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Children of the Revolution: The continued unevenness of the gender revolution in housework, childcare and work time across birth cohorts

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates whether parents spend different amounts of time in housework, childcare, and employment across birth cohorts. We apply data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS; 2003–2018) and age-cohort-period models to compare parents' time spent in these activities across three successive birth cohorts: Baby Boomers (1946–1965), Generation X (1966–1980) and Millennials (1981–2000). For housework time, we find no evidence of cohort change for mothers but for fathers, we observe an increase in housework time with each subsequent cohort. For time spent caring for children, we identify a period effect whereby mothers and fathers regardless of which cohort they belong to are spending more time in primary care of children over time. For work time, we find an increase in mothers' contributions across these birth cohorts. But, net of this overall trend, we find Generation X and Millennial mothers are spending less time in employment relative to Baby Boom mothers. Fathers' employment time, by contrast, has not changed across cohorts or over our measured period. Ultimately, we find gender gaps in childcare, housework and employment across cohorts remain suggesting cohort replacement and period effects are inadequate to close gender gaps in housework, childcare and paid employment time.

1. Introduction

For decades, social scientists have likened the progress towards greater gender equality as a 'gender revolution'. At times this gender revolution has been described as 'stalled' (Hochschild, 1989), 'quiet' (Goldin, 2004), 'uneven' (England 2010), 'unfinished' (Gerson, 2009) or the 'first half' of a two-part evolution (Goldscheider et al., 2015). Recent research by Paula England and colleagues (2020) shows the gender revolution as both 'slowed' and 'stalled' across several domains – education, labor force participation and earnings. For education, women's attainment of college- and advanced-level degrees has outpaced men's in absolute numbers for decades, but the ratio of women to men in graduating with a degree or doctorate has flatlined since the 1990s and slowed in men dominated fields (England, 2010). Women's labor force participation has also stalled between 70 and 75 percent for decades with women's greatest gains between 1970 and 1995 (England, 2010). The gender pay gap in earnings follows a similar trajectory, improving from the 1970s and slowing since 1990 onward (England, 2010). Despite some progress, England, and colleagues (2020:

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6994) note that changes in the 'gender system' have been 'deeply asymmetric' with women's progress in the public sphere occurring faster than men's in the private sphere.

Liana Sayer (2016) shows that men's contributions to housework and childcare, after decades of rapid improvement to narrow gender gaps, have also stalled. Women decreased their housework contributions by 1 hour and 45 minutes between 1965 and 2012, with the bulk of this decline occurring by the mid-1980s. Men increased their time spent in housework too, but this trend is not as linear as it is for women. Men went from 36 min of housework in 1965 to 1 hour and 40 minutes in 1998, levelling off at 1 hour and 23 minutes in 2012 (Sayer 2016). Mothers and fathers have increased their time spent with children in recent decades; however, mothers still spend twice much daily time with their children as fathers (Sayer 2016). Across this research, women have made advances towards equalizing education, employment, and domestic labor, but improvements have stalled, and gender gaps remain.

How can we make sense of this slowing down and in some cases stalling of gender equality in the public and private spheres? One of the challenges is individual change over time can be driven by multiple factors. Birth cohorts experience different social contexts in their formable years that structure their beliefs about work, gender and family into adulthood. Age, or aging also shifts gendered allocations of time use of the life course, especially when making family and employment transitions. Finally, period effects that influence a society at a given time can shift attitudes towards gender and the associated gendered allocation of time.

To conceptualize these age, period, and cohort changes in time use for US parents, we apply a 'lagged generational change' model that identifies three major levels driving the gendered allocation of time in the domestic sphere: (1) ideological, (2) interactional, and (3) institutional (Sullivan et al., 2018). Ideological and institutional changes are connected, capturing changing attitudes shaped by wider institutional forces. These changes can create period effects, whereby attitudes change across groups, or birth cohort effects, whereby individual birth cohorts are more susceptible to changes due to their age position. According to the generational lagged change framework, the movement towards gender equality is occurring through an interactive process between cohorts and social institutions. Even if immediate change is not apparent at the population-level, inspecting change across cohorts and periods will demonstrate significant change towards narrowing gender gaps in paid and unpaid work into recent years.

Here, we directly test this theoretical assumption of lagged generational change in housework, childcare, and employment time across birth cohorts of parents over a 20-year period. We apply time use data from parents from the *American Time Use Survey (ATUS)* from 2003-2018.[1] We begin by describing cohort differences in time use for three publicly recognized parental birth cohorts: Baby Boomers (born 1946 to 1965), Generation X (born 1966 to 1980) and Millennials (born 1981 to 2000). We then use bounded age-period-cohort models to examine whether there are significant differences across birth cohorts after controlling for other individual characteristics, as well as age, and constrained estimates of a linear time effect. Ultimately, we are interested in birth cohort differences and conceptualize these differences through publicly recognizable generational labels, such as 'Generation X' or 'Millennials' to frame this research. In these models we are interested in whether the 'children' of the Baby Boomers–that is subsequent birth cohorts–are more gender equal or less. We test whether cohort effects are plausible under different assumptions about period effects. For mothers, the same conclusion is apparent regardless of the assumption about period effects: chiefly, there is either no change across cohorts or that Millennials are doing more, results which are counter to the model of lagged-generational change. For fathers, in contrast, we find significant evidence of change, although our models are unable to adjudicate whether this occurs primarily due to period or cohort effects.

2. Theorizing change over time: lagged generational change

A lagged-generational change framework posits that three interconnected components lead to gender equality: institutional, ideological, and interactional (Sullivan et al., 2018). Institutional changes capture the changing social landscape in which individuals are embedded. This can include broad changes in gender ideology, public discourse, welfare, and legal systems. Individuals are born into institutional contexts which may shape their ideological approach to work and family, thus creating ideological differences across cohorts. But, these ideological approaches can shift over time through social interaction, or the interactional component of this framework. According to the lagged-generational change framework, interactions such as socialization with peers and partners across the life-course further shift ideological preferences. As Sullivan et al. (2018) argue, this creates an interactional process whereby individual attitudes can change but so can institutions. As the institutions change, individuals' ideologies also change, an iterative process. This can foster both cohort changes, if driven by socialization with peers and spouses, and also period changes, if driven by changes in social institutions.

Here, we utilize this theoretical approach to understand two main components of change over time – cohort differences in approaches to work and family; and period effects that structure time use across cohorts.

2.1. Lagged-generational change: the role of cohort change

The lagged-generational change model builds upon Karl Mannheim's (1929) work on generations, where birth cohorts are what Mannheim referred to as 'generational locations' – people born in the same era, sharing similar experiences. A new generational location emerges when a new generation breaks with the ways and behavior of the previous generation (Mannheim 1929). And, critically, the unique cultural and historical circumstances of a cohort's formative years shape their attitudes into adulthood (Brooks

[1] We considered also examining data from the American Heritage Time Use Survey (1965–2000) but restricted our data to ATUS data because our research question focuses on whether there has been cohort change in the period of the "stalled" revolution.

and Bolzendahl, 2004; Ciabattari 2001). We use this concept of generational location to help understand three birth cohorts exposed to dramatic social change relating to work and family – the post-war Baby Boom, Generation X and Millennials (Goldscheider et al., 2015; Goldin, 2004). We test the argument that the gender revolution is slow (Sullivan et al., 2018), and thus expect each subsequent generation to allocate paid and unpaid time more equitably than the last, for reasons outlined below.

2.2. Baby Boomers: out of the gender factory

The Baby Boom helped marshal in Second Wave feminism, with Baby Boom women accessing college education at a rate unparalleled to previous generations and breaking the glass ceilings in many men-dominated professions (Goldin, 2004). In this way, they broke with the gender system of previous generations, acting like a new generational location. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a concerted effort by Second Wave feminists to push women out of the 'gender factory' of the home and into the workforce (Berk, 1985). This normative shift coincided with an economic demand for labor in the service and clerical occupations that had historically been dominated by women, which accelerated this transition (Oppenheimer, 1970; Reskin and Roos, 1990). During this time, women started moving into high-status social positions – higher education, professional careers – that were previously held by men. While economic demand pulled women into the workforce, women themselves "had not made plans to be in the workforce for an extended period. Work was a job to "fall back on", not a career (Goldin, 2004: 18). These women still exhibited strong breadwinner/homemaker patterns with many reducing employment to part-time or dropping out of the labor market altogether when children were born (Goldscheider et al., 2015). Thus, many experienced the tensions of a stalled gender revolution and shifting work cultures while remaining tethered to traditional expectations of children and the home. Yet, they were also distinct in women's access to higher education and employment in ways unparalleled to the previous cohort. We expect this birth cohort to be the benchmark, exhibiting the most traditional arrangements of all the subsequent cohorts – for women, less time at work and more in unpaid housework and childcare and vice versa for men than Generation X and Millennials.

2.3. Generation X: children of the gender revolution

The gender revolution did not fully occur, according to Goldin (2004), until women went from "static decision making with limited or intermitted horizons to dynamic decision-making, with long-term horizons" (Goldin, 2004: 1059). However, these shifts left an impression on younger women coming of age during this period. Women born in the late 1960s and 1970s and thus coming of age in the 1980s and early 90s could see gender being 'displayed' differently as their older counterparts were in paid labor in larger numbers, which helped model a life of work and working futures that their predecessors likely never considered during their younger years. Further, these women were "… better able to predict what their future lifetime employment would be … they increased their investments in formal schooling, majored in career-oriented subjects, and continued on to professional and graduate schools in far greater numbers" (Goldin, 2004:18). In this regard, the evolution is generational with younger Generation X women shifting expectations for their future work and family lives during their formative years.

While Second Wave feminism and a changing labor market increased women's access to employment and education, dismantling traditional gender expectations within the home proved more difficult. This is in part because women's employment during this period was highly dependent on their husband's employment conditions and the age of their children. Fathers remained central breadwinners through the 1990s even though women were increasingly contributing to the family budget and in this way women's employment was very much seen as "an insurance policy" for families (Goldscheider et al, 2015). Perhaps because of this, men's time spent on housework and childcare shifted little during this period (Hochschild, 1989). This is perhaps not surprising given the historical context. Goldscheider et al. (2015: 216) argues that "men have had very little preparation for domestic roles, unlike the 100 years' increase in women's education that preceded the rise in female labor force participation". It would be some time before there were shifts in how men displayed gender in any other way than breadwinning. From this literature, we expect Generation X to be transitionary – exhibiting more equal allocations of unpaid and paid time than Baby Boomers. Specifically, we expect Generation X mothers to spend more time in employment than their Baby Boom mother counterparts and less in childcare and housework. By contrast, we Generation X fathers should pick up more housework and childcare than their Baby Boom father counterparts, but we anticipate that fathers' employment time will remain consistent across these generations.

2.4. Millennials: A generation of gender equality?

Unlike previous generations, Millennials expect egalitarian divisions of housework, childcare and employment (Gerson 2009) but cannot access secure, well-paid jobs because they entered labor markets near the Great Recession (Churchill, 2021; Churchill and Khan, 2021) and have been greatly impacted by COVID-19. Millennials came of age during a key transitionary period in gender relations - 'New Father' – which emerged in the last quarter of a century as a way of 'displaying' gender for men (Churchill and Craig, 2022). 'New Fatherhood' is characterized by men being more involved in the care and rearing of their children and being present not only physically but also emotionally (Ciabattari, 2001). For many fathers, this shift in attitude is visible in greater time caring for children (Churchill and Craig, 2022) which may have a significant influence on Millennials' time with children. Further, young Millennials prefer egalitarian divisions of paid and unpaid work but identify structural impediments to achieving these goals (Pedulla and Thebaud, 2015; Gerson 2009). Millennials are also unique in delaying major life course transitions – marriage, parenthood, first home purchases (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011) –in part because they are unable to access secure stable employment and carry higher levels of educational debt than previous generations (Churchill et al., 2019). This distinctive reality – ideological support for equality

yet limited economic opportunities – may result in differences between how Millennial parents 'do' gender than Generation X parents at the same age, despite shifting attitudes. The lagged-generational change framework predicts that Millennial parents will be more equal than Baby Boomers and Generation X parents. Yet, we are less certain of these relationships given the significant economic challenges Millennial parents face in their early years.

In general, we expect cohorts to become more equal over time. This leads to a single hypothesis.

2.5. Lagged-generational cohort change hypothesis

H1. Each subsequent cohort – Generation X and Millennials – will exhibit more gender egalitarian time use patterns, women spending more time in employment and less in housework and childcare and men more in housework and childcare than their Baby Boomer counterparts.

3. Period change and the gender revolution: fits, starts and stalls

The lagged-generational change model highlights the iterative role of ideology and institution in creating cultural, social and policy environments through which parents negotiate gender roles. In the US context, policies have failed to match changing ideological egalitarianism in work and family and, critically, progression towards gender egalitarianism has faced considerable backlash. These major institutional barriers – in attitudes and policies – may create broad period effects, impacting parents across cohorts regardless of age. As a consequence, the gender revolution in paid and unpaid labor may have stalled. Alternatively, these institutional blockages may slow down gender progress, creating a slow but sustained movement towards equality. We describe these competing expectations but point to the importance of institutional context in the gender revolution.

3.1. Changing attitudes: towards greater egalitarianism and its backlash

Since the early 1960s, attitudes towards gender roles have become increasingly egalitarian across most industrialized countries, including the United States, much of Europe and Australia (Dorius and Alwin, 2010; van Egmond, Baxter, Bulcher & Wester 2010). The liberalization in attitudes over time and across countries has been described as the 'rising tide' of gender egalitarianism. However, much like 'stalled' or 'slowed' trends in gender equality and the pursuit of a more equal division of domestic labor, the progress of attitudes towards gender roles becoming more egalitarian has been described in similarly 'revolutionary' terms.

The rising tide of gender egalitarianism across most Western nations is, in part, driven by more egalitarian attitudes of birth cohorts born in the latter half of the twentieth century relative to earlier-born cohorts (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Ciabattari 2001; Inglehart and Pippa, 2003; Sayer, 2016; Van Egmond et al., 2010; Scarborough et al., 2019). However, Meagher and Shu (2019: 1266) describe the period between 1994 and 2004 as "lost decade" within a longer period of egalitarian gains in attitudes as convergence towards egalitarianism stopped. One explanation is that the slowdown in the progress towards more gender egalitarian attitudes had meant the 'end' of the gender revolution replaced by a new cultural frame of 'egalitarian essentialism' (Scarborough et al., 2019). This new frame was a meshing of feminism with traditional familism endorsing women's equality in the public sphere (i.e., women as workers), while maintaining gender-specific expectations in the private sphere (i.e., women as mothers). Within this frame, women have the choice to work but they are still expected to be the main caregiver (Scarborough et al., 2019).

Simultaneously, the US has seen little progress towards institutional support towards greater gender equality, especially around unpaid domestic labor. The last two decades has been punctuated by a series of introduced-but-not-passed legislation aimed at improving institutional support for families. For example, *The Family and Medical Insurance Leave* (*FAMILY) Act* was introduced to but did not pass Congress in 2012 and 2019, which would have provided full-time employees paid leave at roughly two-thirds of their monthly wages following the birth or adoption of a new child or to care for an ill child, partner, or parent. The *FAMILY Act* was reintroduced in April 2021 to the House and Senate but has yet to pass both chambers. Similarly, the *Flexibility and Working Families Act* and the *Schedules that Work Act* were introduced but failed to become law in 2013 and 2017 (Thébaud and Halcomb, 2019).

Childcare policies in the US have followed a similar trajectory to paid parental leave. The federal government provides subsidized childcare through its Head Start programs which are means tested for those below established poverty thresholds. Head Start is delivered at the state level meaning significant variation in enrolment exists (Ruppanner, 2020). Further, Head Start fails to cover all eligible children meaning its resourcing fails to meet demand (Yavorsky and Ruppanner, 2022). This leaves many families with a patchwork of care that is expensive and, for many, difficult to access. Indeed, one-in-two families live in childcare deserts where reliable childcare is absent (Mannheim, 1929) and, even amongst high earning families, childcare costs absorb huge portions of their incomes (Ilin et al., 2021).

On the other hand, parents' desire to spend time with their children may have increased over time. Certainly, existing research shows that parents had been increasing their time spent on children from the 1960s through roughly 2009 (Bauman, 2011; Sayer (2016). One prominent explanation suggests that parents (both mothers and fathers) had increased their time spent with children in large part because higher education had grown more intense (Ramey and Ramey, 2010). As more students applied for a limited set of slots at universities, selectiveness grew and incentives for parents to spend time with children increased. This mirrors the notion of the rise of intensive parenting (Hays 1996) or "concerted cultivation" (Lareau, 2003) and research showing that parental spending on children has increased (Kornrich and Furstenberg, 2013).

3.2. Hypothesizing period effects towards gender equality: Fits, Starts and stalls

This body of research tells a complicated story about potential change between 2003 and 2018. In terms of ideological change, most existing research suggests the importance of cohort replacement and change rather than period changes. In addition, attitudes about women as the primary homemaker and caregiver have been difficult to dismantle. These norms are reinforced by institutional blockages – no mandated federal paid parental leave or universal high-quality accessible childcare – that make enacting women's greater employment and men's domestic contributions difficult. Interactions between cis-heterosexual men and women create a further blockage towards equality, notably that men hold less egalitarian attitudes than women and are required to give up employment prospects to facilitate women's greater integration. Collectively, existing scholarship suggests that broader social forces – institutional demands – will make the transition towards gender equality difficult for heterosexual parents.

Thus, our final hypotheses, capturing broad period effects, are competing.

3.3. Lagged-generational change creating slow gender revolutions

H2. Over time, fathers across birth cohorts will do more unpaid labor (housework and childcare) and less paid labor and mothers will do more paid labor and less unpaid labor.

3.4. Institutional constraints creating stalled gender revolutions

H3. Over time, fathers and mothers time in housework, childcare and paid labor will remain the same.

4. Data and method

This study uses data from the *American Time Use Survey (ATUS; 2003–2018)* to investigate age, cohort, period changes in housework, childcare and paid employment (Hofferth et al., 2020). The ATUS is an annual repeated cross-sectional survey of a representative sample of Americans, collected by the Bureau of Statistics. In this survey, respondents are asked to report their daily activities for a given diary day. Responses are coded into a 24-h time diary to capture a full day of respondent activity.

4.1. Birth cohorts

We begin by describing change across birth cohorts as conceptualized in public debates. We classify respondents into birth cohorts by grouping individuals based on their year of birth: Baby Boomers (1946–1965), Generation X (born 1966 to 1980) and Millennials (born 1981 to 2000).[2] These generational groupings match recent research on attitudes and allows us to speak to public debates about changes in the organization of family life (Sullivan et al., 2018; Scarborough et al., 2019). Because the ATUS data span 15 years, we are able to observe overlap for ages 23 to 37 for Generation X and Millennials and ages 39 to 53 for Generation X and Boomers. We drew all available data from 2003 to 2018 (n = 201,151) and excluded those without an own child under 18 in the home (n = 128,950). We then excluded those who fell outside the overlapping age ranges 23 to 53 (n = 5423). This left us with an effective sample size of 67,636 respondents (n = 15,519 Baby Boomers, n = 41,992 Generation X, and n = 10,125 Millennials).

4.2. Age-period-cohort models

We are centrally interested in processes of change across cohorts: whether individuals' experiences at the time they were born shape their routine housework, childcare and employment patterns later in life and whether this leads to patterns of differences in time use across cohorts. Accounting for cohort change, however, also implies accounting for individuals' age and the time in which we observe them. The linear dependence between these three concepts means that we cannot simply add all three to an OLS regression model. Although a range of APC models have proposed solutions to this problem and have become popular in similar applications (Yang, 2008; Yang and Land, 2006; Sullivan et al., 2018), other research argues that these models create constraints on coefficient estimates, and in particular that they are likely to produce estimates of cohort effects that are biased toward zero (Fosse and Winship 2019a, 2019b). A consensus exists that the only way to produce solutions for age-period-cohort models is to introduce a constraint on coefficients, either by making assumptions about the nature of change over time or implicitly doing so by setting some combination of coefficients to be equal. It is only by doing so that the remaining (unconstrained) coefficients have unique solutions.

In this paper, we approach this problem by estimating age and cohort shifts under each of two potential constraints on the coefficient for period. First, we estimate a model in which we constrain the linear coefficient for year to zero. In this model, we thus assume there is no period effect, or that there has been no change net of household, age, and cohort characteristics over time. Because the period change is assumed to be zero, this estimate also isolates how much cohort change we observe net of other demographic characteristics. The assumption of these models is that all of the change occurs between cohorts rather than over time. Essentially,

[2] Typical classifications might separate Generation Z starting at 1999, but our use the 2000 endpoint in order to match with the 5-year cohorts we use in supplementary analyses.

these models estimate cohort change under the scenario that the gender revolution is stalled (e.g. no period effects).

We then generate a second set of estimates, in which we assume that the total average change in time spent on paid work and housework that occurred between 2003 and 2018 is representative of period effects. To do this, we constrain the coefficient of time in the full model to be equal to the linear time trend that exists with no controls for any household characteristics. This type of model allows us to understand housework, childcare and paid employment time under the assumption of period effects over this time period. Simply, we identify the cohort and age effects if strong shifts in norms, working conditions, or family conditions were responsible for generating substantial change in time use over the surveyed time period.

We follow Fosse and Winship's (2019a, 2019b) suggestions that placing explicit theoretical bounds on estimates grounded in theory is more productive than using one of a range of existing APC models that place constraints that unrelated to theoretical predictions. Here, we place bounds that specify either no period effects or strong period effects, both of which are plausible given the



Fig. 1. Mothers' time by survey year and cohort.

existing scholarship on stalled (e.g. no period and no cohort effects) and slow (e.g. evident period and/or cohort effects) gender revolutions. However, we acknowledge that our upper and lower bounds may not capture the true change. For example, the period change could be more than the total change after changes in characteristics are accounted for, or it could even have changed in the opposite direction. Still, the utility of the bounding approach is that it allows some set of estimates to be ruled as plausible based on the constraints imposed and we find these assumptions about constraints plausible given our knowledge about changes in egalitarianism.

4.3. Dependent variables

We employ three time use measures to capture generational differences in time investments. *Housework time* is measured through an aggregation of time spent in five core housework tasks: cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping and laundry (Lee and Waite, 2005).



Fig. 2. Mothers' time use by age and cohort.

Employment time measures the respondents time in all paid work activities on the diary day. Respondents who are unemployed, at home, or out of the labor force are coded zero on this measure. *Childcare time* measures parents' time in primary childcare activities on the diary day. Although respondents report their time in minutes per diary day, we convert time to hours. We provide description for these measures below and also in our Appendix B.

4.4. Individual controls

Gender is a main predictor of time in domestic and paid labor (Craig and Powell 2011; Craig and Brown 2017) and thus serves as a key individual predictor across all of our models. Gender is measured dichotomously for those who self-report as a woman (value = 1) compared to a man (value = 0) which, due to our sample restriction to parents, captures mothers and fathers. We run models separately by gender to capture whether there are differences between cohorts over time for men and for women.

We apply a series of sociodemographic controls shown to structure time use. We estimate age and its squared term to account for non-linear changes in time use. Because there may be substantial patterns in both the level and timing of fertility, and because children influence household time, we control for the presence of children. We capture the presence of children in the home through two measures: (1) the total number preschool aged children (5 or under); and (2) the total number of school aged children (6–17). These account for changes in time across the life-course and its major transitions.

For our remaining controls, there are reasons to expect that they are both related to the distribution of childcare, housework, and paid work time, and that there are potential shifts across generations. We include race measured through a series of dummies: white (omitted category); Black, Asian, and all other racial groups combined. A separate question asked respondents were reported whether they identify as Hispanic origin which we coded dichotomously (yes = 1). We also control for income with a series of categories: those that earned less than $25,000, 25,000–39,999, 40,000–59,999, 60,000 to 74,999, 75,000 to 99,999, and 100,000 and over. Those who were missing or failed to report their income exhibited significantly different time use patterns than those who reported income and thus were included as a separate category. We control for marital status, divided into four distinct categories: single/never married (omitted category), married, divorced, separated and widowed. We include a measure of education with three categories: those with a college education, those with some college, and those with a high school diploma or less. Finally, we include the respondents' self-reported employment status comparing those reporting full-time (value = 1) or part-time (value = 1) work to those who are out of the labor market (value = 0). In models that estimate time in employment, we exclude this measure.

5. Results

5.1. Descriptive overview: time use by age, birth cohort, and year

Fig. 1 shows averages for our time use variables across cohorts and survey year for mothers allowing us to spotlight any period effects. Fig. 2, by contrast, shows averages by cohorts and age. These figures graph time use across these groups without controlling for marriage and fertility patterns that likely structure time use. Fig. 1 does not identify clear period effects that increase or decrease time use across domains in consistent ways. Rather, the figure suggests time use is likely patterned across cohorts and life cycle. Changes in mothers' life cycle stages across this time period likely impact time use within cohorts. For example, hours spent on childcare decrease over time within each of the cohorts, while hours spent on paid work generally increase (suddenly, in the case of the Millennial cohort in early years, likely as they age out of schooling and into independent homes). Each likely represents changes in the average age of cohorts. Fig. 2 illuminates these changes across ages, providing additional evidence that differences between cohorts reflect changes in their life cycle stages. Fig. 2 show a strong pattern of mothers' time by age, with substantial overlap between generations. For example, mothers' routine housework is nearly indistinguishable for most ages between roughly 25 and 35 for those in Generation X and Millennials. In subsequent tables, we use regression models to test for significant differences after controlling for individual characteristics (see Table 1 below).

Figs. 3 and 4 show that fathers spend less time on routine housework and childcare and more time in paid work than mothers. In contrast to mothers in Fig. 1, fathers' time in Fig. 3 shows more overlap across cohorts when examined by survey year. Fathers' time in routine housework increases over time among all three cohorts, but patterns across the three cohorts are similar. For paid work, there is more variation, but the cohorts again appear similar. Only for childcare are differences apparent, with more recent cohorts doing more child care. Again, this could reflect differences in life stage. As is the case for women, there is limited evidence of strong period effects that elevate or decrease time use across all three cohorts simultaneously. Fig. 4, however, suggests the existence of cohort differences for routine housework and, to a lesser extent, childcare, particularly between Millennials and earlier cohorts. Millennial fathers' routine housework and childcare, exceeds that of Generation X regardless of age, and Generation X's housework exceeds that of Baby Boomers. There is a weaker link between age and the amount of time spent on each of these activities among men, suggesting that stage

Table 1
Annual linear trends in mother's and father's housework from linear regressions.

	Mothers	Fathers
Routine housework	−.005*	.015***
Child care	.010***	.012***
Paid work	.013***	.0004



Fig. 3. Fathers' time by survey year and cohort.

of life cycle may be less important than for women.

Overall, these figures highlight that it is challenging to understand differences across cohorts without attempting to consider aging and shifts in the current institutional environment that may structure period effects. Both may reflect differences in employment, earnings, education, family composition and other sociodemographic characteristics that structure any apparent cohort differences in time use. Thus, we introduce regressions that control for these characteristics, with two potential assumptions about how large period effects are.

5.2. Regression results

Table 1 shows estimates of annualized trends with no controls for age, cohort, or individual characteristics. For mothers, these



Fig. 4. Fathers' time by age and cohort.

trends are significant although modest in size. The change in housework would be the equivalent of a roughly 5-min decline in housework per day over the entire 16-year period we observe ($-0.005*16 = -0.08$ h $= 4.8$ min), roughly 10 min per day more childcare, and roughly 13 min per day more paid work). Still, this suggests that over time and on average, mothers have spent less time in housework but more in childcare and employment, lending mixed support for our assumptions of lagged-generational change as creating slow (for housework and employment) but stalled (for childcare) outcomes (mixed support for H2 and H3). Fathers, on average across all cohorts, spent more time in routine housework, and child care, lending preliminary support to the model of lagged-generational change. Unlike for mothers, fathers paid work time is stable over these years. However, as we show below, the inclusion of control variables, age, and cohort effects complicates this picture.

Tables 2 and 3 show estimates of differences between cohorts for mothers and fathers under two different scenarios. Table 2, for mothers, has four columns. Each columns shows differences between Generation X, Baby Boomers, and Millennials under two

scenarios. First, we show estimates (in the first and second columns) as if there had been no change over time. That is, we constrain the coefficient for the period term to be equal to zero, meaning the entire change is driven by cohort differences. Next, we show (in the third and fourth columns) the estimated cohort difference under the assumption that the entire annual trend (from Table 1) is a period effect: in other words, a change from 2003 to 2019 in average behavior across all cohorts. In these regressions, the coefficient for year is constrained to the linear trend reported in Table 1: in other words, that mothers in all cohorts have spent less time (−0.005 h) in housework; more time in childcare (0.010 h); and more in employment (0.013 h) over this time period. Net of this assumption, we then estimated the coefficients for age and cohort.

Turning to cohort effects in Table 2, we find no significant differences between Baby Boomers and Generation X in their routine housework hours, under either assumption about period change. Counter to expectations (H1), Baby Boomers and Generation X mothers spend equivalent time in housework to each other at similar ages, again lending support to arguments about stalled gender revolutions. When we assume that mothers, on average, spent less time in routine housework over this time period (e.g. the annualized trend is a period effect), we find Millennial mothers spend more time in routine housework than their Generation X counterparts, which would strongly contradict H1. Even under the assumption of no period change, Millennial mothers' time in housework is not significantly different than Generation X mothers. The lack of a significant decline is surprising because existing research on attitudes found differences across cohorts. The lone significant result suggests that Millennial mothers have reversed the long decline in mothers' housework and are now doing more, net of household characteristics (and a secular decline in housework) than previous generations.

For childcare, we see no significant difference in time spent in primary care of children for Generation X compared to Baby Boom mothers (Table 2, columns 1 and 3; counter to H1). Comparing Millennial mothers to Baby Boomers, we find that Millennial mothers spend more time in primary care of children only if we assume that the positive period effect is zero (column 2). In contrast, if we assume that the positive period effect captures a movement towards intensive parenting across birth cohorts, we find no significant difference between these groups. Again, these lend weak support that lagged-generational change is reducing mothers' unpaid domestic labor (counter to H1).

For paid employment, the linear trend for mothers' work hours is 0.013. Under this assumption (e.g. mother's employment has increased), Table 2 shows that Generation X mothers work significantly less than Baby Boomers, while Millennial mothers work slightly less than Generation X mothers (though the difference is not significant). The alternative assumption – that mothers' employment time has remained stable across birth cohort – leads to no significant cohort differences. Either way, we find no evidence that cohort replacement is creating lagged-generational change of more employment across cohorts of mothers.

In Table 3, for fathers, we present estimates based on the assumption of no change over time in the first and second columns. Then, we present the estimated cohort difference assuming the entire annual trend is a period effect in the third and fourth columns. Again, the coefficient for year is constrained to the linear trend from Table 1: that fathers have increased their housework (0.015 h per year), childcare (0.012 h per year) and employment (0.0004 h per year) time over this period.

Unlike for women, Table 3 shows that linear effects are more consistent with a lagged-generational change approach arguing the gender revolution is slow. When we assume no period effect, we find GenX fathers spending more time in housework than their Baby Boomer counterparts, and that Millennial fathers spend more time than Generation X fathers (0.10 and 0.16 h per year respectively; columns 1 and 2), consistent with our lagged-generational change hypothesis (H1). For child care time, we find Baby Boomer and Generation X fathers report equivalent time when no period changes are assumed. But, Millennial fathers report greater time contributions (0.12 h per year) than their Generation X counterparts, again lending support for cohort-driven lagged-generational change.

When, we assume period effects – or, that fathers across cohorts have all increased their routine housework and childcare time over these surveyed years – we find no significant differences between cohorts (Table 3, columns 3 and 4). Given the intensification of egalitarian gender norms and new fatherhood norms it is entirely feasible that fathers greater time investments are driven by period effects shifting fathers' time towards greater investments in housework and childcare. Or, as exhibited in columns 1 and 2, each subsequent cohort of fathers may contribute more than the last. We can't adjudicate between cohort or period as the key mechanism driving these changes, but our results indicate that fathers' time has increased over the time period in ways consistent with lagged-generational change. And, importantly, these patterns are different to those for mothers where lagged-generational change is not evident. What is more, across all of these models – assuming no period effects (columns 1 and 2) or strong period effects (columns 3 and 4) – we find fathers' employment time is unchanged. This also serves as an important contrast to mothers' paid employment time which at best has experienced modest increases over time (Table 1 – linear trend increase of 0.13 h per year) and at worst seen a decline with each subsequent generation (Table 2; columns 3 and 4) net of this period effect. Ultimately, our results indicate an increase in

Table 2
Cohort differences among mothers from bounded APC models, under two constraints on period change.

	No period effect		Entire trend is period effect	
	GenX (compared to Baby Boomer)	Millennial (compared to GenX)	GenX (compared to Baby Boomer)	Millennial (compared to GenX)
Routine housework	−0.02	0.04	0.02	0.08*
Child care	0.03	0.13***	−0.05	0.05
Paid work	−0.02	0.00	−0.12*	−.10

Note: controls include age, age squared, marital status, race, ethnicity, education, weekend/weekday, employment status, and weekly earnings.

Table 3
Cohort differences among fathers from bounded APC models, under two constraints on period change.

	No period effect		Entire trend is period effect	
	GenX (compared to Baby Boomer)	Millennial (compared to GenX)	GenX (compared to Baby Boomer)	Millennial (compared to GenX)
Routine housework	0.10***	0.16***	−0.01	0.04
Child care	0.04	0.12***	−0.05	0.03
Paid work	−0.12	0.02	−0.12	0.01

Note: controls include age, age squared, marital status, race, ethnicity, education, weekend/weekday, employment status, usual hours worked, and weekly earnings.

fathers' childcare and housework contributions but stability in their paid employment time.

Aging and the life course processes associated with it are clearly related to the experiences of each of these cohorts. The coefficients for age are similar for these outcomes regardless of the assumption about period change. Because each estimate includes a quadratic term for age, it can be difficult to interpret the relationship between age and each of the time use measures. Appendix I shows predicted values to illustrate how these change over the life cycle, as years above or below the average age in the data set. These results suggest that there is strong life course patterning of each type of work, particularly for child care, even after estimating cohort and period effects. We note that the link between age and paid work is negative, which is somewhat surprising, given the relatively young age of our sample (ages 23 to 53). Without controlling for household characteristics, the relationship between age and paid work is curvilinear for men and only increasing for women. However, it is merely the inclusion of individual characteristics, not period or cohort variables, that leads to a negative effect of age. This suggests that, net of the presence of children, marital status, race, education and income, that older individuals work fewer hours.

5.3. Robustness checks: OLS regression results across cohorts

To better contextualize these findings, Appendices G and H show these two constrained regressions but using 5-year cohorts instead of the generational cohorts, with the largest of the Baby Boomer cohorts as the reference category. Appendices G and H largely show patterns consistent with the results above: for fathers, those born in later cohorts did more housework and childcare (under the assumption of no period change). For mothers, housework and primary childcare time increase amongst younger cohorts (under the assumption of no period change) again indicating that, if cohort effects are evident, they are stalled rather than lagged. These sensitivity checks lend further support to our existing estimations, lending support for lagged-generational change for fathers but not mothers net of disparate estimations of age-cohorts.

6. Discussion and conclusion

Drawing on time use data, this paper assessed arguments about the progress of the gender revolution by examining cohort differences in parents' time use across a range of dimensions. Time use researchers Sullivan et al. (2018) argued that change across the gender system is happening through a process they described as 'lagged generational change' whereby cohorts will eventually close the gaps between men and women. Using a novel approach to estimate cohort differences by bounding estimates, we hypothesized that if change in the gender system was truly underway, we should see evidence of slow progress – where younger parental birth cohorts would become more consistent in their housework, childcare and paid employment time than their forebears. On the other hand, if we found no differences in time use patterns across birth cohorts then the gender revolution had indeed 'stalled'. Our findings, however, lend credence to the notion that the gender revolution is, as England et al. (2020) has argued, ' … uneven–affecting some groups more than others and some arenas of life more than others'.

We find mothers are spending as much, if not more, time in housework and childcare with each subsequent cohort. While employment time may be increasing for mothers overall, when we account for this uptick, we find that Generation X and Millennial mothers are spending less time in paid employment than Baby Boomer counterparts. Thus, the gender revolution for mothers in paid work are stalled with no improvement over our sampled period between 2003 and 2018. This is consistent with previous research by England (2010) which has previously found that progress in women's economic participation flatlining in recent decades. And, with previous research showing mothers' reductions in housework and childcare had peaked, declined, and then plateaued from 1965 to 2012 (Sayer, 2016). We extend this analysis to show that cohort replacement will not close these gender gaps. At best, younger cohorts' time remains flat and at worst has traditionalized – with mothers spending more time in childcare and housework and less in employment.

For fathers, the picture is a bit rosier. Fathers' employment time is stable but they have increased their contributions in routine housework and primary childcare. Of course, fathers' increased contributions are not sufficient to close the gender gap, but they are a movement towards lagged-generational change. These changes may be driven by a period effect – we know that attitudes towards greater, more involved fatherhood have become more egalitarian (Churchill and Craig, 2022) which may have influenced fathers' contributions to childcare. We also know that ideals of intensive parenting and new fatherhood have increased investments in children (Sayer 2016). Our results indicate that fathers have increased their time in both – either across all cohorts or with each subsequent

cohort contributing more than the last. Either way, this is a good sign for lagged-generational change, and a movement towards greater equality. In many ways, this is consistent with existing evidence that younger cohorts of fathers are doing more than their predecessors, like that found by Leopold et al. (2018) as well as Sullivan et al.'s (2018) cross-national research, which suggests gender convergence in housework. These findings might also suggest that the second half of the gender revolution as described by Goldscheider et al. (2015) increased involvement of men in the private sphere of home and family may be underway in the United States.

These findings are not without limitations. Our application of time use data, although robust in measurement and available for large samples, are not longitudinal. Thus, we cannot speak to within- or between-person change over time and differences in fertility and marital patterns shown to drive cohort changes in Germany (Skopek and Leopold 2020). Expanding analyses to existing high quality panel data would be an important next research step. Further, we are capturing cohorts at a certain time period meaning that these analyzes should be replicated as each cohort – especially Generation X and Millennials – continue to age. Adding subsequent parents from younger generations would also benefit these analyses. Ultimately, we find strong evidence of stalled gender revolutions for mothers but a movement towards gender convergence for fathers which may continue over time or continue to stall. Finally, we strategically exclude time use data from the pandemic period given its incredible impact on time in employment, childcare and housework (Craig and Churchill, 2021; Collins et al., 2021). But, this period effect may be monumental in shifting parents' time use towards greater traditionalism or equality. Existing research demonstrates fathers increased housework contributions in the US but only temporarily (Collins et al., 2021). The long-term consequences of this event are still being measured and assessing them from an age-period-cohort-period perspective would be useful.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix

Appendix A
Descriptive Statistics for ATUS sample

	Baby Boomer					Gen X					Millennial				
	Obs	Mean/ %	SD	Min	Max	Obs	Mean/ %	SD	Min	Max	Obs	Mean/ %	SD	Min	Max
Housework time	15,519	1.67	2.04	0	19.42	41,992	1.70	1.99	0	18.75	10,125	1.72	1.92	0	17.5
Childcare time	15,519	0.87	1.46	0	17.75	41,992	1.47	1.88	0	19.18	10,125	1.97	2.17	0	19
Employment time	15,519	3.56	4.30	0	23	41,992	3.31	4.25	0	23	10,125	3.03	4.13	0	$21.58
Age	15,519	46.51	3.77	39	53	41,992	37.40	5.55	23	53	10,125	29.19	3.64	23	37
Married - spouse present	15,519	79.12				41,992	77.29				10,125	64.34			
Married - spouse absent	15,519	0.95				41,992	1.13				10,125	1.66			
Widowed	15,519	1.43				41,992	0.66				10,125	0.32			
Divorced	15,519	11.60				41,992	9.06				10,125	5.44			
Separated	15,519	2.82				41,992	3.07				10,125	3.30			
Never married	15,519	4.07				41,992	8.79				10,125	24.95			
White	15,519	85.53				41,992	83.34				10,125	81.13			
Black	15,519	8.07				41,992	8.92				10,125	11.98			
Asian	15,519	4.38				41,992	5.48				10,125	4.00			
Other Race	15,519	2.02				41,992	2.26				10,125	2.89			
Hispanic	15,519	10.08				41,992	16.17				10,125	20.52			
Education: High school or less	15,519	29.47				41,992	30.92				10,125	37.58			
Education: Some college	15,519	26.86				41,992	27.67				10,125	33.24			
Education: College or beyond	15,519	43.67				41,992	41.41				10,125	29.18			
Survey day is weekend	15,519	50.24				41,992	50.67				10,125	50.55			
Employed - at work	15,519	79.43				41,992	75.79				10,125	68.71			
Employed - absent	15,519	3.30				41,992	3.46				10,125	3.20			
Unemployed - on layoff	15,519	0.54				41,992	0.61				10,125	0.43			
Unemployed - looking	15,519	3.03				41,992	3.71				10,125	6.07			
Not in labor force	15,519	13.70				41,992	16.43				10,125	21.58			
Income: <25 k	15,519	10.43				41,992	14.91				10,125	25.97			
25 k-40 k	15,519	11.39				41,992	13.69				10,125	18.64			
40 k-60 k	15,519	15.05				41,992	15.89				10,125	16.58			
60 k-75 k	15,519	11.03				41,992	11.06				10,125	11.33			
75 k-100 k	15,519	20.21				41,992	15.49				10,125	11.54			
>100 k	15,519	22.08				41,992	23.98				10,125	14.41			
Income: Don't know or missing	15,519	9.82				41,992	4.99				10,125	1.54			
Number of children under 6	15,519	0.18	0.44	0	3	41,992	0.64	0.71	0	3	10,125	1.06	0.68	0	3
Number of children age 6 to 17	15,519	1.16	0.50	0	2	41,992	0.93	0.64	0	2	10,125	0.52	0.60	0	2

Appendix B
Description of Variable Coding from ATUS,

Time Use	
Housework time	Sum of housework, food and drink preparation, presentation and clean up, and grocery shopping
Employment time	Sum of work and work related activities
Childcare time	Sum of Caring for and Helping Household Children, Activities Related to Household Children's Education, Activities Related to Household Children's Health
Cohort	
Baby Boomers	1946 to 1965
GenX	1966 to 1980
Millennials	1981 to 2003
Gender	
Woman	Woman = 1; Man = 0
Presence of Children	
Young Child Present	Dichotomous value for presence of child under 5 in the home
Number of children	Number of own children 18 or under present in the home
Sociodemographic Controls	
Race	White = 0; Black = 1; Asian = 1, All other = 1
Hispanic Origin	Hispanic = 1; Else = 0
Income	Self-Reported Income Categories: Less than $25,000 = 1; $25,000-$59,999 = 1; $60,000-$99,999 = 1; $100,000 - $149,999 = 1; and $150,000 plus = 1; Missing or Failed to report = 0
Marital Status	Single/never married = 0; Married = 1; Divorced/Separated = 1; Widowed = 1
Education	College Degree or higher completed = 1; Less than a College Degree Competed = 0
Age	Age and Age-Squared
Employment	Full-Time = 1; Part-Time = 1; Not Employed = 0
Weekday/ Weekend	Weekday = 1; Weekend = 0

Appendix C
Women's time use, average across all cohorts

Year	Housework	Child care	Work	N
2003	2.34	1.64	2.44	4288
2004	2.30	1.65	2.59	2763
2005	2.34	1.64	2.46	2902
2006	2.35	1.58	2.61	2918
2007	2.29	1.68	2.57	2626
2008	2.22	1.62	2.58	2662
2009	2.21	1.68	2.62	2725
2010	2.23	1.66	2.55	2701
2011	2.27	1.63	2.62	2408
2012	2.27	1.67	2.48	2437
2013	2.22	1.69	2.60	2149
2014	2.26	1.74	2.57	2150
2015	2.33	1.78	2.60	2004
2016	2.28	1.76	2.68	1866
2017	2.23	1.76	2.76	1782
2018	2.26	1.81	2.76	1602

Appendix D
Men's time use, average across all cohorts

Year	Housework	Child care	Work	N
2003	0.72	0.95	4.53	2876
2004	0.74	0.95	4.36	1915
2005	0.74	0.98	4.52	1899
2006	0.84	0.98	4.33	1901
2007	0.79	0.99	4.65	1790
2008	0.77	1.01	4.45	1809
2009	0.84	1.09	4.18	1791
2010	0.83	1.06	4.33	1758
2011	0.89	1.01	4.23	1623
2012	0.88	1.14	4.39	1564
2013	0.90	1.12	4.54	1417

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Appendix D (*continued*)

Year	Housework	Child care	Work	N
2014	0.93	1.02	4.48	1446
2015	0.88	1.05	4.43	1308
2016	0.85	1.12	4.67	1310
2017	0.96	1.20	4.41	1228
2018	0.98	1.05	4.47	1160

Appendix E

OLS and Constrained Regression results for Mothers' Time Use (n = 40,380)

	Housework	Housework	Child care	Child care	Paid work	Paid work
	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)
Age	0.03***	0.03***	−0.01***	−0.02***	−0.01*	−0.02***
	(11.94)	(13.03)	(-6.99)	(-9.43)	(-2.32)	(-3.98)
Age squared	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00	−0.00
	(-4.04)	(-4.04)	(-12.03)	(-12.02)	(-0.85)	(-0.85)
Baby Boomer	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Generation X (compared to Baby Boomer)	−0.02	0.02	0.03	−0.05	−0.02	−0.12*
	(-0.57)	(0.58)	(0.90)	(-1.69)	(-0.37)	(-2.12)
Millennial (compared to Generation X)	0.04	0.08*	0.13***	0.05	−0.00	−0.10
	(1.18)	(2.36)	(4.28)	(1.62)	(-0.00)	(-1.80)
Married - spouse present	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Married - spouse absent	−0.32***	−0.32***	−0.09	−0.09	0.66***	0.65***
	(-3.80)	(-3.76)	(-1.21)	(-1.29)	(4.68)	(4.63)
Widowed	−0.30**	−0.30**	0.01	0.01	0.27	0.27
	(-3.03)	(-3.01)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(1.64)	(1.63)
Divorced	−0.42***	−0.42***	−0.07*	−0.07*	0.99***	0.99***
	(-12.03)	(-11.99)	(-2.23)	(-2.32)	(17.16)	(17.09)
Separated	−0.36***	−0.35***	0.02	0.02	0.77***	0.76***
	(-6.60)	(-6.57)	(0.48)	(0.41)	(8.60)	(8.55)
Never married	−0.36***	−0.35***	−0.03	−0.03	0.70***	0.69***
	(-9.93)	(-9.84)	(-0.87)	(-1.06)	(11.73)	(11.60)
Black	−0.28***	−0.28***	−0.34***	−0.34***	0.38***	0.38***
	(-7.90)	(-7.87)	(-11.32)	(-11.39)	(6.52)	(6.47)
Asian	0.52***	0.52***	−0.03	−0.03	−0.11	−0.11
	(10.66)	(10.72)	(-0.64)	(-0.77)	(-1.32)	(-1.41)
Other race	0.01	0.01	−0.12*	−0.12*	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(-2.13)	(-2.18)	(-0.07)	(-0.10)
Hispanic	0.51***	0.52***	−0.30***	−0.30***	−0.04	−0.05
	(17.03)	(17.11)	(-11.68)	(-11.85)	(-0.85)	(-0.97)
Some College	−0.19***	−0.18***	0.09***	0.09***	0.24***	0.24***
	(-6.79)	(-6.75)	(3.93)	(3.83)	(5.39)	(5.33)
College or higher	−0.35***	−0.35***	0.38***	0.38***	0.34***	0.34***
	(-11.70)	(-11.64)	(15.18)	(15.05)	(7.03)	(6.95)
Survey day is weekend	0.38***	0.38***	−0.37***	−0.37***	−3.15***	−3.15***
	(18.80)	(18.79)	(-21.55)	(-21.53)	(-93.33)	(-93.32)
Employed - at work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)		
Employed - absent	0.38***	0.38***	0.64***	0.64***		
	(7.18)	(7.18)	(14.18)	(14.18)		
Unemployed - on layoff	0.90***	0.90***	0.52***	0.52***		
	(6.22)	(6.22)	(4.23)	(4.25)		
Unemployed - looking	0.90***	0.90***	0.60***	0.60***		
	(18.19)	(18.19)	(14.32)	(14.32)		
Not in labor force	0.85***	0.85***	0.81***	0.81***		
	(33.71)	(33.72)	(38.05)	(38.04)		
<$25,000	0.02	0.03	−0.09*	−0.11*	−0.59***	−0.61***
	(0.44)	(0.59)	(-2.14)	(-2.47)	(-7.00)	(-7.23)
$25,000-$39,999	−0.03	−0.02	−0.09*	−0.10*	0.06	0.04
	(-0.61)	(-0.46)	(-1.99)	(-2.34)	(0.75)	(0.51)
$40,000-$59,999	−0.14**	−0.14**	−0.07	−0.08*	0.21*	0.19*
	(-2.86)	(-2.70)	(-1.62)	(-1.98)	(2.51)	(2.27)
$60,000-$74,999	−0.20***	−0.19***	−0.03	−0.05	0.43***	0.40***

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Appendix E (*continued*)

	Housework (no period effect)	Housework (period effect is total change)	Child care (no period effect)	Child care (period effect is total change)	Paid work (no period effect)	Paid work (period effect is total change)
	(-3.74)	(-3.58)	(-0.76)	(-1.13)	(4.79)	(4.54)
$75,000-$99,999	−0.18***	−0.17***	0.03	0.01	0.24**	0.22**
	(-3.48)	(-3.33)	(0.60)	(0.28)	(2.83)	(2.61)
≥$100,000	−0.25***	−0.23***	0.07	0.04	0.38***	0.35***
	(-4.82)	(-4.56)	(1.57)	(0.97)	(4.51)	(4.10)
Income (don't' know or missing)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Number of children under age 6	0.19***	0.19***	0.97***	0.97***	−0.60***	−0.60***
	(9.75)	(9.76)	(58.02)	(58.00)	(-18.47)	(-18.48)
Number of children age 6 to 17	0.23***	0.23***	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.17***	−0.17***
	(11.57)	(11.58)	(-4.75)	(-4.76)	(-5.03)	(-5.04)
Year (constrained)		−0.01		0.01		0.01
		(.)		(.)		(.)
Constant	1.91***	1.87***	1.13***	1.22***	4.12***	4.24***
	(31.42)	(30.67)	(21.87)	(23.55)	(41.02)	(42.17)
Observations	40,380	40,380	40,380	40,380	40,380	40,380

t statistics in parentheses.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

Appendix F
OLS and Constrained Regression results for Fathers' Time Use (n = 27,256)

	Housework (no period effect)	Housework (period effect is total change)	Child care (no period effect)	Child care (period effect is total change)	Paid work (no period effect)	Paid work (period effect is total change)
Age	0.01***	0.01**	0.00	−0.01*	−0.02***	−0.02***
	(7.30)	(3.21)	(0.21)	(-2.52)	(-3.35)	(-3.39)
Age squared	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00***	0.00	0.00
	(-1.45)	(-1.38)	(-8.64)	(-8.59)	(0.69)	(0.70)
Baby Boomer	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Generation X (compared to Baby Boomer)	0.10***	−0.01	0.04	−0.05	−0.12	−0.12
	(4.28)	(-0.48)	(1.36)	(-1.82)	(-1.75)	(-1.80)
Millennial (compared to Generation X)	0.16***	0.04	0.12***	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(5.36)	(1.39)	(3.51)	(0.86)	(0.20)	(0.16)
Married - spouse present	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Married - spouse absent	−0.00	−0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.06
	(-0.02)	(-0.14)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Widowed	0.76***	0.75***	0.02	0.01	−0.67	−0.67
	(5.65)	(5.57)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(-1.73)	(-1.73)
Divorced	0.31***	0.30***	0.00	−0.00	−0.22*	−0.22*
	(8.85)	(8.70)	(0.05)	(-0.05)	(-2.20)	(-2.20)
Separated	0.47***	0.47***	0.04	0.04	−0.15	−0.15
	(7.09)	(7.04)	(0.49)	(0.46)	(-0.80)	(-0.80)
Never married	0.16***	0.15***	0.08	0.07	−0.43***	−0.43***
	(4.19)	(3.89)	(1.83)	(1.63)	(-4.00)	(-4.00)
Black	0.00	−0.00	−0.23***	−0.23***	−0.28**	−0.28**
	(0.00)	(-0.04)	(-5.86)	(-5.89)	(-2.93)	(-2.93)
Asian	0.04	0.03	−0.08	−0.09*	0.04	0.04
	(1.04)	(0.76)	(-1.90)	(-2.09)	(0.42)	(0.42)

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Appendix F (*continued*)

	Housework	Housework	Child care	Child care	Paid work	Paid work
	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)
Other race	0.01	0.01	−0.03	−0.03	−0.15	−0.15
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(-0.43)	(-0.42)	(-0.99)	(-0.99)
Hispanic	0.02	0.01	−0.19***	−0.20***	0.21**	0.21**
	(0.66)	(0.38)	(-6.88)	(-7.06)	(2.95)	(2.95)
Some College	0.11***	0.11***	0.13***	0.13***	0.04	0.04
	(5.22)	(5.18)	(5.13)	(5.10)	(0.59)	(0.59)
College or higher	0.11***	0.11***	0.31***	0.31***	0.00	0.00
	(5.05)	(5.12)	(12.00)	(12.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Survey day is weekend	0.47***	0.47***	0.16***	0.16***	−5.38***	−5.38***
	(29.95)	(30.06)	(8.53)	(8.60)	(-118.23)	(-118.23)
Employed - at work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)		
Employed - absent	0.24***	0.23***	0.30***	0.30***		
	(4.81)	(4.77)	(5.22)	(5.19)		
Unemployed - on layoff	0.84***	0.84***	0.35**	0.35**		
	(8.66)	(8.75)	(3.07)	(3.13)		
Unemployed - looking	0.75***	0.75***	0.64***	0.64***		
	(15.47)	(15.40)	(11.30)	(11.25)		
Not in labor force	0.67***	0.66***	0.73***	0.73***		
	(17.05)	(16.91)	(15.90)	(15.80)		
<$25,000	−0.02	−0.04	−0.01	−0.03	−0.99***	−0.99***
	(-0.37)	(-0.87)	(-0.26)	(-0.59)	(-7.92)	(-7.93)
$25,000-$39,999	0.01	−0.01	−0.02	−0.04	−0.33**	−0.33**
	(0.16)	(-0.35)	(-0.51)	(-0.85)	(-2.78)	(-2.78)
$40,000-$59,999	0.00	−0.02	0.01	−0.01	−0.19	−0.19
	(0.12)	(-0.44)	(0.18)	(-0.20)	(-1.65)	(-1.66)
$60,000-$74,999	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.05	−0.08	−0.08
	(1.08)	(0.46)	(1.55)	(1.13)	(-0.70)	(-0.70)
$75,000-$99,999	0.01	−0.01	0.10*	0.09	0.01	0.00
	(0.37)	(-0.19)	(2.29)	(1.92)	(0.05)	(0.04)
≥$100,000	0.06	0.02	0.19***	0.16***	−0.10	−0.10
	(1.64)	(0.58)	(4.23)	(3.52)	(-0.88)	(-0.89)
Income (don't' know or missing)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Number of children under age 6	0.05***	0.05***	0.55***	0.54***	0.00	0.00
	(3.73)	(3.66)	(31.98)	(31.93)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Number of children age 6 to 17	0.01	0.01	−0.11***	−0.11***	0.04	0.04
	(0.66)	(0.62)	(-5.88)	(-5.90)	(0.83)	(0.83)
Year (constrained)		0.02		0.01		0.00
		(.)		(.)		(.)
Constant	0.26***	0.39***	0.49***	0.59***	7.43***	7.43***
	(5.59)	(8.37)	(9.03)	(10.89)	(55.38)	(55.40)
Observations	27,256	27,256	27,256	27,256	27,256	27,256

t statistics in parentheses.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

Appendix G
Robustness checks, 5-year cohort regressions for mothers' time use.

	Housework	Housework	Child care	Child care	Paid work	Paid work
	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)
Age	0.03***	0.03***	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.01	−0.02***
Age*Age	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00	−0.00
Born 1951–1955	0.43	0.36	−0.25	−0.13	−0.65	−0.48
Born 1956–1960	0.11	0.06	0.09	0.17*	0.03	0.15
Born 1961–1965	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.09
Born 1966–1970	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Born 1971–1975	0.00	0.03	0.04	−0.01	−0.04	−0.10
Born 1976–1980	−0.02	0.02	0.01	−0.08*	0.03	−0.09
Born 1981–1985	0.01	0.08	0.02	−0.12**	0.08	−0.10

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Appendix G (*continued*)

	Housework	Housework	Child care	Child care	Paid work	Paid work
	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)
Born 1986–1990	0.02	0.11*	0.12**	−0.06	0.10	−0.15
Born 1991–1995	0.11	0.23**	0.21***	−0.02	−0.09	−0.39**
Born 1996–2000	0.16	0.30*	0.09	−0.18	−0.02	−0.38
Married - spouse present	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Married - spouse absent	−0.33***	−0.32***	−0.09	−0.09	0.66***	0.66***
Widowed	−0.30**	−0.30**	0.01	0.01	0.27	0.27
Divorced	−0.42***	−0.42***	−0.07*	−0.07*	0.99***	0.99***
Separated	−0.35***	−0.35***	0.02	0.02	0.76***	0.76***
Never married	−0.36***	−0.36***	−0.03	−0.03	0.70***	0.69***
Black	−0.28***	−0.28***	−0.34***	−0.34***	0.38***	0.38***
Asian	0.52***	0.52***	−0.02	−0.02	−0.11	−0.11
Other race	0.01	0.01	−0.12*	−0.12*	−0.01	−0.01
Hispanic	0.51***	0.51***	−0.30***	−0.30***	−0.05	−0.05
Some College	−0.19***	−0.19***	0.09***	0.09***	0.24***	0.24***
College or higher	−0.35***	−0.35***	0.38***	0.38***	0.34***	0.34***
Survey day is weekend	0.38***	0.38***	−0.37***	−0.37***	−3.15***	−3.15***
Employed - at work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
Employed - absent	0.38***	0.38***	0.64***	0.64***		
Unemployed - on layoff	0.90***	0.90***	0.52***	0.52***		
Unemployed - looking	0.90***	0.90***	0.60***	0.60***		
Not in labor force	0.85***	0.85***	0.81***	0.81***		
<$25,000	0.02	0.02	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.60***	−0.60***
$25,000-$39,999	−0.03	−0.03	−0.08	−0.09*	0.06	0.05
$40,000-$59,999	−0.14**	−0.14**	−0.07	−0.07	0.20*	0.20*
$60,000-$74,999	−0.20***	−0.20***	−0.03	−0.04	0.42***	0.41***
$75,000-$99,999	−0.18***	−0.18***	0.03	0.02	0.24**	0.23**
≥$100,000	−0.24***	−0.24***	0.07	0.07	0.37***	0.36***
Income (don't' know or missing)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Number of children under age 6	0.19***	0.19***	0.97***	0.97***	−0.60***	−0.60***
Number of children age 6 to 17	0.24***	0.24***	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.17***	−0.17***
Year (constrained)		−0.01		0.01		0.01
Constant	1.91***	1.86***	1.13***	1.21***	4.10***	4.20***
	40,380	40,380	40,380	40,380	40,380	40,380

t statistics in parentheses.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

Appendix H

Robustness checks, 5-year cohort regressions for fathers' time use.

	Housework	Housework	Child care	Child care	Paid work	Paid work
	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)	(no period effect)	(period effect is total change)
Age	0.02***	0.00	0.00	−0.01***	−0.02**	−0.02**
Age*Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00	−0.00
Born 1951–1955	−0.03	0.16	−0.02	0.13	0.35	0.36
Born 1956–1960	−0.09	0.05	−0.04	0.07	0.20	0.20
Born 1961–1965	−0.05	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.07
Born 1966–1970	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Born 1971–1975	0.08**	0.01	0.04	−0.01	−0.10	−0.10
Born 1976–1980	0.11***	−0.03	0.03	−0.08*	−0.12	−0.12
Born 1981–1985	0.15***	−0.06	0.08	−0.08	−0.08	−0.08
Born 1986–1990	0.28***	−0.00	0.18***	−0.03	−0.12	−0.13
Born 1991–1995	0.37***	0.02	0.20**	−0.07	0.09	0.08
Born 1996–2000	0.14	−0.27*	0.11	−0.22	0.34	0.33
Married - spouse present	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Married - spouse absent	−0.00	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04
Widowed	0.76***	0.76***	0.02	0.02	−0.67	−0.67
Divorced	0.31***	0.31***	0.00	0.00	−0.22*	−0.22*
Separated	0.47***	0.47***	0.04	0.04	−0.16	−0.16
Never married	0.15***	0.15***	0.08	0.08	−0.44***	−0.44***
Black	−0.00	−0.00	−0.23***	−0.23***	−0.28**	−0.28**
Asian	0.03	0.03	−0.08	−0.08	0.05	0.05
Other race	0.01	0.01	−0.03	−0.03	−0.16	−0.16
Hispanic	0.01	0.01	−0.20***	−0.20***	0.21**	0.21**
Some College	0.11***	0.11***	0.13***	0.13***	0.04	0.04
College or higher	0.11***	0.11***	0.31***	0.31***	0.00	0.00
Survey day is weekend	0.47***	0.47***	0.16***	0.16***	−5.38***	−5.38***
Employed - at work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
Employed - absent	0.23***	0.23***	0.30***	0.30***		
Unemployed - on layoff	0.84***	0.84***	0.35**	0.35**		
Unemployed - looking	0.75***	0.75***	0.64***	0.64***		
Not in labor force	0.67***	0.66***	0.73***	0.73***		
<$25,000	−0.03	−0.03	−0.02	−0.02	−0.98***	−0.98***
$25,000-$39,999	−0.00	−0.01	−0.03	−0.03	−0.32**	−0.32**
$40,000-$59,999	−0.00	−0.01	0.01	0.00	−0.18	−0.18
$60,000-$74,999	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.07	−0.08	−0.08
$75,000-$99,999	0.00	0.00	0.10*	0.10*	0.00	0.00
≥$100,000	0.05	0.04	0.19***	0.18***	−0.09	−0.09
Income (don't' know or missing)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Number of children under age 6	0.05***	0.05***	0.55***	0.55***	0.01	0.01
Number of children age 6 to 17	0.01	0.01	−0.11***	−0.11***	0.04	0.04
Year (constrained)		0.02		0.01		0.00
Constant	0.27***	0.39***	0.49***	0.58***	7.42***	7.42***
Observations	27,256	27,256	27,256	27,256	27,256	27,256

t statistics in parentheses.

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.



Appendix 1. Predicted values showing the link between age and time spent on housework, child care, and paid employment.

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