2008 (see Ballescas 2009; Lopez 2012). This chapter finds that the relational nature of care work expands the encounters with which the institutionalised elderly experience long-term care. Through long-term care work, the embodiment of caregiving fostered through the daily proximities of bodies and establishment of affective ties in the care of Japanese elderly residents by Filipino care workers create cultural encounters of care that expand interactions with foreign migrants to a more intimate nature.

Elderly care in Japan

Long-term care work in Japan, or *kaigo*, is the provision of nursing care and support to activities of daily living (ADLs), ensuring the well-being and safety of environment of old persons and persons with disability. Certified care workers (*kaigo fukushishi*) in institutional care provide support in bathing, feeding and toileting, and other forms of ADLs, such as assistance in transferring and mobility, hygiene maintenance and sleeping.

In 2018, there were 1,623,451 nationally certified care workers (*kaigo fukushishi*) in Japan (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan 2018a). The EPAs with three Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam) beginning in 2008 allowed for the formal acceptance of foreign professional nurses and care worker candidates in health-care sectors such as hospitals and long-term care facilities for the elderly, which was unprecedented in Japan. A total of 4265 EPA foreign care workers from Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam came to Japan from 2008 to 2018, of whom 1682 came from the Philippines (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan 2018b). Though small in number compared with the number of locally certified care workers, the number of foreign care workers is expected to increase to 60,000 by 2024 with the inclusion of 'care work' in the occupations under the Technical Intern Training Program beginning in 2019 (Department of Labor and Employment, Philippines 2019). This is within the context of the projected need for an additional 380,000 care workers by 2025 according to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan (Hirano 2017).

The formal acceptance of foreign labourers in Japan's care labour market through EPA was initially met with apprehension and resistance,[2] especially from the Japanese Nursing Association, who were concerned about lowering standards of care (Tsukada 2010; Ueno 2011) and competition with local workers.[3] On the one hand, this issue relates to the conceptualisation of 'skilled' and 'unskilled' work (Ogawa 2012b), where care work, despite being 'professionalised' in Japan, is in practice regarded as low-skill; thereby the acceptance of migrant care workers challenges the Japanese state's preferential treatment for accepting highly skilled migrant workers. On the other, scholars view the issue as a challenge to multicultural coexistence (*tabunka kyōsei*), which reflects reluctance regarding the social integration of migrants (Switek 2016).[4] Scholarly discussions on migrant care work in Japan are situated within the literature of the migration of foreign nurses and care workers to Japan via the EPA (Switek 2016; Nunoo 2016; Hirano and Tsubota 2016; Hirano, Ogawa and Ohno 2012; Ogawa *et al.* 2010; Asato 2007) and skilled workers in general (Vogt 2014; Akashi 2014; Asato 2013; Ford and Kawashima 2013; Vogt and Achenbach 2012). Ethnographic studies of Filipino long-term residents and EPA candidates doing care work highlight the experiences of the migrant community in Japan within the context of Filipinos' historical migration to Japan as entertainers, marriage migrants, wives to Japanese men and of Japanese-Filipino children (Suzuki 2007; Takahata 2016). However, the participation of foreign care workers in the care of Japan's ageing population presents an emerging phenomenon, which can be understood not only through discourses of multiculturalism and skilled labour migration, but also (and perhaps more importantly) through the perspective of care work, which this chapter aims to provide.

Long-term care facilities and welfare services for the elderly have become a major industry in Japan as a result of the revised Long-term Care Insurance in 2000, which saw an increased marketisation of elderly care services. Elderly individuals admitted into care facilities are categorised as needing high and specialised levels of care that can no longer be provided by family members, such as special care for dementia and for bedridden individuals (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan 2002). Japanese care facilities focus on providing total care and ensuring the elderly residents' medical well-being, safety and security (Wu 2004). Besides providing specialised care, care in long-term facilities in Japan is characterised by its provision of 'nutritional support, life rehabilitation, mandated staffing ratios, and seasonality and cultural practice' (Annear, Otani and Sun 2016, p. 754).

The availability and professionalisation of care services in Japan have significantly transformed how, where and who provides care, significantly changing the role of the family as the traditional and ideal providers of care.[5] However, the turnover rate among Japanese care workers is high due to the nature of care work, which is considered to be one of the 3K jobs (*kiken, kitsui, kitanai*, dangerous, dirty and difficult). Elderly residents are referred to as *riyōsha* (users), which reflects their status in the institution as recipients of care service. This establishes the economic relationship between the institution, the elderly and the care workers. At present, the changing landscape of elderly care in Japan, which increasingly draws on the labour of migrant workers, underscores the question of whether care changes depending on *who* provides it. The differences in the practices and expectations of elderly care between the Philippines and Japan inform the performance of care as a result of an embodied set of practices.

Long-term elderly care as an embodied experience

This chapter views care work based on an understanding of the body and embodiment in nursing care. Bodies are the main point of contact in care, and the way care workers attend to the body is shaped by cultural notions of care through seeing, touching and feeling. In this sense, the act of caring is a specific cultural phenomenon. Looking at the body as the source and recipient of care practices, Csordas (1993) explains 'somatic modes of attention' as culturally constructed ways in which the body perceives and attends to other bodies. From the perspective of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty (2005) views bodily perceptions as imbued with meanings that are embedded in a cultural world and become an unconscious set of practices, or what Bourdieu (1977) defines as 'habitus'.

However, elderly care is not simply 'body work' (Twigg 2000), but also calls for knowledge of nursing and biomedical care. In the nursing profession, practice is rendered within the art of nursing care, and constitutes one of the four fundamental patterns of knowing: (1) empirics, or the science of nursing; (2) aesthetics, or the art of nursing; (3) personal knowledge of the patient; and (4) ethics, or the morality of nursing care (Carper 1978). Practice constitutes the development of *tacit knowledge*, which reflects the highly experiential nature of nursing care that becomes refined through its constant and time-based performance (Benner 1982). Care practices are context-based, and culture shapes how these practices are perceived, performed and recognised. Benner and Gordon (1996, pp. 43–44) view practice as being a 'culturally constituted and socially embedded way of being', and as containing 'a variety of implicitly or explicitly articulated common meanings' performed in a given context. The implicitness of cultural practices sheds light into the imagined reluctance of the Japanese to be touched by foreigners, who are deemed strangers towards unspoken understandings of cultural codes and mores shared by and among Japanese people.

Methodology

The data for this chapter are taken from multiple in-depth interviews of Filipino care workers in the Kansai region from July 2017 to November 2018. The author met various Filipino migrants through participation in Filipino community activities in Kansai as a representative of the Filipino student association in Kyoto, and through this was introduced to the network of Filipino migrants who engage in care work either as a full-time or part-time job. Nineteen Filipino care workers were interviewed several times. Their backgrounds represent the variety of Filipino care workers in Japan: (1) Japan–Philippines EPA care workers; (2) Filipino students (*ryūgakusei)* doing part-time (*arubaito*) care work; and (3) former entertainers and long-term residents engaged in long-term care work. They are working in two types of residential care facilities for the elderly: (1) special long-term care welfare institutions for the elderly (*tokubetsu yōgo rōjin hōmu*); and (2) long-term care health facilities (*roken*).

The author did participant observation from July to August 2017 in a private nursing home in Kyoto employing Filipino care staff, and in a care worker training class (*kaigo shokuin shoninsha kenshū*) for Filipino migrants in Osaka from April to July 2018. Since the informants were based in different parts of Japan, face-to-face interviews were supplemented by online conversations and calls through social media applications, such as Line and Facebook Messenger. The names of individuals are represented with pseudonyms.

The following discussion explores how migrant care work expands the cultural encounters of care between Filipino care workers and Japanese elderly people. It specifically focuses on touch and skinship, formation of shared ties through (dis)location from the family and 'being there'.

Expanding cultural encounters of care in Japanese long-term care facilities

Touch and skinship: the care of the body

A normal day in a care facility begins when a care worker wakes up the residents. Opening the curtain to let the sunlight in at 7 a.m., Rosemary leaned close to the bed and said, 'Ohayō gozaimasu, Ishida san. Ii tenki desu ne. Okimashō ka' (Good morning, Ishida san. It is good weather today. Are you ready to get up?). Ishida san gave a gentle 'Hai'. As soon as she sat on the edge of the bed, Rosemary pulled the wheelchair and positioned it just beside the old woman's legs. She stood in front of her, asked her to place her arms on her shoulders and wrapped her arms around the old woman's torso while securing her grip by holding the pyjama waistband. 'Seino' – with a slight grunt she lifted her in one swift move towards the wheelchair. Rosemary adjusted the foot rests, unlocked the wheels and pushed her towards the toilet. Before helping Ishida san to sit down on the toilet bowl, Rosemary pulled down her pants and checked to see if there was feces in the diaper, or if it had been soiled. Seeing it was empty, she guided Ishida san to hold the bars and slowly eased her on to the toilet seat. She waited a couple of minutes until Ishida san finished peeing. Rosemary then asked her to hold the bars again and when the old woman was on her feet, she took a warm towel and wiped her genitals from front to back. She took a new diaper sheet and inserted it into the pants before pulling them up together. After toileting, Rosemary wheeled Ishida san in front of the sink and prepared her toothbrush. Rosemary let the old woman brush her own teeth, while she combed and arranged her hair into a neat bun. She explained to me that they allow the residents to continue performing tasks that they can still do, so they retain some functions such as personal grooming. Then, Ishida san joined the other residents in the living room, waiting for breakfast to be served. Meanwhile, Rosemary proceeded to the next room, where she provided the same care to the other nine residents in the unit ward.

Basic caring activities such as feeding, toileting, lifting and transferring are common tasks of the care workers. In the performance of such tasks, bodily contact (skinship) and proximity have become an unconscious part of their care. The performance of the seemingly mundane and routine activities of care, or what Aulino (2016) calls 'rituals of care', actually gives texture to the day-to-day lives of the residents and care workers (Twigg 2000). In Japan, skinship (*hada to hada no fureai*) is commonly observed in the physical intimacy between mother and child (Tahhan 2014). In care work, skinship serves to foster trust in the care of a stranger, a non-kin, and allows for the smooth and effective provision of care in the long term.

Touch and skinship are fundamental aspects of care that foster intimate knowledge of the body. Care workers normally take cues from feeling an elderly resident's skin: dry parched skin could mean dehydration or an exacerbation of a skin problem; scaly skin would need moisturising; shiny oedematous skin could suggest poor blood circulation; redness on bony prominences could suggest an early formation of bed sores; skin hot to the touch is suggestive of fever. This knowledge becomes almost intuitive and alerts care workers to the residents' general health condition. Often, this kind of intimate knowledge becomes available to the care worker over the course of her contact with the resident in a way that even family members may not have.

The intimacy fostered through bodily care is often perceived by the Filipino care workers as a natural part of caring that they themselves have done to their family members. Giving value to these activities as a 'natural' process of care looks beyond ethnicity, gender and class and allows them to view the Japanese elderly people as familial recipients of care. They make sense of their care as if they are caring for their own parents or grandparents, and this allows them to visualise their own selves caring for their own kin.

Formation of ties: dislocation from the family

Rosemary emphasised the importance of preparing her mindset whenever she enters the care setting. She described how she tries to put herself in the shoes of these elderly residents and what kinds of lives they had prior to being in the care home. She described it as being similar to her situation, namely that she is living in a place far away from her family. The feeling of being away from home might be similar to what the elderly residents are experiencing.

The notion of location and dis-location among people and place in caring relations shapes the experience of care (Milligan 2003). The sense of vulnerability due to dislocation from one's natural social system is shared by both the elderly residents and Filipino care workers: the elderly person's institutionalisation as isolation from home and family, and the migrant's separation from family because of his/her migration. Empathy through their shared sense of dislocation and vulnerability becomes a powerful connection that expands the care encounter between migrant carers and their local care recipients. For the institutionalised elderly, vulnerability comes not only from their dislocation, but also through a sense of dependency on their care workers and the institution for their daily care. This creates a new form of mutual engagement between foreign carers and Japanese elderly residents in their relations as carer and cared for, in which both are able and willing to give and receive presence, attention and care. This mutual engagement somehow imitates the Japanese concept of *amae*, which Takeo Doi defines as the ability to 'depend and presume upon another's love' (2005, p. ix). Since *amae* is commonly seen in children's relationships with their mothers, elderly individuals may find it inappropriate to exhibit such need to be cared for; however, as is often observed in the context and organisation of activities in residential homes, individual attention becomes a privileged encounter and residents may exhibit *amae* to gather care workers' attention. However, the care facility advises against such closeness as unprofessional and inappropriate, since it risks being seen as favouritism among the care workers.

Danely (2016) points out that this vulnerability shapes the care workers' moral selfhood in making sense of their caring work. At the same time, vulnerability opens up spaces of trust between the cared for elderly and carer. For the Filipino care worker, this may take the form of knowing the elderly person's life history, the sharing of old photos that convey their former lives, or even something as simple as sharing their lives in the past. While the elderly resident may also demonstrate difficult behaviours that can exhaust the care worker's patience and attention, bearing the knowledge of a resident's past allows the care worker to see them as a whole person with a life history.

Imelda had just started working in a day service centre when we met. She told me how much she enjoyed the work, especially with the elderly residents. Despite being new to the facility, she said that her wards 'love' her because of her warmth and approachability. On another occasion, Elena, who also worked at a day service centre, shared a Facebook post of a note from the daughter of the elderly person she cares for. The note reads, 'Itsumo oisogashii naka kami no ke kawaikushite itadaite. Arigatō gozaimasu' (Despite your busyness, thank you for always fixing my mom's hair beautifully). On the same post Elena noted, 'Every time the elderly woman comes to our Day Service, we always braid her hair after she finishes the bath… To hear or to read the words thank you from them inspires me a lot and removes my stress.'

Being there: moral ethics of care work

Residential elderly facilities as spaces of care are constructed and negotiated spaces where care, as an intimate activity that originally is provided in the familial domestic sphere, is managed in the public/private spaces of the care facility. In the long-term care facility, the Filipino care workers and Japanese elderly people share in the time and space where care flows.

INTERVIEWER: How do you describe your relationship with the elderly?
JULIETA: Like a parent. Like a grandfather or grandmother.… The way I treat them is like, family; not just as a care worker.

The cultural embeddedness of care in both Japan and the Philippines as a familial responsibility shapes the meaning of care as work. In many instances, Filipino care workers conceptualise their role as standing in for the family members who, for various reasons, could not be physically present to care for their aged relatives. Nurses, as well as care workers who are engaged in direct care, are guided by the moral code of the profession, which is based on the 'principle of obligation embodied in the concepts of *service* to people and *respect* for human life' (Carper 1978, p. 29, italicisation by the author).[6] Studies on migrant domestic workers view their roles as fictive kin, but in the context of care work, their sense of obligation to care is clearly framed by their roles and responsibilities in the care facility.

As migrant care workers gradually take on the maintenance (physical and emotional tasks) of caregiving, the families of the elderly residents manage the taking care of – that is, the (financial and resource-wise) sustenance of care. A daughter of an elderly resident in the facility expressed her satisfaction in the way that Rosemary looks after her mother. She noted that she had only seen migrant care workers (*gaikokujin rōdōsha*) on TV, and was not expecting to find a Filipino working in the facility where her mother was residing. Despite some initial hesitation about the language barrier, she was able to recognise that the care worker delivers care more than is expected of her. The care worker's attentiveness to her mother and attention to the small things reflect her own care values.

Since elderly care in the Philippines remains highly valued as an important responsibility of children to their parents, Filipino care workers bring with them the same expectations when they care for the Japanese elderly. While performing their roles, carers may go beyond what is expected of them, but this is viewed by both the care recipients and their families as the added value in their service. Filipino care workers, in return, find value in the simple recognition that the residents and families give, no matter how small. In one instance, Julieta received a gift of a pair of socks from the daughter of one of the elderly people she cared for in the day service. For Julieta, these small gifts serve as an affirmation of her care and recognition for a job well done. This imagined positioning by Filipino care workers with the elderly residents construct their embodied role in the society as carers of the Japanese elderly.

Conclusion

The emerging globalisation of care in Japan opens Japanese society to interactions with foreign people that range from casual to intimate encounters, where migrants provide services for maintaining the society, such as in the case of elderly care. While initial interactions have been largely based on imaginations of migrants as 'others' and as strangers to the cultural codes and mores that are embedded in the social relations of Japanese society (Switek 2014), care work provides an understanding of interactions that is not only mediated by language, but also through bodily encounters. Viewing the corporeal and intersubjective dynamics in the context of nursing care opens up unexplored spaces where the depth of interactions goes beyond race, class and gender in building meaningful and mutual understanding, as exhibited in the caring relationships between Filipino care workers and Japanese elderly.

This chapter has illustrated how care work is constituted by embodied practices and how new meanings can be derived from the interactions of Filipino care workers and institutionalised Japanese elderly. Filipino care workers deliver care through bodily intimacy mediated by touch and skinship. Making use of touch and skinship, they are able to translate the physical aspects of care to convey the emotional and affective warmth that their lack of language skill is not able to convey adequately. What the Filipino care worker brings to the care settings are their notions of care work that view caring as a moral responsibility. This is reinforced in empathy through a shared sense of vulnerability via their dislocations from their families by virtue of institutionalisation for the Japanese elderly, and outmigration for the Filipino care workers.

Unravelling the capacities of care work to foster relations and ties between migrants and the Japanese expands the discourse of multicultural coexistence. It challenges prevailing assumptions of Japan as a monolithic society concurrent with significant and rapid demographic changes that drive the society towards more openness to foreign labour. As the ageing population calls for diversifying its labour, the long-term care facilities may serve as a microcosmic community to observe how intimate interactions between foreigners and locals can be initiated, nurtured and transformed.

Notes

1 At the same time, Filipino migrants have long been participants in the global and transnational care chains in other parts of the globe. See studies of Filipina domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles by Parreñas (2001), in Hong Kong by Constable (2007) and in Malaysia by Chin (1998); Filipina home care workers in Israel by Mazuz (2013) and Liebelt (2011); Filipino care workers and nurses in Singapore by Amrith (2016).

2 The Japanese government has promulgated the acceptance of skilled workers, but the inclusion of care workers as 'skilled' challenges the concept due to the largely 'low-skilled' nature of care work. Since this is the first time that Japan has accepted a substantial number of foreign care workers, concerns were raised regarding their levels of Japanese ability, nursing skills, workplace adjustments and relations with care recipients and their families (Kawaguchi *et al.* 2008 cited in Ogawa 2012a).

3 The Japan Nursing Association, in particular, requires foreign nurses to be familiarised with Japanese culture, lifestyle and social life, as well as to be able to conduct smooth communication in Japanese to avoid confusion and medical errors (Tsukada 2010).

4 For instance, Switek's (2016) analysis of the encounters of Indonesian care workers and Japanese elderly in residential care facilities during the first few years of the EPA as 'reluctant intimacy' emphasised how the national reluctance towards migrants affected and shaped the individual encounters at the care facilities. Scholars critical of multicultural politics in Japan (Mackie 2013; Nagayoshi 2011) see the accommodation of difference not as a threat to the homogeneity of the 'nation' but as a further reinforcement of 'Japaneseness' (Nagayoshi 2011).

5 However, scholars agree that decision making about elderly care in Japan, especially at the end of life, is not a straightforward process (Elliott and Campbell 1993; Long 2005). The availability of resources, family relations and the elderly's preferences all play an important role in deciding how an elderly family member is to be cared for in old age.

6 Similarly, Article 44-2 of the Social Worker and Care Worker Act of Japan emphasises the promotion of *dignity* of individuals as a primary duty of social workers and care workers.

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8 Immigrants caring for other immigrants

The case of the Kaagapay Oita Filipino Association

Melvin Jabar

Most research on Filipino immigrants in Japan is now heavily focused on formal caregiving work (e.g. Chapter 7 by Navallo in this volume; Imamura, Saito and Miyagi 2010). This is understandable, as the tides have shifted in another direction. In the past, Filipina women thrived in the Japanese entertainment industry. Today, many of them engage in caregiving work. In fact, Filipina women in Japanese–Filipino marriages are ideally positioned to be hired as care workers, as they can speak relatively good Japanese and have permanent visas. Instead of hiring someone from the Philippines, it is economically feasible to recruit immigrants who are already in Japan. While much research is now geared towards this direction, this chapter takes a different approach by looking at how Filipina women provide care to their fellow Filipino immigrants. The aim of this chapter is to describe the role of a specific Catholic Church-based organisation of Filipino immigrants (specifically Filipina wives of Japanese husbands) in Japan in providing care to their fellow Filipino immigrants. Instead of focusing on the role of the Catholic Church in providing support to Filipino immigrants, this chapter highlights the role of a church-based Filipino organisation in providing care, not necessarily in the context of religious institutional care initiatives. Care in this regard is not limited to health care but also extends to spiritual, psychological and financial care.

This chapter argues that ‘ethno-religious’ organisations such as the Kaagapay Oita Filipino Association play a crucial role in providing care to immigrants from their respective ethnic backgrounds, given the absence of immediate family members to provide them with informal care. While they have their own family members from their families of procreation, it seems that Filipina immigrants still crave the Filipino way of providing care. While the host state can provide health and medical care, there are culture-specific care needs that can only be attended to by individuals or institutions that are sensitive to such cultural details. Differences in the provision of care can be due to language, religion or cultural practices. In this chapter, I would like to add to the scant literature on Filipino organisations in Japan providing care to fellow Filipino immigrants and their impacts on their well-being. In addition, this chapter also addresses a gap in the research on ethnic organisations. Most studies focus only on the role of such organisations in integration and the forging of networks among immigrants, for example the case of immigrants in

Canada (e.g. Ho 2018). This chapter attempts to paint in broad strokes how organisations such as the Kaagapay Oita Filipino Association are trying to make themselves relevant to the lives of Filipino immigrants who have lived in Japan for years, by providing care to them in relation to health, ageing and death.

My argument is that it is about time we looked at the life trajectories of immigrants, not only by focusing on how ethnic- or nationality-based organisations such as the Kaagapay can help in fully integrating them into the mainstream, but also by looking at how these organisations can provide care and services to them. Immigrants have medical, ageing and future death care needs, which should be dealt with in research. Studies have shown that elderly immigrants will be dependent on the available social networks they possess in terms of accessing care. Social networks too, especially ethnic based, serve as buffers to mitigate challenges that come with ageing, such as social isolation and loneliness (Hossen 2012). For instance, in Hossen's study in Canada among elderly Asian immigrants, social isolation and alienation may be addressed through quality of family relationships, social ties and access to health care. Meanwhile, a study in the United States depicts high symptoms of depression among elderly Korean immigrants to the United States owing to immigration-related sources of stress such as 'language barriers, acculturation issues, social isolation' and others (Mui, 2008). Martineau and Plard (2019) demonstrated that challenges faced by the elderly population in France can also be attributed to the fact that they have to operate within the dominant gerontological model of the host country. Their results depicted that achievement of successful ageing among immigrants requires a complex process compared their non-immigrant/local counterparts.

In Japan, meanwhile, literature on ageing studies is highly focused on the local elderly population. Understandably, Japan has not reached a juncture where immigration and multicultural diversity is at its peak, unlike in Canada, the United States and other developed countries. However, sooner or later Japan will face the same fate, as the country will be forced to welcome foreign workers and immigrants. Studies, domestically and internationally, point to the importance of maintaining social bonds to achieve successful ageing. For instance, the study of Murata *et al.* (2019) noted that community engagement among the elderly in their study reduces the odds of getting dementia. While studies on elderly immigrants elsewhere are thriving, studies of a similar nature in Japan leave much to be desired.

Role of organisations in immigrants' lives

Past studies looked at the role of religion in the integration of immigrants (Peshchke 2009, p. 367). Her article underscores the importance of religion (or religious organisations) in the lives of migrants. Religion, according to Peshchke, initiates community building that promotes social cohesion. The study of Chen, Talwar and Ji (2015) among elderly Asian immigrants in the United States, meanwhile, maintained that

> connecting with religious group members and being involved in religious activities offers elderly Asian immigrants not only support but also a sense

> of belonging within their community. Religious activities help them to maintain bonds while they acculturate in the U.S.
>
> (Chen, Talwar and Ji 2015, p. 15)

Studies of religion and Filipino migration to Japan are not new. Lopez (2012, p. 283), for instance, investigated the role of religious intimacy in Japanese–Filipino marriages. Lopez argues that, to some extent, the religious practices of Filipina wives are accommodated by their Japanese husbands in consideration of their marital relations. Some studies such as the one by Arriola (2015) looked at non-religious roles of the Catholic Church in Japan. Arriola (2015, p. 213) focused on how churches serve as brokers of health-care services for Filipina mothers. However, my chapter demonstrates how a Catholic Church-based organisation not only serves as a broker for health services but also provides care. Further, there are other studies which look at how the Japanese culture hampers the Catholic religious socialisation of children in Japanese–Filipino families, which may, in turn, impact family dynamics.

Despite the positive contributions of religious practice in a foreign land, there are cultural barriers that restrain Filipina women from passing their religion on to their children. For instance, Lemay (2018, p. 9) mentioned that some Filipina mothers could no longer bring their children to church because of school activities (see also Umeda 2009, p. 323). This can further alienate Filipina mothers from their Japanese–Filipino families, and matters concerning these mothers' health, lives and deaths must be dealt with amongst themselves. The Filipino community in Japan will need to play a role in dealing with the health, ageing and death issues of Filipino immigrants, as the host country may be unaware of the cultural minutiae surrounding these aspects of life.

Ethnographic fieldwork

Data in this chapter are based on ethnographic fieldwork over seven years (at both a personal and a professional level) which I conducted in Oita Prefecture, Japan. I conducted personal interviews, home visits, participant observations and focus group discussions to understand the life experiences of Filipina mothers in Japanese families. For many years, I have been conducting fieldwork activities to understand the marital experiences of Filipina mothers, as well as their parental involvement in their Japanese children's education. These mothers are members of a Catholic Church-based Filipino group in Oita City, Japan. I stayed in Japan from 2001 to 2004 for my undergraduate studies and then later returned for my doctoral studies (2008–2012). After graduation, I undertook a series of follow-up research activities, investigating different aspects of the mothers' lives, including their marriages, their children's education, their views on ageing and their contribution to Catholicism in Japan.

Although my doctoral research and the research that followed did not specifically examine immigrant care, my data provided me with stories which could be used to reflect on how immigrant workers provide care in the absence of family members and relatives. While I was in Japan, I was intrigued by the possible future of these Filipina mothers, given their circumstances. They must come to terms with cultural differences and linguistic challenges, the absence of Filipino family members and relatives, and their own inability to prepare for their future owing to financial constraints. Most of them make ends meet, as they not only support their family of procreation (their own family) but also their family of origin, by constantly remitting money to the Philippines.

Even though I am not a part of the community, by remaining in constant touch with the community for almost a decade, I became well acquainted with Filipina mothers and the boundaries of my role as a researcher blurred as I was also actively doing community organising work. To some extent, there is a higher degree of reflexivity in this chapter, as I am one of the founding members of the organisation. In fact, I attended countless Bible learning activities of the organisation. I also participated in, and co-organised, formal and informal events of the organisation from Christmas parties, fund-raising activities and other Church-based activities to birthday parties and get-togethers. Finally, I made countless visits to their homes for informal conversations.

Most Filipina women in the organisation are former cultural performers, and many of them came to Japan in the 1980s. They became residents of Japan by virtue of marriages to their Japanese husbands. They are active church leaders, and many new immigrants look up to them as their elder sisters (in Filipino, they are addressed as 'ate'). The organisation to which they belong is the Kaagapay Oita Filipino Association which was officially established in 2010, although the group has been in existence for even longer. Kaagapay is a Filipino term meaning 'to be with others' or 'to be at someone's side'. The group decided to adopt it as the organisation's name because of the desire of its members to provide mutual support, care, respect and, most importantly, spiritual nourishment. Leaders of the group thought that the group, being attached to the Catholic Church, should take the lead in ensuring that Filipino immigrants adjusted well in their community and, if they encountered problems, the organisation should provide care in the best possible way.

In 2010, the organisation's by-laws were drafted, and the founding officers took an oath before its members. The Kaagapay, as it is fondly called, is a church-based organisation in Oita City, Oita, Japan. Its members, though few, are mainly residents of Oita City, although there are some members from the neighbouring small cities of Beppu and Taketa. The organisation has about 100 members, but only about ten are active.

As articulated in its by-laws, the Kaagapay

> aims to contribute to the welfare of Filipinos residing in Oita, Japan. Its mission is to provide genuine, Christ-centred, and exemplary leadership to its members, particularly Filipino immigrants and their families in Oita. It envisions a Filipino community that promotes partnership, camaraderie, and religiosity.

To realise this mission, the organisation seeks to provide services and programmes for the development of Filipino immigrants not only as immigrants but also as Christians and Filipinos. One of the main goals of the organisation is to bring Filipino–Japanese families closer to the Catholic faith. The organisation also serves as the custodian of Filipino culture in Japan. Because of their active presence in the church through their financial support (church contributions), volunteer work for the church and religious activities, two members of the Kaagapay were invited to sit on the Church council. This was an achievement, since not all churches in Japan openly integrate Filipino Catholics to their councils.

Spiritual care: psychological effects of religious activities

Through years of fieldwork, I have realised that for some Kaagapay members, attending church-related activities is a form of self-care, as well as caregiving. This is one of the themes that emerged in both the interviews and my participant observation activities. For members of the Kaagapay, spending time together, laughing and telling stories somehow provided different degrees of comfort. Although it may not be obvious to some members, the Kaagapay officers mentioned on many occasions that the mere physical presence of a member of the community is itself a form of care.

For the members, being part of the Kaagapay has become a means to maintain good family relationships. In fact, the Catholic Church organises a family day (barbeque party) for Filipina women and their Japanese families to strengthen their family bonds, as well as the relationship of Filipinos with their Japanese Catholic counterparts. Having sound familial relationships makes them very happy, which has contributed much to their well-being. I was able to participate in one such activity and observed how happy the members were as they exchanged stories. Though it is a temporal experience, at least during these activities, one has the opportunity to see the smiling faces of the participants.

Some Kaagapay members appreciate that even though their Japanese husbands are not Catholic the husbands nevertheless support the members. The Japanese husbands do this by attending church activities or by simply allowing them to practise their own religion. Attending church is especially important to them, as it provides them with spiritual and psychological nurturance. The success of the first barbeque party even encouraged the Bishop of the Archdiocese to sponsor another similar event. In fact, one of the leaders of the association posted a message in the Facebook group, which read:

> Thank you very much to all those who joined the fun and who helped to successfully implement the ‘We Are One Family in Christ’ event last August 11 at the Oita Catholic Church. We made God smile that day, that’s for sure. The Japanese community which hosted the BBQ Family Event was really happy about our joyous participation in the event, especially the Bishop. Because they were so happy, they have decided to have another similar event on a national holiday in November.

To nurture their faith, members of the Kaagapay attended Bible learning activities. These cathartic encounters provided them with psychological relief while teaching them about life-related adjustments with respect to being mothers of Japanese children and living in a Japanese family, in general. I recall that during our sessions we would read from the Bible and reflect on it by relating theological lessons to real life situations and daily encounters.

On many occasions, I would witness some members share their heartfelt challenges, some reduced to tears because of the problems in their lives. In these Bible learning activities, Filipina women somehow unburdened themselves of their pent-up emotions. In fact, it was mentioned that through the Bible learning activities, they provided care by lending a sympathetic ear and supporting each other in every possible way. Because their husbands and children were busy at work and school, respectively, Filipina mothers had to find avenues to interact and communicate. Members of the Kaagapay find the organisation to be a place away from their homes and part-time jobs where they can express themselves.

Their involvement in the organisation has also brought them closer to the Philippines symbolically. Their constant interaction with other Filipinos provides them with the 'opportunity' to freely speak their language, eat Filipino food and share their thoughts and feelings without constraints. At almost all the events I attended, members eagerly anticipated forthcoming activities because they would be able to prepare Filipino food for the banquet. In fact, individual members would be asked to bring the dishes they could prepare well. For them, preparing Filipino food is exciting, as they do not cook these in their daily life. Few prepare Filipino food for their family members, who prefer Japanese food.

In most research on Filipinos in Japan, cultural performances (such as Filipino festivals) have been seen as identity reconstructions (Balgoa 2017, p. 100). However, I also see a psychological aspect of participation in socio-cultural events. Phinney (1991), for instance, argues that a strong ethnic identity promotes self-esteem among immigrants. Their participation in these activities somehow raises their Filipino spirits, which, in turn, promotes a sense of place (and of belonging) and high self-esteem. Through these gatherings, the members perhaps develop what they call 'place identities or the sense of being at home' (Howard 2000, p. 382). Through their faith, the Kaagapay can facilitate caregiving by functioning as a gathering place for churchgoing Filipinos. Hirschman (2006, p. 1229) argues that 'the bonds of faith are reinforced when a religious community can provide nonspiritual fellowship and practical assistance for the many problems that immigrants face'. While their care is guided by their faith, the practical support and care the members of organisations such as the Kaagapay provide to each other strengthens and legitimises the presence of such organisations. The support and care provided by members to each other is a concrete manifestation of their religious principles. The organisation is trying to reach out to other Filipino immigrants. The association has been willing to do all it can, even for strangers, and provide the care needed in times of sickness and death. However, the challenge for the organisation is to be able to entice others to become members. The members openly say 'who else can help us except our own?' Organisations such as the Kaagapay are especially important in providing help to Filipinas who are single parents or divorcees.

Health care: of being carers for each other

Members of the Kaagapay themselves provide certain types of care when someone in their group is sick or hospitalised. They express their concern through hospital visits or by raising funds for medical care needs. The organisation's Facebook group is, in fact, used to announce the condition of hospitalised members. Two of the several announcements included these contents:

> We appreciate your concern for our sister Martha [pseudonym]. We regret to inform you, however, that at this point, visits are not allowed. She requires sufficient rest to recover. Visitation is discouraged to avoid bacterial and viral infections. Thank you for your understanding.
>
> As you may already know, our dear sister Martha had a stroke last Saturday. She is now in the hospital. As of this writing, she may already have undergone surgery. This is the best time for us to show that we care for our fellow Filipinos. We are her family, as she is far from her own family back home. I am once again knocking on your doors to ask you for a small financial contribution. Any amount will do. What matters most are our thoughts and care. Should you wish to send your wishes to Martha, please contact me anytime.

I visited some members of the group who were hospitalised myself. Some of the Kaagapay leaders also constantly shared stories with me about their visits to hospital to see a sickly Filipina friend. One instance relates to a leader of the Kaagapay. This leader used to visit a member who had been battling cancer for several years. Due to the unavailability of a Filipino priest in their community, she would often visit a Filipina woman in the hospital to pray over her and to simply pay her a visit. It is common among the members of the Kaagapay to be asked to pray when someone in the community is sick or hospitalised. There was one instance when a member requested prayers for the speedy recovery of a Filipina who had a major stroke.

The same leader shared with me that days before my interview with her she had visited a member who had been confined to the hospital for some time and who was unaware of her date of discharge. The Filipina was expressing her gratitude for the prayers and the trouble taken by fellow Filipino immigrants to visit her in the hospital. The leader had this to share:

> I visited Danica [pseudonym], who has been confined to the hospital and has no prospects of being released any time soon. As always, she thanked me and the Kaagapay profusely for praying for her and asked for the group's continued prayers for her healing. She mentioned another Filipina who needed our prayers too. It is humbling to be identified with the church

> and to be approached and appreciated for the spiritual upliftment that you can give to others.

In a conversation I had with one of the members, it was related to me that a Japanese patient once told her that she was lucky because she had a lot of friends visit her in the hospital and that some of them were praying for her recovery. The Japanese patient even requested the member to include her in their prayers.

Given the effective health-care system in Japan, access to health services is not a problem among Filipina wives, as most of them are covered by state insurance. However, besides access to health services, constant hospital visits by Filipino friends and prayer requests make the difference, as related by the Kaagapay members themselves. The Filipino way of providing care with the nuance of religion somehow transforms the mechanical health services afforded to them by the state to something more spiritual.

Mourning and providing death care

The organisation provides financial support when a member's loved one departs. This means that caregiving by Filipina women in Oita is not only for the Filipinos in their community but also for their loved ones back in the Philippines. They request that everyone, member or otherwise, donate any amount when someone is hospitalised or when the relatives of a member of the organisation depart. For instance, after receiving financial support from the organisation, a Filipina posted a message in the organisation's Facebook group, which read:

> Many thanks to all of you who prayed, who gave comfort and sympathy, and provided financial support for the loss of my dear mother. Mary [pseudonym] took the trouble to hand me the offerings. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Members of the Kaagapay do not hesitate to provide financial and spiritual support to Filipina women in need of care, which even extends to providing care to bereaved Japanese families of departed Filipino immigrants. One such instance was when the organisation had to literally plan and manage the wake of a Filipina who was a member of the Kaagapay. What was interesting was that the church allowed the group to perform funeral rituals that are not considered conventional in Japanese society.

When this Filipina passed away, her Japanese family seemed unprepared to perform post-death rites, including her wake. However, since she was active in the church, it was not difficult for the Kaagapay officers to seek approval for her wake at the Catholic Church. The Kaagapay members also made financial contributions, and some volunteered to manage the wake and help her to her final rest.

During her funeral mass, an audio-visual presentation was made to honour her for her contribution to the church and for being a testimony to God's love.

Some delivered short speeches, thanking those who, in many ways, had become part of the Filipina's life in Japan. The mass also included songs which reduced the Filipina's son's classmates to tears. For financial reasons, her immediate family members in the Philippines were unable to attend, and so it was the Kaagapay which participated in her family's stead.

In the past, the Kaagapay has helped victims of calamities or people of impoverished communities in the Philippines. However, they realised that they do not need to spread their wings in faraway places but instead should focus their attention on providing support to Filipino immigrants who are in difficult situations. Members and leaders of the organisation are beginning to realise that as they age they need to help each other when sickness or death strikes Japanese–Filipino homes in Japan. To provide support, the members can capitalise on their cultural assets as a means to raise funds for the future when health issues and death come their way. On many occasions, the Kaagapay has staged cultural performances showcasing the Filipino culture. With these cultural performances, they can achieve several goals: not only can they share their culture with the Japanese community, they can also save for a rainy day. In one of the focus group discussions I conducted with members of the Kaagapay on their views on ageing, one of the realisations I had was that they have concerns regarding their ageing selves. They see their future selves staying in Japan because they have their own families to look after. However, they worry about what the future will be like for them. They anticipate that if their children do not look after them, they will find themselves in institutional homes for the elderly. In an interview, for instance, one leader expressed her worries regarding falling sick when her sister is not around. She shared:

> Two days ago, I got sick, and so I suddenly thought about what would happen to me once I reach that age. Now you are still young, but what about when you are old? There will come a time when your children will also live independently after college. This is what it is like in Japan, not like in our country. So, parents are left alone. Here, in our province, you will see that most residents are old people. So, the responsibility of old people must be shouldered by the younger ones (not the young but the adults). The question is can we really cope growing old here? We do not have relatives. It is good for me because I have a sister here. She can accompany me to the hospital. What is good here in Japan, though, is that there is a pension, there is insurance. They have many services for the elderly because the ageing population is growing rapidly in Japan. It's getting to be a big problem here in Japan.

Despite these uncertainties, though, the members are optimistic that through their organisation they should be able to age, and die, gracefully as they will receive assistance from their Filipino community. In fact, one member shared that it is one of her dreams to be able to establish an institution for the elderly among Filipino immigrants. She had this idea because she worries about the language and cultural differences that they could experience living in Japanese institutions for the elderly. She said that she would prefer to live with other Filipinos, as they are likely to share common interests and do not have to adjust their lifestyles, given their shared cultural practices and traditions.

With the absence of a multicultural and socially inclusive institution for the elderly, the Filipina women expressed their desire to stay at home independent of their children when they reach their senior years, rather than staying in elderly care institutions. This arrangement is referred to as 'ageing in place' (Wiles *et al.* 2011). Such an arrangement is preferred, as Filipina women wish to maintain social ties and connections with fellow Filipino immigrants and to make their own decisions. What they fear most is the possibility of not being able to get along well with their in-laws. To avoid meddling in the marital affairs of their children, they would rather distance themselves and find a place where they can spend time with their friends. There are two areas of contention regarding how Filipino women view ageing. On the one hand, there is always this reference to what life was like in the past during their younger years and what life will be like when they face ageing. This is similar to the concept of 'di tulad ng dati' (literally translated as 'not like in the past') of Esteban (2015). On the other hand, they also have this comparison between what life would be like if their ageing years are spent in the Philippines or in Japan.

Conclusion

The presence of Filipino community groups such as the Kaagapay in Catholic churches can be related to issues of integration and identity construction. However, such arrangements can serve as psychologically liberating social structures providing care which make adjusting to life changes easier and foster an optimistic view of the future, despite uncertainties, especially in relation to health, ageing and death. While health-care services in Japan are gold standard, issues of health, ageing and death should be dealt with beyond their biomedical aspects, meaning that there are cultural nuances surrounding such issues, and only those who understand culture can provide for the specific health, ageing and death care needs of immigrants.

The Filipino way of providing care highlighted here is the kind of care which is based on religion. Filipinos provide care for others based on the religious teaching of being a good Samaritan to others. The care that members of the Kaagapay extend to each other, and even to those outside the organisation, is viewed by outsiders and insiders alike as spiritual care, as it is graced by faith. Ageing issues of immigrants in Japan is a subject that will demand attention sooner rather than later. While Japan is struggling to deal with domestic issues of ageing, concerns of immigrants may get the short of end of the stick. It is hoped that the experiences of Filipina immigrants can provide early signs of how Catholic churches in Japan should deal with Catholic immigrants, specifically elderly Filipinas. As a sign of gratitude for their contribution in passing on the faith to their offspring, Catholic churches in Japan should consider how best to help when these immigrants face ageing and death.

This chapter has several limitations as it is only focused on one case study. Therefore, I recommend further study to look at the different Filipino organisations operating in Japan, both faith-based and secular, with a focus on the nature of organisations, including the services and programmes they offer, for a better understanding of the roles such structures play in providing care to fellow immigrants. As a qualitative research study, this chapter, I must admit, has a high level of subjectivity and reflexivity, given that, as a researcher, I cannot detach myself from the inquiry as I am a part of the organisation being studied. My own biases and tendency to glorify the organisation must have affected the ways in which I analyse my own findings. Thus, an outsider's (etic) perspective in looking at caregiving organisations will be a welcome enterprise.

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Part III

Migration and mobility

9 Invisible migrants from Sakhalin in the 1960s

A new page in Japanese migration studies

Svetlana Paichadze

During the 1990s amidst the Asian economic crisis and a demographic crisis in Japan, Japan began to open its doors to immigration while officially saying there was no immigration into the country. In order to avoid linguistic problems and issues of cultural adaptation among immigrants, Japan changed the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act to allow the entry of the overseas descendants of Japanese émigrés to work in Japan. This led to a large influx of people of Japanese heritage from Latin America. Around the same time in 1994, the China Returnees Support Act was enacted, which allowed people who were left behind in China and other former colonies following defeat in 1945 to return with their immediate families via a government-funded programme. It became possible to bring one adult child (and his/her family) on the condition that the descendant would take care of his/her first-generation parent(s).

The opportunity to come with their families led to an increase in the number of returnees from China and the beginning of descendants of Japanese from Sakhalin moving to Japan. These people have Japanese names and faces, but most of them do not speak Japanese and they have a completely different cultural background. Inherently, they are immigrants or, using the terminology of Tsuda (2009), ethnic return migrants. In other words, a large number of Japanese immigrants are the descendants of Japanese. Recently there have been a number of studies about contemporary ethnic return migration in Japan, including return migration from former colonies (Hyun and Paichadze 2015, 2016; Minami 2016).

However, the migration process and issues of migrants in Japan did not start from the 1990s. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki (2010, p. 14) argues: ‘The Cold war also stimulated waves of cross-border movement which have generally been neglected in writings on the history of foreign communities in Japan.’ In particular, she talks about two such groups: the first and most visible group was Allied military forces, and the second was undocumented migrants who arrived without passports on small boats from Korea (Morris-Suzuki 2010, p. 14). However, as will be demonstrated in this chapter and the next chapter by Mooam Hyun, these were not the only two groups of migrants which were forgotten and neglected in the history of Japanese migration. There were the Japanese women from Korea and returnees from Sakhalin who moved to Japan from the end of the 1950s to the 1970s. They were neither illegal nor temporary visitors. They officially moved to Japan as long-term residents, but they were invisible as migrants. Certainly, their numbers were much less than foreign military personnel or undocumented migrants, but that was not the only reason for their invisibility.

Their invisibility was created by normative acts (the legal basis) and a particular discourse (philosophical basis) which emerged after the end of the Second World War. The legal basis was constructed by the Japanese constitution (1947) and the Nationality Act (1950, 1952, 1984). Under the constitution:

> the Japanese people were no longer ‘subjects’ (*shinmin*) but ‘nationals’ (*kokumin*), and their status was no longer seen as bestowed by the emperor but, rather, as founded upon natural human rights. This extension of the political basis of citizenship, however, coincided with a restriction of its geographic basis. Former colonial subjects from Korea and Taiwan, even those who were permanent residents in Japan, lost their Japanese citizenship and their right to vote in Japanese elections.
>
> (Morris-Suzuki 2015, p. 190)

The new, postwar Nationality Act of 1950 (revised in 1952 and 1984) continues to be based on the principle of *Jus sanguinis* – a principle of nationality law by which citizenship is not determined by place of birth but by having one or both parents who are citizens of the state.

The postwar discourse of *Nihonjinron* (‘theories of the Japanese’ – see Ogawa and Seaton’s introduction) was based on the philosophy of the uniqueness of Japan, Japanese people and Japanese culture. This discourse:

> flourished and continued to dominate in both popular and academic debates over the six decades since the Second World War. While variegate assertions comprise the field, they share the premise that the Japanese, living in the Japanese archipelago, are ethnically and culturally uniform. In other words, the Japanese nation (N), Japanese ethnicity (E) and Japanese culture (C) are assumed to be one and the same, forming an N = E = C equation.
>
> (Sugimoto 2012, p. 453)

Nihonjinron discourse, on the one hand, excluded from the Japanese nation those people who were living in Japan but were not Japanese by ethnicity and/or culture, primarily the Korean-Japanese or Taiwanese-Japanese. On the other hand, this discourse forcibly included those of Japanese ethnic background into the ‘Japanese culture/identity frame’ without reference to their cultural diversity. Including return migrants in this ‘Japanese culture/identity frame’ was another reason for their invisibility.

There is some research about Japanese Koreans who were excluded from the Japanese nation after the Second World War (Morris-Suzuki 2015, p. 190), but there is practically no research about return migrants of this period of Japanese history. The exception is chapters five and six of Taisho Nakayama's recent book *The Japanese Left Behind in Sakhalin and Postwar Japan* (Nakayama 2019). Nakayama's chapters focus on the collective and individual repatriation of the 1950s and 1960s from Sakhalin to Japan, but they are more devoted to the reasons why the Japanese remained on Sakhalin and to the mechanisms of late repatriation.

The return migrants of the 1950s and 1960s were the people who could not repatriate from Sakhalin or South Korea after the end of the Second World War. There were several groups of Japanese who were left behind in Sakhalin. The biggest of them was the spouses of Koreans from Karafuto. The formation of Japanese–Korean families on Sakhalin occurred via similar processes to those that took place in *naichi* ('Japan proper') or the territory of the Korean Peninsula (see Chapter 10 by Hyun in this volume). However, on Sakhalin, it was reinforced by the social and economic closeness of Japanese and Korean migrants from poor families (Hyun and Paichadze 2015). The gender ratio was also similar with the other regions – it was mostly Japanese women who married Korean men. However, there were two big differences between Japanese women from Korea and from Sakhalin at the moment of their return to Japan. First Japanese women from South Korea were predominantly widows or divorced, while the Japanese women from Sakhalin returned with their Korean husbands. Second, these families that returned from the Soviet Union during the Cold War had children who were Russian native speakers and had, in some cases, very strong Russian cultural identities. In other words, they were people with complex ethnic, cultural and language backgrounds, even if they were representatives of only Japanese families.

The main purposes of this chapter are to compare each period of repatriation/return from Sakhalin and thereby clarify the particular characteristics of the returnees in the 1960s; and, furthermore, based on extensive interviews with the first and especially second generation of Sakhalin returnees in the 1960s, to analyse their experiences upon returning to Japan and the processes of their integration into Japanese society.

Types and periods of repatriation from Sakhalin

Usually people who returned to Japan from former colonies are called either repatriates or returnees. *Hikiagesha* (repatriates) refers to Japanese citizens who continued to live for six months or more in a place other than Japan until 15 August 1945. In other words, the repatriates are Japanese who had moved to other parts of Asia through the expansion of the Empire of Japan. Their return to Japan was the responsibility of the state and they were objects of national support (for example, the Repatriates Benefits Payment Law). The collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945 resulted in the movement of 6.9 million Japanese nationals from the colonies and occupied territories.

Repatriation was organised until the 1950s, and then the *Mi kikan-sha ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō* (Special Measures Act on Unreturned Persons) was enacted. Under this law, all those who had not yet repatriated were declared dead and deleted from their family records. In the case that they remained alive but could not be found or repatriated for some reason, they ceased to be Japanese and lost all rights to repatriation. From that time on, only individual repatriation was possible, for which permission to enter Japan and the presence of a guarantor was required.

Kikokusha (returnees) refers to ethnic Japanese who could not be repatriated in the immediate postwar. Usually it means Japanese who were left behind in China and Sakhalin and who decided to come back to Japan from the late 1980s. Generally, even though the return of these people has been called ‘repatriation’, they were legally and institutionally treated as ‘returnees’ by the legal system rather than as repatriates (for example, the China Returnees Support Act 1994).

Repatriation after the Second World War: the first period of repatriation, 1946–1949

The first period of repatriation from Sakhalin was organised between 1946 and 1949. In 1945, the population of Karafuto stood at approximately 380,000, which included 23,498 Koreans (Nakayama 2012, p. 104).

Between 13 and 23 August 1945, by the order of the Director-General of Karafuto, approximately 88,000 people were evacuated from Karafuto. The evacuation ended when the Soviet army entered Karafuto’s ports, but even after August 1945 when South Sakhalin came under the control of the Soviet Civil Administration (military government) many people still tried to leave in fishing boats. Around 24,000 are thought to have ‘escaped’ between September 1945 and the beginning of official repatriation. From the end of 1946 until July 1949 a total of 279,356 people were repatriated from Sakhalin. Most of the former Japanese population from Karafuto settled on Hokkaido – the northern-most island of Japan (Bull 2015, p. 64).

The image of the repatriates of this period was created by the activities of repatriates’ organisations such as Karafuto Hikiagesha Dantai Rengōkai (Alliance of Karafuto Repatriate Groups, established in 1946) and Zenkoku Karafuto Renmei (All Japan Federation of Karafuto, established in 1946). However, as Bull (2015, p. 77) argues, ‘By this time also, repatriate groups were presumed to be synonymous with the repatriate community. As this study has suggested, that presumption cannot be made for the formative years of the late-1940s when the Karafuto repatriate emerged.’ As shown by Bull, the groups representing repatriates were closely linked to the state and did not always represent the interests of repatriates, just as state aid did not always reach repatriates directly (Bull 2015, pp. 75–77).

In addition, in the 1970s the boom of *jibunshi* (self-history/memoir) writing began, and a huge number of personal stories were released that depicted the lives of repatriates. Many personal stories written in the 1970s convey the image of the Japanese as victims of the war and the repatriation process, but there is not much written about their lives and their problems inside Japanese society after repatriation. Two of the most serious problems that repatriates faced after they arrived on Hokkaido were securing somewhere to live and finding a job. Moreover, as Tsuji argues, despite the fact that these people were born and raised in the Empire of Japan and their native language was Japanese, even the first wave of repatriates from the colonies differed from the people of metropolis in their views and identities (2013, pp. 384–393).

There was another category of repatriates that was completely excluded from the repatriate groups and the history of postwar repatriation. These were the Karafuto Ainu. After the Second World War, about 1159 Karafuto Ainu people were deported from Sakhalin. They lived in various areas of Hokkaido, but then part of the community settled in the village of Wakasakanai in the north of Hokkaido. However, not all of the Karafuto population could be repatriated. Koreans who were permanent residents in Sakhalin did not receive permission to repatriate.

Meanwhile, the Korean population in Sakhalin lost Japanese citizenship and Japan was not interested in their return. The USSR needed workers in the period between the departure of the Japanese and the arrival of the Soviet population. The tense political situation in the Korean peninsula and the beginning of the Cold War intensified the repatriation difficulties of Koreans (Din 2019). Furthermore, indigenous people other than Ainu – such as the Nivkhi, Uilta and others – were not repatriated even if they had a family relationship with a Japanese because they had no Japanese family registration. From the 1950s to the 1960s, they and their family members became citizens of the Soviet Union.

In the case of the Japanese, too, not everybody could return from Sakhalin after the war. As was mentioned above, Japanese women married to Korean men could not repatriate in this period. Furthermore, some people were kept on as specialists in factories or the agricultural sector. In addition, some Japanese from Sakhalin had been arrested and detained. The left-behind Japanese from Karafuto continued to live their lives in the same places in postwar Sakhalin, but the shifting of the border turned them into a first generation of immigrants. Many of them started to work, learned the Russian and Korean languages, and adapted to life in Russia. However, they never gave up hope of returning home and seeing their relatives again.

The second period of repatriation, 1957–1959

From 1957 to 1959, under the terms of the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, some Japanese could return to Japan. This repatriation included Japanese women with their Korean husbands and children. From August 1957 to September 1959, 766 Japanese women and 1541 members of their families returned to Japan (Hyun 2013, p. 134). This wave of repatriation is known because of the work of the leaders of the movement for the repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans – No-hak Park and Hee-pal Lee (Hyun 2013, pp. 135–136). After moving to Japan with their Japanese wives, they created an organisation named Karafuto Kikan Zainichi Kankokujin Kai (Association of Koreans in Japan for Repatriation from Sakhalin) and started to send petitions to both the South Korean and Japanese governments demanding a solution to the problem of Koreans left behind in Sakhalin. From their activities it can be said that some of the repatriates at this time had very strong Korean identity.

However, not much is known about the everyday lives of these repatriates or about the processes by which they adapted into Japanese society, mainly because many people from the first generation have died and interviews with the second or third generations are very difficult as they were very young at the time of repatriation. From the small number of interviews conducted by the author it is possible to say that among returnees from Japanese/Korean families, there were two main ways of adapting into Japanese society – becoming 'pure Japanese' or joining the Zainichi Koreans (Koreans who continued living in Japan after the Second World War). As can be seen from the following testimony, Koreans from Sakhalin joined the Korean community in Japan, including through marriage. 'My uncle [Korean] and my aunt [Japanese] after their return to Japan were living in Miyagi prefecture. Later their daughter married a local [Japanese] Korean.'

Sometimes, at first, there were attempts to adapt their lives as Japanese, but for some reason they changed their mind. Another informant testified:

> I was three years old when we moved to Japan. I remember only a very big ship. Then we went to Furano, where my mother's family was living. We just lived as a usual Japanese family. I knew that my father was Korean because my grandfather said to me: 'I don't like Koreans, but your father is a good man.' Then one day my father decided that all of his children had to go to a Korean school in Sapporo. We had to move and start our study there. We didn't understand why he did this, and it was very difficult for us because we didn't speak Korean. After a number of years, I understood his motive.… He wanted to move to North Korea.

Moving to North Korea, known as *kikoku jigyō* (returning home project), was a Japanese government policy to send Japanese Koreans from Japan to North Korea. Under this policy, from 1950 to 1984 a total of 93,340 people including 6839 Japanese were 'repatriated' to North Korea (Takasaki and Park 2005, p. 49). Some Japanese-Korean families from Sakhalin, who returned to Japan as 'Japanese', were then sent to North Korea as 'Koreans'. In the case of the interviewee above, the family remained in Japan because of the reluctance of one of the sons to 'repatriate'. However, documents held by the Japan–Sakhalin Association clearly indicate these cases of families of repatriates from Sakhalin who were sent to North Korea as Koreans (Nihon Saharin Kyōkai 2018). More detailed research into the re-repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans to North Korea from Japan is needed, in particular, the compilation of reliable statistics on the number of re-repatriates and insights into their fates. It can be assumed, however, that migration by Koreans males from Sakhalin and their inability to adapt to life in Japan or return to South Korea led to their decisions to move to North Korea.

Also among the people repatriated in the 1950s from Sakhalin to Hokkaido there was a small group of indigenous people from Sakhalin, the Uilta. They were suspected of spying for the Japanese army and at the end of the Second World War they were interned in a prisoner-of-war camp in the Soviet Union for several years. After being released, they got permission to 'return' to Japan. However, their requests for a pension were denied because the Japanese government deemed that Uilta and Nivkh people from Sakhalin were ineligible for armed service and had been illegally recruited (Tanaka and Gendānu 1993).

Individual repatriation or returning home, 1960–1993

A detailed picture of the repatriates from this period will be given in the next section, so only the briefest overview is given here. The first important characteristic of people in this category is that they were not a 'group of repatriates'. These were people who applied for individual repatriation to Japan. To leave the USSR, they needed an exit visa. They lived in different places in Sakhalin, and they requested and obtained permission to leave at different times. So, before leaving they did not form a single group. For entry into Japan, they also needed a document permitting entry. To obtain one it was necessary to confirm their family record and have the consent of their relatives to be their guarantors. After they moved to Japan, they mostly lived with their relatives, who were their guarantors, and many of these returnees were not connected with each other.

The second important characteristic of people in this category of returnees was the duration of the time they lived in Russia. During the returns of the 1960s, as well as during the previous repatriations of 1957–1959, the returnees were mainly Japanese-Korean families. These returnees of the 1960s tried to live as 'pure Japanese' or to enter the Japanese-Korean community after their return. However, the peak of individual repatriation came in 1965. By this time a new generation had grown up on Sakhalin. They were native speakers of the Russian language and had a different self-identification. This generation has sometimes found it difficult to adapt to both Japanese society and the Japanese-Korean community.

Modern repatriation – return to Japan after the China Returnees Support Act (1994)

Modern repatriation refers to the process of Japanese people and their descendants returning to Japan after 1994. The reasons for moving to Japan were very different for each generation of returnees in this period. For the old generation it meant returning home and being reunited with their families in Japan. But for the other generations, moving to Japan was often precipitated by the difficult economic situation on Sakhalin and it was a form of economic migration (Paichadze 2015, pp. 214–215). Under a temporary return programme, 3358 people visited Japan (1215 of them were Japanese) and 134 families, a total of 303 people, became permanent residents. The returns of this period were not a collective repatriation, but nevertheless they were all sponsored by the Japanese state.

In 1989 the Nihon Saharin Dōhō Kōryū Kyōkai (Sakhalin Brotherhood Association, now Japan–Sakhalin Association) was formed. This organisation became the focal point of efforts to assist the return of Sakhalin Japanese. From the 1990s, the work of this organisation enabled short-term visits and return for permanent residence of Sakhalin Japanese to begin. At the same time, Japanese people living in Sakhalin created the Association of Japanese of Sakhalin. Since the 1990s, thanks to the efforts of these two organisations, short-term visits to Japan began, and then after 1991 the permanent return of ethnic Japanese to Japan became possible. The participation in activities of these organisations consolidated the community of Sakhalin Japanese.

Since the 1990s, the short-term visits of Sakhalin Japanese to Japan and return for permanent residence have been included within the returnee policy for Japanese abandoned in China. The support policy for Japanese abandoned in China started in the 1980s, but in 1994 the China Returnees Support Act was enacted. It was officially called *Chūgoku zanryū hōjin-tō no enkatsuna kikoku no sokushin oyobi eijū kikoku-go no jiritsu no shien ni kansuru hōritsu* (Act on Measures on Expediting of Smooth Return of Remaining Japanese in China and for Assistance in Self-Support after Permanent Return to Japan). Japanese returnees from Sakhalin have been included in the 'Others'. Prior to the 1990s, the government-funded repatriation of Japanese from China implied return for only abandoned orphans. With Japanese returnees from Sakhalin falling completely under the law for Chinese immigrants, this assistance was extended to them, too. After the China Returnees Support Act of 1994, the Japanese government implemented a policy that allowed disabled returnees to return with their immediate families via a government-funded programme. It became possible to bring one adult child (and his/her family) on the condition that the person would take care of his/her parents. The opportunity to come with their families led to the start of repatriation from Sakhalin.

After returning to Japan, practically all the returnees had a half-year Japanese-language training programme in the Tokorozawa Repatriates' Center. Thereafter, returnees were not obliged to live with their Japanese family, but many of them chose to live in Hokkaido because of geographical and climatic proximity to Sakhalin. There, many of them continued Japanese classes and other activities in the Hokkaidō Chūgoku Kikokusha Sentā (Hokkaido Chinese Returnees), and many children started to go to the Saturday Russian school in Sapporo. These common activities after their return to Japan helped to consolidate and unite the returnee community in their new home in Hokkaido.

Individual repatriation or returning home, 1960–1991

Numbers of returnees

According to Russian researcher Podpechnikov (2003), in the years 1964–1966 a total of 382 Japanese and Koreans left Sakhalin for Japan: 19 people in 1964, 362 people in 1965 and one person in 1966. Among them were 60 Japanese, 109 Koreans and 213 children (Podpechnikov 2003, p. 259).

However, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare gives the data shown in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 Numbers of returnees from Sakhalin, 1960–1993

Year	*Total numbers*	*Female*	*Male*	*Couple/family*
1963	4	3	1	1
1964	3	3	0	0
1965	60	50	10	9
1966	5	3	2	1
1967	7	7	0	0
1968	8	7	1	1
1969	1	1	0	0
1970	3	2	1	2
1971	–	–	–	–
1972	1	0	1	0
1973	3	2	1	–
1974	2	2	–	–
1975	2	2	–	1
1976	3	–	–	–
1991	1	–	1	–
1992	1	–	1	–
1993	1	–	1	–
1994	5	3	2	1

Source: Compiled by the author based on documents received from Nihon Saharin Kyōkai.

The difference between the Russian and Japanese sources is clear. In addition to the possibility of human error in calculating the numbers of people who ‘left’ and ‘entered’, the Russian statistics count both Japanese and the Koreans, with children listed in a separate category. The Japanese statistics count only the Japanese and did not count people of Korean nationality or children, including those who were born to Japanese–Korean marriages. The Japanese documents reveal a prevalence of Japanese women. For example, in 1965 there were 50 women and ten men who returned. The marital status of the returnees is unknown, but nine men and women have the same last name, so it may be assumed that they are spouses. Comparing this and Podpechnikov’s data, and when cross-referenced with the author’s interview data, it can be concluded that the other women were married to Koreans. As mentioned above, returns after 1960 were permitted at the personal request of the returnees, but the possibility of their return depended on their relatives. In Japanese documents, their names and addresses are indicated, as well as their familial relationship with the repatriate. After returning to Japan, the place of residence and standard of living also depended on relatives. As one informant recounted:

> We were supposed to go to my mom’s sister’s place in Hokkaido, but she died while we were moving to Japan. We arrived in Tokyo and we had absolutely nowhere to go. One of our friends, who repatriated after the end of the war, told us that there were empty apartments in their housing for repatriates, so we settled there.

In both Russian and Japanese statistics, the largest number of individual repatriates was recorded in 1965. This raises two questions. Why did individual repatriations peak in 1965? And why, given the sufficiently large number of returnees, was collective repatriation not organised as it was in 1957–1959?

Nakayama (2019) addresses these issues. He argues that 1965 was a peak, after which the Japanese government kept repatriation to a minimum, but his explanation regarding the large number of returnees in 1965 is that this year was when a large number of letters requesting repatriation were sent to the Japanese Embassy and to both the Japanese and the Soviet Red Cross (Nakayama 2019, pp. 171, 195). However, it can be assumed that political events triggered this peak of repatriation. In October 1964, L.I. Brezhnev came to power in the USSR and in November of the same year Eisaku Sato became prime minister in Japan. The large number of permissions for individual repatriation in 1965, together with permission to visit graves on Sakhalin in the same year, perhaps were ‘political cards’ demonstrating the continuation of favourable Soviet–Japanese relations, despite the change of leadership of the countries.

About conducting not collective but individual repatriation, Nakayama argues that the Japanese government had a plan for collective repatriation, but the Soviet government rejected this because it might give the image internationally of the responsibility of the USSR for the remaining Japanese (2019, pp. 174–175). The Soviet side was most likely opposed to collective repatriation, however, the fact that the Japanese side did not pay any ‘repatriation benefits’ to returnees in the 1960s suggests that on the Japanese side there was initially a difference between the last collective repatriation in the 1950s and individual repatriation in the 1960s. In addition, demands for repatriation among the Korean population of Sakhalin had already begun at the end of the 1950s in Japan and South Korea (Hyun 2013, pp. 135–137). Collective repatriation and a crowd of people waiting for repatriation could lead to further demands. Consequently, a plan for individual return that did not attract the attention of the international community was perhaps most convenient for both Soviet and Japanese sides.

Life after returning to Japan

Over the past few years, the author has conducted several interviews with people who came to Japan from Sakhalin between the 1950s and 1970s. Finding these people is difficult because, as mentioned above, they are not connected via membership of an organisation. Some of them were found through the Zainichi Korean network. Others were contacted via the Japan–Sakhalin Association or members of the Hokkaido Chinese Returnees Center. In addition, people were interviewed on Sakhalin whose relatives left for Japan in the 1950s to 1970s. The interviews conducted in Japan are summarised in Table 9.2.

All interviewees studied in Russian schools, not Korean ones, when they lived in Sakhalin. This contrasts with the Japanese of the same generation, who returned after 1990. Most of them graduated from Korean schools (Hyun and Paichadze 2015). Why did the repatriates of the 1960s go to Russian schools? In the case of

Table 9.2 Interviews conducted by the author in Japan

Year of return	*Place of residence in Japan*	*Place of interview*	*Interviewed generation*	*Family*	*Level and language of education*
1958	Sapporo	Sapporo	2	Japanese/ Korean	Middle School (J), High School (K)
1965	Sapporo	Sapporo	2	Japanese	Middle School (R, J), High School (J)
1965	Obihiro	Sapporo/ Obihiro	2	Japanese/ Korean	Middle School (R, J), High School (K)
1965	Hakodate	Hakodate	1, 2	Japanese/ Korean (?)	Middle School (R, J)
1976	Tokyo	Tokyo	1, 2	Japanese/ Korean	Middle School (R, J)

Japanese families, the lack of choice was obvious after the war. For Korean families, there was also no option after 1963, when the Korean schools were closed. However, other reasons can be assumed. When I directly asked the returnees about the reasons behind their choice of school, they answered that a Korean school did not exist in their area. However, in Tomari, where interviewee B was living, there was a Korean school, but the interviewee still did not go there.

After the end of the Second World War, the main reason for opening Korean schools on Sakhalin was to study the Korean language and create national identity among the young generation in preparation for their presumed life in Korea after repatriation. The families that chose not to send their children to Korean schools might indicate that repatriation to Korea was not expected. Furthermore, there were cases when studying in a Korean school became a reason not to repatriate to Japan. For example, interviewee E said that her family returned to Japan, but she stayed on in Sakhalin because she studied at the Korean school, where anti-Japanese sentiments were very strong and there were rumours that Koreans were being killed in Japan. She was afraid of these stories and decided to stay in Sakhalin (Nihon Saharin Kyōkai 2018).

From life stories

The life histories of two interviewees, who are Japanese returnees from Sakhalin, illustrate some of the key points of the preceding discussion: their experiences upon returning to Japan, the difficulties they faced integrating into Japanese society and their struggles in daily survival in Japan.

Informant A

> We returned in 1965 and started to live in a small village near Hakodate. I didn't understand Japanese well, and because I studied at a Russian school I

> could neither read nor write in Japanese. But the hardest part was not that I could not read and write, but the fact that everyone accused me of being 'red'. Even teachers accused me of this, and any problem ended with these accusations. Then we moved to Hakodate. I was an athlete and looked older than my years, so I was constantly being watched by the police.
>
> Whatever I did – whether I bought a camera or went to learn Russian in the Japanese-Russian association – the police came to our house to check me. It was very hard, and I decided to forget that I knew Russian and I lived in Russia. As an athlete, I obtained entry via recommendation to a high school in Sapporo, but my parents did not have any money and I decided to go to work. My brother chose a different path and went to Tokyo. In Tokyo it was easier with the Russian language [because it is far from the Russian border]; my brother traveled several times to Moscow, and then in the 1990s with our mother to Sakhalin.

Informant B

> We went to Japan in 1965. I was 15 years old. We went to Obihiro, where my mother's family lived. My family started living in a house for post-war repatriates, but because we were very poor, my older brother and I were sent to work. I worked in my uncle's house for some food. It was hard work in the fields, and I got very poor food, and when I decided to go to school, I got kicked out of my uncle's house. I returned to my parents' house, but there was no money there. So, I started to work early in the morning – before going to school. I got up at 5am and went from house to house and sold milk, then I sold newspapers. When I was at school, I wanted to sleep. I understood only English and mathematics because I did not know Japanese. I could not enter a Japanese high school and was sent to Sendai to a Korean school, but I did not understand Korean either.

Conclusions

At the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s, especially after the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union (1956), people who could not repatriate after the collapse of the Japanese Empire got the opportunity to return to Japan, and some decided to do this. For the Japanese government, it was only the repatriation of their 'own people' within the framework of a new ethnic Japanese policy. But the actual situation was much more complicated. Women who had lived for 15–20 years outside Japan, and their children who were born in Japanese–Korean marriages and had studied in Russian schools, certainly did not fall within the framework of 'pure Japanese'.

From the interviews, we have seen three types of problems that returnees faced after their return: economic problems, political ostracism, and cultural, language and educational issues. The complete absence of any social assistance from the state led to the dependence of the returnees on their relatives, and very difficult economic situations. Despite the improvement in relations between Japan and the USSR in the 1960s, it was still the Cold War period and the younger generations of returnees were monitored by the state and often could not freely express their self-identification. In addition, the second generation had problems with schooling. Japanese schools were not prepared to teach children who did not speak Japanese, while studying at Korean schools was difficult because of the lack of knowledge of the Korean language. But the final key characteristic of the repatriates of the 1960s was their disparate experiences. They lived isolated from each other and could not organise a movement to improve their lives in Japan.

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10 Japanese women in Korea in the postwar

Between repatriation and returning home

Mooam Hyun

This chapter explores the lives of Japanese women in South Korea during the postwar period.[1] The collapse of the Empire of Japan in 1945 ended Japan's colonisation of the Korean peninsula. However, a group of Japanese remained: Japanese women who had married Koreans before the end of the Second World War and lived in Korea. They faced many problems, but they chose to live in the independent former colony as nationals of both the former colonial ruler and a defeated country. Another group was the Japanese wives of Koreans returning to the peninsula from Japan. Many Koreans who had lived in Japan from the prewar period were workers who had left their families in Korea or were unmarried men seeking Japanese wives. Also, as many Japanese men were away during the war, there were naturally many cases of Korean–Japanese couples (Morita 1964, p. 819). These Japanese women married to Koreans thought they could freely travel between Japan and Korea in the future and decided to accompany their Korean husbands to Korea (Fujisaki 1972, p. 114).

The existence of Japanese women in South Korea has been the subject of various publications, especially since the normalisation of relations in 1965 (Fujisaki 1972; Kamisaka 1982; Itō 1996; Ishikawa 2001). However, academic research is limited. Despite an attempt to study the life histories of these women by sociologist Kim Ueng-ryeol in the 1980s (Kim 1983, 1996), research has mainly focused on descriptions of their life histories based on interviews at the mutual aid association Fuyo-kai/Buyong-hoe and the community home Gyeongju Nazare-won (Kobayashi 1986; Yamamoto 1994; Kasetani 1998). There is little empirical research into the movements, settlement and returning home of Japanese women in South Korea. By clarifying these processes, this chapter presents another (following on from Svetlana Paichadze's research in the previous chapter) little-known aspect of postwar migration across the 'new frontiers' created by the collapse of the Japanese empire.

The node of ethnicity, class and gender

During the expansion and collapse of the Japanese Empire, it is important to keep in mind from the postcolonial perspective that women living throughout the empire/colony embodied *continuing colonialism*. On the Korean peninsula, the *naisen kekkon* (Japanese–Korean marriage) national policy was promoted by the Japanese Empire to encourage assimilation via the formation of Japanese and Korean families, but it also distorted the ‘ethnic – class – gender mutual relationship’ (Kim 2011) before the Second World War.

Naisen kekkon occurred largely in *naichi* (‘Japan proper’) or *gaichi* (lit. ‘outer lands’), namely the ‘immigration type colonies’ such as Karafuto (Sakhalin) (Miki 2012, pp. 87–89), as opposed to ‘colonial exploitation colonies’ such as Korea, where many Japanese inhabitants engaged in white-collar occupations. If class contradictions surpassed ethnic contradictions, *naisen kekkon* for women would have been an option for raising their status via marriage. Consequently, more Japanese women accompanied their Korean husbands back to Korea after the war than stayed in Japan. But, these Japanese women (=gender) of a colonial ruling country (=ethnicity) who were externally expelled (=class) faced great upheaval following the collapse of the Japanese Empire.

The political turbulence caused by Japan’s defeat and the liberation of Korea forced Japanese women who chose life in Korea into hardship, including in their private family relationships. The husband’s family’s attitude towards a bride from the defeated country was often cold, and husbands sometimes abandoned their Japanese wives if they had a legal wife in their hometown from before their wartime mobilisation to Japan. After the spring of 1946, when postwar Japanese repatriation was largely completed, the Busan Japanese Support Council (Busan nihonjin sewakai), which carried out repatriation work, was tasked with the repatriation of ‘women and girls returning home after broken Japanese-Korean marriages’ (Morita 1964, p. 821).

In response to withdrawal orders from the US military authorities, when the Busan Japanese Support Council staff repatriated in July 1948, the repatriation of Japanese was assigned to the Health Department of Gyeongsangnam-do Province, and repatriation camps were renamed Returning Japanese Camp. At that time, the Busan Japanese Support Council visited Japanese women in Busan and confirmed there were 170 women. Officially there were 1677 Japanese women in all of South Korea, but the actual number was estimated to be 3000 (Morita 1964, pp. 818–827).

From repatriates to returnees

The real troubles for Japanese women in Korea started when they started to be treated as returnees after the beginning of the Korean War in 1950. Japanese women in Korea who lost their Korean husbands in the Korean War were driven into poverty and it no longer made sense for them to live in Korea. Many Japanese women escaped the war and headed for Busan in an attempt to return to Japan. Japanese women waited at several Returning Japanese Camps, such as the Shorinji temple in Choryang-dong and the camp in Cheokki (Akasaki in Japanese), present Southern Ward Uam-dong.

Japanese women unable to present official papers such as family registration certificates were forced to live in the camps for a long time. The procedure for returning to Japan was first to contact their Japanese family to obtain a copy of the family register and an identity guarantee certificate, and then to submit the papers with their picture to the Korean Foreign Ministry for a repatriation application from Korea. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs then received the application, confirmed the address and investigated the existence of an identity guarantor, creating a complicated procedure (Hōmu Kenshūjo 1975, pp. 139–140).

The women were unable to return to Japan smoothly as they were not considered ‘Japanese repatriates’ by virtue of having lived in Korea before the end of the war. Only Japanese women who were not legally married to Koreans and who did not delete their family register in Japan were Japanese repatriates. And women who had entered their Korean husband’s family register were classified as ‘former Japanese women with Korean nationality [*senseki moto nihon fujin*]’ (Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan n.d.). Japan’s position on these women was ‘to hold on board the ship, in principle, those who do not have relatives in Japan’ (Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan 1950). In these cases, the women were forced to live in camp accommodation for a long time.

Japanese women forced into long-term detention at one Returning Japanese Camp sent the ‘All Japanese Repatriates in Choryang-dong, Busan, Petition’ requesting that the Japanese government allow them to return home more quickly in March 1951. Procedures on the Japanese side took time because of the Japanese government’s determination to ‘demonstrate legal background’, as reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ repatriate manager at the special committee on overseas nationals’ problems by the Upper House on 17 March 1951. Although the Repatriation Support Bureau claimed ‘it is possible to repatriate with a family register in *naichi*’, the Japanese government’s position was ‘it is not pure Japanese repatriation for “former Japanese women with Korean nationality” who were permitted to enter Japan by the GHQ’ (Kokkai gijiroku 1951a). When they ‘returned home as a result of war’, it was necessary to decide ‘whether they would be classified as a Japanese repatriate or an immigrant as [the women] were now Korean’ (Kokkai gijiroku 1951b).

The Korean government provided a ship for returning Japanese women and the first voyage by 60 Japanese women and their children departed on 29 May 1951. When the ‘repatriation’ ship arrived at Moji Port on the following day, the arrival of the ‘Korean wives’ or ‘foreign wives’ made headlines. A total of 1695 more people returned home on Korean ships through to the end of 1954 (Hōmu Kenshūjo 1975, p. 141). In the 1950s, therefore, South Korea handled the return of Japanese women to Japan.

The Korean government demanded that Japan should allow entry to the ‘Japanese living in Korea’ without entry permits and identification procedures, even those unknown on family registers, only by the identity guarantee of the guarantor. On 16 November 1952, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement accusing the Japanese government of being responsible for the delayed return home of the Japanese (*Asahi Shinbun* 1952).

After the Korean War ceasefire in 1953, Japanese women dispersed in Returning Japanese Camps such as Shorinji were relocated to the Busan Alien

Detention Center (Busan compound). In the 1950s, the Korean government drew the so-called Syngman Rhee Line and detained many Japanese fishermen who had sailed beyond the Line. They were also transferred to the Busan compound originally established to contain Japanese women in Korea.

Japanese newspapers at the time lamented 'We don't understand why the Japanese government hesitates to repatriate the Japanese from Korea' (*Yomiuri Shinbun* 1956). It was mystifying why Japanese women in Korea were stuck in the Busan compound. In June 1958, the Busan compound held 52 people. During this period the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that roughly 1200 Japanese women were living in Korea and the number of children was 3000 (Kim 1958, p. 96). Japanese women in Korea who had no one to rely on departed from the Busan compound to their homes in Japan.

From the Japan Women's Association of Korea to Fuyo-kai

In April 1960, president Lee Seung-man (Syngman Rhee), who had a strong anti-Japanese stance in Japan–Korean relations, was ousted by the civil revolution. The Park Jeong-hee administration, which took power in a military coup in May the following year, pushed forward the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea. These political changes in Korea were a major turning point for the Japanese women left in Korea, who had been forced to live incognito amidst Korean resentment regarding Japan's former colonial rule.

More people became sympathetic towards the Japanese women in Korea in the 1960s, and activities to help the Japanese women in Korea gained momentum. When the goodwill delegation led by Foreign Minister Kosaka in September 1960 visited South Korea, five Japanese women in Korea appealed to him to work with the Korean government on a temporary return (*Asahi Shinbun* 1961). Kamata Nobuko of the private Japan–Korea Affinity Society (Nikkan shinwa-kai) visited Korea in November of the same year, listened to the women's stories and negotiated a temporary return for them with the Japanese government (*Yomiuri Shinbun* 1961a). Thus, an agreement for Japanese wives to visit Japan was concluded (*Yomiuri Shinbun* 1961b).

There was also a new movement for Japanese women to regain permanent residence in Japan. On 19 June 1961, social worker Yoon Hak-ja (Tauchi Chizuko), also a Japanese woman in Korea, visited the Japanese Red Cross Society asking for assistance with returning Japanese women in Korea back to Japan (Kōseishō hikiage engokyoku shomuka kiroku gakari 1963, p. 22). Following the visit of Yoon, the Japanese Red Cross asked their Korean counterpart to investigate who wanted to return. The Korean Red Cross announced on 11 August 1961 that 120 of the 1009 Japanese women living in Korea desired to return to permanent residence in Japan (*Yomiuri Shinbun* 1961c). As the investigation progressed the hard living conditions of the women became clearer. And so, Japanese women returning to Japan as permanent residents was promoted by the Red Cross in both Japan and Korea. With the cooperation of the Korean Red Cross Society, 448 people returned in 1962, 181 people in 1963, 273 people in 1964 and 172 people in 1965 (Nihon sekijūjisha 1986, pp. 176–177).

Japanese women in Korea were greatly encouraged by the progress regarding permanent residency and temporary return. They held a roundtable discussion regarding procedures to return to Japan, attended by section chief Maeda Toshikazu of the East Asia Division of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was on a visit to Korea. This roundtable discussion led them to set up the Japanese Women Support Association (Nihon fujin sewa-kai) aimed at facilitating the returning procedures (Hirata 1964, p. 17). The Japanese Women Support Association discovered women who could not afford even the cost of temporary return because of extreme poverty. Meanwhile, other Japanese women established the Yayoi-kai group at the Seoul Myeong-dong Catholic Church, a place where they could freely speak Japanese.

Japanese women in Korea, whose urgent concerns were economic mutual assistance and the establishment of temporary return procedures, integrated the two groups in December 1962 and the next month launched the Japan Women's Association of Korea (Zaikan nihon fujin-kai). Hirata Teruyo was appointed chairperson. She had gone to Korea with her Korean husband in 1944 and was a teacher at a girls' school in Gongju. As the momentum for normalising diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea grew, the number of members increased and branches formed in rural areas, too. In Busan, Japanese women had gathered at the Catholic Church and received food and clothing shortly after the end of the war. These women in Busan learned about the Japan Women's Association of Korea in 1962 and proposed to establish the Busan branch.

The establishment of the Japanese Women's Association of Korea was epochal. Supplies from Japan and Korea were distributed to the poor and the Association raised funding in Japan to cover expenses for the temporary return of its members in poverty. The Association was registered as an official group by the Ministry of Public Information in May 1963. In 1966, the Association was renamed Fuyo-kai (Buyong-hoe), and the Seoul headquarters and Busan headquarters were to develop their own activities. Kunita Fusako, who has led the Busan headquarters of Fuyo-kai since 1973, also joined when the Association was renamed (Gotō 2010, p. 77). From then until the present day, she has looked for Japanese women in southern South Korea and supported their temporary return.

The conclusion of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan–ROK in June 1965 was important for Japanese women in Korea. Reports said that 'they gazed at the Hinomaru [Japanese flag] in the Japanese embassy, they hugged each other and cried, exclaiming "The country protects us!"' (Gotō 2010, p. 77). However, these expectations of Japanese women were betrayed when members of the Japanese Women's Association of Korea visited the Japanese embassy in 1966. The Japanese ambassador denied them use of the name Japanese Women's Association of Korea, saying, 'Japanese women in Korea does not refer to you. It is about Japanese women coming here hereafter' (Motohashi 1972, p. 78). Japanese women in Korea were denied recognition as 'Japanese living in Korea'.

This led to a name change from the Japanese Women's Association of Korea to Fuyo-kai in 1966. The name originated from Lee Masako, or Princess Nashimoto no Miya, who married the last prince of the Dynasty of Korea brought to Japan, and headed to Korea with her husband in 1963.

Normalisation of diplomatic relations and the path to returning home

Just as the Japanese women in Korea were beginning to gain more attention, their campaigns were buried in the wave of activity that accompanied the 1965 normalisation of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea. After being denied recognition as Japanese living in Korea, support for Japanese women returning home as a humanitarian project was considered to be no longer the responsibility of the Japanese and Korean Red Cross Societies and was terminated.

At the same time, however, media discussion of the existence of Japanese women in Korea and their children was awakening memories of colonial rule in Japanese society. Writer Fujisaki Yasuo became interested in the Japanese women in Korea following contact with children of the returnees who were studying at a night school held in a junior high school in Tokyo. Fujisaki had spent his childhood in Korea. He quit his teaching job and visited Busan in April 1964 (*Asahi Shinbun* 1985). He wrote many magazine articles about Japanese women in Korea and their children and summarised them in the book *Abandoned people: caught in Japan and Korea's twisted history* (Fujisaki 1972). Meanwhile, on 5 March 1968 public opinion was roused by an *Asahi Shinbun* article about Japanese people living in Korea in extreme poverty who wanted to return to Japan (*Asahi Shinbun* 1968). But the principal reason the Japanese government moved to tackle the problem was that members of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee of the House of Representatives visiting Korea in November received a petition from a Japanese woman at the Japanese Consulate General in Busan. On the way home, Adachi Atsuro of the House of Representatives, a member of the delegation, met with a Japanese woman living in a slum in Busan, who made a tearful appeal for help directly to Prime Minister Sato Eisaku (Kokkai gijiroku 1969).

On 3 December 1968, when the South Korean ambassador to Japan visited the Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister Sato asked for Korea's cooperation regarding the return of Japanese women in Korea (Gukrip gukhoe toseogwan 1968). Three years after the 1965 diplomatic normalisation, the Japanese government had finally started taking measures to promote the return of Japanese women in Korea. Four days later, on 7 December, Sato instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consider the treatment of Japanese wives in Korea from a humanitarian standpoint.

The Korean government immediately started an investigation. The day after receiving Prime Minister Sato's request, Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for an investigation into the number of Japanese living in Korea, their residence locations, motivations for settlement, nationality status, livelihoods, the number of applicants wanting to return to Japan and whether they were registered as an alien. This was the first full-scale official investigation by administrative agencies on the number of Japanese living in Korea.

From this investigation we catch a glimpse of the actual conditions of Japanese living in Korea. According to the investigation results, 1102 women and 324 men, a total of 1426 Japanese, were living in Korea (Gukrip gukhoe toseogwan 1969). The nationality breakdown reveals 783 Koreans, 489 Japanese, 46 dual citizens and 108 stateless citizens. The survey of their livelihoods revealed 70 people were upper class, 205 middle class and 1151 lower class, indicating that most of them lived in poverty. The number of applicants wanting to return to Japan was 223. Returning to Japan was an option to escape poverty, but it was unrealistic for many because it necessitated a separation from their adult children and Korean husbands.

Those who wished to return home also had to confront practical problems. Despite financial aid and acceptance, for the poor living hand-to-mouth it was financially impossible to make several trips to Seoul in order to get their travel certificates. In addition, alien registration was tightened after the 1965 diplomatic normalisation and violators of the immigration control law, whether through ignorance or failure to pay the fee, who did not pay a fine were not permitted to leave.

On 7 January 1969, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke with the Japanese Consul General Tsuruta Tsuyoshi (Gukrip gukhoe toseogwan n.d.). The Japanese embassy made a verbal request to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 February and for the cooperation of the Korean government in establishing the facts about Japanese living in Korea. In addition, the Japanese embassy requested that they reduce fines and allow immigration procedures and applications for returning home to be made in Busan.

The campaigns of Japanese women in Korea

In April 1969 Japanese women in Korea started returning home with the support of the Japanese government. The government set aside a 12 million yen budget to support Japanese living in Korea. This partially eliminated the problems that prevented the returns, especially of poorer women. Although it had become more difficult to provide family registers and identity guarantors due to the passage of time, other routes opened up for proving Japanese nationality and a measure was introduced in which the state could help them to find a guarantor. Regarding anxiety about their livelihood in Japan after returning, welfare provisions were arranged.

The Diet's previous viewpoint from the 1950s, which tried to exclude former Japanese women with Korean nationality as 'not pure Japanese', began to dissipate and a more sympathetic approach was embraced. At the House of Representative's Foreign Affairs Committee on 17 December 1968, immediately after Prime Minister Sato's instructions given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7 December, Representative Hoashi Kei of the Socialist Party said that the women were 'victims of the war'. He also mentioned the difficulty in obtaining family registers and asked for a solution (Kokkai gijiroku 1968).

As long as the legal status of Japanese women in Korea was considered to be 'former Japanese women in Korea', the nationality problem was an obstruction to returning home. In the Japanese Diet, criticism was directed at the Ministry of Justice for taking this line, and the Ministry of Justice had to soften its position, which, until then, had been bureaucratic and imposed strict returning qualification requirements (Kokkai gijiroku 1969). However, the Japanese government's return policy had many problems, such as there being little consistency between the positions of the relevant ministries, and the respective responsibilities of national and local government being unclear. The women were still asked why they were going home now during immigration procedures and during resettlement by civil servants in the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Japanese women in Korea confronted the Japanese government and objected to this treatment.

Despite these problems, returning home went relatively smoothly in accordance with the Japanese government's policy. In the three years from 1969 to 1971, 485 people in 205 households returned. However, while 'repatriates' referred to those who had continued to live for six months or more outside Japan until 15 August 1945 under the repatriates benefits payment law, those who went to Korea with their husbands after the war had ended were not treated as repatriates but as persons who had 'left of their own choice'.

Japanese women who had become Korean nationals confronted particular difficulties. Furthermore, an elderly Japanese woman was not allowed to accompany her children if they were over the age of 18 and she had to return by herself. The returnees had to apply for alien registration since they entered Japan as foreigners. They could not move into the Tokyo repatriates' dormitory, and as they were returnees (*kikokusha*) they were required to set their permanent address as the place where their guarantor was living. Their children's education was an urgent issue for many, regardless of whether they were repatriates or returnees. But, returnee children were only able to learn Japanese at a night junior high school in Tokyo.

Nishiyama Umeko and the Compatriots Social Gathering of Returnees

On 7 June 1972, seven people from four families arrived at Shimonoseki on the Kampu Ferry. One of them was Nishiyama Umeko, 66, who was an avid supporter of the Japanese women in Korea and involved with Fuyo-kai. This was Nishiyama's first return in 26 years. She had married a Korean man who had been forcibly taken to Hokkaido. Then from Otaru they moved to the Korean Peninsula after the end of the war. After she lost her husband, she returned to Japan alone leaving her four children in Korea. Staff from the Shimonoseki City Welfare Office and Moji Quarantine Office welcomed them at the port. Nishiyama and her party read a statement requesting to go to Tokyo, where it was easier for the repatriates to become independent, and held a sit-in at a room at the ferry office. Nishiyama and others were at the forefront of the movement for returnees' rights ahead of the women left in China, who pushed through their returns without a guarantor and held a sit-down protest at Narita airport in 1994.

Nishiyama and others headed to Tokyo, complained about their plight and appealed for help. In fact, these protests were prepared in advance. *Kimin* author Fujisaki Yasuo, scholar Koyama Takeshi, photographer Motohashi Narikazu and others supported the protests of Japanese women in Korea. They proposed that Japanese women in Korea raise their voices and appeal to the relevant authorities. Returnees living in Tokyo had held their first meeting on 6 June 1971. Fujisaki and Koyama became the managers, and the Compatriots Social Gathering of Returnees from Korea was established on 1 August. At the inaugural general meeting, they adopted a letter of intent and requested a solution to legal and institutional problems to enrich the lives, welfare and education of returnees. They called for enhancement of support policies regardless of nationality, such as employment mediation and vocational training, completion of dormitory and housing mediation, the training of Japanese language instructors for their children, freedom of choice of nationality and residence on a family basis, simplified procedures for returning home, guarantee of returning expenses and seeking guarantors by 'country' (Kankoku hikigesha dōhō shinbokukai 1971, p. 2).

The Compatriots Social Gathering of Returnees from Korea submitted these requests as 'unsolved problems from the period of the Japanese annexation of Korea' and held a demonstration to seek a solution to the 'urgent problem that we need to live like human beings'. The Social Gathering sent a petition to the Prime Minister's official residence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, Tokyo and requested a meeting. In response to these movements, Japanese women in South Korea appealed to the Japanese embassy as applicants to return home and residual family members.

In April 1972, Fujisaki and others established the Relief Society of Abandoned Japanese Women in Korea by themselves in preparation for Nishiyama's return. As Nishiyama, referred to as the 'mother of Japanese wives', returned and pursued Japanese responsibility, the Compatriots Social Gathering of Returnees from Korea also gained momentum (Koyama 1972, p. 135). Their motivation was a desire to 'protest against the government that tried to take bureaucratic measures ignoring the facts' and 'protest Japan's politics that did not take a humanitarian position about our suffering for the past 27 years' (Okamoto 1973, p. 289).

After her return, Nishiyama made more concrete demands. The requests mentioned above developed into demands for the establishment of a repatriation centre. Although the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1978 made it possible for Japanese left behind in China to return home, it was only in 1984 that the Support and Communication Center for Returnees from China was established in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture. The necessity of a facility for Japanese returnees to live in and learn the necessary skills for life in Japan had been advocated by the Korea returnees for more than ten years.

In addition, Nishiyama began demanding the government take national responsibility for abandoned people as war victims produced by Japan's imperialism and colonial policy. She lived in Tokyo and worked as a representative of the Compatriots Social Gathering of Returnees from Korea. She also set up the executive committee for establishing the Repatriation and Returning Center and together with teachers of the night junior high school who were educating returnee children, concentrated on establishing the Center (*Asahi Shinbun* 1976).

In her lifetime, Nishiyama and others were not able to file lawsuits on behalf of the wartime abandoned people of Japan, such as the lawsuit filed in the 2000s by the Japanese left behind in China. However, by continuing to question the country's responsibility about the reasons why Japanese women were living in Korea, Nishiyama and her contemporaries are considered to be the pioneers of the movement to demand the establishment of returnee support policies later.

Conclusion

The Act on Measures on Expediting of Smooth Return of Remaining Japanese in China and for Assistance in Self-Support after Permanent Return to Japan was enacted in 1994. The content and context of this law owed much to the experiences of Japanese women in Korea. Nishiyama's and others' persistent demands that the Japanese state take responsibility finally forced the Japanese state to act. The existence of Japanese women in Korea had been largely forgotten or ignored after the war, and 'repatriates' became 'returnees' with the passage of time during the postwar. The Japanese government only actively helped Japanese women in Korea after the 1965 diplomatic normalisation, and the Nazarewon returnees' dormitory (current Gyeongju Nazare-won) was opened in 1972 as a private welfare facility to accommodate those left behind in the measures. But, many children of the Japanese women left Korea to make new lives in places unknown. As neither the children of Zainichi (Korean residents in Japan) nor children of newcomers from Korea, they constitute a distinctive ethnic minority with linguistic and identity problems as both returnees and Zainichi, about whom very little is known.

In 1982, TV Nishi Nihon (West Japan) broadcast *Straits: Japanese Wives' 36 Years in Korea* based on the stories of Japanese women in Korea, and in the same year Kamisaka Fuyuko published *Keishu Nazare-en Social Welfare Community: Forgotten Japanese Wives*, which also gained much attention. When the *Yomiuri Shinbun* newspaper's western headquarters started a campaign to help Japanese women in Korea return home as well, the problem of Japanese women in Korea was noticed and gained support. However, it is still difficult to find records of how these displaced citizens and their children have blended into Japanese society since their return.

The living space of Japanese women in Korea was distorted by the consequences of the colonial policy that involved the people of Japan and Korea colliding with the 'border' of the nation-state. If we look into the lives of Japanese women in Korea such as Yoon Hak-ja, who raised many orphans during the Korean War, and Nishiyama Umeko, the 'mother of Japanese wives', we can understand the 'mediator's thoughts that break the limits of both nations' through the 'history of the women near the border' (Morisaki 1970, p. 12). Even though Japanese women in Korea have for the most part an invisible existence that can only be seen at the Gyeongju Nazarewon residential home and in the activities of Fuyo-kai, the study of these women whose lives straddle the borders of Japan and Korea reveals new frontiers and hidden historical spaces in our understanding of the relationship between Japan and Korea.

Note

1 This chapter is a revised version of a paper first published as 'Zaikan nihonjin josei no sengo: hikiage to kikoku no hazama' (Japanese women in Korea in the postwar: between repatriation and returning home) in H. Imanishi and K. Iizuka, eds, 2018. *Teikoku nihon no idō to dōin* (Movement and mobilization in the Japanese Empire). Suita: Ōsaka Daigaku Shuppankai.

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11 Challenging the ‘global’ in the global periphery

Performances and negotiations of academic and personal identities among JET-alumni Japan scholars based in Japan

Sachiko Horiguchi

‘I wouldn’t be who I am if it weren’t for the JET Programme!’ This is a comment I have heard a number of times from my colleagues in Japanese Studies. As a scholar of Japan, I have always been curious about the question of *who* become Japan scholars. The more I have immersed myself in Japanese Studies communities, the more I have come to notice that the JET Programme may have played a significant role in sustaining communities of Japanese Studies scholars. The JET Programme, or the Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme, is a government-led programme that has recruited fresh college graduates as assistant language teachers in Japanese schools since 1987. As someone also involved in teaching English for many years and acutely aware of issues surrounding English language education in Japan (Horiguchi, Imoto and Poole 2015), I have been sceptical of the contributions the JET Programme has made to the improvement of English language education in Japan, as others have also argued (McConnell 2000, pp. 251–258; Metzgar 2017, pp. 68–70). The contributions it has made to Japanese Studies communities, on the other hand, have appeared to be more visible, with many alumni maintaining long-standing affection towards Japan and turning their affection into their professional careers.[1] These events and impressions inspired me to embark on research into JET-alumni Japan scholars in 2012. I started interviewing scholars at various stages of their careers based in Japan – since I have been based in Japan myself – asking about how they got into Japanese Studies and how they reflect on their career trajectories. While these scholars’ narratives might not differ greatly from those of other Japan scholars who had not joined the JET Programme, as many of the narratives presented below show, there are connections that can be made between their past experiences working in Japanese primary and/or secondary education and their more recent experiences working in Japanese higher education.

Recent scholarship on emerging multiculturalism in contemporary Japan has primarily focused on migrants from ‘third world’ countries (see Chapters 7, 8 and 12 in this volume), with limited attention given to migrants from the ‘West’ and their impact on global and local communities.[2] This chapter fills this gap by examining narratives of Anglophone Japan scholars who set foot in Japan as JET Programme participants teaching English in Japanese secondary schools, later received training in postgraduate programmes in the 'West' to become scholars researching some aspect of Japan, and have been based in Japanese higher education institutions. Drawing on ten interviews conducted with JET-alumni scholars of various ages about their life stories, this study sheds light on ways in which these scholars find themselves 'privileged' as symbols of 'internationalisation' in Japan, and yet find themselves marginalised in scholarly communities at local and global levels. Through critically examining how these JET-alumni scholars perform and negotiate their academic and personal identities, this chapter also highlights tensions and connections between the 'core' and 'peripheries' of the 'academic world system' as well as those between area studies and disciplines in the humanities and social sciences.

The chapter begins by outlining the context in which the JET-alumni scholars under study engaged with Japan, focusing on a history of the JET Programme and its relevance to the slogan of the 'internationalisation' (*kokusaika*) of Japanese education. I will then give a brief overview of the methods employed in this research, followed by an examination of the JET-alumni scholars' narratives and their shifting professional and personal identities in relation to the social milieus in which they have situated themselves.

The JET Programme as a symbol of 'internationalisation'

The JET Programme was launched in 1987 as a state-sponsored international exchange programme that, it was hoped, would alleviate political and economic tensions between Japan and the United States (McConnell 2000, p. 1; Metzgar 2017, p. 6). The precursors to the JET Programme include the Monbusho English Fellows (MEF) Program which started in 1977. This was originally a Fulbright Commission-led assistant teaching programme initiated in 1969 that sent American college graduates with no special training in ESL (English as a Second Language) to Japan and was later taken over by Japan's Education Ministry (Monbusho) (McConnell 2000, pp. 41–42). A British counterpart to the MEF Program was the British English Teaching (BET) scheme, which began several years after the MEF Program (McConnell 2000, p. 43). The JET Programme is a reorganised and expanded version of these programmes, but is unique and significant in that it was led by three separate Japanese government ministries: the Ministry of Education (now the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology [MEXT]), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (now the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications [MIC]), each with differing goals. The Ministry of Education sought to improve foreign language education in public schools, the Foreign Ministry sought to improve understanding of Japan among youth – particularly elite youth, who might become political or business leaders after they returned home – in participating countries, and the Home Affairs Ministry sought to promote grassroots internationalisation and regional development in local governments across Japan (McConnell 2000, p. 30; Metzgar 2017, p. 7). The Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) was established under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs as the administrative office of the JET Programme. The majority of JET Programme participants have worked as Assistant Language Teachers (ALTs) in Japanese schools, partnering with Japanese teachers of English, while a small percentage have worked as Coordinators for International Relations (CIRs) in municipal and prefectural offices assisting with the 'internationalisation' of local governments since the launch of the Programme, and a tiny fraction of the participants have worked as Sports Exchange Advisers since 1994 (Metzgar 2017, p. 7). As of 2019, over 70,000 people from 75 countries have participated in the JET Programme; the first batch comprised 848 participants and, at its peak in 2002, there were 6273 participants (CLAIR 2019). In 2010, under the rule of the Democratic Party of Japan, the Programme came under scrutiny due to concerns about the operation of CLAIR, general costs associated with programme administration and little evidence of its contribution to improvements in English language proficiency (Metzgar 2017, p. 63). Thanks to JET-alumni voicing the Programme's value as an international exchange programme, and, more importantly, the Liberal Democratic Party regaining power in 2012, the Programme has successfully avoided significant budget cuts or cancellation. The number of participants was 5761 in 2019 (Metzgar 2017, pp. 63–64; CLAIR 2019).

The JET Programme was inaugurated in the 1980s as a top-down scheme in response to Japan's perceived needs to 'internationalise' (*kokusaika*). McConnell's (2000) nuanced ethnography illuminates the contested interpretations of the rhetoric of 'internationalisation' in Japanese society, symbolised in how the different agenda of the three ministries outlined above were all subsumed under this same rhetoric (see also Goodman 2007, p. 73). This push for 'internationalisation' has continued to characterise Japanese education reforms, particularly in the higher education sector. In part, 'internationalisation' for Japanese higher education institutions has meant an increase in the number of overseas students studying in Japan (see Chapter 12 in this volume), with varying needs and agendas from the institutional point of view, as well as a rise in the number of Japanese students studying abroad (Goodman 2007). The rise in English-medium programmes focusing on Japan to attract international students is symbolic of this trend, but this change, along with pressures placed on faculty to publish in 'high-impact' English-language journals, has also been fuelled by the establishment of international university rankings and expansion of audit culture in this neoliberal era (Kuwayama 2017, pp. 161–164; see the introductory chapter and Chapter 2 in this volume). It is within this context of the 'internationalisation' of Japanese higher education that the JET-alumni under study are building their careers in Japan.

Among the varying agendas behind the shared slogan of 'internationalisation,' Metzgar (2017) draws attention to the Foreign Ministry's goal of improving global attitudes towards Japan, and situates the JET Programme as a public diplomacy effort, focusing on the contributions of American alumni to US–Japan relations. Metzgar (2017) collected responses from over 500 American JET-alumni in an online survey conducted in 2011 regarding their motivations, reflections on JET and their professional careers. In this survey (Metzgar 2017, p. 89), 10 per cent of respondents reported that they were unemployed (including students), another 10 per cent worked for the government in the United States at various levels, 29 per cent were at various levels of education, 31 per cent were in the private sector and 5 per cent were in international organisations in the United States or elsewhere. Metzgar provides a history of the American JET-alumni community, and gives a professional profile of American JET-alumni based in the United States, ranging from those in higher education, international education and exchange, government, policymaking sphere, journalism, private sector and US-based Japanese institutions (Metzgar 2017, pp. 103–143).

This chapter focuses on a yet another group of JET-alumni who have developed at least part, if not all, of their careers as Japanese Studies scholars in Japanese higher education institutions, and aims to shed light on the intersections of their life stories with trajectories of Japanese Studies as an academic field, as well as the positionality of Japanese higher education institutions within it. The following section will provide an overview of the data collected for this study.

Methods and data

This research is based on the narratives of ten JET-alumni Japan scholars, originally from the United States and the United Kingdom. These academics came to Japan as assistant language teachers after finishing college, later went on to enrol in postgraduate degrees in the United States or the United Kingdom with a focus on Japan, and after finishing their doctorates, they have been affiliated with Japanese universities. Enrolling in postgraduate programmes after returning from JET is not an uncommon choice; Metzgar (2017, p. 88) found that 51 per cent of her respondents acquired additional academic credentials such as master's, PhD or other professional degrees after completing the JET Programme, well above the 8 per cent average for the American population overall. Among the ten interviewees, six are from the United States and four from the United Kingdom, and all of them were holding some sort of teaching or research position in Japanese universities at the time of the interview. Several have moved elsewhere since the interview, although the majority remain in Japan. Seven are male and three female, six were married to a Japanese, and all identified as being racially 'white'. The interviewees participated in the JET Programme (or a precursor to the JET Programme) for one to three years between 1986 and 2005. The interviews were conducted between 2013 and 2018, and the interviewees were 33–51 years of age at the time of the interview. In order to protect their identities, pseudonyms are used when making reference to their narratives.

As is widely acknowledged by anthropologists, interviews are always performative in nature (Briggs 2007) reflecting the 'presentation of self' (Goffman 1959) in the face of the interviewer. The interviews were conducted by me, a female English-speaking anthropologist from Tokyo, who shared much with the interviewees in terms of academic training and residence in Japan. Whilst I do not deny the honesty with which the interviewees shared their experiences, thoughts and emotions, I was struck by how careful they were in their choice of words. This is not surprising, considering that scholars are trained to be careful about their language when interacting with their peers. The interviews were conducted in English, though for all interviews there were occasional moments where Japanese words were used; this use of Japanese language in the interviews symbolises their familiarity with Japanese society as well as connections with me, the interviewer. In the following, I will examine some of the key data from these interviews.

The JET Programme as an entry to Japan

For most of the interviewees, their attachment to Japan was something that emerged after they arrived in Japan as JET participants. Many mentioned that they had no particular interest in Japan before coming, although they had general interest in living in other countries. This resonates with Metzgar's (2017, p. 88) finding that 90 per cent of American alumni respondents gave 'seeking cross-cultural experiences' as their motivation for participation in the JET Programme. Nick from the United States, for example, said that he 'knew very little about Japan' when he first arrived in Japan as a JET. Nick, however, was attracted to the idea of teaching English somewhere 'that was completely culturally different' and had befriended boys from Asia since his childhood years. Another American, Ben, was keen on travelling, but when he was young he was 'not at all interested in Asia'. Others had interest in Japan from their early years or had family connections to Japan/Asia. Barbara from the United Kingdom said that being three-sixteenths Chinese, she 'was always interested in Asia' and her visit to a Victoria and Albert Museum exhibition on Japan had a 'big impact'. A few mentioned that they were not sure what to do with their life after finishing college, and, for some, the salary package offered was an attraction. In Jane's case, not only was she sick of academia and needed a 'break' from academia but also found the JET Programme helpful in paying back her student loans.

Many recalled that while on the JET Programme, they were focusing on studying Japanese and engaging with the local community. They acknowledged that often on weekends the JETs around the area would gather for drinks. Some called these JET communities a '*gaijin* bubble' (foreigners' bubble) and were critical of how their members were often making complaints about Japan. My interviewees would typically distance themselves from this '*gaijin* bubble' and instead participate in local activities: they would have been characterised as the '*Nipponophiles*' in McConnell's (2000, pp. 202–205) classifications of various types of JET participants. Kevin from the United States recounted that playing sports helped him become close to 'not just the kids but everyone in the community', and Tim, another American, noted that not only was playing basketball a good way to create 'relationships with good people' but also being beaten by the Japanese in basketball matches was effective in breaking cultural stereotypes. The engagement with the locals may be seen as the JET participants' contribution to the nurturing of grassroots multiculturalism, one of the aforementioned goals of the JET Programme. The degree to which the JET participants were satisfied with their work at schools varied. Some were happy that they were allowed to develop course materials by themselves, while others did not have much freedom over their classes and yet appreciated the time they could have for themselves to work on their Japanese or to hang out with their new Japanese friends due to the minimal expectations from the schools. Asai's (2006) ethnographic study examines shifting cultural identities among JET participants and reveals that their subjective positioning and self-esteem are dependent on their relationships with students and Japanese teachers of English along with the school environment, in addition to their educational skills and/or motivation. Komisarof's (2004) interview-based research explores how JET participants perceived acculturation orientations among Japanese colleagues. He illuminates how their expectations for assimilation or integration in various degrees are hampered by separatist attitudes of their Japanese teachers. Just like Asai's (2006) or Komisarof's (2004) research subjects, my interviewees often negotiated their identities and strategised their positioning, which they continued in their post-JET years in Japanese institutions. Many seemed determined that they did not want to make English language teaching their career, and this determination led them to do intensive Japanese language learning. Andrew from the United Kingdom did not take Japanese language study seriously in the first year, but towards the end of the first year, he started 'doing some research on English language teaching as a career' and found that 'it looked like there were limited opportunities for career advancement in the U.K.' Inspired by friends who were making progress in Japanese, he started to study Japanese more seriously, which later led to his enrolment in a Japanese Studies postgraduate degree. The sense of exclusion that motivated my interviewees to improve their Japanese language ability was often accompanied by a sense of privilege, which I will explore in the next section.

Being privileged and finding comfort in Japan

The JET-alumni Japan scholars under study often expressed how they have felt overly privileged throughout their years in Japan, starting from their years on the JET Programme and continuing afterwards, not only at the interpersonal level but also with regard to funding and employment opportunities. This aligns with Debnár's (2016, pp. 116–129) findings from his study of European migrants in Japan that 'whites', especially 'white males', enjoy not only symbolic 'small benefits' of white privilege in everyday life but also advantages in the labour market, particularly in the university sector with increasing demand for foreign scholars, where English language ability becomes significant social capital (see also Komisarof 2012). Ben, an American, used the term 'gravy train' to explain how he has been ‘fed’ by the Japanese government and universities throughout his post-college years. After his participation in the JET Programme, he was supported by a MEXT scholarship while doing his doctorate, followed by a post-doc with JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science), and was hired at a Japanese university. He, along with Tim, acknowledged that being a ‘white male’ also gives him a privileged status in Japan, and that participation in the JET Programme helped him with success in receiving scholarships and landing jobs in Japan. However, Ben and Tim differed in their future visions. While Ben was positive about establishing his career in Japan, suggesting that ‘there’s no place like Japan in terms of an intellectual challenge’, Tim hoped to leave Japan since he feared that ‘a false sense of security and confidence’ have been developing and he has ‘lost his intellectual sharpness’ in the years he has lived in Japan. Barbara, a British early career scholar sarcastically noted that whites, particularly white males, find themselves in ‘cotton wool’ without realising that they have ‘been put on a pedestal all the time’, and expressed her hesitance about capitalising on the privilege. This was echoed by Nick, an American who has worked in Japan for most of his academic career. Nick recalled how, before starting work in Japan, he was working in the United States to prove to himself that he could survive in the American labour market. He remarked that he did not want to be spoiled by the ease of finding work as a Westerner in Japan.

The scholars based in Japan explained their reasons for staying in Japan, in both personal and professional terms. For some, family connections formed in Japan through marriage with a Japanese spouse have played a part. Others mentioned that their personality fits in Japan better. Mike suggested that he has more culture shock when he goes back home to the United States. Professionally, being in Japan meant better access to data as well as better insights into the society they study. Victor from the United Kingdom stated that being a resident in Japan allows him to take an ‘insider’ perspective into Japanese society and allows him to access easily databases and media reports. Nick also feels that he knows ‘Japan better than most non-Japanese scholars studying Japan from abroad’ and said ‘my [=his] lived experience of 18 years is … an important foundation in terms of knowledge’. Barbara, on the other hand, cautioned that foreign scholars may have skewed assumptions on Japan through relying too much on their personal connections in Japan, which mainly consist of outward-looking cosmopolitan-minded Japanese who are hardly representative of the Japanese population. And whilst the scholars find their immersion in Japan an advantage in their academic endeavours, they also find themselves marginalised in Japan professionally.

Negotiating marginalisation at the local level

For the scholars under study, the comfort of living in Japan does not necessarily come naturally, and the ‘guest’ treatment (see Debnár 2016, pp. 147–151) they have received as JETs and in their later careers in their privileged position in

Japan also means that they have not fully integrated into the local institutional context. They can find themselves marginalised, despite their high Japanese proficiency (for which they are often overtly flattered, as Debnár [2016, p. 153] notes). Ben lamented that although he played a crucial role in the 'internationalisation' of the institution he was based in, he had 'no voice'. The scholars commented on strategies they have used for working within the Japanese system as foreign faculty, in their attempts to negotiate their institutional marginalisation. Kim (2010, pp. 585–586) points out in her study of transnational academic mobility that assuming the position of a 'stranger' and 'minority', which 'requires active engagement with *otherness*', is key for developing 'transnational identity capital', which in turn necessitates certain strategies. Several interviewees noted the importance of working in harmony with their Japanese colleagues. Victor mentioned that in addition to being persistent, it is important not to 'rock the boat' in a Japanese university, stressing the importance of 'going with the flow without shaking things too much'. He sees himself as having successfully transitioned from 'a foreigner that was not allowed to change anything in the system' to 'an accepted and respected foreigner given power to do things within the system'. Nick also suggested that he has made sure that he was contributing as much as or more than his Japanese colleagues. Liu-Farrer (2016, p. 61) confesses that despite fighting with her essentialist view of culture as a sociologist, in practice she found herself influenced by the discourses of Japanese society and used her 'preconception of cultural differences' in making sense of her frustrations as a member of a Japanese university. Similarly, several of my interviewees commented that although they acknowledge the critiques made against *Nihonjinron* from a scholarly perspective (see the introductory chapter to this volume), since their early years in Japan as JET participants they have found *Nihonjinron* ideals like *wa* (harmony) helpful in their day-to-day survival in Japan.

Another issue with marginalisation at the local level is limited connections with the communities of Japanese academics trained in Japan, which comprise the domestic cores of disciplinary networks in the social sciences. My interviewees read and cite Japanese language literature in their research, but despite their long careers in Japan, they often collaborate with Anglophone scholars or Japanese scholars who received their academic training in the West. Andrew, for example, has preferred to work primarily with Anglophone researchers and noted his perceived differences in academic culture: the Japanese scholars in his field are too 'theory-heavy' and/or they tend to 'stay with the same theme' throughout their career, whereas in his view, Western academics move from one theme to another. As Sugimoto (2014, pp. 202–205) points out, Japan's social science community has drawn on theories of Western origin, but they have also fostered 'emic' concepts and theories which have not been given sufficient transnational attention (see also Chapter 2 in this volume). And these 'emic' paradigms may hamper foreign scholars' participation in Japanese academic communities supported by a large internal academic market (see Ben-Ari 2017, p. 36). Furthermore, my interviewees have published the majority of their research in English, the dominant language of the academic world (Ben-Ari 2017, p. 37), which marginalises themselves from local scholarly communities. Some explained that it is simply easier to write in English, but also pointed out that they are expected by their institutions to publish in English as international faculty in response to the aforementioned influence of audit culture. In the meantime, some scholars have collaborated substantially with domestic social scientists in government-funded research projects. Victor, for instance, shared his experiences of working with Japanese colleagues and helping them have their research published in English. But for Victor and other scholars, being connected to the global scholarly community has been a more important part of their professional practice against the backdrop of the peripherality of Japan in what Kuwayama (2004, 2017) calls the 'academic world system'.

Attempting to impact the centre in the global periphery

Kuwayama (2004, 2017) has noted that Japan occupies a peripheral position in the 'academic world system' dominated by the 'core' Anglophone institutions in the United States and the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent by those in France or Germany (see also Ben-Ari 2017). The 'core determines what kinds of knowledge deserve to be valued and what kinds of theories, methods, and writing styles should be recognised internationally' and this dominance of the Anglophone centres has been consolidated further in the current audit system (Kuwayama 2017, p. 161). Some of my interviewees voiced the sense of being in the periphery and expressed their hopes to 'return' to the centres where they received their postgraduate training. For these scholars, Japan was not necessarily their first choice. They have applied for jobs in different countries, and they happened to get the best offer from a Japanese institution. A few noted a popular perception that mediocre academics 'get stuck in Japan', which parallels the ways in which 'provincial' knowledge produced in Japan is often labelled as parochial or insular by those in the centre of the 'academic world system' (Ben-Ari 2017, p. 38). On the other hand, other scholars criticised this 'academic world system' (see Sakai 1997; Takayama 2011; Sugimoto 2014; Ben-Ari 2017), and emphasised the bright side of being on its periphery. Victor criticised the Anglo-centric and colonial nature of the global university rankings as well as excessive audit culture in Western academia, and appreciated the institutional culture of Japanese universities, where book publications are valued and there is less pressure than elsewhere to publish journal articles which 'no one reads'.[3] He also stressed the importance of doing 'more than those in the English-speaking world' and of publishing internationally so that the prejudice against Japan-based academics would be reduced. In a similar vein, Ben, who has developed critical perspectives against US-centric paradigms and theories through his years of 'learning' in/from Asia, also suggests that his positionality in Japan has allowed him to make criticisms against Anglo-centric theories in his field. Transnational academic intellectuals, including these non-Japanese scholars in Japan, may contribute in these ways 'to a "creative destruction" and reconstruction of the paradigms of academic work' (Kim 2010, p. 584) and help 'develop and maintain the multilingual and multicultural sensitivity to concept construction and theory formation' (Sugimoto 2014, p. 205).

Area studies vs discipline

A final issue concerns the relationship between academic disciplines in the humanities/social sciences and area studies. There appears to be a tendency towards prioritising not only the Anglophone centres of the 'academic world system' over their peripheries, but also disciplinary fields over area studies. The majority of my interviewees received their doctoral training in humanities/social sciences disciplines rather than in Japanese Studies, with some asserting that they first wanted to be identified by their disciplines; Jane emphasised that 'I am [=she] is an anthropologist, and I happen [=she happens] to be studying Japan'. Ben, who has conducted research in not only Japan but other parts of Asia, emphasised the importance of expanding his field since he did not want to present himself as a 'Japan scholar'. In Ben's view, he can also contribute better to Japan's 'internationalisation' through researching non-Japanese societies and help develop theories in his discipline with more cultural sensitivity. There is often an 'uneasy' relationship between disciplines and area studies (see Derichs 2014; Ben-Ari 2017) and in the backgrounds of disciplinary identification at the individual level is a structural prioritisation of the discipline, wherein disciplinary journals tend to have higher impact factors in the citation rankings (see the introductory chapter to this volume). Nevertheless, in the same way that the peripherality of Japan can be a ground for challenging the core, several scholars expressed the view that area studies programmes do and can incorporate strong disciplinary training and that disciplines and area studies can enrich each other.

Conclusions

To conclude, this chapter has shown how JET-alumni Japan scholars, 'wanted' as symbols of 'internationalisation' by the Japanese government and universities, not only find themselves privileged in Japan as Westerners, but also marginalised both locally and globally. The scholars negotiate their privileged but marginalised status in the process of carving out their professional careers. In the backgrounds of these negotiations and practices are tensions and connections between the 'cores' and 'peripheries' of the twenty-first century 'academic world system', as well as those between area studies and disciplines. Within their liminal positionality and with their cosmopolitan outlook as border-crossing scholars, these scholars are leading the frontiers of scholarly knowledge construction in many ways. This research will benefit from a more rigorous comparative analysis vis-à-vis other cases of transnational academic mobility (Kim 2010; Komisarof and Hua 2016) and/or JET-alumni Japan scholars based in countries outside Japan. Examining educational contributions of the scholars in producing and reproducing knowledge on Japan in their teaching practice is also much needed.

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Notes

1 Roger Goodman, a participant of an antecedent to the JET Programme and one of the leading British Japanese Studies scholars, suggested that 'a large proportion of those studying in Japan-related graduate courses are from a JET background', and predicted that it is likely that 'in a few years, … the majority of those teaching in such courses will be alumni of the programme' (Goodman 2001, p. 156).
2 Significant exceptions are Debnár (2016) and Komisarof (2012).
3 See Mathews (2015) for a comparison of the different publishing practices undertaken by anthropologists in Japan and the United States.

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12 Dream vs reality

The lives of Bangladeshi language students in Japan

Siddiqur Rahman

Immigration in Japan is low compared to other developed countries (Higuchi 2007). According to recent statistics, only 1.7 per cent of the Japanese population was born outside Japan. Japan has historically had comparatively high levels of ethnic homogeneity. Recently, due to Japan's low fertility rate and the growing aged population, the Japanese government has begun opening its doors to foreigners, while eschewing policies that might be explicitly called immigration policies (see the chapter by Paichadze in this volume). Japan has welcomed some semi-skilled migrants into its service sectors since the 1990s. In response to the labour crisis, the Japanese government has introduced programmes, such as the trainee and technical intern system, to supplement its markets with 'side-door' (Gracia 2013) migrant labour. Such programmes help account for the numbers of care workers for the elderly from countries like the Philippines (see Chapter 7 by Navallo).

Another part of the strategy has involved welcoming international students. In 1984, the government stated that Japan would aim to attract 100,000 foreign students by the beginning of the twenty-first century. Since then, the number of foreign students enrolled in Japanese universities has increased. The Japanese government has also stated plans to increase the number of foreign students attending Japanese universities to 300,000 by 2020. These foreign students with permission to work part-time have become a crucial source of labour in Japan. While the majority of students in Japan are from East Asia (see Appendix), there are also significant student populations from countries across Asia and beyond.

This chapter explores the experiences of one of the smaller national groupings in Japan: Bangladeshis. According to Ministry of Justice (2017) figures, in 2017 there were 11,255 Bangladeshi migrants in Japan, of whom the number of language students in May 2017 was 829 (JASSO 2017). I will focus on the experiences of Bangladeshi language students in Japan. The data suggests that, due to specific migration and labour polices in Japan, they experience a different set of challenges from those faced by other Bangladeshi migrants. I begin by outlining the context of international student migration in Japan and Bangladesh. Next, I describe the experiences of students in language schools and part-time workplaces. Finally, I detail students' career opportunities and the challenges they face.

Migration and Bangladeshis in Japan

Earlier studies (Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 1997) have examined the assimilation process of immigrants and the associated struggles they face in new sociocultural settings. Other studies such as Sassen (2001) and Ong (1999) focused on multiculturalism and transnationalism to capture the fluid landscape of immigrants' social, political and economic lives and identities. Two debates have emerged in the recent discourse on international student migration. The first debate is centred on the 'brain drain', which was coined by a British politician in the context of British migration to the United States in the 1950s. This debate focuses on whether developing countries in Africa, Latin America and South and Southeast Asia are losing valuable human capital as students study abroad. It also examines the ethical concerns of students receiving subsidised education from their country of origin while settling in developed countries for better job opportunities. Some scholars also question the ethical foundations upon which developed countries lure these students by offering many incentives for them to immigrate after graduation (Massey *et al.* 1998; Bhagwati 1976). By contrast, others researching the brain drain have argued that despite its detrimental effects, in some circumstances the brain drain can be beneficial to the sending countries (Schiff 2005; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz 1997; Ghosh 2006). In response, critics of this view note that although skilled migration is increasing, labour migration of mostly unskilled migrants still dominates in the international flow of people (Brzozowski 2008). The second debate is centred on whether student migration provides a side-door labour supply for developed countries. However, scholars have rarely discussed the mechanisms by which international students have become a growing source of cheap labour for unskilled jobs in developed countries.

According to UNESCO, in 2018, 4.8 million people studying in universities outside their home countries and could be classified as international students. Two-thirds of them were in Western nations such the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Germany. Developed nations compete to attract international students for two reasons. First, international students provide a huge economic boost to host countries. Estimates show that in Australia, for example, earnings from international students rank third after tourism and transport (Gracia 2013). Second, international students comprise valuable human resources to the host country. Gracia (2013), for example, argues that Chinese language students explore new career paths through Japan's transnational economy after becoming familiar with the language and culture. She also argues that Chinese language students have developed a new form of transnationalism by establishing businesses back in China. This chapter extends this analysis and argues that the transnationalism of language students in Japan functions in many different ways. For example, unlike Chinese language students, Bangladeshi language students do not necessarily initiate grassroots entrepreneurial enterprises back in Bangladesh; rather, they try to legally stay in Japan.

This research used a mixed method approach for collecting data. Data were gathered from relevant secondary sources including books, journals, official

Bangladeshi and Japanese government documents, newspapers and other online sites. Participatory fieldwork was conducted in Tokyo from November 2016 to February 2017 to gather primary data. Participant observation included visiting participants' houses and workplaces, as well as their religious gatherings and other social events. Qualitative data were primarily gathered by adopting participatory research tools, such as in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and case studies. Data were collected from 15 students who were enrolled at the time in language schools in Tokyo. Of these, five were current students, five had already graduated from their language school and five were Bangladeshi students studying in universities and receiving funding from the Japanese government. All respondents were male. The age range of the respondents was between 21 and 29, and the average age of respondents was 25. Most respondents were considered to be from the middle and lower-middle classes in Bangladesh. The middle class in Bangladesh can loosely be defined as a family with an average annual income of 12,000–15,000 US$. Respondents had diverse backgrounds, but most attended public colleges or universities in Bangladesh and had recently graduated.

Analysing the experiences of Bangladeshi language students elucidates the need to consider the effects of migration on happiness and well-being (see also Chapter 14 by Klien in this volume) in order to create a more effective and inclusive migration policy than one simply derived using economic markers of the status of migrants. The vivid narratives of Bangladeshi language students' lives reveals the considerable hardships they face and can contribute to the development strategies regarding international student migration from East and South Asian countries. The experiences of the Bangladeshi students are in marked contrast to those of Western students, or Western graduates who have participated as 'privileged' foreigners on programmes such as the JET Programme (see Chapter 11 by Horiguchi in this volume). Due to limited time and resources, the study could not include language students from other countries or a significant number of Bangladeshi students who are studying science, technology and medicine in Japanese universities. Nevertheless, despite the small sample size, the clarity of the voices illuminates some of the darker and lesser-discussed aspects of the 'Japanese dream' for migrants. These voices contribute to a literature in which brain drain debates, both theoretical and empirical, are too economic-centric and to some extent suffer from Western epistemological bias. A cross-fertilisation of ideas from different disciplines, especially within the social sciences, and voices from various countries can provide new insights to our understanding of the future of Japanese immigration policies.

The context of student migration in Bangladesh

Previous studies have explored the connections between the forces of globalisation and international migration and identified several analytical factors to explain the increasing number of migrants. These reasons include – but are not limited to – global disparity between developed and developing countries, international job crises, labour market segmentation, communication and transport innovation, changing migration networks, new rights and entitlements, and migration industry growth (Koser 2016). As a developing country, Bangladesh has a national context that is conducive to emigration. Emigration is an important building block of the Bangladeshi economy and the money that migrants remitted back contributed over US$15.4 billion to the national economy in 2018 (*Daily Star* 2019b). Bangladeshi emigrants tend to migrate to Middle Eastern countries, developed countries in Europe and North America, and Australia. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia hosts the greatest number of unskilled labourers from Bangladesh (Gardner 1995).

Japan has been receiving Bangladeshi immigrants since the 1980s. Historically, Bangladeshi migrants have participated minimally in the Japanese labour market. For Bangladeshi immigrants who work and live in Japan, a student visa has been a favourite means of securing entry into the country. Bangladeshi student enrolment in Japanese language institutes has increased noticeably since the 1990s. The number of students varies each year depending on government policies for student visas. In 2016, the number of Bangladeshi language students in Japan was 577, primarily located in large Japanese cities (JASSO 2017). The regions of Bangladesh from which these students emigrated are notably diverse. Historically, Bangladeshi migrants have largely come from regions such as Dhaka and the adjacent district of Munshiganj. Over time, however, significant regional variation has become evident in the origins of Bangladeshi students.

The greater political, economic and ideological contexts surrounding student migration to Japan are integral for understanding migratory processes and experiences. The Bangladeshi government has imposed no restrictions on students studying abroad. The high unemployment rate, the low number of students universities can accept and the mismanagement of Bangladeshi universities have led to an increase in migration. Passport offices have been established throughout Bangladesh, making passports accessible, and the domestic socioeconomic context incentivises Bangladeshi students to study abroad. Japan has offered Bangladeshi students lucrative scholarships for higher education. Most Bangladeshi students in the 1980s and 1990s travelled to Japan for higher education on government scholarship programmes. These scholarships were offered in diverse fields including science, agriculture, technology, business, social sciences, arts and humanities. Aside from government scholarships, individual students privately sought admission to institutions and applied to scholarships from the various foundations offering the scholarships. After successful completion of their studies, most funded students either look for white collar jobs in Japan or elsewhere, or return to Bangladesh. The number of Bangladeshi language students studying abroad in Japan rapidly increased in the 1990s. Furthermore, the technological and economic prosperity of Japan, the economic success of migrants in Japan who returned back to Bangladesh, curiosity, and a desire for new experiences led many students to choose Japan as a destination.

In particular, economic factors have encouraged Bangladeshi students to migrate to Japan. Like many developing countries, the lack of job opportunities has been a chronic problem and remains a key challenge for Bangladesh. Since its independence in 1971, successive Bangladeshi governments have implemented initiatives to attract national and foreign investment and create jobs for the large population of unemployed youth. Despite the high level of unemployment, the GDP growth of Bangladesh has been nearly 7 per cent per annum since 2016 and it has become one of the fastest growing economies in the world (World Bank 2019). However, Raihan (2018) has referred to this rapid GDP growth as 'jobless economic growth'. Employment opportunities are slowly increasing, but they continue to fall short of meeting the public's actual needs. Inadequate investment in both public and private sectors and a lack of diversified portfolio of industries led to slow employment generation in Bangladesh. Economic development through remittance has recently gained popularity in Bangladeshi development discourse. Like many similar countries, Bangladesh considers remittance a viable strategy and continues to promote inward flows of remittance to ensure development.

Importantly, Koser (2016, p. 38) defined the 'migration industry' as the institutional arrangements of international migration. Aside from states, other groups – including brokers, labour recruiters, immigration lawyers, travel agents and housing providers – play crucial roles in facilitating international migration and by doing so generating business. The institutional arrangements in Bangladesh and Japan facilitate Bangladeshi student migration to Japan. Since the 1990s, a number of Japanese language institutions have opened in Bangladesh, principally in large cities such as Dhaka, Chittagong and other divisional towns. Some are unreliable while others are not, but only two of these Japanese language institutions are accredited by the Japanese embassy in Bangladesh. The mushrooming numbers of language training centres in and around Dhaka use aggressive marketing to increase their visibility and attract students. Many students have been enraptured by this attractive marketing and considered Japan for their future studies. Some language institutions in Bangladesh actively facilitate the admission and visa application processes for students of Japanese language institutions. They have established contacts with brokers and recruiters both in Bangladesh and Japan.

Brokers play a key role in language student migration. Some Bangladeshis living in Japan work closely with Bangladeshi brokers. Often, these agents are relatives of would-be migrants who have been referred by someone in Bangladesh to establish contact. These agents work informally without government licence or oversight, and students are unable to verify their validity or service costs. These agents offer a list of required activities and services to students with a variety of service costs. The most popular services include – but are not limited to – arranging for the admission offer letter for a Japanese language institution, tuition fees for the first year, processing all papers for visa applications, purchasing travel tickets, finding housing upon arrival in Japan, renting a house for several months and airport pick-up. Field data suggest that the prices for these services range from BDT9 lakh (10,700 US$) to BDT12 lakh (14,000 US$).

Furthermore, social networks play an important role in Bangladeshi language student migration to Japan. Most of my respondents' migratory experiences were facilitated by their social networks or brokers in Bangladesh. These networks help newcomers establish contacts with language schools, rent houses, complete visa applications, arrange travel and obtain preliminary information about Japan. Given the political, economic and institutional contexts in Japan and Bangladesh, the recruitment of Bangladeshi language students in Japan will likely continue to increase. Japan needs additional side-door labour from such students. The unemployment and underemployment of Bangladeshi youth has become more acute, and economic development through remittance seems to be gaining prominence in development discourse in Bangladesh. Consequently, the Bangladeshi government is likely to encourage more students to emigrate for education or work to secure remittance. The number of Bangladeshi students of the Japanese language has been increasing every year. In 2019, the Japanese government expressed an interest in admitting Bangladeshi migrant workers in various semi-skilled categories (*Daily Star* 2019a).

Language students' lives in Japan

This section presents the lives of language students on and off campus. It attempts to capture students' experiences in language institutes and their daily lives to provide a more comprehensive understanding of student migration outcomes. The early experiences of students tested their physical and emotional abilities and allowed them to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to establish themselves in the Japanese job market.

Most language schools have one morning shift and one afternoon shift. Each shift is three hours. No financial assistance is provided for tuition fees as most institutes are profit-driven, private institutions. Language schools have different graduation requirements, often ranging from 12 to 24 months of study. The quality of language schools also varies greatly as the Japanese government does not significantly oversee language institutions. International agents from countries such as China, South Korea, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia and Nepal liaise with language schools to supply foreign students. Consequently, some language schools have departed from their functions on paper as language teaching institutions and have effectively become 'visa mills'. Amidst growing criticism regarding crimes by foreign students, visa breaches and the general fear of immigrants among Japanese citizens, the Japanese government has suspended or revoked licences from language schools with corrupt practices (Garcia 2013). According to my informants, most Bangladeshi students successfully complete language school. Only in exceptional cases do students require an additional semester to complete these programmes. Their academic achievement is also more than satisfactory. Respondents have mentioned that most students maintain good grades. Apart from *kanji*, they find that learning Japanese is easy.

Students are legally allowed to work 28 hours per week if they reside in Japan on a visa obtained through a language school. Two types of part-time jobs, in food service and labour-intensive industries, are popular among the respondents. However, immigrant students most commonly undertake food service jobs.

Students find jobs through their personal networks, in which friends and relatives refer students to recruiters. Online job portals and word-of-mouth are also popular ways of finding work. The respondents mentioned that part-time job pay varies depending on the nature of the work and typically ranges from 900 to 1200 yen/hour. The average pay is around 1000 yen/hour. Students often work overtime to earn more money to pay tuition fees, meet emergency family needs and purchase expensive personal items such as watches, shoes and cameras. The interview data suggest that most students exceed the amount of work hours denoted in their visa agreement. Some students report that earnings from the legal number of hours are difficult to live on, and it is difficult to obtain financial assistance from their families while studying abroad. Students, therefore, often work multiple jobs. Most students work four days per week. The work is labour-intensive and tiresome, which negatively affects their ability to focus on studying at home.

Certificates from Japanese language institutions are important for language students. However, working part-time often helps them practise Japanese. They find *hiragana* and *katakana* are much easier than *kanji*. Some mentioned that at the beginning of their work their Japanese colleagues and bosses helped them with pronunciation and work-place language fluency. Many mentioned that without the part-time work experience it would have taken much longer to reach their current level of fluency in Japanese. Students' understanding of Japanese culture is also crucial for their future success. Learning Japanese culture requires time and interaction with Japanese people. Respondents reported that they learned Japanese culture from both language institutions and their workplaces. However, interactions with Japanese clients, primarily in restaurants and cafes, more effectively helped them gain an understanding of Japanese culture. They reported observing social rules and the behaviour of Japanese people on the bus, trains and subways as well.

Work remains the most important experience in the lives of students. Japanese workplace culture is new and unfamiliar to them. One mentioned:

> At the beginning, I thought the Malik [owner] was a bad person, but after a while, I realized that being tough at work is part of Japanese work culture. There is no time to relax at work like in Bangladesh.

Most Bangladeshi students did not have any prior work experience before moving to Japan. For those with work experience, most had not previously worked in food service. Some mentioned that the Japanese workplace culture is very strict. Some bosses are stern and rigid and do not allow mistakes. Some also mentioned that the workplace hierarchy is strictly maintained.

Social networks are crucial for Bangladeshi students to survive and prosper in Japan. Two kinds of social networks are effective – Bangladeshi networks and Japanese social networks. Most students rely more heavily on their Bangladeshi social networks than non-Bangladeshi or Japanese social networks. These social networks are based on either friendship or kinship. Some social networks diminish or collapse over time, and new social networks develop. Many respondents mentioned that their ties with relatives and friends who helped them come to

Japan no longer exist or have weakened. It is difficult for Bangladeshi language students to develop strong Japanese social networks. Some have Japanese friends through work relationships, but these relationships do not typically last or extend beyond workplace boundaries. It is not clear why language students were not able to develop close friendships with Japanese. However, one respondent did mention how his Japanese girlfriend helped him with language, finding housing and signing a legal document.

Due to work and class schedules, students had less time to socialise with others. They often had few friends beyond their work. Most students mingled with their Bangladeshi friends and socialised online. Some mentioned that they developed friendships with other students in their classes. However, such friendships did not typically last; as one respondent mentioned, most Southeast Asian friends had different cultural and linguistic orientations, and it is difficult to nurture close friendship with them. Due to a lack of friends, language students often feel isolated in Japan. Based on my ethnographic observations, even among Bangladeshi roommates, students were frequently unable to spend time together since everyone had different class and work schedules. Students had to plan socialising activities well in advance. Religion also plays an important part in students' everyday lives. As practising Muslims, there are certain foods considered *haram* and *halal*. *Halal* food is not always available, and this is a significant concern for migrant students in Japan.

Shaping the future

Bangladeshi students' life experiences in Japanese language schools and workplaces greatly influence their future careers. Their lives are shaped by the nature of language schools, the experiences they gather from part-time jobs and the social capital they accrue. As described previously, language schools provide them with some initial and formal cultural capital, allowing for upward social and economic mobility. Moreover, their experiences in the workplace facilitate their mastery of the Japanese language and allow them to understand workplace culture, professionalism and timeliness while developing broader social networks, influencing their future career trajectories.

The unemployment rate in Bangladesh is very high. Competition for jobs is intense, and it is difficult to secure private sector, white-collar jobs in Bangladesh without sufficient social network support. Language students are not confident enough in their ability to secure desirable employment to return to Bangladesh. Although the economic landscape of Bangladesh has recently and gradually become more international, few Japanese companies operate in Bangladesh compared to Europe, America and Asia. The high unemployment rate and lack of Japanese companies in Bangladesh results in language students' inability to apply their Japanese cultural and linguistic skills in Bangladesh. They prefer to remain in Japan and find suitable careers.

Language students rely on different sources to find jobs. All students have cell phones with Internet connections, allowing them to look for jobs. Apart from the Internet, social networks – especially Bangladeshi social networks – have been an effective means to find work, specifically part-time. Most of my language student informants found part-time jobs through Bangladeshi social networks. Fellow Bangladeshis help each other find work at any opportunity. Full-time jobs in factories are often advertised on the Internet; some respondents reported that they visited popular job websites in Tokyo to look for better or full-time jobs. To address the knowledge gap among students, some language students used social media sites, such as Facebook, to disseminate information about lifestyles, admission processes and working conditions in Japan. They use Facebook at regular intervals to provide other aspiring Bangladeshi students with the necessary information before they come to Japan.

After graduating from language school, most students aspire to gain admission to Japanese universities in their chosen fields, such as business and engineering. However, the conventional pathway begins at language school, and students typically attend *senmon gakkō*, diploma school, before having the option to work in semi-skilled jobs or continue their studies in universities. Many of the respondents dream of getting into top universities, but entry exams are rigorous and competitive, and scholarships and financial uncertainty are obstacles for most students. However, two Bangladeshi language students among my informants were able to obtain scholarships to study at a top university. Students' secondary plans were often completing the diploma school, and finding a semi-skilled white-collar job in their respective fields. They believe that these jobs are less labour-intensive with a modest, but sufficient, income, allowing them to change their visa status. Furthermore, these jobs have a regular work schedule, which would allow them to organise their social, financial and career plans accordingly. Only a few language students successfully found such jobs.

When the above paths were unavailable, most language students completed diploma school and found factory labour-intensive jobs with minimal pay and undesirable social status. It requires a lot of time for language students to attain upward economic and social mobility in these jobs, and it eventually becomes a source of language students' frustration and disappointment. Field data suggest that a significant number of graduates become independent entrepreneurs after obtaining diplomas from *senmon gakkō* rather than working in factories. They mentioned that entrepreneurship provides them with more freedom and a better income. Furthermore, they mentioned that banks in Japan provide loans for start-up capital. Many graduates took loans from banks to run travel agencies, Indian restaurants and *halal* food shops, or they exported used Japanese cars to Bangladesh. By taking this path, language students have developed many small-scale businesses in Tokyo and other big cities in Japan.

After graduation, though some language students return to Bangladesh, most students remain in Japan despite the difficulties. They derive their motivation to stay in Japan from their social and economic origins, limited career opportunities in Bangladesh and the attraction of the Japanese lifestyles to which they have become accustomed over the years. They often compare their present life with the life they would have had in Bangladesh. One interviewee said:

> No matter how hard our lives in Japan are, I am much better off than my life in Bangladesh. I love Japanese people and their mannerisms. They are honest and especially the shop owners – they never cheat their customers. Customers are treated like Gods, and I enjoy this very much when I go to buy anything in any shops in Japan.

It appears that most language students primarily migrated to Japan to achieve economic success through language school. Earning money from Japan to send home, repay loans and cover their families' expenses are language students' primary economic goals while in language school. After spending five years in educational institutions – two years in language school and three years in *senmon gakkō* – respondents began to conceive of their future economic and personal goals. Most were close to the age of 30 by the time they completed *senmon gakkō*. At that point, they began to feel the parental and societal pressure of attaining a solid job, getting married and settling down. They were incentivised to remain in Japan and continue to earn money and keep working in unsatisfactory conditions. They mentioned that job insecurity and the uncertainty of having a decent life back in Bangladesh forced them to stay in Japan. Some were required to send money to their families and forced to save money for marriage, medical emergencies and other familial expectations. After living in Japan for more than five years, language students had become accustomed to Japanese lifestyles. They were appreciative of Japanese culture, infrastructure, governing systems and policy.

Conclusions

This chapter has briefly outlined the opportunities and challenges of Bangladeshi, migrant language students in Japan. Through participatory research and in-depth interviews with 15 informants, the circumstances of migrant students' social, economic and educational backgrounds, their experiences in language school and their part-time workplaces, and their experiences with restricted upward social and economic mobility, all became clearer. Language students come from diverse economic and social backgrounds; however, most students in this study came from the Bangladesh middle class and were driven by economic motivations, rather than a desire simply to learn Japanese. The broader economic, political and institutional contexts of Bangladesh and Japan facilitated students' migration to Japan. Throughout this migration process, the role of social networks and agents in Japan and Bangladesh were important in facilitating their migration. The data suggest that language students are subject to economic exploitation by agents due to their lack of knowledge about language school admission, visa applications and settlement in Japan.

After arriving in Japan, students often have no choice but to take on multiple part-time service jobs, which are labour intensive and significantly disrupt their sleep and studies. Earning income to pay tuition and assist their parents financially puts constant pressure on students to work more hours while in language school. Due to rigorous work and school schedules, students eventually become socially isolated. Most students experienced low social and economic mobility following graduation from language school. To attain upwards educational and social mobility and extend their stay in Japan, they often enrolled in three-year diploma schools. They continued to struggle with hectic schedules until graduation from diploma schools. After graduation from diploma schools, most students took jobs that promised little upwards social and economic mobility. Searching for better careers, they were more motivated to become entrepreneurs or migrate to another country in Europe, Canada and Australia. This chapter argues that student migration comprises a significant subset of international migration and contributes to previous debates, which have centred on the brain drain/gain in the sending and receiving countries. In the case of Bangladeshi language students in Japan, their experiences shed light on how language students take diverse pathways through study and part-time work to their future careers.

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13 Sending them over the seas

Japanese judges crossing legal boundaries through lived experiences in Australia

Stacey Steele

This chapter analyses responses to a questionnaire by Japanese judges who studied as visiting research scholars at Melbourne Law School in Australia between 2003 and 2014 under the Supreme Court of Japan's Overseas Training and Research Program ('Program').[1] For some judges, the Program is their first in-depth international experience.[2] A typical Japanese judge has a very good primary and high school education, graduates from one of the best Japanese universities, spends a few years studying for the national examination, completes the Supreme Court Legal Training and Research Institute course, including internship rotations and a final examination, and is appointed a judge in their late 20s or early 30s (Kashiwagi 2014). Few judges have the time to study overseas before becoming a judge or, perhaps, even have a part-time job. The questionnaire responses provide a snapshot of the judges' experiences abroad and are supplemented by observation of the Program by the author, who has been the Program's supervising academic since its inception at Melbourne. The chapter uses the responses to examine potential learnings for debates globally about mobility, especially in the higher education sector, and the content of judicial education. The chapter argues that these types of overseas study programmes offer invaluable opportunities for the individuals and institutions involved, but such programmes are not without critics and their impact is difficult to assess. These programmes are also expensive and personnel-intensive, as future changes to the Program at Melbourne Law School demonstrate. This chapter thus develops one of this book's key themes by highlighting a Japanese case study to find direct solutions to common global challenges: improving international exchange experiences and training judges.

Japanese judges at the Melbourne Law School

The concept of sending judges overseas to research and study for extended periods of time builds on a tradition of international legal outreach immortalised in the Meiji Period (1868–1912), when Japan's fast-paced modernisation demanded the adoption of Western legal technologies and constructs. 'Sending students "out"' has been an economic development strategy in other jurisdictions at other times too (Neubauer and Kuroda 2012, p. 212). This approach continued in Japan during the period before the Second World War when judges and prosecutors could volunteer to undertake extended research trips overseas (Kozuka 2017). In the 1970s up to the late 1980s, the number of judges studying overseas was still less than ten judges annually. The Program was restricted to candidates who were perceived to be part of an appointment trajectory for a super elite who would go on to hold senior judicial positions, similarly to the Meiji Period. As Japan's economic capacity and international integration increased, the number of judges on the Program gradually expanded during the 1990s to about 20 judges annually despite the economic malaise of Japan's 'lost decade'. The Program capacity increased dramatically again from 2000 to 2010. Currently, there are between 30 and 35 judges undertaking extended research postings overseas annually in countries such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, England, France, Germany and the United States of America.

The reasons for the increasing numbers of judges studying overseas in the twenty-first century are multifaceted. At one level, the trend reflects the growing capacity of junior judges to undertake overseas postings from a language competency perspective and the Supreme Court's budgetary situation in a richer Japan.[3] Access to the latest thinking on emerging legal issues still plays an important part in the Supreme Court's outreach effort. Judicial visitors receive research questions from the Court, for example, and write reports in Japanese about how important issues are dealt with in their host jurisdiction as part of consultations during reform debates in Japan.[4] However, internationalisation and judicial legitimacy also emerged in the twenty-first century as explicit drivers for the Program after key reform recommendations were made by the seminal Justice System Reform Council ('Council') in 2001 (Justice System Reform Council 2001).[5] These drivers are considered further below in the context of the judges' responses to the questionnaire.

As the Program expanded in the 2000s, the Supreme Court sought new partners. The first judge came to Melbourne Law School in June 2003 as a result of the Law School's excellent international reputation and Professor Mal Smith's long-standing personal connections (Steele 2010). Judges are chosen by the Supreme Court based on their application, recommendations from senior colleagues and language test scores. Visiting judges tend to be three to six years into their tenure before undertaking the Program. Judges usually study for a year at the recipient institution, but a small number of judges are eligible for a two-year programme which enables them to enrol in a Masters of Laws (LLM), typically in the United States. The historical focus on the United States is based on America's high standing as an innovative jurisdiction for research and legal developments, its capacity to host many international visitors reflected in so many law schools with high global rankings across a diverse geography, long-standing connections with Japanese professionals forged during and after the Occupation and Japan's geopolitical alliances, and the practical implications for students of law schools which offer 12 month LLM courses which qualify graduates to sit admission exams in key jurisdictions.

During their stay, judges meet with legal professionals. In Melbourne, the interactions often involve complex areas of law and may require language and knowledge mediation by academics or research associates of the Asian Law Centre. Judges attend classes and observe different teaching approaches and styles. Judges also present at least one seminar during their 12 month visit and sometimes mentor students. The scope of the Program from year to year depends on the individual judge's circumstances, including language capacity, family situation and length of judicial experience. Judges receive financial support from the Supreme Court in the form of a return airfare, continuation of salary and payment of any applicable fees.

The financial support and opportunity offered to Japanese government officials for overseas study programmes has been criticised in the Japanese media. The criticism focused on the number of public officials who left their public role during or after their study overseas and moved to a higher-paid position in private industry. The reasons for such criticism were ameliorated somewhat with the introduction of a new law which requires public officials, including judges, to repay any study abroad subsidies if they resign from their public position within five years after finishing the overseas study (*Kokka kōmuin no ryūgaku hiyō no shōkan ni kansuru hōritsu* (Act no. 70, 2006)) (National Personnel Authority 2019). These provisions have been enforced by the Government. More recently, the difficulties faced by elite public officials in Japan are being acknowledged by the media, which may also lessen criticism of overseas' study programmes (Hayashi 2018).

Melbourne Law School judicial alumni: questionnaire responses

On the tenth anniversary of the Program at the Asian Law Centre at Melbourne Law School, alumni judges were asked to respond to a short questionnaire containing about 20 questions presented in Japanese and English about their experiences in Australia.[6] The questionnaire was drafted by the author and distributed and collected by the Supreme Court. Nine out of a possible 11 judges responded in Japanese during the period from August to September 2014. In the free form responses, the judges discussed their personal objectives and motivations for participating in the Program and the perceived impact of the programme. Translations of the responses in this chapter are based on the author's interpretation of the Japanese responses.

The questionnaire responses did not contain the respondent's name, but included details such as gender, current age and workplace location. The questionnaire deliberately did not ask respondents to identify the particular 12 months which they spent in Australia, which would have immediately identified them to the author. Based on the responses, however, it is possible that the author as well as the Supreme Court may be able to attribute a certain response to a particular judge because of historical knowledge of Program participants. From this perspective, the respondents may not have felt comfortable providing overt criticism of the Program. Accordingly, the overwhelmingly positive nature of the responses cannot be interpreted as a comprehensive endorsement of the Program per se. However, there were advantages to administering the questionnaire in this way. The high response rate may be attributed to the Supreme Court's involvement, thus overcoming difficulties in obtaining interview data highlighted by other studies of professional study experiences in Australia (Nicholson and Hinderling 2010). The data collected from participants was also a 'practical corrective' to the author's own observations of the Program (Marginson and Sawir 2005, p. 283).

At the time of responding to the questionnaire, the respondents were aged between 32 and 42 years old with the mean age being 39. Each judge had an undergraduate degree from an elite university such as Chuo, Keio, Kyoto, Osaka, Tokyo or Waseda. None of the respondents had a LLM or PhD degree, but very few Japanese judges have research-intensive qualifications. Eight out of nine judges attributed their English language skills at the time of responding to be at an intermediate level (one claiming beginner status). The options not chosen were: 'excellent' or 'fluent/native'. One respondent was female. Five respondents were accompanied to Australia by their partner or other family. Of those with family, the children were very young. Only one respondent felt that participation in the Program had a negative impact on him financially, explaining that the exchange rate was quite unfavourable at the time (high Australian dollar) and he had the additional expense of his accompanying family (including flights and insurance costs).

The judges' postings on their return to Japan were very diverse and it was not possible to discern any particular patterns. Seven of the nine respondents received metropolitan postings and two respondents received regional postings. The judges' research topics were also diverse and included youth and law, juries, victims of crime, family law, divorce dispute settlement, mediation systems, contract law, administrative law and the refugee recognition system. Further, the responses did not reveal any particular trends based on any gender, university, court or pre-posting position, but the survey pool is arguably too small to reveal such trends even if they existed.

Question Four of the survey asked, 'How was your overall experience in Australia? Why did you choose Australia?' In terms of overall experience, one judge noted the importance of experiencing many things for the first time on both a 'career and personal level'. Two judges commented that the opportunity was valuable because it gave them a chance to meet people from a diverse range of backgrounds and another judge with a similar response valued meeting 'other judges'. Judges are asked to nominate three jurisdictions when they apply for the Program. Some judges responded to Question Four by pointing out that the destinations for the candidates for the Program are ultimately chosen by the Supreme Court and therefore they didn't specify a particular destination but rather stated a category or goal. One candidate, for example, did not want to go to the United States because so many other judges already go there; another three judges expressed a preference to go to an English-language or common law jurisdiction. One judge heard from a senior colleague (*senpai*) who had been on the Program that Melbourne was a great place and Australia offered a diverse legal system with interesting research topics.

Question Six of the questionnaire asked, ‘How do you think your experience in Australia has shaped your career after returning?’ Two judges were unsure whether the experience had any impact and three judges suggested that it was too early to tell yet. One judge suggested that the experience had broadened her/his world view, but the experience hadn’t directly influenced her/his career. One judge commented generally that s/he is able to use the learnings from Australia in her/his current role. Two judges suggested that their subsequent postings were possibly a direct result of their experience in Australia, particularly because of their newly acquired language and cultural skills. At the time of the survey, all returnees were still judges, although some had been seconded to ministries, which is typical of a Japanese, elite judicial career.

Question Seven teased out the issue of learning by asking, ‘What skills did you gain in Australia and how are they being utilised since returning?’ Only one judge noted that s/he didn’t use any particular skills or knowledge from the Program, but her/his English did improve somewhat. Other respondents commented on the improvement to their language, cross-cultural and communication skills. The respondents demonstrated an understanding that communication relates to more than just language capacity. One judge commented that the opportunity to ‘explain Japan’ in Australia required deep reflections about many things s/he previously took for granted. Other judges also suggested that the experience required her/him to think in a ‘global’ way and from a ‘comparative law perspective’. One judge noted that the broader perspective gained from her/his experience in Australia helped when resolving disputes between parties. The concept of ‘broadening’ views and perspectives was a common thread through the majority of responses. Finally, one judge admired the focus on ‘work–life balance’ and family time in Australia and had vowed that he would emulate these approaches on returning to Japan.

Question 13 asked, ‘What improvements would you suggest to the Program?’ Five respondents did not have any suggestions or did not think that the Program required improvement. One judge commented on the need for more time between finding out about being accepted into the Program and the date for departure from Japan to allow for preparation, including obtaining a visa. Another judge also commented on the time it took to obtain a visa. One judge suggested that more time for discussion with (Australian) judges about actual cases would have been beneficial. Another judge suggested that the destinations for exchange to Australia be expanded beyond Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra to other cities. One judge thought that s/he would have gained more from the Program had s/he been more experienced as a Japanese judge before undertaking the Program.

Question 15 asked, ‘Do you still keep in contact with friends or colleagues whom you met in Australia?’ Four respondents simply said that they were still in contact. One judge responded that s/he did keep in contact after returning to Japan, but that the contact had fallen off after a while. Another judge noted that his family was still in contact with friends from his language school and friends that they made as a family. One judge commented that s/he kept in touch mainly through social media such as Facebook, but had also met some people after returning to Japan. One judge noted that s/he still keeps in touch occasionally with a Korean judge who s/he met whilst they were both researching at Melbourne Law School.

International experience: global mobility

These findings offer some preliminary insights for migration and mobility research, especially in the context of higher education which already has a rich literature. In contrast, research on global judicial mobility is not abundant, although in-person judicial exchange occurs at many levels and the impact of those interactions is debated (e.g. Law and Chang 2011).[7] Researchers writing on mobility generally expect that flows of students and academics will lead to the movement of ideas (Neubauer and Kuroda 2012, p. 214). Studies also look for ways to measure the 'value' of international experiences such as generating 'soft power' and influence for donor countries providing scholarship opportunities for students (Purdey 2015), and academics with foreign PhDs improving the ranking of domestic universities through increased international publications and connections (Shin 2012, p. 80). Other studies consider the potential for disruption when foreign academics participate in otherwise domestic institutions (Ma 2012). Furthermore, research on mobility in a higher education context often considers the motivations of students, their expectations and their sense of connection (Missbach and Purdey 2015).

The potential for Japanese judges to facilitate the flow of legal concepts and ideas between Australia and Japan is a tantalising prospect. This flow potentially goes both ways, with Japanese judges making valuable contributions to the Melbourne community through personal contacts with judges, other legal professionals and students. In Japan, Mihira suggests that there has been such 'great change' in the 'normative environment' of the training of the current justices of the Supreme Court when compared to their predecessors that 'there is a good possibility that this change has affected the Court's exercise of judicial review' (2014, p. 185). He notes that justices sitting on the Court up to the early 1990s received their training under the Meiji Constitution prior to the Second World War and concludes that greater 'activism' by the Court is 'not a temporal deviation' due to these developments (2014, pp. 184–185).[8] Two influential Japanese law scholars, Haley and Foote, have also argued that Japanese judges have a central role in the formation and development of law in Japan, including based on experiences from studying overseas (2014, p. 81).

The questionnaire responses suggest that some of the judges are conscious of subtle changes in their perspectives, but it still seems too early in their post-visit careers to identify any specific transfers or application of knowledge gained during their overseas studies. As the judges become more senior, their capacity to influence change may also increase, but it will be difficult to definitively demonstrate a direct causation between international experience and the flow of foreign legal ideas to and from Japan. There are too many other variables, including increased judicial diversity due to the appointment of more female judges, the new legal education system introduced in 2004 and intergenerational changes more generally. The availability of online information for judges and court clerks to obtain information about foreign law is also increasing (Law and Chang 2011, p. 33). Law and Chang also suggest that analysing references or citations in written judgments may not reveal the extent to which judges consider foreign law when deciding a domestic case (2011, pp. 29–33).

Moreover, the objective of the Program is not necessarily for Japanese judges to acquire foreign legal knowledge and ideas, although their regular reports back to the Supreme Court are a tangible way in which information is being transferred to Japan. The goal of the Program today is to expose highly educated legal professionals to non-Japanese experiences and force them out of their educational and professional comfort zones to better equip them for dealing with complex situations. Foreign language acquisition is also just a useful side effect and not the primary goal of the Program. However, the responses suggest that English language capability is highly prized by the judges themselves. Some judges did not mind where they were sent provided that the jurisdiction used English. Language acquisition as a motivation for overseas study also reflects the goals of students documented in higher education literature (Marginson and Sawir 2005, p. 282). Individual students have also been shown to be less focused on technical skill acquisition for economic development, and are more likely to be making a ‘life-situation calculation’ (Neubauer and Kuroda 2012, p. 216).

The goals and desires of international students are becoming increasingly diverse and a great variety of courses and delivery styles are on offer (Neubauer and Kuroda 2012, p. 211). Even amongst the nine respondents to the questionnaire, there was diversity in the judges’ rationales for choosing Australia. One judge wanted to go somewhere not many other judges go, although the reason for this approach was not explained in the response. The judges’ choices are limited by the institutional arrangements established by the Court. The Court’s choice of Melbourne Law School was partly based on personal connections and the Asian Law Centre’s long history of legal scholarship about Japan (Steele 2010). The Court also establishes connections with respected and highly ranked universities where judges will have access to innovative and sophisticated legal thinking.[9] The Court has made efforts to further institutionalise the Program by writing to the Dean as well as the Program’s academic supervisor with a view to ensuring stability even if a particular person leaves. More recently, the Court has been strengthening relationships with other jurisdictions such as Singapore, but usually only with highly ranked, globally recognised institutions based on existing personal connections with established academics.

Administrative obstacles to mobility are another key similarity reflected in the higher education literature and the judges’ responses. Obtaining visas has previously been identified as an obstacle to study in Australia (Marginson and Sawir 2005, p. 299; Neubauer and Kuroda 2012, p. 11). Ma notes that obtaining a visa was also an obstacle to non-Chinese academics working and researching in China (2012, p. 187). Based on feedback from judges and the Asian Law Centre, the Court now notifies successful candidates much earlier than when the Program commenced to give them more time to obtain relevant documentation and apply for visas. Other obstacles to the success of any particular judge's stay include language and cultural barriers, which depend on issues such as English capacity on arrival, and differences in status because Australian judges are much older and more experienced than the Japanese judges. Despite these obstacles, the questionnaire responses suggest that Japanese judges find their own ways to stay connected, including through social media and in-person visits, but the quality of any professional interaction after they return to Japan is not clear.

Training for judges: lessons for other jurisdictions?

Judges need to develop new skills and knowledge to meet changing societal needs and effectively cooperate across borders. The content, timing and funding of training for judges is controversial, however, and inextricably linked to the issue of demonstrating relevancy and thus legitimacy of a judicial system (Piana *et al.* 2013, p. 3). The Program offers some insights for other jurisdictions looking for ways to train judges and demonstrate relevancy. Some influential commentators maintain that judges are extremely well respected in Japan (Haley 2008; Haley and Foote 2014). However, judges were included in the general criticism of the legal profession by the Justice System Reform Council in 2001. The Council suggested that the judiciary was out of touch with public expectations: the competitive Japanese national bar examination and career judiciary created judges without broad experience and community understanding. Other commentators are even more pointed in their criticism of the Japanese judiciary. Fukurai, for example, blames Japanese judges for failing to challenge Japanese prosecutors, thus leading to an unhealthy reliance on confessions in criminal proceedings (2013, pp. 537–538). He is also critical of the centralising control of the Supreme Court's General Secretariat which controls promotions, tenure and transfers, as well as the lack of diversity and life-experience amongst judges.[10]

The dramatic increase in the number of judges studying overseas on the Program in the 2000s coincided with increasingly vocal criticism of the judicial system. The Program has become part of the Court's efforts to address community criticism. The cost involved in emulating the Program is likely to be prohibitive for many developing countries, however, unless aid is available for scholarships. Moreover, the 'hierarchy of the exchange' taking place is an important contextual difference between the Program and programmes supported by donor legal aid (Gillespie and Nicholson 2012). The Japanese judges are going to another developed and mature legal system in Australia. They are primarily interested in learning about Australian law to supplement and develop their own understanding of Japan, which is also a sophisticated and mature legal system. This contextual difference also impacts on the goals and nature of the subject matter studies. The Supreme Court is primarily interested in judges gaining 'soft' skills; whereas a key goal of other judicial exchange is the transfer of black letter law concepts and systems. The incursions and investigations during the Program are driven by the Japanese judges and the Supreme Court, not donors or foreign investor needs (Gillespie and Nicholson 2012).

In Japan, the government continues to pay for the training of judges on the Program. The judges' responses suggest that most visitors do not experience a negative financial impact as a result of participating in the Program. Visiting judges and the Court are extremely conscious that public funds are being expended, sometimes leading to interesting outcomes such as trying to source cheap indirect airfares between Australia and Japan. The use of this existing mechanism of 'sending out' contrasts with responses in South Korea, where criticism of the judiciary led to the whole appointment process for judges being radically reformed in 2007. Judicial candidates must now complete a certain period of time in private legal practice, thus also shifting the cost of training judges more to individual candidates and the profession (Supreme Court of Korea 2019). Japan has an ancillary system for taking in judges with ex-judicial career experience, but only a few candidates have ever been appointed using this path. There may also be other ways to establish a judiciary with broader life experiences. The criteria for becoming a judge, for example, could include an exchange overseas or minimum foreign language competency. The potential for adverse consequences for candidates who may not have had the financial means or opportunity to study overseas is one disadvantage of such market-based approaches. Large private law firms in Japan also sponsor young lawyers to train overseas, acknowledging that most lawyers do not have time during their studies to experience life outside Japan if they want to pass the applicable competitive examinations.[11]

Finally, the career judiciary in Japan makes the Program possible in a way that the system of post-lawyering judicial career appointments in jurisdictions such as Australia may not. The Australian judiciary is not immune to criticisms of being out of touch with community expectations and some courts have adopted short-term overseas visits and sabbatical experiences at law schools to facilitate different learning experiences. However, even in Japan, the mix of judicial professionals and training options is impacted by the workload and demographic shape of the judiciary. At the time of finalising this chapter, the Supreme Court has requested that Melbourne Law School receive a court clerk rather than a judge annually from 2021 to reduce the number of judges studying overseas at any one time. It appears that as the Japanese judiciary ages and older judges retire, it has become difficult to have so many judges posted overseas at any one time whilst also meeting caseloads and other work priorities. This change also provides more training opportunities for clerks, who traditionally have received only very limited opportunities to study overseas compared to judges.

Conclusion: mobility and judicial training

This chapter's analysis of responses from Japanese judicial alumni who have studied at Melbourne Law School offers a case study for global mobility studies which demonstrates the possibility of facilitating the flow of legal knowledge and practices. After more than a decade, however, it is still too early to identify any concrete examples of a direct impact on the careers or approaches of Japanese judicial alumni from the Program. The judges' responses to the questionnaire tend to reflect the Supreme Court's normative stance that judges develop broader life experiences through the Program. This finding reflects global mobility research. The extent to which these experiences may help to directly overcome criticism of the Japanese judiciary, however, is likely to remain unclear and difficult to demonstrate empirically. The cost of such programmes – personally and institutionally – is also underscored by the criticism of publicly-funded study overseas and the difficulty in assessing the impact of such study abroad programmes. The future changes to the Program, which will accept court clerks from 2021, also highlight the institutional constraints of the Program. By evidencing these advantages and disadvantages, however, this analysis of the Program provides a useful case study from Japanese studies for other jurisdictions – a key goal of this collection.

Notes

1 This project was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee, University of Melbourne (Ethics ID: 1341334.1). This chapter reflects the author's personal opinions. Statements do not represent the views or policies of the author's employers, past or present, or any other organisation with which the author is affiliated.
2 The Program also involves sending a small number of court clerks overseas and the Court provides opportunities for judges to work at private law firms and companies. The Supreme Court also supports ad hoc short-term overseas visits (one week to one month) depending on budgets and research priorities. Over ten judges visited Melbourne before the implementation of the *saiban-in* (lay judge) system in May 2009, for example.
3 More recently, the Supreme Court's budget has been under increasing strain.
4 For example, electronic filing, sentencing approaches and judicial salaries. The content, frequency and detail of the reports depend on the individual judge and the Court's needs.
5 On the impact of the Recommendations on the judiciary, see Mihira (2014). On 'internationalisation' and Japanese legal education, see Fukui and Steele (2014).
6 A copy of the questionnaire is held by the author. This chapter focuses on responses to key questions due to limited space.
7 Other examples of global judicial mobility include the foreign judges on commercial courts in Singapore and Hong Kong.
8 Rather than 'activism' phrases such as 'creation of norms' and 'policy making' may be more useful in understanding trends such as the Tokyo District Court's work at the turn of the century to improve the administration of insolvency cases (Haley and Foote 2014, pp. 108–109).
9 On the hierarchy of higher education, see Marginson (2006).
10 Retired and serving judges have also criticised the power of the Supreme Court of Japan over judges. See Segi (2014) and Okaguchi (2018), respectively. Judge Okaguchi is a controversial figure who has been reprimanded by the Supreme Court for anonymous tweets about his own decision. See also Nishikawa (2017) who analyses the background of Japanese justices and comments on the increasing number of female judges.
11 On the disadvantages of Japan's national bar examination, see Steele and Petridis (2014).

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14 'Life could not be better since I left Japan!'

Transnational mobility of Japanese individuals to Europe and the post-Fordist quest for subjective well-being outside Japan

Susanne Klien

> I really am a (male) housewife.
>
> (*Ore, hontō ni shufu dakara*) (M, 38)

> Wanting to leave something behind in a meaningless life.
>
> (*Nanka nokoshitai, muimi na jinsei ni ha*) (M, 38)

> I think I would have died if I had stayed in Japan.
>
> (*Nihon ni zutto itara shinun ja nai ka to omotte*) (F, 47)

These are three statements from interviews conducted with Japanese expatriates in Europe between 2015 and 2017. The Lehman Shock, the Great East Japan Earthquake and increasingly precarious labour regimes have resulted in rising numbers of Japanese individuals questioning conventional forms of corporate working and living (Nishimura 2009; Klien 2015, 2016). This ethnographic study explores the motives of Japanese individuals in their 30s and 40s who have relocated to Europe for non-economic reasons. Generally defined as 'lifestyle migrants' (Benson and O'Reilly 2009), they tend to opt for self-created work in the creative sector. The chapter aims to examine the changes individuals experienced as a result of their relocation, their social life and sense of belonging, and their mid- and long-term plans.

Data were compiled from over 20 semi-structured interviews and participant observation conducted in Austria, Germany and Portugal between December 2015 and September 2017. The empirical data presented here show that motives are diverse, but Japanese migrants tend to relocate for reasons of self-growth, inspiration and change. Lifestyle migrants generally aspire to non-normative life courses; however, their narratives indicate that resistance to mainstream values features side by side with the perpetuation of societal norms. On the one hand, interviewees express high satisfaction with their daily lives. Yet, having eschewed or relinquished stable careers in lifelong employment and familial engagement, they also mention their sense of liminality, precariousness, disengagement and pressure to turn their lives overseas into a success.

So how are these individual trajectories relevant in a larger context? The theme of this volume is ‘new frontiers’ in Japanese Studies. I argue that in order to extend Japan’s relevance beyond area studies, transcending its geographical boundaries is an option of vital importance. Classical scholarship in Japanese studies has always been concerned with bounded entities both in geographical and other senses – just think of John Embree’s analysis of *Suye Mura* (1939) or Ruth Benedict’s seminal study *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946) on the ‘national character’ of the Japanese. They perpetuated bounded entities, otherness, ‘national essence’. More recently, however, scholarship that includes Japan but also transcends it has gained significant traction. Lieba Faier’s (2009) fascinating ethnography of Filipina women in rural Japan, Sawa Kurotani’s (2005) study of Japanese corporate wives in the United States, Mitch Sedgwick’s (2007) ethnography of Japanese corporate employees living in France, Ayako Suzuki’s (2015) ethnography of male Japanese expatriates in Ireland and Shiori Shakuto’s (2017) research into Japanese retirees in Malaysia are some examples.

Jennifer Robertson has previously pointed out that anthropologists ‘in general do not regard Japan as a geographical “prestige zone”; that is, unlike Bali or Morocco or the Andes, or Oaxaca, Mexico – they do not regard Japan as a cultural area of choice and theoretical cachet’ (2005, p. 4). Given this history of anthropological disinterest in Japan as a field, I propose to shift more attention to communities with ‘porous and often-contested boundaries’ (Sedgwick 2017, p. 66) such as Japanese expatriate networks. Sedgwick observes that ‘anthropology has splintered, as have forms of fieldwork: There is little agreement as to what now constitutes a proper site for anthropological research’ (2017, p. 65). I propose to perceive this methodological vacuum as a positive momentum to rethink the overall thrust of Japanese Studies.

This transnational angle in researching Japanese settlers abroad helps to transcend and simultaneously re-sharpen the focus on Japan. Such a perspective contextualises Japan in a wider, i.e. global, context and helps us to analyse universal issues including theoretical concerns that dislocate it from sedentary and essentialist discourse frequently found in area studies. Bruno Latour (2005, p. 204) argues, ‘No place dominates enough to be global and no place is self-contained enough to be local’. Circulation, mobility and locality are not necessarily dichotomies. Drawing on Latour, Anna Tsing and Deirdre McKay, I would like to propose a deterritorialised understanding of place/Japan. Both Latour (2005) and Tsing (2005) did not distinguish between the global and the local. Importantly, Doreen Massey (1994, p. 4) indicated that localities include ‘relations which stretch beyond the global as part of what constitutes the local’. McKay (2006, p. 201) argued for an ongoing importance of locality in a sense of being ‘place-based, without being place-bound’. All this leads us to an understanding of the field as no longer spatially defined (Sedgwick 2007, 2017) and an understanding of fields/Japan as interconnected rather than something to be approached as a discrete entity, as argued by Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992, p. 6). Coining the concept of multi-sited ethnography, George Marcus

(1995, p. 1) called for an end to ‘the single sites and local situations of conventional ethnographic research designs to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects and identities in diffuse time-space’. In so doing he paved the way for contemporary transnational ethnographic research.

Aihwa Ong (2006, p. 121) states that mobilities have ‘become a new code word for grasping the global’ and the novel lifestyles that have emerged. In Japan, this lifestyle change is happening both through mobility from Japan to countries abroad and urban to rural relocation. These individuals predominantly pursue lifestyles that do not involve conventional employment (*tsutomenai to iu ikikata*, Mori 2011) in the sense of being a fully fledged member of (adult) society (*shakaijin*). By comparing Japanese individuals from diverse professional backgrounds in different cultural contexts, this chapter aims to scrutinise how ‘Japanese identities’ are negotiated in expatriate contexts. The narratives introduced in this chapter are based on fieldwork conducted in March 2016 in Berlin, Vienna (March to November 2016) and Lisbon (September 2017). I will now introduce three individual narratives of Japanese expatriates and follow up with a discussion.

Case 1: the ‘professional unemployed’ and personal fulfilment

Aki, 38 years old and originally from Tokyo, is a close friend of one of my best Japanese friends when I was living in Berlin back in the early 2000s so we have known each other for many years. He moved to Berlin in 2007. He was attracted to the city because he got the impression that it was a place that is still under construction and Berlin’s ongoing change would be an incentive for him to change. In Tokyo, he got the sense that the city lacked inspiration because it was already complete. When he first went to Berlin, there was a party in a shared flat every single night so one could always get free food – ‘the ideal socialist life’ as he comments with a laugh.

Aki has his own record label, makes his own music (house) and works as a DJ in Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam, London and other places in Europe. Having studied contemporary music at university in Tokyo, he worked as a company employee for a private TV station. However, he dropped out after two years as he was confident that he would have a successful career and felt that the long-term challenge was insufficient. With a smile he observes that ‘If I had stayed in Japan, I would probably have married a girl I met at a matchmaking party (*gōkon*), work as a salaryman and have two kids now.’ Instead, he shares a flat in a former East-Berlin district, is single and does not work except for occasional jobs as a DJ. Only recently has he managed to make a living as a DJ. He gets his clothes from his friends in Tokyo because he does not want to spend money on anything but records. He also says that he has never bought any furniture, all pieces in his flat are recycled items. Half of his friends are Japanese, half are German.

He describes himself as ‘a professional unemployed’ (*pro no mushoku*) who enjoys spending extended hours at home, shopping consciously for discounted food and preparing various meals, like a housewife. Aki says he is 100 per cent satisfied with his life, only wishing he had more money. From Monday to Wednesday he is mostly free, reads books and manga, cooks, goes to clubs and makes his own tracks in his studio. As a corporate employee in Japan, he was only sleeping some three to four hours per night and typically catching up on sleep during the weekend. Now he sleeps ten hours every night during the week when he does not work behind the turntables.

Aki seems happy because he lives a life that he has chosen for himself and his work matches his interest. In Japan, DJing is not a recognised professional activity, but Berlin has many DJs covering a panoply of musical genres. When I ask him about his long-term purpose in life, he says that he wants to keep on moving around in Europe as he does presently. He observes that he thinks he has not changed much, but is thinking more carefully about what environment he chooses to be active in. According to Aki, in order to grow he feels that it is most important to be in an environment where he can compete with like-minded peers in a fair manner. As for risk, he posits that he has a persistent sense of insecurity and restlessness, but considers the risk involved in his lifestyle as the other side of the coin of having opted for the life he likes to live. While Aki's trajectory runs contrary to conventional postwar aspirations in Japan to notions such as safety through affiliation and rooted place that constitute 'a sedentarist metaphysics' to borrow Lisa Malkki's (1992) term, his everyday life such as his pronounced domesticity seems highly sedentary, implying the coexistence of sedentary and nomadic lifestyle features in one and the same individual trajectory. This finding is also commensurate with Kurotani's notion of 'dwelling while travelling' (2005, p. 152), which she developed in her ethnography of Japanese corporate wives in the United States. Aki's narrative also suggests that Berlin offers the chance to pursue more diverse lifestyles than in Japan – a finding that also featured in other interviews with LGBT Japanese expatriates. He describes Japan as rigidly normative with regard to gender as a country that continues to be based on the male breadwinner model. His narrative and lifestyle indicate a yearning to overcome this normatively prescribed gender role of males focused on work and females supporting males in the domestic sphere: after all, he jokes about himself being a male housewife; he shares his flat with a male, is not married and does not have any offspring.

Case 2: 'Wanting to leave something behind in a meaningless life'

Rei is an emerging conceptual artist with an elite background. I meet up with Rei in his wife's café in Neukoelln, an area that has turned from a shabby district with a considerable share of Turkish residents in south Berlin to the embodiment of hipsterdom within a few years due to the massive influx of creative migrants from across the world – an area that may now qualify as what Sassen (1998, p. xxxiii) referred to as an 'urban glamour zone'. Several years ago, I visited Rei's studio with a common friend. Now 38, he has had a fast-paced career since that time: several solo shows, residencies and group exhibitions in top international galleries and triennials. I ask him about his reasons for staying in Berlin for so long. He replies that he is originally from west Japan and if he had stayed there he would not have any incentive to move on and grow as an artist. He uses the term '*miyako-ochi*' (having to leave the capital to live in the countryside due to professional failure). We talk about the pervasive centrality of Tokyo in Japan's power relations that determine artist careers. He remarks that if he had chosen to remain in Japan, his career would not have evolved in the way it has. When I joke that he has really moved on career-wise using the word 'shusse' (literally: moving out into the world), he shakes his head saying that he is really at the bottom of society and realised so when he met up with his former schoolmates who all have stable incomes as corporate workers. When they heard about his professional activities as an artist, the only comment they had about his lifestyle was 'You are doing art? Can you make a living from that?' Rei's deliberations tinged with jealousy about the stable livelihood and disinterest in this lifestyle illustrate the concomitant elements of relations and disengagement.

He wishes he could have a factory style studio, and his dream would be to have assistants working for him and to show works at representative art fairs. When I ask about his parents' reactions to him living abroad for so many years he says that they do not understand the meaning of his relocation. He sarcastically claims that he has already died for them and the dog they keep has the same name as him. Rei observes that the next couple of years are going to show whether he is going to make it as an artist. Interestingly, he states that those people not making it on the market end up in university and in Japan. He would like to return to Japan (after all, he has so many friends there) but if he manages to carve out a successful career as an artist for himself, he will not go back to Japan. On the contrary, he says that he is reluctant to reside in the same place. He says that living in Berlin allows him to make the works he really wants to, something that would have been impossible in Japan. He observes that he would have made certain works catered to certain people.

Rei presents himself as the sore thumb sticking out in Japan's harmonised society. Yet he concedes that he is maintaining relations with the Japanese university he graduated from. Still, he turned down an offer as a temporary lecturer as he preferred to stay in Berlin. If he does not manage to assert himself as an artist, he needs to rely on this network. He adds 'If I do not manage to be successful, it's going to be dreadful, in that case, there is no other option but die' (interview on 5 March 2016). He also mentions that his failure would be a major hassle for his family.

Despite his long expatriate career, Rei frequently refers to Japanese society during our interview and engages with his German surroundings to a limited extent, yet aspires to a global career as a contemporary artist. His narrative is clearly split between radical depreciation of Japanese conventions and behaviour that seems deeply ingrained with Japanese norms. On the one hand his narrative is permeated by an aspiration to transcend Japan in everyday life and with regard to his career. Yet, he admits with a chuckle that one of his happiest moments is eating sushi at a Japanese restaurant in downtown Berlin with his family every other Sunday. And finally, his family follows the classic Japanese model of father as male breadwinner and mother in a supporting role as his wife graduated from the same art university, but renounced her career as an artist. Yet, they differ from the prototype as Rei's wife has pursued her entrepreneurial ambitions by starting a café with a French friend.

Case 3: 'I think I would have died if I had stayed in Japan'

Mai is an acquaintance of a German friend of mine and I have met her before our interview, if briefly. Born in 1975, Mai grew up in Roppongi, Tokyo. Her grandparents were Chinese immigrants from the Shanghai area. From our first encounter, I get a sense of her mental strength and spirit of resistance that has resulted from her multilayered identity. Her main incentive to move to Germany was to do arts. She had initially wanted to go to London or New York but figured out that she did not have the funds to live there. After finishing her undergraduate studies at a fine art university in Tokyo and half a year of study exchange at Duesseldorf Art Academy she decided to relocate to Germany. In retrospect, after her move to Germany she did not really face any difficulties when settling in as people say clearly what they think and she gets a sense of what people drive at. She has always felt ill at ease with what she calls 'Eastern communication', concluding rather radically that she thinks 'she would have died had she chosen to remain in Japan'. When she goes back to Japan now, she feels surveilled and pressured to adapt in various ways.

As a result of her move to Berlin she can focus on making art. She mentions that her art would not be well received in Japan. There would be little relevance or impact. She implies that the social criticism embodied in her work is simply not well received in Japan and that is why there is no point for her to be active as an artist in her home country. After moving to Germany and coming back to Japan for short periods, she noticed how androcentric Japanese society was. Her life clearly revolves around art; she concedes that artists tend to be self-centred. Coming from an affluent family, she has bought her own flat in Berlin and intends to spend the rest of her life there, although she concedes that being perceived as the eternal foreigner is challenging at times. Yet, when I invite her to come along to a gathering of long-term Japanese residents living in Berlin on the anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake, she vehemently declines, adding that she does not wish to join any social networks of Japanese expatriates in her chosen place of residence. Clearly, she wishes to avoid any contact with other Japanese living in Berlin.

Discussion

Even if my interlocutors differ in their motivations, careers and quotidian routines, there are some recurring features that can be teased out from their diverse trajectories. First, these individuals in their 30s and early 40s are completely immersed in their work, which matches their interest. Even if Aki does not work for half of the week, the work he does is music related, hence personally inspirational. He has evidently made a conscious lifestyle choice with all the risks this choice entails. Rei clearly has been taking a high-risk gamble to become a contemporary artist in the global scene and is completely immersed in his career. He cannot think of any disadvantages resulting from his move abroad. For Mai, there seems no viable alternative to pursuing her career as an artist in Germany due to the specificity of her artworks. Second, all the narratives of my interlocutors are characterised by a lack of long-term planning, but high satisfaction with their present life due to self-determination in the way they spend their time. Third, most migrants refer to a heightened sense of self-responsibility related to their aspiration to assert themselves in the global arena. Evidently, this drive to be a global player inevitably entails high pressure, but results in a more distinct vision and drive. This in turn translates into to a greater sense of independence with regard to less concern about what others think. Many settlers also broached differences in communication, with more open and egalitarian exchange being mentioned as common in Germany versus a lack of straightforward communication in Japan seen as a drawback by all interviewees. Rather than self-search stories (Kato 2010, 2015), these young expatriate Japanese have relocated to do what they want. These narratives and trajectories show that 'mobility has become ordinary in the emerging global order' (Robins 2000, p. 196).

So what do these narratives tell us about the relevance of the much debated notion of culture? Migrants certainly refer strongly to their past which has been shaped by their cultural environment. All three migrants connote Japan in negative terms, depicting Japanese culture as constraining. Aki observes that he would have ended up as a salaryman with a conventional lifestyle had he remained in Japan. His statement that he aims to compete fairly with his peers suggests that social relations in Japan make self-development through conflict and discussion difficult; Rei presents himself as the sore thumb sticking out, referring to Japan as a context that embodies comfort, but leads to a lack of inspiration and self-development due to lack of competition; Mai even says that she would have died if she had remained. Yet, their daily routines and trajectories suggest a post-cultural identity as these individuals seeking to achieve professional recognition beyond Japan identify more strongly with global activities that could be situated almost anywhere in the world. None of these migrants has plans to go back to Japan, stating that even if they miss their friends and family, their professional ambitions are higher on their agenda and they feel that Japan does not offer a stimulating environment for them.

These narratives suggest that just as Gupta and Ferguson observed previously, 'actual places and localities become ever more blurred and indeterminate, ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct places become perhaps even more salient' (1992, p. 10). In reality, the 'Japan' Aki is talking about refers to downtown Tokyo (*shitamachi*), while Rei refers to his hometown Hiroshima when talking about his 'Japan' and Mai to uptown Roppongi in Tokyo. Even 'Tokyo' means totally different things to my interlocutors. So, on the one hand, 'imagined communities', to borrow Benedict Anderson's (1983) paradigm, continue to exert excessive power; yet most of my interviewees engage in activities that have little relation to Japan and are contextualised in a setting that has little to do with Japan.

Second, the study showcases the emergence of lifestyles that unite work and leisure in novel ways (Klien 2015) that often include 'living in a manner that involves living for oneself' (*jibun wo ikashite ikiru*) (Nishimura 2009) spanning regions and continents. Pursuing a career that is not only financially sustainable but also personally fulfilling is without any doubt a worthwhile enterprise. However, the entrepreneurial undertakings of the individuals described above show that their efforts for personal fulfilment are based on well-reflected acts of choice. As Rose (1992, p. 142) argued, the self of individuals means

> to aspire to autonomy, it is to strive for personal fulfilment in its earthly life, it is to interpret its reality and destiny as matters of individual responsibility, it is to find meaning in existence by shaping its life through acts of choice.

And not surprisingly, the self is intricately entangled in its social surroundings.

What strikes me as worth noting is the fact that some migrants have mastered the German language and are well integrated with local communities (like Aki and Mai) while others make little effort to engage with their German surrounding beyond the minimum extent necessary (Rei). Aspiring to a career in the global art scene does not necessarily involve day-to-day dealings with the German environment, as shown in the case of Rei. Beyond the fact that migrants mention mostly negative aspects of Japanese society they prefer to avoid by having little contact with other Japanese expats, culture seems to have little impact or relevance in their everyday lives. Interestingly, while some Japanese expatriates continue to refer to Japanese social relations (like Rei and Mai), they do not explicitly refer to their Japanese identity in their professional work as they aim for careers in the global nexus. Clifford has argued that 'mobility is always a supplement; roots always preceded routes' (1997, p. 3).

Whereas the migrants presented in this study show that practices of displacement are constitutive of cultural meanings in the sense that, yes, culture as the production and circulation of meaning has certainly shaped these individuals previously, their present lives and activities seem to have emancipated themselves from the paradigm of culture. Previous studies of Japanese expatriates have claimed that 'there is a particular way for Japanese to live in NYC, including the kinds of work to find, places to live, things to do, means of striving and connecting, and techniques for representing one's experiences back home' (Kanzaki 2014, p. 53). Yet the interviewees depicted above and others I encountered during fieldwork in Berlin deviated from such patterns of homogeneity as migrants in Berlin tended to be excessively individualist, radically devoted to pursuing what they regarded as useful and strategic for the pursuit of careers in the global arena and altogether disinterested in what others thought of them.

However, somewhat paradoxically, common references to their homeland and Japanese norms were pervasive. On the one hand, they proudly discuss their decision to leave Japan. On the other hand, the majority of Japanese settlers keep looking back to their home country by referring to it in multiple ways, be it by regularly visiting Japanese restaurants in their new places of residence, by returning to Japan once in a while, by reading Japanese manga regularly or by interacting with Japanese friends in their new residences and/or back in Japan. The trajectories of migrants featured in this chapter indicate a fuzzy confluence of nomadism and rootedness, adaptation and resistance, blending in and opting out. Their narratives are permeated with a mix of social engagement and dislocation, vibrant aspiration and inherent resignation. Some have made grand decisions to turn themselves into successful artists, and they are without doubt doing their utmost to make their dreams happen. Yet, some concede that they cannot help thinking about a scenario in which they should not be successful. All three migrants equal their new home with a better life, more meaningful career and self-growth.

All in all, narratives and participant observation confirm Elliott's and Urry's argument that 'living a mobile life is, to be sure, a mixed blessing' (2010, p. x). The yearning for a better, professionally more challenging and personally more meaningful life concurs with a persistent sense of risk and the fear of failure. Oral narratives and quotidian practices of my expatriate collaborators suggest an uneasy coexistence of relief and aspiration about the new life with less social constraints and various pressures, including the ambition to succeed, financial issues and the pressure of being constantly stigmatised as the foreigner, to name but a few. The ways Japanese expatriates cope with these pressures vary: some denigrate anything related to Japan, some celebrate their regular familial outings to Japanese restaurants, some seem to engage in unnuanced representations of Japan and their second homes as binaries, with Japan being their last-resort option. Yet, ironically, their narratives indicate a multilayered enmeshment of multiple cultural contexts.

This raises the question whether the time has finally come to critically rethink the clichéd idea of a bounded 'Japanese culture,' notions of certain patterns of behaviour and stereotypes and the concomitant essentialist fetishisation of difference. Traphagan (2013, p. 23) has poignantly observed that:

> In one sense, there is no such thing as 'Japanese culture'; but there is a sense in which many Japanese people, under certain circumstances, tend to interpret their surroundings in similar ways and construct their worlds on the basis of assumptions about what is natural and normal behavior.

However, the three migrants discussed in this chapter illustrate that 'Japan' is a minimal vector tying these individuals together. Coming from highly diverse sociocultural backgrounds and places in Japan, these expatriates ultimately harbour totally different notions of Japan. Home for Aki is densely populated Akihabara in the north part of Tokyo, which is now known for its spreading maid cafés. Mai comes from a posh southern district of the Japanese capital, whereas Rei is from western Japan, but has pursued his studies in Tokyo. Their motives are vastly different as well, although they all are aspiring to self-employment in the creative sector.

I would like to close this chapter by arguing that these trajectories can be seen as critical junctures to epistemologically approach Japan differently, i.e. by sharpening the ethnographic focus on Japan through a departure from its perception as a bounded geographical entity. Yijiang Zhong (2017, p. 113) has described Japanese Studies – the 'studies of Japan both outside and within Japan' – as 'a possibility of the formation of a consciousness and mode of knowledge that go beyond the horizon of the nation, which is a potential likely to be realised in the practice of an emerging global academia'.

I would like to reiterate the call for a fresh transnational and cosmopolitan ethnographic lens on Japan by dislocating Japanese Studies from its lingering – and in my eyes anachronistic – fixation with national boundaries as ontological disciplinary core and convert rituals of essentialist Othering into practices of universal relevance beyond the discipline of area studies. Freeman (2014, p. 10) brilliantly argues that

> The anthropologist is primed to observe and explain what is different, but she is less well trained to interpret phenomena that look and sound familiar. The challenge before us is to resist the numbness and unease that emerges from apparent similitude.

This discomfort, evidently, also holds true for area specialists: claiming difference used to be the ultimate goal rather than unearthing similarities. This is why binaries continue to be prevalent to this very day. The research of communities that are porous in multiple ways may offer the urgently needed push for area experts engaging in the study of Japan towards the systemic analysis of similitude, be it apparent or real.

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Part IV

The environment

15 Japan’s environmental injustice paradigm and transnational activism

Simon Avenell

Existing research has provided excellent national histories of industrial pollution and the domestic environmental movement in Japan, particularly during the era of high-speed economic growth from the mid-1950s until around the early 1970s (Walker 2011). Until very recently, however, we have known very little about the regional and global ramifications of Japan’s pollution experience and the transnational reach of the country’s environmental activists and movements. Part of the reason for this lacuna arguably stems from the very nature of the enterprise of so-called ‘Japanese Studies’ as it developed in the post-Second World War era under the shadow of the Cold War. Like all of the other fields of Area and Asian Studies, Japanese Studies has fostered a particular way of knowing about Japan through the lens of American power. On an ideological level, American influence in postwar East Asia has operated through the careful cultivation of nationalisms in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and elsewhere, arguably at the expense of allowing people in these nations to freely construct their identity as inhabitants of a shared East Asian region (Sakai and Yoo 2012, p. 5). Instead, we have witnessed an obdurate interlocking of Pax Americana, East Asian nationalisms and, relevant here, intellectual pursuits such as Japanese Studies.

In terms of pursuing the ‘new frontiers’ championed by this volume, there is probably value in thinking about how this framework of knowledge production has shaped and continues to shape *what we know* and *how we know* about Japan. It also prompts us to think about ways of opening up the field to other voices and to border-crossing or even borderless perspectives. From the standpoint of Japanese history (although the observation probably applies to other disciplines), we might reflect on aspects of methodological nationalism. For instance, how has a tight focus on producing national history helped to reinforce the separation of Japan from its region as well as Japanese mythologies of monoethnicity: in other words, the foreign gaze inadvertently authenticating native essentialisms?

Faced with this intellectual condition, one possible new frontier might be to better embed the study of Japan in sub-regional (i.e. East Asia), regional (Asia) and global contexts in order to uncover previously obscured perspectives and ways of knowing Japan and, moreover, as a way of understanding other non-Japanese histories which are inclusive of Japan or Japanese influence. This would mean repositioning and reconsidering subjects that may not immediately appear to be entangled in these wider contexts in order to see what new knowledge about Japan might be possible. To be sure, in any attempt to overcome the ideological and methodological limitations of Japanese Studies we must be vigilant to avoid the allure of erecting new essentialisms like ‘global Japan’ or ‘New Asianisms’. We must also take care not to erroneously demonise studies whose scalar focus is the nation and below. The point is to *expand* and *enhance* our field of vision, not to craft or endorse new or refurbished ideologies.

The environment and environmentalism appear to be promising lines of inquiry for charting such new frontiers in Japanese Studies in at least two ways. First, we might ask what can be learned from Japan’s environmental history for ourselves and for the world. More specifically, how might knowledge of Japan’s experience with industrial pollution and other environmental challenges enrich our understanding of these issues within our own backyards and globally? Japan, after all, is one of the few countries to have experienced both an industrial pollution ‘nightmare’ and a pollution clean-up ‘miracle’ – all in the past half century. It is among the few unfortunate countries to have suffered a catastrophic nuclear power plant disaster involving reactor meltdowns and serious environmental contamination. Moreover, we can also ask how the recent history of environmental activism in Japan might shed light on the link – or disconnect – between local interest and global responsibility in an age of borderless environmental problems.

Second, looking back towards Japan, an environmentalist perspective can help us formulate new questions about Japan in order to know the country in novel ways. For instance, we can enrich historiography on Japan by investigating previously ignored ‘transnational’ and ‘global’ aspects of modern Japanese environmental activism in order to understand the country’s environmental interconnectedness to its regional Asian and Pacific neighbours and also further afield. As I have shown elsewhere (Avenell 2013, 2017) and discuss further below, studying Japan’s recent environmental history reveals fascinating processes of ‘grassroots regionalisation’ and ‘grassroots globalisation’ operating as formative elements in the postwar Japanese environmental movement and, more broadly, in Japanese civic movements and civil society. It also reveals Japan and Japanese activists as influential actors in regional and global environmental developments.

East Asia, for example, has served as both a geographical space in which Japanese activists have operated from the late 1960s onward, as well as a conduit through which these groups have come into contact with emergent global norms and discourses about human rights, gender, minority rights, environmental protection, human security and grassroots development. Importantly, regionally active Japanese groups subsequently injected such learned norms and discourses back into the activist community in Japan, enriching and growing domestic civil society in ways otherwise impossible. Moreover, Japanese activists have been prominent on an international stage – for instance, their energetic participation at United Nations conferences such as the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 or, more broadly, in the human rights revolution of the past 50 or so years. I suggest that these border-crossing experiences of Japanese environmental activists have arguably shaped the ideational and structural development of civil society in postwar Japan as much as other factors like the activist state or domestic historical contingencies (Pharr 2003; Avenell 2010).

In short, focusing on Japanese environmental history transnationally clearly evidences how the global, the regional, the national and the local have been inseparably intertwined, and how omitting any scale of analysis necessarily omits critical aspects of this history. Oxymoronic as it may seem then, one departure point for producing new knowledge on Japan may lie precisely in a conceptual liquification of the rigid borders of the country and an embrace of regional and global perspectives. Below I briefly outline a model for this kind of perspective based on the case of the environment and environmental activism in Japan over the past half century or so, but many other perspectives are possible. The example of the environment, at least, evidences how the historical record supports – almost demands – such a conceptual reorientation.

Environmental injustice at home

Consider again the key methodological-interpretive question raised above: what becomes visible by investigating transnational aspects of Japanese environmental activism from the late 1960s onwards? At least three new insights, I believe. First, we witness how Japanese movements' and activists' influence has spread beyond the archipelago. They have been knowledge producers, intermediaries and actors in both regional and global environmental initiatives. In particular, the experience of widespread industrial pollution in 1960s Japan gave birth to a strong protest movement centred on environmental justice. In turn, Japanese activists took this movement for justice to the world, informed by what I call their 'environmental injustice paradigm' (Avenell 2017, pp. 3–5).

Second, beyond the narrow scope of the environment, transnational environmental activism has been critical in shaping approaches and understandings of (East) Asia within Japan. It was a method by which progressives reengaged with Asia in the wake of colonial empire and militarism. Apart from a brief flurry with Asian and Third World nationalism in the 1950s, for almost two decades after the war's end progressive activists paid little or no attention to the region and Japan's unresolved historical transgressions therein. A single-minded commitment to rebuilding democracy at home played a role in this neglect, as too did an almost-neurotic preoccupation with American influence in the country. In the midst of this mindset, it was the antipollution and anti-Vietnam War movements of the 1960s that really brought Asia back on to the progressive radar screen in a concrete way. Moreover, following in the footsteps of the environmental movement, from the 1970s onwards we also see a veritable wave of new border-crossing initiatives relating to gender, minorities, democratisation and grassroots economic development (Avenell 2018). In this sense the environmental movement was a trailblazer for the progressive left's postwar reawakening to Asia, providing it with a concrete method for reengagement.

Third, if we look beyond the region, the Japanese environmental experience at home (for instance, horrific methylmercury pollution and poisoning at Minamata Bay) undoubtedly became a constitutive element of the wider global environmental awakening of the 1960s and beyond. To paraphrase the biologist Paul Ehrlich (1987, p. v), polluted Japan represented a kind of coal miner's canary with respect to industrial pollution for both developed and developing nations worldwide, portending their own terrifying futures should they fail to respond to environmental degradation from economic development. Importantly, it was Japanese activists themselves who proactively took the dreadful story of Japanese industrial pollution to the world. Many of them clearly felt a deep moral responsibility to do so.

Space limitation prevents any in-depth account of this fascinating history here, but it is worth highlighting in broad strokes the process by which Japanese activists moved from a largely domestic movement centred on local mobilisations to the realm of transnational activism and, critically, how their experience with local environmental injustice fuelled this process. From around the mid-1950s until the early 1970s Japan's amazing spurt of economic growth – its 'economic miracle' – resulted in extremely severe 'negative externalities' for the natural environment and human health. What we witness in Japan from the mid- to late 1950s is the appearance of certain terrible cases of industrial pollution. Most infamously, perhaps, was the widespread methylmercury poisoning at Minamata Bay in Kumamoto Prefecture caused by brazen and immoral effluent dumping from the Chisso Corporation factory. Methylmercury ingestion by people in local communities who ate seafood from the bay resulted in shocking, lifelong neurological effects and in some cases premature death. Even the unborn were affected as the organic mercury crossed the placenta causing severe neurological retardation and other complications. Elsewhere local communities grappled with chronic asthma caused by nitrogen dioxide emitted from petrochemical complexes (Yokkaichi city), the excruciating pain of bones broken due to cadmium poisoning (Toyama Prefecture) and local rivers and streams choked with industrial sludge. Inhabitants of large cities like Tokyo and Osaka endured irritating air quality, prompting city officials to erect electronic pollution monitoring signboards in downtown areas. The inventory of pollution was long indeed.

Importantly, antipollution activists and local communities did not suffer in silence. From around the mid-1960s we witness a massive wave of protest, intensive media attention and, ultimately, a substantive governmental response. As the Japanese public became more and more fearful of and opposed to pollution they began to exert great pressure on political leaders who responded finally (and, I might add, reluctantly) with a wave of regulation, most notably in 1970 when a series of very stringent pollution countermeasures were passed in the Japanese Diet – the so-called 'Pollution Diet' – and in 1971 when the Japanese government established the Environmental Agency, one of the first national agencies of its kind in the world. The culmination of protest, media coverage, public awareness and legislative response meant that by the late 1970s, at least with respect to industrial pollution, Japan was a far cleaner country, leading some to even speak of a pollution clean-up miracle.

Miracle or not, the point I wish to stress here is just how critical this experience with industrial pollution was in shaping the contemporary Japanese environmental movement and, particularly, in opening the way for transnational engagement in environmental issues later. More than anything else, both activists and ordinary citizens in Japan were deeply moved by the terrible situation of pollution victims, like those people poisoned by methylmercury at Minamata Bay, particularly the many innocent children inadvertently contaminated by their unsuspecting mothers. As I noted earlier, I argue that, due to this experience, Japanese environmental activism from around the 1960s onwards has been characterised by a strong focus on the nexus of human health, human rights and justice, as opposed to protection of the natural environment per se.

This experience with industrial pollution became the core of Japan's human-centred or anthropocentric environmentalism and it underwrote activists' environmental injustice paradigm. It is important to emphasise, of course, that my argument is not that there have not been other forms of environmentalism or approaches to nature in Japan. This is clearly not the case. Japan has nature conservation movements with long histories and the natural world is a core element of the Shinto religion and its beliefs and practices (Brecher 2000). International nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), moreover, set up operations in Japan as early as 1971. However, I am arguing that, for very good historical reasons, anthropocentrism – focusing on human rights, human health and justice – came to dominate the environmental movement in Japan and that this focus had a very substantial impact on the kind of environmental knowledge and issues that Japanese activists would focus on first in Japan and then later transnationally.

Indeed, this seminal encounter with industrial pollution fashioned activists' environmental injustice paradigm. Pollution victims became for activists living proof of the direct causal links between political and economic power, destruction of the natural environment and the transgression of human rights and health. Furthermore, individually, infuriation with environmental injustices served as the primary motivation for activists to take concrete action. This environmental injustice paradigm unquestionably evolved over time in response to new environmental challenges, and especially through transnational activism, but its core remained intact, providing a coherent vocabulary and concrete vision for activists over many decades. Deeply infused with a sense of moral duty, the paradigm highlighted the obligation of activists to offer support for local victims and to mount a resistance against the responsible companies and their political lackeys. Moreover, as activists from a terribly polluted nation, the paradigm convinced some that it was their duty to communicate Japan's experience abroad so that other countries might avoid such human suffering and injustice. In sum, the experience of injustice at home became for a small but influential minority the motivation for transnational activism.

Importantly also, the paradigm influenced the kinds of transnational alliances Japanese activists would build. The paradigm's deep scepticism towards majoritarian ideas such as the 'public interest', which very often served as pretexts by which powerful economic and political interests pursued their agendas, translated into a scepticism towards ideas and catchphrases of the emergent global environmental movement such as 'Spaceship Earth'. This perspective paved the way for alliances with activists in developing countries protesting against the rich global 'North' and the environmentalism of the affluent.

As I have intimated, Japanese activists have been very receptive to this postcolonial, third world criticism of the 'Northern' environmentalism of the affluent and we can map this inclination on to their transnational activism. For example, Japanese activists spoke out for discriminated communities in the developing nations of Asia and South America at both the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm in 1972 and again at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. They have also been actively involved in movements for the protection of the local living environments of people on South Pacific Islands and within indigenous communities in Australia. To those unfamiliar with Japan's pollution experience such connections may seem perplexing since we might assume that Japanese activists, coming from an advanced nation, would necessarily lean in the direction of a globalist agenda like activists in North America and Europe. But, as we have seen, this sensitivity to local environmental injustice was not without historical foundations. It grew directly out of the history of industrial pollution in Japan, which made these activists very aware of the suffering of local communities and the importance of protecting the rights of such communities in formulating responses to environmental problems.

We can chart this rights and justice based approach to environmentalism from its origins in 1960s Japan through subsequent decades of transnational involvement. The earliest example was a highly influential group of natural and social scientific experts who became active from 1963 through their group, the Research Committee on Pollution (RCP, Kōgai Kenkyū Iinkai). This was one of the first environmental NGOs in postwar Japan and its members played an important role in leading the struggle against industrial pollution as well as bringing issues of justice to the very centre of the movement. Members read like a who's who of the contemporary Japanese movement: the economist Shigeto Tsuru, the chemical engineer Jun Ui, the economist Ken'ichi Miyamoto, the legal scholar Michitaka Kainō and the physician Masazumi Harada. Members' focus on the human victims of pollution was certainly influenced by their Marxist leanings, but just as important were their first-hand encounters with the victims themselves. Their various site inspections brought members into direct contact with the horrific consequences of industrial pollution and this, more than anything else, set them on a campaign for compensation and justice. Masazumi Harada, for example, explained how his life as a young physician was completely transformed after encountering the victims of methylmercury poisoning in Minamata Bay (Harada 1989, p. 1). Significant in the context of this chapter, as elites mostly in institutions of higher learning, RCP members had extensive international contacts making them perfectly situated to take the lead in communicating Japan's environmental experience (and its human-centred, justice-based, environmental agenda) to the world.

A couple of examples in this connection should suffice. In the late 1960s, Jun Ui travelled through Europe on a World Health Organization-sponsored fellowship. Throughout the journey Ui met with experts studying mercury pollution in Italy, Sweden and elsewhere. He also delivered speeches at academic conferences on pollution and gave interviews that received extensive media coverage – in some cases front page treatment. In the early 1970s with sponsorship from regional newspapers in Japan, members of the RCP travelled to the United States and Canada (and elsewhere) where they focused particularly on cases of mercury contamination. In New Mexico Masazumi Harada examined children of a poor African American family struck down with mercury poisoning after eating contaminated pork, while in Ontario, Canada, members investigated hair samples and conducted physical examinations on Native American communities whose fishing grounds had been contaminated by mercury dumped from a nearby paper mill. In the latter case, RCP members provided expert assistance in subsequent legal actions. The Committee also played a leading role in introducing Japan's pollution nightmare to the world. Most notably, in 1970, Tsuru and colleagues organised the International Symposium on Environmental Disruption: A Challenge to Social Scientists, which brought world-leading experts on pollution problems to Japan (Tsuru 1970). As part of the event, foreign experts were taken on a 'pollution tour' of Japan, during which they surveyed the country's infamous 'pollution department stores' (i.e. sites like Fuji City contaminated with myriad forms of pollution).

Jun Ui was also instrumental in establishing environmental networks in Japan that would serve as launch pads for transnational activism. In 1969 Ui and colleagues established the so-called Independent Lectures on Pollution (ILP, Kōgai Jishu Kōza). As the name suggests, the movement started as a series of public lectures on industrial pollution delivered by Ui at the University of Tokyo. Subsequently the movement developed into a nationwide network with publications and various subcommittees supporting local protests. From the 1970s, Ui and others involved in the movement began to take their movement overseas. In 1972, for instance, Ui travelled with industrial pollution victims from Minamata and elsewhere to the UNCHE conference in Stockholm where they participated in the various NGO meetings and fora running parallel to the main proceedings. The group also gave press conferences during which they displayed the physical horrors of heavy metal and other forms of contamination. Ui also received an award from the renowned Karolinska Institutet for his work on cadmium poisoning. Throughout the conference Ui and his companions distributed around 5000 copies of the English-language pamphlet *Polluted Japan*, which provided concrete details on the range of pollution in Japan (Ui 1972). This pamphlet subsequently circulated through environmentalist circles worldwide, even being translated into Thai in 1973. After the conference Ui used his award from the

Karolinska Institutet to establish the English-language publication *Kogai: The Newsletter from Polluted Japan* which was distributed to subscribers across the world.

Another fascinating outgrowth of the RCP and, particularly, Ui's ILP movement, was a series of transnational antipollution movements throughout Asia and the Pacific in the 1970s. The original provocation for these mobilisations were reports from various Asian countries about Japanese corporations setting up pollutive operations there due to more stringent regulations in Japan after 1970. This so-called 'pollution export' sent a shockwave through activist circles in Japan because not only did it take the 'shine' off the 'pollution clean-up miracle' at home, it also implicated activists as complicit citizens and consumers of a nation and economy responsible for contaminating other Asia-Pacific countries and devastating the lives and health of local people. Japanese activists responded beginning in 1973 with movements against pollution in Thailand by a subsidiary of the Asahi Glass Corporation, and thereafter against the planned relocation of polluting Japanese industrial plants to Incheon and Ulsan in South Korea and, later, to Mindanao in the Philippines. All these mobilisations involved substantive interactions and coordinated transnational protest events between the Japanese and their counterparts abroad. In the days before even facsimile machines were in widespread use such coordination was no easy task, yet movements with their shoestring budgets and small memberships managed to coordinate events and even travel to overseas pollution sites to meet with local activists. Moreover, in 1974, together with anti-Vietnam War activists and Christian groups, Ui and ILP members organised the Conference of Asians which brought some 30 activists from throughout East Asia to Japan to discuss issues relating to the environment, democracy and human rights.

Apart from expanding their environmental agenda abroad, such transnational interactions proved critical in activists' reconnection to Asia in the postwar, and in compelling them to face unresolved legacies of the past. In the course of their interactions, activists began to realise that the patterns of Japanese exploitation and misbehaviour evident in pollution export in many ways were part of a longer history of Japanese transgressions in Asia, beginning with the creation of its colonial empire in the nineteenth century and stretching into its barbarous militarism thereafter. Japan may have used guns to pursue its aggression in the past, but today it was constructing a new economic colonial empire under the patronage of local dictatorships often buttressed by a United States fearful of communist infiltration into the region. Activist publications of the time such as the aptly named *Don't Let the Pollution Escape* (*Kōgai o nogasu na!*) witness this growing sensitivity among activists to their complicity for both past and present Japanese actions in Asia. The environment and pollution export thus served as methods for activists to both rediscover and come to a deeper understanding of their region and their responsibility as progressive activists towards that region. Thanks to this transnational involvement by environmental and antiwar activists, thereafter Asia became a vital theme within other civic movements in Japan, bringing a new level of maturity to a civil society often dominated by a sense of victimisation. Discovering Asia, indeed, was also a discovery of the self as victimiser, as aggressor, and as accomplice.

Into the 1980s Japanese transnational environmental activism expanded further to include issues such as nuclear power in the Asia Pacific Region. Japanese groups also mobilised in support of people throughout East Asia whose living environments were being destroyed by logging and mining. For example, Japanese activists became involved in the struggle of the Penan People fighting to protect their rainforest habitat from logging in the Malaysian state of Sarawak on Borneo Island. The focus of the Penan's protest was not so much about the conservation of the rainforest for the sake of the forest or nature but, rather, the preservation of habitats on which these people relied for sustenance and survival. As should be obvious, the Penan's focus on habitat rights and the injustices of logging resonated closely with the anthropocentric environmental injustice paradigm of Japanese activists, hence the almost-natural alliance between the two groups. To be sure, conserving the remarkable rainforest was a concern for the Japanese, but this came second to their concern for the rights of the Penan people. Other examples of this kind of anthropocentric transnational alliance include Japanese lawyers' support for communities in the Malaysian area of Bukit Merah affected by illegal dumping of radioactive material by a Japanese–Malay joint venture mining operation in the 1980s as well as similar support for Australian Aboriginal communities whose lands were home to the massive Ranger Uranium Mine in the country's Northern Territory. In all cases justice and rights beat at the heart of transnational involvement.

Finally, as we move into the 1990s and beyond, Japanese groups started to become involved in global environmental issues such as stratospheric ozone depletion, biodiversity depletion and climate change. As in earlier decades, activists formed transnational alliances with overseas groups, such as the ties between the German Klima Forum and the Japanese Kiko Forum in the struggle to control global warming (Reimann 2002, p. 181). Japanese activists involved in the movement to protect the ozone layer through a ban on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) also drew heavily on the insights of foreign activist-scientists as they created their movement. As in 1972 at UNCHE, Japanese activists and NGOs also travelled to Rio to participate in the NGO for at the Earth Summit (UNCED). Representing the largest of all NGO contingents at the conference, the Japanese pavilion became a kind of hub for environmental groups from around the Asian region. Significantly, one of the core messages propagated by Japanese activists at the conference was that so-called global environmental initiatives (e.g. addressing climate change) must consider the perspectives of poor and peripheralised communities worldwide. In response to notions such as 'Our Common Future' popularised by the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission), Japanese activists censured the global 'North' for its rapacious consumption of scarce resources and its historical role in polluting the atmosphere. Through the lens of their injustice paradigm, Japanese activists emphasised that the effects of global environmental problems would not be distributed evenly and would hit the poorest and most disadvantaged hardest. In the name of natural justice, any solutions simply had to consider the rights of such communities and countries, or risk degenerating into a form of eco-imperialism. Even in our present age of global-scale environmental problems then, the Japanese environmental injustice paradigm continued to deeply inform the kinds of messages and forms of activism many Japanese groups became involved in transnationally and internationally. And, moreover, I believe this is the reason many Japanese environmental groups continued to find common cause with activists from the developing nations of East Asia.

Concluding thoughts

Herein I have attempted to illuminate one possible new frontier in the study of Japan through the case of the environment, and, specifically, the transnational activism born out of Japan's domestic experience with industrial pollution. From the advent of Japan's pollution crisis of the 1960s, environmentalism in the country came to be characterised by a noticeable anthropocentric or human-centred focus attentive to human rights and the pursuit of justice. I have called the activist mentality surrounding this approach Japan's 'environmental injustice paradigm'. While protest against environmental injustices within Japan undoubtedly contributed to a kind of pollution clean-up miracle in the country, the novelty of the narrative presented here is how this protest also became a stepping stone for some grassroots activists to subsequently engage in transnational activism in East Asia, in Europe and North America, and in international spaces such as UN environmental conferences. This transnational element of the Japanese environmental movement has been largely overlooked in earlier research, leaving us mostly unaware of just how influential the Japanese experience and Japanese activists have been beyond the country's borders.

First and foremost, such transnational activism made the Japanese experience with pollution something more than a national one. Horrific experiences like that with methylmercury contamination in Minamata Bay became part of global environmental knowledge and deeply informed the direction of the global environmental movement and policymaking towards the environment and the regulation of industry worldwide. Moreover, this transnational involvement had significant reverse impacts within Japan. Movements against pollution export to East Asia, for example, not only awakened activists to the deeds of Japanese industrial capital in the region, it also obliged them to consider a scarred Asian past largely ignored by the progressive Japanese left until the 1960s. This reconsideration directly challenged deep-seated mentalities of victimisation in the Japanese activist community, prompting grassroots actors to recognise their complicity as aggressors and victimisers both in the past and the present. Going transnational also opened a conduit for the flow of global norms from a burgeoning global civil society into a budding domestic Japanese civil society. Transnational environmental activism can thus take some of the credit for the significant developments in Japanese civil society beginning from around the late 1980s onward. Such transnationally active groups became exemplars for the kind of civil society many Japanese hoped to grow. Related, the example provided by such groups prompted others involved in issues such as gender equality, human rights, minority issues and pacifism to expand their vision beyond the nation and to begin building border-crossing ties. Indeed, I believe that this history is testimony to the palpable impact of the dual processes of grassroots regionalisation and grassroots globalisation within Japanese civil society from the 1960s onwards.

In relation to other areas in the study of Japan, we might speculate about the new vistas that may be made possible in a similar conceptual liquification of national borders. As I have argued, attempting to know Japan in such novel ways may open up new knowledge about Japan as well as new insights into the way Japan has influenced other nations or the world more generally. This in turn may foster an inter-area dialogue and practices of cross-referencing capable of challenging the regime of knowledge inherent in the 'hub-and-spokes' arrangement that has so deeply shaped postwar area studies. The point about liquification is not that the boundaries are made to magically disappear (because in reality they cannot and do not). Rather liquification confirms the undeniable permeability of these boundaries, especially to processes often concealed by disciplines unconsciously and quite innocently under the sway of methodological nationalism. Indeed, one new 'frontier' in Japanese studies may lie precisely in recognising the permeability of the 'frontier' itself. Doing so should alert us to the various ideas, objects and people that have been flowing back and forth through this porous periphery, subtly transforming phenomena both within and without.

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16 'Community power'

Renewable energy policy and production in post-Fukushima Japan

Akihiro Ogawa

Japan has assumed a central position within global discourses on energy since the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami in 2011 that caused radiation leakage from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This disaster singlehandedly destabilised energy policymaking and production practices in Japan. Before this disaster, many people in Japan, including myself, never gave much thought about energy, and only individuals with some reason to be worried about energy issues engaged in discussion about energy. However, people from a broader cross section of society joined the conversation after the disaster. They started learning about how the electricity system works – how electricity is generated and how it is consumed. Before the 11 March disaster, if and when the general public discussed electricity, it was mostly within the context of global climate change; in other words, how to reduce carbon emissions. Unlike coal and natural gas plants, nuclear energy does not involve carbon emissions during the generation of electricity. Such energy generation reflected an ideal pursuit of development and growth, which dominated our lifestyle over the post-Second World War period. However, the post-disaster landscape reshaped our values and ways of living at the grassroots level. People began to engage in more insightful political debates.

Since the 11 March disaster, I have been looking at opportunities for creating a new energy production infrastructure, built from the bottom up, signalling a shift from the traditional state-centralised, top-down policymaking towards a more decentralised, participatory, self-reliant form of regulation. In particular, I have observed that Fukushima is now a centre for renewable energy production. Stimulated by the efforts of local communities, the drive for renewable energy production at the grassroots level is dynamically expanding further across Japan. What we now require are new paths to renewable and sustainable energy, greater local control over green energy production and more meaningful public participation in the decision-making process to create a greener economy, including more extensive participation from local citizens. Individuals are beginning to experiment with renewable and more efficient modes of energy production. Among the many types of renewable energy, solar power is the easiest to install because the equipment setup is simple. It was also considered profitable because of the relatively high purchase prices when the national government first supported solar energy in July 2012 by requiring major electric companies to purchase renewable-derived electricity at set prices.

One important observation is that people I met at field sites referred to such renewable-energy-derived electricity as ‘community power’ (Iida and ISEP 2014). Community power is defined as renewable energy installations initiated, operated and controlled by local citizens. It is characterised by maximisation of local ownership and decision making, wide distribution of financial benefits and matching energy production to local usage exactly tailored to the community’s needs and context. It ensures that local communities have democratic control of renewable energy generation through all stages of planning, installation, operation and distribution through community-owned renewable energy projects. It indeed creates social, economic and political advantages by strengthening local economies, building community resilience and empowerment, and building renewable energy industries, which generates new employment.

This chapter considers the potential for building community power in the post-Fukushima era through an analysis of current examples of Japanese renewable energy production. Japanese citizens had already begun implementing community power industries in the early 2000s, before the Fukushima disaster, following deregulation of the Japanese electricity market. The 11 March disaster further accelerated the national sentiment for community-oriented renewable energy production.

Deregulating Japan’s electricity market

Japan started liberalising its electricity market in the 1990s, when Japan pursued more neoliberal politics that allowed more competition in energy supplies for large-lot factories and corporate customers. This was also in line with the worldwide trend towards deregulation and aimed at correcting Japan’s high cost structures and high prices relative to those in other countries (TEPCO 2014). However, the market for households and other small-lot consumers has remained monopolised by regional utilities up to now. Meanwhile, more opportunities have been provided to the renewable energy market. In 2003, the Japanese government enacted a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) scheme, which required electricity retailers to supply a certain amount of renewable electricity to grid consumers. One energy expert reported that the RPS scheme boosted the growth of renewable energy at an annual rate of 8 per cent; and after the introduction of the Excess Electricity Purchasing Scheme for Photovoltaic (or usually simply called ‘PV’) Electricity, it grew even faster at an annual rate of 13 per cent (Edahiro 2014).

As a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in March 2011, Japan’s electricity market has been radically reviewed. One of the major efforts to deregulate the electricity market was the active introduction of a Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) scheme as the country sought to diversify its energy mix away from nuclear power and bolster its capacity for renewable energy, in particular solar energy. This political sentiment was buoyed by a new policy announced in September 2012 by the ruling Democratic

Party of Japan (DPJ) government to eliminate nuclear power entirely from Japan's energy mix by 2040, while increasing power supply targets from renewable sources to about 35 per cent (see Eto 2014 for the nationwide discussion process on energy policymaking). However, the September 2012 announcement was totally reversed just three months later (16 December 2012) when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won the majority in the lower house election and Shinzo Abe, a hawkish politician, returned as prime minister.

The FIT scheme mandates power companies to buy electricity generated by renewable sources at fixed prices set by the government, on the assumption that the prospect of stable revenues would facilitate investment in renewable power generation. In the process of liberalising the electricity market, Japan had already enacted a FIT scheme in November 2009 that required utilities to purchase excess solar power sent to the grid by homes and businesses and pay twice the standard electricity rate for that power. Meanwhile, the pre-quake Strategic Energy Plan announced by the DPJ in 2010 emphasised nuclear power as the mainstay of Japan's energy supply and offered little guidance for addressing renewable energy (Hiranuma 2014). In 2010, the year before the Fukushima disaster happened, nuclear power accounted for 28.6 per cent of Japan's total power generation and renewable energy for only 1.1 per cent (METI 2014).

The new FIT scheme was introduced by the DPJ government in July 2012 with a rate of 42 yen (US 38 cents) per kWh (excluding taxes) for solar power over a period of 20 years. Since then, the number of renewable energy businesses, mainly photovoltaic power producers, has grown across the country. The rate was indeed extremely generous and triggered a surge in solar investment. The tariffs are among the highest (some even say unnecessarily high) in the world. Japan became the largest solar photovoltaic market in the world, replacing Germany in 2013, according to *Bloomberg News* (4 June 2013). This is a result of investments in response to government incentives developed after the Fukushima nuclear crisis to encourage green energy. Following the announcement of the tariffs, we observed almost daily declarations that renewable industry players would plan to open operations. In particular, solar power plants could be built relatively easily and quickly, from small residential rooftop projects with a capacity up to 10 kW to large mega solar photovoltaic power plants with an output of several megawatts. The *Japan Times* (31 October 2015) reported that solar output during the peak-demand period in the summer of 2014 reached 6.33 million kW – the equivalent of six nuclear reactors.

In April 2013, the Japanese cabinet of Prime Minister Abe decided on a 'Policy on Electricity System Reform' consisting of three main steps to secure a stable national power grid by breaking the monopolies of the ten electric power companies: (1) expanded operation of wide-area electrical grids by 2015; (2) full liberalisation of the retail market and power generation by 2016; and (3) legal structural separation, including the unbundling of the generation and transmission of electricity into operations run by separate companies by 2020.

The first stage of the process commenced in 2015, establishing an independent regulator: the Organization for Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission

Operators (*Denryoku kōikiteki un'ei suishin kikan*). This was created to overcome a concern that an electricity generator would still be able to own distribution through a holding company structure. Then, by April 2016, Japan's electricity market was fully deregulated by opening up the remaining retail electricity market, which included residential and small business consumers. With the large number of new market players as renewable energy generators, Japan is now preparing to finally end the long-standing monopoly of the ten regional electric power companies, which will likely lose some of their market share to newcomers. In 2020, furthermore, the national government plans to separate the power transmission business from the power production business, which will be expected to create another space for newcomers, although there is still an unfavourable development in that the big electric companies are creating sister companies to run the grid. Therefore, electricity will still be in the control of the same big companies and continue to be difficult for other producers to use. They are protecting the stability of the grid, so newcomers can only connect a maximum voltage of 50 kW on to the network (as of 15 July 2018). Surviving with such vested interests along with other renewable energy generators, 'community power' entities are gaining momentum.

Stories from Fukushima

Iitate in Fukushima Prefecture has experienced a huge tragedy. Before 11 March, it was a quiet traditional village where people enjoyed rural life. Three, or even four, generations of the same family lived together under one roof, practising agriculture and dairy farming. Indeed, Iitate is a well-known farming region in Fukushima for *wagyu* cattle. At one time, the village was listed as the twelfth most beautiful village in Japan. Iitate is also an archaeologically important site that people began inhabiting thousands of years ago, prompting a regular exhibition of Iitate life at the Fukushima Prefectural Museum in Aizu Wakamatsu. People lived in harmony with nature, surrounded by thick forests. Their life was simple and quiet, and residents believed that their lives would continue in this way forever.

Their lives were completely destroyed by the explosion of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, 40 km southeast of the village. The residents of Iitate were informed that they were safe as their homes were outside the 20 km (12 miles) evacuation zone designated by the national government on 12 March, and so they stayed. The earthquake itself did not significantly affect village life. However, 20 days later, on 30 March, the International Atomic Energy Agency informed them that they exceeded the operational criteria for evacuation in terms of radiation exposure. This was primarily because of wind patterns, as Iitate was directly in the path of a radiation plume. Massive amounts of radioactive particles were deposited by precipitation on the night of 15 March. Following the announcement, the government ordered the evacuation of all Iitate residents by 11 April. Because residents were not fully informed, all 6000 Iitate residents were exposed to harmful levels of radiation. One report gave a reading outside the village office on the evening of 15 March of a startling 44.7 μSv/h, an extraordinarily high level of radiation (Fukushima Prefecture 2011). The Japanese government-set target is 0.23 μSv/h. The residents of Iitate were eventually forced to leave the village, leaving everything behind. Many families were split up, with members of the three generations living in different locations.

I visited the Iitate Village Office in August 2015 as part of a group of researchers organised by a local journalist. I observed the presence of Office employees, and I assumed that they were already preparing for the return of the residents, although the evacuation order would not be lifted until 31 March 2017, more than one-and-a-half years later. Iitate was the first local authority in Fukushima Prefecture to set a date for ending the evacuation, in 2012, when the mayor, Mr Norio Kanno, promised to reboot the village within five years. In June 2015, two months before my visit, decontamination work was completed in the village's residential areas, and the cost of decontamination had reached approximately 200 million yen (1.8 million US$) per household. Reports suggested that the work had reduced the average radiation level in the air to 0.8 μSv/h. Meanwhile, my radiation survey meter outside read 0.46 μSv/h. The internationally accepted level for radiation absorption is 1 mSv/h or less per year, although the International Atomic Energy Agency and others suggest that, for the case of Fukushima, anything up to 20 mSv or less per year (the typical worldwide limit for workers in nuclear plants) poses no immediate danger to human health: 0.8 μSv/h translates to 7.012 mSv/h.

Shortly after emerging from the car, I tasted metal in my mouth, a common experience for people with no prior radiation exposure. On the drive, I saw many black plastic bags piled up like mountains. They were dampened bags containing irradiated soil, leaves and debris from the decontamination operation. The dampened piles of bags were everywhere in this village, which made me think that ordinary peaceful life would never return here. In the village, meanwhile, I saw many solar panels installed at unused farmland sites. The local journalist told us that people in Iitate are trying to expand the solar panel industry on farmland because, even if agricultural products are grown, it is unlikely that people will purchase them given public concern about radiation. At that time, I was informed that the solar panels I saw in a place called Itamizawa were set up by the Iitate Electric Power Co., a community-oriented renewable energy firm.

After the trip to Iitate, I scheduled a follow-up interview with Mr Norimichi Chiba, managing director of the Iitate Electric Power Co., and visited the company's office in Fukushima City. The headquarters are in Iitate; however, due to the evacuation, the office is temporarily housed in a building in the centre of Fukushima City. Chiba, a retiree in his early 60s, told me that the company was established in September 2014 by Mr Minoru Kobayashi, who was born and raised in Iitate. Kobayashi's family had been running a farm there, planting rice and breeding prized Japanese black wagyu *Iitate Gyu*. Soon after the 11 March disaster, he evacuated his cattle to a friend's ranch in Zaō, a town in the neighbouring Miyagi Prefecture, and continued breeding cattle. Since then, Kobayashi had been commuting to Zaō from his evacuation home in Kitakata, a city in the Aizu region, northwest Fukushima, to take care of his cattle.

During the conversation, I asked Chiba directly about his motivations for starting their renewable energy business. Chiba mentioned that he and Kobayashi were heavily influenced by Mr Yauemon Sato, whose name I already knew because it had been mentioned by many people involved in the renewable energy business. After the 11 March disaster, Sato set up his own renewable energy firm in August 2013: Aizu Denryoku (Aizu Electric Power Co.) in Kitakata, to where Kobayashi evacuated. Sato was the representative partner of Yamatogawa Sake Brewery, a local brewery established in 1790 in Kitakata City.

Sato was an influential advocate of renewable energy. He had no background in electricity production, but using his business experience of getting small breweries into markets dominated by larger manufacturers, he established the Aizu Electric Power Co. in August 2013 with local friends, municipalities and business associates. With a capital of 38 million yen (350,000 US$), the company built 48 solar power plants. As of July 2016, his company had produced a total of 3,877 kW (Aizu Electric Power Co. 2016) and sold the electricity to Tohoku Electric Power Co. All the solar plants are relatively small scale, as the company intends to create sustainable employment in local communities. Those plants also disperse risk within electricity generation. His renewable energy business has been expanding to include hydraulic and biomass energy. To expand the business, the company further raised 100 million yen (900,000 US$) through fund raising at 200,000 yen (1800 US$) per unit by consumers in the Tokyo metropolitan area to support Fukushima residents (Sato 2017, p. 44).

Sato is a so-called ‘hero social entrepreneur’ who ‘has received a disproportionate amount of foundation and media attention’ (Nicholls 2011, p. 87). In a feature article on him in *Asahi Shimbun* (18 April 2015), he remarked:

> I thought when the nuclear plants exploded, my business for the past 200 years would be over.… Nothing would be gained by blaming the state and TEPCO. What caught my attention were many power plants in Aizu where plenty of water was available.…
>
> What we need to survive are water, food, and energy. We have plenty of water, food, and energy. Electricity generated by hydraulic power plants in Aizu is ten times more than the amount required by the entire Fukushima prefecture. There is an enormous potential for renewables in Fukushima.

‘Community independence with an energy revolution’ is an important corporate mission, according to his company leaflet. TEPCO indeed deprived them of the capability to produce electricity in Fukushima. Fukushima was like a domestic colony of the Tokyo metropolitan area and sent electricity to the capital without consuming it locally at all.

I attended a national symposium on renewable energy in November 2017 at which Sato was a speaker. He explained his company’s missions to the audience, who were mostly conscientious citizens interested in establishing renewable energy businesses:

> If a big company is coming from outside of Fukushima, the money earned will be moving out from Fukushima. This would be the same structure adopted by TEPCO. We need to change this structure or circulate our money within the local area.… But instead of just complaining, we are responsible for overlooking the nuclear power plants. Instead of bringing energy sources from outside, we will take advantage of renewable sources, including solar, hydro, biomass, geothermal, and wind.… Through these activities, our children will understand that 'we can change our society by ourselves'. I want to hand over such a community to the next generation.

Utilising local money and resources, Aizu Electric Power Co. envisions a sustainable society. Ultimately, Sato intends to re-gain by buying back the water rights for electricity generation in Lake Inawashiro, the fourth largest lake in Japan, which TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power Co. have now monopolised (see *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 April 2015). The Aizu Basin is the bread basket of Fukushima Prefecture. It has long been blessed with not only natural resources but also many local historical and cultural treasures. By having plenty of natural resources, people can enjoy a self-sufficient life, or produce locally and consume locally.

Influenced by Sato, Kobayashi decided to create a renewable energy company. Both Kobayashi and Chiba of the Iitate Electric Power Co. were well connected within Sato's renewable energy network. Kobayashi raised over 10 million yen (90,000 US$) in funds for renewable energy production from local people and businesses. Chiba helped set up Iitate Electric Power Co. As an engineer by training and career, he had already gained some experience in the renewable energy industry at a geothermal energy power site in Tsuchiyu, an *onsen* (hot-spring) town in Fukushima that suffered a sharp decrease in tourists after the 11 March disaster. People there incorporated renewable energy business practices into the reconstruction plans, which combined revitalisation of the community with job creation. They worked on binary geothermal power with good quality and high temperature and pressure water. Chiba was one of the key figures in the geothermal project. He said to me: 'Renewable energy should be something citizens can be in charge of.' In fact, Iitate Electric Power Co. is supported by villagers' investments and donations. The firm asked for villagers' permission to install solar panels on their farmland. As of July 2016, when I interviewed him, I was told that 35 villagers had installed 30 solar panels of 50 kW each. The firm then sold the electricity generated at 27 yen per kWh (US 25 cents) to the Tohoku Electric Power Co. and can continue doing so under the FIT scheme for the next 20 years. Some of the earnings were used to pay the investors or villagers as rent for using their land.

What I found interesting about post-Fukushima Japan is that renewable energy policy and production provides an active window into the political processes in which multiple actors work to consolidate a new rationale of post-nuclear energy and connect production activities involving renewable energy. Good examples are the Japanese movements promoting renewable energy at the grassroots level that were established in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. One such movement is called *Zenkoku gotōchi enerugi kyōgikai* (http://communitypower.jp/), or the Japan Community Power Association, which is an emerging networking entity of energy-focused social enterprises and concerned individuals who promote and produce renewable energy in Japan. Originally, it was established as the 'Community Power Initiative' in June 2013, and then reorganised as Japan Community Power Association in May 2014. Sato, the founder of the Aizu Electric Power Co., is the board chair of the Japan Community Power Association. The network creates an anonymous citizen investment fund centred in communities and implemented by renewable energy businesses. As of January 2019, 51 citizen-based community-oriented renewable energy-related businesses and their supporters across the country organised a platform or 'alliance' for renewable energy generation, which includes Aizu Electric Power Co., Iitate Electric Power Co. and others. This emerging network, the Japan Community Power Association, presents both the classical Tocquevillian attitude, focusing on advocacy through representative democracy, and a design for public services in accordance with the values of concerned citizens. It also provides valuable guidance for agencies concerned with developing and nurturing green energy social enterprises.

Ways of living sustainably

Energy is central to nearly every major challenge and opportunity the world faces today. Be it for jobs, security, climate change, food production or increasing incomes, access to energy is essential for all. Sustainable energy is an opportunity – it transforms lives, economies and the planet. In 2015, we observed two important international agreements developed to support the 'community power' movements I have argued for thus far: the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations Sustainable Development 2015) and the Paris Agreement on climate change (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2015). These policy developments helped buoy the current positive sentiment towards renewable energy production globally.

SDGs form the core of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development titled 'Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda'. It balances the economic, social and ecological dimensions of sustainable development, and places sustainable development and the fight against poverty on the same agenda for the first time. One of the SDGs mentions energy. Access to energy is an essential prerequisite to achieving many sustainable development goals. In particular, it targets to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all by 2030; more specifically, Goal 7 aims for a substantial increase in the share of renewables in the global energy mix and a doubling in the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency. Another target is to promote research in renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technologies. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement on climate change, which came into force in 2016, addressed the need to limit the rise of global temperatures. This is a historic agreement to combat climate change and unleash actions and investment towards a low carbon, resilient and sustainable future. The main aim of the universal agreement is to maintain the global temperature rise in this century well below 2°C and to drive efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Renewable energy is an essential part of the solution to climate change. According to the United Nations,

> Affordable, scalable solutions are now available to enable countries to leapfrog to cleaner, more resilient economies. The pace of change is quickening as more people are turning to renewable energy and a range of other measures that will reduce emissions and increase adaptation efforts.
>
> (United Nations Sustainable Development 2015)

These global policy developments were supported by a comment by Fatih Birol, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA): 'We are witnessing a transformation of global power market led by renewables' (BBC 2016). The comment was made in October 2016, when the IEA released a report (IEA 2016a) that renewables have surpassed coal to become the largest source of installed power capacity in the world; in 2015, renewables accounted for more than half of the increase in power capacity, and about half a million solar panels were installed every day around the world. In fact, 2015 marked a turning point for renewable energy. Renewable energy represented more than half the new power capacity around the world, reaching a record 153 GW, 15 per cent more than the previous year. Furthermore, most of these gains were driven by record-level wind additions of 66 GW and solar PV additions of 49 GW. According to the IEA (2016b), there are many factors behind this remarkable achievement: more competition, enhanced policy support in key markets and technology improvements. While climate change mitigation is a powerful driver for renewables, it is not the only one. In many countries, combating deadly air pollution and diversifying energy supplies to improve energy security play an equally strong role in growing low-carbon energy sources, especially in Asia. It forecasts that renewables will remain the fastest-growing source of electricity generation, with their share growing to 28 per cent in 2021 from 23 per cent in 2015.

All of the dynamism, both at the grassroots level and as part of policymaking, exploring alternative energy policies and practices can be classified in the context of 'natural capitalism' (Hawken 1997; Hawken, Lovins and Lovins 1999). Natural capitalism is industrial capitalism reformed to incorporate the value of 'natural capital', or life-supporting systems and resources. Ancillary tenets include reducing waste, increasing efficiency, mimicking natural systems and transitioning to a flow and service economy. Paul Hawken (1997) observes, 'Natural capitalism is not making sudden changes, uprooting institutions, or fomenting upheaval for a new social order.… Natural capitalism is about making small, critical choices that can tip economic and social factors in positive ways.' Through the generation of community power under natural capitalism, 'creating synergies', as termed by Ostrom (1996, p. 1082), are generated in the society. Ostrom reflects, 'when co-productive inputs are diverse entities and complements, synergy can occur.… [Participants] build a credible commitment to one another so that if one side increases input, the other will continue at the same or higher levels.'

Governments, businesses and civil society together with the United Nations are mobilising efforts to achieve the United Nations SDGs as well as the Paris climate accord. In contemporary Japan, the ongoing deregulation of electricity production and distribution is a political agenda; deregulation increases the choice of power companies for ordinary citizens, under the assumption that competition between electrical service providers will result in better services and more innovation, in response to consumer needs.

In July 2018, the Japanese government announced a medium- to long-term energy plan – a national guideline for energy policy (Japanese Cabinet Office 2018) – that envisions a shift towards renewable energy and cuts dependence on fossil fuels and nuclear power. The basic energy plan, which is updated once every three to four years, showed that the government aims to have renewables account for 22 to 24 per cent, fossil fuels 56 per cent and nuclear power 20 to 22 per cent of the country's electricity generation by 2030, despite criticism from civil society. Green Peace Japan, an international environmental NGO, claims, 'It lacks urgent and ambitious renewable energy targets, while maintaining dangerously high coal targets, and unrealistic targets for the troubled nuclear sector' (Greenpeace Japan 2018). However, I would say that changes will be incremental. The most recent data available for the share of renewable energy in Japan were 14.5 per cent (which includes hydro 7.6 per cent), along with thermal power 83.8 per cent and nuclear power 1.7 per cent (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2016). The share for renewable energy is almost the same level as France (16.3 per cent) and the United States (13.6 per cent) (IEA 2017). The increased focus on renewables under the United Nation's SDGs and the Paris climate accord underscores Japan's challenge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the years ahead.

Consumers, innovative entrepreneurs, active citizens, local people and communities, and governments are forming a platform for community power. They are developing and accumulating ecological knowledge and technology to create a sustainable greener economy by practising 'natural capitalism' in their daily lives. Expanding renewable, sustainable energy, or what I called community power in this chapter, could contribute to natural capitalism, and also, importantly, could further the development of local participative democracy when various approaches to the concept succeed in simultaneously realising a substantial increase in citizen involvement and more efficient governance. Community power is indeed changing the existing partnership between state authorities and citizens. The new partnership empowers citizens to contribute more of their own resources. Citizens are regarded as co-producers of public services, instead of simple consumers, as argued in the new public management scholarship (Bovaird 2007).

Globally, the green energy industry has reached a new stage in its development. Some renewable technologies have become more affordable, particularly in developed markets, making them cost competitive with fossil fuels. Now, the focus is on the challenges ahead in promoting these renewable technologies in the face of opposition to this shift, and identifying institutional frameworks, including the FIT system, required to make green energy more attractive. Today, an awakened global consciousness is heralding the active shift away from conventional energy practices towards the use of green energy worldwide. Community power innovation has become mainstream, and this chapter has documented the long-term effects of these new values, practices, relationships and institutions as they relate to the construction of a green economy and increased alternative energy consumption.

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Appendix

Survey on Japanese-language education abroad

This appendix presents the data on Japanese-language learning abroad compiled by the Japan Foundation. Particular references to these data sets are made in the Introduction and Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. Comments below the graphs are added by the editors.



Figure 17.1 Total Japanese-language learners in China, South Korea and Indonesia, 1974–2015.

These are the 'big three' in terms of the number of total language learners. The trends for China and Indonesia are discussed further in Chapters 4 (by Zou) and 5 (by Pratama and Purnomo), respectively.



Figure 17.2 Total Japanese-language learners in Taiwan, Thailand, Australia and the United States, 1974–2015.

The ‘middling four’ have total learners in the range of 100,000–400,000.



Figure 17.3 Total Japanese-language learners in other Asian countries, 1974–2015.

Other Asian countries, particularly Vietnam, the Philippines and India, show strong upwards trends in terms of Japanese-language learning.



Figure 17.4 Total Japanese-language learners in other Western countries, 1974–2015.

Numbers of Japanese-language learners in these countries range from 10,000–30,000.



Figure 17.5 Numbers of Japanese-language learners by education sector in 2015.

There are three main patterns. In Asia-Pacific countries/regions like South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, language learners are concentrated in secondary education. This indicates that Japanese is considered a good foreign language to be taught to children as part of national education policy. In China, Taiwan and the West, language learning is concentrated in higher education. This is where the links with academic Japanese Studies are closest. The third group comprises Asian countries/regions such as Hong Kong, the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore. Here the main group is ‘other’, which suggests a large market for private Japanese language schools focusing on business Japanese and/or preparatory schools for further study in Japan.



Figure 17.6 Total numbers of Japanese-language learners in higher education in 2015.

Figure 17.6 presents the stark fact that more people learn the Japanese language at the university level in China than in the rest of the world put together. Combined with the fact that in 2018, according to JASSO (Japan Student Services Organization) statistics, 38.4 per cent of the 298,980 overseas students in Japan were Chinese, the rising prominence of China in Japanese Studies discourse seems inevitable.

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