



Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s:

Hadravová, Lenka

Title:

Diasporic Namus in Transition: Respectable Women Do Not Only 'Do Things Right'-
Turkish Australian Women and Shifts in Gendered Moral Identity

Date:

2021

Persistent Link:

<https://hdl.handle.net/11343/312566>

Terms and Conditions:

Terms and Conditions: Copyright in works deposited in Minerva Access is retained by the copyright owner. The work may not be altered without permission from the copyright owner. Readers may only download, print and save electronic copies of whole works for their own personal non-commercial use. Any use that exceeds these limits requires permission from the copyright owner. Attribution is essential when quoting or paraphrasing from these works.

**Diasporic Namus in
Transition:
Respectable Women Do Not
Only ‘Do Things Right’**

**TURKISH AUSTRALIAN WOMEN and SHIFTS in
GENDERED MORALITY**

Lenka Hadravová

ORCID 0000-0001-7989-2782

December 2021

University of Melbourne
School of Social and Political Sciences

A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Abstract

Based on fieldwork among three generations of Turkish women in Australia, the thesis investigates nuances of collective and individual shifts in understandings of worth attached to self and other through the prism of *namus*. The persistence of and discernible shifts in the spheres of youth sexual morality, gendered and parent-child relationality highlight how narratives of *namus* serve as a crucial point of existential reference for women negotiating, resisting, and accommodating self and their place in the world. Considering the evolving interethnic dynamics in multicultural Australia, which have influenced Turkish immigrants' perceptions of identity, the aim is to capture the shifts in collective, and personal moral ideals attached to sexuality and intimate life in diaspora. While the importance of Islam and the participants' sense of Muslimness has been acknowledged, the collective Muslim identity was not the primary focus of the inquiry. The thesis speaks to the anthropological discourse that problematises morality as a fixed attribute of sociality whose norms people uphold and follow. It contributes with conceptualising *namus* morality as existential strategizing, moral modalities that encompass both social reproduction and social change, moral agency, and moral identity. In addition, it adds to the literature on diasporic (Australian) Turks who reside outside areas of ethnic concentration (communities).

Declaration

This is to certify that:

- (i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD,
- (ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material
- (iii) the thesis is fewer than 100 000 words in length

..... Lenka Hadravová

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my supervisors, Dr Violeta Schubert and Prof Andrew Dawson who took me under their patient and caring expert wings. This thesis and my education have benefited as a result of their involvement.

I owe much to all research participants, I thank them for affording me access to their worlds, for dedicating a great deal of their time and self to this research. I am grateful to all for taking me in their very intimate thoughts, shared their often time emotionally burdening details. I also thank to my Turkish friends in the UK as well as Dr Orhan Karagöz and his family who facilitated some of the contacts in Melbourne and provided their perspectives on the matter. I am also thankful to Dr Bengi Selvi-Lamb for feedback upon reading my draft and expressing pleasure about representation of Turkish women and providing suggestions about Turkish language.

I am grateful to Dr Julie Davies and Dr Desislava Parashkevova for detailed reading of my thesis, and their generosity in advising on matters of language and writing. I am also indebted to Dr Michael Pickering for his loyal friendship, steadfast encouragement and reading through my very final draft.

Moreover, of course, I am forever thankful to my husband Jorge Cantillana Herrera, and my parents Jitka Hadravova and Jaroslav Hadrava in the Czech Republic for their relentless emotional support, encouragement and for tolerating all the postponed family and social engagements that often centred around how to transfer books on planes.

Table of contents

ABSTRACT	2
DECLARATION.....	3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	4
INTRODUCTION.....	8
CHAPTER 1	25
COUNTERING HEGEMONIC CONSTRUCTS OF THE MUSLIM ‘OTHER’: REVIEW OF THE DISCOURSES, DEBATES AND SCHOLARSHIP OF WOMEN’ WORTH, POSITIONALITY, RESPECTABILITY AND CHASTITY	25
1.1 INTRODUCTION	25
1.2 ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF WOMEN: FROM MUSLIM WOMEN AS HOMOGENISED OBJECTS OF RESEARCH TO MULTIFACETED AGENTS OF RESISTANCE.....	27
1.3 RESPECTABILITY, MODESTY AND CHASTITY IN MUSLIM AND MEDITERRANEAN VILLAGES	35
1.4 DIASPORIC MUSLIMS IN THE WEST, RENEWED ORIENTALISATION AND DE-CULTURALISATION OF THE HONOUR CRIMES DISCOURSE: A FOCUS ON SUBJECTHOOD FORMATION.....	48
1.5 ANTHROPOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH TURKISH WOMEN AND NAMUS IN COMMUNITIES IN AUSTRALIA AND OTHER LOCATIONS	58
CHAPTER 2	69
METHODOLOGY: RESEARCHING COMPLEX AND DELICATE MATTERS.....	69
2.1 INTRODUCTION	69
2.2 FIELD SITE: TURKISH DIASPORIC COMMUNITIES AND INDIVIDUALS OF MELBOURNE.....	70
2.3 GAINING ACCESS TO THE FIELD SITE THROUGH BUILDING TRUST AND MUTUALITY.....	74
2.4 DATA COLLECTION: WHEN THE TOPIC AND QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT MORALITY.....	80
2.5 ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND DATA ANALYSIS: MAKING MEANING OF THE DATA	84
2.6 REFLEXIVITY AND THE RESEARCHER’S POSITIONALITY: AFFORDANCES AND OBSTACLES	85
2.7 ETHICAL RESEARCH: MANAGING POTENTIAL RISKS TO PARTICIPANTS.....	90
2.8 CHALLENGES IN THE FIELD AND OTHER LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH.....	92
CHAPTER 3	95
FRAMINGS OF NAMUS IN TRANSITION: WOMEN DISAMBIGUATING IDENTITY, MORALITY, SEXUALITY AND WORTH.....	95

3.1 INTRODUCTION	95
3.2 NAMUS AS AN OBJECT OF INTERNAL DIVERSITY AND OTHERING IN THE TURKISH DIASPORA.....	97
3.3 FROM SAVING FACE TO SELF-RESPECT: SHIFTS OF NAMUS CONNOTATIONS.....	101
3.4 ON MODALITIES OF MORAL RELATING TO TURKISHNESS IN THE DIASPORA: BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND AGENCY	107
3.5 MORALITY BEYOND NAMUS: DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN MORAL WORTH AND CHASTITY	123
3.6 RELIGIOUS NAMUS: RECLAIMING WOMEN’S WORTH FROM CULTURAL MUSLIM’S OPPRESSION	130
3.7 SPATIALITY OF NAMUS, ‘LEAVING’ THE TURKISH COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD GENERATION: ‘NAMUS DOESN’T LIVE HERE ANYMORE’ OR DOES IT?.....	137
3.8 CONCLUSION	146
CHAPTER 4.....	150
THE IDEAL OF MARRIAGE-BOUND VIRGINITY AND SITUATING ‘FIRST SEX’ BETWEEN POINTS OF BELONGING AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT.....	150
4.1 INTRODUCTION	150
4.2 VIRGINITY AS A PRECONDITION FOR MARRIAGE AND A MARKER OF THE BRIDE’S CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE DIASPORA.....	151
4.3 SPACES OF MORAL LIMINALITY: BETWEEN MARRIAGE-BOUND AND RELATIONAL VIRGINITY	157
4.4 VIRGINITY TURNS PRIVATE: FIRST SEX AS A MATTER OF BELONGING AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT ...	161
4.5 THE UNSPOKEN VALUE, DOUBLESPEAK AND GOSSIP: COMMUNICATION ABOUT SEXUAL MORALITY	169
4.6 UN-GENDERING VIRGINITY: ‘BOY, IF YOU SLEEP AROUND, YOU CANNOT ASK FOR A VIRGIN GIRL!’	174
4.7 CONCLUSION	177
CHAPTER 5.....	180
RELATIONAL MORALITY: WHETHER MARRIED OR DE FACTO, ALWAYS LOYAL AND COMMITTED TO THE ONE.....	180
5.1 INTRODUCTION	180
5.2 MORALITIES AND FORMS OF WOMAN’S AGENCY IN TURKISH ARRANGED MARRIAGE.....	181
5.3 (UN)ORGANISED DIASPORIC INTIMATE LIVES: BETWEEN ARRANGED MEETINGS AND TACIT DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS	188
5.4 CHOOSING WHOM TO MARRY: FROM ARRANGED ENDOGAMOUS ‘IMPORTS’ TO INTERCULTURAL LOVE..	205
5.5 DIVORCÉE MORAL IDENTITY STIGMA: ‘WHO DO YOU THINK YOU ARE, TALKING TO MY HUSBAND? YOU ARE A WIDOW.’	215

5.6 ADULTERY, THE WORST NAMUSSUZ ACT: ‘AS A MARRIED WOMAN, I CANNOT LOVE SOMEONE ELSE, IT IS AGAINST MY CULTURE.’	225
5.7 CONCLUSION	233
CHAPTER 6	236
TRANSFORMATIONS OF NAMUS DYNAMICS BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD: FROM AUTHORITARIAN IMPOSITION THROUGH AUTHORITATIVE GUIDANCE TO DIALECTIC PARENTING.....	236
6.1 INTRODUCTION	236
6.2 GENDERED AUTHORITARIAN PARENTING: A MEANS OF EXISTENTIAL AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL IN THE DIASPORA.....	237
6.3 AUTHORITATIVE EMPATHETIC GUIDANCE: RAISING A BETTER PERSON THROUGH UNDERSTANDING, LEADERSHIP AND AFFECTION.....	248
6.4 DIALECTICAL PARENTING OF SECOND-GENERATION MOTHERS: MAKING THE PAST WRONGS RIGHT TO BETTER DAUGHTERS’ EXISTENTIAL EXPERIENCE AND FUTURES.....	256
6.5 ‘NAMUS DOESN’T LIVE HERE ANYMORE’: PARENTS WHO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THE TURKISH COMMUNITY AND HERITAGE.....	263
6.6 CONCLUSION	269
CONCLUSION.....	272
BIBLIOGRAPHY	292

Introduction

The term ‘*namus*’¹ alludes to a complex set of ideas and behaviours but generally refers to a focus on sexual self-restraint as a marker of a reputation of moral integrity, both for the individual and/or the collective. Besides chastity, and compared to other kinds of honour, such as *şeref* or *onur*, it is also generated through adherence to the moral rules and values of the community or society that one lives in.² Although *namus* continues to be analytically problematised by scholars and often generates social and ideological contestation, it is generally accepted that it disproportionately burdens women, assigning them more responsibility for chastity, modesty, purity and fidelity than men (e.g., Antoun, 1968; Ortner, 1978; Mernissi, 1987; Mernissi & Lakeland, 1991; Zevallos, 2003, 2004)³. For some scholars and commentators, the inherently gendered conceptualisation of *namus* points to it being a tool for the regulation and, in some contexts, even violent oppression of women (Eck, 2003; Gültekin, 2011; Kardam, 2007)⁴. Others, however, have understood *namus* as a personal value or virtue, an aspiration or a measure of self-worth that is imbued with women’s agentic, self-making and performative force (see, e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1986, 2011; Withaecx & Coene, 2014)⁵. What remains consistent in these understandings is that *namus* involves an element of moral judgement, which generates a sense of self-worth through a bi-directional process of evaluation between self and others. In his now classic, tripartite theory drawing on

¹ The word *namus* is derived from the Arabic word *nāmūs* ناموس, which means ‘custom, law’. It was apparently derived from the Aramaic/Syriac *nūmūs* or *nīmūs* נומוס where it similarly meant ‘custom, law, religion’ (Jastrow, Dict. of the Targumim, Talmud Bavli etc. p. 888, 905). In addition, the dictionary entry also refers to the Ancient Greek term *nómos nómos*, which means the same thing (Liddell & Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon p. 1180). (<https://www.nisanyansozluk.com/?k=namus&view=annotated>)

² <https://sozluk.gov.tr/>

³ For discussion, see Sections 1.2.1, 1.3.1, 1.3.2

⁴ For discussion, see Section 1.2.1

⁵ For discussion, see Section 1.2.2

Plato's conceptions of soul and polis, Pitt-Rivers (1965) argues that 'honour' rests not only on self and others but also on the sentiment that connects the two elements. Pitt-Rivers (1965) states that

honour is the value of a person in [her] own eyes, but also in the eyes of society. It is [her] estimation of [her] own worth, [her] claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgment of that claim, that [her] excellence is recognised by society (p.21).

Considering the elements of sentiment and emotion prompts us to recognise and animate the difference between the normative and the agentic. Therefore, this study aims to explore the connections between the normative framing of social or collective *namus* and the individualised negotiation of self-worth that occur when one is existentially strategising in a complex environment with competing expectations. In this sense, *namus* is a stable, yet perpetually fluid construct that guides how differently situated individuals and collectives co-opt and negotiate around concepts of morality in order to generate a sense of worth. Therefore, this exploration of *namus* enables us to consider the ambiguity, fluidity and plasticity that reside in the different perspectives, positionality and situatedness of and between self and others, especially in the context of the intergender and hierarchical manner of sociality.

Namus, especially *namus* morality,⁶ continues to be a salient existential reference for the Turkish Australian women who participated in this study. For some women, concerns about *namus* can both cause and alleviate immediate existential anxiety in new contexts and situations, such as during post-migration integration. This leads us to expect generational differentiations among diasporic communities and it is often presumed, for example, that the first-generation migrants experience anxiety of difference more acutely than the subsequent generations born into the host society. Regardless, in existential strategizing, *namus* is

⁶ In the sense of a kind of morality that incorporates *namus* and practices of *namus* in a systemic way, making them a crucial element of a particular social entity such as a village or an early-stage diasporic community. Individuals are called to relate to it one way or another.

deployed and related to in various subjective ways as people navigate their self-worth, identity and situatedness in the world. As a modality of being and meaning making, *namus* has proven to be a focus of collective and individual resilience and change in diasporic contexts.

In the case of women who have been socialised with different ideals and judgements about what constitutes socially sanctioned conduct, as is the case for the so-called ‘second diasporic generation’, it is particularly compelling. Their experiences highlight the nuances of understandings and sentiments surrounding *namus*, its consistencies and shifts in deployment both at the collective and individual levels. Notably, in the interchange of ideas between generations of diasporic communities, the discourse created around *namus* morality, its interpretation, imagery and connotations revolve around attempts to make sense of the experiences of differently situated women. Thus, although some of the women who participated in this study considered *namus* personally oppressive, others endeavoured to show how it empowered their individualised, agentive capacity and afforded them a stronger position in the process of existential negotiation.

This thesis is based on fieldwork across three generations of Turkish Australian individuals and communities of Sunni Muslim, *Türkiyeli*, Turkish Cypriot and *Alevi* background carried out in Melbourne between 2014 and 2016. This research has highlighted a series of intersecting and interweaving shifts that affect how these women situate themselves in their personal, communal and societal worlds, particularly in relation to understandings of *namus* and its effects on intimate relationships with others and with self. More precisely, recognising the overarching popular discourse of oppression associated with Muslim or Middle Eastern identities that Turkish women are continually being reminded of, in this thesis *namus* is understood as a springboard for transforming self, through which women’s notions of self-worth, dignity, respectability, personal and collective moral identities, or their place in

the world are located, negotiated, resisted, rejected or accommodated. In addition, the thesis explores tendencies that could signify more profound collective moral changes occurring in conjunction with the social and existential transformation of immigrants' lives, and those of their children, during the fifty years of Turkish settlement in Australia.

The notion of a women's 'worth' in relation to their place within their family, community and society has been central to both feminist theorising and ethnographies of small and large societies. The connection between women's respectability and socially prescribed chastity has been emphasised, especially in the case of Muslim women. Mediterranean and other 'village' studies have highlighted the importance of interrogating such connections but have also contributed to reinforcing images of public-private, honour-shame and morality-law dichotomies. Furthermore, in locations where Muslim women are part of an ethnic/migrant minority, typical representations are overwhelmingly framed around oppression. Women from Muslim backgrounds are typically essentialised as the passive and submissive members of their family, community and society, regardless of their particular subjectivity or identity. Equally, the visibility of diasporic Muslim women in the 'host' society incites stereotypes and prejudices that have prompted the second-generation, in particular, to interrogate their identity and social belonging as living in a field of contestation either reinforces difference or reframes attempts at assimilation. Indeed, not all 'Muslims' are the same thus, Muslim women who wear a hijab, for example, do not exhaust the category of Muslim women identity (see, e.g., Fadil, 2011). Similarly, there are women of Muslim heritage who resist being identified as Muslim in various ways and on multiple levels (e.g., Fernando, 2009). This has led some scholars to recognise the exaggerated focus on Islam in what Shielke (2010) alluded to in his statement, 'there is too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam' (p.2). In recognition of this perspective and the resulting gap in the literature on everyday experiences of Muslims that do not focus predominantly on concerns with religion

while the importance of Islam and my participants' sense of Muslimness is acknowledged in this thesis, the collective Muslim identity is not the primary focus of the study. Instead, my primary focus is the variety of women's identities and their existential expression.

Turkish women in Australia, as in many other places, have long been distinguished from other 'Muslims' as a result of Turkey's historical, political and international relations and its unique implications for societal developments. They straddle the categories of Islamic-secular/cultural, Middle Eastern-European, traditional-modern, conservative-liberal and Turkish women are particularly interesting conceptual case as those who have occupied heterogeneous positions towards their own domestic modernist-secularist project, a 'new morality', which was unleashed in the mid-nineteenth century (Kandiyoti, 1998). This project has been competing with religious and conservative cohorts for dominance over the national vision of ideal Turkish womanhood ever since. This seems to continue within the diaspora, where the project has gained another dimension through the quest for immigrants' cultural and existential survival and their retention of traditions, customs, values and norms. From this perspective, women once again become sites where visions about 'the right' morality compete and it is, thus, important to pay attention to.

The typical notion of morality is both regulative and cultivating, aiming to maintain social order while making people better than they would otherwise be (Abu-Lughod, 2011). Accordingly, *namus* morality can be considered a means of social ordering regarding reproduction, kinship, and gendered intersubjective and intergenerational relations. In communities, particularly in villages and rural towns in Turkey, *namus* morality and related *namus* politics⁷ have been central to organising and regulating public conduct and intimate relationships. Indeed, moral judgements have been used as a tool to affirm or deny social

⁷ Intersubjective, relational and inter-group/kinship dynamics that use someone's *namus*, or lack thereof, as a means of disposition, manipulation, exchange or acquisition. The practice of gossiping stands central to such dynamics as it creates and perpetuates its force. *Dedikodu* is a Turkish term that includes both gossip and rumour where the former means rather to exchange information and the latter intends to manipulate through spreading unfavourable information, which can be both false and true.

presence and positionality. People know that morality can be a social and personal fact, something that one either has or lacks and that others can see and judge. However, this conceptualisation limits people's options to conforming through static 'norm following' (Mattingly, 2012), as though what is right and wrong were fixed and indisputable. Indeed, certain people may have fewer options for moral self-determination as existential dynamics may also come into play, while other people may ultimately be motivated to fulfil the normative ideals because of their religious and other beliefs. However, even though some people may take, or appear to take, established mores and norms for granted, other people critically interrogate and challenge moral frameworks, bringing about broader societal changes as a result. Thus, the case of Turkish Australian women represented in this thesis alludes to the shift away from viewing (*namus*) morality as a social system toward viewing it as a point of reference to *existential strategizing*.

Hence, the main research questions of this thesis focus on how Australian Turkish women understand and experience *namus*, whether understanding *namus* helps us to better understand how women navigate their self-worth, and how their self-worth relates to issues of identity and relationality. I investigate how Turkish Australian women have experienced their sense of self-worth in relation to the requirements placed on their conduct, public self-expression, sexual activity, and relationships with non-related men that may align with or digress from the expectations of 'influential others' (including family members, community, peers and the broader society). In broader terms, the intent of the research is not to enforce constructed 'oppressed-liberated' binaries nor to determine which subgroups of Turkish women are 'oppressed' and which are 'liberated'. Instead, it is to gain insight into how the structural forces of morality, embodied in the unilateral imagery of what constitutes good, proper, honourable, ideal, feminine behaviour looks like and how it has been reproduced, fought against or transformed in the context of multicultural Australia.

Many studies that have addressed topics of Turkish female sexuality, gender relations and ethnicity in the context of the migratory experience have predominantly focused on the intergenerational changes between first-generation and second-generation migrants, that is the people who first settled in the new country and their children. However, this thesis is concerned with intergenerational and intragenerational dynamics and seeks to capture the collective and individual experiences of this normativity and fluidity with more nuance and to determine the strategic worth of *namus*. In this, the thesis contributes to the move away from understandings of diasporic feminine moralities as emerging from the ‘traditional’ mode of sociality, away from the idea that they are, as Laidlaw (2014) argues, ‘based on the assumption that it is governed by rigid moral norms that leave no initiative to individuals’ (p.148).

Furthermore, the thesis engages with the broad body of scholarship that informs the extensive theorising and debate about the honour-shame paradigm and how it has been conceptualised in relation to diasporic communities (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2011; Dilmaç, 2014a, 2016; Withaekx & Coene, 2014). A relatively new body of anthropological scholarship relating to the problematising of morality as merely a social fact that ‘involves an attempt to modify the legacy associated with Durkheim and the idea of the moral as confined to unreflective norm following’ (Mattingly, 2012, p. 161). Through proposal of two moral modalities *doing things right* and *do the right thing*, the thesis offers another avenue to reconcile conceptualizations of moral practice as a tool of social reproduction, or what Robbins (2007) called ‘a routine behavior that reproduces what has come before’ (p. 311) with approaches that only see acts based in conscious, deliberate and free choice as truly moral. Thus, interrogating *namus* through the prism of the moral, particularly through the interplay of the self and others, brings a new perspective to both the discourse of honour-shame and to theorizing about moral agency that more than a free choice. No less, the thesis

contributes to theorizing on moral change that takes place in collective and individual perspectives over time.

Finally, the thesis complements the existing studies on the Turkish diaspora (in Australia) by incorporating the elements of existential strategizing and individuation of morality. In this sense, this thesis engages with, but ultimately moves away from, the typical focus on womanhood, sexuality and identity-making as, primarily, expressions of Islam and Muslimness (see Zevallos, 2003, 2004, 2005) and *community*-based concerns (see Karagoz, 2020). The attention is on the diverse Turkish Australian women who also reside in ‘areas of dispersion’ in Melbourne (Icduygu, 1990) rather than merely situating women, as individuals, within the collective.

One of the insights that emerged from the ethnographic fieldwork across different generations and age cohorts of ethnic Turkish women, is that these changing perceptions of self and relationality have come about through a gradual process of change, rather than through momentous injurious events. While the nuance of *namus* resides in its various shifts and consistencies, overall patterns of de-collectivisation, individualisation and diversification feature prominently. However, these gradual changes have intersected with traumatic events at times, for example in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, when the target of prejudice changed from ‘wogs’ to ‘Muslim others’. Arguably, such contextual factors help realign identity, relationality and self-worth as expressed through both narrative and somatic responses to the complex interplay of perceptions and judgements about the other. Thus, the points of difference and othering framed around notions, practices and deployment of *namus* morality have been consistently made from both an intercultural perspective (between Anglo-Australians and Turks/Muslims) and an internal perspective (amongst different demographic and identity subgroups within the Turkish diaspora).

Although parental moral anxieties and scrutiny of daughters in Turkish Australian communities have generally eased over the past five decades, there is evidence of a persistent connection between a woman's sexual activity, alleged or factual, and judgements made about her moral integrity. Individual framings of *namus* amongst Turkish Australian women seem to have been shaped by subjective lived experiences with *namus* community politics. In particular, second-generation mothers tap into this experience when determining their approach to parenting their daughters. Nevertheless, Turkish women with different subjectivities, social standing, existential situations and sentiments towards *namus* principles often share a common desire to reduce the emphasis placed on women's sexual restraint as a source of personal and collective 'worth' or 'value'. Instead, they subjectively propose alternative constructs of personal moral identity: most frequently, humanity, empathy and compassion. I propose that this manifests as a shift in moral modality, from *doing things right*, a mode which perpetuates cultural heritage in the next generation and was once demanded of immigrant parents, towards *doing the right thing* and expressing one's authentic moral self.

There is an indication in the case studies presented here that personal emancipation is not achieved through a refusal of *namus* principles per se, but through (i) rejecting community politics based on gossip, judgmental attitudes and interference into one's conduct, and (ii) eradicating gendered double standards in the assessment of one's sexual morality. *Namus* once consisted of interweaving principles that women needed to uphold altogether in order to be socially and personally acknowledged as *namuslu* (respectable), yet these principles have been largely untangled. Today, one individual principle can take precedence over another. In general, sexual self-restraint remains a personally significant value for Turkish women

generally, not only for those who are ‘Islamically aware’⁸. It is also noteworthy that instead of rejecting sexual restraint, some women now tend to require it from their potential life partners in addition to practising it themselves.

Simultaneously, however, there is also a trend toward decoupling virginity from marriage. As marriage is occurring later in a woman’s life, first sexual experiences are taking place outside of marriage more often. However, there is still a level of social constraint around pre-marital sex and despite tacit knowledge that it takes place, one should not by any means display or boast about it, even though it is now silently accommodated by current marriage practices. A woman’s loyalty and fidelity are now the primary requirements in relations between a man and a woman, and it is not only the wronged partners who seldom forgive transgressions, the woman’s girlfriends are often equally unforgiving.

Traditionally, intimate relationships were reserved for marriages that had been correctly arranged and organised. Thus, for older women of the second generation, it was impossible to date serially as even being seen with a non-related man attracted community scrutiny that had damaging impacts on the young women’s lives. Today, many young second- and third-generation Turkish Australian women either date secretly, using technology, social media and dating apps or are in semi-official relationships that their parents turn a blind eye to and publicly deny. Currently, for many Turks, as long as the daughter is careful about not being seen frequently with different men in public, her conduct is deemed relatively unproblematic. However, the situation is quite different with more conservative families and ‘Islamically aware’ women who deploy *namus* in different ways.

The ongoing focus on how women are socially perceived remains evident in the relationship between parents and their daughters. The focus remains on the quality of parenting needed to preserve a woman’s sexual morality and character and, in this regard,

⁸ A term designed by my respondents who wanted to distinguish themselves from ‘cultural Muslims’ or ‘secular Turks’ based on their religiosity, active contemplation of and practice of Islam.

what matters most is that good values are passed onto daughters. In the case of the daughter's transgression, her family is also subject to moral scrutiny. However, parents are increasingly disregarding the opinions of others. Especially second-generation mothers, in their efforts to 'correct past wrongs' experienced, as caused by *namus* politics, will often prioritize their daughters' emotional and mental wellbeing over the opinions and judgements of others. In light of their own negative experiences, they are motivated to seek out and provide an alternative experience for their daughters. This is the ultimate moment of an *agentic moral and existential change* when one transcends past self by changing a present situation of own daughter, and in effect bringing about the change for the future others.

Another way to understand the boundaries and distinctions relating to *namus* is through the dimension of spatiality. Accordingly, *namus* resides in specific places, sites and spaces in Melbourne that are imagined not only as enabling or inhibiting personal expression and presenting self but also as either fit or unfit in relation to existential aspirations for one's good future. Particularly locations of diasporic communities are such spaces that some Turkish people attempt to leave either temporary or more permanently to avoid moral scrutiny for themselves or their children in their *existential strategizing* to achieve a good life. In this sense, the community is a space in which *ethnic moral identity* and cultural knowledge is perpetuated. As such, it is an essential reference of transforming self and others. In short, the issue of *namus* morality brings forth a complex array of thoughts and experiences for the Turkish women that were the focus of this research and highlight the importance of delving in a more nuanced way into the intersections between the collective and the individual existential strategizing on the way to achieve a good life, the mode of being that is inherent particularly amongst migrants. Below is an outline of the thesis.

Chapter outline:

In Chapter One, I review the key discourses and debates in four interwoven thematic segments of anthropological literature that relate to the topic of the thesis: (i.) constructs of (Muslim) womanhood, worth, positionality and oppression; (ii.) modesty and sexual chastity amongst Mediterranean and Muslim village communities; (iii.) constructs of Muslim subjecthood in the West post 9/11, with a particular focus on culture, gender and honour crimes; and (iv.) studies of Turkish communities in Australia. The aim is to contextualize the broader theoretical, ideological and praxeological perspectives within which the present thesis is embedded.

In Chapter Two, I explain my approach to the question of how Turkish Australian women in focus experience *namus* morality and generate a sense of self-worth with respect to the requirements placed on their conduct, public self-expression, sexual activity and relationships with men. More specifically when it coalesces with or diverge from the views of ‘influential others’ – namely, family members, community, peers and the broader society. This chapter also describes and justifies the methodological design, and the approaches and methods used in the research. I outline the research site, participant selection process, data collection, data management and analysis methods, ethical considerations, my reflexivity and positionality, and the challenges and limitations of the research.

My approach to structuring the research chapters of this thesis was to ‘deconstruct’ the concept of *namus* and categorise it into elements or spheres of meaning that reflect how my research participants expressed them. Therefore, in Chapter Three, I explore the concept of *namus* in its broader perspective where I situate participants’ various understandings of *namus*, whereas in Chapters Four, Five and Six, I focus on the respective spheres of meanings. Thus, in Chapter Three, I explore general shifts of meanings, framings, attitudes and situatedness to *namus* on communal and individual levels. Firstly, while ethnically and

culturally united under the umbrella of Turkish identity, Turkish Australians have a rich multiplicity of identities. This diversity is reflected in the framings of *namus*, which are sometimes deployed in the internal othering between different Turkish Australian communities. The subjective lived experience of the contested discourse and field of *namus* morality also shapes how *namus* is framed and the nature of such othering.

Secondly, I explore the temporal shift in linguistic connotations that suggests the process for the individualisation and de-collectivisation of *namus* through the shift in its connotations. In general, the shift has been from *namus* that is imagined as a tool for ‘saving face’ – in front of others or for others towards, towards imaginations where connotation of self, such as ‘self-respect’, has taken over. Third, I interrogate the dichotomy of *oppressed-liberated* vis-à-vis the transition being associated with and expected from Western-born Muslim women. The aim is to better express how female moral agency operates in systems that approach young women as *protégés*. While the literature has discussed aspects of conflict in individuals growing up in ‘in-between’ cultures extensively, I focus on finding alternative expressions that avoid implied divergence. *Doing things right* and *doing the right thing* represent two modalities of relating to one’s socio-moral milieu that merge structure and agency and the dichotomy of Muslim-Western womanhood. I also outline the temporal shift of individuation and diversification through ethnic, community and personal conceptions of moral identity.

Moreover, I illustrate shifts in how different Turkish Australian women achieve their sense of emancipation, self-worth and dignity. Among the techniques identified are (i.) demands for dismantling links between sexuality and respectability, between individual and collective moral integrity and reputation, (ii.) demands for defeating gender double standards in moral judgement of premarital purity, (iii.) opposition to the involvement of others in women’s sexuality, or (iv.) connotative reversing of cultural-religious oppression where

Islamic *namus* represents what is ‘original’ and ‘pure’ form of *namus* that has been ‘hijacked’ by secular Turks that misuse it for patriarchal oppression. Instead, Islamic *namus* applies equally to both genders, aims to ‘civilise’ people and elevate women’s conditions. I conclude Chapter Three by considering the aspect of spatiality, that is, how is *namus* associated with certain spaces and locations in Melbourne.

In Chapter Four, I explore the shifts and consistencies around the principles of virginity, premarital sexual purity and chastity. More specifically, I look at how these principles have developed through their embodiment in youth sociality and the intimate life in the diaspora. The chapter is structured around the gradual change from a socially sanctioned emphasis on marriage-bound to relationship-based virginity. I argue that, over the past five decades of the diaspora, virginity, once a precondition for a good marriage - directly determining women’s existential trajectory has remained something of an ideal of a woman’s personal, yet to some extent compelled, choice, especially among diasporic mothers. Simultaneously, the way women construct meaning around their first sexual experience has generally shifted. It is now less a question of belonging to the Turkish identity or ‘the right man’, and more a matter of personal experience and development, even though all perspectives have remained represented. However, the link between a woman’s sexual activity and judgement of her character remains significant, although it is now expressed in different ways. There is also an indication that potential partners still have a preference for women who maintain a level of premarital sexual chastity. Rather than requiring partners to be virgins, one previous sexual partner in the context of a serious relationship is generally tolerated. Nevertheless, a woman’s previous sexual experience is still fundamentally a matter of tacit knowledge and is hardly talked about at all. Interestingly, while evidence-based testing of virginity, for example, the ‘bedsheet test’, all but disappeared in the diaspora during the 1980s and 1990s, some of the performative practices relating to presenting a bride’s

virginity to the community, such as the ‘red ribbon’ ritual or *kına gecesi*, have remained important, yet in a reshaped deployment.

Chapter Five explores shifts in relational morality, precisely the principle of fidelity and loyalty to a spouse and the evolution of socially sanctioned intimate relationality between Turkish men and women in the diaspora. Specifically, I observe a change in women’s agency, sense of moral self-worth and moral identity in respect to marriage, practices of matchmaking and changes in her marital status. In this context, the persisting moral stigma around *divorcées* is noteworthy, forcing, I argue, divorced women to reside in a state of *moral liminality*. Firstly, while marriage used to be the only acceptable method of intimate relationality, the range of acceptable relationship types has gradually expanded alongside women’s possibilities and opportunities for self-realisation. Unlike their older counterparts, many second and third-generation Turkish Australian women are postponing marriage to later stages in life, to facilitate university studies, travel and career building. Regardless, marriage and family life remain a central value and goal for most Australian Turks. In addition, though previously impossible, de facto cohabitation is now practised, often under a parental roof. However, like with premarital sex, it generally remains ‘something that stays in the family’. Most young unmarried women living with their partners reside in other suburbs in Melbourne, away from the Turkish communities and their parents often hide the fact from their social network.

Secondly, I describe how matchmaking has transformed over the decades from strictly arranged ethnically endogamic marriage, to arranged meetings (which are still preferred by ‘Islamically aware’ women), to self-initiated partner selections based on personality and personal preference. Love, personal compatibility and getting to know each other are now more important determining factors than ‘aspirational’ compatibility where the choice is made based primarily on a desire for material security and existential advancement through

marriage. Even in the arranged meetings where a woman's family and her social network are always ready to assist in passing contacts and knowledge about a potentially suitable partner, women are now, almost always, at the centre of partner selection and decision-making.

Furthermore, I show that fidelity remains the most robust moral value and relational requirement for men and women. However, women are still calling for and working to dismantle the double standards associated with the socially harsher judgement of adulterous women than adulterous men. Divorce is another phenomenon on the rise amongst Turkish Australians. Marriage, which used to be an enforced lifelong institution and part of every Turkish woman's destiny has become just one relationship in a woman's life. However, there is evidence of a persistent link between a woman's trustworthiness and her marital status.

Finally, Chapter Six examines the changing relationality between parents and children, the third pillar of *namus* morality that relates to loyalty to family and respect for elders. Often interpreted as unquestioned obedience and docility, it appears that while loyalty and respect to elders remains at the core of Turkish families, it is now expressed in a variety of different ways. I show how the nature of parent-child relationality evolved from gendered authoritarian imposition through gendered authoritative guidance to more of a permissive friend-like tendencies. I specifically focus on parenting that I called 'dialectic'. While alluding to chronological order, all approaches embody relationality that can occur today.

The nature of gendered-authoritarian-imposition relationality embodied strictly hierarchical positionality between parents and children, how the father was the central source, at least in his public image, of distant and disciplining authority, and the mother attributed with nurturing also cultivating qualities. In the authoritative guidance approach, the gap between parents and children closes slightly, yet it remains present. Parents are still a source of authority for their children, but their approach is to guide through dialogue and explanation

instead of by imposing rules whose substance and understanding often remain unclear to their children.

In the concept of *dialectic relationality and parenting* I show how the lived experiences of *namus* morality and its community politics have affected Australian-born mothers and thus given rise to a more egalitarian relationality that is delivered through dialogue. I argue that such approach evolves as an attempt to compensate for past wrongs and the desire to better daughter's experience growing up by changing one's parental approach to their children and thereby changing the *status quo* for others. Most prominently, these mothers demonstrate that they care less about other Turkish people's opinions and judgements about their parenting integrity and success. Instead, their priority is to care for their daughter's emotional wellbeing and development. These mothers actively take on the role of facilitators of change. By improving conditions for their daughters, they seek to reform themselves, compensate for past wrongs, and strive to create a better future for all women.

Chapter 1

Countering Hegemonic Constructs of the Muslim ‘other’: Review of the Discourses, Debates and Scholarship of Women’ Worth, Positionality, Respectability and Chastity

1.1 Introduction

In moving forward in better understanding of *namus* and how it is situated in relation to Turkish Australian women’s positionalities, identities and experiences of morality, we need to understand how the notion of women’s ‘worth’, the connection between women’s respectability and socially prescribed chastity has been discussed and debated in anthropology and related fields that take an interest in gender, women and Muslims. In this chapter, I review the key discourses and debates in four interwoven thematic segments of anthropological literature that relate to the topic of the thesis: (1) constructs of (Muslim) womanhood, worth, positionality and oppression; (2) modesty and sexual chastity amongst Mediterranean and Muslim village communities; (3) constructs of Muslim subjecthood in the West post 9/11, with a particular focus on culture, gender and honour crimes; and (4) studies of Turkish communities in Australia.

The aim is to contextualize the broader theoretical, ideological and praxeological perspectives within which the present thesis is embedded. Furthermore, given the significance of concepts relating to the perception, identity and positionality of (Muslim)

women, the focus on diasporic Turkish women requires a broad examination of the multiple spheres of articulation which not only encompass the ‘host’ but also the ‘home’ society. Any examination of the diasporic or migrant communities infers fluidity and a continually interactive process within which multivalent identities are shaped, negotiated and debated in multiple contexts.

This theoretical orientation of necessity requires an examination of a broad body of literature relating to gender, sexuality, morality, the values of honour and shame, ethnicity and the nature of the individual’s and the group’s situatedness within a state and the society within which they reside and which they identify as belonging to. Thus, in the first section, the review focuses on feminist anthropological scholarship, debates, and methodological and theoretical orientations relating to gender and women specifically. I then review the post-colonialist critique of the Western feminists’ treatments of representations and conceptualizations of (Muslim) women relative to power structures and influences that emerged with colonialism and its legacies.

Following this, I examine the issue of values, especially the continuing influence of the ‘honour and shame’ paradigm of Mediterranean scholarship, in which sexuality and morality in the Mediterranean and the Middle East has been a significant focus. The dramatic shift in attention to ‘Muslims’ and Muslim women in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks heralded an unprecedented level of attention that arguably caused both theoretical ruptures and a synthesis of key anthropological approaches and debates. The problem of essentialism, reductionism and the countering of hegemonic constructs relating to Muslim women is especially evident in relation to Turkish women, who are often viewed as anomalous and straddling European or Western modernity, and the more ‘traditionally’ conceptualized notions of Muslim women. The diasporic context also brings about a reformed negotiation

between values and identities, vis-a-vis the home and host society, and the relationship between gender and nation-states more broadly.

1.2 Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Women: From Muslim Women as Homogenised Objects of Research to Multifaceted Agents of Resistance

1.2.1 Women's Inferior Social Worth and Universal Subordination in Feminist Anthropology

The notion of women's worth, their positionality within their families, communities and society was addressed in anthropology from an emic perspective by female scholars in the 1970s. In establishing the 'anthropology' of women, these scholars sought to remedy the 'male bias', the misrepresentation of women and their 'analytical invisibility' in ethnographies specifically, and in the discipline more broadly (Lamphere, 2006, p. x; Moore, 1988, p. 3). More precisely, feminist anthropology explored and critiqued the disparities in the evaluation of the qualities, activities and worlds of men and women as two separate social categories. While the framing of such theoretical attention has been critiqued and debated since the 1980s, we should acknowledge the accomplishment of the early feminist anthropologists (e.g. Ortner, 1974; Rapp, 1975; Rosaldo, Lamphere, & Bamberger, 1974) who initiated the change of how anthropologists approach women in their research today.

Feminist anthropologists, inspired by the feminist movement and the legacy of Margaret Mead, aimed their critique at the production of knowledge and discourse about women predominantly created by male researchers. Accordingly, the existing ethnographic accounts were skewed towards the male perspective, where women were only passive, often complementary objects beyond a male researcher's appropriate access and interest. Also, it was claimed that female anthropologists' work had been systematically overlooked within the

gendered power structures of anthropological departments (Moore, 1988; Rosaldo et al., 1974). The aim was to provide more realistic accounts of women's worlds where women are at the centre of attention, and we can learn through the eyes of a female anthropologist, what women actually think and do. Unlike a male researcher, a female anthropologist can access women's spaces and conversations, which is particularly essential in the case of researching Muslim worlds.

Despite having become the subjects of many studies, women, however, remained to be approached through lenses of gender disparity where a lesser social value is assigned to women and their activities. The central debate focused on the notion of women's universal subordination and why it is found across cultures. The particularly influential was thesis of Sherry Ortner (1974), who claimed that the subordinate women's positionality (and thus inferior social value) was manifested universally in every culture and located in 'deeper mind structures' (Levy-Strauss' structuralism) and the symbolic elements of a given culture (p.67). For instance, the question that Ortner's phrased, 'why the control of female sexual purity is such a widespread and virulent phenomenon' (Ortner, 1978, p. 19) can be seen to have set off an ongoing concern with the issue of virginity, chastity, and the various links between women's sexual purity and their gendered oppression or positionality within kinship (see Schneider, 1971). Moreover, the subordination was replicated through enculturation in the intergenerational transmission of cultural and social values, beyond the actual economic or social power (p.68) that individual women might gain or manipulate (Rosaldo, 1974, p. 21). This theory stands on three premises. Firstly, that women, when compared to men, are attributed with the parts of universal structural binaries nature/culture, private/public, passive/active, pollution/purity, which connote defilement and other inferior values. Secondly, women fulfil roles and tasks that bear less prestige and, thirdly, that women are not allowed to access the societal realms believed to hold the highest forms of power.

Hence, according to Ortner, a woman's worth is derived from her biological functions -closer to nature whereas a man's worth is derived from the active creation of the human environment, from the creation of lasting objects, as opposed to womankind who give only perishable life. Furthermore, a woman's sexuality is seen as dangerous and a potential source of pollution. Therefore, women must contain their sexuality if the social and moral order are to be maintained. According to Rosaldo (1974), the social value arises within the dichotomy of the profane/sacred space that parents occupy in a child's eyes. As it is possible to observe the mother's domestic activities every day, they are not valued as much as the father's distant and unknown world, which is imagined as exciting and prestigious.

The exclusive focus on women as a research category and the universal subordination thesis, however, were quickly challenged. For instance, Marilyn Strathern (1987, p. 280) considered such an approach reductionist for portraying only one segment of the researched society, while Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1983) argued that it merely created another source of bias. In a similar vein, Henrietta Moore (1998) argued that,

If women are different from men, then it follows that they must share something as a collectivity, but assumptions about the similarities between women have only served to raise further questions about differences between them. (p. 159)

Accordingly, the thesis of universal subordination homogenised the lived experience of women with various uneven socio-economic statuses and positions. As a result, this created categories of women with different levels of privilege and associated agency, various life scenarios and associated challenges. Therefore, Scheper-Hughes (1983, p. 112) writes that, 'there is no single shared experience of womanhood', just as there are different kinds of oppression and emancipation and many levels of social worth beyond gender division.

Although the thesis engages with the perspective of women, these refinements are important in the development of my approach to the thesis topic. I will, for example, examine

whether the approach to *namus* morality is different for various families or women, based on their existential dependence on the ‘community’. My proposal is that socio-economic or existential advantage creates a sense of privilege that allows some women to escape dependence on what others think, of others judgment of worth.

1.2.2 Post-structuralist and Postcolonial Intervention: A Theoretical Broadening of the Scholarship on Middle Eastern and Muslim Women’s Positionality in Their Worlds

The feminist analytical focus on women’s positionality and social worth, based solely on the thesis of universal subordination, was also challenged by female working on Muslim, Middle Eastern and other non-Western womanhood. Female scholars hailing from the countries of the research attention expanded the investigation of women's oppression by categories of race and ethnicity.

This refinement accommodated broader shifts in social and humanities research. For example, Sehlkoglul (2018, p. 76) notes that the rise of Muslim and Middle Eastern scholarship since the 1980s has coincided with two influential theoretical and epistemological developments, post-colonial critique and the gender turn. Foucault’s work on the relationship between power and knowledge, or sexuality and subjectivity formation, provided an epistemological ‘method’ (see Lynch, 2011, p. 19) for elucidating how oppression, inequality, sexuality and normativity work. These two developments transformed how research on non-Western women has been approached in anthropological and related research ever since.

The post-colonial critique addressed the politics of knowledge and uneven distribution of power in an imperial context, based on the ‘inferiorization of excluded others’ (Rapport, 2014, p. 13) and later ‘drew attention to [the] politics of modernity as a regulatory discourse creating new forms of subjection and exclusion rather than fulfilling the promises of universal

emancipation' (Kandiyoti, 2001, p.53). Anthropologists and other scholars hailing from the Middle East and Muslim backgrounds in particular, have accommodated the post-colonial critical stance against the objectification and essentialism of enquiries into the 'colonised other' (Asad, 1973) or 'orientalised other' (Said, 1978). Female scholars from the Middle East turned against male bias – particularly against the *male colonialist gaze* imbued with sensationalised, stereotypical perceptions of Muslim women. However, the critique was also directed against the privileged position of Western middle-class feminism, which was accused of being ethnocentric and ignoring the voices of ethnic minority women.

Thus, in her seminal essay, Chandra Mohanty (1984) argued that the deployment of oppression as a universal and ahistorical category of analysis overlooks the differences between Southern women. Instead, due to the difference between women's class, race and desires, the experience of oppression is diverse, complex and subjected to historical and individual reasoning (pp. 332-333). Mohanty also asserted that Western feminism's political project, despite not having a monolithic agenda and being marginalised itself, has constructed a stereotype of 'Third world woman'. According to Mohanty, this stereotype reduces non-Western women to representations of 'ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimised, and sexually constrained' (1984, p.261). For Mohanty, however, the Western culturalist discursive practice is reproduced by both Western and third world feminists. Part of Mohanty's resolution to respect the unique positionalities and subjectivities of non-Western and non-white women is taking immigrant and women-of-colour scholars' work seriously.

In relation to the 'gender turn', the prominent work of Judith Butler (Butler, 1988, 1990, 1993) transformed the paradigm of women studies from a universally subordinate category with a somewhat fixed identity, into studies of how such a category is constructed and maintained through an act of *performance* by both men and women. In her term

‘constitutive constraint’, gender is not an essence, nor a biological quality, but a discourse, a normative system that guides social hierarchy through societal norms. Through an ontological flip of the feminist scholars’ trope, from ‘woman’s sex (nature) creates her womanhood (culture)’ to ‘gender (culture) constructs her sex(uality)’, gender has been instituted as a mode of existence and identification through which people perceive their worlds. As Stephanie Clare (2009, p. 54) observes, by rendering gender as a sort of a *performative act*, Butler incited people to realise that they ultimately have *an agency* that works in constituting of subjectivity and subjectivation – the way it stands in contrast with conceptualisations of agency as some kind of a free will or a device to express opposition.

Adding layers of race and ethnicity, in conjunction with the shift towards discursivity, provides an interesting vantage point for considering the complex existential situations of those who have grown up in a field of contestation, such as in a diaspora environment. A critical insight is that without acknowledging the hegemonic dynamics between the Anglo-Australian majority and its ethnic other, attention paid to women negotiating their place in their worlds may lead to stereotypical, reductionist interpretations in which women are viewed as passive recipients and executors of social rules imposed by their families, their ethnic communities, or Islam. Rather, intercultural and interethnic dynamics must be considered as part of the process of generating their sense of self-worth.

Furthermore, examination of Muslim and Middle Eastern women’s positionality in their enclosing structural systems beyond family and gender dynamics were expanded to include political and social projects. State, nation, Islam and its intersections were examined as sources of patriarchal hegemony over women’s lives. The well-respected volumes edited by Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989) and Deniz Kandiyoti (1991b) initiated a scholarly enquiry in the 1990s. According to this perspective, Turkish women occupy a unique historical position. Kandiyoti (1991a) explained how, against the backdrop of the

transition from the multi-ethnic (millet system) Ottoman Empire to the nation-state of the Turkish Republic, women transformed from objects of political discourse to political actors and citizens (p. 42). Accordingly, the emancipation of women was part of the Young Turks' modernisation project, which abolished the Islamic theocratic caliphate and aimed to secularise every aspect of Turkish society. The cultural identification with Islam was replaced by a unified and standardised Turkish nationality. Kandiyoti (2001) argues that women were incorporated into post-colonial Muslim nation-states under the following terms: 'in part, being caught between the contradictions of universalist constitutions defining them as citizens, of *shari'a* – derived Personal Status codes limiting their rights in the family, and of post-colonial malaise burdening them with being the privileged bearers of national authenticity' (p. 52). Kandiyoti calls this process the 'politics of modernity' or 'a regulatory discourse' that has created 'new forms of subjection and exclusion rather than fulfilling the promises of universal emancipation' (2001, p.53). The secular-modernist/nationalist direction versus Islamic-traditional has become a binary dichotomy that has been influential in searching for an ideal womanhood in Turkish society. Therefore, it is important to see how it has played out in the diasporic narratives of morality explored in this thesis.

Muslim feminist scholars have contributed significantly to the debate regarding the positionality of Muslim women, who are considered subordinate by default under Islam. For example, Fatima Mernissi (1987) separated religion from the power structure surrounding Islamic practice and argued that the unequal power dynamic between men and women does not stem from the Qur'an *per se*, but rather from the misogynist interpretations and practices of Islamic *ulama* (Islamic scholars, jurists and theologians), which are grounded in patriarchy. According to Mernissi, Arab culture, unlike the West, views women as potentially powerful and threatening because of their active and potent sexuality. Instead of suppressing sexuality, Islam regulates it through spatial gender segregation into strictly homosocial worlds and by

directing sexuality to marriage' (Mernissi, 1987; Mernissi & Lakeland, 1991). Mernissi's conception challenged the Western self-image of a global vanguard of female sexuality and representations of Muslim women's monolithic passivity. In addition, the idea of distilling Islam from the institutional and social patriarchy has recently been instrumental in Muslim women's emancipatory efforts to challenge the male bias in the personnel of religious institutions, thus, demonstrating that Muslim women can pursue their emancipation without compromising their beliefs or relationship with Allah – particularly when living in the West.

In summation, eschewing the divisive tension that appears to exist between Western, secular, post-colonial, Muslim, and other feminisms, all these research endeavours that have sought to emancipate women from patriarchy, to give them respectability, self-worth and dignity, have enriched the anthropological imagination employed in current inquiries into the lives of women from various subjectivities, groups, communities, societies and cultures around the world. Ideas associated with Western feminism, despite the many critiques aimed at its theoretical and epistemological shortfalls, remain relevant in certain elements, layers, and areas of inquiry into gender inequality. These ideas also remain influential and offer opportunities for the empowerment of some Middle Eastern women, particularly Turkish women, in the context of the secularist part of the local discourse.

Post-colonialist, Muslim, intersectional, and transnational feminist scholars have offered invaluable, previously ignored, perspectives. The previous ideal of approaching 'the researched' from a neutral point of view has shifted towards the positionality of reflexion. Therefore, anthropological inquiries should consider the confluence and intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, class, religion and sexuality and examine them with respect to particular historical, political and social contexts and dynamics. The resulting differences between women searching for their own dignity and self-worth in their respective milieu needs to be respected.

1.3 Respectability, Modesty and Chastity in Muslim and Mediterranean Villages

In the previous section, I explored how women's worth has been approached in anthropology from various feminist positions and emancipatory perspectives. Although not explicitly addressed as '(self-)worth', the efforts of primarily female scholars to rectify the objectification, disinterest, and disrespect imbued in the traditional accounts of women's situations, could be argued as, in fact, restoring (self)-worth. Here, I will explore how research into the social worth of Muslim, and other, women have been approached through the consideration of modesty, sexual restraint and the so-called honour and shame complex.

Within the paradigms of cultural and structural determinism and structural functionalism, it was widely assumed that the honour-shame complex was the fundamental uniting cultural and socio-moral essence of traditional Mediterranean village sociality. Following the critique of the feminist anthropologists, post-colonialist and post-structuralist anthropologists in the 1970s and the 1980s previously discussed, the theme of honour-shame was incorporated into research on communities in large 'modern' cities. In the 1990s, the topic faded into the margins of scholarly interest, only to resurface, rather abruptly, post-9/11. With the renewed popular and scholarly interest in Muslim immigrant communities living in the West that emerged after 9/11, the concepts of honour and shame once again became prominent, especially in discourses relating to *hijab* and honour killings.

1.3.1 Modesty in the Great-Little Tradition: The Study of the Application of the Islamic Scriptures in the Everyday Life of Muslim Communities

Anthropologists working on Middle Eastern and North African Muslim communities in the 1960s became interested in the influence Islam had on the everyday lives of Muslims. Islam

was treated as a monolith and it was assumed that the Qur'an, Hadiths and Sharia texts provide a universal normative superstructure that all Muslims are compelled to follow. The theory was that the comparative study of social life in various Muslim communities would enable anthropologists to see 'the extent' of the influence on everyday practices and beliefs. In this context, modesty was widely represented as one of the prominent cultural traits characterising Muslim communities. Thus, for example, Richard Antoun (1968) aimed to decipher the 'code of modesty' through analysing 'accommodations'⁹ of textual Islamic scriptures (the Great Tradition) in the actual behaviour, customs and beliefs of peasant village communities (the Little Tradition). According to Antoun, the modesty code has three elements: (a) covering of various parts of the body, (b) behaviour/character traits such as bashfulness, humility, diffidence, shyness, and (c) customs and beliefs associated with 'chastity, fidelity, purity, seclusion, adultery, animality, the inferiority of women and superiority of men, the legitimacy of children, and the honour of the group' (Antoun, 1968, 672). However, given the disruptions of social life, it is not possible to accommodate the modesty code in everyday life exactly as is prescribed in the Islamic scriptures.

Furthermore, Antoun claimed that the oppression of Muslim women was the result of the combination of the Islamic scriptures and Muslim male social dominance and chauvinism. While on the one hand, Antoun attributed the Qur'an with a 'civilising' and universalising power that had liberated the individual from pre-Islamic tribal social ordering by awarding individuals their rights, on the other hand, he argued, these rights were awarded only to men and children, leaving women behind. Antoun argued that it is particularly in 'the areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance, family relations, adultery and property ownership' where women continued to draw the short straw (1968, p. 672).

⁹ Antoun takes Redfield's term 'social organization of tradition' (Redfield, 1955; Steward, 1956) and reshapes it into new term for the 'accommodation of tradition'.

The 'Great-Little Traditions' approach to Muslim communities emerged from Robert Redfield's (1955) concept of anthropology as contextual research into culture through the study of 'little communities which are, historically, the most predominant forms of human sociality. Building on Ferdinand Tönnies' classic concept of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (1887), little community, as opposed to a society, is defined as an internally homogenous, self-sufficient peasant community with group consciousness and distinctiveness. Furthermore, it is a universal cultural phenomenon, a 'dimension of civilisation', 'a universal stage of cultural development between primitive sociality and industrial/urban society', which is heterogeneous, has dependent relationships, and its own state/national consciousness (Redfield, 1955, p. 13). As people in the little community retain certain elements of the 'great tradition' (stories, rituals, sacred motifs, or spiritual teachers) and utilise them in everyday life, this relationship can be observed by anthropologists. The legacy of seeing Islam as a monolith (Geertz, 1971), as 'a blueprint of a social order' (Gellner, 1981, p. 1) that exists within Muslim societies and communities themselves, who then adapt its 'rules' to their respective social lives, is still influential.

Scholars from various fields have critiqued the 'Great-Little Traditions' approach to Muslim communities, however, its legacy is still strongly represented in popular discourse and imagination. Muslim anthropologists and Islamic studies scholars highlighted the inadequate theological and legal scholarship and its methodology (see, e.g., Abu-Zahra, 1970; Asad, 2009). Abu-Zahra (1970) highlighted, in particular, 'the questionable logic in searching accommodation of highly abstract and contested theological concepts by illiterate Arab peasants' (p. 1079), and the ahistorical homogenisation of a wide variety of Muslim communities observed in different eras, resulting in a cultural 'hotchpotch' (ibid.). Equally, Islamic feminist scholars have strongly countered the notion that the Quranic texts have restrictive impacts on Muslim women. Indeed, many of them claim that the texts promote the

emancipation of women (see, e.g., Ahmed, 1992; Barlas, 2002; Mernissi, 1987, 1991; Mernissi & Lakeland, 1991).

1.3.2. The Emergence of the 'Honour – Shame' Paradigm and the Mediterranean Cultural

Unity

Concurrently with the 'Great-Little Traditions' approach to Muslim communities, the researchers¹⁰ of the recently founded 'anthropology of Europe' focused on the study of small and isolated village communities around the Mediterranean. John Cole writes that even though the so-called move of anthropology from far-away places to home was inevitable due to the shrinking opportunities for research in Western European ex-colonies, where anthropologists no longer enjoyed the trust¹¹ of local communities (1977, p. 335). This shift generated a strong sense of unease at British anthropological departments (Dawson 2020; Dawson 2021). Cole writes that some critics argued that using approaches intended for studying 'primitives' when studying 'the civilised' distorted the idea of 'real' anthropology as the study of people in exotic and remote locations (1977, p. 358). Furthermore, David Gilmore (in Boissevain et al., 1979, p. 87) commented that although various anthropologists worked on similar topics around the Mediterranean¹², the 'Europeanists' and 'Islamicists' would not communicate their conclusions to one another until the late 1970s.

¹⁰ Aceves (1979) argued that although Julian Pitt-Rivers (1957) is usually credited for laying the foundations, other non-British anthropologists, such as Julio Baroja, worked on the Mediterranean Europe before him. As the recent review (Benthall, 2019) of letters between the Baroja and Pitt-Rivers indicates, the two anthropologists were connected in friendship and conversation for most of their lives.

¹¹ Thus Boissevain (1979, p.84), for example, writes of how people in the newly independent countries saw through 'the self-interest, career-oriented, paternalistic manner' of many anthropologists, which reminded them the behaviour of the missionaries and colonial servants.

¹² The assumption of cultural unity in the Mediterranean was influenced by the historical synthesis of Fernand Braudel (1949) who located populations around the Mediterranean within a distinctive and united socio-economic-cultural complex, where communities developed similar practices based on the environments of the desert, mountains and the coast.

‘The Mediterraneanists’ approached anthropology as a comparative study of culture by focusing on specific shared phenomena that characterised the shared essence of the region and how the honour-shame complex, in particular, stood out as a characteristic moral-cognitive structure of the area. In other words, the honour-shame complex was described as a cultural archetype permeating through societies and their value systems. For instance, Péristiany (1965) writes, ‘Mediterranean peoples are constantly called upon to use the concepts of honour and shame to assess their conduct and that of their fellows’ (p.10).

The interconnectedness between self-discipline and the disciplining of others was considered salient in the moral-social structuring of people’s everyday lives in the village. Pitt-Rivers’ (1965) timeless tripartite theory explains the interweaving mechanism of such structuring where honour consists of internal and external dimensions. The internal component reflects two psychological facets -a sentiment and the manifestation of this sentiment in conduct. The external component reflects social facet, in the moral evaluation of one’s conduct by others. As Pitt-Rivers (1965) put it,

honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgment of that claim, that his excellence is recognised by society (p.21).

There is a similar principle of interconnectedness between an individual and his/her group of belonging, in that one’s honour is intertwined with the honour of the kin. Gilmore (1987) writes that these ‘reciprocal moral values represented [the] primordial integration of an individual to a social group’ (p.3). Every member of the collective is accountable for the honourable image (reputation) of that collective in public opinion. Conversely, group honour is also transferred onto the reputation of each individual member of the collective. This mutually charging honour sustains the integral unity of the collective. Being honourable provides both an individual and their collective with an advantage in conflicts and the

capacity to partake in transactions of social and economic nature, making one's life in the broader community possible.

Furthermore, the honour-shame complex was understood as a gendered dichotomy which also defines male-female relationships and gender roles. Although a person of good repute can be both honourable and shameless (Pitt-Rivers, 1965), what constitutes desirable qualities differs for men and women. While desirable male qualities vary from region to region (Péristiany, 1965), the female 'code of honour' was universally entwined with male honour through her shame. In this context, shame is a euphemism for a woman's sexual purity, chastity, fidelity, modesty and shyness, in both behaviour and bodily comportment, and requires her to be obedient to her male kin.

In addition, Pitt-Rivers (1965) observed double standards in the assessment of sexual integrity. While a woman is considered dishonoured when her sexual purity is tainted, a man's is not. Thus, Campbell (1964) wrote, the way a woman's virginal status is socially assessed differs in different communities and is dependent on 'what the community is willing to concede' (p.13). This means that while virginity is, in some sense, a bodily affair, it is primarily considered a community-specific social consensus about what kind of public conduct provides an indication of women's virginal, and for that matter moral, status and quality. Furthermore, the woman's reputation is thought to be passed on through the family, through the female line, from mothers to daughters (ibid.).

Given this understanding of women's honour, it follows that two salient components of a man's honourability include control over his women's sexuality and his sense of self-importance (Davis, 1977). How high a man could hold his head among other men is dependent upon the extent to which the man's kinwomen (his mother, wife, sisters and daughters) are publicly considered 'shameful'. As honour-shame morality compels a man to 'protect and defend his and honour' as well as that of his family, it also renders him

vulnerable. (Campbell, 1964, p.145). Thus, ‘men are obliged to supervise the conduct of their female relatives and remain ever vigilant’ because their women’s shame makes them ‘sensitive to the judgements of others’ (ibid.).

In contrast, John Campbell (1964) argued that honour is an ideal that both women, through sexual shame (*drope*), and men, through the notion of manliness (*andrismos*), should aspire to internally, rather than out of fear of external sanctions. This means that Campbell deemed honour to be more than a device of social ordering. In this respect, for Campbell, honour becomes something of a “civilising process”, as ‘an honourable man must discipline the animal strengths and passions to its own ideal ends’ (1964, p. 146). It is this drive for self-improvement, the conquering of biological urges, rational thought and culture, that makes us human. It is a matter of self fulfillment, but also of proving oneself to others and seeking recognition for that achievement. Thus, Campbell’s conception affords individuals with some form of agency in making the decision to act morally.

Similarly, the notion that agentic action has a role in moral change featured in the work of Constantina Safilios-Rothschild (1969). She studied how different segments of Greek society, particularly in urban cities achieved a change in social convention. According to Safilios-Rothschild, the change was, to a certain extent, achieved by redefining honour and shame as based upon one's own personal situation rather than a reflection of and upon the behaviour of other family members (pp. 213, 216). To illustrate this, Safilios-Rothschild engaged with the concept of *philótimo*, which means ‘love of honour’ (1969, p.205). This term is used by Safilios-Rothschild ‘to identify the character of a Greek who is concerned with his honour and his good name above all and who is willing to safeguard it at any cost’ (ibid.). Inversely, an individual who does not possess *philótimo*, is called by Safilios-Rothschild *aphilótimo*, meaning he lacks shame or is shameless and does not feel the need to conform to societal norms, nor to respond to dishonourable conduct (ibid). Accordingly, the

individual change happens when one becomes shameless and stops caring about honour. Therefore, as Safilios-Rothschild put it, ‘those who no longer adhere to traditional moral values may not think that a girl with consensual premarital sexual relations [...] or if she changes her mind about marriage [...] is dishonoured’ (p. 213). Such people do not need to resort to violence in defence of honour, while those in traditional (rural) societies with *philótimo* were, when dishonoured, required either to commit suicide or to retaliate with violence. That is, women who were unchaste, unfaithful or who behaved as if they had the same sexual freedom as men were expected to commit suicide. While men were expected to defend their honour and that of their family by either assaulting or killing the dishonoured woman and/or those responsible for the dishonour, that is, by committing an ‘honour crime’ (p.206).

In asking why there is such a preoccupation with honour in the Mediterranean, Jane Schneider (1971) considered what ecological conditions led to the adoption of the honour-shame complex in this region. Focusing on the value of female premarital chastity, Schneider linked the honour-shame complex to competition for scarce resources, especially water and grazing land, between property holders such as peasant villagers, shepherds and pastoralists (p.14). Schneider claimed that in places where modern state institutions are not enforced well or are ignored altogether, female virginity becomes part of a political game amongst men who flaunt their honour in order to strengthen their claim to their property. In comparison, in places where state institutions are accessible and available, people tend to be less preoccupied with female virginity (p.22).

Regarding the influence of material and economic conditions on the honour-shame complex, John Davis (1977) questioned the earlier assumption (Campbell, 1964) that honour is an egalitarian principle that has no connection with economic power. Instead, Davis argued that honour is related to wealth because ‘performing the manly roles that generate honour,

such as providing for the family or looking after women is easier when the family is not poor' (p.77). In addition, Davis claimed that moral ideas always give way to economic opportunity (ibid.) and that honour-shame is, actually, less important. Similarly, Boissevain (1979) suggested that material resources and economic constraints always have more influence over the way of life in a particular region than morality and law (p.84, citing Leach, 1961). Later, Stewart (1994) endeavoured to reconcile these two positions in his theory of vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (egalitarian or peer based) honour. According to this theory, personal honour equates to the right to respect and is, thus, enforced by the legal systems of several countries today. With this definition, Stewart bridges the gap between 'honour morality', which is associated with atavistic premodernity, and law, which is associated with modernity.

The conceptions of honour that base the measurement of one's individual and collective moral reputation on existential survival (Schneider) and economic materiality (Davis) are interesting and need to be examined in a diasporic context. How *namus* morality changes for immigrants whose economic situation improves compared to other immigrants who remain dependant on their compatriots is one of the key questions covered in this thesis under the discourse of 'existential strategizing'. The Mediterraneanist treatment of honour-shame has generally contributed to anthropological knowledge about the moral interconnectivity of self and others in communities where people rely on each other for existential survival and state support is scarce. While we like to think that this type of sociality passed with the advancement of the modern state, I argue that this idea cannot be fully forgotten, especially given the current neoliberal and libertarian calls for less state involvement in and support for the affairs of its citizens. Furthermore, this concept remains relevant and applicable to other aspects of moral mutuality.

However, aspects of this approach have been critiqued since the late 1970s.

Anthropologists working in the area objected to the essentialisation implied in the application of honour-shame as the ‘supreme’ value system that characterises the whole Mediterranean. For instance, Michael Herzfeld (1980) suggested other moral principles, such as hospitality, respect and honesty, are equally important in the area and can complement the analysis of the region’s values. Importantly, as evidenced through Herzfeld comparative study of two different Greek communities, honour is not one specific way of behaving, but rather ‘socially appropriate behaviour’ that is different in different communities and is not confined to the Mediterranean region.

Several other matters were also highlighted as problematic when creating essentialised portrayals of ‘the cultural other’. For instance, Boissevain (1979) highlighted the ‘rural bias’ that ignored ‘bourgeois’ situations and, thus, led to a generalisation of the whole ethnicity/culture/nation based on the situation of a specific village. Similarly, Herzfeld objected to seeking out marginalised people and ‘exoticizing’ them as ‘barbaric, primitive, or violent’ (1980, p. 337). He also challenged the ‘archaization’ of the Mediterranean by ‘civilised’ and privileged Anglo-Saxon anthropologists (Herzfeld, 1980, p. 339; 1987, p. 64). Based on Herzfeld’s intervention, studies of the honour-shame complex could be transferred from the Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and North African villages to other parts of the world and into large cosmopolitan cities and its subcultures (see, e.g., Archetti, 1988; Asano-Tamanoi, 1987; Gilmore, 1987; Heinonen, 2011; Melhuus, 1990; Wyatt-Brown, 1982, 2001).

1.3.3 Female Honour and the Agentic Construction of ‘Self’

The critiques of the Mediterraneanists, as discussed in the preceding section, were accompanied by contributions from female anthropologists working with Muslims, from

post-colonialist positions in particular, who reshaped the approach to the study of honour, shame and modesty further in the 1980s. While they built on earlier feminist anthropologists' critique of hegemonic positions and the methodological male bias represented by the Mediterraneanists, they were also influenced by the approach of the post-structuralist intellectual project¹³ and thus interrogated the binary oppositions that both the notion of women's universal subordination (e.g., Ortner, 1974) and the honour-shame paradigm was founded on. Unni Wikan (1984, p. 19), for instance, argued, that although there are significant gender differences in some Middle Eastern societies, the previous male-dominated analysis exaggerated the attention on male honour, 'leaving women with, if anything, only shame' (p.635). Wikan also stated that

the apparently binary nature of 'honour' and 'shame' is deceptive [...] and poorly matched on a conceptual level [because] they are dissimilar with respect to experience-nearness as templates for people's understanding of themselves and of others (1984, p.649).

Accordingly, male honour has been described in a positive sense, as expressing a person's good moral quality, while the poor moral qualities correlated with shame were associated with women. As an alternative, Wikan proposed focusing on a contextual and intersubjective usage of shame because shame, rather than honour, is 'the predominant concern' in the Middle East (p.636). According to Wikan, shame encapsulates an act rather than a personal quality. As such, it is not only connected with women's sexual integrity but with the judgement of any socially inappropriate intersubjective behaviour that can be committed by either men or women. This argument is similar to what Herzfeld (1980) had in mind when he

¹³ The post-structuralist turn in anthropology is credited to James Clifford and George Marcus (1986). Their work incited a change in how anthropologists wrote about, or in Abu Lughod's words (1996), 'against culture'. Clifford and Marcus urged researchers to question their own objectivity, positionality, representation, perspectivism, and reflexivity.

suggested that honour is the judgement of ‘socially appropriate behaviour; rather than a value, as discussed above.

Around the same time, Lila Abu-Lughod (1986) countered against the structuralist determinism inherent in approaching honour through women’s self-formation and the subjective lens of emotions and desires. Like Wikan, Abu-Lughod collapsed the gendered dichotomy of honour-shame, where honour pertained to men and shame pertained to women. Instead, she proposed that both genders have the potential to attain honour in different ways. Unlike previous scholars who sought to identify the unifying characteristics of women’s collective experience, of ‘women’s worlds’, Abu-Lughod (1986) was interested in the diversity of individual women’s constructs, experiences and perceptions of their moral worlds as identified through their expression of desires and emotions.

Thus, through their poems, Abu-Lughod’s Awl’ ad Ali Bedouin women revealed their own subjective ways of adopting moral ideals such as honour and modesty, and how they shaped their sense of self. Abu-Lughod identified another way to understand how a person’s agency works beyond the free-willed-constrained binary and suggested that practising modesty and chastity can be experienced as a means of empowerment. Thus, we learned that women practice modesty and chastity for reasons other than the Islamic imposition and male hegemony suggested by, for example, in the Great-Little Tradition approach. Abu-Lughod’s approach also collapses the gendered dichotomy of honour-shame, where honour pertains to men and shame pertains to women. Instead, a woman that has shame is honourable and, thus, both genders have the potential to attain honour. For Awl’ ad Ali Bedouin women, modesty and sexual propriety are both associated with honour and parts of a shared and lived moral code that guides one’s behaviour. However, this is ‘a subject of constant discussion and contestation, and the object of reflection in their highly developed tradition of poetry and storytelling’ (Abu-Lughod, 2011, p. 20).

Abu-Lughod (1986, 2011) made the important point that although a community may not value gender equality, this does not equate to a lack of female moral agency.

Accordingly, the fact that women and men are assigned different roles in society and that their social worlds are usually separated, means that everyone needs to attain honour and respect individually, regardless of gender. To be honourable means to uphold ideal personal principles, such as showing respect to those higher in the society. Here,

modesty is a key form that the respectfulness that produces respectability takes. It includes aspects of demeanour and dress as well as being reserved with, or avoiding altogether, members of the opposite sex who are not relatives. Good men, respected men, keep a proper distance from unrelated women, treating them politely and protecting the reputations of their wives and kinswomen through their own good behaviour (Abu-Lughod, 2011, p. 21).

In summation, by the early 1990s, honour and shame represented two distinct concepts of enquiry. The idea that honour was exclusive to men while women were primarily construed as the passive defenders of male honour was rejected. Instead, it was shown that women are agents of their own honour and shame. Honour and shame consist of subjectively and collectively sanctioned behaviours that are different for men and women. Locating Muslim women at the centre of knowledge production provided researchers with unique insight into the diverse universe of subjective perspectives and experiences of what is required from these women and their societies. In so doing, it also enabled the formation of a more nuanced portrayal of various Muslim cultures, relationships and morality.

1.4 Diasporic Muslims in the West, Renewed Orientalisation and De-Culturalisation of the Honour Crimes Discourse: A Focus on Subjecthood Formation

In the two preceding sections, I focused on bringing together developments in anthropological theorising and research concerning Muslim and Middle Eastern women's positionality, social and self-worth, respectability, and the discourses of modesty, chastity, honour, shame and morality. From the structuralist and structural-functionalist treatments in the 1960s and the 1970s through to the emergence of post-structuralist, post-colonialist and other critiques in the 1980s, the topics have undergone several transformations.

In this section, I explore how these topics developed further in relation to research investigating the lives of diasporic Muslim women, particularly those born in the West to immigrant parents. In the 1980s and 1990s, anthropological studies were predominantly mapping transformations of family structures and conditions of immigrants' life resulting from changes in existential and working conditions in their new country. However, the 2000s rapidly changed the tapestry of inquiries into diasporic Muslim communities in the West. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001, the ensuing US-led 'global War on Terror' and retaliatory Islamist extremist attacks in Europe and elsewhere, made it almost impossible to overlook Western countries' security anxiety (Humphrey, 2009) and a high demand for research into political Islam, Islam and terrorism, Muslim youth radicalisation, their in-between identities, civic loyalties, and other renditions of the theme of the 'compatibility' of Islamic and Western values and worlds ensued (Akpinar, 2003; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009).

In this context, the previously addressed *male colonialist gaze* and dismantled honour-shame paradigm were resurrected in the research and debates about Islamic patriarchy and custom imposition, in particular, the *hijab* and honour-related gendered violence. Indeed, it

would be hard to deny that the inherent framing stems from the influential thesis ‘clash of civilisations/cultures. Accordingly, there is an irreconcilable cultural difference between Western and Islamic worlds, between secular modernity and Islam’s theological tradition (Gellner, 1992). As Rita Chin (2010) writes, ‘in these imaginations, a Muslim woman is the primary marker of the clash between backward religiosity and secular progress’ (p. 563). In short, what was dismantled in the 1970s and 1980s, at least in anthropology, has found its way back into the discourse. Thus, once again, Muslim women feature as the focus of debates between two perspectives -the cultural/religious determinism the is viewed as governing ‘homogenised’ Muslim lives and the critique of this perspective. This prompted the new approach ‘de-culturalisation’ of the pathological issues entwined with the discourse about Muslims-in-the-West.

1.4.1 Honour-Shame Revisited: Honour Murders and Gendered Violence in Diasporic Perspective (De-)Culturalised

The topic of so-called honour-based crimes and gendered violence has been popularised through various avenues of storytelling since the late 1990s. Both academic and non-academic authors have raised awareness about the phenomena. Yet, as Abu-Lughod (2011, pp. 19, 38) argued, many of the accounts have drawn sensationalized attention to the topic and created a negative image of Muslim and Middle Eastern communities, particularly Muslim men (Ewing, 2008). Indeed, two approaches to the topic have surfaced and both have been represented amongst both Western and ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’ authors. On the one hand, there has been a prevailing tendency to ‘culturalise gender violence’ in an attempt to explain it through elements featured in ‘culture’ or Islam, deeming ‘honour violence’ as something distinctive to the Middle East (see, e.g., Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Schlytter, 2009). This

approach is a continuation of the determinism featured in the approaches to honour-shame and modesty from the 1960s and in some of the feminist anthropology of the 1970s previously discussed. When adopting this approach, some studies attempt to destigmatise, yet creating rather more issues, the whole cultural or national group by attributing honour crimes to rural people and immigrants from villages (see, e.g., Dilmaç, 2014a, 2014b, 2016; Eck, 2003) or by differentiating it from Islam (see, e.g., Abdo-Zubi & Mojab, 2004; Doğan, 2011, 2014; Sev'er & Yurdakul, 2001). In comparison, other authors (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2002; Abu-Lughod, 2011; Abu-Lughod et al., 2001; Ewing, 2003, 2008; Kogacioglu, 2004; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Welchman & Hossain, 2005) with primarily post-colonial and post-structural orientations have argued against the culturalisation¹⁴ of gender and family violence, directing the observer's focus onto the inequal structures of power between racialized and hierarchialised *others* that happen to live at one place and share one country.

Here, an exchange between Unni Wikan and Lila Abu-Lughod (2011) about Wikan's interpretation (2008) of the case of a young, Swedish-born, Kurdish woman who was murdered by her male kin illustrates the resurrected contradictions between cultural/structural determinism and the 'de-culturalisation' approach to honour-based violence. Both Wikan (1982) and Abu-Lughod (1986), in their monographs on Arab Muslim communities in Oman and Egypt respectively, contributed to dismantling the 'honour-shame code' and the essentialization of Muslim gender relations. However, in her analysis of why Fadime Sahindal 'had to die' at the hands of her male kin, Wikan (2008) sees the 'moral-cultural logic' of the honour-shame complex and its dynamics between an individual and the collective as underpinning the events leading to the murder.

Building on the premise of an intergenerational rift in Muslim diasporic families, Wikan argues that the murder occurred because Fadime committed three interrelated

¹⁴ The approach builds on Abu-Lughod's earlier thesis of 'writing against culture' (1996) which argues that the category of 'culture' has featured a hierarchical and uneven relationship between *self and other*. Therefore, Abu-Lughod's suggestion for anthropologists urges the particularisation of research topics and realities (p.51).

transgressions of the honour code, which she did not fully understand. The three offences were choosing her partner and independence, breaking the rules of exile¹⁵ when visiting her mother and sister in secret, and shaming her family by going to the media and making the shame public. Building on her earlier argument (1984) that *raison d'être* is about 'avoiding public shame' rather than a 'preoccupation with honour', Wikan contends that the third offence was the capital one because 'shame does not damage the family honour until it has become public knowledge'. Thus, having been 'displayed in the marketplace' the family's shame could no longer be hidden and the only way to regain masculine control in the eyes of others was to kill the offender (Wikan, 2008, p. 6).

In contrast, Abu-Lughod (2011) found Wikan's analysis essentializing. She argued that seeking justification or understanding for the criminal deeds of the few in cultural ideologies and social systems that are allegedly applicable to the whole social entity suggests that the whole society, and every individual in it, would approach the problem in the same way, that is, by resorting to murder. Therefore, Wikan, in a rather insensitive way, stigmatizes the whole diasporic community by ignoring the fact that most people from the community condemned this as a reprehensible deed. Abu-Lughod states:

[N]either values of honour nor their enforcement through violence are ever said to be restricted to Muslim communities, and honour crimes are not condoned in Islamic law or by religious authorities (2011, p. 17). Besides, every family would react differently (ibid., p. 21).

Ewing (2008, p. 4) highlights the issues with assessing gendered (and other) violence based on cultural grounds and group rationales in a similar way. She argues that when a Muslim and a Western assailant are concerned, double standards are usually deployed. In the

¹⁵ In exchange for their life, the exiled person cannot return.

case of a Muslim offender, culture seems to be called upon to explain the deed, whereas in a case of a Western offender, elements of the individual's subjectivity are called on to rationalize it. Abu-Lughod (2001) argues that this occurs as a result of two interconnected dichotomous imageries according to which Western countries are seen as adhering to values of individualism, freedom, humanity, tolerance and liberalism in contrast to the immigrants' countries of origin which are viewed as backward, barbaric, inhumane, intolerant and illiberal (pp. 34-35, 37).

Correspondingly, studies addressing Muslim masculinities have emerged that tackle the essentialist binary tropes of despotic, misogynistic and violent Muslim men and powerless and victimised Muslim women. Such imagery depicts Muslim immigrant communities as places from which women need to be saved.¹⁶ For instance, Katherine Pratt Ewing (2008) analysed how Turkish men living in Germany construct their masculine identities when faced with multivalent discrimination stemming from negative stereotypes about Muslim men in general. In her conceptualisation of 'stigmatised masculinity', Ewing examines how tropes associated with debates about honour killings and the hijab portray Turkish immigrant men as 'seeking hono[u]r and respect primarily through violence and the oppression of women's (2008, p.4). Accordingly, German national identity (Self) has been constructed through the abjection¹⁷ of Turkish Muslim masculinity (Other), which is to be despised for its existential difference and considered 'incompatible with the ethical subject of a democracy' (ibid.). As a result, Muslim men are all seen as forcing their women to wear the *hijab*, forbidding them from public encounters, working, and studying, while Western men are seen as considering women as their equals.

¹⁶ The critical discourse of 'saving Muslim women' was initiated by Abu-Lughod (2002, 2013) when she questioned the ethics and real motives of the 'Western humanitarian rescue project', which claimed to be saving Muslim women from irrational and violent Muslim men through political, military and other interventions. Abu-Lughod interrogates the instrumentalization of tropes and imageries of Muslim women's objectified oppression as a justification for imperialism.

¹⁷ 'Abjection is the process of maintaining a sense of wholeness and identity by casting out that which is felt to be improper or dangerous to the integrity of the self.' (Ewing, 2008, p. 4).

According to Abu-Lughod (2011), perceiving the gender and family violence that also happens in some Middle Eastern and Muslim communities solely through ‘the cultural’ means stripping moral systems of their complexity, homogenizing human experiences within communities, occluding political and social interventions of the most modern kind, but ignoring the dynamism of historical and political transformations of women, families, and everyday social and cultural life and experience (p.44).

Instead, in her attempt to understand violence against Muslim women, Abu-Lughod proposes, that we should focus on the motives and dynamics that arise within processes of migration: their insecure conditions, responses to racism, contact with new and different moral systems, the dynamics between immigrants, the state and its institutions, and competing forms of authority and governmentality (p.46). Overall, the central idea of the critique provided a departure point for calls to ‘de-culturalise’ and ‘de-collectivise’ the assessment of reasons for violence because ‘morality is on every single individual to achieve’ (Abu-Lughod, 1986, 2011).

Drawing on this critique, research on honour has since focused on the de-stigmatisation of the Muslim background and gendered moralities of immigrants. Some authors, particularly of the feminist persuasion, have approached the call through the prism of ‘culture-blind’ universality. Accordingly, honour-based violence is perceived, uniformly, as a type of ‘gender violence’ grounded in the universal patriarchal oppression of women across cultures (Welchman & Hossain, 2005). However, as Withaekx (2011, p. 4) argued, such an approach can lead to a complete disregard of contextual and cultural specific factors that may result in scholars neglecting the specific difficulties that women from minority groups face. Others have attempted to de-stigmatise the discourse by shifting the attention from a pathology of honour towards its other meanings and aspects that are construed as more positive for or even beneficial to women (see, e.g., Baxter, 2007; Dilmaç, 2014a, 2014b, 2016;

Rexvid, 2012; Withaekx & Coene, 2014). In addition, Withaekx (2011) proposed the idea that the reconceptualization of culture as a heterogenous category encompassing multiple identities and a multitude of ideas, mores and values which can be negotiated and challenged, and that, above all ‘do not stigmatize, stereotype or urge migrants to assimilate’ (p.11).

Withaekx (2011) maintains that within such a framework, in the migration context, honour-related violence can be understood as a reaction of individuals on the specific circumstances they find themselves in, drawing on the cultural resources they dispose of to give meaning and shape to their actions. For some, this may lead to the development of patriarchal ideas, used to legitimate violence. For other, it may mean redefining identity by rejecting violence and suppression (p.11).

1.4.2 New Gendered (Muslim) Subjecthood: An Analysis Against Unified Religiosity

Together with the efforts to de-culturalise violence against women and decouple imaginations of Muslim morality from its association with the honour-shame complex, other approaches have addressed the renewed cultural essentialisms and reductionisms that emerged in the wake of 9/11 and Western civilisation’s sense of superiority over Muslims. One of the prominent debates addressed the Western preoccupation with agency and the emancipation of young veiled Western-born Muslim women in particular. They were perceived to be caught in-between, on the one hand, subject to the oppressive traditional culture of their parents and ruled by Islamic customs, and on the other hand, part of a liberal, progressive and secular Western society. As such, these women’s manifestation of religiosity and identity, co-shaped the heightened visibility of Islam in the West in the so-called Islamic revival (Dorothea, 2011; Fadil & Fernando, 2015, p. 60). They confused the system of Western perceptions of linear ‘modernisation’ that fosters secularisation and liberalisation. Upon socialisation within Western society, these women were expected to ‘throw away’ their veils and ‘become like

us'. Instead, they continued to don their Islamic attire. This contradiction gave rise to 'headscarves debates' and some of them resulted in 'headscarf bans' (see, e.g., Bowen, 2007; Joppke, 2009). Thus, a certain scholarly focus on Muslim gendered subjecthood formation has aimed to explore both diversity amongst individual Muslim people and the nuance of various influences that affect the formation of their subjecthood.

In this context, it is useful to draw attention to Talal Asad's conceptualization of Islam as 'a discursive tradition' (2009, p. 14[1986]). He originally sought to critique 'dualistic typologies', such as the Great-Little Tradition, Gellner's (1981) sociology of Islam and Geertz's (1971) culturalist approach to religion, as systems of symbols. He took issue with separating Islam out as some kind of universal civilising ideological superstructure, with the Muslim community (*umma*) being perceived as a unitary sociological object. Furthermore, Asad's suggestion to investigate relationships instead, the dynamics between texts, institutions, communities, everyday experiences and practices, became particularly relevant in the post-9/11 debates about Western-born Muslims. According to Asad, research on Islam and Muslims should: (1) cover the historical context of the researched actors, their ideas and opinions; (2) consider changes in the analytical focus from 'typical actors', such as 'orthodox Muslims' and 'liberal Muslims', to changing patterns of institutional relations; (3) avoid the conflation of political economies with 'Islamic dramas', even though they may be interconnected; (4) avoid correlations between 'types of Islam' and 'types of social structures'; and (5) consider Islam as a discursive tradition (not a social totality) and its various connections with the formation of moral selves, knowledge production, the manipulation of populations and their resistance to such manipulation (2009, pp. 10,19).

Saba Mahmood's (Mahmood, 2005, 2006) conceptualisation of moral agency and ethic-self formation has also been influential. The ethic-self is differentiated from 'the Western, feminist concept of liberal selfhood' (Shively, 2014, p. 462) that recognises

individual agency as inherently subversive to one's constraints on autonomy (ibid.) as it occurs in the process of Hegelian self-reflexivity (Tauber, 2005). In the case of Muslim women from a mosque study group in Egypt, Mahmood demonstrated the gradual process through which women willingly submit to the disciplinary practices of Islamic modesty, humbleness and obedience (*al-haya*) in order to achieve a disposition of 'embodied piety' (Mahmood, 2005, p. 27), something that is perceived as a process of cultivating an ethical-self and essential to becoming 'virtuous Muslim subjects' (Fadil & Fernando, 2015). Mahmood, thus, shows morality as a character formation where one is in the conscious process of acquiring unconscious and unreflective ethical disposition. This theoretical moment is important for the theoretical underpinning of this thesis as it merges topics of Muslim womanhood, agency, freedom and morality.

Mahmood's work triggered a 'piety turn' in anthropology by heightening attention to Muslim piety and related acts (Sehlikoglu, 2018, p. 82). This approach has continued in research on Muslim communities around the world (see, e.g., Dorothea, 2011; LeBlanc, 2014). The 'piety turn', Schielke observes, has enabled us to see that 'Muslims' engagement with their religion is neither the outcome of blind adherence, nor the result of coercion, but an active and dynamic process of engagement with ideals of good life and personhood' (2010, p. 5). However, the piety turn has been critiqued for its unilateral focus on certain Islamic norms and pious Muslims that has overshadowed other expressions of Muslim selfhood and identity, and other Islamic traditions. For example, Nadia Fadil (2011) or Mayanthi Fernando (2009) specifically identify the exaggerated focus on veiled Muslim women as causing the 'normalisation of the headscarf' and misrepresenting the complexity of Muslim identities by implying that 'the pious [and veiled] Muslim is the only visible Muslim' (Deeb, 2015, p. 95).

Other critiques have highlighted the effects of other structures, such as economic and political dynamics, family, community and state, that can, while mediating one's life, also

make contradictory demands on a person (Shively, 2014). Similarly, the piety turn has been critiqued as ineffectively reflecting ‘the ambivalence, the inconsistencies and the openness of people’s lives that never fit into the framework of a single tradition’ (Schielke, 2010, p. 1). Religion might be influential in relation to certain aspects of individual moral self and insignificant in others. The crux of these critiques is encapsulated in Schielke’s statement that: ‘there is too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam in the sense of a lack of balance between the emphasis on religious commitment and a not always sufficient account of the lives of which it is a part’ (2010, p. 2). Thus, Fadil (2011) proposed an analytical shift towards exploring second-generation, ‘secular’ and ‘liberal’ Muslim women that chose to ‘un-veil’ and ‘live Islam differently’ (p.86). Similarly, Fernando (2009) aimed to fill this gap with a study of ‘publicly proclaimed secular’ or ‘ex- Muslim’ women in France. Schielke (2010) proposed,

to divert focus from traditions, discourses and powers towards existential and pragmatic sensibilities of Muslims [...] because as in any human life and subjectivity, there are ethical, not so ethical, and unethical acts that an individual commits in everyday life and over one’s life course (p.7).

Therefore, particularly given the changing Muslim identities in a changing world, moral subjectivity needs to be given more attention. Instead of ‘searching for perfection’, we should focus on the ‘conflicts, ambiguities, double standards, fractures, and shifts as the constitutive moments of the practice of norms’ (Schielke, 2009, p. 38). After all, as ‘selves are contradictory, multiple, and fragmented’ (Sehlikoglu, 2018, p. 84), aspects of parental and ancestral senses of morality often stand out in the diasporic setting through their cultural differences. This should not be easily dismissed. Rather it should constitute a springboard for their children’s use of their own moral agency to both dynamically engage with and guide their own self-formation.

This chapter section not only reflected the latest developments of the discourses of honour-shame, Muslims in the West and ensuing subjecthood formation, but it also provided an important contextual underpinning to the framework of the thesis as well as it exposed the nature of contestation that many diasporic Muslim women, particularly those born in the West to immigrant parents, are compelled to grow up with, live in and negotiate.

1.5 Anthropological Engagements with Turkish Women and Namus in Communities in Australia and Other Locations

In the previous section, I explored how approaches to Muslim women's positionality, morality, honour, respectability and modesty have developed within discourses about the Muslim-in-the-West, specifically post- 9/11. I have highlighted how prisms of honour-shame, the Islamic imposition of 'rules' and the 'clash of civilisations' were initially recalled to scrutinize gender and family violence, used in 'headscarf debates' and influential in selfhood formation. These developments have given rise to two tendencies that are currently influential in anthropological research on the morality of Muslim diasporic communities: the deculturalisation of gender violence and reconceptualization of the meaning of honour, and the expansion of research into 'Muslim' moral subjectivity and moral agency beyond piety and religion, and away from 'the moral ideal'.

In this section, I explore the developments and tendencies observed in research on Turkish women. The central focus, here, is on research into Turkish communities in Australia, however, in order to contextualise it further, I also outline some of the tendencies in research into Turkish communities still in Turkey (the ethnography of small village communities) and

in Europe. I conclude by defining the theoretical and research gaps and outlining the theoretical framework of this thesis.

Turkish people have historically occupied different conceptual spaces in Australia and in Europe. Due to factors including the different proximity to Turkey, different historical and political relations with Turkey, differing immigration policies and the size of the diaspora in 'host' countries, Turkish immigrants have been imagined as occupying both places on the axis Europe -Middle East. In the European consciousness, Turkish people have generally been considered backward and as an invading 'Muslim/ Middle Eastern other', a category that has developed throughout the history of the intensified relationship between different parts of Europe and Turkey (see, e.g., Ewing, 2008; Mandel, 1994, 2008). Thus, as Ruth Mandel (1994) poignantly observes, although many Turks are better integrated into the local social and economic structures than many eastern Germans since reunification in 1990, they are still seen as more 'foreign' and, thus, serve as targets for anger, frustration and violence (p. 115, 119). Mandel argues that this othering drives them 'outside the embrace of Europeanness' and to the margins where they remain 'permanent outsiders' (1994, p. 120). Simultaneously, Mandel continues that 'the self-designated "Westernized" urban Turks often feel shame and resentment toward their "backward, embarrassing" compatriots, who, they say, give all Turks, "even the well-integrated, modern ones" a bad name' (2008, p. 92).

In comparison, in Australia, the imagery is more multifaceted. As Humphreys (2009) observes, 'despite being the second-largest Muslim 'community', Turkish immigrants did not have a conspicuous public profile as Muslims' (p.146). This was, he suggests, because the public face of Muslims and Islam in Australia was shaped by the visibility of Lebanese Muslims' struggles (p.151). Instead, until 9/11, Australian Turks were primarily grouped together with the Italians, Greeks and immigrants from other Balkan nations, into the broader 'Southern migrant stereotype' (Elley, 1986, p.73) referred to with the derogatory label 'wogs.'

Only since 9/11 has the conception of Turks suddenly acknowledged their Muslimness, which has, bearing in mind the discussion in the previous section, been reflected in various research topics (see, e.g., Hopkins, 2008a, 2008b; Hopkins & McAuliffe, 2010; Zevallos, 2003, 2004).

What is more, Turks have inhabited quite a special place (Keceli, 1998b, pp. 208-209; Windle, 2004, p. 272) in the Australian psyche because of the historical imagination associated with Gallipoli (see Jakubowicz & İçduygu, 2015; Michális, 2015). After the dismantling of the White Australia Policy, Turkish immigrants were invited as the first non-white, Muslim group to migrate, as officialised in the 1967 bilateral Agreement.¹⁸ However, as Banu Şenay (2010) writes, an anxiety about whether to categorise Turks as Europeans or Asians accompanied the decision-making process (p. 3). In contrast to Western European countries, who were interested in Turks as factory guest workers that were expected to leave when their contracts ended, Australia approached Turkish immigrants for settlement¹⁹ and promoted family immigration (Humphreys, 2009, p. 146; Içduygu, 1990, p. 50). This commitment to Turkish migrants was later cemented by continuing the intake under the family reunion scheme (Humphrey, 2009, p. 146).

The imagery of Turkish society straddling the Europe-Middle East axis and positioning itself on the margins of both was used by British anthropologist Chris Hann (1993) to explain why ethnographic research had somewhat neglected Turkey. Hann stated that ‘it is not European, but neither can [it] be considered mainstream Mediterranean or Middle Eastern’ (1993, p. 224). In comparison, the American anthropologist Emelie Olson (1986) offered another, more pragmatic, reason for this neglect, namely the bureaucratic

¹⁸ As a starting point for the Turkish presence in Australia, this date is, however, factually inaccurate. Other Turkish speaking migrants, who identified as ethnically Turkish, started arriving almost two decades earlier, albeit in much smaller numbers. They came from Cyprus, on British passports (Hopkins & McAuliffe, 2010, p. 48) and from Thrace, in Greece, and Bulgaria on their respective countries’ passports. Yet more migrated via Germany and other Western European countries (C. Inglis, Akgönül, & Tapia, 2009, p. 108).

¹⁹ Previous research (Elley, 1986, p. 8; İçduygu, 1990, pp. 4, 16; L. I. Manderson, Christine, 1985, p. 195; Şenay, 2009) has demonstrated that the earlier Turkish migrants considered themselves guestworkers and thought of their trip to Australia as a two-year opportunity to accumulate substantial financial capital before returning to their homeland.

obstacles set by the Turkish regime after the military coup in 1980 (p.70). Nevertheless, we can learn about certain aspects of life in Turkish villages and rural town communities from previous ethnographic accounts. While undoubtedly entrenched in the paradigms of the time, as previously discussed, these accounts may be male oriented and missing perspectives on women's roles (Elley, 1986, p. 14). Nevertheless, they can still provide us with rich data about the contexts that some of the older informants in Australia left when they migrated and what they relate back to in their transnational existential strategizing. We can learn, for example, about social changes, household structure, family relations and social values (Benedict, 1974; Magnarella, 1974; Mansur, 1972; Stirling, 1965).

Interestingly, the research that had the honour-shame paradigm as its focus has somewhat bypassed Turkey. It was only echoed in, for instance, Michael Meeker's study (1976) where he addressed 'two qualities of honour', *namus* (sexual honor) and *şeref*, comparing how the terms were used by Turks and Arabs. Although based in a structuralist analysis of relationships, Meeker brings the concept of 'love' as a form of structuralist 'control' into the exploration of meanings imbedded in different kinds of social and family ties, for example, between spouses, fathers and brothers or daughters and sisters. As he argues, love and control are equally important in the Middle Eastern communities, yet they somewhat coexist in ambiguous dynamics. Notably, Meeker conveys notions of dialectic and time through his analysis as well. While *şeref* entails 'the active aspects of a historical unfolding', *namus* represents 'the statistic aspects of a past history in relation to a fixed present' (1976, p.385).

A different approach to modesty, chastity and honour, is presented in the ethnographic study of Turkish peasants by Carol Delaney (1991). Using feminist and culturalist (Schneider) analysis, Delaney claims that the symbols of soil (*toprak*) and seed (*tohum*), which embody feminine passivity and masculine activity respectively, are imprinted in and

inform the ways in which Turkish peasants construct their heavily gendered worlds. These symbols also represent two spheres, the intimate (human) and the ultimate (Islamic divine) procreation. According to Delaney, the guiding principle of gender relations resides in the notion of male ‘protection’ of women, that is the seed planted in the soil, which is practised in several ways. This is the principle underpinning gender segregation, early marriage, enforced or arranged marriages, endogamous marriage rules and only condoning sex within marriage. A woman’s ability to prove that the child is the legitimate offspring of her husband through her modesty and chastity is what determines her husband’s *namus* (together with *onur* and *şeref*, three Turkish words that signify honour) (p. 40). Delaney writes that, while it might be partially motivated by religious reasons, Turkish village women are required to be covered because ‘the female body is perceived as “naturally” open [*açık*]¹, and this is interpreted as a sign that it must, like fields, be socially closed’ [*kapalı*]¹ (p. 38). While not really moving away from the dichotomy of the honour-shame paradigm, Delaney adds to the conceptualisation of *namus* by reincorporating the women’s perspective, although their agency remains within the constraints of the collective cultural vision of morality.

Most of the interest in *namus* has, however, been channelled through research into honour-based violence. Turkish scholars, mainly of a feminist orientation, have created a substantial body of literature. As discussed in the previous section, some works return to the rural areas of Turkey, while others direct themselves to the Turkish diasporas in the West. As I argue in the first chapter, this topic has become an item of *cultural intimacy* causing division into the old dichotomies of urban-rural and modern-traditional, and othering amongst different groups both in Turkey and within the diaspora. In the context of the discourse of stigmatisation through ‘culturalising’ gender violence, for instance, Dilmaç (2014a, 2014b, 2016) seems to ‘save Turkish honour’ by distancing *şeref* from *namus*. Dilmaç interviewed young Turkish university students and graduates in Istanbul and France and observed a

pattern similar to that noted by Mandel (1994) and discussed at the beginning of this section. The students in Dilmaç's study used *şeref* to distance themselves from *namus*, which they considered barbaric, rural and pre-modern – something that belonged to a people with a different vision of honour (Dilmaç 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2016). According to Dilmaç, *şeref* is, in contrast, framed as a genderless 'civic honour' associated with moral visions of the nation. It is defined as 'respect for others, honesty, righteousness, and devotion to the nation and to society' (2016, p. 309). As such, it organizes public spaces and maintains social order through restraint and self-containment (2016, p.308). *Namus* is further framed by Dilmaç as antithetical to *şeref*, as relating to a gender-based virtue-based honour that is 'linked to purity and chastity in women' and moral honesty in men. *Namus* can ignite actions such as honour killings and is based on 'sectarian, patriarchal rules that disregard the jurisdictional laws of the country' (Dilmaç, 2016, p.309). In contrast, *şeref* 'can curb the violence through condemning it as dishonourable' (2016, p. 302). While Dilmaç's framing provides an important nuance, framing 'the good' honour and 'the bad' honour in this way is somewhat problematic. In attempting to de-stigmatise and de-culturalise the gendered violence associated with Turkish culture, it reinforces the old modernist-secularist stereotype which deems villagers from South-East Anatolia as prone to violence through their inclination to adhere to the principles of *namus*.

Furthermore, the scholarship exploring Turkish womanhood, gender and sexual morality has been accentuated in relation to the state's nation-building efforts, modernity, secularism and Islam. The ever-present tension arising from the boundary between urban-rural, modern-traditional, secular-religious have permeated most of such scholarship – either enforcing it or dismantling it. Since the 1990s, Turkish female authors in particular have been challenging the established tropes of the Kemalist nation-building project's normative conceptualisation of secularist modernity and the unilateral visions of ideal Turkish

womanhood and emancipation, which depends on the abjection and othering of the rural traditional Muslim woman in a hijab. To name but a few, Deniz Kandiyoti (1991a, 1991b, 1998) proposed that there are three systems of patriarchal oppression, that the state, religion and kinship/family represent three confluent hegemonic powers that loom over Turkish female bodies. Ayse Parla (2001) explores such tensions on the subject of state-sanctioned virginity testing where she argues that the testing is ‘either tolerated for ‘protecting the traditional values of hono[u]r, chastity, and virtue’ or it is ‘condemned as a proof of our failure in attaining a desirable degree of modernity’ (p. 66). Parla, however, argues that instead of signifying ‘remnants of tradition’, it points at inclusion of ‘preoccupation with women’s modesty’ into ‘mechanism of modern state’s surveillance’ (ibid.). Although Kemalist visions of women’s emancipation do not equate to the Western feminist project of universal emancipation from the established gender roles, ideal Turkish womanhood could be achieved through education, caring motherhood and attentive wifehood. Regardless, some scholars such as Nilüfer Göle (1996) argue that veiled Muslim women are excluded from modern womanhood. In the study of university ‘*kapalı*’ students that choose to wear a turban²⁰ (veil) despite the discouragement of public secularists, Göle easily dismantles the complementary binaries of traditional-modern, *kapalı-açık*, urban-rural.

The first anthropological studies on Turkish immigrants in Australia were by Joy Elley in Melbourne (1982, 1985, 1986, 1988) and Lenore Manderson and Christine Inglis (1984; 1985), who worked with women from the Turkish community in Sydney. This focus on Turkish immigrants in the 1980s appeared in the context of a heightened focus on immigrant integration and settlement and cultural difference was examined as a potential

²⁰ The Turkish term for a style of veil that provides women with a personal sense of modesty and expresses affiliation with a Muslim religious identity while distinguishing itself from the traditional *başörtü* worn by older rural women.

factor causing socio-economic disadvantage²¹ in relation to migrants' employment, welfare and education. Elley's study (1986) captured Turkish immigrants' subjective gendered and ethnicised experience of the settlement process in relation to their socio-economic backgrounds in Turkey. The positionality of Turkish women as unilaterally 'disadvantaged, subservient and powerless' was challenged (1982;1986, p.16). In comparison, Manderson and Inglis were more focused on the socio-economic aspects of the changes associated with migration and were specifically interested in how Turkish women negotiated participating in the workforce while managing child-rearing duties.

In addition, Christabel Young's sociological and demographic accounts contributed further data on the settlement process and demographic changes in the community in Melbourne (1988; 1980), education and employment (1982), and the worlds of teenage girls (1985). In 1986, Ahmet İcduygu conducted an extensive sociological qualitative and quantitative inquiry into the structural and cultural changes in Turkish migrant lives pre- and post-migration. The results were firstly published in his PhD (1990) and then, over the next decade, in a series of articles on various topics including structural changes in households and families (1993) and the transformation of plans in the process of settling and acquiring citizenship (1994, 1996).

The 1990s, marked another shift in the research, this time towards the children of Turkish immigrants who were born in Australia, the so-called second-generation. Arguably, by that time, most of the Turkish immigrants would have shifted their plans towards permanent, if 'unintended' settlement (İcduygu, 1994, p. 81). This shift was often motivated by the desire to provide better educational opportunities and a familiar lifestyle for the Australian born children (Elley, 1993, p. 58). Educational and occupational disadvantage remained a central focus of the research, particularly from the perspective of women, as did

²¹ For instance, Manderson and Inglis write that 'Turkish speaking migrants in Australia have acquired a reputation for being a group of recent arrivals who typify the disadvantaged situation of groups who were encouraged to migrate as 'factory fodder' (1984, p. 271).

the cultural gaps between immigrant parents and the children educated and socialised in the Australian school system (C. Inglis, Elley, & Manderson, 1992; Keceli, 1998b; Latifoglu, 2001). Inglis, Elley and Manderson (1992) concluded that while there is a gap between Turkish and other youth, caused predominantly by the continued stereotyping and discouragement of Turkish youth by non-Turks, in general, Turkish youths are largely successful in overcoming socio-economic and cultural barriers in their aspirational quests (p.149-150). Young women who face considerably more constraints than males and their peers in Turkey, are particularly committed to establishing their careers (p.151). The edited collection of conference papers marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of *Türkiyeli* presence in Australia (Akçelik, 1993) includes essays on education, identity formation (Elley, 1993), family, marriage and domestic violence (Cevik, 1993) and several other issues experienced by Turkish women (Guerra, 1993).

The 2000s and 2010s have seen increased interest in second-generation identity formation, especially in relation to Muslimness and Islam (Asaroglu, 2006; Hopkins, 2008a, 2008b; Hopkins & McAuliffe, 2010; Zevallos, 2003, 2004) through the means discussed in the previous section and linguistic analysis (Ackland, 2006; Beykont, 2010, 2012; Yağmur, 2004; Yagmur, Bot, & Korzilius, 2010; Yağmur, de Bot, & Korzilius, 1999; Yağmur & van de Vijver, 2012). Research interested in other Turkish identity groups, such as Alevi women (Hopkins, 2011; Kiliç, 2002) and Turkish Cypriots (Adal, 2013; Ali & Sonn, 2009; Ali & Sonn, 2010; Cahill, 2015; Hüssein, 2007) has also surfaced and research has expanded to incorporate further interest in media consumption and transnationalism (Hopkins, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b; Inglis, 2011; Karanfil, 2007; Şenay, 2012, 2013; Zevallos, 2008).

Previous research into Turkish communities in Australia, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, has evolved and engaged with the changes in women's positionality in both migration and intergenerational perspectives. However, such data has not been updated in the last thirty

years. Since then, socio-economic conditions have changed significantly, new immigrants from Turkey have arrived (and gone back and forth) and the second-generation of young women featured in the earlier research have matured and become mothers of the third generation. None of the previous studies were in a position to include a focus on second-generation mothers and their daughters. Furthermore, as Icduygu (1990) noted, the voices of the Turks who intentionally live outside ‘areas with a high concentration’ of Turks are yet to be incorporated into the research.

As yet, the topic of honour in Australian literature has only been discussed as a socially static category that women, their parents and other members of their family need to maintain or defend. Nor have the studies engaged with the subjectivation of its meanings and development over time. Although Zevallos has written on the intersecting topics of sexuality and identity, she was only able to include pious Muslim women in her analysis. As discussed in the previous section, the emerging aim is to engage with a broader variety of diasporic Turkish subjectivities, which include different expressions of religiosity and stances towards various aspects of Turkishness. As Annick Prieur (2002) writes that

values and practices regarding sex and gender are among the most fundamental constituents of a society’s symbolic system and an individual’s self. Gendered ways of behaviour are symbolic markers of ethnicity, both in the process of labelling from the outside and in the construction of subjective identity. Nevertheless, gender construction amongst immigrant youth cannot only be explained through cultural influence on either side. As ‘there is something new in making’ (p.53).

Thus, in this thesis, the point is not to enforce the constructed ‘oppressed-liberated’ binaries that are usually matched with the ‘Muslim-Western’ dichotomy, nor to decide which subgroups of Turkish women are oppressed and which are liberated. Instead, it is to gain insight into how the structural forces of morality, embodied in the imagery of a good, proper,

honourable, ideal womanly behaviour, have been reproduced, fought against and transformed by individual women in their existential aspirations for a good life – whether for themselves or for their daughters.

Chapter 2

Methodology: Researching Complex and Delicate Matters

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I explain my approach to the question of how Turkish Australian women in focus experience *namus* morality and generate a sense of self-worth with respect to the requirements placed on their conduct, public self-expression, sexual activity and relationships with men. More specifically when it coalesces with or diverge from the views of ‘influential others’ – namely, family members, ‘community’, peers and the broader society. This chapter also describes and justifies the methodological design, and the approaches and methods used in the research. I outline the research site, participant selection process, data collection, data management and analysis methods, ethical considerations, my reflexivity and positionality, and the challenges and limitations of the research.

This study is based on an interpretative anthropological approach using qualitative methods and multiple data collection techniques. The primary data was procured through fieldwork carried out in Melbourne, Australia, between 2014 and 2016 amongst Turkish Australian diasporic communities and with individuals of Turkish Cypriot, *Türkiyeli*, Sunni Muslim and *Alevi* heritage. Although I engaged with both men and women and explored both male and female perspectives, this thesis focuses primarily on women’s perspectives and constructions due to conceptual anchoring, as well as the scope and methodological

accessibility of deeper layers of personal data grounded in the affordances and limitations of cultural and gendered identity. This focus is the result of the fact that I was able to connect better with and gain more quality data from women. I used several techniques to access different groups of research participants with various identity markers and possible perspectives. This breadth, combined with different data collection techniques, provided sufficient triangulation and a more robust empirical foundation for the arguments presented

2.2 Field Site: Turkish Diasporic Communities and Individuals of Melbourne

The fieldwork for this thesis was undertaken in various locations within the Melbourne metropolitan area and online. However, the focus was, first and foremost, on the subjectivities and perspectives of Turkish Australian individual women, their families and social networks, rather than on a particular location or ‘community’, which were only secondary considerations of the project. Melbourne was chosen as the field site over, for example, Sydney (where there is a similar size Turkish diaspora) because of the better research opportunity and accessibility, rather than being targeted for a specific purpose. Nevertheless, as illuminated below, place may be an important existential reference for individuals defining their own identity.

The idea and project design developed out of my interest in pursuing a transnational comparative study of Turkish immigrants in Europe, where I come from, and Australia, where I have migrated to. While there has been substantial research on women in the Turkish diaspora of Europe, this has not been matched in the Australian context despite its unique and rich fabric of immigrant communities. The fact that this topic has received little attention, in part, be because it is a smaller community with a comparatively inconspicuous profile (in

relation to other ethnic minorities) and, as a result, it may appear to be a less significant research area. Nonetheless, the previously noted geographical, social, civilisational, political and other ‘straddling-in-between’ of the Turkish people is thought-provoking, particularly in relation to the study of (Muslim) feminine moralities in transition.

Compared to previous studies that focused on one identity group defined, for instance, by birthplace (Turkish Cypriots or *Türkiyelis*²²) or religion (Sunni Muslim or *Alevi*), I have included participants of Turkish Cypriot, *Türkiyeli* - Sunni Muslim²³ and Turkish *Alevi* heritage who identify with the Turkish ethnic identity. The intention was to determine whether there were any nuances in the constructions across these different identity groups and diasporic communities. In doing so, I was mindful of the potential risk of essentialising or homogenising individual identity sensibilities as discussed, for instance, by Lütfiye Ali and Christopher Sonn (2010). Therefore, I sought to remedy this risk by acknowledging a sense of identity in every participant narrative and while drawing conclusions throughout the thesis.

While the presence of Cypriot Turks in Australia precedes that of *Türkiyelis* by more than two decades, my oldest informants arrived from either Turkey or Cyprus in the late 1960s to early 1970s. Notably, numbers of Turkish Cypriots and *Türkiyelis* rose in the 1970s, although immigrants from that period tended to have different motivations. Motivations to migrate are always subjective and often multifaceted, yet many Turkish Cypriots arrived and stayed because of the interethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks that flared up in the 1960s and 1970s. A similar push factor, the suppression of their cultural practices and freedom to express their identity, has driven the migration of *Alevi* from Turkey since the 1970s. In general, *Türkiyelis* arrived predominantly for economic and material-existential reasons due to the economic recession in Turkey.

²² *Türkiyeli* is a colloquial term that refers either to ‘a Turk from the mainland’, that is from Turkey as opposed to, for instance, Cyprus, or to a ‘civic national identity based on citizenship of the Republic of Turkey’ as distinct from the term *Türk*, which refers to those sharing the ethnic identity (Grigoriadis, 2007).

²³ Throughout the text, I use term *Türkiyeli* only for participants of Sunni Muslim background and religiosity. Although *Alevi* are technically *Türkiyelis* to, I only use term *Alevi* for participants of *Alevi* identity

It is also important to briefly consider notions of community and how it is experienced and lived by the research participants. In delineating such, I followed how my informants addressed several issues, both inclusive and exclusive in nature. My informants used the word “community” in two ways. The second and third generations in particular used the word to express their relationality to their cultural and ethnic heritage in their narratives, for instance, when they wanted to distinguish themselves personally (in a sense of ‘I am different than other Turks who live in the community’). However, the word was also used to refer to a specific location in Melbourne in a sense of belonging and to distinguish themselves from Turks living in other areas which, as elaborated below, they see as *others* and different from themselves.

In Melbourne, there are several such location-based communities. Parallel to the general geo-social divide between northern and southern suburbs that is widely acknowledged in the consciousness of Melbournians and rooted in historical class rivalries, there are ‘Turks from the South’ who live in the suburbs south of the Yarra River, especially Dandenong, and ‘Broadie Turks’ who are located in the northern suburbs of Broadmeadows, Dallas, Roxburgh Park and Craigieburn. Although Dandenong and Broadmeadows are both considered ‘working class’ suburbs, the ‘Turks from the South’ exist beyond the consciousness of ‘Broadie Turks’. The Turkish Cypriot domain is in the western suburbs, especially Footscray and Sunshine (Hüssein, 2007), while the *Alevi* community’s core is concentrated around the northern suburb of Coburg (Hopkins, 2011).

These communities were established during the settlement process in the 1970s, as the early Turkish immigrants settled in the suburbs near the immigrant hostels and factories where most of them initially worked (Başarin & Başarin, 1993; Wills, 2008). Previous research has noted that the early *Türkiyeli* immigrants from this period formed relatively tight-

knit, insular²⁴ communities, isolated from mainstream Australia, for both self-induced and external reasons (Hopkins, 2008b, p. 59). According to Elley (1986, pp. 278-279) and Içduygu (1990, p.314), limited English, different values and norms (related to food, alcohol consumption, dating and de facto relationships), residential and occupational segregation, exploitation, prejudice, discrimination and racism prevented this first generation from participating in wider Australian community life. In addition, as these first migrants arrived with only temporary economic advancement in mind, there was little incentive to orientate themselves towards the Australian way of life (Içduygu, 1994, p.81) or form relationships outside their Turkish community (Içduygu, 1990, p. 333). Thus Elley (1986) comments, that ‘the ethnically defined space created a reassuring environment where customs and mores are shaped by traditional understandings’ (p.7). While Içduygu (1990) makes the interesting observation that

although most of his informants said to be open to interethnic friendship, only a few had some form of social, albeit infrequent and shallow, contact with other people of other ethnicity, mainly Greeks, Italians, Yugoslavians or Lebanese. There were very limited or mostly non-existent contacts with Anglo-Australians (p. 312).

Today, these communities, particularly the one in Broadmeadows, remain self-sustained in terms of shops, restaurants, cafes and bookshops with Turkish-speaking staff and Turkish produce, as well as high schools run by Turkish Islamic organisations, mosques and *cemevi* for the *Alevi*s in Coburg. ‘Broadie Turks’, particularly of the first generation, tend to organise most of their daily activities around the suburb, whether for convenience or because of the cultural familiarity. However, it is essential to note that the residents of these

²⁴ According to Içduygu (1990) pp. 310, 312), Turkish immigrants of the first generation had only Turkish intimate friends, mostly from the same village, town, or city (bonds of *hemserilik* = fellow townsman ship) (p. 310). Only two percent had also non-Turkish friends that were not Anglo-Australians, but migrants from of another ethnicity, mainly Greeks, Italians, Yugoslavians or Lebanese. These contacts were however rather shallow and infrequent. There were very limited or mostly non-existent contacts with Anglo-Australians. (p.312)

communities do not live in a confined space and their daily lives often involve commuting and travelling to other suburbs in Melbourne to engage in a variety of activities, such as work, shopping, entertainment, social and family commitments, and school or university. In addition, some Turkish individuals and families who moved to other suburbs for various reasons, still return occasionally to visit Turkish restaurants, buy Turkish products or access Turkish services.

Beyond the notions and experiences of community in my informants' narratives, it is also important to note how I am situated in relation to the communities. During the preliminary phases of the fieldwork, I lived in share-houses in Sunshine, Footscray and Coburg and shared a house with one of my third-generation informants. I commuted to Broadmeadows, Roxburgh Park and Craigieburn to meet with other informants. I also included Turkish Australians who do not live in these predominant suburbs but are scattered across Melbourne's southern and eastern suburbs such as Elwood and Richmond. Unfortunately, I was not able to form any meaningful connections with Turks from Dandenong. Despite this, instead of an ethnography of one specific location, I sought to develop deeper relationships with my informants and to obtain a diverse range of representations that would allow me to detect various nuances within Turkish Australian women's voices.

2.3 Gaining Access to the Field Site through Building Trust and Mutuality

Gaining access to the field by building strong relationships with my informants and their families was central to my study as a cultural and social outsider researching a topic of a very delicate and personal nature. As Abu-Lughod (1983), insightfully wrote:

unveiling the lives of women in other cultures is a difficult enterprise that requires long-term contact and the cultivation of mutual trust between the ethnographer and the women she studies (p. 158).

Although I have over a decade of lived experience associating with Turkish people in the UK, the Netherlands, Cyprus and Turkey, gaining access to Turkish Australians was surprisingly problematic. In comparison, the Turkish people that I met in Melbourne were, at first, more guarded, hesitant, distrustful and overall slow to open up to cultural outsiders. They do, however, still maintain the values of hospitality and warm humanity and extend these once they feel familiar enough with someone. Zevallos (2004, pp.74-75) describes having similar issues recruiting informants for her study of gender and ethnic identity, to the extent that she considered redesigning her research as she was not able to recruit anyone until very late. Even then, she only recruited pious Muslim university students whose intention was to 'better' the image of Muslims after 9/11.

With the relevance of the engrained caution vis-à-vis Muslim othering from Anglo-Australian discussed in previous studies, I outline several intersections with the Turkish Australians' typical caution in interaction with other people. This caution is mixed with Australian slow-paced lifestyle in cities' suburbia with its typical 'disentangled self-interest'. As one of my informants tried to explain:

Turkish people just don't want any problems. We are not scared of anything; life is good. However, I think that it is just because people don't want to attract unnecessary attention and disturb what they have achieved in their lives.

In the process of gaining access to the field site, my initial plan was to begin with unobtrusive observation in the suburbs where Turkish people live. However, the observation in both the suburbs that I lived in and others, such as Broadmeadows, was not as fruitful as I

expected at the onset of the research. Both Australians and Turkish Australians are not so different in one regard, in that they seem to prefer organising their life quite privately, around their houses and neighbourhoods and through closely curated and insulated friendships networks and contacts. Unlike smaller European cities that are scattered with buzzing public life, Melbourne is a vast urban colossus with expansive suburbs radiating out from a relatively small city centre. The suburbs are sprawled, merging into one another, and most lack a busy town square-style public centre where people can gather regularly. As a result, most public life takes place around large shopping malls or shopping strips, public parks and sports fields. Only the affluent suburbs in the south have beaches in their vicinity. The Australian dream is to live in a large private house and most immigrants seem to adopt this aspiration. Therefore, the urban landscape in most of the suburbs concerned is bland and it is difficult to find public spaces for observation. However, this realisation itself was useful data that led me to explore other methods and recognise the importance of building sound relationships in the field (see Esterberg, 2002, p. 69).

My revised strategy was to cultivate deeper friend-like connections with a smaller number of informants. I hoped that building such rapport, while demanding time and effort, would allow me to both enlarge the pool of participants and inquire about more intimate questions that are, as I realised later, often not even discussed within one's immediate friendship circle. In addition, I was also prepared that I might not be able to gain much deeply personal information from some more conservative and politically attuned Islamic women, particularly because of what I may represent to them as a white researcher and outsider. As discussed in Chapter 1, the field of Muslim subjectivities has become contested. This research was conducted at a time of heightened contestation in Australian universities and university-educated Muslim women were, as demonstrated by Zevallos's research in Melbourne (2004), aware of this discourse and might want to navigate or even modify their answers accordingly.

Nevertheless, I approached the situation with an open mind and included all women who wanted to talk to me from all subjectivities and expressions. After all, this contestation is definitely part of the current discourse and life in a multicultural society and, as such, needs to be addressed. In fact, ultimately, being an outsider gave me an advantage given the sensitive nature of the topic. I was thought of as someone who would leave the social environment and who had no interest in spreading gossip or making judgements, something that Turkish Australian women often worry about. This made it easier for participants to share their stories with me.

Initially, when I arrived from Europe, I did not know any Turkish Australians. Therefore, I began my search for participants using a top-down (formal access) strategy through one of the many Turkish-run institutions. The most useful proved to be the executive manager of the Islamic Council of Victoria, an organisation that prides itself on building religious and cultural bridges. Through him, I secured my first contacts with both veiled and non-veiled 'Islamically aware' (as they describe themselves) Australia-born *Türkiyeli* women, and secured invitations to several community events at mosques and, most importantly, to family homes and community gatherings through which I secured more informants.

I then recruited other research participants using a bottom-up (informal access) strategy, through word-of-mouth and snowballing techniques (Fassinger, 2005). I found this strategy more effective because I was able to build trust with individual informants more quickly and our exchange tended to last longer. In short, the informants recruited this way were more likely to honour the relationship between us rather than participating in the research out of nicety or a sense of duty having been referred to the study by someone important in the 'community'. However, this strategy was initially slower as it required actually meeting the first interested person who would be willing, and to a certain extent

motivated, to share their insights and recruit or introduce me to other interested informants within their social circle.

In this regard, I felt quite fortunate, as I met several 'key' informants through my existing friendship networks, work and university contacts. My former housemate, one of my 'key' informants, introduced me to several other young Turkish women in a more spontaneous way. These contacts were crucial as being referred by my housemate had already enough initial trust-building process done by the virtue of being recommended to them. I also acquired access to Turks from different demographics through my students at International House, a college of the University of Melbourne, where I worked. These introductions proved very valuable as they facilitated contact with Turkish peers from private high schools and university, thus giving me access to a variety of young, mainly third-generation Turks from relatively affluent families living outside the Turkish communities. It would not have been easy to meet such informants otherwise as often they live scattered around Melbourne and do not typically attend community events.

Helpful access to the Broadmeadows community was facilitated by a fellow PhD candidate, a second-generation Turkish Australian from Broadmeadows. He introduced me to some of the local people, directed me to potentially receptive informants and showed me around the 'community'. I gained more personal contacts independently by visiting local businesses and, through them, more invitations to research participants' homes and various events. As the information about community events is usually distributed person-to-person rather than being advertised to the general public, as an outsider, I would not have learnt about them or been able to participate in them without an invitation.

Being seen with a local made a difference to both how I felt being around the suburb and how I was received. Although I am still not able to determine which of these factors was most important, I certainly gained more confidence and trust from people as an outsider, or so

I thought, although people would often only talk to me after being introduced by a host. Only then would I enjoy the warm hospitality that I became accustomed to in the Turkish diasporas in Europe. Having a Turkish ‘guide’ opened many personal doors and provided many opportunities for me to observe the public activities of local residents without being perceived as an intruder. Nevertheless, my out-of-placeness was particularly obvious in the ‘male spaces’ that persist within the diaspora, such as certain cafes and shisha smoking shops, and even hairdressers which often have separate sections for men and women with gender-specific staff who serve the appropriate customers in each section.

One of my Turkish friends in London has extended family in Melbourne and was able to facilitate contact with the Turkish Cypriot community spread around Footscray and Sunshine. Through this channel, I accessed some of the most valuable data in a relatively short time. The transnational interconnectedness and cordial generosity of extended Turkish families and their friendly loyalty were proven once again in this international exercise. Early in the fieldwork, I was talking with my friend online and telling him about the difficulties I was having acquiring informants and how a couple of my early informants had even ‘ghosted’ me. Without hesitation, my friend asked who exactly I needed and then offered to contact his maternal cousin. Although they had only met once, he knew she worked as a social worker and, therefore, thought she could help. Within a couple of days, I was sitting in her living room chatting over a cup of coffee. The very same day, I arranged to attend several family, community and religious events. I remained in contact with this family and acquired more *Türkiyeli* and *Alevi* informants with their help.

Finally, I obtained other highly valuable research participants through location-based social media apps, where I searched for profiles of people with Turkish names. There was quite an abundance of such profiles, in particular, for younger second- and third-generation Turks who use social media as a channel for dating and socialising in a concealed way. I was

always upfront about my research intentions and careful not to lead anyone, particularly male participants, on. Most of them agreed to meet for research purposes and found the idea interesting. Through these contacts, I snowballed additional participants from various Turkish backgrounds.

I interviewed in-depth approximately 38 people, both Turkey- and Australia-born: 27 women and 11 men. The youngest participant was 18, and the oldest was in the mid-70s. The largest cohort was women in their 20s (10); six women were in their 30s, four were in their 40s, four were in their 50s, and two were in their 70s. Men's ages ranged from the early 20s to the mid-50s. Nine interviewees (7 women and two men) were of Turkish Cypriot heritage, 20 (13 women and seven men) were Türkiyelis of Sunni Muslim background and nine interviewees (7 women and two men) identified as of Alevi heritage. As described in the recruitment strategies in depth above, I recruited most of my interviewees via private channels, via a 'bottom-up' approach, rather than via organisations and a 'top-down' approach. Only three of my interviewees were recruited via the Islamic Council of Victoria. I only attended the Turkish Cypriot mosque in Sunshine as it was more inviting and accessible than the Broadmeadows mosque. During the fieldwork, I also engaged with around 200 people informally. These people felt differently about their involvement with their respective diasporic 'communities' and lived in various places around Melbourne, both in areas of ethnic concentration and dispersion. Their socio-economic and educational background was diverse, similar to the degree of religiosity, and these indicators were intertwined.

2.4 Data Collection: When the Topic and Questions are about Morality

As the trusting nature of the relationships was not only central to the way data collection occurred but also influenced the kind of information that was shared, I here elaborate on the

technicalities of what kind of data was collected and how. The fieldwork included (1) unobtrusive participant observation, (2) in-depth semi-structured, unstructured and life narrative interviews, (3) focus groups, and (4) social media exposure. For the most part, the observational and ‘talking’ phases merged because of practicalities and the occurrence of opportunity, but also because, as Katherine Ewing (2006) argues:

interviewing itself is a form of participant-observation in which interviewer and respondent are engaged in a dance of carefully chosen communications that modulate their shifting identities (p.91).

What this means is that interviewing is not some kind of robotic or automatic asking and answering of questions. It is a social interaction where ideas about the other come into play in dialectic reshaping of who we are from the onset of interview. It can be emotionally charged, and people may change their stance as they attempt to avoid being judged or feeling shame. People also negotiate their self-image based on cues from the other. It is a relationship. As such, answers need to be contextualised and understood within the possible interplay of situatedness between the interviewer and the interviewee.

Therefore, whilst gaining access to the field site, I acquired a particular type of data through unobtrusive and participant observation. As the recruitment of research participants was continuous, the data collection phase partially merged with the phase primarily devoted to and interacting with individuals on a basic social level. With my informants, I attended cultural festivals, concerts, parties, community social and religious gatherings, picnics, BBQs, weddings, henna nights (*kina gecesi*), dinners, coffee dates, shisha smoking, shopping, walks and drive-arounds, and substantiated the information gathered through social media. During these activities, I observed the dynamics between men and women, interactions between different family members, bodily behaviour and ways of dressing, participating in any conversations and gossip sessions that I could – when it was appropriate to the particular

context and situation. Participant observation provided me with background data and complemented the nuances of the participants' social realities and lived experiences that were revealed during the in-depth interviews or in the informal and online chats about intimate issues.

During both in-depth interviews and other interactions, I asked questions and encouraged discussion about the participants' lived experience, individual and family stories, attitudes, imaginations, behaviour and any practices associated with aspects of *namus*, sexuality and morality. Interviews with each participant were approached in stages depending on the nature and depth of intersubjective rapport. I usually began by asking about topics that I knew my informants were interested in but that did not involve anything private or contested. As I have a broad awareness and general knowledge about a variety of topics, I was able to engage with my informants on a sustainable level. Only then, if it 'felt right', would I ask more intimate or personal questions, allowing the dialogue to unfold in a manner that enabled the participant to construct meaning.

When asking personal questions, I relied heavily on intersubjective mutuality and the strategy of self-exposure by being willing to share personal details of my life related to the topics being discussed. It is my belief that this way, ethical aspect of honesty and more equal relationship between the researcher and the researched is achieved. In what I call the 'sauna/nudist beach effect', which symbolises situations where one no longer feels shy or exposed in front of strangers because the stranger is also 'naked', I aimed to reach a level of shared exposure, of mutual sharing, that neutralised this sense of vulnerability. Thus, I found that with older participants, particularly divorced women, I was able to create this connection by openly bantering about men, sexuality and our attitudes towards them. I gathered invaluable data about morality and judgement during this process and aimed to become as close as possible during the regular catchups.

Coupled with standard interviewing techniques, I used a technique that I call ‘indirectly asking about moral sentiments’. First, I presented a narrative about a situation, event, idea or belief that another informant had told me, carefully concealing their identity. Then I asked what my respondent thought about it and elaborated on the themes uncovered during the conversation. Afterwards, I observed, juxtaposed and triangulated their response with those of other participants. The aim was to avoid the uncomfortable feelings that can arise for participants when one asks directly about personal moral sentiments, they might wish to conceal for fear of being judged, becoming the subject of gossip or simply feeling under the spotlight. As the study aimed to acquire data about patterns and themes represented amongst Turkish Australian women in general, not specific people, I made sure to demonstrate this to my participants while obtaining quality data. After all, people are more likely to reveal what they really think when commenting on the deeds of others and while my informants felt free to express what they really thought, this technique also allowed me to indirectly observe how they morally assessed others.

Furthermore, I also obtained a lot of data and background knowledge by inviting research participants to advise me on how to approach other participants about the contested topic of *namus*. By indicating my awareness of how important and sensitive the topic can be for some people, I demonstrated my respect for my informants’ culture and identity. For instance, one of my young male informants advised that:

namus is personal, it doesn’t feel nice, it’s ego. They might not talk about it directly, but they will talk about other things related to it. You should curve around it and slowly lead to that. If you go straight into it, they won’t talk.

His advice proved essential and I stuck to it during the fieldwork. However, while men were more guarded and found it more difficult to talk, most women did not mind talking directly and openly, particularly divorced women and young third-generation women.

Finally, I used social media, such as Facebook, as another publicly available data source. Although I observed community pages and individuals' profiles, the data obtained this way was not the direct focus of my research. Rather, it provided further nuance that complemented my interpretation of people's sensibilities surrounding morality. I used this data to triangulate the data attained through other means and gain further insight into how individuals and the communities engaged in discussions around issues of morality by paying attention to the general tone and mode of discussions.

2.5 Analytical Approach and Data Analysis: Making Meaning of the Data

In the anthropological interpretative approach, where the researcher writes the account of the informants' worlds, data analysis is a crucial process for making sense and meaning of the informants' accounts. It is, in fact, a creative process as the researcher must select which themes are important and which are not. It is also an embedded process as this selection is heavily dependent on the researcher's subjectivity. The interviews and focus groups were usually voice-recorded and then transcribed, otherwise they were written in field notes during and after participant observation sessions. I also wrote reflections on the development of the research relationships and other notes about the data collection process itself.

The data obtained during the fieldwork was iteratively analysed throughout and after the data collection phases using thematic and narrative analysis to extract meaning and identify themes. My method for interpreting the data included several steps. I usually listened to the recording of the interview the same day, transcribed it and made preliminary notes that were then stored under the date and a number identical with the recording stored in my computer. If there was no recording, but only notes, I rewrote them as a full and structured

text. I searched for preliminary patterns and themes then used the social media discussions and posts for triangulation and nuance. When relevant, I copied the post and added it into the corresponding theme or conversation in the relevant file.

Upon concluding the fieldwork, I listened to and reread all transcripts and corresponding notes to familiarize myself with the material as a whole. Then I revised and matched the preliminary themes generated and open-coded the data (Esterberg, 2002, pp. 158-159) to detect recurrent and corresponding themes across the whole dataset. I also applied both narrative and discourse analysis to the responses to identify specific themes and how the participants generated particular meanings.

I analysed individuals' narratives and responses to both open-ended and semi-structured questions looking for any similarities and differences that could illuminate the transformation of meanings, practices and sensibilities of (*namus*) morality for both intergenerational (between parents and their children) and intragenerational (between older and younger women) relationships between Australian-born Turkish women. Finally, as outlined in the previous chapter, I searched for the nuance between various women's subjectivities.

2.6 Reflexivity and the Researcher's Positionality: Affordances and Obstacles

In this research, the collection and analysis of data were conducted by a sole researcher. It is, thus, important to both reflect on and be reflexive about my own positionality and situatedness. This allows for the critical examination of socio-cultural and political discursive spheres of potential influence and bias that may have affected the production of both meaning

and ‘partial truths’ about the people represented (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Kenway & McLeod, 2004, p. 527) in the thesis. As Abu-Lughod writes:

we must constantly attend to the positionality of the anthropological self and its representations of others. [...] What is needed is a recognition that they [the partial truths] are also positioned truths’ (1996, p. 53).

Therefore, when developing ‘truths’ in this case study of Turkish Australian women, I carefully deliberated on my positionality, how it relates to my research participants and how my representation of them could impact them personally and socially. At the same time, I was aware of affordances that my positionality might provide compared to a researcher who was also a ‘native’ or ‘cultural insider’.

My motivation to research this topic was multilayered, driven by personal reasons, intellectual interests, curiosity about the perceived difference in how Turkish people approach gender, family and social relations, and the never-ending endeavour to ‘save face’. Although a cultural outsider, I am Czech, I formed an appreciation and respect for Turkish people and their culture. My affinity and ability to understand Turkish ‘social grammar’ was formed through a long-term relationship with a Turkish British partner, friendships with individuals of Turkish heritage around Europe and frequent visits to extended family in Cyprus and Turkey. In my lived experience, I also came to recognise an incongruence between the monolithic imagery of Turks and other Muslims, which prevails in the Czech Republic (where I grew up) and in the UK and the Netherlands (where I lived with the partner through whom I came to know Turkish people personally). Although, I have not spent much time around visibly Muslim Turks, the growing mistrust and general dislike of people with a Muslim background were ubiquitous in Europe after the violent attacks of the 2000s. However, the questions remained: To what extent is my perception embedded in the historical European imageries of Turks? Is there actually a palpable difference between us and them? Are we

really so different? When the opportunity to come to Melbourne arose, I was intellectually stimulated by the possibility of adding another layer to this question. Throughout the research, I have learned a lot about myself and my own culture including that the many disagreements I used to have with my partner were possibly due to a clash of personalities rather than our cultural differences.

Given the current contestation, political and ethical discourse surrounding research on Muslims (Ogan, 2007) and after reflecting on critical perspectives voiced in Chapter 1, two of my greatest concerns were the extent to which I represented a voice of race and authority and the extent to which that may harm the research participants or their ‘communities’ in some way. The way that I negotiated this was to critically reflect on the analytical framing of the research and my approach to the collection of data by focusing both of these processes on providing a platform for highlighting the participants’ voices and experiences. This enabled me to let go of some of the anxieties that were inhibiting my more genuine interaction and relationality with the women. While initially driven by curiosity and a desire to learn about Turkish Australian women as an intriguing cultural other, after reading and becoming embedded in departmental and disciplinary debates about decolonisation, together with having to pass detailed university ethical approval process, I became overly sensitive to these categories, which impacted how I felt as a researcher and how I connect with my participants. Today, having the comfort of some distance from the research, I am able to acknowledge the usefulness and positive impact this experience had on the design, goals and conduct of the research and my anthropological practice in general, back then, however, I felt quite a discomfort. This process of critical reflexivity was, in other words, crucial to my attaining an understanding of how the power of knowledge constructs can play with our minds and interrupt our relationality.

Once out in the field, I regained the sense of comfortable familiarity connecting with Turkish people through a similar sense of humour, cordiality and care for one and another, although I did remain highly self-observant. Regardless, as I came to know more informants on a deeper level, by demonstrating genuine interest in understanding their lived situations, I gained a level of trust that reached beyond research relations. Both veiled and non-veiled participants, particularly older women, offered me warm friendliness, goodwill, generosity and encouragement. After I explained the project's goals, most of the women considered it essential to contribute their perspectives on the issue. For instance, I recall a particular interview with one of the younger participants. Upon acknowledging that it might be uncomfortable to talk about sexuality, she promptly offered an encouraging response connoting an association with *namus*: 'Don't worry, I am open with these things, I am not shameful. It's my life, so if I am a virgin, it's ok.' Being so far away from home, these women offered me one. We connected through womanhood and experiences of migration despite the intersections of privilege that might have set us apart.

My approach to my informants was based on mutuality, respect and trust. Research participants are certainly not passive objects to be studied but thinking subjects capable of portraying research matter in the way they chose to do so. The younger Australian-born participants in particular were knowledgeable about various discourses, representations and imageries made about them as they are entrenched in Australian social life. Thus, the exchange between us was always bidirectional or cyclical. Research participants might have assumed things about me based on the imagery accessible to them and, on that basis, chose to extend or limit what they would reveal to me. At any given stage, this fragile exchange could have been lost. They are gatekeepers in their own right and only let the research go as far as they feel comfortable whether exposing themselves or other people.

My positionality as a ‘non-Turkish’ female anthropologist brought both limitations and affordances in various spaces. Standing out visually, I was deemed an outsider almost immediately, particularly in the Turkish community of Broadmeadows and by participants that have been somewhat marginalised or are not in regular contact with non-Turks. In consequence, there were layers of initial mistrust revolving around my ‘*yabancı*’²⁵ status. However, I was often able to dismantle some initial suspicions by demonstrating my knowledge of Turkish culture, genuine interest in learning about their ways and ability to engage on an interpersonal level. Talking about *namus* was almost impossible with older conservative men. While some of the younger, Australian-born men with lower educational attainment tended to avoid the topic. In comparison, men, who had more recently arrived from Turkey, whether from a city or a village, were more approachable and open to talking about the topic.

However, being a non-Turkish, non-Australian migrant woman, opened up other spaces that would not have been accessible for a male researcher or someone who usually resides within the ‘community’. When asking questions of a highly intimate nature, I was allowed to hear stories and confessions, even those about infringing *namus* and the ‘community’s standards of morality. Given their concerns about being judged or shunned, these women felt that they could not share such information with insiders, not even their close friends. Hence, several participants even perceived our interactions as an opportunity to ‘offload’ their moral burden by being actively listened to. As previous research suggested (Zevallos, 2003, 2005), Turkish Australian women perceive non-Turks as more relaxed about issues of sexual morality. Therefore, I was often perceived as a ‘moral outsider’, who would not judge them, and a ‘social outsider’, who would not spread gossip. In addition, I learnt

²⁵ Turkish for foreigner or stranger. This term is used, particularly by older first-generation migrants, to refer to out-group otherness.

from one such informant that, as someone from a university, I evoked a sense of trust and was attributed with a level of expertise and the ability to understand the issues encountered.

2.7 Ethical Research: Managing Potential Risks to Participants

Considering the issues around the collection and analysis of data, the sensitivities involved, and the need to be critically reflexive and honest about how we are informed and shaped by ideas brings us to the issue of research ethics. Conducting research often involves complex ethical issues, which is even more salient when working in contested fields, as discussed above. Therefore, I was highly mindful of two things. First, in the context of current global public scrutiny and intrusion into Muslims lives, I was aware that the presence of an ‘observer’ may induce feelings of uneasiness, insecurity or being spied on. Second, given the sensitive nature of the topic, I was mindful that women’s participation, their answers and the way I treat and handle the data, could potentially incriminate or discredit my respondents’ good reputation and even jeopardise the aspirations that these women, and their families, have for the future. Therefore, I had to be cautious, particularly around young women socialised in conservative families or dependent on the Turkish communities. I did not interview underage girls and I always sought permission to publish the stories within the framework of ethical research.

Therefore, I also compared and evaluated each contribution against the potential drawbacks for participants, community and culture at every stage, especially when deciding whether to include it in the published material. The research plan was subject to the University of Melbourne’s extensive human research ethics approval process and I followed the approved steps. I also sought to eliminate any situations that may feel like an intrusion

whenever possible. For instance, I did not attend community events unless invited and introduced by central participants, such as brides or those being celebrated because hospitality is cherished within Turkish culture and guests are, therefore, highly respected. I also prepared for the possibility that someone may express discomfort and was ready to assure them that I would not report their activities or behaviours.

I asked the participants with whom I established trust and deeper rapport whether they would be interviewed. When they agreed, they were given a copy of the plain language statement and a consent form. Recordings of interviews, whether as audiotapes or written notes, were not passed on, yet I always sought permission before recording anything and explained the reasons for making a recording. Most of my research participants agreed and those who did not feel comfortable making an audio recording consented to my notetaking. I explained that their real names would not occur in any of the materials and that I would always use a pseudonym.

I also devised a plan to manage any negative impact on the participant that might have occurred despite my compassionate and honest intentions. These potential risks were most likely to occur, if anywhere, in relation to in-depth interviews. Therefore, I ensured that I had spent adequate time gaining the participant's trust and building good rapport by reinforcing the aims of the research, that my observations did not intend any level of judgment and that participation is confidential and voluntary. Participants were encouraged to contact the University's Human Research Ethics Office, or me, if any personal issues caused distress. In addition, I assured everyone they could withdraw from the research at any time.

2.8 Challenges in the Field and Other Limitations of the Research

In addition to the issues of positionality and ethics, it is important to note the challenges and limitations of fieldwork-based research. Several women withdrew from the research, gradually rather than abruptly, just as an unwilling witness may sneak away from a scene upon realising, they should not be there, to avoid causing trouble for themselves. Instead of directly expressing their wish to withdraw from the research, these participants would repeatedly excuse themselves from our arranged meetings or would not repeat an invitation to an event that I had been tentatively invited to. Out of respect and ethical consideration for my participants' privacy, I would 'get the message' and not pursue them, instead, intensifying the relationships with those who remained engaged and interested. These other women, and their families, formed the core of my informant network and were those who allowed me into their inner circle to be willing to talk about the sensitive topics of sexuality, gender and *namus*.

I shared my struggles with recruitment with some of my informants, seeking their insider perspective on what may have prompted the other participants to gradually 'ghost out', even when they had indicated they enjoyed our first meeting and would like to participate further in the research. Interestingly, the answers were grounded in the participants' respective subjective lived experiences. However, there were two prevalent imaginations that, ultimately, had something in common – a fear of being exposed and thus potentially damaging their reputation.

First, participants that had been oppressed by their partners or male kin in the past tended to imagine that the participants who withdrew must have given in to the concerns of their male kin about being involved in research about *namus*, suggesting they may have been worried it would disgrace the family. Consequently, it may have been difficult for the withdrawing participant to admit that their male family member was not allowing them to

participate or that they were withdrawing to avoid causing potential rifts in their family relationships. They suggested the withdrawal might have reflected a reluctance to let strangers into the deeper layers of what Herzfeld (1997) called ‘cultural intimacy’, thus playing into the prejudices about the oppression of Muslim women (Abu-Lughod, 2016; Cooke, 2007). *Namus* may be a matter of Turkish cultural intimacy that, although cherished, can also be a source of embarrassment and shame.

Second, *kapalı* women²⁶ in particular, if not exclusively, who had experienced some form of racism, essentialism, or stereotyping based on their Muslim or ethnic background, tended to imagine the participants withdrew because they did not want to expose their community to further unwanted scrutiny or risk causing trouble for themselves in their ‘community’. Many of these women had experienced unwarranted comments about how oppressed they are as Muslim women. One of the informants, Zehra, described this concern as a desire to maintain the *status quo* and avoid unnecessary problems: ‘They just want to stay where they are in their comfort zone, and they don’t want anything to distract it.’

Similarly, several informants warned me that some *kapalı* women would not be genuine in their answers because they would not want their community to appear in a negative light. This provided me with a nuanced understanding of why some *kapalı* women’s narratives were flavoured by almost unreal exaggerations that there are no issues in their lives, that all is well and positive. I understood their concerns the given context in which the fieldwork was conducted, namely during the post-9/11 era of exaggerated scrutiny and interrogation of Muslims in the West. This assumption was confirmed by some of my young Australian-born male participants during our chats. They shared their concerns about potentially being monitored and not wanting to get into trouble for expressing critical views of certain government decisions and specific political figures who, according to them, gained votes

²⁶ In Turkish ‘closed’. It means women who wear a veil (*hijab* or *başörtüsü*)

using populist, fear-mongering tactics that targeted Muslims. I always respected this concern and their request to not record our chats.

As a result, the design of this study and its methodology was greatly shaped by the voices of the participants who, as discussed above, illuminated many nuances about the complexities of and negotiations about what may be shared with others, particularly outsiders such as myself. They pay careful attention to what they say to whom and how they represent themselves, their feelings, their opinions and other people in their families, communities and broader society. The women, in particular, by positioning themselves and others around *namus* morality, and its associated ways of presentation of self as inferred by their identity as Turkish women.

Chapter 3

Framings of Namus in Transition: Women Disambiguating Identity, Morality, Sexuality and Worth

3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on situating *namus* in transition, that is, in identifying the nuances in how conceptions of *namus* have shifted and how it has persisted across generations and in the subjectivities of Turkish women in Australia. I delve into the ways that one's sense of moral self, in both a collective and individual sense, is put to use around other people's understandings of morality, in particular, when having and maintaining *namus* is a salient existential reference. I only briefly refresh what has been explained in the Chapter 1 about the social and normative aspect of *namus* -or else, 'the honour-shame' morality. It has had existential relevance in the small rural communities in Turkey (Dilmaç, 2014b), which, to a certain extent, provided the model for the sociality in the, at least, early days, tight knit diasporic communities in Australia (Icduygu, 1990; Elley, 1986). Moral qualities, such as trustworthiness, could be also signified by having a repute of chaste and modest wife and daughters. People living in this sociality can, therefore, utilise the moral capital generated through *namus* to acquire various forms of existential assistance and prosperity (Bourdieu 1966, 1979). Conversely, families who are not trusted, whose reputation is somewhat

tarnished, can encounter impediments in various negotiations, such as business deals, securing labour assistance or arranging a marriage for their children. Women, specifically, can display their good character, and thus reinforce their family's social standing, while simultaneously enhancing their own existential prospects by securing a good marriage. Loyalty and respect for one's family are, in particular, highly valued and women can demonstrate adhering to these values through chastity and sexual restraint, that is by maintaining their premarital virginity, being faithful to one's husband and complying with parental positions concerning, for example, whom she marries. Being seen with an unrelated man or out and about alone could not only compromise a woman's reputation, and thus undermine her existential prospects in the eyes of potential in-laws, such behaviour may also tarnish the social standing and reputation of her family.

It is, however, important to examine whether the relevance of such framing has changed over time and how Australian-born Turkish women relate to such type of morality. As Zevallos (2003, 2004) argued, Turkish Australian Muslim respondents addressed that the responsibility for the sexual morality as unevenly burdened. First (1), I demonstrate how the diversity within the Turkish diaspora is reflected in the way *namus* is understood and how these different framings are deployed in *othering*, both externally (towards non-Turks) and internally (towards different Turkish groups). Second (2), I explore the temporal shift in linguistic connotations that suggests the process for the individualisation and de-collectivisation of *namus*. Third (3), I interrogate the dichotomy of *oppressed-liberated* vis-à-vis the transition being associated with and expected from Western-born Muslim women. The aim is to better express how female moral agency operates in systems that approach young women as *protégés*. Fourth (4), I show how Turkish women use their moral agency to demand change and disrupt the established ways of 'doing things'. Fifth (5), through voices of 'Islamically-aware' Turkish women, I explore the *cultural-religious* dichotomy concerning

namus as it reappears in the Turkish Australian diaspora. Finally (6), I explore the spatiality of *namus*, that is, how it is associated with certain spaces and locations in Melbourne.

3.2 Namus as an Object of Internal Diversity and Othering in the Turkish Diaspora

In much of the literature on migrant/diasporic communities, it is presumed there has been a presumption of a break between generation. It is typically framed as a difference between ‘first’ and ‘second’, or consecutive generation migrants. It has also been suggested that second-generation ‘migrants’ share common characteristics that constitute a distinctive ‘culture’ (see, e.g., Brookes, 1985). Although such conceptualisations of a generational divide based on the moment of migrancy obfuscate the complexities of how different subjectivities resist such essentialising, certain factors continue to sustain this divide. For example, people deploy different trajectories of migrancy to distinguish themselves from others: ‘the first one born in Australia in our family’, ‘the first generation in our family that grew up in Australia’, the ‘first Aussies in the family’ and so forth. Individual lived experiences are also often framed around notions of generation.

In contrast, current research points towards the diversity of subjectivities and tendencies that have been shaped in different contexts over time. Essentially, while their framings of identity certainly do share common elements, the ‘second generation’ also encompasses people from a wide age span, who grew up in different eras and diverse familial socioeconomic situations. Previous research has demonstrated some of the impacts the process of migration has had on immigrants and their children, giving rise to elements of difference from Australian society and between migrancy generations. The literature has also drawn attention to the diversity of educational and skills capital (C. Inglis et al., 1992; Keceli,

1998b; Latifoglu, 2001), worldviews, identities and a range of religious commitments (Hopkins, 2011; Hopkins & McAuliffe, 2010) represented amongst Turkish immigrants as well as the shift in Australian migration policy (Şenay, 2009) and, thus, official attitudes towards immigrants over time. Here, in considering the significance for framings of *namus*, I consider notional negotiation between diachronically made diversity (commonalities shaped in different milieus) and synchronous inclusion in a migrant generation, cultural or ethnic group that shares common sense of identity. Both have their justifications for their different perspectives, at times, even feeding into each other. Yet, the argument running through this thesis gives preference to the temporal and contextual malleability of *namus* over the commonalities between migrant generations. In short, first-generation immigrants, who have only recently arrived from Turkey, often have more in common with third-generation Turkish Australians of a similar age, than other ‘first-generation’ migrants who arrived fifty years ago.

One of the central themes represented amongst research participants, whether they are first-generation or from a later migrant generation, relates to ideas about their world before they migrated to Australia as a stark contrast to the world of the ‘host’ culture. For example, village life in Turkey is imagined as encompassing fixed structures where ‘everyone knew their place, as well as how to behave’. In comparison, the Australian world is perceived as a morally unbound place where people live their lives as they please without being morally ‘ordered’ or gossiped about. Thus, the Australian-born daughters of the early arrivals,²⁷ my older participants, often referred to gendered *namus* morality as something their parents ‘froze’ in their minds, something they brought to Australia from their villages, and passing it on to subsequent generations has become their *raison d’être*. I recall a visit to the home of my Turkish Cypriot informant’s parents. As my host Ceren (45) was taking me to the kitchen

²⁷ Turkish immigrants who arrived in the ‘first cohort’ as part of the Agreement between 1968 and c. 1974.

where we were to help her mum make *simit*²⁸, we encountered her elderly father watching a very old Turkish movie in the living room. Zeynep nodded towards the TV and sneered: ‘You see, this movie is about *namus*. It’s that old.’

The divide appears to have widened, as current younger second- and third generation tend to regard *namus* as an obsolete word²⁹ used only by ‘old conservative Turkish people in the community’. In such narratives, *namus* morality is objectified as an item of intergenerational othering and point of difference. It may, thus, appear as though the ‘first-generation’ holds different views from the ‘second generation’ and vice-versa. However, it is more individual trajectories and experiences that shape the fluidities, shifts and refinements around what *namus* means. For instance, informants spoke of how they viewed *namus* when they were younger, during the 1980s or of whatever period or event they thought was formative for their personal and subjective views about *namus*.

Concurrently, the presence or absence of *namus* morality is used to measure an individual’s or social group’s movement between the traditional and the modern, or between being Turkish and Australian. The tendency to talk about *namus* morality as an impediment to one’s ability to fully embrace one’s social environment or Australianness was primarily represented amongst older second-generation female participants whose parents arrived in the 1960s/1970s. For instance, Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Zeyneb (48) elaborated on how she experienced *namus* morality when growing up in Melbourne in the 1970s/1980s, making a comparison with her mother’s era and today:

In my generation, we were still expected to detach [from the broader Australian society] in some way. On the one hand, we could go to school and work, but couldn’t

²⁸ A type of Turkish bread.

²⁹ Dilmaç (2014, p. 262), for instance, observes this ‘othering’ in the case of young university students in Istanbul. For the most part, they proclaimed the connection with feminine sexuality and chastity was ‘the product of an obsolete and “outdated” mode of thinking’. These students considered themselves ‘more “modern”, open-minded and better adapted to the democratic and liberal society they lived in’. At the same time, however, they lamented that ‘the essence of Turkish values’, honour, is missing and undervalued in European countries.

go out to do something else. [...] Although today, this ancient morality has eased out quite a bit, at my time, this was still very strongly represented. [...] My mum was maybe twice in her life on the beach, you know. They weren't allowed. Or they went a couple of times to the cinema. My grandfather was very loving, providing for his family, but he was very strict, in terms of *namus* – absolutely. And then they were known as a good family. If anyone wanted a good girl, they knew they could go to him. His girls wouldn't wear makeup, they weren't roaming around in the streets [...], and this was pretty much spilled onto my generation too.

Moreover, considering people in the Turkish diaspora as a monolithic social and cultural entity belies the rich heterogeneity in how they express their identity. Current research has engaged with Turkish Australian women of Turkish Cypriot, Turkish *Alevi* and *Türkiyeli* Sunni Muslim heritage with various levels of, and attitudes to, religiosity. While there is a sense of shared Turkish ethnic identity across these groups, there are also noteworthy divides and a sense of mutual othering. Perceptions of self and other, modernity, and gender relations present an interesting case of unifying and divisive dynamics where alleged attitudes to *namus* morality are used as a point of commonality and *othering*. On the one hand, as second-generation Turkish Cypriot Aysel (50), for instance, expressed how, 'in terms of *namus*, credibility and all that stuff, we share it with mainland Turks, it is such a big part of who we all are.' On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots and *Alevi*s generally consider themselves 'less strict' or 'less restricted' than Sunni *Türkiyelis*. For instance, Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Gülşen (43) recounted how:

Their [her *Türkiyeli* girlfriends'] parents were much stricter. These girls had their own battles even to go out with us [a Turkish Cypriot youth group], which they weren't

allowed anyways. So, we [as Turkish Cypriots] were the lucky Turks in our generation.

Australian-born Turkish Cypriots usually based such claims on having ‘Europeanised modern attitudes to gender relations’ due to the ‘long-term British presence in Cyprus and Greek cultural influence’. On the other hand, *Alevi*s typically maintain that it is because they do not practice gender separation in religious rituals and social gatherings as Sunni Muslim Turks do. In the former case, it is imagined that either the location of origin is closer to Europe, or that cultural contact and cohabitation with Europeans, Brits or Greeks, somehow ‘civilises’ people, helps them unlearn the atavistic ‘Turkish element’ associated with *namus* morality (for further discussion the underpinning ideas see Section 1.4). Similarly, the *Alevi*s often claim they are more ‘progressed’ and ‘modern’ in the aspect of gender compared to Sunni Muslims. Regardless, as previous research has also documented, Sunni *Türkiyelis*, *Alevi*s (Kiliç, 2002) and Turkish Cypriots (Bridgwood, 1986; Cockburn, 2004) are all invested in *namus* morality principles as social entities to some extent.

3.3 From Saving Face to Self-Respect: Shifts of Namus Connotations

Namus has become a somewhat loaded and awkward concept for people born in Western Turkish diasporas. Previous research both in Turkey (e.g., Dilmaç, 2014a; Dilmaç, 2014b, 2016) and Europe (e.g., Ewing, 2008; Mandel, 2008; Withaekx & Coene, 2014) suggested that honour, and for that matter *namus*, are perceived as a point of internal distinction-making based on class and education, and the degree of intertwining between East-West, rural-urban and traditional-modern dichotomies. According to Dilmaç (2014a), young urbanites and

university-educated Turks distinguish quite sharply between *şeref* and *namus*, the two types of honour. While the former, so-called civic honour, is associated with positive qualities such as trustworthiness, for example, and seen as ‘an essential principle of life worth living’, the latter is detested as an atavistic concept from ‘the rural underdeveloped East’ and is predominantly associated with gendered honour violence.

The association between *namus* and gendered honour violence has been used, repeatedly, in the *othering* of Muslim immigrants through the ‘culturisation’ of honour as something pre-modern, traditional and backward, that is, as something that modern, Western, civilised people *do not do* (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4). Instead of perceiving honour as a specific, socially approved behaviour that most societies practice to some extent (see, e.g., Herzfeld, 1987; Stewart, 1994), honour has been culturally particularised, that is, attributed to specific cultures. Thus, for cultural and social outsiders, to talk about *namus* with Western-born Turks who are intimately aware of, and often grew up exposed to, the negative connotations of the topic will always be challenging. In the space of contention, *namus* becomes a matter of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 1997) that people may feel self-conscious talking about. Indeed, this was the case with some of the Turkish Australian participants in this study. As a consequence, in my participants’ life narratives, I could hear instances of prejudices based on assumptions made around *namus* matters and perceptions of other Turks.

This issue of how *namus* is understood and deployed needs closer attention as it cannot, in fact, be taken for granted that the word *namus* is on the radar of all Australian Turks. While older first- and second-generation participants were likely to know and use the word *namus*, the younger second- and subsequent generation participants were generally less familiar with the term. Even though in some cases, it was quite obvious that their distancing from the concept of *namus* was prompted by the awkwardness described above, most often it was due to the language barrier described in the previous research. While the majority of

Turkish Australians continue to speak Turkish at home (Yağmur, 2004; Yagmur et al., 2010), there is still an intergenerational gap in their ability to understand the Turkish language (Latifoglu, 2001).

Notably, when I asked my informants to explain what *namus* meant, most women struggled to provide a literal translation. Instead, they used illustrative examples from their lived experience that showed me that, even when it is not explicitly referred to, *namus* morality continues to have relevance. Based on spheres of meanings, principles, ideals and publicly demonstrated behaviours that my participants assigned to *namus*, I will focus on these core elements in the following chapters: (1) female premarital virginity and chastity (sexual abstinence/asexuality), (2) sexual fidelity and loyalty to one's husband, (3) respect and loyalty to one's family. This loyalty is manifested by obeying parental rules, conforming to elders' visions of right and wrong, and caring for elderly parents, siblings and children³⁰.

In giving examples of what *namus* means, a pattern of individualisation, subjectification and de-collectivisation of *namus* meanings and sentiments permeated the women's narratives. While older second-generation participants - *Türkiyeli* particular,³¹ felt somewhat compelled to uphold all three spheres of *namus*, that is premarital virginity, fidelity and obedience to parental rules of *namus*, integratively. In comparison, their later Australian-born counterparts appear to be better positioned to negotiate the respective *namus* principles separately. Notably, every participant highlighted one sphere of *namus* as subjectively more significant and relevant than others. In addition, the older second-generation women appear to have experienced changes in their personal moral sentiments. For instance, the Australia-born Turkish Cypriot Fatima (53) recounted:

³⁰ The association with caring for elderly parents, siblings and children appears to be rather uniquely diasporic. Although the immediate meanings of *namus* in the modern Turkish language are overwhelmingly gendered, the term is also used in contexts beyond gender, even in politics or business (e.g., *namus borcu* – “a debt of honour”, which is also used in betting; *namussuzca iş* – “a corrupted deal”; *namus meselesi* – “a “matter of honour”)

³¹ As argued in previous research (e.g., Elley, 1986, pp.278-279; Icduygu, 1990, pp. 312-314) the sociality within the early diasporic *Türkiyeli* ‘community’ was insular and isolated from mainstream Australia.

I would not dare to have sex without being married. For us, Turkish girls, that was something we didn't do so that we wouldn't damage our future. No one would marry us back then. Today, I don't agree that a woman that loses her virginity out of wedlock is *namussuz* like I did before. I believe that it should remain her private matter and not for others to judge. [...] For me, what is really *namussuz* is cheating - either of them, husband and wife. [...] If you are not happy, then get a divorce, get another partner, but do not cheat. That is *namussuz*. Also, if a woman who pursues a man she knows is married, then she is *namussuz* too.

Secondly, older second-generation women tended to illustrate *namus* through examples where they were being urged 'to be and act proper' for their family's reputation, to 'save face' in the 'community'. In comparison, younger women were likely to speak about *namus* as self-respect or an obligation towards the self, without including others. Thus, it seems that, on the level of connotative associations deployed when thinking and talking about what *namus* means, there has been a shift towards the individualised, inward-looking aspect of *namus* and away from the outward-looking or collective understanding. This shift is something similar that Stewart (1994) had perhaps in mind when he developed his concept of personal honour that elaborated on Pitt-Rivers' (1966) tripartite theory.

To illustrate these claims, we can compare the following narratives of two Australian-born Turkish women, Aysel (49) and Filiz (20). Aysel's parents came from Cyprus, and Filiz from Anatolia, almost thirty years apart. They grew up in what they both called the Turkish community— Aysel in Footscray and Filiz in Broadmeadows. Both women disliked the atmosphere of community *namus* politics based, primarily, on the scrutiny of women's conduct and judgemental gossip about her (and thus her family's) integrity. Aysel recounted the following illustration of the moral environment she experienced growing up:

You had to make sure that you always save your face because you can only lose it, but you cannot gain it back; after all, mud sticks. [...] You would often hear them [other older Turkish people] saying *namuslu* (she is honourable), or *namussuz* (without honour) if she has done something to bring disrepute to the family. I think this is kind of a village mentality that our parents brought with them. It [*namus*] was important because everything in those days was based on credibility, respect, and standing in the ‘community’. The perception that the community had of you could either make you or break you. So, it was tough to step outside without somebody seeing or hearing or knowing what you were doing. We had these neighbours that were always sitting in front of their house, observing what was happening in the street and then gossiping about it. I had to pass by their house to get home. Once on the way home from school, I stopped at a café just around the corner to sit with a school friend. My father, who worked as a bus driver, already knew about it by the time I came home because our neighbours told him. I don’t care what the neighbours say – we are not living in Turkey, we live in Australia, so why couldn’t I go for a coffee with a friend? I didn’t do anything wrong. Fortunately, my parents were reasonable, and they told me next time I do something like this, not to sit in the window. They just didn’t want them to gossip about us.

Comparably, Filiz explained that

In our Turkish ‘community’, gossip goes around. Usually, here, if someone sleeps with someone, the same day, the whole community knows about it. And then it goes like Chinese whispers. *Namus* is when I never slept with anyone. And if they don’t believe me, then I can say f* yourself because I know myself. That’s respect to myself. I don’t have to prove anything to you, so you can leave if you are not happy with me. *Namus*, for me, is anything but respect to myself. It is to respect yourself

enough, so you don't bring bad words upon yourself from others. [...] Your friends are not always your friends. The most smiling face can be your worst enemy. So, you gotta be careful what you say to people. I learned that. Now, I swear to god, I don't say anything to anyone. I trust only my brother, as I know that he'd never tell my secrets.

Interestingly, Eren (23), Filiz's brother, proclaimed:

The second generation, in general, doesn't know what honour is. It's very minimal. You don't carry honour for your family, for your brothers anymore; you carry honour for yourself. My honour is for myself. If I walk out of my front door and I can keep my head high, that's enough for me. *Namus* is respect to yourself first, then to your mum and dad. If you respect yourself, then you are *namuslu*, and you have your *namus*. If you don't respect yourself and you sleep with Tom, Dick and Harry, why do you want me to respect you? Respect yourself, and then I'll respect you.

The community's *namus* politics might seem similar above narratives, on the first reading. However, upon closer reading, we can detect a nuance, a shift. Although I will discuss changes in sexual morality in more depth in the next chapter, I will bring attention to the shift quickly here. While thirty years ago, girls were gossiped about just for sitting with a friend, today they are gossiped about for sleeping around. The scrutiny still reflects an intrusion into the individual's private conduct even if what constitutes problematic conduct has shifted, at least for certain segments within the community.

Furthermore, while the pressure of scrutiny remains, there is a notable difference in how *namus* is understood and deployed. Young Turkish Australians tend to individualise it. Accordingly, honour is portrayed as something to be upheld individually, for one's own sake, rather than being for or because of others. Although the inward-looking aspect has always

been a constitutive part of the honour, some young Australian-born Turks who care about honour tend to emphasise it, often proudly, as something that is *of today*. As such, it stands in contrast with the collectivist aspect of honour, which is seen as *of the past*. Depending on the audience and their attitude to the past, some young Australian Turks respond to the individuation of honour as either a sign of progress or with nostalgia.

3.4 On Modalities of Moral Relating to Turkishness in the Diaspora: Between Structure and Agency

The children of immigrants in the West, particularly from Muslim and non-European backgrounds, have long been described in the literature as living ‘in-between two cultures’. For instance, İçduygu (1990) writes that second-generation Turkish Australian youths appear to live in conflict between ‘the values and moral standards which their parents brought from Turkey and those of the Australian society in which they live’ (p.280-282). While some authors (e.g., Marranci, 2008) have attempted to dismantle the implication of two irreconcilable, bounded and fixed worlds competing with one another for influence over the identity of immigrants’ children, the idea has permeated public discourse. Accordingly, diasporic youth have been characterised as struggling to choose between loyalty to their cultural or religious heritage and a desire to fit in with the ‘Australian way of life’. While some of my second-generation research participants struggled to reconcile the moral requirements of their parents or their respective communities, others struggled to identify with the implied cultural conflict. Thus, as the trope of ‘oppression by culture’ cannot encompass a multiplicity of individual Turkish women’s experiences, thus, the matter needs to be examined further.

Therefore, I here explore alternative expressions of second-generation women's moral being and how they relate to their worlds when *namus* morality is a site of potential contention, yet still a responsibility that the women cannot simply ignore. I first introduce the term *diasporic ethnic moral identity* and show how the notion of *namus* and practice of its principles represent an essential marker of collective identity, a point of existential reference and even a survival strategy when in a foreign country. Albeit only in outline here (as I elaborate on the topic in the following section and relevant chapters), I also show how *namus* has slowly faded from the central position in my participants' sense of personal moral identity. Secondly, I introduce a pair of moral modalities – *doing things right* and *do the right thing* – that encapsulate two ways to interpret how to action *namus* morality. The two expressions also articulate the underlying logic for why women either uphold or refuse moral expectations and social conventions when exerting their moral agency. From another perspective, the two modalities aim to reconcile the previously implied conflict between the imposing structure usually associated with the Turkish world and women's agency, typically associated with the situation of women in the Western world. No less, the pair embodies a dimension of temporality where the former correlates with a perpetuation of tradition, or ways of how 'things have been done', connecting past, present and future, and the latter represents 'here and now'.

3.4.1. Diasporic ethnic moral identity: Deploying *namus* as a tool of cultural survival in a foreign country

Earlier in the chapter, I showed how *namus* morality, or rather its presence or absence, can represent a point of in-group and intergenerational *othering* within the Turkish diaspora. Similar distinction-making occurred in the narratives and the intercultural attitude towards

Australians. Particularly among the early arriving Turkish immigrant ‘community’, *namus* principles tended to represent a vital identity marker that delineated the boundary between us, the Turks, and strangers (*yabancılar*), the Australians. The former possesses, or ought to possess, *namus*; the latter does not. Such a notion was based on suspicion about the local ‘Australian’ customs and behaviours. Mixed-gender socialising and women’s uninhibited freedom of expression and movement in public was particularly challenging to the Turkish immigrants’ sense of right and wrong. Arriving in the wake of the women’s movement in the 1970s, instead of seeing these as hard-fought-for liberties that only some Australian women could enjoy unapologetically, Turkish immigrants, quite understandably, misinterpreted such behaviour as a fixed cultural trait or moral convention of the ‘*yabancılar*’ (strangers). The following excerpt from an interview with Australia-born Turkish Cypriot Feriha (51) demonstrates this distinction-making:

Growing up, I have always been told that Turkish girls don’t go out and Turkish girls don’t have boyfriends. This is because we are Turks, and it’s not right to have a boyfriend in our culture. People have to come and ask for you, rather than finding someone on your own, as Australians do. Because when my parents came, they brought that thing with them, of how it was in the village when they left, and they brought us up like that. I think they were scared to lose us here. Lose us to foreign influence, to behave like Australian girls or marry an Aussie. For many in that generation, it was unthinkable. Everything was so different and new for them. I imagine that it must have been terrifying for them as many never left their village before coming here.

What is evident in Feriha’s narrative, is the normative dimension of such distinction-making. ‘Don’t be/become loose like Australian girls’ is a trope that some of my second-

generation informants heard growing up in the 1970s and 1980s. It relates to the parental moral anxiety that revolved around the imagery of their daughters adopting what they saw as ‘Australian ways’ and then ‘losing her’ as a result. In this context, the trope was used as a moralising device to keep young Turkish Australian women on a particular course of life, that their parents had envisaged for them and, monolithically, considered the best way to achieve a good life. Even though more young Turkish women were encouraged to pursue higher education and careers (Elley&Inglis, 1995; C. Inglis et al., 1992; Latifoglu, 2001), getting married and having children remained at the very core of what was generally considered a good life.

The diasporic experience added another layer to the pursuit of a good marriage. In addition to the typical existential strategizing to secure a good future, immigrants sought to continue Turkish identity, values and culture in a foreign country. In the initial stages, many early Türkiyeli migrants³² considered their stay in Australia temporary and planned to return to their homeland after two or three years (Elley&Inglis, 1995, p. 194). Although the plan to return did not eventuate for most migrants, in fact, most of them had made arrangements to stay permanently by the end of the 1970s (Elley&Inglis, 1995, p. 194), the initial aspiration set the trajectory of their everyday choices where maintaining Turkish identity and culture while in Australia was concerned. Therefore, people sought to avoid being labelled a *namussuz* family so that they would be able to acquire existential assistance from within the insulated and interdependent Turkish diasporic community and attract good marriage matches for their daughters – whether back in Turkey (as prospected) or within diaspora.

Importantly, because daughters were seen as directly instrumental in ‘passing on the culture’ while rearing their children, even though their Turkish identity was passed through their father, girls were kept much closer to minimize the risk she would marry a non-Turk.

³² Turkish Cypriots were inclined to decide they would stay permanently earlier because of the conflict in Turkey.

Such marriages equated to losing the next generation of children as they were seen as neither Turkish nor Muslim. Such convictions were informed by the customs of patriliney and patrilocality that were predominant in rural Turkey at the time the first arrivals emigrated (Mackie, 1983; Stirling, 1965). According to these customs, a bride was to join her husband's family on multiple levels. In addition to physically relocating to her in-law's household, a bride merged into the family legally, symbolically (one of the Turkish words for a bride is *gelin*, which means 'the one who came') and identity-wise (her name and even her birthplace were changed in her identity documents). These practices have remained influential in Australia, in the visions of the ideal world held by immigrant parents. Thus, for example, my suggestion that a Turkish mother, even if married to an Australian, would undoubtedly bring her children up with Turkish or Islamic values was immediately dismissed by one of the older Australia-born participants with: 'Nah, the children would be his, the Aussie guy's.'

Notwithstanding, parents believed that Turkish morals, values, beliefs, practices would better assist their children as they worked towards the ideal of a good life – far better than Australian ways could. Accordingly, the arguments made by my older first-generation interviewees were often substantiated with examples of Australian women's misfortunes, they had either heard about or observed in their environment. Extreme cases, such as sexual assaults, teenage pregnancies and sexual objectification of the female body, were seen as representative consequences of the Australian moral crisis and the moral failure of Australian parents to guide their young daughters. Thus, in their eyes, Australian women were not afforded appropriate dignity and respect, something they wanted for their daughters and sought to achieve through protectionism and authoritative parenting³³.

Therefore, *namus* morality, explicitly as observed by women, was considered an essential instrument for the cultural and ethnic survival of the diaspora and as a marker of

³³ See discussion in Chapter 6

Turkishness. It is reflected in the term *diasporic ethnic moral identity*, a collective moral identity based on shared ethnicity and diasporic experience. It can also be expressed as a sense of belonging to a particular ethnicity or ethnic heritage through maintaining the morality believed to be a characteristic of that ethnicity.

Further, the sense of *diasporic ethnic moral identity* constructed around *namus* was similar for Turkish Cypriots, *Türkiyelis* and *Alevis*. In other words, by subscribing to *namus* morality women presented a similar marker of diasporic group inclusivity across Turkish subgroups, even though their relationality to the Turkish nation-state³⁴ before their migration may have been diametrically different. A partial explanation for this can be found in Uzer's (2016) typification of Turkish nationalisms. He distinguishes between Kemalist, ethnic and conservative Turkish nationalisms that are somewhat intertwined, but which each provide different avenues of expression for their adherents based on place, language, religion and ethnicity. Thus, the various Turkish identity groups may express their relationality to *namus* morality as part of their Turkish ethnic moral identity in a similar way.

In contrast, for many Australian-born Turkish women, *namus* morality can be an artefact, an object of Turkish heritage and ancestry towards which they are compelled to relate one way or another. Significantly, however, the way they relate to *namus* morality arises within the space of shifting relationships with broader Australian society. Although the older Australian-born women were growing up when multiculturalism³⁵ was officially implemented

³⁴ Not everyone participated in the Republican Kemalist nation-building project that has been, in many respects, monolithic and singular (Al, 2015). For instance, many Turkish *Alevi* families left Turkey because of the cultural and religious oppression rooted in the state regime's assimilationist agenda (Aunina, 2018; Hopkins, 2009a, 2011; Hopkins & McAuliffe, 2010; Mandel, 2008; Özkan, 2019; Sökefeld, 2008). Similarly, rural conservative families whose Islamic beliefs permeated their worlds struggled, understandably, with the Kemalists' modernisation efforts based on strict secularism, the nationalisation of Islam and 'de-traditionalization' of the rural East (Al, 2015; Aunina, 2018; Göle, 1996). (Al, 2015; Aunina, 2018; Göle, 1996). In comparison, how the Turkish Cypriots related to Turkish state nationalism was rather complex (Ali & Sonn, 2009) and has undergone various shifts over time (Apeyitou, 2003).

³⁵ Parents of Australian-born Turkish Cypriots who started arriving in the early 1960s (Ali & Sonn, 2009) saw the 'White Australia policy' officially dismantled in 1966 and the first *Türkiyeli* migrants arrived at the end of the 1960s, that is during a phase where the official policy supported integration (Şenay, 2010).

in the 1970s (Şenay, 2010), general attitudes to ethnic diversity and difference have been lagging for quite some time.

Generally, as my informants claimed, the older research participants grew up under the weight of echoing assimilationist pressures towards ‘ethnic’ practices and behaviours (Collins, 2013, p. 228; İçduygu, 1990, p. 297). The dual pressure that resulted from their social environments caused a variety of reactions in Turkish Australian adolescents. Depending on their personal stories, some of them coped well, while others struggled to reconcile their differences. Thus, some of my older second-generation respondents’ life narratives included feelings of shame and humiliation, that led to the rejection of Turkishness in some of the more extreme cases. The following excerpts include examples of ethnic boundary-making and its effects on women’s subjectivities. Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Aysel (49) explained that

As a Turkish girl, I couldn’t have a boyfriend, so my Aussie schoolmates used to mock me as a lesbian. I have nothing against lesbians, but I wasn’t one, so it hurt me initially. [...] I surrounded myself with friends that were closer to our culture, who understood. I made friends with some Greek girls whose religion is different, but our culture and traditions are very similar.

In contrast, Aysel’s older sister Banu (50) had a different experience:

My Anglo girlfriends used to ask me to join them when going out, but I always refused as I knew that my parents wouldn’t let me. So, it was no point asking them. Same with boys. However, I never got mocked. Well, at least not in front of me. Australians kind of knew that us, girls from European, Turkish background, cannot go out, so the one who asked me probably just thought that I’m one of those that her parents don’t let her. So, the guys just stopped trying. [...] I was pretty self-assured

and believed our parents, so I didn't mind not going out. It was part of who we were as Turkish girls.

Stereotypical imagery of Turkish women as apriori oppressed by their families or culture due to static rules of *namus* morality is central to ethnic othering. While it may seem, at first, that such stereotyping ended with the older informants' coming-of-age, evidently, it is still part of the lived experience of young Turkish women today. For instance, Australia-born Turkish *Alevi* Ceren (24) stated:

One day, my girl mates and I are at this pub, here, in Coburg, talking to this mid-aged Anglo-woman. After an hour of chatting, she figured out that we are Turks, and she dropped straight away: 'But are you gals even supposed to be out at this time?' Bam. Jaws dropped. We all felt so patronised by her. It was so offensive. It felt like we're convicts of the crimes we won't get rid of ever.

Attitudes to *namus* morality have diversified over time. While several external factors have facilitated this moral change, including acculturation pressures, the changing socioeconomic situation of some families and less pressure to appeal to other Turks, several internally induced factors have also been in play. Therefore, alleviating the existential anxiety of 'losing culture' and identity could be an important dynamic to explore. The opening of Turkish private schools³⁶ and mosques³⁷ in the 1990s (Şenay, 2012, pp. 1626-1627) helped, I

³⁶ Two private Turkish religious schools were established in the 1990s. Sirius (previously ISIK) and Ilim colleges sought to provide better educational outcomes for Turkish Australian youth (Mission Statement of Sirius College, 2018), erase the imagery of Turkish Australian youth's educational disadvantage (Brookes, 1985; Latifoglu, 2001; C. Young, 1982) and offer Turkish parents the opportunity to pass Islamic moral values on in an everyday educational setting (Cicek, 2017).

³⁷ Hanafi Sunni Islam is the only Turkish state-approved denomination and, as such, is promoted and supported through Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) in the diaspora (Humphrey, 2009, p.151). Turkish Cypriot and *Türkiyeli Hanafi* Sunni Muslims congregate around two prominent Turkish mosques, representing epicentres of their respective Islamic communities. The former attends the Sunshine mosque, the latter socialise and pray in the Broadmeadows mosque. However, there are many other mosques in Melbourne where Turkish Muslims pray, when it is more convenient and readily accessible.

argue, to alleviate this anxiety. Having access to these institutions answered the call of some migrant parents (Latifoglu, 2001) who wanted their children to receive an Islamically appropriate (moral and religious) and culturally familiar (linguistic and historical, focusing on discipline and structure) education. Having the opportunity to choose the path of their children's formal education and development seems to be a significant benefit for newly arriving immigrants.

Furthermore, the data suggests that although many of these conventions had transformed back in Turkey and Cyprus, parenting in the Turkish diaspora in Australia retained its gendered and controlling nature well into the 2000s (see more on shifts in parenting in Chapter 6). However, after international travel was made affordable for a broader range of people, which allowed Turkish Australians to have frequent in-person contact with their homelands, some parents started changing their attitudes to parenting. First-hand observation of the relaxing conventions in Turkey and Cyprus made parents realise that if they afforded their daughters certain liberties, they would not be failing in their duty to preserve 'Turkish culture' – which had, in the meantime, changed.

While I am aware that there needs to be a much deeper analysis conducted, I here observe that my younger informants felt more accepted than their older counterparts, if not necessarily appreciated for the cultural richness of their 'ethnic' background. The shift in the attractiveness of some elements of ethnic difference in recent decades, for example, through food consumption, is a matter for further research, but the overall picture suggests processes related to 'super-diversity' phenomena (Vertovec, 2007, 2019). Diversified inter-and intra-ethnic dynamics, transnational multidirectional movement between Turkey and Australia, and socioeconomic conditions were among the processes through which relationality towards Turkishness and Australianness changed.

3.4.2 Doing things right versus doing the right thing: Two moral modalities of transition

In this section, by examining second-generation women's relating to what their parents presented to them as Turkish morality, I move the attention from the intercultural perspective to that of the individual. Through the two modalities – *doing things right* and *doing the right thing* – I capture and illustrate the essence of what motivates women who are positioned as the family *protégé* to act either in line with what is presented as right or in line with what emanates from within herself as right. Both modalities simultaneously encompass a *socio-moral structure* and her *agency* to incorporate, defy or transform such structures. From another perspective, the two modalities have the capacity to reconcile the previously implied conflict between the imposed structure (usually associated with the Turkish world) and a woman's agency (usually associated with the woman's situation in the Western world).

In this line of theorising, I aim to reconcile two approaches to morality. On one side, morality or being/acting moral has been conceptualised as an element of social reproduction, in Robbins' (2007) words as 'a routine behavio[u]r that reproduces what has come before' (p. 311). For other theorists, moral action is only such that is based on conscious, deliberate free choice (Laidlaw, 2002; 2014). Also, Zigon (2007, 2008) alleged that while being moral is a non-deliberative, habitual way of being in the world, a kind of a disposition that is somewhat people's default modality, free autonomous expression of reflective moral self comes forward only in extraordinary situations of 'moral breakdown', such as cheating. I will come to this distinction in section 5.6, which deals with moral deliberation surrounding adultery.

However, such attention to autonomous moral agents implies that acting in compliance with morally approved social practices is somewhat not a conscious nor reflective moral doing. In other words, people are engaging in the involuntary and compelled practice. Cassaniti and Hickman (2014, p. 258) argue that actors might be morally conscious of their

actions when engaged in the reproduction of norms and practices. Comparably, Lambek (2015) contends that rules exist ‘to produce a kind of self-transcendence that makes human freedom possible or that is, in effect, human freedom’ (p.6).

Influential problematising of freedom and autonomy was brought by Mahmood (2005). According to her, the Western conceptualisation of freedom and autonomy applied only to practices absent of coercion and constraint does not help think about Islamic religious practices that would be accordingly always criticised as coercive and oppressive. Mahmood demonstrates different notions of freedom and autonomy as experienced by the Islamic women of piety movement in Egypt as they endeavour to create a moral self through deliberate submission to religious rules.

Going back to the framework of moral modalities in this thesis, when a woman employs the modality of *doing things right*, she gravitates towards conformity to the standards and principles presented to her as ‘the tradition’, ‘the custom’ or ‘the culture’. She does so because she aspires, or feels compelled, to fulfil her duty to maintain her cultural, ethnic or family lineage. By doing things right, she transcends the present and creates a bridging between the past and the future thus perpetuating the existence of her lineage, culture and ethnicity in time. This modality reinforces conservative tendencies to maintain the *status quo*. It can also soothe immigrants’ existential anxiety concerning disconnection from their culture and identity and ensure a sense of balance and order. As the modality includes inherent fixed moral judgement of what is right based on ‘how things used to be’, or ‘have been’, a woman’s agency instead resides in her choice to either comply or resist and does not consider much of her ‘creative’ or transformative input.

In contrast, the modality *doing the right thing* implies a resolute break from the *status quo* or established practices through the assertion of a fully autonomous and distinctive moral self. Simultaneously, the meaning or content of ‘the right thing’ may still be aligned with the

social conventions or expectations of others. Either way, it is the agent, the woman, who creates the meaning. The primary objective is to be true to one's conscience, which is often used as an emancipatory technique to express one's autonomy from outer influences, either other people or imposed moral criteria. Thus, the substance of the modality affords a woman her creative input concerning the *status quo*. Moreover, through compliance with and rejection of conventions, a woman can also reshape established practices as per the modality *doing things right*. Taking the dimension of temporality into perspective, by acting in the mode 'do the right thing', she may derail the expected continuation of 'culture' or 'tradition'.

Furthermore, the two modalities are not in a dichotomous relationship and do not characterise anyone's specific moral self. Some women, however, tend to habitually use one modality over the other, although this can change during significant life events or as a result of social changes. However, I detected a shift in women's general inclination towards one modality when looking at the matter through the overall macro-diasporic lens. Despite the women having challenged the *status quo* of their respective times, *doing things right* generally prevailed in my informants' responses. Recently, *doing the right thing* has become more prevalent across age groups and different migrant statuses (including Turkish- and Australian-born women). It is most certainly a process stemming from the efforts of the women's rights movement, which have been ongoing and somewhat amplified, globalised and unified during the last decade, particularly through social media.

In short, *doing things right* and *doing the right thing* are two fundamental modalities of morality through which second-generation Turkish women relate their sense of self to their parents' worlds and moral frameworks. *Namus* morality is the existential reference for their parents because it is through *namus* that they believe they will sustain their cultural identity in the diaspora into the future, by transferring it to their daughters into their daughters' children and so on. What I argue is that parents use *namus* as an existential point of reference for

themselves and their children. As women carry culture by passing it onto the next generation, there is an emphasis on marrying Turks. *Namus* is the existential battleground for identity, loyalty and commitment and the very essence of securing ‘who we are’ when experiencing feelings of insecurity. Adding the dimension of temporality into question, while the modality *doing things right* definitely facilitates such transitions of values from the past and into the future, the modality *doing the right thing* is unpredictable in this sense. Instead, it may convey a radical transition by breaking away from ‘tradition’ and how things have been done until now. The following narratives of three Australian-born women include examples of nuanced transitions between the two modalities. What follows is a description of my interaction with Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Aynur (48).

I am sitting with Aynur at her parents’ house in Footscray. She and her sister alternate every afternoon after work attending to their parents’ needs and keeping them company. While we are almost whispering about intimate details of Aynur’s life so her parents cannot hear, her mother enters the room and silently sits down on a chair in the corner right next to us and murmurs something. I ask Aynur if her mum wants me to go because I have been taking her daughter’s attention for perhaps too long. Aynur assures me ‘No, no, please stay. She is just a bit confused about the time of the day. She has Alzheimer’s, and because my dad went to lie down in his bed, I think she thinks it’s time to go to sleep, but I’ll find out.’ Aynur then vanishes from the room with her mum, and I observe through the doors, which she has left ajar, how she sits her frail mum onto the sofa in the lounge room, switches the TV on, and lovingly strokes her cheek and smiles at her. Then she returns to me, sits down and explains with visible sadness in her eyes that ‘My dad has Parkinson’s, so he cannot care for my mum himself. Well, he also doesn’t like strangers in the house. I think it’s because, in his generation, it used to be a woman who cared for everything. A man sits down on a sofa, and it

means it's time for his tea. But my mum cannot even make a cup of tea anymore. She gets confused, and she forgets what she is doing.'

In Turkish families, it is still widely expected that a daughter will take care of her elderly parents and this act reflects on the moral worth and quality of the whole family. It is part of both family honour and parental pride. It demonstrates to the audience (the community or whoever else may care) that her parents brought her up well and instilled the right values. Every daughter is aware of these moral obligations and should, hence, act in the modality *doing things right*. However, Aynur emphasised that she cared for her parents not because of the social expectation or to 'look good in the eyes of anyone', but because she could not stand the idea of her parents sitting in the house all day and night feeling lonely. Thus, her drive to act is in the moral modality *doing the right thing*. Aynur explained her sense of personal moral identity thus: 'I don't feel that I have to. I just feel I should do it for them and myself. They brought us up, they cared for us, so while I can, I will do it. It is who I am.' In this context, Aynur also specified what being moral meant to her:

When I said earlier that being moral to me means being devoted to my husband and my family, I suppose I include my parents in my family. It would be immoral for me to leave them. I cannot stand the imagery of them starving alone, falling, and then laying there for days without being discovered. That, for me, would be immoral to let them be alone. I could not possibly live with myself.

Aynur deployed the modality *doing the right thing* in her decision to help in the case of her in-laws, cementing her claim to a personal moral identity. Almost two decades ago, her husband's sisters refused to leave their lives in London and relocate to Cyprus to take care of their frail parents. Instead, it was Aynur who insisted on going to take care of them. She took their two little daughters and relocated across the world to stay with her husband's parents.

The family returned to Melbourne several years ago after the in-laws died and because Aynur's disabled daughter was struggling with the local education system, which could not accommodate her needs. Aynur highlighted:

I could never sleep tight knowing that I left old people languishing on their own when they needed help. That's not who I am. I knew that none of his sisters would take care of them, so I had to do the right thing. That's who I am.

The following narrative provided by Ceyda (49) features an example of another moral modality shift. Instead of opting for *doing things right* as was expected from her, Ceyda went for modality *doing the right thing* in order to fulfil her sense of what is right. Even though this case might not, at first, stand out as a typical example of moral doing in a sense doing good for others. As in the other two cases, Ceyda picked this as an example to illustrate morality. After all, it shows the multiplicity and nuances of how morality and what it entails is understood. Ceyda narrated:

In the 1980s, when I was growing up in Footscray, it was still pretty much unheard of that a young Turkish woman travelled abroad on her own, without either her husband or her family. It was not like today when my girls had been around the world by the age of 30, and they keep travelling, with no marriage and kids in sight, you know. Travelling was my biggest dream. So, after finishing high school, I worked and saved up a good amount of money to go to Europe with another friend. My parents were not happy about it, but eventually, I persuaded them. We were going to stay with my aunties in the UK and then in Cyprus anyway, so it wasn't like my parents wouldn't know where and with whom I was. So, we went, but it caused a huge stir up in the 'community', well, as predicted. People gossiped about us, what we were doing, and that we were a bad influence on their daughters, and so on. [...] This was something, I

suppose, that I didn't let anyone stop me. I didn't care what others were thinking. I said that I knew what I was doing, so why not. I wasn't doing anything bad, and if I was up to doing something [*namussuz*/ (sexual)], I would have done it anyway, so I went. It was the right thing to do for me. I remember that after this affair, other girls in the community started travelling, so I guess I changed the grain a little bit for others.

Almost thirty years younger, Australian-born third-generation *Alevi* Deniz (20) told me about an event from her childhood that strongly influenced her personal moral identity and set her onto a path to becoming an active advocate for animal rights. Deniz's sense of what is right was created through her rejection of an important tradition on moral grounds.

We were in Turkey visiting my grandparents in the village. I usually love going there as I am closer to my mum's parents than my dad's. I was only ten or so, and I wasn't aware of this custom as we don't do it in Melbourne. We were invited to this wedding where they, as the tradition goes, sacrificed a goat in front of me. They just cut the poor animal's throat. [At this moment, Deniz became visibly distraught and started crying]. I think that if someone can do this to an animal, it is wrong. It reflects entirely bad on who we are and cannot do it. It's not right. [...] After that experience, I became a strict vegetarian and now, I dedicate my time protesting against animal rights abuses. I always knew this is gonna happen. I can't see it any other way. [...] My mum understands me, but my grandparents think that we kids have become spoilt in Australia.

In all three examples, we see the formation of personal moral identity as one's unique and subjective conceptualisation or sense of the moral self. Although moral self is not always

identical with personhood, but rather a feature or dimension of it as -David Carr (2002) and Schielke (2009) have argued, these three examples illustrate the process through which these dimensions of ‘who we are’, our personal moral identity, can be realised. However, this segment of one’s identity evolves and changes throughout one’s life. Personal moral identity is not fixed. Rather, as Charles Taylor (1989) observed,

what gives us a sense of the self are the issues that matter to us or are significant to us. [...] In order to realise such significance, people do so in the context of ‘narratively understood self’ where the sense of the good is woven into one’s understanding of life as an unfolding story (p. 326).

Therefore, personal moral identity is related to self-realisation and authenticity anchored in an ongoing dialogue between self and others whose opinion one cares about, within one’s lived experience within a particular moral and social milieu. Through processes of evaluation, juxtaposition, comparison and the synthesis of past experience, one can infer one’s sense of what is right. The agentic moral self is able to transcend mere ‘norm following’, which results either in acceptance, internalisation, refusal (resistance) or transformation of social requirements and moral principles. The process is illustrated further throughout the thesis.

3.5 Morality Beyond Namus: Differentiating between Moral Worth and Chastity

The process of personal moral identity formation through transcending the sense of morality that is based on how ‘things have been done’ was prominent in the field of *namus*. This shift is achieved by differentiating between a woman’s moral worth and sexuality. Research participants highlighted the issue that moral judgments continue to be made about women’s

alleged sexual activity even though what constitutes immoral behaviour has shifted (see discussion in Chapter 4) and the relational practices have changed (see Chapter 5).

Accordingly, the reputations of the women, and their families, can still be tarnished by gossip and a woman's alleged promiscuity can still be weaponised against her in what I called community *namus* politics.

A shared voice has, however, been surfacing amongst Turkish Australian women with different subjectivities. This voice is calling for several changes including the rejection of the gendered double standards associated with judgment of one's *namus*, the acknowledgement of women's moral integrity based on moral qualities other than chastity and familial conformity, and the dismantling of the idea of collective *namus*. However, this does not mean that Turkish diasporic women are abandoning values of chastity, virginity or fidelity. Instead, they are rejecting the judgemental involvement of others in what they consider personal matters. For instance, first-generation Turkish Cypriot Ekrem (75) stated:

When I grew up in Cyprus, there used to be many rules about what is right and wrong. But what I really think is that people should always try to think for themselves. So, my morality today is no longer about being seen as *namuslu* by others, but rather avoiding conflict, understanding other people, be free not to be forced to do things.

Similarly, Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Zeyneb (49), who was traumatized by community *namus* politics when younger, brusquely expressed her discontent with judgments that 'people make about young girls who date'. In order to make her point, Zeyneb purposefully used *namus* as a point of othering based on class, education and urban-rural, West-East dichotomies as outlined in Section 3.4. She said:

I think the more you are ignorant, the more it's about sexuality. Like if my daughter was to go out with one of her male friends, if I am educated and worldly, it wouldn't

be a matter of *namus*, whereas if it was a different family, they would see it as a matter of *namus*.

Other women expressed their dissent linguistically by refusing to use the words *namussuz-namuslu* to express someone's moral qualities. Instead, they substituted them with other words connoting honour (*şeref*³⁸) or morality (*ahlak*³⁹). Australian-born *Alevi* Melis' (47) expressed:

I have my pride, but I would never use the word *namus* for it. Ever. A lot of Turkish women do not realise that they are seen as property. They think that it's great to be called *namuslu*. It's against a woman's liberal choice of her sexuality, her own body. I have my pride, and I say it, but if a man tells me you're my *namus*, I don't accept that. No, no, no. I am Australian, mate. You don't own me! I grew out of it.

Namus has its collective aspect (see Section 1.3.2 for further explanation) through which one's reputation is interconnected with the reputation of significant others, creating a collective *moral entity*. Thus, the one's mishaps brush off onto the reputation of other people in the collective moral entity. As such women are said to have "drawn the short straw" as their *namus* is disproportionately scrutinized by others. The widely used saying, '*benim namusum, senin namusun*' [my *namus* is your *namus*] implies the classic male-female interconnectedness and moral unity between intimate partners in particular, but also with other family members. My informants translated it as the classic trope of 'woman's *namus* is man's *namus*' (see Chapter 1). The principle has been widely gendered and has, therefore, become a point of criticism. As a consequence, tendencies toward de-collectivisation and

³⁸ *Şeref* refers to another type of honour that is usually translated as dignity or grace. It is perceived as non-gendered and denotes the moral qualities of trustworthiness, honesty, civic engagement and mutuality.

³⁹ *Ahlak* is a more general word that translates as morality, ethics and manners.

individualisation of *namus* projected into the dissenting voices. Many women have expressed their desire for personal emancipation through dissent from the collective aspect of *namus* morality. So, it was for Australian-born *Alevi* Ceyda (43) who stated: ‘For me, it is being in my skin and be able to make my calls that I can be responsible for myself. Second-generation *Türkiyeli* Melis (50) expressed this as a desire for ‘Not having to have my behaviour shaded by my father or brother because their expectations are so different, especially when they are so old.’ Likewise, Australian-born *Alevi* Ekrem (45) observed how

Today, morality is very different from the concept that we are talking about [*namus*]. For me, it is when I have respect for myself as a woman, the respect that fits in my moral expectations of myself. And that is a very sensitive spot for our parents.

Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Ayten (50) categorically stated that

Namus to me means nothing because my *namus* is no one else’s business. I’m no-one else’s honour. I don’t belong to a man. What I have done in the past has nothing to do with my current partner. If I did something wrong, why should I tell him, and why should he judge me? It’s my thing, not his.

While Australian-born *Alevi* Esin (43) rejected *namus* profoundly with the following claim:

It doesn’t exist in my vocabulary. It is a word for Turkish men, meaning my women, my honour, don’t you dare do anything to shame me. [...] It is a word of holding his wife, children, and women in his family group responsible for his honour, controlling them by holding them accountable to specific patterns, beliefs and moral conduct.

Alongside men, however, older women also play an important role in this system of control through gossip and name-calling. I dislike this too.

The key to understanding Ayten and Esin’s sharp refusal of *namus* is understanding their lived experience. Ayten was abused by both of her husbands, who used the principles of

namus to assert dominance over her. Thus, the expression ‘*benim namusum, senin namusun*’ translates to her as ‘man’s control and ownership of his wife’s body and sexuality’.

Nonetheless, Ayten acknowledged that others could have very different approaches to *namus* depending on their upbringing. ‘Some refuse it; some still behave according to it. However, I cannot stand it anymore’, concluded Ayten.

In comparison, Esin forged an equal partnership with her German-born Turkish husband, whom she married for love in her late twenties after graduating from university. Her rejection of *namus* is motivated by the recognition of conflict between her personal moral identity and her lived experience. She grew up with a strong dislike for her father’s authoritarian impositions on the family. Esin found them morally baseless but respected them out of fear of repercussions for ‘going against’ her father. A large portion of her personal moral identity and moral orientation (Taylor, 1989) coalesces with her self-ascribed identity as a liberal feminist. Accordingly, Esin stated that her moral duty is to help other Turkish women realise their worth beyond *namus* morality. Instead of fulfilling the ideal of ‘a good (Turkish) woman’, she wants other women to aspire to become autonomous human beings. Esin explains:

Look, I don’t have any issues with these ideals as far as it is a woman that chooses them as the moral attributes that she wants to live up to. But what about women like me who chose a career over this? What bothers me is the unilateral way it is continuously being imposed onto women, which does not allow them to grow into strong women on their own terms. [...] These limitations put all women into a framework that would suit a man on the pedestal. It is about unequal power, and women are on the receiving shorter end. Therefore, it is inevitable that some women like me will rebel against such domination to determine what is right and wrong for them. [...] I’m doing as good as my father, brother or husband, and I am my own

person who will live according to my own expectations. Today they still tell you, “be a goody girl, and don’t go around and have many boyfriends”. But for me, younger girls need to respect themselves to show that they don’t have to bow to a man. I have work; I stand on my feet. Why would I have to bow down to any man?

In comparison, some participants, such as Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Sanem (49), endorsed *namus* as ‘a female pride and moral virtue’, despite struggling with *namus* politics all her life. When I met Sanem, sometime after she got divorced, she shared quite an interesting turn of moral sentiment. She stated that all her life, she had been *doing things right* in order to be called a *namuslu* woman, but after she divorced her second husband, the way she saw morality changed. She said:

I went to Paris and met this gorgeous man on Tinder. We had sex, you know, one-night stand, and things changed for me forever. My perspective changed. What is this *namus* bullshit? I realised that I am still a decent person; I haven’t changed. I am not eyeing my friends’ husbands, but I do see other men now. However, I do it so others cannot gossip about me or so my sons don’t see it. I don’t feel bad about myself like I would feel before. I don’t feel ashamed anymore.

In framing *namus* as a woman’s sovereign virtue, *Türkiyeli* Merve (50) reflected something close to a synthesis of her friends Esin and Sanem’ positions. Merve’s response reflected her lived experience growing up with an authoritarian father who, although he loved his family, was very controlling and angry. Merve became determined that she would never allow her partner to treat her the way her father treated her mother. Thus, her narrative embodied an emancipatory shift towards the individualisation of *namus* matters:

I think that your *namus* should not belong to your father, husband or son, but you should care for your *namus*. It should be within you, yours and only yours. Men in your life should not feel responsible for it. But it's a powerful thing; the man wants to have the power so he can say that he is the one in control, the one to say what you do in your life. So, this way of thinking needs to end.

It appears that each woman's sense of empowerment arose from their accumulated life experience – through the retrospective and thoughtful deliberation in the context of previous life events. Every woman had established different levels of disambiguation between their moral identity, sexuality and family influence. While some women could articulate their ideas more precisely than others, upon using their acquired knowledge capital, all women expressed their fully autonomous moral agency to restructure their sense of moral self and morality. It seems that Australian-born *Türkiyeli* participants, particularly from the older cohort, often experienced stricter conditions than Turkish Cypriot or *Alevi* women when growing up amidst the unforgiving community *namus* politics of Broadmeadows.

Subjective ideas about *namus*, what constitutes moral conduct and how it reflects one's self-worth, can change over a person's lifetime. This transformation has, in some cases, been in line with what Kandiyoti (1988) described with the concept of the 'patriarchal bargain', that is when a woman's social worth increases as she matures and moves up the gendered social hierarchy by meeting social conventions and expectations and by *doing things right*. However, I argue that some Turkish Australian women demand more radical change, to be allowed to determine what is right for them and what constitutes proper conduct, here and now, instead of patiently waiting for the time they will be able to cross onto a hierarchically 'stronger' social position. On this note, the two modes of change can, in some cases, combine. After reaching a certain social stage (typically get married) and experiencing an existential

upheaval (e.g., divorce), instead of continuing to *do things right*, a woman may lose the fear of scrutiny and thus change her moral modality to *do the right thing*.

Thus, as demonstrated in the narratives, the shift towards de-collectivisation and individualisation of morality does not necessarily work against the values associated with the established notions of *namus*. In general, Turkish Australian women continue to value chastity, virginity, fidelity, loyalty to their partners and respect for their elders while demanding the right to determine what is right and wrong for themselves and come to their own reasons for upholding these values. It follows that self-respect entails emancipation from others' impositions, control and judgments, as well as the power to determine what is right for oneself. This shift can be expressed as moving from *doing things right* by others towards *doing the right thing* for myself. However, this shift is not a shallow turn into selfish individualism. As the third-generation *Alevi* Deniz (20) elaborated:

I believe that it is important to put myself in the centre and cause the least harm possible to others. It means to be true to myself because only content and self-assured individuals can offer something to others. If you don't find what you love, then what good can you offer to others?

3.6 Religious Namus: Reclaiming Women's Worth from Cultural Muslim's Oppression

Emancipatory tendencies in approaches towards *namus* have also emerged out of Islamic morality. Although expanding on the discourse of Islamic morality is beyond the scope of this thesis, I must briefly draw attention to how a particular group amongst my informants approached the concept of *namus*, that is those who self-identified as 'Islamically-aware' in

order to distinguish themselves from ‘secular Turks’ or ‘cultural Muslims’.⁴⁰ It needs to be acknowledged that Islam has profoundly influenced Turkish people’s identities, family, social and gender relations, either directly through practice or indirectly through its discourse and influence on people’s sense of identity (Asaroglu, 2006). Hopkins & McAuliffe (2010) argues that such influence ‘can be maintained without a strong commitment to the faith-based elements of religious life’(p.55).

Equally, there are various Islamic schools, denominations and traditions amongst the Turkish Australian Muslim diaspora.⁴¹ Although these religious groups compete for socio-political influence over diasporic minds and bodies (Şenay, 2012, pp. 1626-1627) and I interviewed women across various religious allegiances, I did not employ this ideological difference as a primary lens, but only acknowledge it as a factor of influence on visions of *namus* when it stood out in the narratives of the research participants. For example, the most visible difference observed in ‘Islamically-aware’ women is their approach to veiling and whether they consider it relevant to *namus*. Some schools of Islam are more liberal in their approach to veiling than others and, since the 1990s, this has been a significant issue within the Islamic private colleges that some of the younger participants attended. There was a pattern amongst these women in their approach to veiling. While Ilim College prescribes their female students must wear an Islamic veil, Sirius College is more liberal and allows its students to decide whether to wear a veil or not.

Nevertheless, some of the ‘Islamically-aware’ informants framed *namus* as a primarily religious concept. They did this, I argue, to reclaim their dignity and self-worth and overcome the stereotypes, particularly those of secularists – both Turkish and Western – who depict

⁴⁰ There is a discourse about the negative impact distinguishing between Muslimness and Muslim identities can have based on the ‘level of’ religiosity or religious expression. Please see the discussion in Chapter 1. However, I use the terms here out of respect for my informants’ way of expressing their own sense of identity, which was, in this case, based on a religious-secular dichotomy.

⁴¹ This includes, among others, the state-organised Diyanet Hanafi Islam, the Gülen movement that runs Sirius college, the Milli Görüş that runs Ilim college, and the Cemaat-i Nur or Süleymanlılar.

religious Muslim women as oppressed by Islam. These women asserted that ‘Islamic’ *namus* is a ‘pure form’ of a concept that has been hijacked by, as one of my informants put it, ‘chauvinist Turkish men who don’t know Islam and who oppress women’. Once again, the ubiquitous religious-secular/cultural dichotomy is deployed in this framing and Islam is represented as ‘a civilising’ instrument to subvert somewhat primordial patriarchal oppression and gendered double standards. Accordingly, because Islamic *namus* is considered a requirement of both men and women equally, it is seen, by these women, as more progressive than the practices and ideas of secularists. For instance, Australian-born Nermin (37) explained:

Religiously, *namus* means to preserve your dignity and your modesty. *Namus* is precious and beautiful. It means to lower one’s gaze, to think about one’s actions that might provoke somebody else’s actions. It is to keep one’s thoughts safe because even watching certain programs on TV and the Internet can spoil *namus*. According to Ahl-as-Sunna, it is the same for males and females. There is no differentiation. In fact, a boy who has slept around has no right to go and ask for a pure girl. Islamically, he has no right. Actions of some ignorant chauvinist men who don’t know Islam distorted the pure idea of *namus* to serve their petty and unethical agendas to control young women. Therefore, today, for most young second-generation, it means predominantly female virginity. However, the more philosophical and ethical aspect of *namus* is known only to the more theologically educated cohort of the second generation.

Similarly, Australian-born Sena (27) stated:

The whole idea of *namus*, religiously speaking, is that modesty and chastity apply to everyone, not only women. But if you say the word *namus* culturally, it is meant only for women. It is a gendered paternalistic way to control women. [...] I share a

common Turkish identity, and I'm also part of my family and the Turkish 'community'. So, on the one hand, because *namus* continues to be relevant to Turks here, it means that it concerns me too. It means I have to behave because people are watching. But on the other hand, personally, *namus* is irrelevant to my own life; I disagree with its principles. Why should a woman's honour reflect on a man? Really? And why should a man lose his *namus* through women? What if he did something bad himself? Usually, it doesn't have any implications for him, culturally speaking.

All of the research participants who identified as "Islamically-aware" had university degrees, volunteered for various social and community organisations and had chosen professions (for example as teachers, social workers or lawyers) that enabled them to help, assist, care for or better the situations of others. Compassion and doing good for others were essential to their sense of moral self. They self-identified by a variety of qualifiers, such as 'practising', 'religious' or 'religiously conservative' and used such labels to distinguish themselves from other Turks, particularly 'cultural Muslims' or 'secular Turks'. However, the way they used the religious-cultural dichotomy was not only to capture who they are religiously but, more importantly, to express their "tongue-in-cheek" stance toward the authoritarian nature of Kemalist and, for that matter, Western ideas about modernity, secularisation and religious practices (for discussion, see, e.g., Göle, 1996; Kadioğlu, 1994; Şenay, 2012). Notably, Kadioğlu (1994) writes that both 'Kemalist women' and 'post-Kemalist – turbaned women' alike were expected to 'relegate their sexuality to an insignificant realm' where the former was to focus on 'their public visibility as emblems of modernization' and the latter chose 'personality' over sexuality (p.659).

The lives of diasporic Turks in Australia seem to be, as Şenay (2012, 2013) convincingly argues, under the influence of 'the fierce political climate in Turkey' (2012, p.

1621), and ‘long-distance Kemalism’ in particular. Most of my informants come from rural families⁴² who were once the focus of Kemalist reforms seeking to modernise the Turkish nation by dismantling, as Tunçay (2021) put it, ‘the social despotism prevalent among the traditionally-minded Turkish-Muslim population, caused by, he [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk] believed, the bigotry of the ulema’. Accordingly, Muslim women wearing headscarves were characterized as uneducated, backward and oppressed by their traditional social circumstances (Akbulut, 2015). In contrast, the new symbol of Kemalist Westernization and modernisation project was a secular woman without headscarf (Göle, 1996; Kandiyoti, 1991a, 1998). Under the headscarf ban (*başörtüsü yasağı*)⁴³, *hijabi* women could not become elected politicians, public servants, teachers or lawyers, nor visit university campuses (Akbulut, 2015). The aim was to erase the *hijab* from public spaces and to shame and discipline women, and their families, who continued to wear it. This imagination image seems to be still alive in the diaspora. Thus, these particular Muslim women’s somewhat critical stance towards these ideas is mirrored in calls for inclusive democratisation, religious freedom and a targeted effort to dismantle the monolithic imagery of what Miriam Cooke (2007) termed ‘the Muslimwoman’⁴⁴. This effort is directed against the process of othering Muslim women - both internally (by secularists within Turkish society) and externally (by secularists in the West).

In the following narrative, Nermin (37), who is a high school teacher, illustrates what it was like growing up and searching for spirituality in the Broadmeadows community in the 1990s. Although, her family was ‘partially religious’, they never told her much about Islam.

⁴² Some researchers (e.g., Elley, 1986) have emphasised that these families spent several years in Turkish regional towns or big cities before migrating to Australia, insinuating that this indicates a somewhat sudden change in social practice.

⁴³ The first official headscarf ban was issued in 1978 as part of a strict dress code for government workers. However, the general headscarf ban was issued after the 1980s military coup to revive Kemalist ideology in socio-political life.

⁴⁴ Although Cooke intended to use this term in her critical evaluation of structural oppression and othering in the secular West, it can be also applied to the situation of the factions of Turkish society, as the idea originates from a shared ideological source of Western secularisation.

Even though her mum used to wear a traditional *başörtü*, as rural women of her generation typically did, Nermin was never told to cover her head. Nermin recalled:

I started wearing *hijab* when I was about 17, in year 12, back then in the 1990s. I felt that I wanted to flaunt my identity and be true about that. I didn't want to be under a certain name [Muslim] if I didn't live up to the expectations. But then, it meant to go against the grain of the older secularist, more cultural part of Broadmeadows 'community'. I was one of the first young Turkish women of my generation who started wearing *hijab* freely here. And I was confronted a couple of times by elderly Turkish males; one of them was a Hume City councillor, back then. He told me that I look like a horse with blinds on [my] eyes, going just straight as being told, not seeing left or right. He implied that because of wearing *hijab*, I cannot think for myself. It was a very intense experience, which stuck with me, but I didn't bow to them. They were scared that we, *hijabis*, would bring trouble to the 'community', reflecting poorly on Turks as backward. Also, they were brainwashed by Kemalists. They were taught that religion is backward, and hijabs are what Arabs wear.

Nermin also explained that when she was growing up, with no Internet, there were not many opportunities for young people to educate themselves about Islam or find a meaningful direction for their specific existential situation. At the time, there were no Islamic Turkish colleges, Broadmeadows mosque was under construction and people from her social circle could not give her adequate answers to her spiritual and existential questions. Then, one day, an *imam* and his wife were sent from Turkey to provide religious service and pastoral care to the Broadmeadows Turkish 'community'.⁴⁵ It was a revelatory moment when Nermin found

⁴⁵ The Turkish state sends religious leaders and teachers to Turkish diasporas around the world through its organisation Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). Recently, the practice has been questioned in some European states that are suspicious of the political influence Turkish state has over its diaspora.

direction from and a role model in the *imam's* wife. She provided Nermin with a perspective on how to combine her desires 'to be educated, virtuous and religious'. At that moment, Nermin said she found a way to feel dignified and worthy while 'living Islam truly'.

In addition, these Islamically-aware women flipped the dichotomy of secular - religious so that instead of being understood as modern/progressive-traditional/conservative, it was understood as conservative/traditional-progressive/modern. As Sena (27) stated:

Before, you would see in the mainstream media how Turkey has all these highly positioned women, like judges, professors and ministers, but they are more like Western-type feminists, culturally quite conservative women. Turkey before Erdogan used to celebrate a successful secular woman, whereas now I think it's changing.

There are highly educated and self-assured Muslim women (Islamists) who want to be heard.

In Sena's understanding and worldview, Muslim women's ideas can be seen as more progressive because they demand democratisation in the sense of inclusivity for minorities and wish to widen the horizon of what it means to be modern. For them, being 'modern' means being inclusive of differences in womanhood in a way that is similar to intersectional feminism. In other words, modernity, for her, connotes Islamist democratisation that emerges as an antithesis to Kemalist secularist nationalism, which has never managed to surpass traditionalist gender relations beyond only allowing women into the public sphere (Arat, 2008; Kandiyoti, 1998). Thus, we can surmise, it is through Islam that these women find their sense of worth, through a 'civilising' emancipation from the idea of 'conservative' culturalist and secularist patriarchal domination. In terms of *namus*, which is grounded in such visions, Sena stated:

It is an ancient masculine protection of his women from being kidnapped⁴⁶ or raped.

In Australia, it has lost its relevance and therefore it lacks its justification and should be abandoned.

Instead, people should be inspired by the Islamic notion of morality that stipulates both men and women must be equally chaste and pure or, in Nermin's words, 'keep one's heart and body clean and pure for God equally.' Therefore, these women, although they believe they are already equal before Allah, want their worth and respectability to be recognised through a universal, ungendered practice of chastity and premarital purity. A similar practice has been observed by Sezgin Cihangir (2013) in the Turkish diaspora in the Netherlands where men, in order to be worthy of these women's attention, should also practice premarital purity and relational fidelity in both body and mind.

3.7 Spatiality of Namus, 'Leaving' the Turkish community and the Third Generation:

'Namus doesn't live here anymore' or Does It?

Together with the temporal shifts in *namus*, spatiality is another dimension that influences how Turkish Australian women frame *namus*. *Namus* resides in space, thus, there are sites and places in Melbourne that are imagined as enabling or inhibiting ways of personal expression and as fit or unfit for existential aspirations towards a good future. Thus, self-discipline, negotiation and strategies for self-presentation are also posited around *spatiality*.

The spaces that are imagined as inhabited by *namus* coalesce with what my informants referred to as Turkish communities (see Section 2.2 for more information). It was said that

⁴⁶ 'kidnapping' (*kız kaçırmak* in Turkish) specifically refers to the taking of a young bride by a man for marriage without family permission; sometimes it can refer to a man and young woman who make a "promise" to each other and mutually agree to run away and marry in secret, like elopement.

such spaces can accommodate and define people's sense of self, identity and belonging, as well as the way people see and relate to each other. In the early days of the Turkish Australian diaspora, newly arrived immigrants tended to settle, primarily, around other compatriots. Turkish Cypriots, *Alevis* or Sunni *Türkiyelis* established their respective Turkish communities around certain Melbourne suburbs. Cultural and linguistic familiarity or existential assistance generated through social networks was a primary motivation for the early arrivals to organise like this, and this is still the case for even the most recent newcomers. Diasporic or immigrant communities are places of security where one can find a sense of order through personal expression, cultural production, consumption and a sense of situatedness. Such sentiments were embodied in Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Nermin (37)'s narrative about the Broadmeadows 'community'. At one point, she was living in one of the southern suburbs of Chadstone, where the majority are Anglo Australians, for her job as a teacher. However, although she did not experience any specific instances of racism, she never, as a *hijabi* woman, felt socially included or as if she truly belonged there and moved back to Broadmeadows. Nermin explained it thus:

I know from my family background that they have come to Australia on very difficult terms, with zero money, a lot of hard labour, family and community building, and everything was kind of hard work. They made it here thanks to the help of other Turkish families [...] I grew up in the community. I am highly involved and highly active in the community. I enjoy it, even though it is sometimes tiring to be in the community because there are many social expectations. [...] For example, you've just got to be a good role model, represent your family and values. Especially, if you come from an educated family, that needs to extend to your children. I am a teacher, so I like serving the community. It's my time to give back; that's how I see it. I never thought of staying away and disowning my community as some others did.

In contrast, other young Turkish Australian women perceive such ‘communities’ as inhibiting their personal expression or as unable to provide an environment that facilitates the realisation of desired existential aspirations and personal development – for themselves or their daughters. While some younger Australian-born informants have gained unprecedented liberties compared to their older counterparts, they felt compelled to exercise their autonomy outside the Turkish suburbs to avoid gossip. I was often invited to accompany my young informants on various drive-arounds and at parties in other suburbs, away from Turkish areas: far enough away not to be seen doing something that might compromise their reputations. For instance, third generation *Türkiyeli* Banu (25) told me:

You know, I only go to cafes in Broadmeadows with my girlfriends and only during the day. I also have a couple of ‘guy mates’, well, we don’t do anything, they are just mates, my brothers know them, and they are not Turks. So, when I want to meet them, I have to drive to other suburbs where no one knows me. People here gossip like crazy. And even though I am still a virgin, I don’t wanna risk our family being gossiped about. Well, when you’re a wog, guys can do things that we [women] can’t.

Relatedly, the theme about a taxi driver having sex with women, or people having sex in an Uber car appeared in many narratives. Regardless of whether these stories are true, the frequent recurrence of the theme is significant. Away from the Turkish ‘community’s stifling moral standards, escaping in a car to have sex with a stranger seems to be a fantasy that embodies a desire to gain personal liberation from the scrutiny of those who impose their power on others. For example, *Türkiyeli* Zehra (50) told me such a story about a taxi driver that would pick up a woman that she knew so that they could have sex in his car. Zehra narrated:

She knew that he was Turkish, but he didn't [know she was]. And once she said some Turkish word, perhaps '*lan*' [mate]. The taxi driver was so embarrassed, he took her home and told her that if he knew she was Turkish, he would not go anywhere near her because of the gossip. And that was the end of it.

Thus, it appears that the boundary within which *namus* morality reigns is attached to a physical place and a shared ethnic identity. As far as the 'immorality' takes place outside such boundaries, it may no longer matter as far as the agentic moral self is engaged. The moral quality attached to one's deeds comes forward in an intersubjective setting within a *morality group*, that is, amongst a collective that perceives something as either moral or immoral. It could be argued that it is the degree to which one is attached to moral ideals, one's involvement with a morality group, or one's subjective lived experience with *namus* community politics that makes particular sites and spaces perceived as cultivating *namus* sensibility in individual actors. While for some Turkish women, the place of Turkish community continuously evokes such sensibility embodied in moral scrutiny, for others, it induces feelings of moral belonging.

Furthermore, the 'leaving of the Turkish 'community'' was also intended as more permanent for some participants. In addition to other socioeconomic reasons attached to ideas that there are certain disadvantages associated with living in the Turkish 'community', as elaborated in the research from the 1980s and 1990s in particular (see Section 1.5), a specific theme emerged in the narratives. Several research participants expressed their preference for living outside the Turkish 'community'. For some women, this remained a fantasy, while others were able to realise this desire. Notably, whether later arrivals or Australian-born mothers, both groups indicated that their decision was guided by the desire to facilitate better conditions for their daughters' wellbeing. Having experienced their own personal drama with

community *namus* politics, these mothers aimed to avoid the *namus* scrutiny and intrusions into their daughters' personal lives, implying these had had a destructive effect on their own lives and, by extrapolation, on a woman's creation of healthy self-worth and self-image (see Sections 4.2, 6.4 and 6.5 for discussion). For instance, *Alevi Mutlu* (45), who did not want to live in, as she said, 'another Turkish village on the other part of the world' shared her Australian-born husband's yearning for 'a fresh start somewhere away from the 'community', where everyone knows everyone'. Mutlu articulated:

I don't mix a lot with them [Turkish Australians], and I don't want my kids to mix with them either. Well, I don't mind my kids having Turkish friends, but have you seen Aliya's [her daughter] Facebook, the way she dresses? She is the type of girl that would not fit in the Turkish 'community'. She is so free she'd stand out. Whatever she wears, she doesn't care. She is happy with herself, confident. Even in just a T-shirt, her boobs are hanging down, she doesn't care. She is not like me. She can stand up for herself. She is my best investment in life, and I would not want her to lose that confidence. It would happen if people gossiped.

The notion that the 'community' embodies *namus* was also reflected in the narratives of these women's daughters, the third generation of Turkish Australians. Although growing up elsewhere in Melbourne and with different levels of contact with the 'community', these young women also imagined and associated Turkish community with constraints as opposed to a 'liberal lifestyle'. However, these young women often described a tension between their aspiration to live such 'liberal lifestyles', being Turkish and having a certain level of self-scrutiny. After all, *namus* might reside in a space, but such spaces can be also expanded beyond the borders of a location, in contrast to the case described above. Through a sense and imagination of belonging to a cultural identity facilitated by parents, certain elements of

morality may reappear amongst people of consecutive diasporic generations in their search for self, identity and their place in the world.

Such a process is reflected in the following case of the third generation *Türkiyeli* Ceren (20). She identifies as a Turkish Australian Muslim and although she attended a private Catholic school and grew up in Mooney Ponds in Melbourne's northwest, she has built her connection to Islam through her family and by attending female *sohbets*⁴⁷ after school. I met Ceren when she had just enrolled in her first year of an engineering degree and was experiencing new challenges concerning her *moral identity* in regard to her first sexual experiences, going out, drinking and taking drugs. Unlike her sister, who wears *hijab* and is, according to Ceren, 'a good Turkish Muslim girl who would not do anything she does',⁴⁸ Ceren had experienced parties, drinking and was experimenting with drugs. She had also just spent a summer in Berlin with her friends. Ceren stated:

All these things that we are talking about would be called *namussuz*. It's like wrong, *haram*, completely immoral. You don't have your *namus* if you do them. [...] But *namus* is a word that only the typical Turkish people in the community use. You know, people that care about *namus* because they care for gossiping about others.

Nonetheless, Ceren specified that, although she does not feel any direct pressure from her parents or anyone else, the moral principles of *namus* have power over her. She explained

⁴⁷ *Sohbets* are 'community' meetings where various issues concerning everyday life are discussed. They are gender and age separated. They fulfil an important educational function by transferring ethical values such as social justice, tolerance, benevolence and respect (UNESCO, 2010). E.g., Sametoğlu (2015) writes about Gülen movement's *sohbets* that are religious conversations where issues of religious, moral and *hizmet* (service) issues are discussed. However, she also portrayed them as places of youth socialisation. In such a sense, my young informants attending Sirius college related to *sohbets*. Silverstein (2008, p. 124) examines *sohbets* ("companionships in conversation") amongst a contemporary Turkish Sufi order. He observed that "sohbet harnesses and institutionalizes the conception of love [to God] into a discipline of companionship as a technique for the formation of moral dispositions" (p. 130). In comparison, Şenay (2015) studied *sohbet* ("conversation") as an important pedagogical tool in Sufi tradition of learning to play *ney* (reed flute). During the practice of the dialogue, the process of cultivation of ethical sensibilities in a student musician takes place.

⁴⁸ Later on, Ceren told me that she had found out her sister was 'seeing a boy', which took her by surprise.

that her moral conflict has two sides. On the one hand, she does not find ‘anything wrong with doing such things [exploring drinking, partying and exploring her sexuality] because she is not hurting anyone’. On the other hand, she said that she ‘would lose her sense of self as a Muslim if she let herself go’. Ceren is a brilliant and curious young woman who cares about growing and exploring the world beyond what would usually be expected from young women of her age. She explained: ‘My greatest fear is to live a mediocre life and go with the norm. I guess that might come into play as to why I don’t really wanna immerse or get assimilated with the Turkish community.’

‘Leaving the Turkish community’ and finding one’s own ‘Turkish self’, reshaped on one’s own terms, is a strong theme in the narrative of another young third-generation *Türkiyeli* woman Adile (24). *Namus* morality and community politics played a role in her Australian-born father’s total split from his family in Sydney, which occurred in stages over several years. At the core, however, was Mustafa’s refusal to *do things right* based on his family’s visions and forging his own way of *doing the right thing* by himself and his young family. For example, he refused to contribute half his salary to his sister’s dowry and chose loyalty towards his fiancée over his sister and mother in a conflict between them. As a consequence, he was shunned, which started a raft of gossip in the Turkish community where his parents were well known. Ultimately, he moved to Melbourne and never talked to anyone in his family again. Adile’s parents do not socialise with anyone Turkish other than one uncle and one other Turkish family. Even though Mustafa had a very complicated relationship with the ways of Turkish diasporic sociality and his Turkishness, he wanted his two daughters to somehow connect with their Turkish identity. He enrolled Adile in Sirius College in Broadmeadows. Adile described her experience as follows:

I didn't fit in there. It was too square. For them, I was *yabancı*⁴⁹ because of my mother. They didn't want me to be involved because I wasn't what they expected me to be. Besides, I wanted to study music, but they didn't offer that, so I changed schools. [...] Today, I understand that I've chosen to distance myself because both my parents didn't want to be connected with the woginess. But today, I appreciate my heritage and where I come from. I think my dad is shocked by how intrigued I am today because a lot of the time I used to push it away when he tried to tell me about it.

When I asked if she could specify what she did not like, Adile highlighted her interpretation of *namus* morality and community *namus* politics as a core of her antipathy to Turkishness and as an obstacle to reconnecting with her Turkish heritage. Adile said:

I didn't like Turks, but that's because of the people I was exposed to. All they live by and care for is if a person comes from a good family or if their kids can speak Turkish and cook Turkish cuisine. And then when a guy bashes his wife, they say, oh, but he comes from a good family. I hate this. [...] *Namus* got to do with gender difference, and partners decide on each other's lives. It's got to do with that you have to be a certain way, and if you're not like that, we don't want you. *Kapalı*⁵⁰ girls put on Facebook only photos when they go to coffee shops during the day or maybe for dinner with their girlfriends. They don't go clubbing, as they would be seen as *namussuz*, like gross. That's what Turks from the community see straight away: "why would you let your daughter do that?" But now, as I am older, I'm meeting different Turks that are not like that, and I like them. I also love Turkish music and art.

⁴⁹ A foreigner, a stranger. This label is used to express out-group otherness.

⁵⁰ In Turkish, this means closed. It is also used to describe women who wear headscarves.

Although the imminency of community *namus* politics is missing in the everyday lives of families that prefer to avoid the Turkish ‘community’, it is evident that the moral values related to *namus* have not disappeared from their lives. Instead, the *namus* values have become an aspect of parenting in such families and adapted to the individual parents’ ideological orientation. *Namus* practices, thus, become more individualised and subjective in certain moral sites. Generally, for Australian-born Turkish children who have been detached from the Turkish diasporic ‘community’, it is the social dimension of *namus*, or perhaps rather the discourse addressing the topic, that often poses an obstacle in reconnecting to their Turkish heritage. However, what is characteristic is the tendency to ‘pick and mix’ which elements of their Turkish heritage they identify with and which they reject.

Examining the concept of spatiality further, while some research participants imagined *namus* as residing in the centres of Turkish communities in Melbourne, others located *namus* in Turkey or else, Turkey as a domain of *namus*. In particular, newly arriving Turkish-born participants expressed that “*namus* no longer exists in Australia” when addressing local Turkish youths’ lifestyles and behaviours. Likewise, some first-generation parents imagined that by marrying their offspring in an overseas marriage in Turkey, their children’s ways – perceived as somewhat morally corrupted, would transform. In other words, *namus* that has been somewhat getting lost in diaspora would be found. The imagination was based on the notion that *namus* still resides in Turkey and with Turks that stayed there. In consequence of sharing life with a Turkish spouse, their Australian-born children would then be reminded of ‘proper’ *namuslu* ways (see further discussion in sections 5.3 and 5.4). In this perspective, *namus* was also associated with a high concentration of Turks yet located in places of ethnic ‘purity’ in Turkey.

3.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I situated nuances, shifts and consistencies in how framings of *namus* are embodied in practices of *namus* morality. The aim was to expand the focus beyond the obvious “disciplining” dimension of morality towards its existential element. That is, what being moral means to different people of various positionality and how practising *namus* morality enhances or inhibits conditions of existence, both materially and ideologically, in a collective and individual perspective.

It appears that for some people, deploying *namus* morality may be an important orientation in their existential strategizing, for others less so. That might include prospecting and facilitating ‘a better future’, either for oneself or for others, and preserving one’s cultural, ethnic and personal identities. Daughters born in the diaspora were seen, from the point of view of their early immigrant parents, as conveyers responsible for passing on culture to the next generation and preserving Turkish identity in the foreign land. For Australian-born Turkish women, *namus* morality may thus represent an existential reference with varying proximity and intensity that is accommodated, resisted or reshaped in the process of locating self in the world.

Situating the collective self in relation to others and understandings of *namus* reflects the internal diversity of the Turkish diaspora in Australia. Here, the framing of *namus* involves distinction-making infused with both inclusive and exclusive dynamics that reinforce a sense of personal and group moral identity. Thus, the *other* group, which either does or does not have *namus*, is seen either positively or otherwise. This moral othering has multiple dimensions based on the delineation of boundaries around migrancy generation, age, class, ethnicity, culture, civilisation religiosity, place of origin and place of residence in Australia.

Processes of individualisation, de-collectivisation and subjectification permeate conceptualisations of *namus*. While a fixed monolith of three interwoven moral imperatives – virginity, sexual fidelity and obedience to one’s parents – once occupied the central position in Turkish women’s moral identity, these principles have evolved into subjectively elective elements that share space with other, often more important, moral values (such as compassion) in a woman’s individualised sense of personal moral identity. The way people explain *namus* also reflects elements of these shifts. Instead of connotations of collectivity, such as ‘saving face’ of self and others in *the moral group* when fronting others, individualised ‘self-respect’ now underpins the concept.

This development has a particular way of reframing the discourse from being a rigid form of social control over individuals, towards a more open form that enables women ‘now’, as distinct from ‘then’, to better express themselves as individuals. A shift in time conceptualised as the enabler of individual agency places emphasis not merely on the gradual progression through a series of hierarchically powerful social positions – from a virginal *gelin*, through loyal wife and mother, to autonomous *divorcée* – but also on a judgement about the difference between those individuals who have managed to take advantage of the social hierarchy and those who have not. For some women, *namus* morality can remain a framework of virtuous self-making, and for others, it represents oppression.

Notably, unified moral voices across various subjectivities of women have been demanding the uneven burden put on women’s moral responsibilities for deeds and reputations of others be addressed. It challenges the collectivity of *namus* and suggests disassociating the intertwined moral integrity of members of moral groups, such as families, towards individualised responsibility. Equally, they demand a transcendence beyond the judgment of women’s moral integrity based on chastity and directing attention towards other personal moral qualities. The point of the shift is not to abandon the values of premarital

virginity, relational fidelity or respect to parents, nor to demand selfish individuation but to refuse the judgemental involvement of others.

The two modalities – *doing things right* and *doing the right thing* – capture and express moral and existential beliefs that are related to the inherited normative framework and to self. *Doing things right*, based on how things have been done until now, is an incitement to continue and preserve the ways of one's ancestors, perpetuating them into the future. It represents an attempt to preserve collectivity in an existentially insecure environment. *Doing the right thing* connotes 'here' and 'now' and entails the notion of one's individual and subjective authenticity. The two modalities embody the *modus operandi* behind the perpetuation or change of social and moral conventions over time.

An interesting case is presented through the specific voice of some Australian-born 'Islamically-aware' Turkish Muslim women, who use *namus* as a tool to subvert gendered double moral standards they locate in 'culture' instead of in Islam. Accordingly, they claim *namus* is a religious concept that applies to all equally, regardless of gender, and aims 'to civilise' people and elevate women's existential conditions. In these imaginations, Islamic *namus* was once a pure form of moral principles that have been hijacked by 'secular Turks/cultural Muslims' and misused as a tool of 'chauvinist oppression'. These women express their opposition to Western and Kemalist modernisation projects and how their echoes seek to minimise public religious expression and social influence in the diaspora.

Spatiality is an important dimension of how *namus* is framed. *Namus* is imagined as residing in certain places in Melbourne, specifically in the centres of Turkish communities. As such, these spaces are imagined as either enabling or inhibiting personal expression, wellbeing and self-worth, or as being fit or unfit for an individual's existential aspirations toward a good life or future. While the informants' narratives mainly pivoted around the notion of scrutiny and community *namus* politics, in further research, it would be interesting

to examine what makes particular sites and spaces to be perceived as more conducive for cultivating *namus* sensibility in individual actors. It is perhaps to do with what the thesis suggests throughout - the subjective experience, to what degree individual actors care for *namus* values, as well as to whom they perform such values.

However, *namus* values still influence families who are no longer located within the geographical sphere and the immediate reach of *namus* community politics. Turkish parents often continue teaching the relevant values to their daughters. However, parental enforcement and daughters' observation become a moral site of individual choice or circumstance. Competing dynamics of inclusivity and exclusivity may incite interconnected moral and existential anxieties that may then mobilise heightened self-pride, hyper-protectionism of cultural identity, self-isolation or even an aversion to one's heritage.

In the next chapter, I expand on the first of the three spheres, the values or principles of *namus* as they were delineated by the research participants – premarital purity and virginity. I will identify the shifts and consistencies in how such principles have developed through their embodiment in youth sociality and intimate life.

Chapter 4

The Ideal of Marriage-Bound Virginity and Situating ‘First Sex’ between Points of Belonging and Personal Development

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored the shifts and continuities in how *namus* has been framed by Turkish Australians from different diasporic generations and with various subjectivities. I situated the ideas and discourses related to *namus* and those embodied in positionings towards (diasporic)⁵¹ *namus* morality as a collective and subjective search for self-worth through accommodation, resistance, rejection, negotiation and transformation. While *namus* now has a different existential relevance for women, processes of de-collectivisation, individualisation and subjectification permeate its framings.

In this chapter, I return to what informants most frequently defined as a principle, an element, or even the essence of *namus*, namely premarital purity and virginity. I explore the shifts and consistencies in how it has developed through its embodiment in youth sociality and the intimate life of the diaspora. While virginity, once a precondition for marriage, has remained something of an ideal, especially among diasporic parents, the way women

⁵¹ In the sense that the socio-moral dynamics of *namus* principles are deployed within the diasporic communal sociality. The addition of ‘diasporic’ into the term ‘*namus* morality’ implies repurposed and reshaped ways of deploying *namus* principles compared to pre-migration communal village life.

construct meaning around their first sexual experience has generally shifted. It is now less a question of belonging to the Turkish identity or ‘the right man’, and more a matter of personal experience and development. Thus, I here substantiate the argument presented in the previous chapter regarding the individuation and de-collectivization of the value of *namus* principles through a consideration of premarital sexual chastity and the subjectification or diversification of *namus* meanings in relation, in particular, to first sex.

4.2 Virginitly as a Precondition for Marriage and a Marker of the Bride’s Cultural Knowledge in the Diaspora

In the accounts of my older research participants, both Turkish and Australian-born, virginity and premarital purity were predominantly represented as bound to family *namus* and moral integrity. Given the continuing practice of endogamous arranged marriage (see Chapter 5 for further discussion), this issue can have various repercussions for a young woman’s marriageability and her position in the marriage. In my participants’ accounts, relevant themes included anxiety that potential in-laws would ‘not come to see her’ (*görüciye gitmek*)⁵² and that in a severe case, as one of the *Türkiyeli* participants put it, ‘you simply had to be a virgin. Otherwise, they [your in-laws] would send you back to your parents.’ Married women could also be ostracised, shamed and even abused in their marriages because of assumptions about their immorality – being considered someone less worthy and not deserving of respect in the relationship.

⁵² Marriage politics are interconnected with *namus* politics as mothers organise the family matches by gathering information through gossiping within their female networks and at female gatherings (Elley, 1982, 1985).

In the tight-knit Turkish Australian communities of the 1970s and 1980s (Manderson & Inglis, 1984, p. 268), young women's conduct was intensely scrutinized, as their mothers' conduct would have been in their Turkish villages. Behaviour was monitored through what can be called the 'neighbours' watch', when people attentively observe affairs in their street, or through gossip, which occurred during home visits and community gatherings. During these activities, people regularly made assumptions of moral misconduct about others. Being seen associating with men or in places considered unsuitable for women, could trigger a damaging campaign against any young woman. It would be assumed she was morally corrupt and that her virginity had been compromised. Although almost always exaggerated once unleashed, these rumours would almost always damage the reputation of the whole *moral group*, including members of the woman's family. This anxiety about the potential damage to the family's existential aspirations in addition to the daughter's marriage prospects compelled parents to impose limitations on their daughters.

In the diaspora, in the context of first-generation moral and existential anxieties about 'losing culture' in a foreign land, as previously discussed, a young woman's virginity also symbolised her ability to pass on Turkish values, morals and customs to the next generation. Being able to control her adolescent sexual urges and preserve her virginity despite the Australian environment, which was considered hypersexualised and immoral, also demonstrated other moral qualities such as reliability, perseverance and self-discipline. Potential in-laws would then consider the young woman a good match because they felt assured their potential daughter-in-law possessed Turkish values and would care about passing them onto their grandchildren.

Similarly, being known as *namuslu*, as a 'pure Turkish girl' would work in the favour of a bride who found herself in 'an overseas marriage', mostly with a match from a parental village. Such marriages continued to be arranged despite the efforts of Australian-born

women to avoid such matches. Australian-born Turkish girls (and boys) were imagined as ‘not fully Turkish’ or being ‘too Australianised’. This imagery implies that Australian-born Turks do not know or practise Turkish culture, traditions and customs correctly or lack morals, for example, by wanting equality within in the marriage, having premarital sex and mixing with men. Thus, by being known as a ‘pure Turkish girl’, young Australian-born women who find themselves in overseas marriages also demonstrated their knowledge of Turkish culture through their affinity with the Turkish moral identity and by *doing things right* (see also Section 3.4).

The following life story of Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Emine (50) illustrates how essential it was to enter marriage as a reputed virgin. At sixteen years of age, Emine was taken out of school and married to her first husband in an overseas match. When I asked her why she thinks this happened to her, Emine explained that after her father died, her mother was left alone in a foreign country with two children. Struggling without her husband’s wage and existentially worried, her mother sent Emine to work in a factory to help support the family. Emine did not mind at the time and liked helping her family. However, as she matured into a young woman, she started attracting looks from men and with it, envy and community gossip. Being a widow⁵³, her mother feared losing Emine’s and her even more vulnerable *namus*. Therefore, believing it would stop the gossip, she decided to find Emine husband as soon as possible. However, in her haste, she was only able to arrange a wedding with an older man in the ‘community’. The marriage was a disaster, filled with violence, and they soon divorced.

Although Emine recalled the time after the divorce as one of the happiest times in her life, it did not last long, as her mother arranged another marriage for her, this time in her village in Turkey. The second marriage was equally disastrous. Although the second husband was not violent like the first one, he constantly disrespected her because of insinuations about

⁵³ See Section 5.6 for a discussion on the moral stigma, factual and linguistic, related to status of a widow.

her tainted reputation. He questioned her moral integrity, calling her names, suggesting that as she had grown up in Australia and her mother had found her an older man in such a hurry, she must have been sleeping around and could not have been a virgin. Emine could not do anything about it. She was trapped in a terrible marriage with three children. She only divorced when her children grew up and were able to contribute to the family income.

In attempting to understand how young Australian-born women ‘responded’ to communal moral pressure, it became apparent that the narratives of my older participants, of both *Türkiyeli* and Turkish Cypriot heritage, typically entailed internalising and personally embracing the value of premarital purity as part of their moral identity. Only a few informant narratives included stories of ‘rebellious’ or ‘sneaking out to see a boyfriend’ and the majority did not pursue any sexual experience. Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Ayse (49) explained:

For our generation, it was implied by our parents and other people in the community that sex is something between a man and a woman that you do after marriage, not for pleasure before marriage. It was not right. Sex was something that we would do once we got married to a husband, so we had children. We would not think about it as something that we should desire. It was out of [the] question.

Similarly, Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Gulhan (49) recounted:

Many people that I grew up with never did anything that would compromise it. We didn’t run away or had a boyfriend – some girls, however, did. I had friends who would jump out the window at night to have sex, but me and my friends, we’d be like, you shouldn’t be doing that.

Building on the concepts explained in the previous chapter (Section 3.4), it seems that remaining a virgin until marriage was a matter of women’s *diasporic ethnic* and *personal*

moral identities. Most of the women expressed themselves through the moral modality of *doing things right*. The typical motives for preserving one's virginity were satisfying communal expectations, parental authority and expressing love through duty to parents.

Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Fatima (50) illustrates the interconnection nicely:

Preserving myself sexually for my husband was part of who I was and what I stand for as a woman of Turkish heritage. It was something that I knew was required by my parents and people in the 'community', so I took it for granted.

Similarly, Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Ayten (51) stated:

I grew up traditionally, and in our tradition, we have to stay virgins. So, I just took it for granted that you have to be. [...] I was thinking culturally: it's a no [to have sex].

In other women's narratives, the modality *doing the right thing*, to satisfy their own sense of what is right and a sense of *self* surfaced more prominently. Yet they did not break from the *status quo*. For example, Australian-born Turkish Cypriot, Zeyneb (48), stated:

I believed that sex out of marriage was not right and I would not do what I did not believe was right. [...] We were brought up the way that we would never steal, and this was one of the things that you would never do. It was wrong to do it.

Interestingly, slightly younger informants who grew up in the 1990s and had higher levels of educational attainment tended to frame their premarital celibacy with more pragmatic reasons rather than expressions of morality. In their narratives, the sexual chastity attached to their moral identity was an affordance, an enabler of a good future and not having to participate in the sexualised youth environment was seen as a lesser burden. For example, Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Aliye (41) explained:

The crushes and being rebellious was not an issue for me when growing up. I wasn't really interested in guys because my focus was on my studies, and I didn't wanna end up married young with some guy who would hold me back. I had my dreams.

In comparison, Kamile (43) said:

Well, I was in an all-girls Catholic school and so I didn't really have a chance to meet the right person to fall in love and go crazy and sneak out at night to meet a boyfriend. I also didn't want to be like other girls who were competing for guys between themselves, showing off, flaunting their sexuality. I saw them as lacking self-respect. I felt sorry for them as they did it to fit in. In fact, I was lucky because, as a Turk, I didn't have to do it.

It appears that a reputation for premarital sexual purity played a central role in the lives of older Australia-born Turkish women. It was closely associated with their marriageability and their positionality in the marriage, in both diasporic and overseas endogamous marriages. However, it is essential to acknowledge that virginity was not just a socially imposed or enforced rule. It was also a value that many Australian-born women of that generation embraced, whether as a virtue attached to their Turkish identity or as a pragmatic affordance and enabler of a good future. Nevertheless, in the next section, I demonstrate how some women were able to negotiate and loosen the connection between virginity and marriage by deploying their moral agency in the sense of '*doing the right thing*'. These cases introduce the idea of *relational virginity* and *moral liminality*.

4.3 Spaces of Moral Liminality: Between Marriage-Bound and Relational Virginity

Female sexuality, at least amongst my older Australian-born informants, was inherently linked to and only appropriate within marriage. The wedding night was imagined as a crucial milestone in a woman's intimate life where she, upon entering the morally sanctioned space of wedlock, could realise her sexual self. Although most of the older second-generation participants claimed to have embraced the moral values of premarital sexual restraint and the belief that these restrictions can only be lifted with marriage, there were, of course, situations and circumstances where a woman was compelled to question this limitation. These instances often involved creating spaces of *moral liminality* where the woman balanced on the verge between the moral and the immoral, risking her existential security and visions of a good future.

In the following example, Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Zeyneb (49) found herself in such space. Despite upholding the idea of premarital sexual restraint, seemingly for the pragmatic reason of not jeopardising her marriage prospects, Zeyneb lost her virginity outside marriage with her *fiancé*. She recounted:

What we did was our business. He didn't force me. I didn't feel pressured. I was in love, and we both saw it as part of that process. [...] In retrospect, I don't think that I would have had sex with him if I wasn't sure that we were gonna get married. I don't think I would have. To me, it was just wrong to have sex without the intention of marriage. No one else would want me if I was not. I might have met a guy of my dreams, and he might not want me because I am not a virgin.

The way Zeyneb approached her first sexual experience shows that morality can be also a subjective matter that is not rigid but situational and people can existentially strategize based on these intertwined perspectives. While being aware that she was transgressing both socially

and personally important moral principles and risking serious existential difficulties, Zeyneb was able to justify this decision to herself and satisfy her sense of moral integrity. Using the idea of van Gennep's classical concept of liminality (1909), Zeyneb seems to have appeared in the space of *moral liminality* where she stood at a threshold between the moral and the immoral yet was not wholly either. As she recognised herself, Zeyneb was compromising her marriageability and, thus, her existential advancement. Nevertheless, she leapt towards her fate by trusting her *fiancé* to stand by his word and marry her. Thus, after she lost her virginity, she was in a space of existential danger until the actual wedding took place and her existential position was reinstated.

Zeyneb's case exposed another layer to the upholding of the premarital chastity principle, namely the *relational aspect of virginity* that underlay the *institutional (marriage-bound) aspect of virginity*. As the term implies, the relational aspect has to do with the attachment of a woman's virginity to a relationship with a man – either with a husband or, as I will show in the case of younger Turkish Australian women, with a boyfriend. Whether actual or prospective, the relationship was another significant incentive for many women to remain virgins. In my participants' narratives, I would hear expressions such as 'I was waiting for that right man', 'I could show him that he is that special one' or, inversely, 'if I had sex before marriage, no man would want me'. However, for my older participants, the relational aspect of virginity was still firmly intertwined with their marriage prospects, with the institutional aspect of virginity. Therefore, while Zeyneb's overarching moral stimulus remained the vision of a good marriage, she was able to sideline it in her moral consciousness as she felt that she could rely on her actual relationship and trust her *fiancé*.

In the context of the moral liminality that can arise from the situational deliberation of morality within the diaspora, the significance of the traditional pre-nuptial ritual *söz*⁵⁴ comes

⁵⁴ The Turkish word for 'a promise'.

to the fore. In the *söz*, the groom's family comes over for an official home visit (publicly announced in the community through gossip) with the bride's family to officially propose and organize the details of the marriage. In Turkish villages, this was an essential part of the marriage ritual but in the diaspora, its importance has shifted slightly, and it has become more of an elective feature of 'dating'. Turkish Cypriot Fatima (50) indicated this shift in the opportunities for premarital dating and the role *söz* played:

In my generation, because girls wanted people to be more accepting of seeing her going out with a boy, so they maintain the family *namus*, they [the girls] would want to have *söz* because it means promise, a handshake, commitment, agreement that they would get married. So, people should not gossip about them after having the *söz*.

Hence, in the space of *moral liminality*, having *söz* provided Turkish women in the diaspora with another layer of assurance, albeit an unstable one, in their moral deliberations on the marriage-bound and relational dedication of their virginity. On the one hand, losing one's virginity in the phase between the *söz* and the formal wedding is still dangerous space to be in for a young woman. The 'promise' of marriage can still be broken, which would mean the woman could potentially be left an unmarried non-virgin if the wedding does not proceed. On the other hand, in the diaspora, unlike a generation earlier in Turkey, premarital intimacies have become more of a couple's 'tacit business'. As long as the couple is publicly acknowledged by the *söz*, people are less likely to intrude, even though they still watch out for and gossip about more visible moral pathologies. The matter hinges on the hope that, if the marriage is called off, not many people in the community would call a woman *namussuz*. Therefore, losing virginity in this phase is theoretically more acceptable than if it is lost before the *söz*. Notwithstanding, as Zeyneb stated, 'if a woman decides to have sex, she should be sure that she wants to get married'.

Interestingly, although *söz* was not included in the marriage rituals as often by the 2000s, it seems that it has started regaining popularity amongst young third-generation Turkish Australians. In contrast to the older second-generation migrants who used it as some kind of ‘a moral refuge’, the youngest Turkish Australians deploy *söz* as an expression of pride in their Turkishness and a sign of respect for their parental heritage. Another wedding ritual, *bekaret kuşağı*,⁵⁵ is being utilised in a similar way. Although some third-generation women find the ritual objectionable, primarily because of its ‘sexist’ framing, *the red ribbon tying* ritual is generally respected by the *Türkiyeli* diasporic community for highlighting the relationship between fathers and daughters. For example, Sena (27) stated that, while she was happy to ‘play along’ with the ritual to make her parents, particularly her father happy, her younger sister allegedly proclaimed that ‘she ain’t doing it as she is not a cow to be tied like that’. That such stark differences can occur within one family indicates another layer of subjectification in women’s approaches to *namus* morality, its practices and expressions.

I have already demonstrated that although virginity was, at least for the older second-generation, closely associated with marriage and the threshold of moral behaviour concerning female sexuality was socially clear, there have also been instances where a young woman has deployed her moral agency in order to oscillate between understandings of what constitutes moral behaviour. I first explored which space a woman engaging in such deliberations appears to be in, both socially and personally, and argued that it is a space of *moral liminality*. Secondly, I showed how the pre-marriage ritual of *söz* constituted a dimension of moral liminality. In addition, I introduced the relational aspect underlying a woman’s ideas and prospects about virginity and showed that, in the case of the older second generation, it was

⁵⁵ The Turkish word for a ‘maidenhood belt’, refers to a marriage ritual that occurs upon the bride’s departure from the parental home on her wedding day. Her father, as the most senior and respectable man in the family, ties a *red ribbon* around the bride’s waist. This is usually a very emotional time for the whole family, but particularly for the bride and the father, as it symbolises a bittersweet farewell. The red ribbon symbolises the bride’s virginity and the fact that her father can proudly say he has raised a *namuslu* woman and is able to giving her away to her husband as a virgin. This ritual is predominantly practiced by *Türkiyelis*.

still only considered a complement to the institutional (marriage-bound) aspect of virginity. In the next section, I explore the current landscape of premarital sexual morality through the narratives of my younger research participants.

4.4 Virginity Turns Private: First Sex as a Matter of Belonging and Personal Development

The value of premarital virginity continues to occupy an important place in adolescent Turkish Australian women's lives. However, there have been significant changes in communal, parental and individual women's perspectives. Generally, while premarital sexual morality continues to be scrutinised, particularly in the experience of young women growing up in the suburbs with a high concentration of Turks, the central focus of the scrutiny has shifted from virginity to promiscuity. That is, instead of being preoccupied with having (and sometimes proving) an intact hymen on the wedding night,⁵⁶ young Turkish Australian women are typically more concerned about avoiding being labelled as someone who 'sleeps around'. As a result, the timing and circumstances of first sex have become more of a personal choice for each woman and their private business. Depending on her immediate family and social environment, different levels of self-scrutiny might be attached to such a decision. As third generation *Türkiyeli* Filiz (20) put it: 'today, if a girl wants to sleep with someone, trust me, she will. She'll hide it from her parents if she needs to.' However, she still needs to be very careful about whom she tells and how she speaks about it. Indeed, first sex is not something that she could boast about or explore with just anyone.

While most of the Turkish parents, including Australian-born mothers, would prefer their daughter 'preserve herself for the one', their predominant reasons for doing so have

⁵⁶ In Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries, there is a whole discourse about embodiment of the value of premarital purity into hymen, its symbolism and practices. However, it falls outside the scope of this thesis.

shifted from a representation of family *namus* and community or existential security towards care for the daughter's emotional wellbeing, in both a romantic and a pragmatic relational sense. As Australian-born mother, Ceren (49), said: 'today, I don't believe that a girl is *namussuz* if she is not a virgin, but I would prefer my daughter to be because I believe it's better for her in the relationship. Here, I return to the concept of *relational virginity* highlighted in the previous section. As it transpired, some Turkish diasporic men still prefer to marry or date a virgin, so parental preoccupation with their daughter's virginity remains associated with the idea of moral capital that will benefit her later, should she have any relational problems. Accordingly, as I explored through Emine's example in Section 4.2, a woman who enters marriage or a long-term relationship as a virgin, is thought of as having a stronger position, a moral high ground and a higher sense of worth. *Türkiyeli* Ceyda (23) explained that 'in our culture, usually our Turkish boys prefer someone who is a virgin, so they have that virgin for themselves'.

On this note, I recall a discussion with a trio of girlfriends during one of my focus groups that addressed the idea that a woman's moral capital resided in her virginity and how the lack of it could be used against her in relational disputes. All three women, one of *Türkiyeli* and two of *Alevi* background, told me that they lost their virginity in their early twenties with their then boyfriends. Although their parents knew about the relationships, they all had to be discreet about them around other Turkish people. *Alevi* Selin (26) recalled:

We started dating after like five years of being best mates. I know that I was precious to him because I was a virgin. I know that he would never date me if I wasn't [virgin] because once we were talking about other girls that we thought were sleeping around, and he told me: "do you know what attracted me to you? You, being a virgin at a certain age. You were a virgin, but I thought you were a slut. But then, when you told me that you were still a virgin, I needed to get you." But then, after we started sleeping

together, we started fighting, and he started accusing me of sleeping with other people, even though I was always around him. He would call me a slut. He was a psycho.

Then, *Türkiyeli* Sevda (24) added her perspective:

But let just think that we are all virgins. Guys would automatically think, no, they are not. Because they automatically think that you are not until they actually know you. So, it's judging straight away.

Then *Alevi* Ebru (25) elaborated on Sevda's claim further:

It's because we go out, we know how to have fun. Like I have a friend, she is still a virgin, she knows how to have fun too, but automatically she'll be judged that she isn't. That's how it is here.

It seems that although there have been some shifts towards liberation, it is not quite the kind of liberation usually imagined. The 'liberated' Turkish young women who go out, still have to deal with *namus* morality within the context of the current idea of a hyper-sexualised Australian youth environment. Their decisions and behaviour seem to be moderated by the relational aspect, that is, when they are with a non-Turkish partner, they might feel less prone to self-regulate. At the same time, however, another moment of self-regulation might arise in connection with the anxiety about being seen with and judged by Turkish men – potential partners. In this regard, Turkish young men's affinity with *namus* morality seems to be homogenised by Turkish women. It is, therefore, the imagination or the possibility of being scrutinised that leads women to self-regulation.

The claim of some respondents that young Turkish Australian men prefer virgins may be, thus, an over-generalisation. While it is true that female premarital sexuality is still unequally scrutinised, the imperative of virginity has shifted in relational perspective amongst

some men. Except, perhaps, for those ‘Islamically-aware’⁵⁷ Turks for whom premarital virginity remains a central moral imperative and a quality based on Islam, strict virginity is no longer a central topic in a relationship for young Australian-born Turkish men. Instead, it is a reputation of promiscuity that is not desirable in a woman. Although this is certainly not a turn into an acceptance of female sexual freedom, exploration of her sexual self or casual sex ‘for fun’, nonetheless, it is a significant shift towards the moral acceptance of an expanded range of women’s life situations and accommodating her lived experience. For instance, third generation *Türkiyeli* Murat (23) stated:

I don’t care if a girl I am interested in is a virgin. What I care about is if she is not a slut, sleeping around or going around flirting with my mates. She should not be gossiped about as a slut. That’s all.

Comparably, Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Serkan (27) declared:

I don’t care if she’s had sex with her previous boyfriend or if she had someone before. Obviously, she shouldn’t have had many, but one or two relationships is fine. If she loved him and she had sex with him, it’s ok with me.

A similar theme was featured in Australian-born *Alevi* Dilek’s (25) narrative that nicely sums up the current state of the intimate lives of the Turkish Australian youth:

Well, guys’ minds have developed in this sense, not all of them, but some of them. Turks, though, they only accept the ones that have been in a relationship when they slept with someone. So, if I only have slept with my ex-boyfriend, they would be like, “oh, you guys were together for so long,” they would understand that, but if I turned around and said that I have slept with two other people, and I wasn’t in a relationship

⁵⁷ This is a term coined by my research participants. It describes an in-group distinction between ethnic Muslim Turks, those that are perceived as not motivated by religion, and those who attempt to live their lives based on Islam. For further discussion see Section 3.6.

with them, and I wasn't seeing them either, it was just a little bit of fun, then automatic judgment – “slut”. Bam.

I will now present two prominent themes in the perspectives of young Australian-born Turkish women relating to the circumstances of first sex. As anticipated, virginity is still significant to many young Australian-born Turkish women. However, with many postponing marriages due to their academic, career and other aspirations, they are more likely to question the value of the practice. In their deliberation about when to have sex for the first time, they typically negotiate between (1) their sense of belonging, either to their Turkish identity in what I termed *ethnic moral identity* or to a relationship with ‘the right man’, (2) their *personal moral identity*, and (3) their desire and curiosity to explore their worlds.

Firstly, as discussed earlier, the relational aspect has been prominent in participants’ narratives. The theme of having their first sex or losing virginity with ‘the one’, with ‘someone special’, with ‘someone I care for’, ‘someone I love’ or inversely, ‘not with a wrong person’, is embodied in what I call *relational virginity* in this thesis. It continues to be represented amongst young Turkish Australian women and has become one of the dominant motivations for their deliberations about celibacy. The relational aspect revolves around the idea of gifting one-self through the first sex, which then creates a mutual bond with the partner based on the uniqueness and high value assigned to virginity both socially and personally.

For instance, third generation *Türkiyeli* Filiz (22) articulated a strong affinity and distinctive ownership claim over her virginity by distancing herself from other moral influences and the hypersexualised youth environment. Indeed, the relational aspect clearly underlay her narrative of using her virginity to demonstrate her dedication to her husband. She stated:

Forget my parents, forget my brothers, forget everyone. For me, it's a no. It's also not because I am not married. I feel that it's just for me. I don't think it's right to have sex just with anyone. [...] There is certainly a pressure on girls to be out there with boys, but personally, I don't feel the need to show off and be like others by saying that I have slept with someone. [...] In my eyes and why I have remained a virgin is that when I get married, I want to show this is the person I want to spend the rest of my life with, so this is the person I want to give my virginity to.

In comparison, another third generation *Türkiyeli* Ceren (20), who grew up away from the Turkish suburbs, talked about the reason for declining an offer to have sex during her recent university trip:

There were just condoms lying around and people getting laid everywhere. And the opportunity came up to me, and I said no. [...] I said no because I got scared. He was just like this random guy I met only a couple of days ago, and you hear stories about guys being assholes during it and afterwards. I want to do it with someone who cares and makes sure that I feel comfortable because it's my first time. [...] I identify myself as a liberal intersectional feminist, so I am all for girls exploring their sexuality, you know. I don't think it's *namussuz* to go out and have sex. I feel like virginity is just a concept and having sex with someone doesn't change who you are or make you like a bad person. It's ok to just have fun and take control of your own body. But obviously, given my background, I still have these sorts of inhibitions that stem from Turkish culture and Islam.

When I reconnected with Ceren a year on, she told me that she had had her first sexual experience with her then-boyfriend. However, they broke up sometime after. I asked her if she

regretted losing her virginity with him now that they were no longer together. Ceren answered:

Not a single bit. Obviously, I'm heartbroken now, but I am glad that I have had such a great experience. I feel like I have grown as a woman and as a person. It's great to have that experience.

Ceren's answer also features the next theme I want to focus on – first sexual experience as a matter of *personal development* and *self-exploration*. Though represented primarily among girls who were somewhat detached from Turkish communities and suburbs, this theme highlights the diversification of gendered moralities in the Australian Turkish diasporas and women's approaches to sexuality. The young research participants in their mid- to late-twenties who stated that they had had their sexual first experience, had mostly done so in a committed relationship. Even though these women were no longer in that relationship, they talked about the experience as an important point of their self-discovery and personal growth. This personalisation of motivations for having first sex is quite radical, as these women claimed their sexuality as their own, distancing it from their ethnic and relational belonging.

For instance, *Türkiyeli* Adile (24) told me that she had her first sexual experience when she was 18. After a night out with her then-boyfriend, she decided to stay at his place and 'it just happened'. Notably, she did not plan it, nor did she feel she was doing it because he was 'the special man', but because the 'time felt right' for her and she wanted to experience it, to explore how it felt. Although Adile remembered it as a special moment, she also recounted that she did not feel that she could share it with her Turkish girlfriends or with her mum because she would feel ashamed (see Chapter 6 for further discussion on issues around talking about sex).

The topic of shame and guilt surrounding sexuality is interesting in Adile's case. In her case, different layers surfaced *vis-à-vis* to when she attended her friend's *kina gecesi*⁵⁸ soon after her first sexual experience. Instead of feeling ashamed for having sex, she felt guilty for not being honest and forward about no longer being a virgin. This might indicate and support the claim previously made about the moral shift away from principles associated with sexuality towards a preference for compassion, empathy and moral values associated with how one relates to others. Adile recalled:

I felt so guilty being there with all these women while I was dancing around my friend. I wasn't ashamed of myself nor felt embarrassed for not being a virgin. But I felt guilty that I was doing something against the rules. I just felt terrible for them as I felt that I was tricking them because it was a special night, and unmarried girls are supposed to be virgins. Well, I was no longer one. And nobody knew.

Finally, Deniz (20), whose immigrant mother tried hard to instil into her that she 'should wait for the right person that she would eventually marry', explained:

I don't think my virginity belongs to one person. I lost it to someone whom I loved at that time when I was 17. It was a good year, but it's like an experience. I don't regret it. [...] I just made up my own opinion on that. I didn't see why a girl needed to be pure. I don't believe in that. It's just part of the growing process, and you need to live and learn. Both girls and boys. Before marriage. I can't marry someone I don't know well on that level. My parents did. That is insane.

⁵⁸ In Turkish this means 'henna night', a traditional pre-wedding ritual that symbolises the farewell from female kin to the daughter that is leaving the family. At the one I attended with an informant, the bride-to-be was dressed in a traditional red gown symbolising her virginity. While she was having *henna* applied to her hands, women sang farewell themed songs and poems in a circle around her while holding candles. *Kina gecesi* is a special and intimate tradition, reserved only for women, and it is especially emotional for the bride's mother.

Indeed, although the value of virginity remains significant and although premarital female sexuality continues to be scrutinised, young women's approaches have substantively diversified. Some young women still wait until marriage to have their first sexual experience, while others do not want to wait. Either way, for these women, virginity has retained its solid relational character. What is, however, new to the landscape of Turkish diasporic sexualities is the personalisation of female sexuality, where first sex is seen as a woman's personal and private experience and a matter of personal development. In the next section, I explore the ways in which Turkish Australians have been educated about sexuality.

4.5 The Unspoken Value, Doublespeak and Gossip: Communication about Sexual Morality

Given the importance of female virginity in their social and personal lives, Turkish people hardly anytime speak about it. It is an unspoken value that young women are often expected to make central in their lives, yet it is neither communicated to them directly by their parents nor named. In this section, I demonstrate that although there has been a substantial shift in how premarital female sexuality is constructed, scrutinised and practiced, communication about female sexuality has remained quite opaque.

When talking about premarital sexuality, various euphemisms are used. The older Australian-born research participants used phrases such as 'going out', 'running off with a boy', 'sneaking out at night', 'being seen with a boy' and so forth. It might be because they were accustomed to the euphemistic expressions for sexual morality used by their parental generation during the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, it was seen as inappropriate to talk about sexuality with one's children for fear it would 'put ideas into their heads' and thus

indirectly encourage their daughters to pursue sex. Instead, parents invented indirect ways to address the value of virginity and the proscription of youth sexuality.

More often than not, young girls learned about sex indirectly, by hearing stories and eavesdropping on gossip during women's house visits and in the family home. Rights and wrongs were encoded in these stories through the judgment of others' behaviour. However, as the stories were not directed at the young girls and the meaning was not explained to them, girls formed their moral self, vis-a-vie sexuality, by observing the negative and positive cues in the gossipers' voices and grimaces. By imagining scenarios of social inclusion and rejection and fearing being judged in the same way, young girls tended to avoid the real-life situations and behaviours featured in the overheard judgemental gossip. For example, Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Esin (47) conveyed: 'I learnt just through stories that you hear growing up. You know, such and such did this and such and such did that'. Similarly, Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Zeyneb (49) recounted:

My parents were open, but I don't remember them sitting down and lecturing us on anything or even discussing anything, particularly not my dad, because I was my mum's business. [...] Everything was rather implied, and we grew up with that. They wouldn't say you shouldn't, but you know the way how they talked about people, young girls, they did or didn't, you sort of knew what you can do and what you can't.

The narrative of Australian-born *Alevi* Ceyda (49) had similar characteristics:

As a kid, it was more peripheral. You are more excluded from the adult talk. You'd be playing around your mum and eavesdropping. When we were visiting someone, and women were all sitting around talking and they might say "Did you hear about so and so daughter? You know she went out with her boyfriend." And then they would make faces and grimaces [she grimaced in contempt and disapproval]. And we would be curious about that. What's that [she made the same grimace].

Another second-generation Turkish Cypriot, Ayten (50), explained her experience of learning indirectly about sexual morality:

Nothing sexual is ever talked about, at least when we were growing up. *Bakire* means virgin, *kız* means a girl, *kadın* is a woman. *Kız* becomes *kadın* after her first sex. *Kız* then means that you are a virgin, so you are still considered a child, a young girl.

Sometimes they would use *bakire* and *kız* interchangeably. If they don't wanna say it explicitly, they would say *kız değil* - not a virgin. But I didn't learn until I was way older. When you are like 17, you become to be part of the conversation when older women gossip about other girls. That's when you pick up on the values stuff, on whom they judge they would say, "don't do that when you grow older", so you know how to behave.

As I showed earlier, *namus* morality operates differently in the Turkish immigrants who relied heavily on the Turkish community and in those who did not. For the former, having *namus*, that is, having a reputation for being a good and moral person, would help assure one's existential survival in a foreign country without a local social network. The sense of dependency on other Turkish people would push them to make their parenting stricter in order to be known for having good, chaste, *namuslu* daughters, and inversely, not to be gossiped for moral transgressions. However, Turkish immigrants who came with social capital or who had skills could build the necessary social capital quickly after they arrived in Australia. Therefore, they were less dependent on other Turkish people for their existential prospects and treated their socially acknowledged family *namus* as less immediately important. This did not mean that they abandoned *namus* values such as premarital sexual purity, fidelity in marriage or respect for parents. Indeed, such parents passed these values onto their daughters in a somewhat similar fashion, yet with some subtle differences. I

illustrate the significance of this difference with the following narrative from the *Türkiyeli Ela* (37) who grew up in a Turkish immigrant family that was existentially better positioned.

Ela's family had lived alongside other Turkish people since their arrival in Australia. They came from Istanbul, spoke English and were already existentially well-positioned. Therefore, they attempted to merge into Australian society as soon as possible.⁵⁹ As they did not really have to care about their moral standing in the community or their family reputation or image, the ideal of *namus*, of having a good reputation for being a pure virginal girl, did not have much bearing on Ela's personal life. She was allowed to socialise and meet different friends. Ela told me that she lost her virginity on her twentieth birthday with her Australian then-boyfriend, and similarly to the younger women in the previous section, she recounted it as just one of her life experiences. Her mother had, however, tried to instil the value of virginity in her. While she usually used indirect, rather opaque, references to the sexual exploitation of women, she had approached Ela quite directly, embarrassing her. She recalled:

I remember my mum bringing up virginity for the first time. She told me not to drink alcohol when I go to the party, because it can lead women to... [Ela was looking for the right words]. She told me that, unfortunately, the world has not changed much in how we treat women. When you drink alcohol, it can lead to bad things, because you become vulnerable. She told me that it is how women lose their virginity these days. I could connect with it as it was exactly how my Australian girlfriends lost theirs. It's kind of a rite of passage in this country. And I don't know how she knew it back then, but she just said don't do it. That's lowering your expectations, that is not a nice and gentle way. Women need to have love. They need to take time exploring. I was only 17. I was like I don't wanna hear it! And she was like don't be such a prude! I was still a *kiz namuslu*, a girl with dignity.

⁵⁹ Icduygu (1990, 312) writes that women with a better education and better English were more successful in forming interethnic relationships.

Finally, most of my research participants in their twenties, despite having very close friend-like relationships with their parents, described an atmosphere of awkwardness when it came to communicating about sexuality with their parents. For instance, *Türkiyeli* Ceren (20) said:

The talk about birds and flowers didn't really happen with my parents. I remember, when I asked my mum why virginity is so important, she only brushed me off saying that it's better to keep myself that way, and that was it.

Türkiyeli Aylin (25) shared a similar experience:

I haven't really spoken about that in detail with my mum. She hasn't really told me anything about it. I guess, like you know, with the first-generation Turks, sex is a bit taboo, so also my mum doesn't really like to talk about it.

Similarly, *Alevi* Dilek (25) recounted:

My mum never talked about sex with me. It was more, you know, you have to keep that for yourself until you get married. She would say it this way, so I don't know and learn much about sex. And she didn't know any better. For her, it was about sex is done only in marriage. I learned about everything at Roxburg High and my older brother's pornography. I found it in his computer and called my girlfriends. We watched it together. I think we were like 13. I think it wasn't a great way. You know, this was a very sensitive topic in our area, particularly in the Islamic 'community'. They used to send a letter to our parents to ask for their consent before the sex class, and we would also have a special class for girls. [...] We would watch documentaries, receive free condoms and be shown how to use them.

In short, ways of communicating about youth sexuality within Turkish Australian families have remained generally awkward despite a notable change in the level of scrutiny of and

framing of premarital sexuality amongst young women. Even the Australian-born parents who have existentially advanced beyond the situation of their early-arriving immigrant parents found talking about sexuality with their daughters difficult. However, regardless of when they arrived and settled, families who came from urban and highly educated environments in Turkey, who did not have to rely on the Turkish diasporic community existentially, seemed to be able to communicate about sexuality more freely with their daughters. Additionally, the youngest girls seemed to be able to access information about sexuality and sexual morality within their school and through their peers.

4.6 Un-gendering Virginity: ‘Boy, If You Sleep Around, You Cannot Ask for a Virgin Girl!’

As discussed in the previous chapter, Australian-born women of different subjectivities seem to currently share a voice that rejects two issues: (1) judgements of a woman’s moral integrity based solely on her sexuality, and (2) gender-based double standards in moral judgments of moral integrity. While the first theme was discussed previously in Section 3.5, here, I complement the topic with the second theme that incorporates a more robust case of premarital sexuality and female virginity. It also furthers the key argument of this chapter: that the preservation of virginity has become a more relational matter over time. It seems that the women’s need to address these gendered double standards also reflects this particular shift. At the same time, women are not appealing for a sense of sexual ‘liberation’ in order to abandon the value of chastity. In fact, as shown in the previous sections of this chapter, both virginity and sexual restraint remain highly valued among Turkish Australian women. Instead, the discourse addresses the issue of equalising the gendered relationality or, in other words, the un-gendering of virginity.

The disgruntled Turkish Australian women across various subjectivities highlighted the judgemental scrutiny unevenly imposed on women while men are apparently allowed to explore their sexuality. Addressing the unfairness, these women demand that men be either equally held accountable for their promiscuous behavior or that sexuality be dissociated from everyone's moral worth. This sentiment shows clearly in all of the following Australian-born Turkish women's life narratives. For instance, Turkish Cypriot social worker Zeyneb (49) questioned the situation growing up:

Boys were allowed to go out and play with other girls, but when they were to get married, it had to be with a good Turkish girl [virgin]. As far as they didn't get them pregnant to take them home, it was ok. For boys, what you did out there, stayed there. Our cousin's son had a non-Turk girlfriend, he got her pregnant, and they got married, but there was always this distinction with her. She wasn't taken into the community for a very long time. They shunned her, not him, because it's always the woman who should know better or guard herself. You shouldn't be there and you shouldn't allow him. But what about men's behaviour? It's the same as with the rape argument.

The gendered double standards for the scrutiny of youth's sexual morality were centred around the theme of Turkish girls staying chaste and waiting to be married, while boys roam free outside the domain of the Turkish 'community', collecting sexual experience with non-Turkish girls, whom they are not allowed to marry. Such themes were featured in the narrative offered by *Türkiyeli* Muslim lawyer Sena (27). She criticized the hypocrisy of the young men:

In this obsession with virginity that Turks have, boys get away with everything for some reason. So, if you are a boy, that's ok [to be sexually active]. Turkish boys have no curfew, they go to clubs, they do anything, but when the time comes for marriage, he has to marry the pure girl who hasn't talked to anyone. But a girl can't do that.

Because once a girl does that, she's stuck with that label for all her life. I have this male friend, who does this, and it annoys me so much that he just sleeps around. Yeah, sleep around, it's fine, but don't expect your mum to find you a nice pure virgin. I am so annoyed by this.

Similarly, *Türkiyeli* teacher Nermin (37) uses Islam as the foundation for her critique of these gendered double standards. According to her, the value of gender equality stems from Islam (see Section 3.6 for further discussion). Nermin stated:

The double standards occur amongst theologically uneducated chauvinist controlling men. Amongst us, more Islamically-aware Turks, men are more respectful. Anyway, I believe that a man that has slept around has no right to ask for a virgin. Islamically this is wrong. Islamically, sex is only for a married couple, and both man and woman should enter the marriage as virgins.

The issue with men was also taken up by *Türkiyeli* university student Ceren (20) who expressed a desire to marry a non-Turkish man. She proclaimed:

There is such a significant double standard. I think that guys have still a bit more freedom than girls. For Turkish guys, it is almost expected to go and take girls out and have sex with them. I think it is a very asshole kind of thing. I am gonna have my fun, and then I am gonna completely change and then I will find someone pure for my parents. I think it's a bit of a clash of character. That's why I don't wanna be with a Turkish guy. I just think it's not for me.

Almost identical themes featured in the narrative of *Türkiyeli* music producer Adile (24) who shared the following:

It makes me angry that parents in the community are stricter on girls. Even if they like going out innocently with their friends, they let the older brothers do whatever with their friends. It makes me mad that predominantly Turkish boys are raised to be very

sexist. Obviously, within the Turkish culture, the stereotypical gender roles are very prevalent, so many of them are raised like “oh, I am gonna find myself a pretty Turkish girl, so my parents accept her, and hence they will accept me. I essentially won’t have to look after myself, so I can laze around and do whatever the hell I want. So, I have someone to run around and make me clean my clothes and whatever”. I already told my parents that I would never marry a Turkish guy. I said, don’t get your hopes up. I’m pretty outspoken within our family, and I always say what I want, and they are like “oh all right, whatever, you just do whatever you want.” My parents are not crazy strict [laughing].

In comparison, *Alevi* university student Deniz (20) called for equal gender rights and recalled:

It makes me angry because we should have the same rights as they [men] do. We are not something you buy and sell or can put on your mantelpiece as a nice, pretty cute thing. If someone doesn’t want to marry me for that reason [not being a virgin], then good, don’t marry me then. But hey, then don’t sleep around too! No one ever asks guys if they are virgins! No one teaches how everything works to guys. They are not taught how our orgasm is as much important as theirs. I think they should be teaching boys about vaginas about female pleasure.

4.7 Conclusion

I have explored the nuance of the shifting moral fabric of the intimate lives of Turkish diasporic youth through the *namus* principle of premarital sexual purity. For Turkish young women, the idea of sociality with boys has been described as heavily constrained at their expense. The notion of female virginity has been connected with marriage and women’s

marriageability. Generally, while for older Australian-born research participants, in particular, virginity was a precondition for a good marriage. However, for young Turkish girls today it is more of a moral ideal that their mothers wish for them. With the shift in women's life aspirations and opportunities, which often see marriage postponed until later in life, more first sexual experiences are taking place out of wedlock.

Examining how various young research participants' have constructed the meaning of their first sexual experience and the values they place upon it, I have shown how the concept of virginity has transformed from a matter of belonging to Turkish identity, family (representing family *namus*) or 'the right man', to a matter of a personal experience and development. The shift, thus, follows the line of the general argument of the thesis regarding the de-collectivisation and personalisation of meanings of diasporic *namus*, here attached to female virginity and the first sexual experience. Instead of representing moral standing, status, image, or the reputation of a collective (family, 'community', ethnicity or religion), Turkish Australian women across different ages and Turkish identity subgroups have laid a strong claim over their virginity as their personal business.

This representation is based on the most frequent themes in the narratives of this study's participants. However, there are, indeed, young Turkish women who might preserve their virginity for marriage or feel strong pride towards their virginity as a representation of their ethnic or religious moral identity as well as of their personal moral identity. Equally, there are women who distance their first sexual experience from their personal moral identity, considering it a private matter and part of the process of a personal development.

Although female sexuality is still overly scrutinised, the focus has shifted from the moral aspects to the relational aspects, to whether a woman is in a committed relationship or promiscuous. Generally speaking, to lose one's virginity in a committed relationship can be accommodated, although some people remain adamant that female sexuality should always

be channelled into marriage. The fabric of sexual morality has diversified and is more dependent on a woman's subjectivity and particular life situation and circumstance. Virginity can be a currency of pragmatic and existential strategizing, part of a woman's personal moral identity, a source of moral self-worth or an item belonging to ethnicity, diasporic 'community', family or a partner, and a personal moral choice. Either way, it seems that the motivation for female sexual activity has shifted from the rigid belief that it should be confined to marriage, to a more flexible situational and relational understanding that is contingent on multiple dynamics within the relationships that a young woman maintains with herself and her environment. A relatively new addition to the Turkish Australian fabric of youth moralities has been the construction of the first sex as a life experience and point of personal development.

Chapter 5

Relational Morality: Whether Married or De Facto, Always Loyal and Committed to the One

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored the nuances of *namus* as a moral principle of premarital purity and the manner in which it reflects shifts in women's positionality and sense of self-worth shaped around constructions of their first sexual experience. Previously defined as the most prominent *namus* principle, I identified its quite prolific shifts in the intertwined public and private, collective and individual, contours of *namus* that have been regulating and shaping gendered sociality and sexuality amongst Turkish Australian youth. Here, I extend this analysis by considering how facets of *namus* interact with certain shifts in gendered intimate relationality. I discern how expectations of marital fidelity, once firmly required, have been transformed and challenged. I focus specifically on women's changing positionality, sense of self-worth and moral identity in relation to the evolution of socially sanctioned relationships, matchmaking practices and marital status changes. Despite the changing landscape of relationship typology, this chapter highlights that fidelity and monogamy remain the axial point for framing what is moral *vis-à-vis* intimate relationality.

5.2 Moralities and Forms of Woman's Agency in Turkish Arranged Marriage

The practice of arranged marriage (*görücü usulü evlilik*) has traditionally been at the centre of sociality, both in the Turkish village (Delaney, 1991; Hart, 2007; Magnarella, 1974; Stirling, 1965) and in diasporic Turkish communities (Baykara-Krumme, 2015). It has structured, organised and regulated sexual and gender relationships, matters of kinship, lineage, inheritance and economy. It has also been perceived as having 'a procreative and social character than pursuing an individual, unitive element' (Cevik, 1993, p. 91). In much of the literature on migration imbued with the ideals of unidirectional modernity, arranged marriage is something to be left behind, both in time and place. It is also often perceived as a humiliating practice for women – one that inhibits their agency. The issue is, however, more complex than it first appears as there are different nuances in how it has been practised in different families and experienced by Turkish women in Turkey, Cyprus and Australia.

The issue of the monolithic depiction of women's passivity in the process of arranging marriages has already been challenged. For instance, Elley (1986, p.15) argues that women are in control of creating affinities within and between families. Similarly, it has been argued that it is women who arrange the marriages. First, the groom's female kin initiate the search for a bride, collect information (through gossip) about the candidates' morality and other qualities, 'go and see her' and negotiate with her mother and other senior women in her family. Simultaneously, the young woman's kinswomen investigate the bridegroom's qualities. However, when it comes to the brides themselves, their situation appears to reaffirm the monolithic imagery as they continue to be viewed as having a little or no agency in the process.

Indeed, the moral ideal of *namus* involves the idea of a young virtuous woman 'waiting to be asked'. This notion, however, already implies that a woman's praiseworthy,

virtuous passivity, is not fully *passive*. Especially in the context of a hypersexualised youth environment such as that found in Australia, remaining virtuous requires an *active* suppression of one's sexual urges.

Three of the fieldwork cases, two from Cyprus and one from Turkey some thirty years later, allow me to demonstrate how three different brides were afforded different levels of input and agency in their arranged or otherwise facilitated marriages. I suggest that the practice of arranged marriage is not homogenous or fixed, nor does it follow one particular script. Rather it can be unique and is often adapted to individual situations. Furthermore, these women's marriage stories are also stories of their migration to Australia through international marriages. Although thirty years older, Turkish Cypriot sisters Ekrem (70) and Safiye (75) managed a relatively significant level of involvement in the arrangements for their respective marriages. In contrast, the life trajectory of *Türkiyeli Alevi* Mutlu (45), from a rural town in Anatolia, almost thirty years later, was determined mostly by the decisions and dynamics within her family members. This is also to demonstrate the difference in marriage practices amongst Turkish Cypriots and *Türkiyelis*.

Ekrem (70) recounted how she met her husband Bülent (77) when he came to her small village near *Lefkoşa*⁶⁰ to look for a wife. Bülent had migrated to Melbourne alone several years before they met. He worked hard, saved money and then decided it was time to find a wife in Cyprus whom he could bring to Australia. He returned to his native village 'to see several girls that were up for marriage', one of whom was Ekrem. As the practice used to go, young men and their female kin would visit several households to see and choose his future wife. Girl's family would then talk to him and his family in order to make an

⁶⁰ The Turkish name for the city known to Greek Cypriots as *Nicosia*. After the division of the city between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1963, its northern part has become the capital of the de facto state of Northern Cyprus and is officially called *Lefkoşa*.

arrangement for their possible union. Both Ekrem and Bulent liked each other instantly and Bulent asked for her hand in marriage. Ekrem recalled:

At that time, I had already refused a couple of men and I wanted to stay in Cyprus with my parents. But when I saw him, I liked him, he was a mature and good-looking man, and so it happened. I told my parents that I liked him, my parents liked him too and so we had *söz* and two weeks later a *nikah*⁶¹.

While she was telling me about her memories of her marriage in her beautifully kept, blossoming garden while sipping tea and eating *simit*⁶², Ekrem's wrinkled but beaming face suddenly twinkled mischievously. She leaned towards me and whispered, allowing me into what she considered her private business and revealing the pragmatic aspects of her moral deliberation:

But I didn't sleep with him then. It only happened six months later after I came here [to Australia]. It's because I didn't know him well. I trusted him, but I just didn't give myself to him. I told him that when I come to Australia, then we do it. Because maybe I could be pregnant and then before I come to Australia maybe he would change his mind. *Namus* [virginity] in our country is very important.

Other layers of Ekrem's marriage story reveal more about how other women could be involved in arranging a marriage outside the formal scenario, as well as how transnational family ties could be utilised in Turkish overseas marriage and migration. This shows that trustworthiness generated by socially acknowledged moral integrity is an important quality that underscores an arranged marriage. Ekrem's older sister Safiye (77), played, in fact, a crucial role in ensuring that Ekrem 'was given' to Bülent. Safiye married Cemal (76) who

⁶¹ A religious 'wedding' with *hoça* (a Muslim teacher and a clergyman who has a position of authority in the village setting).

⁶² A Turkish pastry.

was also settled in Melbourne, a couple of years earlier. It happened that Cemal knew Safiye's family through his brother Emre who had been married to another of Safiye and Ekrem's sisters in Cyprus. Ekrem shared that, as her family was widely known for 'having good girls' (having *namus*), Cemal was interested in marrying one of them and he expressed his interest to the family through his brother's wife. On account of his brother's reputation, Cemal was trusted instantly. The mother of the seven girls selected Safiye for him and, with Safiye's consent, sent Cemal her photo. Cemal liked her and they started exchanging letters between Cyprus and Melbourne. This was the only communication between them for the next five years because of the conflict in Cyprus. They built a mutually loyal friendship first and the trust built in this period was later used to persuade Safiye's parents to allow her to board a boat set for Melbourne on her own, as a young unmarried woman, and travel towards her future with Cemal. In her letters home, feeling homesick, Safiye asked Ekrem to join her in Melbourne, vouching for Bülent and the good life she would have with him in Australia. On this account, Ekrem recollected:

I used to read my sisters' letters to my father because he didn't know how to read and write. And that letter, she wrote, just moved me. I was sold to that idea. It helped me make up my mind about saying yet to him.

Both Ekrem's and Safiye's marriages were facilitated by others because, at the time, women could not socialise with non-related men. It would be seen as highly immoral, and a young woman would lose her social *namus*. Albeit significantly in charge of expressing their agreement or disapproval of a man, neither Ekrem nor Safiye could choose just anyone by their volition. Instead, they had to wait for who came to see them and consequently choose them. A woman's passivity in the process was still valued as her virtue.

In comparison, Mutlu (45), thirty years younger, grew up in a small rural town in central Anatolia in an *Alevi* family and migrated to Australia in the early 1990s through an arranged marriage to Australian-born Turgay (48). His family was amongst the first Turkish immigrants who arrived in Australia at the end of the 1960s. After he graduated from university, his parents announced that they would all travel to Turkey for “a holiday” on which they would search for a wife for him, that if he liked someone, he would get married. Turgay agreed. Mutlu recounted how her marriage was arranged:

Someone from my town went to their town for a funeral, and his mother was there too. You know, in our communities, gossip travels. At that funeral, his mother mentioned that they live in Australia and are here [Turkey] to look for a girl because they couldn't find anyone suitable there [Australia]. So, this lady from my town said, 'there is one girl in my town, you have to come and see her'. So, they came to my house to see me. We offered coffee, and I couldn't even look at his face. We were raised really shy and whatever our parents used to say it counts. We didn't have much choice.

The very same day, Mutlu's family agreed to the wedding. One week later, Mutlu was engaged and married, as she highlighted, 'without even talking to each other properly'. Although Mutlu was asked if she wanted to marry Turgay, her family seemed to have the upper hand. She recounted the experience:

Everybody confused me. There was a lot of pressure. I have two brothers, and their word counts like my mum's and dad's. One of them told me to say yes, 'go, you'll have a much better future in Australia'. The other one was like 'you must say no, he is ugly, he is not for you. My grandma, who was the real authority in the family,⁶³ also said yes.

⁶³ Elley (1982, p. 11) writes that in Turkish traditional communities, the oldest woman of the household has the highest respect. She is the only person who can directly and intimately relate to all members of the family and has an important say in negotiations. A young woman who does not like marriage plans being made for her can

Besides, I have already finished high school, and if a girl passed twenty, no one would want to marry her those days. They used to say, if you were good enough, someone would have picked you already. There was another man that was interested in me. He was working for the army. He wasn't a good-looking man anyway, so I didn't have much to choose from. Australia that was.

One week later, Mutlu panicked at the realisation that she might end up living with someone she did not love. So, she told her father that she was not going to Australia. Mutlu's dad replied: 'If I spit, I won't take it back. That's my worth, you will marry him, and you will only come back in your coffin.' Her father called upon his honour (*şeref*) and Mutlu left for Australia.

While one could be quick to judge Mutlu's family or father for pressuring her into the marriage and so impinging on her agency, it is also necessary to understand that they did what they believed to be existentially best for Mutlu. The tension between the two interlaced perspectives about visions of marriage and a better future permeated Mutlu's marriage story. The family approached marriage as an institution, a space where a woman's existential provision and security is realised. In contrast, Mutlu and her brother approached marriage from a relational aspect, as a space where romantic notions of love and desire are realised and, therefore, drive the process.

This acknowledgement notwithstanding, the decision-making process during Mutlu's arranged marriage occurred within the framework of relational power dynamics grounded in the family hierarchy, based on seniority and gender (Kandiyoti, 1988). Mutlu was approached as a family *protégé*⁶⁴, who though having her own moral agency, was expected to respect her

express her stance through her grandmother or the senior woman, who can then relay the daughter's wishes onto the father.

⁶⁴ In a sense of a dependent that is located on a lower position in a social (family) hierarchy, which can be based on age or gender. Someone who is protected in exchange of gratitude and admiration in a relationality that is somewhat the core of 'vertical honour' (C. Stewart, 1993)

more senior family members⁶⁵. Hence, although Mutlu felt confused about marrying Turgay. In addition to only having limited options because of the impossibility of meeting other men, her moral responsibility to her family's decision, compelled her to *do things right* and agree.

Mutlu explained:

I couldn't fall in love and marry someone I wanted, it's against the family tradition.

You cannot talk to a boy or meet him. It's a small town. Only four thousand people live there, and my dad was a businessman. Everybody knew him and everybody knows that

I am his daughter. It would go to my parents straight away if I was meeting with a guy.

Ultimately, Mutlu came to Australia where, in her words, she 'fell in love with the new lifestyle, new modern clothes, new foods and working possibilities.' She stated that she felt liberated and like she belonged. Her husband was treating her well, she forged an endearing relationship with her in-laws and later had children. She particularly appreciated that her husband wanted them to live away from the Turkish suburbs.

In summary, I showed through the narratives of two different Turkish families that arranged marriage is a practice where different women can have different levels of agency depending on the individual circumstances, subjectivities of family members, social standing and other variables. Thus, to conceive of processes related to arranging a marriage as automatically malignant or working against the best interests of the women involved is to reduce the multiplicity of perspectives.

⁶⁵ For further discussions on moral modalities see Section 3.5 and on parent-daughter relationality see Chapter 6

5.3 (Un)Organised Diasporic Intimate Lives: Between Arranged Meetings and Tacit De Facto Relationships

Over the past fifty years, the way that intimate lives have been communally sanctioned in the Turkish Australian diaspora has transformed. As a consequence of women's expanding educational and career prospects, and other opportunities, their relational aspirations have also diversified. While for the older second-generation, marriage was still the only morally acceptable way for a couple to be together, young Turkish Australian women today practice a wider range of intimate relationships, including *de facto* cohabitation and committed dating. Such relationships are, however, usually a matter of tacit knowledge where parents might know about them, condone them, or even support them, yet do not boast about them in front of other Turkish people. Female serial or casual dating is still frowned upon in general. Either way, a woman's moral integrity continues to be heavily scrutinised through her capacity to commit to one man. It is also expected that she would eventually marry.

5.3.1 Arranged Meetings, Romantic Love and Good life in Marriage of the Older Second-generation

At the time of my older Australian-born informants' 'coming-of-age', from the 1970s through to the early 1990s, marriages were still mostly facilitated by other involved people, such as family members or 'go-betweens'⁶⁶. As Zeyneb (49) explained: 'We couldn't go out to bars nor chat through social media like young girls do today to get to know guys, so this was like a service to us, so we could get to know someone.' As I demonstrated in the previous section, arranged marriages can proceed in various ways, with different trajectories and input levels

⁶⁶ A person that can be related or otherwise, is somewhat knowledgeable of 'community' affairs and people. Today, it can be even a friend that knows both potential partners.

from the brides. As I recognised during the fieldwork, the term ‘arranged marriage’ has become one of those ‘loaded words’ and a somewhat awkward matter for the second generation’s ‘cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld, 1997), in a similar way the word *namus* has⁶⁷. This tension arises at the interface between attempts to assimilate to the idea of ‘modern’, ‘liberated’ Australianness and experienced instances of prejudice, which hinge upon a conflation of the words ‘forced/arranged’ marriage and the misunderstanding of a woman’s level of say in the process. Notably, my informants preferred to use the term ‘arranged meeting’ when explaining their experience of having their marriage facilitated by other people.

In the distinction made between ‘an arranged marriage’ and ‘an arranged meeting’, there have been two general shifts: in the process leading up to the marriage and in the moral sensibilities concerning youth sociality. First, as the narratives in the preceding section demonstrated, no premarital dating was allowed with an arranged marriage. In comparison, while some research participants from more conservative families in Australia experienced a similar kind of arranged marriage, others were afforded some time for ‘getting to know each other’ (although within limits) before committing to the marriage. In the following narratives, older Australian-born participants recount how they met their husbands and experienced the process of getting married.

Turkish Cypriot Feriha (48) stated that she did not want to get married early because her dream was to go to university and travel the world. She recalled:

I used to get people coming around, checking me out or asking for my hand since I was 16. I exactly knew when people came to our house for that reason disguised as friendly coffee visits. Then I would just leave or hide in my uncle’s house. I wasn’t going to sit there. I used to say I am not a cow to be checked out.

⁶⁷ For further discussion see Chapter 3

Her parents supported her and would politely refuse the marriage offers under the pretext that Feriha needed to finish her studies first. However, after graduation, Feriha found another ‘excuse’ – she wanted to travel. She laughed, saying ‘but after I came back from Europe, I ran out of excuses and the pressure was back on.’ Feriha eventually married a Turkish man, Murat, who came from the same village in Cyprus as her grandparents. Having been recommended by her neighbour, Feriha recalled her experience of her ‘arranged meeting’:

My mum told me that he was coming with his sister and nephew, who had lived in Australia for quite a long time. But I freaked out because I knew that his sister was my mum’s age, but then my mum said that he is the youngest in the family. When they came, I said he is all right. I liked him. And then we used to go out for a coffee, but my dad said that we couldn’t continue going out like this, that something needed to be done formally. So, we had a *söz*, an engagement, and then we got married. We had a *nikah* and then a legal wedding ceremony at the Registry Office.

When asked if she fell in love with her husband, Feriha answered that she never felt any strong emotions towards him. As a matter of fact, because of the way she got married and not having had a chance to explore different men through dating, she did not know what it meant to fall madly in love. Regardless, she was proud of what they had built together as a couple and as functional parents. They trusted and cared for each other. Feriha highlighted that she would never betray him nor cheat on him as that was, according to her, the worst *namussuz* behaviour.

In comparison, Zeyneb (49), another Turkish Cypriot, proudly highlighted that she ‘did not marry an import’, but a locally born Turkish Cypriot, Okan (53). In their marriage story, there were no ‘go-betweens’. Instead, it was Okan’s mother who ‘came to ask for her’ immediately after meeting Zeyneb during her university fieldwork with elderly Turks. Zeyneb recounted:

On the very day, she called my mum [to ask] if she can come for ‘a visit’. I was not interested, as I didn’t want some guy to weigh me down. I had my ambitions. Anyways, she came to visit, and my mum wanted me to go and make a coffee.⁶⁸ That night I was working on my essay, and I was very frustrated. His mum was very nice, she wanted me to go and focus on my studies, but my mum was making faces to make me go and do it. So, they sat together and talked, you know it’s a woman-to-woman situation. She told her that they came with an intention to see me for their son. Later, I was sitting in the cafeteria, and I was saying to my friend there is no way I am marrying a Turk. They are bloody chauvinists, and all they think about is themselves. I don’t wanna live like that. So, I said to my mum, I am not doing it. She said to me, “you can’t turn the lady down, just meet him, it’s just one afternoon.” And because I listened to my parents, I met him, and I fell in love at first sight.

Okan and Zeyneb dated for a while before their *söz* because their parents wanted them to get to know each other before making a commitment. It was not long before they decided to go forward with the formal proceedings. In her own words, they decided

We were ready, we both achieved our goals, he was already working, bought a house and was ready to settle down. Although I wanted to do some travelling together before we settle down, it has never happened, but we’re planning a big trip soon, don’t we?

Zeyneb smiled mischievously at Okan who had just entered the room asking her where she left the vacuum cleaner as he was about to do his share of the weekly house chores. I jokingly asked Okan if it was love at first sight for him too, but Zeyneb jumped in and saved him answering the intimate question: ‘I don’t think Okan felt the chemistry straight away as much as I did.’ Then Okan added smiling: ‘but it has changed since then.’ Zeyneb jumps in to conclude: ‘I think that we both felt that it’s the time in life. It’s not like you are girlfriend and

⁶⁸ A potential bride making a coffee for her potential in-laws is an old custom. It was once an opportunity to see her and observe her manners, her hospitality and the overall ‘chemistry’ between them all.

boyfriend and you don't know what your intentions are like couples these days. We knew, so we married.'

Notably, some young Turkish Cypriots, unlike *Türkiyelis*, used to have another opportunity and space to socialise with their peers outside school. Their parents established a youth club affiliated with the North Cyprus Turkish community Association⁶⁹, where young adults could mix and mingle at 'evening dances' and other events held in a protected environment under the supervision of volunteer parents. Several of my informants mentioned that they knew some married couples who had met in that space. Indeed, it was how Emel (43) and Ercan (45) met. Emel's mother, İmge (74), recalled what happened when Emel asked her if she could go on a date with Ercan:

I said, ok, you could go out with him, but not alone, only with your friends. So, they went out a couple of times, but his family learnt about it and they came to tell us. My husband didn't know, so I told him that I let her go because she would go secretly even if I said don't go. [...] Then they said that they liked each other and that they wanted to get married. So, we had *söz*, promise, and then Ercan started coming over here. Ercan was a good man, just like my sons. [...] I used to give him a bed as he came very late after work. My husband agreed only if he wouldn't see Ercan coming out of her room. Then they bought a house together right next to us. But only Ercan lived there because they weren't married yet and we would disagree. Emel only stayed with him at weekends and after work to cook for him. [...] Today, it's different because many young people live together before marriage like Australians.

⁶⁹ Cultural and national clubs are commonplace to socialise in Australia's many diasporic communities. These were very common particularly during the post-WW2 influx of European immigrants. Many such clubs still exist today, yet they struggle to attract younger, consecutive diasporic generations.

My older Australian-born informants met their husbands through various means, with different kinds and levels of involvement from others. It also seems that the level of communal scrutiny differed between Turkish Cypriots and *Türkiyelis*. Unlike most of *Türkiyelis*, some Cypriot women had the opportunity to get to know their husbands before marriage, and others even found their husbands independently. While further, in-depth analysis of why this was the case needs to be conducted, my consideration of the matter is based on themes that occurred across my research participants' narratives.

My understanding is two-pronged. Firstly, Turkish Cypriot parents were already used to living next to another culture before arriving in Australia. Also, the fact that Cyprus had been part of the British Crown resulted, to a certain extent, in influencing behaviours, particularly of aspiring 'worthies of the village'. Therefore, the moral anxiety connected with cultural survival had slightly different dimensions compared to the anxiety of *Türkiyelis* who were mostly familiar with homogenous attitudes to morality. In short, Turkish Cypriots felt comparably more existentially secure and less culturally shocked. Secondly, Turkish Cypriots as a group had been in Australia more than a decade longer by the time *Türkiyelis* started arriving since 1968 and when most of the concerned older participants' stories took place. Therefore, Turkish Cypriots seemed somewhat more in line with the local practice of inter-sex mingling.

Considering this, an intriguing morality change happened around the time when the *Türkiyeli* population increased in the 1970s. Based on personal experiences of the older Turkish Cypriot research participants born in Australia around the 1950s, the Turkish Cypriot parents started to put more restrictions on girls compared to the times before *Türkiyeli's* arrival. While some participants expressed the idea that it was due to wanting to appeal to and to be acknowledged (to have a better word) by *Türkiyelis* as 'proper Turks' by practising the right 'Turkish morals' or having *namuslu* girls, others explained it via parental fear of

'something bad' happening to their girls when seen as 'loose'. Such imagery involving a special deal of moral panic about *Türkiyelis*, which prevailed amongst some Turkish Cypriots at the time, is reflected in the following second-generation Zeyneb's (48) narrative:

The *Türkiyelis* were different and had different views. I recall the elders saying that the *Türkiyelis* that came were low lives and thieves, would use drugs and carried knives. *Türkiyelis'* attitudes to women were more misogynistic. Women were seen as property; they were more traditional, maybe from their religiousness, as opposed to *Kibrislis*, who weren't as religious. I had a *Kibrisli* friend in the eastern suburbs who was almost kidnapped off the street by a *Türkiyeli* guy and his mates because he wanted to marry her. Stories like these created fear and animosity amongst us. They basically didn't trust them. [...] That's not to say that all *Kibrislis* were innocent or all *Türkiyelis* were bad, but overall, I reckon that *Kibrisli* men were not seen as a threat to their daughters because they treated women with respect. Besides, everyone in our small community knew each other, and men would not dare to cause harm. I think that the *Türkiyelis'* questionable motives towards young women and the way they treated their women were seen as a threat to our morality.

There was, however, an intriguing ambiguity in Turkish Cypriots' relating to *Türkiyelis*. For example, Başarin & Başarin (1993, p. 67) write how Turkish Cypriots welcomed the first arriving *Türkiyelis* at the airport waving banners that, for example, stated: "brothers, welcome to Australia, we are no longer alone, here." When I asked about such incongruency, first-generation Emel (67), whose narrative conveyed similar imagery to Zeyneb's, explained:

Yes, we were welcoming and happy to see them as Turks, we opened our homes to them, but we still kept our daughters safe. Besides, we [Turkish Cypriots] were already

in the mainstream; we arrived as English citizens. *Türkiyelis* came and were accommodated in the migrant hostels. There was a kind of scepticism towards them. However, we did mingle. Especially at special events, lasting friendships were also born.

On the one hand, we have a sense of inclusivity based on the idea of shared Turkishness, which was arguably accelerated by experiencing violent events back in Cyprus that saw many friendships between ethnic Turks and Greeks torn apart. The initial appeal of uniting with 'long-lost Turkish brothers' in Australia was, thus, a symptom of nationalistic dreaming about a better future. However, on the other hand, there was a permeating taste of assumed differences in values, beliefs and morals.

Further, some of the women in facilitated marriages admitted that they had not experienced romantic love, rather, the notion of a 'good life' and their self-worth emerged from their commitment to marriage and family life. Likewise, it seems that what matters *vis-à-vis* arranged marriages and a 'good life' is not the element of romantic love but the feeling that the woman's sense of agency was not diminished in the process of the marriage arrangement. This can be achieved through trust in the parental decision, having her input respected, or feeling ready for and in agreement with the marriage, which is crucial to 'setting the tone' for the nature of the relationship. Marriage stories of divorced women that felt somehow compelled or manipulated to marry someone, specifically in an overseas marriage, involved sentiments of a life not fully lived and regrets and disappointments about 'being married this way'. Such were the stories of Mutlu from the previous section and the Australian-born *Türkiyeli* informants Selma (51) and Emine (50) whose parents were amongst 'the first arrivals' from Turkey. Emine's compelling story was related in the previous chapter.

Selma, like Emine, was taken out of school and married when she was 'too young', to a man from her father's village in Turkey. She explained 'I was naive. I still don't know how I said yes, but the pressure on me was immense [...] He was coming from a decent family, so I said ok'. At the time, Selma had instead 'had her eyes on' a young local Turkish tram driver who reciprocated her interest. Every day, when he passed by their restaurant, they exchanged smiles. However, their mutual interest never materialised because as Selma explained, 'back then, we couldn't do anything more than that.' Before travelling to Turkey for her wedding, Selma attempted suicide by taking sleeping tablets but her younger sister found her and called an ambulance. Selma told me that, after her suicide attempt, the hospital had asked why she had done it and she had disclosed that her family was pressuring her to marry. However, her mother denied Selma's allegation and Selma was ultimately discharged without any intervention. The family then travelled to Turkey to finalise her marriage but it, too, never materialised. Instead, Selma's family visited other families with sons and arranged a wedding with one of them, whom Selma sponsored and brought back to Australia. Soon after, she fell pregnant, but the marriage broke down. With the support of her family, Selma divorced and was quickly remarried again.

In retrospect, women manipulated into marriage evaluated their parents' efforts differently. Though not content with her life trajectory, Ayten understood her mother's actions and never felt any resentment towards her. Selma, in comparison, has never found peace with her father for not allowing her to get a proper education, which would have brought her better opportunities in life and perhaps, even, a better marriage. Thus, years later, Selma gathered the courage to challenge her father and ask him why he had wanted to marry her off so quickly back in 1983 and why he did not 'give her to the tram guy'. He answered that he believed it was the best for her at the time because 'she acted as if she wanted to get married badly'. This implied that her behaviour had been indecent and, in the context of

community *namus* politics, left him with no choice but to marry her off to clear any disputes about her moral standing and that of their family. Selma's father later only reluctantly recognised her perspective and felt guilty for it yet justified his actions through the modality *doing things right* as a good father should.

Selma's father's moral reasoning was bound up with a desire to protect the whole family and all its members. As suggested, being seen as a good and honest family was the social currency, the capital that could be relied upon in the context of precarious conditions during migration and early settlement. Back then, the family relied on the Turkish community to come and eat in their family restaurant, as Anglo-Australians were not yet as interested in the cuisines of other cultures. In the context where the behaviour and reputation of every family member reflected upon the whole family, when people started talking about Selma's sexual integrity, he believed that marrying her off was the '*the right thing to do*' for the entire family.

5.3.2 Diversification of Young Intimate Lives: From Romantic Marriage to Unsupervised De Facto Relationship

The idea of marriage as, first and foremost, a space of existential security for women has been less prominent amongst parents of my younger Australian-born participants. Their existential strategizing has shifted more towards their daughter's education and career advancement as a means to providing them with a 'good life'. With the decreasing emphasis on being in a properly facilitated marriage by a certain age, the pressure has also shifted for many young women. Nevertheless, young women are still anxious about communal scrutiny of their relationships with men but, overall, it was women who were driving their intimate lives with the oversight of their families.

Indeed, I talked with professional and university-educated, conservative young women who still preferred the involvement of others in their matchmaking. Interestingly, it was the women's preference rather than a family-initiated requirement. For instance, young *Türkiyeli* lawyer Defne (27) explained:

I have always been a nerd, always in books, so I was not interested in guys. Islamically it is not right to date anyways. My husband and I met through my friend. She said, "Hey, I know this guy, I reckon you and him would be cool together." She exchanged our numbers, and we were texting for months and then when I trusted him, we met, together with that mutual friend. My parents were not involved in this. I just told them about him, and because they trust me about what I want for my future. I guess, technically, it's not even arranged. Not in the traditional sense like you have to marry this and that person. Unlike in the olden times, when my grandparents talked to each other the day before the wedding. Seriously. And they were the children of two village elders, so they were promised to each other since childhood or something like that. I can't imagine that for myself.

For these women, the appeal of a curated way of 'getting to know someone' resides in the '*dignified individuation*' (in the sense of distinguishing oneself from others) this approach affords within the current hypersexualised context of youth sociality in Australia, which my respondents highlighted. A family member or a friend who facilitates the meeting usually knows both parties very well and can objectively assess personal compatibility. This means that a woman is less likely to suffer through potential character incompatibilities, misunderstandings about men's dishonest motivations and the mistreatment that sometimes occurs in this time of "Tinder dating".

Although the process resembles the arranged meetings from two or three decades earlier, today, even conservative Turkish Australian youth have more opportunities for ‘getting to know each other’. They can connect and chat through social media, texting and other technology, without physically meeting and while remaining hidden from prying eyes. Therefore, even conservative women have several options to choose from when pursuing their intimate goals without compromising their sense of moral identity.

Meanwhile, attitudes to arranged marriages, such as that experienced by Defne, have rapidly changed in some families within just one family generation. Certain elements associated with overseas arranged marriages have even become the subject of jokes and teasing in such families, particularly those who chose to move out of the Turkish suburbs. For instance, third-generation *Alevi* Deniz’s (20) father, who was also born in Australia, was married in an overseas arranged marriage almost thirty years ago. He often teases his daughter by making what Deniz describes as ‘a dad joke’, for example, ‘So when are we going to send Deniz to Turkey for “holidays”?’ By reflecting on his experiences in the early 1990s, he uses such jokes ‘to put her in the right perspective’ by insinuating that, compared to his generation, Deniz has incomparable liberties for which she should be grateful.

Deniz told me that she has enough cautionary tales in her own family to dislike the idea of an arranged marriage. Her mother trusted me enough to tell me about her marriage problems stemming from a lack of romantic love and feeling manipulated into the marriage. Deniz has also observed that her paternal uncle is equally miserable. She once overheard him blaming his parents for his marital problems lamenting, ‘how could you even pick this person for me?’ Therefore, Deniz thinks that arranging someone’s marriage is an old-fashioned way of thinking about a child’s ‘good future’ and she hopes that this idea will disappear. Deniz articulated her plans regarding relationships as follows:

I might get married one day, but only if I find someone right for me. But I still don't know what I am looking for in a man, anyways. All I know now is that I don't want to settle for just anyone and, also, I'm not worried if I won't get married either.

Everything happens for a reason, so I just let it happen. Whatever it is.

Nonetheless, most young Turkish Australian women today can undoubtedly get to know their husbands before committing to him one way or another. Many women can also, get to know more than one partner before they settle down. Unlike casual or serial dating, monogamous *committed relationships* are generally tolerated, under the presumption that the couple aspires to get married eventually. Some young women, in the Broadmeadows community in particular, prefer to 'formalise' their committed relationship publicly through an engagement. When a break-up occurs before marriage, other Turkish people can generally accommodate it morally because the couple has undergone the formal process of signifying their intention to marry. This is what Berna (20), who had just broken off her year-long engagement with her fiancé, did.

Berna lives in Broadmeadows with her parents and two older brothers. The family went through somewhat awkward times when her middle brother Cem's (24) Turkish girlfriend got pregnant. Cem wanted to marry her, despite her mother's suggestion that she might have an abortion, as single motherhood cause the greatest loss of *namus* in her mother's eyes. Cem proclaimed that he married his girlfriend because he 'doesn't believe in abortions'. They did get married and although their marriage did not last long because of individual differences, Cem and his family are delighted that he has a son despite the substantial gossip they endured back then. Due to the gossip, Berna did not want to risk exposing her family to further scrutiny and, therefore, got engaged at 19. However, she broke

off the engagement. In retrospect, Berna was happy she broke off the promise as she expressed in her narrative:

I was too young to get engaged back then, and I was not ready for such commitment. I wanted to travel, have fun. He was always at work, saving for a house. We lived with his family, and I was expected to cook, which I don't enjoy. I could not talk to my mates when I wanted to, because when you are engaged, people in the community start constantly watching your steps. They will look if I meet other guys, what I am doing, whom I am talking to. Personally, I don't give a shit about what everyone else is thinking. It's my life, but you kinda represent your family, and you don't want to be gossiped about as it brings a bad name to everyone.

Furthermore, some young unmarried Turkish couples, such as Berna, are permitted to live with their fiancé in their parent's house in an arrangement that can be called '*a supervised de facto relationship*'. I have encountered this situation amongst Turkish Cypriots, *Alevis* and *Türkiyelis* alike, mostly between second-generation parents and their third-generation children. These cohabitations arose out of the shifting relationality between the parents and their children⁷⁰ and were mostly pleasant, only sometimes with conflicts. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, these arrangements were, in fact, not as awkward as one may expect. In the overpriced Melbourne property market, Turkish parents who allowed such cohabitation considered it a way to help their children save a deposit for a house, whilst allowing them to better develop their relationship. For the most part, parents looked the other way regarding the unmarried sexuality of their children stating it was not their concern. However, conservative Turks would not allow such arrangements in their house, like the participants in İçduygu's (1990, p.274) study, they would consider it shameful.

⁷⁰ For further discussion see Chapter 6

In contrast, in the diverse fabric of Turkish youth relationalities, I refer to the least constrained arrangement as ‘*an unsupervised de facto relationship*’. Relationships of this nature emerged in the accounts provided by several of my informants, mainly of those who maintain some distance from other Turkish people. For instance, third generation *Türkiyeli* Adile (24) lives this way with her Anglo-Australian partner Jack (25). During six months of living with them in a shared house in Brunswick,⁷¹ I observed the development of their relationship and how Adile’s attitude to introducing Jack to her parents changed over time. Initially, Adile kept their relationship secret despite being very close to her parents. Instead, she told them that she lived with a group of friends and workmates. However, for the first couple of months, while Adile rented her own room in our house, she was actually living in Jack’s room. We all considered them a couple, which they clearly and openly were around us. However, to Adile’s parents, they were ‘just friends’. As their relationship developed further, Adile started to feel uneasy about lying to them and decided to reveal the truth. She told me during one of our chats:

My dad always wants me to do the right thing, so I had to tell them. It was not right lying to them. Well, technically, I firstly introduced Jack as my friend because we were friends before we started dating. That’s the truth. But then I was scared of telling them because I didn’t want them not to like him like the previous boyfriend. I had a boyfriend when I was 18 or 19 when I was at Uni, and I introduced him to my parents properly and all that. Only after we broke up, I found out that my dad hated him, but he didn’t tell me. This time, I was worried that they’d freak out for living with Jack. Anyways, my mom asked me, “are you and Jack together?” And I said yes as I couldn’t lie to them anymore. My dad was initially a bit disappointed for not telling them, but I explained my reasons, and they were ok. My dad loves him now.

⁷¹ Living in a shared house while they study or begin building work experience is a rite of passage for most Australian youth.

Since then, Adile and Jack have spent much time with her family. On occasion, Jack and Adile's parents even socialise independently. I was invited to a family BBQ a few times and observed how fond they were. Nonetheless, when I asked if their Turkish family friends were fine with this, Adile told me that her parents never told anyone. They told only one of their closest friends that she was living with some friends closer to her work, but still did not share that she lived with her de facto partner. Adile explained this as another dimension of *namus*:

They hide it because they don't want to look like bad parents and me as a loose one in front of them. In Australia, the good Turkish guys or girls, if they're dating, they don't live outside the family house because their parents would worry about how they would look to other Turks. My mum told me that it's because she doesn't wanna explain and get bogged down in it, but I think it's more that they don't want me to look bad in front of their friends. Well, I don't mind. I don't care what other Turks think. I am different.

The fact that their children live in a de facto arrangement makes some Turkish parents feel uncomfortable, even if they condone it. Second-generation *Alevi* Kamile (31) lives with her boyfriend Serdar, who migrated to Australia a few years ago. His parents in Turkey do not know that they live together. Even though Kamile lived in another de facto relationship before, her mother pretends to believe that they sleep in separate rooms whenever she comes for a visit. Kamile commented:

The whole opinion about me would change and Serdo would be in a very rough position if they [his parents] were to find out. So, I don't want his family to think differently of me because at the age that they are, I can't change the way they think. It's not like that I explain myself to them, and they would say, "Do you know what? You're

right. It's not a chance of that [having sex unmarried] happening." So, it's less headache for me, to just accept the way things are. Does it make me feel bad? It makes me feel less worthy. It makes me feel that he's better off being with someone who is a virgin because I am not worthy of him. But we don't speak about this with him.

Indeed, the way intimate relationships are sanctioned has shifted in many respects. Although marriage remains salient in most people's lives, some are able to live in alternative arrangements. The way marriages are facilitated has shifted from fully arranged to 'arranged meetings' with various levels of 'getting to know' the husband-to-be. Women's positionality in this process has shifted from 'waiting to be asked' to being the initiator and they remain central when romantic love is the driving force in the match. Alongside marriage, other types of committed relationships are currently being practised with various levels of involvement, knowledge and approval from parents. Although 'a supervised de facto' and 'an unsupervised de facto' are two cohabitation arrangements practised by unmarried couples, they still occupy a grey area of the Turkish diasporic landscape of morality. While they are not morally condemned the way, they would have been only a few decades earlier, they are not socially normalised either. Thus, it is mostly young women who do not live in spatial proximity to the Turkish 'community', who seem to be able to escape the scrutiny of *namus* politics, that tend to gravitate towards such cohabitation if they choose to be in an intimate relationship.

5.4 Choosing Whom to Marry: From Arranged Endogamous ‘Imports’⁷² to Intercultural Love

In Turkish families, parental approval of a child’s spouse or partner stands in the centre of the ideal of a good life. Although the intimate relationships that are approved and practised have shifted from facilitated-by-others to women-driven matches, parents continue to influence whom their child ‘brings to the family’. After all, it is through marriage that two different families of unknown people join together. It seems, however, that there is more consultative, overseeing of a daughter’s choice rather than parental decision-making on behalf of the daughter. It is clear that the shift in the decision-making process around whom the daughter should marry is nuanced.

In principle, while marriage stories of the older Australian-born informants mostly featured compulsory ethnic endogamy⁷³ (Elley, 1993, p. 66; İçduygu, 1993, p. 4; Lo Bianco, 1998, p. 25), the younger informants were more able to negotiate for non-Turkish partners. However, I am not suggesting that this amounts to a general shift away from endogamy, some young women would clearly still prefer someone from their culture or religion to ensure harmony based on the shared practices, norms and traditions they wish to pass onto their children (Hopkins, 2008b; Khoo, Birrell, & Heard, 2009, p. 15). The nuance resides, rather, in a shift towards *the woman’s centrality in decision-making* in the process of spouse selection.⁷⁴ With widening opportunities for meeting young men, either online or in-person, young

⁷² This label is common amongst diasporic Turks and describes a spouse who was ‘brought’ from Turkey to Australia in the context of an ‘overseas arranged marriage’. It is often used in a pejorative way.

⁷³ Elley (1993) observed that many of the women she interviewed were content to complying with the parental requirement that they marry someone both Turkish and Muslim, and offered their own reasons for their compliance, such as raising children in a Turkish or Muslim way (p.66). Studies on intermarriage in Australia (e.g., Khoo 2009) show that the Turkish ‘community’ has one of the lowest rates of ethnic exogamy in Australia.

⁷⁴ Cevik and Cahill (1993) started to notice that ‘the aspirations of young people are changing, yet very slowly, towards greater freedom in spouse selection’ (p. 89).

women today are better positioned to find someone based on compatibility and personal affection, character and personality (c.f., Young, 1982, p.20; Manderson & Inglis, 1985⁷⁵).

5.4.1 Ethnic Endogamy in the Early Diaspora: Marrying Turks for Cultural Survival

The firm preference and enforcement of ethnic endogamy amongst ‘early arrivals’, at least, to a large extent stemmed from the existential anxieties they experienced upon arrival⁷⁶. For example, as second-generation Turkish Cypriot Zeyneb (49) explained:

Marriages with non-Turks occurred at our time, but generally, parents wouldn’t be happy about it. They would wish the ground would open up and swallow them. That’s how bad it was. It was instilled in us that we had to marry a Turkish person. They would tell us that it was about similarities of character and values and so, but in fact, it was their fear of outsiders and fear of losing their culture to this land.

In elaborating on the reasons for enforced ethnic endogamy, there are several factors to consider. Firstly, based on the prevailing practices of patrilocality in the village, when it was mostly the bride who joined her husband’s family as a *gelin* (the woman who comes)⁷⁷, parental concerns were associated with their daughter ‘getting absorbed’ into the *yabancı* (foreigner) family. As she would take on the husband’s name and identity, their grandchildren would not be considered Turkish and thus the next generation in the diaspora was considered to have been ‘lost’. These parents worried about various scenarios ranging from impaired

⁷⁵ Young (1982) and Manderson and Inglis (1985) interviewed young Australian-born girls about their ideal husbands. Although they, ideally, wanted a husband who would spend time with them and the children, be considerate and a friend, not all of them got to choose a marriage based on equality and love, or did not have enough time to recognise the personal qualities in the man they were introduced to in the process of an arranged meeting.

⁷⁶ For further discussion see Chapter 3.

⁷⁷ For instance, Kandiyoti (1988) explained that as the last to join the household last, the *gelin* usually becomes a subordinate in that household. (p. 279).

communication with grandchildren to having grandchildren that do not behave properly – as ‘Turks do’. Conversely, marrying one’s daughter to a Turkish man results in the preservation of all these things in their grandchildren thus ensuring the continuation of Turkish identity.

Other forms of endogamy based on the us-them boundary and othering, such as regional or territorial endogamy, were already practised in Turkey. As Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Sena (27) stated:

The first thing a Turkish person in Australia asks when meeting someone Turkish is “Where in Turkey do you come from?” Because Turks from different regions behave differently and have different customs. There is a lot of prejudice between us.

First-generation *Türkiyeli* Serkan (45) who came to Australia only seven years ago told me about the circumstances of his marriage. Serkan and his wife Selin (43) come from different regions in Turkey. He is from the Black Sea region and she is from the western coastal region. They met while Serkan was serving his military duty in Selin’s town and they fell in love. Their families were strongly opposed to their match, apparently because they came from different regions. Selin’s parents’ argument was based on the idea that men from the Black Sea region were ‘wild and too chauvinist’. They were worried that Selin might be treated harshly in the relationship. In comparison, Serkan’s mother tried to change her son’s mind by insinuating Selin would be incapable of fulfilling her duties as a carer because of the differences in traditions. She used to ask, “Why would you marry a girl that cannot cook our food?” Regardless, nothing could stand in the young lovers’ way. Serkan threatened to kidnap Selin and because this would have even more significant private and social consequences for the family’s *namus*, her parents eventually came around. As Serkan and Selin said, their families are on good terms today.

Secondly, some parents preferred to find someone in their village of origin. There were several often-intertwined pragmatic, social and moral reasons. For instance, leaving the already existing sense of territoriality mentioned above, parents tended to trust the existing social networks in their village of origin in Turkey or Cyprus over people from the diasporic community who came from all over Turkey. Equally, given the way *namus* community politics were facilitated through transnational gossip, parents could rely on ‘intelligence’ about prospective spouses from their trusted sources back in the village and family. In addition, Turkish spouses from the village were imagined to be ‘better behaved’ and more likely to retain ‘proper’ Turkish family-oriented values than Australian-born Turks. Thus, Turkish Cypriot Aysel (50) commented on the overseas arranged marriages of her two Australian-born cousins:

Both my cousins [women] married imports. I think my auntie and uncle were probably more cautious as they could see what the ones here [second-generation men] got up to and they thought the ones back in Turkey were like them – or so they thought.

Notably, in her narrative, Aysel mentioned with a trace of pride that she had not married ‘an import’ unlike some of her cousins. Some second-generation Turkish Australians use the term to express their rather derogatory opinion of the practice of overseas arranged marriage between Australian Turks and spouses that are usually from ancestral villages or rural towns. Equally, it is an expression of *othering* used by Turkish villagers that is constructed as atavistic, but also as an advantage or a kind of a mockery of those Australian-born Turks who enter into overseas arranged marriages, something which many young people of that generation wanted to avoid (Young, 1982, p. 20; Elley, 1993, pp. 66-67)⁷⁸.

⁷⁸ Young (1982) writes that her respondents were against marrying someone who grew up in Turkey because they believed that such a husband would not understand ‘the freedom that Turkish girls have acquired in Australia’ (p.20). Comparably, Elley’s (1993) respondents’ reasons for this view were that they would be embarrassed because their husbands would not know how to behave in Australia (because of communication

Conversely, research participants who were, or had been, in overseas arranged marriages used the term more reluctantly.

Moreover, other reasons parents preferred to marry their daughters to someone from Turkey were based on the presumption they would be more 'respectable and mature' (Elley, 1993, p. 67). Grounded in the moral principles of mutuality, reciprocity and responsibility, Turkish migrants remained entrenched in the village community through various deals, assistance, favours and moral debts, which could not be abandoned as it would cause issues to the family reputation. Sometimes, these 'items' of mutuality, reciprocity and responsibility involved a daughter or son given in a marriage that was intended to facilitate economic betterment in Australia. Turkish Cypriot Files (48) provided an example: 'I know one of my cousin's husbands spoke of that [marrying a child to someone from the native village] as "giving the poor guy a go in Australia".'

Similarly, when I asked *Türkiyeli* Selma (51) why her father chose to marry her to a man from his village rather than a local Turkish man she liked, she answered that 'her father probably wanted a cheap labourer for the family restaurant'. Selma's comment implied that a young man born in Australia could not be as easily dominated as a young groom from the village who would be morally bound to her father through gratitude for being given a chance in Australia. Indeed, the imagery of Australia as a 'lucky country' where migrants and their families have been given the opportunity to forge a better life came up in the narratives of several of my research participants. Therefore, marrying someone in Australia might be a kind of hypergamy. As, for instance, third generation Ceren (20) remarked:

When we travel to Turkey, we always feel with my sister that all eyes are on us. We are always being invited to get to know so and so offspring or relatives. I think, generally,

issues, language barriers and the incongruence of lived experience they could not relate to) or because they could not be sure that their spouse had not married them just to secure a visa (pp. 66-67).

diasporic Turks can be associated with wealth and privilege, and many parents in Turkey would like to have their children married to someone here.

Finally, older Australian-born women seem to be more likely to either internalise or conform to parental decisions about whom they should or should not marry⁷⁹. Nevertheless, some women acted upon their differing opinions. For instance, while older sisters Aysel (50) and Sevgi (48) willingly and gladly complied with their overseas arranged matches, their youngest sister Gül (45) found her own husband. While visiting her auntie in London soon after her eighteenth birthday, she fell in love with a man of African heritage and they wanted to marry. However, Gül's father was strictly against the match and ordered Gül back home. She refused and eloped. In response to her disobedience, Gül's father shunned her, pledging never to talk to her again.

5.4.2 Rationalising Love and Affection in Spousal Selection Today

While marrying 'someone Turkish' might still be important for young Turkish Australian women and their parents today, there are, nonetheless, other more significant criteria used in spouse selection. As I showed earlier, it is women who are at the centre of the decision-making process, with parents overseeing, consulting, and approving her choice. For example, third generation *Türkiyeli* Filiz, who married an Australian-born Italian (20) explained:

Usually, these days with all my friends it goes the way that if you meet someone and you like them and the family approves, usually, we can marry that person. But if the parents are really strict and they are very old minded, then it can get complicated, as they might say that they disapprove because they think the partner is not good for you.

⁷⁹ For further discussion see the next chapter.

But mostly, I guess it all depends on our happiness rather than anything else, so with our parents these days. If you are happy, your parents are happy.

Various themes came up in my informants' narratives about whom they would marry. One of them was the *religious-secular* dichotomy-setting, 'cultural Muslims', 'secular Turks', 'Islamically-aware', or 'practising Muslims'⁸⁰. For example, *Türkiyeli* Ebru (27) explained:

People who are hardcore secular Turks impose on their children to marry a Turk, whereas more religious people do not care about ethnicity, as far as their child marries someone Muslim. For the former, like my father's circle of friends, you're Turkish first and then you're Muslim – the nation above all. I personally do not care about nationalistic tendencies, but as a practising conservative Muslim woman, it was important for me to marry a Muslim. I wouldn't have married my husband if he wasn't one, so for me, it was more important that he was a good Muslim than anything else.

Matching levels of educational attainment was another theme of spousal selection. It reflects a shift amongst some parents, from preoccupation with sustaining cultural survival in the diaspora to a focus on their daughter's welfare as secured through her self-realisation and gender equality. Third generation *Türkiyeli* Sena's (25) narrative contained such a theme:

My family is secular, but they are not really racist or biased in that sense [demanding ethnic endogamy]. I married a Palestinian and my sister married an Iranian. They rather value education. So as long as our partners were educated, it was ok to whom we marry. They would die if I married a Turkish tradie. They would say, "no, you are a lawyer, you have to marry someone of your rank". It's because they think that if a girl

⁸⁰ For further discussion see Section 3.6

is very educated and she marries a boy who is not educated, he would feel inadequate. He wouldn't feel like a real man and she wouldn't be able to practice her profession properly because she'd be working late and he'd be at home and would not want to do house duties, wouldn't look after the kids. It's like you have to find someone who is your equal, so he can handle you being more successful than he is.

Aspirations to improve family and its individual members' existential conditions have been a constant theme and not only amongst Turkish immigrants. Hypergamy and 'marrying well' were once the central strategies used to secure a better life for one's daughter. However, in most families today, the daughter's individual academic and professional achievements now take priority. Brookes (1985, p. 18) claimed that 'in a migration setting, a bride's worth was higher when educated because she could support the family through her higher paid job compared to a woman with a lower education'. What I argue is slightly different and the nuance resides in the woman's positionality. While in Brookes suggestion, a woman's educational attainment is a form of capital, a means to appeal to 'a better' husband, here it is an expression of interest in her personal development, wellbeing, self-worth and individual power in the relationship, which is furthered when she has a higher earning potential. In short, a young woman's subjective experience takes the central position in these aspirational ideas instead of a merely complementary one. Marriage and the prospective son-in-law should be tailored to the daughter's career and profession, not the other way around.

Notably, most parents seem to now acknowledge, and aspire to avoid, the gender inequality which their daughters could have to confront in their marriage. However, it is also evident in these views that there is still a tendency to associate sexism with a lower socioeconomic class as it is reserved for men who 'lack education'. Interestingly, while

Sena's family emerged from the 'tradie class' themselves, their aspirations caused them to look down on 'their own people'.

Notions of class and having matching levels of educational attainment were considered safeguards against sexism and assurances of gender equality in the relationship. These were, in turn, also embodied in *Türkiyeli* Serkan's (43) narrative about his aspirations for his daughter Emine (15). In fact, his desire to expand her opportunities in life and career prospects was the very reason why he brought his young family to Australia seven years ago. Serkan expressed his aspirations for Emine in our talk about *namus* and virginity:

I don't want to interfere with my daughter, but it is my advice to her that the first man is always really important. Then, of course, she can talk with boys, but marriage [for first sex] is very important. How can she understand what is good for her future now [implying that she is too young]? I always give her this advice not to worry about boys now. After she finishes her studies and becomes [a] doctor, then she can also have [a] doctor and be equal. But if she becomes pregnant before she becomes someone, then she will be economically dependent on her husband and will not be equal; someone from a socio-economical level, so they can understand each other. I don't care if he's from a village or a city area, but he has to be willing to improve himself in life.

Grounded in the same notion, what matters to Serkan is not his son-in-law's origin but the latter's willingness to advance through the socioeconomic ranks. This is in line with what Icdyugu (2014) stated about a change of male traditional status symbols in migration.

According to Icdyugu, 'man's age, kinship, devoutness or ownership of land', which would attract respect in rural Turkey, 'have been replaced by indicators such as income, qualifications and skills and, perhaps, knowledge of a Western European language' (2014, p. 124).

The rational aspect of deliberating about whom to ‘share life with’ might manifest itself more in planning a ‘good future’. Nonetheless, it is mostly unplanned romantic love and personal affection that actually drives spousal ‘selection’ today. In some of the narratives about spousal criteria, the bottom line was the desire to be loved and respected as a person. For instance, *Türkiyeli Filiz* (20) stated:

My family and I do not care whom I marry as far as he is a good person, and he respects me. I take love as it comes. I don’t know who I am gonna marry. At this point, I don’t have that intention. I don’t care whether he’s Italian, I don’t care if he’s Greek, [or] Croat. Just love me and respect me as a person. I believe that it is the most important.

While according to Sena and Serkan an individual woman’s respectability and worth are acquired by ‘becoming someone’, in Filiz’s narrative, respect and worth are inherent in being a good (compassionate and kind) person. The desired compatibility is grounded in emotional and personal compatibility over anything else.

Overall, this suggests that the shifts in criteria for ‘whom to marry’ bear a pattern of *de-collectivisation* and *individuation*. Where once a unified, enforced ethnic endogamy prevailed, as a means of sustaining Turkish culture and identity in the diaspora, spousal criteria have now diversified and are centred around women’s personal inclinations. Young women mostly care about personal multilayered compatibility with their partners based on various rational criteria and mostly on desire and affection. Respect and worth are pursued through the ideal of gender equality that can be generated through socio-economic emancipation or love and compassion.

5.5 Divorcée Moral Identity Stigma: ‘Who Do You Think You Are, Talking to My Husband? You Are a Widow.’

The breakup of a marriage is never taken lightly because marriage remains a core social institution in the Turkish diaspora (Keceli, 1998a, p. 193). It is a space where gender and sexual relations have been channelled into and ordered in accordance with *namus* moral principles. Through marriage, families unite their affairs, emotions and energies, and become a collective defined between ‘us’ and ‘them’. For most Turkish Australians, a divorce is not only a private affair between husband and wife. It also represents a lethal blow to the very core of the united families. Therefore, it is also an emotional issue that tends to trigger existential and identity crises.

Although divorce has become more acceptable and is no longer perceived as *namussuz* or immoral, divorced women continue to cause moral anxiety amongst some, particularly older, Turkish people. My research participants’ narratives featured a prominent theme of gendered moral stigmatisation⁸¹ directed towards divorced women. For instance, second-generation Turkish Cypriot Ebru (47) related the following:

I remember my dad saying once that divorced women are easy targets. Here some people still think like that. To divorce takes courage, so many women try to avoid it. But divorce is no longer seen as bad as in my times. Today, young women divorce much more often than women of my generation.

At the same time, Australian-born *Alevi* Kamile (31), who lives in Broadmeadows, explained:

She has the name now [label of divorcée], and once you have that label, everyone watches what you do. It’s a matter of just seeing you out by yourself in the middle of

⁸¹ *Namus lekesi* means stigma attached to transgressions of questions of *namus*

the night, and it goes down to ripple rotation [she alluded to acceleration of gossip].

Slut. It is that easy. You always have to watch what you do as a divorced woman.

A divorced woman seems to be approached with suspicion of indecency and character corruption simply by virtue of being divorced. She has not done anything wrong, yet people assume she might because of her marital status. As previously anticipated, such mistrust does not stem from the act of divorce *per se*, Turkish people have become accustomed to divorce as part of life, something that ‘happens’. Yet, there is something more to it that resides in the assumptions about a divorced woman’s liberated sexuality. *Türkiyeli Selma*’s (51) narrative illustrates this point:

In my generation, divorced women are still stigmatised and thus cannot mix so much with married people. It’s because as a divorced woman, you have already had sex.

People are scared that you might use that and eye on other women’s husbands. There is this paranoia. How bad is that, hmm? When I got divorced, it loomed over me. My married girlfriends felt threatened by me and got jealous. They saw me as I am not a virgin, but I also don’t have a man. Therefore, I have to be loose or it’s easy for me to be loose. We’re all single [divorced] in our circle of friends and we don’t mingle with married couples.

Thus, the status of divorcée appears to challenge the usual social, gender and sexual categorisation, and order as a woman is expected to be either an unmarried virgin living under the patronage and protection of her father or a faithful wife existing under the patronage and protection of her husband. A divorced woman fits in neither category and as female sexuality is perceived as active and potent, she poses a potential threat to the defined sexual and social order. Her unconstrained sexuality is imagined as making her ‘go around

and seduce other women's men'. Thus, a divorced woman is in a state of *moral liminality* until she remarries and re-enters the known social, moral and gender order. Until then, she is often socially ostracised, even by her close girlfriends. As Bengi (45) noted: 'as a divorcee, things change for you. Your married friends start getting jealous and suspicious of you because you're single.' All the following narratives feature such divorcée moral scrutiny and shunning based on what I call *divorcée moral stigma*.

For instance, Ayten's (50) mother pushed her to remarry immediately after her first divorce. Ayten was very happy during the time she did not have to deal with a husband, even though her mother restricted her from socialising with her friends due to the impending *divorcée moral stigma*. Ayten recalled two examples:

Soon after my divorce, we went to a family wedding. All my friends were having fun, but I had to stay only at our table. I couldn't go and talk to my friends across the room. My mother was scared that people would say, "look at that widow, she is going to the table to flirt with this and that guy", even though I'd known the family since my childhood. My mother knew our Turkish community very well and tried to protect me. She didn't want my name to get stained, and also, they would think that I am a bad moral influence on their daughters because I was divorced.

[...] I also remember once going home, and at the train station, I met the husband of our family friend. I just asked him how his wife was as I haven't seen her for a long time. As soon as I arrived home, the phone rings. It was his wife. Without saying hello, how are you, she starts yelling at me: "Who do you think you're, talking to my husband? You're a widow." I was speechless.

Another research participant, Sevda (45), mentioned another reason why parents restricted their divorced daughters before they remarried them. This is associated with sexual and social order just as much as with patriarchal protection as mentioned above. Sevda explained:

If the family takes her [divorced daughter] back under the family roof,⁸² she can be restricted to go out because she is *dul* and because some men could try to take advantage of that. She is no longer a virgin and so the guy doesn't have to take responsibility for her. He does not have to marry her.

Notably, in her narrative, Sevda used the word 'widow' to refer to a divorced woman. When I asked her for the reason, she explained that older people in the 'community', in particular, use it as a literal translation of the Turkish word '*dul*' or '*dul kimse*', which in Turkish means both a widow and a divorcée.⁸³ What is noteworthy here is the connection between the connotations of the two terms. Both refer to someone who has 'lost a spouse', only the former through death and the latter through divorce. Departing from the idea that marriage is meant to be a relational commitment 'for life', the only existential situation in which an adult person appears without a spouse would occur after a spouse's death. Hence, the association between a widow and a divorced person might reside in its symbolic connotations with the death of the relationship. As mentioned earlier, a relationship that dies with divorce is not only the one between spouses but also with other members of affiliated families. Research data demonstrates that after a divorce (or, today, even a de facto relationship break-up), in-laws, especially mothers-in-law, abruptly sever all contact with the ex-affiliated person, despite previous cordial rapport. For instance, *Türkiyeli Berna* (24) commented on such an occurrence with her ex-mother-in-law:

⁸² Icduygu (1993, p.16) writes that at the time of his research, there was not a single situation when a single woman, whether unmarried, divorced or widowed, would live on her own. Only single women with children would live without another adult person.

⁸³ The Turkish language is not gender-specific, thus *dul* and *dul kimse* can also be used for a widowed or a divorced man.

It's pretty weird as we used to have a wonderful relationship, we chatted, went shopping, I felt I could tell her anything, yet when we bump into each other now, we don't talk at all. It's like I am dead for her. [...] I just find it awkward as I didn't do anything wrong. I just left her son. Why she cannot even say hello to me?

Furthermore, such vocabulary usage may reflect the persisting meaning and importance assigned to divorce by the older generation. Similar to *namus* and 'arranged marriage', *dul* has become a loaded term, a point of *othering* and even *abjection* based on the dichotomies modern-atavistic and West-East. Tuğba (33), who migrated from Izmir only a few years ago to undertake her doctoral studies in Australia, explained that she would use the word *boşanmış* instead:

But I am from a very modern minority in Turkey. Also, urban youth see the difference between *dul* and *boşanmış*, as it is a newer and more modern word. Even though, I think that the majority would perhaps still use *dul* for a divorced person.

Moreover, divorced research participants who allowed me to peer into their private lives and shared their intimate stories, mostly stated that, despite the scrutiny and moralising in their generation, their lives have become happier through the gains in independence, autonomy and self-sufficiency. None of them believed that divorce had made them morally corrupt and they had learned to decouple their worth from their sexuality. For example, Ayten (50) said:

I am happy now. Without any husband, in my own house, with my boys who make me proud. I would never ever get married again. No way. I know that I am a good and moral person. I know what is right and wrong and being divorced does not make me a bad person. [...] My friend is also divorced. There are many of us. But she sees men

openly. She doesn't hide it because she believes that it's nothing wrong. However, many people in Broadmeadows do not accept that and gossip about her. They shun her, and although they would not say it to her eyes, many people would not accept her in their houses. But she is my friend and, of course, I take her to my house. What she does in her free time is not my business and neither is it anyone else's.

Recognising the moral worth of self but also of other divorced women as detached from marital status, as Ayten did, can take time and lengthy self-work. Not everyone is able or willing to change internalised moral patterns of judgment. For example, second-generation *Türkiyeli* Şengul (47) has been divorced twice. While she enjoys dating different men casually, she complained about her divorcée girlfriend who brings her male friends home where she lives with her two teenage daughters. Şengul disapproves of such behaviour and because she does not want to attract attention and moral scrutiny, she refuses to come over to her girlfriend's house. In the following account, it is evident how ingrained and influential *namus* moral principles and community *namus* politics and scrutiny were in Şengul's thinking and behaviour:

These guys always stay until late, and what if something happens to her daughters. I don't wanna be linked to that. She is too out there, and it's quite compromising to be seen around her. I warned her, what if her sons-in-law get jealous of these men. Also, my ex is after me. It would make him so happy to say how *orospu* [whore, slut, prostitute] I am in retaliation to me. [...] I am always cautious who sees me with the men I date. We either go to his house or a hotel, but I never bring a guy home in front of my sons. I wouldn't disrespect myself in front of my sons.

Şengul's narrative highlights that casual open dating is not an easy affair, even for divorced women who decide to defy community *namus* politics and combat their fear of being morally

scrutinised. Being socialised in the environment described in the previous chapters, certain self-disciplining practices and imagining of right and wrong remain part of their moral self and identity.

In comparison, when I met Australian-born *Alevi* Esin (43), who divorced her German-born husband a couple of years ago, she had just started dating a new Australian boyfriend. Esin is a self-assured professional woman who gets by with the attitude of being ‘ready to conquer the world’. Yet, she was very discreet about her relationship and uneasy about breaking the news to her parents who live in rural Victoria. She also did not feel comfortable having her boyfriend overnight at her own apartment that she sublets to and shares with a young Turkish couple, children of family friends from Istanbul. Esin commented:

I know that they wouldn’t judge me. Kids from Istanbul see things very differently than us [Turkish Australians] here’. You can never shed yourself of that experience and all that influence. I can tell myself a million times that it’s absolutely normal, that I am not doing anything bad, but I still have this at the back of my mind.

This reluctance to introduce a boyfriend to her family was also present in the life narrative of Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Ceyda (49), who was divorced with two sons. At the time I met her, Ceyda had been in a de facto relationship with her Indian boyfriend for the last three years and her brother, who was ten years older, still liked to interfere in her life [Ceyda’s parents had both passed away] and was pushing her to get married to her partner immediately. Ceyda recalled her experience:

When I brought my boyfriend into my life, telling him [her brother] took quite a while because I didn’t have the courage. I kept it to myself for a good 6 to 8 months. Then when we moved [in] together, I had to tell my brother, so he just didn’t bump into him in my bathroom. I told him, look, I am seeing someone, and he [her brother]

straightaway asked when we will get married. And I said yes, we will eventually. The pressure was back on. So, I told my partner, look in my culture, which him as an Indian is very close, there is no one in a de facto relationship. They are either married or single. There is no in-between.

Ceyda's partner initially agreed but then became hesitant. At the time we met, she was considering leaving him because as she said, 'it's a matter of a promise. I am not confident in front of my family, especially my brother, to hold my partner's hand or hug him'. However, half a year later, I was invited to their wedding.

Furthermore, because divorce is never easy for Turkish women, the process around it usually involves profound moral deliberation where the tension between *doing things right* and *doing the right thing* can create 'an impossible choice' between relationships with others and the self. While every divorce story is personal and subjectively unique, there are also common tangents shaped by *namus*, as in the following case of Zehra. Divorce usually means losing relationships that have provided comfort and a sense of existential security. After a divorce or a breakup, families and ex-partners tend to strictly cease all contact, thus, social and emotional capital built over the years is lost. In short, as another participant, Şengül (50) previously stated, 'to divorce takes courage'.

Zehra is a first-generation *Alevi* Turkish Australian woman who migrated to Melbourne through an arranged marriage to an Australian-born *Alevi* man in the early 1990s. She told me that, despite having two children and a comfortable and financially secure life with him, she felt miserable because she had never come to love the husband her family had pressured her to marry. However, her life had been peaceful until she met another man and fell in love. This life event compelled Zehra to reassess her situation existentially and emotionally. She explained:

For the first time, I felt something like this, and it made me realise that I have lived in a lie all my life. I have been an actress for the last twenty odd years since I married him, acting as [if] I am the happiest woman in the universe while my inside was hurting. I didn't have anything else in my life. I was only thinking that my kids gonna go to the best schools, they'll be educated and then they gonna have great jobs, I will buy them a house, they will drive new cars. I was working so hard, always making money, sending money to my family, keeping everyone happy over there. I just wanted to make someone happy in my own life and when this happened, I really found myself. I was like, there is also me here. I wasn't looking for it. It just happened.

Zehra came to realise the duality of her existence for the first time since her family made her marry her husband. On the one hand, her words confirmed her manifest mode of living, which I could also superficially observe through her Facebook photos. These images always portrayed her as smiling and showing off her comfortable life, which included overseas travel, fashionable clothes, socialising with her friends and children or showing off her family house with views over the city. The other perceived reality, as Zehra described it, was the immanent world of her emotions and desires where her authentic self resided and formed a sense of what was 'genuinely right' for her when released from her responsibilities to others. The former existential mode was sustained through the moral modality of *doing things right* by fulfilling the obligations of 'a good Turkish woman', 'a good daughter', 'a good wife' and 'a good mother'. In contrast, having an extramarital affair propelled her to realise the modality of *doing the right thing* for herself, which expressed itself in Zehra's ideation and planning of the divorce.

Women of Zehra's generation, as I argued in Chapter 3, internalised the moral modality of *doing things right* as the primary way of relating to moral frameworks, moral self

and others. In elaborating upon the inhibitions that precluded Zehra from initiating the divorce she wanted, she explored multiple intertwined moral perspectives of *doing things right* and *doing the right thing*. Zehra, for example, reasoned that her children were already grown up and, thus, she no longer felt obliged to stay in the marriage for their sake. However, she still felt responsible for the reputation of her family, her in-laws and her husband. She explained her family's reaction after she sought counsel with them: 'even talking about it makes them upset. Divorce is a bad name for the family. It's *namus*. In their eyes, it would bring them down. They would be ashamed of it.' Thus, her family made it clear that they would not support the divorce. When Zehra confided about her emotional turmoil to her mother, she was told that 'he is your husband, he's your man, and he is the one who is looking after you and your house. He is also the father of your kids, and I don't wanna hear words like this.' Similarly, her older brother refused to sympathise with her. He said: 'if you're not happy, it's all your fault. You are so stubborn. You should learn how to behave with your husband. It [the divorce] would be your fault, fix it yourself.' Even though Zehra knew that her family had traditional views, she expected at least some emotional consolation. She cried about their lack of empathy: 'it's like no one cares about me. Everyone cares about how it would look outside. I am saying I live for my daughter, but I don't think anyone in my family lives for me.'

Remarkably, the only person who understood and emotionally supported her was her twenty-year-old daughter Aliya. They have forged an extraordinary, more than mother-daughter, relationship based on closeness and friendship. Aliya knew about her mother's feelings and thoughts and encouraged the idea of her divorcing her father. However, even though Zehra believed that a person should be able to determine the course of her own life, she did not want to choose herself over her family and friends. The relational aspect of the existential questioning of "what is right" evidently prevailed over ideas of personal

emancipation and the fulfilment of her own dreams and desires. However, Aliya was quite frustrated with her mother for not acting upon her advice. I realised that, despite the intimacy between them, the two women lived worlds apart. In Aliya's world, a woman could pursue anything she felt was right for her. Thus, she could not fully appreciate her mother's concerns about the kind of responsibility and obligation that Zehra felt towards others in her family. The modality *doing things right* remained the primary modality of Zehra's moral sense. Aliya wanted her to *do the right thing* by her. As Aliya told me on another occasion, 'what can a person who is not happy give others?'

5.6 Adultery, The Worst Namussuz Act: 'As a Married Woman, I Cannot Love Someone Else, It Is Against My Culture.'

Although the ways in which intimate relationships are organised and practised have shifted in the Turkish Australian diaspora, one constant seems to remain entrenched. The *namus* principle of sexual fidelity and loyalty to one partner continues to strongly shape the relational behaviour and moral identities of Turkish Australians. Nonetheless, the nuance occurs in relation to relationship length. In other words, while the ideal of 'spending life with one partner' continues to reside in visions of the 'good life', socially sanctioned monogamy has shifted from "commitment to a life-long partner" to "commitment to the partner at the time". Thus, adultery is usually strongly condemned and hardly ever negotiable, even by close friends. Furthermore, this moral rejection applies to all sorts of affairs, whether emotional or sexual, one-off or long-term.

The nature of the moral imperatives of loyalty and sexual fidelity are not only socially normative but also personal and existential. When people cheat, as in the case below, it tends

to trigger immense personal remorse, a questioning of one's own moral identity and even, at times, existential crisis. For instance, Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Aysel (50) explained her stance to adultery:

Personally, I don't think that losing virginity out of wedlock is *namussuz*, but cheating is. Actually, it is the worst example of being *namussuz*. If you're not happy with your partner, then leave him and then go. Find yourself another partner. Behind his back it's *namussuz*.

Similarly, Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Ceyda (47) stated: 'You can get a divorce, but if you divorce because you were cheating, it's still *namussuz*. Same if you pursue a married man or a married woman. Same. *Namussuz*.' Such a situation was experienced by Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Esin (49) almost thirty years ago. She fell in love with her cousin during a holiday in Cyprus, but her father disapproved and ordered her back home to Melbourne. Nevertheless, the pair stayed in contact through letters. After some time, the cousin got engaged with another woman in the village. Unaware of this, Esin continued writing him love letters, which he let his army mates read. The gossip spread all the way to Melbourne, which caused Esin to have a nervous breakdown in the face of shame and embarrassment. 'I felt like I've done something wrong and I couldn't bear the idea that his fiancée saw me as a bad person, a *namussuz* woman, I felt so ashamed,' Esin explained. Instead of feeling betrayed by his actions, Esin felt responsible and ashamed.

The critical female voice once again addressed, as in the case of premarital virginity, the gendered double standards in relation to how adultery is perceived and judged. For instance, second-generation *Türkiyeli* teacher Ada (35) stated:

In cheating, there are absolutely double standards, because if a woman cheats, she is *orospu*, a whore in the 'community', even today, she would be still called *namussuz*, at

least in our generation. But when a guy cheats, there are gossips, but he doesn't lose his honour, he's not finished in the community like a woman is. [...] My good girlfriend, she is Turkish, she just recently found out that her husband is cheating on her. She broke up with him, and he wanted her back, but she didn't accept him back. Would you believe that some people were excusing him that he just slipped and that she should take him back for the sake of their children? I can't stand it.

As with the judgment of premarital sexual morality, the voices of reform are demanding judgments of adultery be gender neutral. The moral value remains intact, yet its practical application has been identified as something needing to be amended.

In contrast, during a general conversation, Alev and Berk, siblings and Broadmeadows *Türkiyeli* in their early twenties, started a heated discussion amongst themselves about cheating. Their robust moral sentiments cemented the claim that sexual fidelity and loyalty in relational morality remain highly significant amongst the youngest cohort. Interestingly, it was the brother's reaction that highlighted a potential shift amongst Turkish sensibilities of masculinity. The sister initially boasted:

I believe that a man should never hit a woman. But I also believe that if a woman cheats on you, then kill her. I would. Who are you to cheat on me? If you are not happy, just leave.

However, her brother sought to scale back her outburst:

You see, this is the wog mentality, tit-for-tat. I believe, as a man, that if someone can dishonour herself by cheating on you, why would you dishonour yourself by hitting that person? Leave her. Finish. See you later. Bye.

However, they subsequently met in a *harmonious* agreement:

It's just shameful. Cheating is shameful.

Berk, the brother concluded:

It's because when you love someone and then that person goes and sleeps with someone else you get heartbroken. Some guys can't deal with it, and they don't wanna be seen as weak or hurt, so they kick around them. Anger clouds their thinking. But I personally think that it's better to just leave and never talk to that person ever again.

What Berk expressed above was from the perspective of the 'cheated' but, in the case of Zehra, the tensions over cheating brought out a particularly bittersweet/acute moral crisis of 'self'. Zehra's discrete and honest conversation with me about her personal circumstances highlighted the nature of her intimate relationships as first and foremost unique and dealing with marital crises in highly subjective ways. Where, for Berk, the conjecture of cheating left him to conclude 'leaving' the marriage should happen instead of cheating, for Zehra (45), it was not that straightforward. I met her amidst an existential crisis that stemmed from her regrets and dissatisfaction with having been, in her words, 'manipulated into a marriage with a man whom she never learned to love'. She wanted a divorce.

One day, while we were chatting about the issues that apparently inhibited her plan to divorce, Zehra suddenly mustered her courage and revealed to me that the underlying issue was, in fact, her extramarital affair with another Turkish man whom she had fallen in love with. At that very moment, I could sense the immense, yet cautious, relief that Zehra felt while admitting her affair to someone else for the first time. With this revelation, her personal story gained another dimension of significance that allowed me to imagine the depth of her existential crisis. Her hesitation to divorce was no longer only a matter of not failing to fulfil her obligation and duty (*doing things right*) to both her families who, she worried, would be gossiped about for having a divorcée among them. Equally, this became a crucial matter for deceiving her sense of personal moral identity. Zehra explained:

According to our Turkish principles because of what I did, I'm *orospu* [prostitute].

You're raised that way, and you cannot help it, because you feel ashamed of yourself.

You cannot escape that feeling. It's part of you.

The affair stayed platonic for the first couple of years but Zehra was already experiencing intense moral questioning. She recounted:

When this happened, I was dying for the guilt. On one side, I was fighting with myself, this can't happen to me, I wasn't raised this way. I'm a married woman, I cannot love someone else. This is against my culture. So, I said to him that I cannot do anything more unless I leave my husband.

Later on, Zehra told her husband that she was in love with someone else and that she wanted a divorce. 'I never loved you, as you know. I didn't marry you for love, it was arranged,' Zehra said that justifying her affair as a matter of love somewhat alleviated her guilt in the adultery. It had not been her who had given her genuine promise to her husband, it was her parents who had pressured her to marry. In this way, Zehra diffused her sense of guilt, at least for her moral self. She was hoping that her husband would leave her, but instead, to her surprise, he bargained 'to give her a chance, forgetting everything, if she forgot about the other man'. He begged her to stay with him under the promise he would make it better.

Instead, Zehra found herself under her husband's watchful eye and suspicious surveillance. She said that she had to stop working in a cafe under the pretext that her husband would cover all of her financial needs, including her overseas travel. I witnessed on many occasions during our meetings that he would call or text her a couple of times every hour and check on her during my visits to her home. 'I feel like a prisoner on a leash when he wants to direct everything I do,' complained Zehra. At this point, I asked Zehra if she felt unsafe and if she wanted me to contact the authorities. Zehra assured me that she felt safe and explained to me that she only confessed to her husband because she 'knew that he does not

have the typical Turkish man mentality'. When I asked her what this meant, she explained that, if this had happened back in her hometown, she would most probably have been severely beaten up and socially ostracised, but that her husband 'is not like that, because he grew up in Australia'. Then she added:

I feel so bad for my husband. He cries all night and I feel so sad for him. He's a human being, and it's because of me he's suffering this much. I hate myself for causing this to him, but I couldn't help myself. It was stronger than me. I cannot make myself love him. I tried, but I can't. I swear I tried so much. I told myself that I will try to make it work. But then I came home, and I realised that I can't do it! I would be on the other side if I didn't have the kids.

Looking at the situation from her husband's perspective, Zehra felt that he was determined to preserve his family. This understanding of Zehra's husband's motivation was also shared by their daughter, who also said that he had been trying to keep the family together. Zehra felt that her husband loved her and would not hurt her. Instead, she reported, he took the anger generated from the heartbreak and insult out on her lover for breaking the *namus* principle that prohibits pursuing someone else's spouse. Zehra paraphrased her husband, 'knowing everything and going along with this, he is a snake, he is guilty, and not you. It is an open book. It's not gonna close'. Zehra's reasoning that her husband would not harm her because 'he is not a typical Turkish man' and because 'he grew up in Australia', is grounded in the idea that Australian-born Turks are different from those born in Turkey. Furthermore, as with Berk, the brother who refused to direct punishment towards the cheating wife/partner in the previous narrative of the two siblings, this may point towards a cultural shift in the sensibility of masculinities. Dilmaç's (2014a) findings in her study of young urban Turks who repudiated *namus* for its connotations of gendered violence are reminiscent of such

a process in an atavistic way of perceiving justice and morality. Instead, they replaced it with *şeref* as a more noble and progressive type of honour. As Herzfeld (1987) would perhaps have it, honour does not specify or describe an exact behaviour, nor does it provide a guideline of such behaviour. Instead, it refers to a socially acknowledged behaviour that is malleable over time and different in various places around the world. Seemingly, what constitutes honourable behaviour in terms of blame and punishment for cheating has shifted in the diaspora.

Notwithstanding, Zehra felt ashamed to the point where she felt she could not confide in anyone, not even to her best friend, a Lebanese woman. In fact, Zahra expressed her concern thus: ‘Turks, Lebanese and Greeks, we all share these values, and I know that my friend would not understand. I think that our friendship would finish.’ Even though she could not know how her friend would actually react, she assumed this based on her understanding and experience of the *moral grammar* shared with other ethnic groups. This brings us back to the Mediterraneanist argument of moral unity voiced by some informants. Regardless, one’s sense of belonging to a ‘morality group’ based on culture, ethnicity or just being seen as cognizant of the group’s moral grammar, creates a sense and series of assumptions about who might morally judge and who might be morally judged based on the shared values.

Reflecting on what was going through my mind as Zehra shared her story, and in maintaining contact with her since we met, what stands out was the issue of gaining and keeping trust when it came to the sensitive issues of inflexions of *namus*, morality and worth, and how they structured relationality, especially with outsiders. I realised how lonely and isolated some women might feel amidst such moral and existential struggles, yet not able to speak about it with anyone. Although I was quite surprised at the extent of the intimacy and detail, to which Zehra confided in a stranger like me, I understood that she shared all this with me as I was a social and moral outsider who would not judge her. We connected on a human

level and through empathetic care for the human other, and I provided her with an attentive non-judgemental ear.

My role as a witness to Zehra's story was more complex. While I was a moral outsider, she also tacitly needed me, or so I assumed, to make a positive moral judgement about her, weighing up 'what she had done' with what kind of 'good person' she was. In her narrative, Zehra regularly added examples of other deeds that she was proud of. I assumed she did it to equalise, or compensate for, her ashamed and guilty self-image. While that is quite self-evident, I argue that she also did this as part of her principled negotiation with herself to keep her self-worth intact and, thus, avoid 'losing herself' entirely. For example, she accompanied her previous statement about cheating and divorce by saying:

You should ask around. I haven't done anything wrong to anybody. Even his sister, his father, mother, I used to treat them like they were mine. I was respectful and loving.

No daughter-in-law can be so good like me. Normally in Turkey, they hate in-laws. I used to live with them for the first two years. I never went to bed unless they went to bed. I always got up before them, made them breakfast, and cleaned the house. I didn't have to, my husband used to fight with me and say "let's go out". But I said that I have to be with your mum and dad. I also worked so hard to put him and his family closer and, today, I feel that I betrayed them after what happened. I cannot even face them.

Like every time I ever see them, something inside me dies.

Two years later, Zehra was still married to her husband and had ended her extramarital affair. She told me that, despite not being in contact with the other man, she thought of him every day. She said that her husband treated her better than ever before and, although she did not love him, she decided against leaving him in order to keep the family together. She added that she could not break so many hearts, in both of her families. So, she broke her own

instead. Although every relationship is unique and life trajectories develop in their own special ways, the values of fidelity and loyalty to one's partner and, if married, their families as well, remains the strongest value in intergender, social and family intersubjectivity in the Turkish diaspora. Both younger and older second-generation informants stated that commitment and fidelity were probably the strongest and most cherished moral values and an integrated part of their moral identity.

5.7 Conclusion

Loyal commitment and sexual fidelity to one's partner is the central moral principle that has shaped and regulated relationality between men and women in the Turkish diaspora. Although the range of socially acceptable intimate relationships has shifted over the last fifty years, this moral principle continues to shape other types of relationships too. Although marriage is no longer the only socially sanctioned kind of intimate relationship, it remains the ideal. While there are now alternative possibilities for the cohabitation of unmarried couples, the principle of strict monogamy and fidelity continues to be enforced. Even when young women are able to date and their relationships are more or less tacitly accepted, the moral *namus* imperative of commitment to one partner shapes the way certain situations are morally judged. Casual and serial dating, in other words, frequently changing partners, is still socially unacceptable and a woman engaging in this behaviour is still thought to be immoral. Thus, adultery remains the strongest moral transgression and is often condemned even by the closest friends.

The differentiation between the kinds of relationships that are accepted among different people in the diaspora is another aspect of the landscape of Turkish diasporic

relational moralities. While conservative families and individual women (there have been instances where it was specifically the bride, not her family, who wanted to have her marriage morally facilitated) might still prefer to have other people organise the match, others drive their own spousal search based on numerous criteria. Either way, what is prominent is the further shift toward a woman's centrality in the decision-making processes about with whom she wants to share her life. Her positionality, and there have always been exceptions even in the village, has shifted from the virtuous and praiseworthy 'waiting to be asked' to being the initiator of either facilitated-for-her or driven-by-her meetings. Compared to earlier times in the diaspora, when tight-knit immigrant communities were experienced as existential modes of material and cultural survival, today, even though the culture of gossip remains, various individual women are more readily able to act based on their own moral sentiments and ideas of morality. Due to the general differentiation of ideas about what it means to be moral in relation to gendered relationality, women are able to negotiate better, which also entails circumventing spaces, places and other people who are thought to contain *namus*, by either physically or digitally avoiding them. Young women can, thus, shape their relationships based on their own conscience and moral sentiments.

In terms of whom to have a committed relationship with, the moral shift in intimate sociality also indicates broader de-collectivisation and individualisation. While in the early days of the diaspora, in their pursuit of collective values and identity preservation, immigrant parents strictly required ethnic endogamy, spousal criteria have diversified and now depend more on each young woman's personal aspirations and desires. Young women are primarily concerned about being personally and emotionally compatible with their partners. This may still include ethnic and religious compatibility, but also includes a similar level of educational attainment and career success. However, this rationalisation of the choice of spouse is primarily the desire for and pursuit of romantic love.

Finally, although divorce has become more common in the Turkish diaspora, divorcee stigma is still a reality perpetuated in women's social groups, particularly among the older generation. Among women who have internalised the imagery of a social order where women were either virginal daughters or married wives, a divorced woman can cause moral anxiety and suspicious jealousy in the vicinity of other women's husbands. Thus, a divorced woman, as I argue, appears in a space of *moral liminality* until she is either remarried or changes her social group. Either way, Turkish women approach intimate relationality in various ways, depending on their sense of positionality in their families, social environment and sense of independence, all of which are consciously considered in their subjective existential strategizing in pursuit of their vision of a 'good life'.

Chapter 6

Transformations of Namus Dynamics between Parent and Child: From Authoritarian Imposition through Authoritative Guidance to Dialectic Parenting

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored shifts in socially sanctioned and gendered intimate relationality and how *namus* principles surrounding marital fidelity interact with these, often ‘new’, types of relationships. The concept of marriage, once expected to be endogamous and facilitated by the couple’s families, has been reshaped and complemented with other kinds of intimate relationality in the diaspora. The publicly demonstrated respect for one’s parents, as expressed through obedience to parental decisions *vis-à-vis* marriage and other matters in the daughter’s intimate life, is the last of the three *namus* principles that my informants emphasised. Conceptually, this principle is used to cement both private and public facets of family, collective *namus* demonstrating their moral unity to others. Importantly, as I argued in the previous chapter, a daughter’s positionality in the process of matchmaking has shifted from someone who is ‘waiting to be asked’ to someone who initiates and organises her own intimate affairs, sometimes with parental oversight.

Therefore, I delve into the last shifting nuance of *namus* morality in the diaspora *vis-à-vis* the relationality between parents and children across three family generations, as narrated

by my informants. Specifically, I explore the predominant forms of parent-child relationality as it has evolved in the Turkish Australian diaspora over the last fifty years. Gendered authoritarian, authoritative empathetic guidance and dialectical parenting are three terms that can be used to identify dominant forms of such relationality that, while intended to show the shift chronologically, they may also be observed amongst different diasporic families concurrently. I also draw together elements from previous chapters in showing how second-generation Turkish women, now mothers themselves, embody these changes in *namus* morality through their parenting. Finally, I consider the parenting style of Turkish parents who have chosen to distance themselves from Turkish communities because of their experience with community *namus* politics and how it affected their children's wellbeing and sense of Turkishness.

6.2 Gendered Authoritarian Parenting: A Means of Existential and Cultural Survival in the Diaspora

The impression given in the accounts of some of the older second-generation informants is that they experienced their upbringing, particularly in relation to their fathers, as somewhat authoritarian, strictly hierarchical and gendered. In their stories about *namus*, fathers were usually described as exerting hegemony within the family, especially in public. However, daughters were seen as 'their mothers' problem' when it came to issues of *namus* morality. More specifically it was the mother's responsibility to instil values of premarital purity and 'proper' behaviour in their daughters.⁸⁴ In terms of 'communicating' appropriate behaviour, first-generation migrant parents were portrayed as inclined to impose rules on their children,

⁸⁴ For further discussion see Section 4.5.

without spending much time, if any, explaining the reasons behind the rules to them. Thus, the participant narratives included expressions such as, ‘it was implied’, ‘it was expected from us’, or ‘we were told that it is the way we do things’. This left the young girls of that generation with limited options – to either conform to or rebel against the rules.

Several factors intertwined in the women’s narratives demonstrate the logic underlying the authoritarian parenting approach in the specific context of remote (as it was perceived by these women) Australia. Firstly, the earlier immigrant parents arrived primarily from smaller village communities that had strictly defined rules around sexual morality as well as clearly expressed gendered expectations and roles. In Australia, far away from the support of their extended families,⁸⁵ new parents were left to replicate these ideals and practices based on fragments of childhood memories and shaped by strict community *namus* politics as discussed previously. Not being able to receive guidance from, engage in continuous communication with, and share rearing responsibilities with other family members, new migrant parents tended to amplify their parenting input for fear of failing to raise proper, socially adjusted adults who shared in the values that shaped the moral framework of their existence. For example, Australian-born *Alevi Sevgi* (43) explained:

We didn’t have an extended family here. There were no aunties that I could go to for advice and a little bit of a rant about my parents. There were not any dominant female figures: it was just my mum and me. In Turkey, we have huge families with uncles and aunties and so we don’t need anyone else there. We have very small families in the diaspora. So, our parents were very uptight because there wasn’t much support with our upbringing by an extended family. Our upbringing was only up to the two, which was a huge responsibility. They didn’t want to fail.

⁸⁵ While the ratio of nuclear to extended families in Turkey was quite high, almost 60% being nuclear families (Icduygu, 1993, p.14), in Melbourne it was much higher. The important factor was the Australian immigration policy (Bottomley, 1984; Mackie, 1983). As Australia was seeking factory workers, the preference was for small family units (a couple with children) up to 50 years of age (Icduygu, 1993, p.19).

Secondly, the desire to preserve identity, culture and values in the diaspora substantially influenced parenting approaches. The fear of ‘losing culture and identity’ compelled parents to exert dominance⁸⁶ over their children, particularly daughters, who were seen as the conveyers of culture to the next generation. To many people, reproducing the *status quo*, specific customs and traditions, came naturally because the familiarity provided a sense of security and made life in a foreign country more intelligible. Second-generation respondent *Türkiyeli* Emine (47) expressed this logic in her narrative:

Our parents were so scared to lose their identity, so they found a solution in restrictions and exerting their power over us – so they wouldn’t lose us. It was all they knew then, and it takes courage to go against what one thinks is right. Some families had more courage than others. So, some kids had better luck and others failed because of the pressure. My mum was only 17 when she came out of her small village, which was the only environment that she knew. Looking at it from my perspective of a Uni graduate, how hard that leap must have been for her, moving to the other part of the world, from home straight to full-time employment, with no supportive family. They were alone and worried that if they let us go off-leash, we would make some mistake. There was a lot of ‘new’ that they didn’t understand here, such as the drinking culture or women going out. They were picturing all these scenarios that might happen to me and in which they might lose me.

Thirdly, the urge to maintain a good reputation, and the existential security associated with it, shaped the parenting approaches of this earlier generation. In response to the various

⁸⁶ Icdygu (1993, p.18) writes that fathers, in particular, felt that relationships between fathers and children have worsened after migration to Australia as a consequence of different values and lifestyle.

existential challenges posed by post-arrival socio-economic and cultural settings, migrant parents tended to live within tight-knit Turkish communities. However, they felt compelled to be perceived within these communities, as people who have their children, especially their daughters, under control. As explained previously, the fear of losing girls to foreign influences, often considered morally corrupt, through their participation in co-educational schools was common, particularly amongst *Türkiyeli* immigrants. Similarly, the prospect of being the subject of gossip was unbearable for many parents, as it was believed to have broad existential ramifications. The prevailing moral modality and tendency of conduct were, thus, oriented towards *doing things right*, with the desire to ‘save face’ being a primary response to children’s mishaps. Parents were oriented towards the outward, public representation of family, collective moral unity.

Moreover, authoritarian parenting was socially sanctioned by the early Turkish immigrant ‘community’,⁸⁷ generating parental gendered *namus*.⁸⁸ Children’s public displays of obedience – or, alternatively, the absence of public displays of disobedience – were an essential part of family *namus*, signalling that parents were in charge and, more precisely, that a father held authority over his family. This, in turn, demonstrated his masculinity to others. Similarly, it communicated to others that a mother had fulfilled her feminine role of raising a

⁸⁷ Manderson and Inglis (1985), for example, claim that few diasporic Turkish fathers were involved in child-rearing generally (p.201) due to practical reasons including coming home from a hard day’s work in the factory too late, but also because of having to maintain ‘respect and deference’ for the fatherly ‘authoritarian image’ (p. 202).

⁸⁸ This vision of a strictly gendered ideal of parenthood is grounded in the family model described by Stirling (1965). In this account, the Turkish village was composed of distinct patrilineal and patrilocal households that were headed by the eldest men. The man was socially responsible for his household, which included his wife, his married sons and their wives, his unmarried sons and his daughters. The family was a socio-economic unit with a hierarchical structure based on gender and seniority, and in which authority was maintained through control and ownership. The father was socially responsible for the behaviour of all members of the household. Other researchers, however, have claimed that this ‘system’ was more an ideal, something to aspire to, rather than the standard. They argue that, even in Turkish villages, this notion had been transformed through the agentic actions of mothers who were generating influence through their sons. For example, Mackie (1983, 5), citing Kiray (1976, 262), describes the role of mother–son alliances in forcing fathers to accept new values and behaviours. Nonetheless, universal interference in daughters’ lives remained the norm, as older research participants growing up in (and prior to) the 1960s/1970s demonstrate.

good woman-bride-mother, perpetuating a ‘good family brand’ and demonstrating the family’s Turkishness.

However, it is important to note that, while the claims above might evoke an image of unloving, uncaring and cold fathers, this was certainly not the case. My older informants conveyed that their fathers were loving and affectionate to them, albeit strict and uncompromising when it came to *namus* morality and values. Thus, rather than expressing affection towards their children, authoritarian relationality emphasises the public, outwardly facing aspect of *namus*. It focuses on the need to constantly ‘maintain face’ and demonstrate self to others, showing that one measures up to the community’s ideals of masculinity and femininity, in order to achieve the parental aim of facilitating an existentially good life for the family. The following two narratives demonstrate this tension between affection and masculinity through observation of what Elley (1985) described as ‘an affectionate but subservient relationship’ between fathers and daughters.⁸⁹ *Türkiyeli* Bengi (45) said:

My dad was really strict. He was our god. Me and my sisters, we used to bring him slippers and water every day when he came home from work and waited when he started talking to us. We knew he loved us, but we were also scared of him. We’d never ever imagine doing something against him. He always told us that he never wanna hear anything bad from our in-laws when we get married. He could not stand if someone cursed him, saying that he had raised a bad girl. As my father’s daughter, I am holding the family pride, and you know they have to be the best all the time. I am obliged to do things right. People need to say that I am my dad’s daughter and that I am married and that I fit the new family well, that I made such a great bride. My dad used to tell us

⁸⁹ Male-female relationships within the family were, in the 1980s at least, characterised by respect, deference and avoidance. Respect must be continually shown to all of one’s elders, regardless of their gender. The greatest respect must be paid to the eldest male members of the family. One of the key aspects of this respectful display is the segregation between males and females (Elley, 1985, p. 27)

“your in-laws have to come to me and thank me for raising you perfectly”. Maybe that’s why I was overly good to my husband’s family. To make my dad proud.

In contrast, the recollections of second-generation *Türkiyeli* Ceyda (50) painted a similar picture, however, her father’s authoritarian parenting damaged their relationship. Her parents eloped from their respective villages, briefly living in Ankara before migrating to Australia in the late 1960s. Ceyda shared:

My grandma’s heart was broken because it was a big *namus* thing. They were from a small village and everyone was talking about them. She said, “I hope you’ll experience the same with your children, so you understand how much pain you have caused me.” [...] Well, even though my parents married out of love, my father was very controlling. My mum wouldn’t even step outside the house without my father having to know about it. She was dependent on him, not having her own income. I couldn’t stand it. Until today, I don’t feel respect for my father for it, but it was part of our culture – those men believed that they had to have control over their families, and they did it through fear. It was his *namus* to show that he was in control.

Mothers specifically carry moral responsibility for the behaviour of their daughters as they are the ones entrusted with teaching ‘womanly morals’. Given the collective aspect of *namus*, which is central to the family’s sense of moral unity, in situations where a daughter is gossiped about as immoral, the mother’s feminine *namus* can be damaged. Divorced mothers in particular tend to be self-conscious as they are already in a state of moral liminality⁹⁰ This was the issue for Australian-born *Alevi* Kamile (31). Her parents divorced when Kamile was little. Unfortunately, Kamile was sexually assaulted in her early twenties by a well-known

⁹⁰ See discussion on divorcée stigma in Section 5.6.

man in the community that she had considered a friend. She confided in her mother as they had always been very close. However, even though she was empathetic and supported her emotionally, Kamile's mother strongly discouraged her from reporting the assault to the police for fear there would be social ramifications that would affect them both. When I asked what she meant by this, Kamile explained that

People would gossip. They would tell you how sorry they feel for you in your face, but behind closed doors, they would gossip. Some of them might say that I asked for it as I went to his house. [...] They would definitely say something about my mum bringing me up alone. But I'd be forever 'that girl who got raped'. My mum wanted to save me from all that.

The external pressure on parents to be perceived as in control (fathers) and as having instilled good values in their children (mothers) created tension and anxiety that often played out internally within the family. Especially in significant matters such as marriage arrangements, disobeying or disregarding one's parents could create a significant family crisis. The consequences of such actions are, however, situational and range from temporarily strained relations, through temporary cessation of communication, to total ostracism. Although cases of violence and even honour killing have been recorded in Turkish diasporas across Europe, I have not encountered any direct or indirect accounts of this during my fieldwork with Turkish Australians. In the relations provided by my informants, the best outcomes saw impaired family relationships reinstated, while in the worst cases family members remained estranged. Two scenarios, related by Australian-born Turkish Cypriot Sevgi (47) and *Türkiyeli* Deniz (24), illustrate this diverse range of possible scenarios.

Sevgi has two sisters. She and the middle sister entered into arranged marriages with the consent of their parents. However, their younger sister Gül had other ideas. During a visit

with her aunt in London, she fell in love with a man of African heritage and wanted to marry him. The father was categorically against it and warned her that if she went ahead with the marriage, he would never talk to her again. Gül did marry the man and, true to his word, her father ceased communication with her although other family members kept in contact. Gül stayed in London with her husband. Sevgi recounted the painful situation:

When my sister called home and my father answered the phone, he just hung up on her. So Gül had to try her luck calling again later, hoping that my mum, my sister or I would answer the phone [...] It was very hurtful and stressful on the whole family because my mum stood right in between them. She was her daughter after all. However, when Gül came with him to Australia for a visit, she didn't bring him home. She came on her own and he waited in a hotel. It wasn't a happy time. But they [Gül and her father] talk now because her marriage broke down a few years ago.

In contrast, Deniz's (24) father, Mustafa (50), experienced a very different fallout with his family in the 1980s. The issue was not that Mustafa wanted to marry someone non-Turkish, his Maltese fiancée even came to live with him in the family home. Rather the issue arose when he stopped contributing to his sister's dowry (*çeyiz*) claiming that he needed the money to save for his own house so he could start a family. The couple soon moved out as the relationship with his sister became strained and, apparently, his fiancée, as a *gelin* and the newest member of the household, bore the brunt of her anger (see Kandiyoti, 1988). When Deniz was born, his mother and sister came to visit but another fight broke out after they called Mustafa's newly born daughter 'that *yabancı* child'⁹¹ and he threw them out. Neither side attempted to reconcile as they each considered themselves the offended party and they never spoke again. Mustafa's parents died only a few years before the fieldwork took place

⁹¹ A derogatory term for 'foreign' or 'foreigner's' child.

and Deniz recalled that her father went through quite a painful reckoning after learning about their deaths from an elderly Turkish man who approached him at a shop to express his condolences. Mustafa particularly regretted that he had not reconciled with his father who, he believes, was innocent in the conflict.

To better understand what happened, we must assess the dispute in relation to the context within which family members based their judgement of right and wrong. The whole family, including all siblings, were expected to work together to ensure that all family members were provided for existentially, the level of need was then determined by gender and social order. According to the traditional arrangement practised by many households in their parental village, brothers were expected to contribute towards their sister's dowry (*çeyiz*) to ensure that she was a sought-after bride and could 'marry well' and early because the brothers would inherit the property later. Therefore, the family perceived Mustafa's actions as selfish and disloyal and as a betrayal of what they considered his moral obligation. However, having been born in Australia and, thus, having grown up in between competing moral discourses, Mustafa did not feel any particular affinity with the somewhat outdated norms maintained by his family, that is, he did not feel compelled to *do things right*. Rather, from his perspective, his moral obligation was to provide for his new family. *Doing the right thing* was more important and urgent than continuing to fund his sister's future in Australia where she could, he believed, get herself a job.

In the patriarchal family hierarchy that shapes ideals of masculinity in the manner described above, it is not the father's place to reach out for reconciliation and doing so may cause him to lose the respect of others and pride in himself. However, Mustafa did not believe that it was his mistake, after all, it was his sister and mother who had disrespected him and his wife by calling his baby daughter names. As Deniz explained, 'once you're out, they'd rather die than ever talk to you again, because they think that it's your disgrace, not theirs.' While

conflict arising from disloyalty is neither a cultural nor an intergenerational crisis of morality, it is a crisis of compassion that demonstrates an inability to see situations from different perspectives, from that of the self and that of the other.

Issues surrounding empathy, unprocessed emotions and ambiguous feelings about growing up were a common theme in the narratives of my older Australian participants' who were raised under authoritarian dynamics. They often mentioned feeling isolated, diminished, belittled, inadequate, guilty and scared as a direct and indirect result of their exposure to this parenting style. This fits with the second-generation *Alevi* Sevgi's (46) experience. She remembers fighting with both of her parents while growing up. She described her relationship with her father as complicated for although there was love, she was also scared of him as he was very strict. Her interaction with her mother used to be upsetting at times too. The issue Sevgi had with her mother was that although Sevgi saw her as caring and she would always make time to listen to her daughter's problems, she would never take any action on her behalf. Sevgi related:

So, they [our parents] expected us to behave in a certain way, but they failed to guide us towards it through explaining. Not being allowed to go anywhere might sound like a smallish thing, but when growing up, it meant a lot to me. I felt left out, powerless, diminished and not trusted. [...] Although I often rebelled and fought for certain things, I thought they would love me more if I did what I thought they wanted me to do. So, I ignored my feelings and did what they wanted me to please them.

Nevertheless, Sevgi grew into a self-assured, academically and professionally successful woman. Her parents valued education highly, despite only having elementary level education themselves. Sevgi was allowed to move to Melbourne to pursue university studies with

another girl from their tight-knit diasporic community in a small regional Victorian town. She recalled:

My father wanted me to study as he knew that without it, he would close the future's doors for me. [...] I will never forget when he dropped me off in the flat, which they rented with the father of my friend for us. He said that if he hears something bad, I am immediately back home. I was scared, so I didn't even dare to do anything. At some point, I realised that to live my life truly, I needed to get out of the influence of my parents. I knew it wouldn't be easy, but I didn't want to throw my life away by living according to how my parents wanted me to. But I understand why they were like that. It was a difficult life change for them, and they just wanted the best for us. I don't hold any grudges against them. It's just the process of growing up would be much easier if they weren't so strict and rigid.

It seems that authoritarian parenting might be, on the one hand, an oft-times successful means of achieving several goals: maintaining protective control over a child, socialising them to become a dutiful member of the 'community', continuing a good family name, preserving cultural identity and heritage in the diaspora and, of course, preventing teenage pregnancies. Yet, on the other hand, the personal relationships between parents and children, and the psychological processes concerned with self-worth in individuals, often suffer in these scenarios. Children raised in authoritarian families are not afforded the opportunity to process rules effectively through understanding and internalising the logic behind the imposed requirements. Furthermore, parents, especially fathers, are not allowed to express their real emotions freely. In short, while authoritarian relationality supports cultural survival in the diaspora and creates dutiful and respectful members of society, it also inhibits the process of individuation.

6.3 Authoritative Empathetic Guidance: Raising a Better Person Through Understanding, Leadership and Affection

It is apparent that authoritarian relationality between parents and children was not the norm in all families within the Turkish Australian diaspora, even in the early days. While authoritarian parenting might have dominated in the public sphere for the reasons stated above, some parents acted differently, for example, by offering greater leniency and accommodating children's desires in the privacy of their homes. As dependence on the Turkish community diminished, the need to appear in control and respected gradually dissipated, transforming the situation for the children further. Therefore, I now turn my attention to a parenting approach that can be called 'authoritative empathetic guidance'.

Even though there is still a hierarchical relationship between parent and child, the imposed and unquestionable authority of the authoritarian style is replaced by authority gained through the parent's compassionate leadership. Narratives referencing this parenting approach included clear ideas about how children should behave, however, the ideas were instilled in the children through dialogue and explanation. The objective was to develop the child's emotional well-being and facilitate a better experience, rather than eliminating discipline. Instead of imposing rules, parents guide their children towards what is believed to be right. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this parenting approach does not usually promote any changes in sexual morality, and the idea that daughters need to be protected is still prevalent.

'Authoritative empathetic guidance' featured in the parenting style of the first-generation Turkish Cypriot Ekrem (75). In our chat about *namus* morality, she started explaining how she had distanced herself, as a mother, from some of her contemporaries whom, she believed, had 'forced or manipulated their daughters to marry someone they did

not want, just to prove their authority'. While Ekrem felt morally obligated to provide 'protection' [as an analogy to parental guidance, leadership, direction] to her daughter, she was committed to supporting her emotional development. She believed that the best way to achieve this was to let her daughter make her own informed decisions and give her unconditional parental love. Ekrem explained:

Girls, when they mature, you have to protect them. You have to tell them right and wrong. [...] You cannot just give your 15 years old daughter a condom and let her go out. You just tell her right and wrong and let her think. She can buy a condom herself if she wants to but I would not provide it to her as some Australian parents do. [...] On the other hand, if a girl starts rebelling, it means that she wants her freedom. You have to give that person freedom and love. Always. It doesn't matter what she or he does. Even if they rebel or do wrong things, you have to give your children love. Still, it's your child. You have to protect her because she needs your help. Nobody else will help that child. Only the mother and father care. [...] My husband thinks the same. When my husband bought this house in this part of the town, our children were still in elementary school. But he was already thinking about them going to university, so they have it closer. And this young man told my husband, I wish my father was thinking like this when I was growing up. Some people in the community think bad. It's silly and uneducated.

Since the 1970s and 1980s when Ekrem's husband represented something of 'an exception to the rule', father-child relationality seems to have undergone a more substantial change. It is reasonable to suggest that, at least for some men, the authoritarian 'look' has been losing its appeal. Displaying firm control over one's family no longer seems to bolster fatherly masculine *namus* as much as it did before. This may well be related to the shifting

ideals of masculinity proposed in the previous chapter. In contrast, there is an indication that showing compassionate, loving and accommodating fatherly care is positively endorsed both within the community and in broader society. Turkish Australian fathers have also been increasingly involved with their children in terms of everyday care. Some fathers seem to have realised that ‘soft power’ is more effective and psychologically beneficial than the unquestioned imposition of rules. Turkish Australian parents seem to be achieving more effective parenting through guiding, leading by example, explaining and engaging in more open discussions about conflicting moral issues. The following case demonstrates this kind of father-daughter relationality.

Serkan (43) is an engineer who relocated to Australia with his wife Bengi (39) and teenage daughter Melis (14) ten years ago. Their aim was to pursue more secure working conditions and expand the future life possibilities for their daughter. Although he has not been able to secure work in his field and has, therefore, worked in menial jobs, he does not complain as he is still able to pay for Melis’ private school. Their ultimate family plan is to return to Turkey once Melis graduates from university, hopefully with a medical degree, allowing her to gain ‘a global and cosmopolitan advantage’ in Turkey. In addition, all three family members feel drawn to Turkey and its ‘better sense of community and friendship’.

All decisions in their ‘family team’, as he endearingly calls it, are made for Melis’ bright future. Thus, he explained: ‘How can she understand what is good and bad for her future now? I need to guide her as she is still a child. We often talk with my wife and my daughter together.’ Serkan told me that his foremost life purpose is to make his wife and daughter happy and he loves them both more than himself. He emphasised that, while he has his ideas about what is right for his daughter, he would never force her to do anything that she does not want to do. Instead, he explains and discusses issues and ideas with her, something Melis confirmed when I spoke with her independently. She said that they often talked about

anything and everything, and she felt supported and encouraged in that she could ask him for advice on anything.

I witnessed actions supporting these words on various occasions, but one situation particularly stands out. One day, I was sitting with Serkan in the café where his wife Bengi works, while he was waiting for Melis to arrive from school. We had been talking about various topics and, when Melis arrived, I asked him if he could explain what *namus* meant. I wanted to see how he would react in front of his teenage daughter given he claimed he was open and there was no topic that he would not discuss with her. Taken by surprise at first, he seemed to brush the question off by saying that ‘it’s just an old concept’ and diverted the conversation away from the topic. Later, when Melis went to the bathroom, Serkan sat closer to me and explained, whispering, why he was hesitant to answer in front of Melis. ‘You know, young girls like her don’t know about it yet’, Serkan started, trying to read in my face why I had asked about *namus*. I was not sure whether his initial hesitation stemmed from a sense of shyness or inappropriateness because the topic was typically discussed between women, between mothers and daughters, or whether it was because he wanted to protect his daughter from a topic that may corrupt her or harm her reputationally if someone overheard our conversation in the Broadmeadows café. I explained this and after Melis returned, we continued talking about other matters. Suddenly, Serkan decided to open the *namus* topic again, this time with Melis at the table. It soon became evident that Melis already knew about ‘the sexual feminine element of *namus*’, as she explained, they discussed it at Sirius college during young girls’ group meetings called *sohbets*⁹². While it was a challenging topic for Serkan, he patiently answered our questions, and I observed the bonding effect between them. Melis appreciated that her father, whom she looked up to, had invited her to talk about an

⁹² *Sohbets* are ‘community’ meetings where various issues concerning everyday life are discussed. They are gender and age separated. They fulfil an important educational function by transferring ethical values such as social justice, tolerance, benevolence and respect (UNESCO, 2010).

‘adult topic’. Serkan then addressed the topic of *namus* from his fatherly and manly perspective:

If I saw Melis with a guy, I’d ask her who he is straight away. It’s because I want to protect her. I need to know who the guy is and test him first. It is a man’s duty to protect his family. If something bad happened to my wife and my daughter, I’d feel ashamed for the rest of my life. I’d feel guilty that I did not prevent it from happening to her. It’s not a feeling of ownership. It’s coming from pure love. And that’s how vulnerable we’re as men, because of our love for our family. Why didn’t I shield you from this before this happened?

I could tell from Serkan’s explanation of *namus* that he was aware of the discourse deeming *namus* a device through which Turkish men controlled women.⁹³ Serkan’s justification of his moral duty to protect his daughter and wife reflected a level of tension that, perhaps, stemmed from trying to avoid being judged in such a way, not only by me but also by his own conscience. He sought to justify his protectiveness through the classical definition of masculine *namus*,⁹⁴ as something arising from a place of affection rather than a place of control or ownership. Whether the former or latter was more influential is not important here, rather, it is the fact that he felt the need to highlight the difference. This indicates that some Turkish men are reflecting on the voice of the Turkish women who are critical of the gendered nature of *namus* morality. Furthermore, as fathers, these men are attempting to accommodate the critique into their relations with their daughters and their plans for their daughters’ futures.⁹⁵

⁹³ See Chapter One and also Sections 3.5 and 3.6.

⁹⁴ See Section 1.3.

⁹⁵ See Section 5.4.2 for Serkan’s hopes for his daughter’s future.

Parents like Ekrem and Serkan prefer to create a mutual and more accommodative relationality with their children. Instead of controlling and ‘protecting’ them through fear, they employ trust and mutual responsibility as devices to achieve the desired parenting outcomes. This mechanism is also used by parents who seek to be more permissive and less conservative or who aspire to have a more friend-like relationality with their children. By demanding honesty from their daughters in exchange for trust, parents can gather a broader and deeper scope of information about potentially dangerous situations in which their daughters might find themselves. As a result, they can mitigate potential repercussions on their daughters’ social and moral reputations. For instance, second-generation *Türkiyeli* Pınar (20) said:

My mother would say to me, “if you ever go out with your guy mates, you tell me, so I don’t hear it from others. Because if I do [hear from others], I can say that I knew about it, and I can have your back. But if I hear from someone else, and you hid it from me, you are in trouble.”

Parent-child relationality based on mutual trust and honesty, through which daughters gain various liberties, also featured in the relationship between Australian-born *Alevi* Kamile (32) and her mother, who raised Kamile and her two brothers alone. Kamile characterised their relationship as ‘having each other’s back’ and illustrated her claim quite jokingly through a scenario from her school years. She recalled:

When I was a school kid, there was a lot of peer pressure. It was very popular to wag school amongst the cool kids and because I wanted to be one of the cool kids, I wanted to wag school too. But I was scared that I [would] get caught. So, I went to my mum and told her about it, so she knew. I told her that she would drop me off at school in the morning, but I wouldn’t go to school. She laughed at me and thanked me for telling her.

She kissed me and I got permission to wag the school. We went to Crown to play bowling, but my brother found out from his friend whose sister was with us. He came to me and challenged me in front of our mum. I was the good girl in the family, so he was happy that, for once, there was something on me. My mum had to fight not to laugh and then she told me off in front of him to keep her face. I was glad that I had told her earlier. I would be in so much trouble with my mum otherwise.

Parents' increasing focus and emphasis on their daughters' emotional welfare during the individuation process has promoted the decoupling of woman's worth from the strictly gendered behavioural expectations. While I will examine Australian-born mothers in greater detail in the next section, here I want to draw attention to the important role that some of the Turkish fathers have been playing in cementing this change for their daughters. While this claim still requires further investigation, we can observe that Serkan and Aykan's stances stand out prominently and expand the diverse landscape of Turkish Australian fatherly approaches and masculinities. By treating their wives lovingly in front of their daughters, fathers can create a healthy pattern of relational intimacy for their children's relationships. In Serkan's words: 'I want to set an example, so Melis knows how she should be treated by her husband one day.'

In a number of the young households, I was invited to, I observed partners sharing chores and fathers dedicating time to playing with their children. One of the informants, Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Aylin (19) praised her parents' relationship and her father's involvement in house chores:

My parents are always together, and they do everything together. My dad actually cooks more than my mum. I think that it's because he wants to show me that when I get

married one day, it is not only a woman who has to take all the pressure of caring for a household. After all, a man has to do his part too.

When I asked her father, Aykan (42), about it, he explained that when he was growing up in Sydney, he never saw a man in his family even crack an egg and that both his parents used to oppose the idea of him cooking at home. His mother used to tell him that his wife would do it for him one day. However, the idea never appealed to him. He was looking for a friend in his wife, not a housewife, and he enjoyed cooking more than she did as well. According to Aykan, everyone should be able to enjoy different things and no one should be forced to participate in activities they do not enjoy.

Thus, although the authoritative empathetic guidance parenting style has been present since the first Turkish immigrants arrived in Australia – as Ekrem’s case demonstrates – its influence has grown and it has, perhaps, even become the dominant parenting style in the Turkish Australian diaspora in recent years. This may have come about because of the decreasing pressure on fathers to maintain the appearance of being in control over their family and increasing encouragement for them to publicly express their caring side. In addition, more and more diasporic parents have become less dependent on what other Turks think of them. They have more opportunities to practice their culture and religion and to travel to Turkey, meaning they are less afraid of losing their cultural identity. Therefore, this is not a move towards unbounded permissiveness or the erasure of Turkishness. Rather, it is about finding a way to consider their children’s existential perspectives and foster their emotional wellbeing while instilling personal values that are, as discussed, in line with premarital purity, loyalty to a partner and respect for others while being considerate of children’s desires and perspectives and understanding of their mishaps.

6.4 Dialectical⁹⁶ Parenting of Second-Generation Mothers: Making the Past Wrongs Right to Better Daughters' Existential Experience and Futures

Our generation is different. Although we love our Turkish heritage and we want to continue our traditions, we are way more tolerant as parents. For example, our parents couldn't stand *de facto*, living out of wedlock, but we are ok with gay marriage.

(Ayten, 50)

While there had already been some early shifts in the relationality between Turkish first-generation migrant parents and their children, a more radical transformation occurred within the second generation, especially between the Australian-born mothers and their daughters.⁹⁷ Although highly subjective, the crux of the change appears to have arisen within a woman's lifelong individuation and emancipatory processes and is further driven by her effort to create a better existential experience for her daughter. Using their own lived experiences as a guide, respondents who were inclined to the change typically reported having negative experiences related to *namus* morality. In consequence, they wanted to protect their daughters from such situations. Many of these women imagined that this could be achieved by altering their relationship with their daughters. It is as if these mothers wished to rectify the past wrongs by refusing to replicate them in their own parenting and relationship with their daughters.

Significantly, rather than abandoning respective (*namus*) values, such as premarital virginity or fidelity to one man, the change occurred through improving how certain rules and values were communicated to their daughters. Instead of imposing rules or maintaining tradition, their attention turned to their daughter's particular perspective in the search for the

⁹⁶ I use the word *dialectic* in its general sense, in relation to a process in which contradiction between opposing sides leads to the creation of 'the synthesised new'.

⁹⁷ The second-generation families emerged during the late 1980s (Icduygu, 1993, p. 12).

best outcome for her holistic existential welfare, including her emotional experience. This change can also be observed in the shift from the parental moral modality of *doing things right* (being good parents according to tradition, identity, culture and other people in the ‘community’) to *doing the right thing* (being a good parent by adapting to one’s daughter’s particular situation).⁹⁸

In the second-generation mothers’ reformed approach to parenting, I draw attention to the dialectical process whereby two opposing viewpoints are brought into confrontation with each other in order to produce a synthesised outcome. I call this *dialectic parenting* and it can have two forms. First, I draw upon the Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis model of change over time. Australian-born Turkish mothers draw on their lived experiences, having been subjected to authoritarian parenting or to negative ramifications of community *namus* politics (*thesis*), to inform their conception of the opposing position (*antithesis*) and, by creating their own parenting style based on this juxtaposition (*synthesis*), they attempt to change their daughters’ experiences. Secondly, dialectic parenting involves using Plato’s (or Socrates’) dialectic method to create a dialogue between mother and her daughter so that they can work together to find a solution that synthesises both perspectives.

This concept is illustrated by the example of the second-generation Turkish Cypriot Kurban (46) who recalled growing up with numerous rules imposed on her by her parents that she perceived as constraints that had not been adequately explained. The rules were only justified with the warning, “What would the neighbours think if...”. She is now the mother of two daughters and, although she believes that a woman should preserve herself sexually for her husband, this is her parental request and wish for her daughters, rather than an obligation she imposes upon them. Kurban explained her reasoning by claiming that the well-being of her daughters was her top priority. According to Kurban, first sex is a unique event because of

⁹⁸ See Section 3.4 for the discussion on the moral modes of *doing things right* and *doing the right thing*.

its connection with intimacy and invested emotions. Thus, as far as her virginity was concerned, to preserve herself was *to do things right*, whereas when her daughters' virginity is concerned, it is about *doing the right thing* for their own well-being. She explained:

With me, it was all about what the neighbours would say, but now I don't really care what the community would say. What I care about is my daughters' welfare. There are more important things in life than what everyone else thinks because who cares? Who are they? They might be gossiping about others but at the same time doing the same. All I care for are my daughters. Unlike me, my daughters can socialise with boys. I trust that they won't do anything stupid. [...] I am not sure if they are virgins. They are not dating anyone, and I told them that I would prefer them to preserve themselves for their husbands because they will connect him to themselves. But what can I do? It is obviously up to them.

In contrast, second-generation Turkish Cypriot Esin (49) did not see things as quite so straightforward. Nevertheless, she also applied dialectic parenting, particularly the first form, to situations involving her son Berk (24) and daughter Mine (20). Esin describes her upbringing as very restrictive, even when compared to some of the other Turkish Cypriot girls of the same age, who were permitted to socialise with young Turkish Cypriots at the community youth club. Her marriage was arranged by her parents. When I met Esin, she was experiencing a moral dilemma regarding whether or not to allow her daughter to date, because she wanted to meet 'the right guy'. On the one hand, Esin was aware of the double standards that she and her husband applied to decisions concerning their daughter and son. While Mine could not even date, Berk was permitted to bring his girlfriend home to live with them without even being engaged. However, Esin was genuinely worried for Mine's wellbeing and what would happen should she meet 'the wrong guy'. Esin explained:

I know that Mine sees this as unfair the same way our generation saw it as unfair, but this is only because Berk and his girlfriend are serious about each other and that it is different for girls as they need to be more protected. It is not that she needs to be a virgin at the wedding anymore, but I don't want her to be taken for a ride by some guy who is not serious about her.

Initially, it may appear that Esin is simply reiterating the moral principles and parenting approach she internalised growing up. However, her approach is founded in a juxtaposition of the traumatic event she lived through and its consequences. When she was around Mine's age, she was deceived by a love interest with whom she was having a secret long-distance relationship through letters. While Esin considered the relationship genuine, the man was already engaged to another woman and was entertaining his friends by showing them her love letters. She suffered a nervous breakdown in the face of the gossip circulating around the Turkish Cypriot 'community'. In her justifications, Esin continued to draw on negative examples from her upbringing:

If I wanted to, I could have said that my son has to marry a Turkish girl and that she has to be from our village in Cyprus, which is what my father did to us. But, because of what I experienced in my life, that's why I'd like them to make the right choice about a life partner. But I won't stand against them either because I don't want them to suffer as I did. Besides, we took Berk's girlfriend in because she had a fight with her mother, who told her to leave and we couldn't just leave her on the street. Also, she has her own room.

In the course of discussing the moral aspects of the situation, Esin leant closer to me and whispered, so that her ageing parents in the next room could not hear her:

No one else knows about this as my parents wouldn't be happy about it and also others would gossip. It all makes me uncomfortable. So, I told my son that this is to help her out for a while, not to get used to it and also to be careful – that they are still too young to have children.

At the time I was wrapping up the fieldwork, Mine had been on a few dates after discussing the men with Esin and Berk had also become engaged to his girlfriend. He wanted to make things more official - primarily for their grandparents' sake. After all, as his girlfriend was not Turkish, the gossip would not be as fierce as if Mine had brought a man home this way. I remained in touch with the family beyond the research and, several years later, Mine finally met the 'right guy' and I was invited to her wedding.

The general notion expressed in this collection of accounts, that daughters need to be more 'protected' than their brothers, has its dissenters among second-generation mothers. According to these women and their personal experiences, 'protection' places girls in a sheltered position, reducing their social experience and rendering them naive and unprepared to cope with the complexities of life. For example, second-generation *Alevi* Sevda (46) also has a daughter and a son. She uses openness and dialogue in her own parenting approach as she believes her children will be better equipped for life if they have exposure to other people and ideas. She stated:

I understand that protecting girls used to be essential back in times when women used to be kidnapped and raped, but today in twenty-first century Australia, this is no longer an everyday threat. Some people in the community need to realise that and let go of their paranoid fears. On the contrary, I think this is the worst any parent can do to their daughters. Such women are then easily manipulated, and it takes a lifetime to learn that not all people are good.

A similar sentiment was expressed by second-generation *Türkiyeli* Gunes (35) who believes that it is essential for a young woman from a minority background to socialise and interact with different people. She believes young women need to ‘learn how to deal with certain situations’ to secure their ‘good future’ and safety. She explains:

If you grow up that naïve, you think everyone is like your family or your circle of friends. You need to get out there and learn the good and bad. We all need to learn from failures and issues. We all need to grow as individuals. So, what is this protection for? I think it used to be a way to control us. But I don’t believe in that personally.

Moreover, the issue of arranged marriage, of deciding whom to marry, as discussed in Chapter 5, featured repeatedly in the positions taken by second-generation mothers. Even though they might have lived in happy arranged marriages and had various opinions about whom their daughters should marry, they tended to emphasise that they would not make such decisions on behalf of their children. As in the accounts about dating, the reasons behind the attitudes towards marriage arose from either personal experience or witnessing others’ struggles. This was the case in the narrative of second-generation *Türkiyeli* Gulsen (48), mother of Filiz (20), who married an Italian. Gulsen stated that she would not object to her daughter marrying a non-Turkish man provided that she was happy in the relationship. She also stated:

If she doesn’t [marry a Turk], then she doesn’t. I won’t make her as our father did to us. But it would be nice if she did because it makes it easier for us to continue our culture and traditions. The same with her going out. I have to trust her that she is not doing something bad. I don’t believe in restrictions because then it only creates a desire to break free. I would not love her less if she slept with someone before marriage. I would not be happy about it, but I would not shun her. Definitely not.

In parallel, some second-generation mothers are able to accommodate the idea of their daughters socialising with ‘guy mates’, male friends. This is, often, a stark contrast to their own coming-of-age experience when there was little tolerance of girls socialising with boys. For example, Ayse (45) stated:

I understand her because she says guys are easier to get along with as friends. Girls are just too bitchy. So, she can talk to a guy as a friend, nothing romantic or anything involved. [...] My husband can't understand that a girl can be friends with a guy without anything going underneath. I think it's because he's stuck in time when he was there, which was in the 1980s.

As second-generation mothers have grown up exposed to different perspectives on morality and have experienced the pressures associated with it, they tend to possess a greater capacity for empathetic insight and tolerance. Consequently, this predisposes them to better understand the situations that their daughters might be experiencing. In contrast to their first-generation mothers, they are better equipped to reconcile contested views, such as those regarding sexual morality, and thus, to facilitate their daughters' smooth transition into adulthood. Second-generation Australian-born Turkish mothers seem less likely to cling to one perspective. Instead, they prefer to communicate their personal expectations to their children by engaging in dialogue with them. This type of parenting is supportive and enabling rather than prohibitive. In a process that we can refer to as ‘retrospective dialectical reckoning’ or ‘making the past wrongs right’, the mother recounts a prominent event from her past and contrasts it with the imagined alternative, which she then applies to her parenting approach to the issue in question. The aim is to better their daughter's current and future experiences and, thereby, transcend her past self through reforming the trajectory in her

lineage. This is the ultimate moment where conscious action towards change occurs, which I will elaborate on, specifically in terms of radicality, in the next, and last, section.

6.5 ‘Namus doesn’t live here anymore’: Parents Who Distance Themselves from the Turkish Community and Heritage

The desire to live outside established ‘Turkish suburbs’ or ‘away from the Turkish ‘community’” seems to be a prominent part of finding solutions in the dialectic reckoning with one’s own past. In addition to the materialistic factors underlying ideation and the desire to leave previous childhood situations, personal negative experience of being subjected to *namus* politics or authoritarian parenting was another significant motive. ‘Not living fully up to their potential’, ‘not developing enough’, ‘struggling unnecessarily’ and ‘not expressing themselves’, were some of the feelings these mothers experienced and related to me. The radicality of the decision to change their daughters’ experience by breaking the connection with certain elements of their Turkishness was noteworthy. Growing up out of reach of the gendered moralising scrutiny of everyday behaviours, daughters were thought to develop into confident and self-assured women much faster and without the lengthy struggle their mothers experienced.

First-generation mother *Alevi Mutlu* (45) said that she does not want to live in ‘another Turkish village on the other part of the world’, which was compatible with her Australian-born husband’s yearning for ‘a fresh start somewhere away from the ‘community’, where everyone knows everyone’. Reflecting upon her own experience growing up, which she characterised as modest and constrained, Mutlu stated that her principal life and parenting objective was to bring her daughter Aliya up as an autonomous and confident person. She

believes that the right way to achieve this is to create safe conditions that will provide Aliya with the freedom to develop herself through exploring and experiencing life – something that Mutlu lamented not having done as she grew up. She explained:

The old rules were not right. So why would I inject it in my kids? I don't want my daughter not to trust in herself. I want her to find out what she wants to do in life and what is right and wrong in her own experience, not with my experience. This way, she will learn better because she will be responsible for her actions herself. Later, she will not blame me for making her do things the way I blame my parents. [...] I have been brought up the way that until twenty, when I got married, I couldn't decide for myself. Our parents were our gods, and we had to represent our family, so no one could say we were not good. Today I am forty-five, and I feel that I am still on a leash as I cannot even divorce my husband because I would lose them [her family, as they disapproved of the divorce]. That's the way we were raised, and we couldn't change it. But today, I live my youth again through Aliya. I love seeing her doing what I couldn't, and it makes me so happy. I want the best for my kids.

I observed that Mutlu's permissive parental approach was based on friend-like symbiotic dynamics between her and Aliya. They travel and spend their free time together, confide in each other and feel comfortable discussing personal details with each other. Aliya knows about her mother's existential and marital struggles, and Mutlu knew about Aliya's first boyfriend and when she started taking the contraceptive pill. She even helped keep it a secret from Aliya's father. Their level of intimacy, based on mutual trust and responsibility, has had beneficial outcomes for both of them. Aliya comes across as a strong, self-aware and kind, young woman who is wise beyond her years. Furthermore, she has her own opinions about many issues, in particular, the protection and welfare of animals.

Like many contemporary Turkish Australian mothers, Mutlu has been trying to pass values of premarital virginity onto her daughter. Regardless of her desire to keep her family away from the Turkish community and ‘the old morality’, she remains attached to *Alevism*. In addition to praying privately, she believes that women’s premarital virginity is part of the *Alevi* identity and that it is her responsibility to teach the value to her daughter. However, given her choice of parenting approach, she does not enforce it. Mutlu described her parenting approach thus:

We had some fights when Aliya was younger. And then I realised that I either control her but lose her or understand her and be best friends with her. So, when I talk, I am right. When she talks, she is right. I prefer her telling me than doing something behind my back. She is a beautiful soul who enjoys her life. So, I allow her to do it.

Aliya told me that although she attended Turkish primary school, she cannot speak Turkish, she had never been interested in her Turkish heritage and that her relationship with her paternal grandparents who live in Coburg, Melbourne was distant. She stated:

I want to create my own life path. My mum couldn’t do anything like what I can, back in Turkey, and that’s why she let me do so many things. When looking at my photos on Facebook, even women in her family say they wished to have the type of life. I think my mum likes that because I am living her dream.

However, things changed somewhat after Aliya graduated with an arts degree and travelled to Turkey with her mother and friends. After returning from the trip, I noticed that her attitude to her Turkish heritage changed. She talked excitedly about what interested her in *Turkish* culture and said she regrets not having discovered it earlier.

Similarly, Australian-born Turkish Cypriots Zeyneb (50) and her husband Erol (54) made a conscious effort to raise their two sons ‘away from the Turkish ‘community’’, to the extent that their son Berk (24) stated that he did not have any Turkish friends except cousins and the rest of the family. Zeyneb’s narratives were infused with references to her somewhat problematic relationship with the Turkish community while growing up in the 1980s. However, it was the prospect of gaining existential advancement for her two sons that motivated her dissent. Zeyneb associated such advancement with cultural assimilation into the broader Australian society. In her words:

I didn’t want my kids to feel less than perfect just because they have a second language. They are Australian born. I didn’t want them to feel less than other Australian kids or being bullied like my generation was because we were different.

Her son Berk, however, flippantly remarked:

Actually, we had the best of both worlds because mum raised us like that. But then we would spend five days a week with our grandma and her house is like a little Turkish embassy. So we definitely got our portion of the Turkish influence. My grandma is the ultimate Turkish patriot.

What Zeyneb struggled with growing up was, as she put it, ‘her mother’s exaggerated care for what people in the community think about them’ and also her ‘unnecessary boasting’. Her son Berk confirmed that it had been behaviours associated with community *namus* politics that both parents could not stand. Thus, they made an extra effort to raise their kids to possess a compassionate sense of moral responsibility for others, to readily stand up against injustice, and, at the same time, to remain confident in their own self-worth. Berk stated:

I couldn’t care less [about *namus* politics]. That’s how mum, and also dad, raised us.

Because she had all these pressures on her when she was younger, so she did her best to

shield us from the same pressure. [...] Dad has always given me the attitude that as long as I pay my dues to society and my family, then what people think of me doesn't really matter. [...] I don't believe that some rules made by others should define your life.

Berk studies teaching and his younger brother social work. I could observe friend-like dynamics, especially between Zeyneb and the boys. Berk often discusses various ethical issues with his mother, and they like to challenge each other when they disagree. However, they both agree that, as her sons, they have always had 'a choice within reason'. On the one hand, their mother has guided them on what is right and wrong. On the other hand, ultimately, they were left to make their own decisions instead of being told what to think or do.

It seems that, while the idea of living away from the 'Turkish 'community'' brings a sense of advantage or breaking free for some of the 'leavers', others seem to yearn for a sense of belonging. This element was present in the story narrated earlier about the breakdown in relations between Australian-born *Türkiyeli* Mustafa (50) and his family. As a consequence of the gossip and shame caused to everyone in the family, Mustafa left Sydney for Melbourne with his young family. However, just as many young Turkish Australians of his generation (born and growing up in the 1970s and 1980s) experienced, Mustafa already had a complicated relationship with his Turkish identity. Growing up he felt somewhat self-conscious and, at times, even ashamed of his Turkish background. His wife, of Maltese origin, stated that when they met, he introduced himself to her using an English name, Peter. Today, despite it being something to tease her husband about, she understands why he did it. As she said, in their youth 'growing up a wog was not something many young people would boast about', so he thought that an English name would appeal to her better.

In contrast, their daughter Deniz (24) stated that she always felt that her dad ‘lived with some kind of a loss in his heart that was beyond the fact of losing his family’. Even though he cut all ties with anyone Turkish he knew, he wanted his daughters to learn Turkish culture, music and language. So, he enrolled Deniz and her sister Liza in a Turkish college, where they both struggled to fit in. Eventually, they changed school. Deniz stated:

My dad is more Australian. But he tries to hold on to it [Turkishness] like there is no tomorrow. He’s like tugging on this rope that doesn’t even have another end anymore. It’s finished because both my sister and I don’t follow any of that. My mum just did it to make dad happy and now he’s the only one. And he is still trying. [...] I could see his struggle. He wanted to be like everybody else [referring to his problematic identity issues growing up] but now, because he is a dad, he wants to hold on to telling these things. That’s all he knows, and it gives him security. He’s got daughters and they have to be good girls. You know that’s an expectation from the community on him and also within himself.

Deniz said that growing up with the story of his dad’s fallout with his family made her strongly dislike her Turkish heritage to the point that she could not stand dealing with Turkish people, particularly in her school, at all. She needed out. Like her dad, she was ashamed of the *namus* morality principles, gossip, authoritarianism, intrusion, judgmental attitudes and so on. However, she found eventually her way into her Turkish heritage through music and art. After some time, she made peace with and has even grown to appreciate her heritage. Regardless, she does not socialise with anyone Turkish beyond her uncles’ family.

6.6 Conclusion

Throughout the last chapter, I explored the shifting relational dynamics between parents and children and the associated change in parenting styles as experienced and narrated by my informants across three family generations of the Turkish Australian diaspora. The aim was to see how the principle of loyalty to one's family and respect for its senior members, once the connection between the intergenerational transmission of culture and *namus* principles, interrelates with family relationships vis-a-vis the positionality of daughters within the family. Thus, I brought together matters discussed in previous chapters where second-generation Turkish women, now grown-up mothers, are consciously change aspects of *namus* morality through their parenting.

Gendered authoritarian, authoritative empathetic guidance and dialectical parenting are three terms that can be used to identify the dominant forms of such relationality. Although they are presented chronologically here, they can also be observed concurrently among different diasporic families. As a rather radical extension of what I refer to as a dialectical approach to parenting, I examined Turkish parents who decided to distance themselves and their families from Turkish communities, partly because of a negative experience with community *namus* politics. In their visions of a good future for their daughters, these mothers paint a picture without judgmental gossip that would inhibit a process of personal development into a confident young woman.

In *gendered authoritarian* relationality, daughters experience the positionality of a protege. In general, a protege is someone who is guarded, sheltered, and thus safe from possible harm, especially sexual advances by men. At the same time, however, my informants complained they felt unprepared to deal with the complexities of adult life because they were naive and trusting in their early years of adulthood. As a consequence, some of them

experienced being taken advantage of and thus suffered emotionally. In addition, it appears that this parenting style is relatively successful in bringing up responsible and dutiful adults who are often successful in their academic and career pursuits: this generates much pride for the parents. However, for the daughters, the process of growing up was often accompanied by difficult emotional experiences that often led them to question their self-worth.

In contrast, authoritative empathetic guidance, probably the most practised parenting style amongst diasporic Turks today, addresses issues related to healthy emotional development. While parents maintain their hierarchical authority over their children, they achieve it by building trust based on the empathetic consideration of their daughter's perspectives and desires. Using dialogue to explain their values, rules and expectations to their daughters, such parents seem to guide their children effectively towards the desired parenting outcomes while enhancing their daughter's experience and the parent-child relationship. Furthermore, this shift is not a move towards the 'Australianisation' of Turkish parenting as Australian parenting is perceived as permissive and as having abandoned the values of sexual morality. What stands out most in this parenting style is the shift in the relationality between fathers and daughters. It was suggested that this came about because of the decreasing pressure on fathers to appear in control of their families and increasing encouragement to publicly show their caring and kind side.

The dialectical style of parenting, specific to Australian-born mothers who have had negative experiences with authoritarian parenting or community *namus* politics, is twofold. Firstly, these mothers attempt to 'correct past wrongs' by avoiding reproducing them for their daughters. Secondly, they tend to use dialogue and negotiation when relating to their children. Their parenting tends to be more motivating and enabling than prohibitive, as it relies on one's capacity for empathetic insight. Through negotiation, these parents are willing to change and adjust their established values and practices. They are truly *agents of change*.

Finally, I explored a specific facet of dialectic parenting by focusing on parents who found more radical solutions for ‘bettering the past felt wrongs’ by rejecting some elements of their Turkishness in their pursuit of creating new experiential opportunities for their daughters. They attempt to radically change their children’s life trajectories by either cutting social ties with the Turkish diasporic community or by adopting permissive and friend-like parenting, which, in their eyes, contradicts the very essence of being Turkish. These parents, particularly mothers, sought to afford their children (especially their daughters), experiences that they once longed for themselves but could not realise because of various factors associated with being Turkish and being part of the Turkish diasporic ‘community’.

Notably, even though the immediate pressure on the girls to represent their family in front of other Turkish people has effectively disappeared, these parents still attempt to pass values and other elements of Turkish identity onto their children, including principles of virginity and fidelity. In doing so, some of them experienced emotions of relief, some experienced loss. Either way, in all examples, having described comparably more ‘liberated’ lifestyles, their children grew up to be multifaceted individuals who, despite struggling with their sense of Turkish identity, found various ways to reconnect with their cultural heritage. These parents and their families stand in contrast to the ‘community’-based expression of Turkishness and this mode of ‘elective identity’ maintenance in the diaspora merits further research although that would be well beyond the scope of this thesis.

Conclusion

This thesis explored the interconnections between the normative framing of morality and the agentic individualised deployment of its meanings that are made through the processes of subjective existential strategizing, in *being-in-the-world* in a sense of working towards a ‘good life’. Examining elements of subjective moral experience, Turkish Australian women have been engaged in shaping moral and social change despite (and often because) of high stakes involved in their everyday existential negotiations for themselves and their children. The thesis investigated how different generations of women within diasporic Turkish communities in Melbourne, Australia, deploy *namus* and construct discourses around *namus* morality, which presents an interesting opportunity to explore these interconnections. Indeed, I argued that *namus* is crucial to understanding the interaction between the collectively enforced existential mode of moral being and the subjectively differentiated existential strategizing. Furthermore, I argue that for the Turkish women who participated in this research, *namus* is a key part of the collective and personal repertoire that facilitates their positioning of self and others by framing their negotiations and navigations regarding their senses of self-worth and morality.

Below, I provide an *Overview of the Research*, highlighting the key findings in order to state the *Contributions and Significance of the Study* in the following section. I then proceed to outlining the *Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research*.

Overview of the Research

I conducted the fieldwork-based research among Turkish Australian individuals and communities of Sunni Muslim, *Türkiyeli*, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish *Alevi* background in Melbourne between 2014 and 2016. Although I engaged with both men and women and explored both male and female perspectives, this thesis focused primarily on women's perspectives as I was able to connect better with and gain more quality data from women on *namus* related issues. I used several techniques to access different research participants with various identity markers and possible perspectives. This breadth, combined with different data collection techniques, provided sufficient triangulation and a more robust empirical foundation for the arguments presented. I explored how these women construct their moral subjectivities and sensibilities in relation to their multivalent identities, relational attachments to *others* and *self* and the effects of community and broader social dynamics. I also specifically highlighted how these women bring about change within their own lives and the lives of their children. The focus on the second-generation women with ages ranging from their twenties to fifties highlights not only the compelling case of being socialised with different ideals and judgements about what constitutes socially sanctioned conduct, but it also alludes *the transition of diasporic namus* in time. Through their narratives of memories and accounts of 'how it was like' growing up in respective times in the Turkish diaspora, how it was being a daughter, becoming a wife, a mother and, in some cases, a divorcée. Most importantly, I examined how these women invent, locate and maintain a sense of worth, dignity and respectability for themselves and their daughters in relation to the changing relevance and meanings of *namus*. While acknowledging the substantial effects of certain 'big events' on the lives of Muslim diasporic communities, such as 9/11 and the 'war on terror' that followed together with global Islamophobia, my aim was to explore and capture broader changes and shifts in the fabric of gendered morality.

In terms of the analytic frames from which the collected data was approached, in eschewing ideas of unidirectional monolithic change, often described as ‘from tradition to modernity’, I presupposed that there would be some level of consistency and change at both the collective and individual levels. Despite this, the general pattern of temporal change did indicate a level of de-collectivisation and individuation of *namus*, particularly in relation to how it is deployed in subjective existential and other strategising, as well as in individual women’s milieus and spaces of engagement with others. While the agentic frame of *namus* emerges more strongly the longer a woman appears in the diaspora or when and where she was born, whether it is ‘a moral choice’ (in sense of both a self-constraint or emancipation) depends on the woman’s subjective belief and ideology about what is right in the pursuit of ‘a good life’.

Overall, I highlight the idea that *namus* is instrumental in a system of mutuality, that it is a means of acquiring moral capital that can be then used in sites of necessity, existential assistance, social engagement or to acquire a spouse through an arranged marriage. In the Australian Turkish diaspora, it seems that *namus* morality was initially used in this way because the migrants had a high level of existential reliance on their Turkish compatriots. Thus, *namus* morality helped to serve to generate practical, day-to-day existential provisions by substituting for the migrant’s lack of local social networks and cultural orientation in the foreign country that was now their home. The need to fit into the tight-knit Turkish diasporic community, where individuals and families were assessed based on their moral credibility, was reflected in the migrants’ existential anxiety. However, having gained better financial security and realised their long-term settlement in Australia, *namus* morality has become, primarily, a tool and a site of the cultural survival of the next Turkish generation in the diaspora. Today, while *namus* morality still remains an existential anchor amongst some Turkish diasporic people, *namus* morality has less influence over those with a broader range

of existential possibilities and greater independence. Instead, in second-generation families, *namus* has become subject to parental choice and values. On the individual level, broadly speaking, a woman's conceptualisation of *namus* and attitude to *namus* morality seem to be matters of choice and the site of her existential strategizing in her unique lived context and momentous life setting.

This brings us to the question to what extent does personal-level change have an efficacy in transforming the way in which *namus* operates within the Turkish diaspora communities. Individual experiences demonstrated in this thesis has indicated that not only second-generation Turkish Australian women have had an influence on how *namus* morality is reproduced in the next generation in the diaspora, further research considering male perspective of *namus* needs to be conducted to answer such question. It was argued that some second-generation parents, particularly mothers, have been driving the change through *dialectic parenting* of the next generation. Although it definitely has a significant efficacy to bring forward a fundamental change, there are other factors and agents that work towards continuity of *namus* morality. No less, as argued earlier, change is not a linear process.

In principle, the modality of early immigrants' existential strategizing through *namus* morality highlighted above was also influenced by the nature of their relationship with 'the host society'. While the primary focus of the thesis was not on intercultural relationships⁹⁹, the way broader Australian society perceives their Muslim minorities through certain

⁹⁹ Experiences of being stereotyped did feature in the narratives of my participants. In the transnational interconnected network of Turkish families, where part of one family resides in Australia, another part lives in Turkey or Cyprus and another part in, for example, England, Germany, or France, comparative data about the experience of people in the different locations paints an interesting picture. Notably, my participants in Australia typically felt less stereotyped than they perceived the extended family members living in Western and Central Europe to be. In general, Turkish people seem to occupy a different and more favourable position as an ethnic group in Melbourne, not only in comparison to their compatriots in Europe but also compared to other Muslims in Australia (see also Dawson, 2015). Arguably, this has come about because of the imagery of Turks that has been created through the different historical and political relationships, because of the different proximity to Turkey and, most importantly, because Australia seems to have a better relationship with its diasporic communities than most European countries have. I do recognise this is an overgeneralization, however, further discussion on the topic should be sought elsewhere as an in-depth analysis of these factors are beyond the scope of the present thesis. Instead, here, the broad shift in Australian society's overall approach to its minorities represented but one of the tangential influences on the internal shifts in the framing of *namus* morality.

attributed cultural, moral and other elements co-shapes the very sense of self-worth and how individuals hailing from such minorities experience belonging to their own ethnic identity and diasporic communities. The broad perceptions of *namus* shaped through reductionist accounts of honour-related gendered violence have proven to have ramifications on how my participants, as both Western and Turkish subjects, spoke and thought about *namus*, morality, dignity, self-worth, and identity. The influence of the contested discourse was often the unspoken force causing the awkwardness between me, a cultural outsider, and my new respondents.

Instead, here, the broad shift in Australian society's overall approach to its minorities represented but one of the tangential influences on the internal shifts in the framing of *namus* morality. Assimilationist pressure has incited a variety of responses within the Turkish community and is one likely factor that has contributed to the initial mobilisation of a heightened self-pride and self-determination, which resulted in the hyper-protectionism of cultural identity and pressure to sustain its preservation in their children born in Australia. As a further result, the children were exposed to a dual pressure that could, in extreme cases, motivate cultural self-isolationism or an aversion to one's Turkish heritage. However, in less extreme cases, individuals have managed to process these pressures through careful negotiation. Either way, assimilationist pressure does not usually succeed in its aim of promoting sameness. The continuing 'moral change' where parental constraints in some families were relaxed, and women's agency was strengthened seems to have been facilitated, beyond other factors, through diaspora-initiated cultural activities that alleviated a sense of existential anxiety. That is, having access to 'community'-led cultural, religious and educational institutions since the 1990s or frequent contact with Turkey since 2000s, helped to alleviate fear of 'losing culture'.

In Chapter One, I reviewed the key discourses and debates in four interwoven thematic segments of anthropological literature that relate to the topic of the thesis: (i.) constructs of (Muslim) womanhood, worth, positionality and oppression; (ii.) modesty and sexual chastity amongst Mediterranean and Muslim village communities; (iii.) constructs of Muslim subjecthood in the West post 9/11, with a particular focus on culture, gender and honour crimes; and (iv.) studies of Turkish communities in Australia. The aim was to contextualize the broader theoretical, ideological and praxeological perspectives within which the present thesis is embedded. In Chapter Two, I explained my approach to the research questions, described and justified the methodological design, and the approaches and methods used in the research. I outlined the research site, participant selection process, data collection, data management and analysis methods, ethical considerations, my reflexivity and positionality, and the challenges and limitations of the research.

In Chapter Three, I commenced by arguing that the discourse and framing of diasporic *namus* morality have generated cases of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic othering based on dynamics of exclusion and inclusion. The former is based on a shared sense of *ethnic moral identity*, which seems to be stronger in times of intensified existential anxiety, such as in the case of the early arrivals. The latter, in which *namus* morality is seen as a marker of an atavistic past, might revolve around a confused sense of belonging or a rejection of one's ethnic heritage out of shame. It seems that such shame was more frequently felt amongst older second-generation compared to the Turkish youth today. This might indicate the changing nature of the relationship that ethnic minorities have with broader Australia. However, this is a point of recommendation for further in-depth research as paying the due justice to this phenomenon, fell outside the scope of the thesis.

General tendencies of subjectification, individuation and de-collectivisation have become quite prominent in the Australia-born Turkish women's conceptualisations of *namus*

and although the term itself has almost faded from the vocabularies of younger women; the concept remains alive. Having once formed quite a fixed canon of respectability comprising of three interwoven moral imperatives – virginity, sexual fidelity and obedience to one’s parents – at the heart of Turkish women’s moral identity, these principles have now evolved into subjectively elective elements that share space with other, often more important, moral values, such as compassion, empathy, and humanity in a woman’s individualised sense of *personal moral identity*. These shifts are also reflected in the way women explained *namus*. While older Australian-born participants tended to explain *namus* through terms connoting collectivity, mainly as a tool for ‘saving face’ – in front of others or for others towards, younger participants’ were likely to allude to self, such as in ‘self-respect’, in their explanations.

Furthermore, I identified the expressions *doing things right* and *do the right thing* as two moral modalities that encapsulate how women relate to their Turkish heritage, phrases that circumvent the implied conflict between the free agency associated with women in Western cultures and the constraining structure typically attributed to Muslim cultures. They express a woman’s compulsion and motivation for acting in line with what is presented to her as right or what emanates from within her as right. They express how women relate to their worlds’ normative frameworks and their subjective desire to shape the existential processes that relate to both herself and the people she is responsible to and for. The two modalities – *doing things right* and *doing the right thing* – capture and express moral and existential beliefs that are related to the inherited normative framework and to self. *Doing things right*, based on how things have been done until now, is an incitement to continue and preserve the ways of one’s ancestors in the present and bring it to the future. It represents an attempt to preserve collectivity in an existentially insecure environment. In contrast, *doing the right thing* connotes the here and now and incorporates the notion of one’s individual and subjective

authenticity. The two modalities encompass a dimension of temporality. Specifically, they embody the *modus operandi* behind the perpetuation or change of social and moral conventions over time.

Notably, this development has a particular way of reframing the discourse, shifting it from a rigid and strict form of social control towards a more open form that enables women ‘now’, as distinct from ‘then’, to better express themselves as individuals. This shift over time, considered to be what has enabled this greater individual agency, places emphasis not only on the gradual life progression through a series of hierarchically powerful social positions – from virginal *gelin*, to loyal wife and mother, to autonomous *divorcée* – but also on judgements about the difference between those individuals who have successfully taken advantage of the social hierarchy and those who have not. For some women, *namus* morality can remain a framework of virtuous self-making, while for others, it represents oppression.

Nevertheless, there appears to be a united critical voice shared by women across subjectivities that is demanding the uneven burden put on women’s moral responsibilities for deeds and reputations of others be addressed. It challenges the collectivity of *namus* and suggests disassociating from the intertwined moral integrity of members of moral groups, such as families, towards individualised responsibility. Equally, they demand transcendence beyond the judgment of women’s moral integrity based on chastity and the direction of attention towards other personal moral qualities. The point of the shift is not to abandon the values of premarital virginity, relational fidelity or respect to parents, nor to demand selfish individuation but to refuse the judgemental involvement of others.

An interesting case is presented in a specific voice of some Australia-born, practising Muslim women who use *namus* as a tool to subvert the gendered double standards of morality that they locate in ‘culture’ instead of in Islam. Accordingly, they claim *namus*, as a religious concept, applies equally to both genders and aims to ‘to civilise’ people and elevate women’s

existential conditions. In these imaginations, Islamic *namus* was once a pure form of said moral principles that has been hijacked by ‘secular Turks’ or ‘cultural Muslims’ and has been misused as a tool of patriarchal oppression. These women express their opposition to Western and Kemalist modernisation projects and their echoes within the diaspora that manifest as attempts to minimise public religious expression and social influence.

In connection to boundary-making, what emerged was the notion of the spatiality of *namus* which resides in certain places in Melbourne, specifically in the sites that are the focus of Turkish communities. As such, these spaces are imagined as enabling or inhibiting personal expression, wellbeing and self-worth and are judged as either fit or unfit for an individual’s existential aspirations towards a good life and future. Due to the general differentiation of ideas about what it means to be moral, women are able to negotiate more effectively. One of the ways entails circumventing spaces, places and other people who are thought to contain *namus*. Some people avoid these places physically, other people digitally. *Namus* values do not disappear from families who are no longer under the imminent influence of *namus* community politics because of having moved to other suburbs. Turkish parents continue to pass the relevant values onto their daughters. However, parental enforcement and the daughters’ compliance become more a matter of individual choice and circumstances.

In Chapter Four, I explored the phenomenon of the shifting moral fabric of the intimate lives of Turkish diasporic youth through the *namus* principle of premarital sexual purity. For Turkish young women, the idea of socialising with boys has been described as heavily constrained. I argued that in the context of migrants’ anxieties relating to diasporic cultural survival, preserving one’s virginity despite growing up in the milieu of Australian youth culture, which is perceived as immoral, is also thought to demonstrate the woman’s capacity to *do things right* and pass Turkish values and culture onto future generations, either in Australia or back in Turkey. However, with the changing trajectories and aspirations of

individual women's lives, the framing and timing of first sex have changed. While for older Australian-born Turkish women, virginity was a precondition for a good marriage, most of current young second- and third-generation women can 'get away with' losing their virginity in one of their unmarried but committed relationships and preserving their virginity is more of a mother's wish for them than an enforced expectation.

Examining how various young research participants' have constructed the meaning of their first sexual experience and the values they place upon it, I have shown how the concept of virginity has transformed from being a matter of belonging to Turkish identity, family (representing family *namus*) or the search for 'the right man', to a matter of personal life experience and development. Regardless of construction, most of my participants made a strong claim that their virginity was their own business. This representation is founded in the most frequent themes in the narratives of this study's participants. However, there are, indeed, young Turkish women who still intend to preserve their virginity for marriage or feel strong pride about their virginity as a representation of collective and personal moral identity. Either way, it seems that female sexual activity has shifted from being rigidly confined to marriage to a situational and relational issue contingent on multiple dynamics within specific relationships between a young woman, herself and her environment during the process of existential strategizing. Thus, the shift reinforces the general argument of the thesis regarding the de-collectivisation and personalisation of the meanings of diasporic *namus*.

Moreover, loyal commitment and sexual fidelity to one's partner was and remains the central moral principle that has shaped and regulated relationality between men and women in the Turkish diaspora. In Chapter Five, I explored which varieties of intimate relationships have been socially acceptable in the diaspora over the past fifty years. In the early days, the arranging of marriages was the primary way intimate relationships were morally endorsed. However, since then, various kinds of relationships have become accepted among different

groups within the diaspora. In the landscape of Turkish diasporic relationalities, marriage remains the existential and moral ideal, however, other unmarried cohabitation configurations are now being practised. Although tacitly acknowledged and condoned in only some families, supervised or unsupervised de facto relationships still occupy a grey area. The principle of monogamy shapes how female dating, which is more or less tacitly accepted, is morally judged. Casual, serial dating, and frequently changing partners is frowned upon. While adultery remains the strongest moral transgression and is often condemned even by the closest of friends.

Nevertheless, facilitated matches remain the personal choice of some more conservative women practising, what I have termed, ‘dignified individuation’ in the context of Australia’s hypersexualised youth sociality. This choice reflects the prominent shift toward a woman’s centrality in the decision-making processes about with whom she wants to share her life. Her positionality, and there have always been exceptions even in the village, has shifted from the virtuous and praiseworthy ‘waiting to be asked’ to being the initiator of the facilitated meetings. These are either facilitated-for-her or driven-by-her meetings where parents are consulted about or oversee whom ‘she brings home’. In terms of whom to have a committed relationship with, the moral shift in intimate sociality also indicates a broader de-collectivisation and individualisation. In the early days of the diaspora, in their pursuit of collective values and identity preservation, immigrant parents strictly required ethnic endogamy. However, spousal criteria have diversified and now depend more on each young women’s personal aspirations and desires. Young women are primarily concerned about being personally and emotionally compatible with their partners and while ethnic and religious compatibility may still be a consideration in this regard, the criteria also include a similar level of educational attainment and career success. However, the rationalisation of one’s choice of spouse is primarily driven by the desire for and pursuit of romantic love. Either way,

Turkish women approach intimate relationality in various ways depending on their sense of positionality within their families, their social environment and their sense of independence, all of which are consciously considered in their subjective existential strategizing in pursuit of their vision of a 'good life'.

Although divorce has become more common in the Turkish diaspora, divorcee stigma is still a reality perpetuated in women's social groups, particularly among the older generation. Among women who have internalised the imagery of a social order where women were either virginal daughters or married wives, a divorced woman can cause moral anxiety, suspicion and jealousy when in the vicinity of other women's husbands. Thus, a divorced woman, as I argue, lives in a space of *moral liminality* until she is either remarried or changes her social group. Thus, despite being commonly accepted and practised, divorce is still far from being an easy way out of marriage crises, particularly for women. Partly due to the lingering attachment to *namus* principles of loyalty to one spouse and partly because of the relationships to which she is morally attached through the obligation of care, a woman might feel ashamed and guilty for potentially bringing negative social consequences upon other members of her native and affiliated families. Thus, divorce often equates to losing those relationships that have provided comfort and a sense of security.

Chapter Six dealt with the issue of parent-child relationality from the perspective of *namus* morality. The principle of loyalty to one's family and respect for one's elders, once the connection that facilitated the intergenerational transmission of *namus* principles, shapes family relationships vis-à-vis the positionality of daughters within the family. My research suggests that although the parenting style and thus the parent-child dynamics have shifted, this moral principle remains a distinct underlying feature of relationality in Turkish families in Australia. Gendered authoritarian, authoritative empathetic guidance and dialectical parenting are three terms that can be used to identify dominant forms of such relationality. Furthermore,

while I demonstrated the shift chronologically, it is important to acknowledge the three styles have also been observed within different diasporic families concurrently. With gendered authoritarian relationality, daughters experience the positionality of a protégé, someone who is guarded and sheltered from possible harm, especially the sexual advances of men, which represents an element of *namus* protection. The research participants' experience growing up was based on the imposition and enforcement of these rules and the principles of *namus* were not explained, only implied. It appears that while this parenting style was effective in bringing up responsible and dutiful adults who were often successful in their academic pursuits and careers, giving their parents much to be proud about, the daughters exposed to this parenting style found the process was often accompanied by difficult emotional experiences that led them to question their self-worth.

In contrast, the authoritative empathetic guidance style, probably the predominant parenting style amongst diasporic Turks today, addresses issues of healthy emotional development. While the relationality is still hierarchical and parenting outcomes are still passed on, as are some *namus* principles, it is done with an empathetic consideration of the daughter's perspective and desires. In explaining the values and expectations to their daughters through dialogue, parents lead them towards their parenting goals while bettering their daughter's experience and the parent-child relationship. What stands out is a shift in the relationality between fathers and daughters, or rather how this relationship is portrayed publicly. My research suggested that the decreasing communal pressure on fathers to appear as family hegemony has afforded them to show their caring and kind side publicly. Accordingly, one can estimate self-worth as a good parent if one is able to combine protection and guidance towards what is right together with the balanced conditions required for a child's emotional development. Although this phenomenon is interesting in terms of the

changing Turkish masculinities in the diaspora, it is beyond the scope of this thesis, and therefore invites further research.

In Chapter Six, I also brought together several matters discussed in previous chapters where second-generation Turkish women, now adults and mothers, have brought about this change in *namus* through what I have called their dialectic parenting. Specific to Australian-born mothers who have had negative experiences either growing up in an authoritarian household or in relation to *namus* community politics, this parenting style has two objectives. Firstly, it intends to ‘correct past wrongs’ by changing the daughter’s life experience, making up for the mother’s past experiences and contributing to a better future for all women. Secondly, it reshapes the approach to dialogue and negotiation with children and is, thus, a rather radical case of dialectic parenting that has emerged among parents who have rejected some elements of their Turkishness. By either cutting their social ties with the Turkish diasporic community or by adopting permissive and friend-like parenting – something that they consider to be contradictory to the very essence of what it means to be Turkish – such parents attempt to radically change their children’s life trajectories. In conveying their visions for a good future for their daughters through dialogue, these mothers educate their daughters without the judgmental gossip that would inhibit their development into confident young women, thus affording them the nurturing environment they felt they lacked growing up. This parenting style tends to be more enabling than prohibitive making these mothers true *agents of change*.

None of these cases, nonetheless, imply that these mothers aimed to repudiate their Turkish identity by transforming their parenting approach to their daughters. Even those parents who distanced themselves from the Turkish community, for whom the immediate pressure to appeal to other Turkish people effectively disappeared, did not forsake their Turkish heritage entirely and still sought to pass elements of their Turkish identity culture

onto their children, including the principles of virginity and fidelity. Their children, having described comparably more ‘liberated’ lifestyles, grew up to be multifaceted individuals who, despite struggling with their Turkish identity, eventually found elements through which they could reconnect with their cultural heritage. These parents and their families stand in contrast to the community-based expressions of Turkishness. Therefore, this mode of ‘elective identity’ maintenance in the diaspora most certainly merits further research.

Research Contribution and Significance of the Study

The thesis explored shifts and continuities in elements of *namus* morality approached not only through its social aspect but through viewing it as a point of existential reference or as a tool in existential strategizing. In earlier theorising, *namus* has been described as one of the salient modes of organising, regulating and cultivating sociality in Turkey, particularly in rural communities (Delaney, 1991; Dilmaç, 2014). Accordingly, ‘*namus*’ morality is typically seen as a means of creating and maintaining social order regarding reproduction, kinship, and gendered intersubjective and intergenerational relations. In this thesis, *namus* was approached as a springboard for self-transformation, through which women’s notions of self-worth, dignity, respectability, personal and collective moral identity, and their place in the world, are located, negotiated, resisted, rejected or accommodated. In addition, the thesis explored tendencies that could signify a more profound collective moral change, which occurred in conjunction with the social and existential (material conditions) transformation of the lives of the migrants, and their children, during the fifty years of Turkish settlement in Australia. To this end, this thesis’ primary concern is how migration instigates social change, processes of reevaluating and repositioning one’s moral self, and subjective existential strategizing about how one should be in the world. It has highlighted the importance of considering the ongoing

negotiation and utilization of *namus* that are not limited to the first generations, but which occur across consecutive generations.

More broadly speaking, this research intended to transcend the dichotomous constructs about diasporic Muslim women in the West and the problems associated with fitting them into ‘oppressed-liberated’ binaries. This research sought to avoid constructing oversimplified subgroups of Turkish women, for example, by characterizing first-generation women as more ‘oppressed’ while second- and third generations are characterized as more ‘liberated’. To gain insight into how the structural forces of morality – embodied in the unilateral imagery of how a good, proper, honourable, ideal woman should behave – have been reproduced, fought against and transformed in the context of multicultural Australia required greater attention to the subtleties and nuances of both collective and individual understandings of *namus*.

To reiterate, the main research question, investigating how Australian Turkish women understand and experience *namus* can be answered by focusing on the shifts and continuities in what the principles of *namus* currently require of Turkish diasporic communities and individuals. Thus, in response to the subsequent research question about what *namus* helps us understand about how women navigate their self-worth, several processes relating to de-collectivisation, individualisation and differentiation were identified as shifting the emphasis from the usual *moral group* (the ‘community’, family or partner) towards ‘owning’ their moral reputation and connected responsibility. For some women, there has been a move away from finding self-worth through being socially acknowledged as moral though sexual self-restraint to focusing on other personal moral qualities, such as being a compassionate and empathetic person, for which they wanted to be acknowledged for. Others, while retaining self-worth through chastity, demanded the dismantling of the gendered double standards of moral scrutiny in the sense of instilling equal expectations regarding male chastity. An

interesting aspect of individuating self-worth drawn from *namus* occurs through spatial distancing and dialectic parenting. Particularly second-generation mothers, who had experienced personal “injuries” through *namus*, regained their self-worth by reshaping the existential experience for their daughters.

The personalisation and subjectification of *namus* draw attention to issues of identity negotiation that come into the spotlight in the diasporic experience. In this sense, these findings contribute to answering the further research question - what these shifts tell us about identity and relationality within the Australian Turkish diaspora. While *ethnic moral identity* remains important for many, expression of subjective *personal moral identity* has been coming forth prominently. The intersections of what is existentially important, how heritage is either perpetuated or reconfigured and what is right or wrong comes together embodied in modalities *doing things right* and *do the right thing*. Indeed, there are various possible avenues for delving into how women navigate their sense of self-worth in respect to the requirements placed on their conduct, public self-expression, sexual activity and intimate relationships. Furthermore, there are clearly many different ways to attain self-worth other than that which is normatively dictated or promoted by *namus*. In this regard, there are many indications that collective and individual ideas both coalesce with and digress from the normative visions created by influential others, such as family members, community, peers and the broader society.

This thesis engaged with the broad body of scholarship that informs the extensive theorising and debate about the honour-shame paradigm and how it has been conceptualised in relation to diasporic Muslim communities living in the West (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2011; Dilmaç, 2014a, 2016; Withaekx & Coene, 2014). The thesis complements the existing studies on the Turkish diaspora in Australia by incorporating the elements of existential strategizing and individuation of morality. In this sense, this thesis engages with, but

ultimately moves away from, the typical focus on womanhood, sexuality and identity-making as, primarily, expressions of Islam and Muslimness (cf. Zevallos, 2003, 2004, 2005) and community-based concerns. The attention is on the diverse Turkish Australian women who also reside in ‘areas of dispersion’ in Melbourne (Icduygu, 1990) rather than merely situating women, as individuals, within the collective.

Finally, the thesis speaks to a ‘morality turn’ within contemporary anthropology (Mattingly, 2013, p. 302), which once called for problematising morality a somewhat fixed attribute of a sociality whose norms people follow (Dawson & Goodwin-Hawkins, 2018; Laidlaw, 2014; Mattingly, 2012; Robbins, 2013). With the moral modalities *doing things right* and *do the right thing*, it has contributed to the debate about finding other ways of expressing moral agency than breaking away from social constraints towards acquiring ‘freedom’ (Mahmood, 2001, 2005). The two modalities propose a contribution to what Laidlaw (2014) called for, as ‘to develop a concept of agency that transcends the distinction between reproduction and agency’ (Cassaniti, 2014, p. 259).

Implications of the Findings and Recommendations for Further Research

I should emphasise again that although my study involved both male and female perspectives, the main focus was on women. While the practice of portraying only women’s perspectives has been challenged (e.g., Strathern.,1987; Scheper-Hughes, 1983) because of the risk of creating certain forms of bias, the highly intimate nature of this study during which individual women shared sensitive information with me, justified this research design and improved the accessibility and quality of this highly sensitive data. However, I am also aware that portraying only women’s perspectives does not fully reflect the gendered dynamics that arise

from *namus* morality. Therefore, the study would be well complemented by future research focusing specifically on male perspectives.

In addition, this study did not include other modes of sexual and gender identification and self-expression beyond the heteronormative framework that *namus* morality implies. This could be perhaps the most interesting area of further research as this thesis presupposed inventive way of deployment of what it means to be moral amongst Turkish diaspora. It would be interesting to conduct a comparison of experiences and situations of young LGBTQI Turkish Australians that may reside in areas of ethnic concentration or dispersion to consider how they experience and conceive of *namus*, morality and self-worth.

Indeed, what has been referred to as *namus* morality throughout this thesis is only one segment of ways to construct, relate to, deploy or resist against a sense of being moral, good, ethical and so forth. There are many other ways of expressing morality, such is expressed in the word *ahlak*. There are also other ways to pursue a sense of self-worth that has not been covered in this specific attention to *namus* and gendered intimate morality. For instance, in this thesis only a cursory mention was possible on the issue of broader relations and identities and on the way that the state and religion, and their roles in shaping and influencing positionalities vis-à-vis moral integrity and citizenship, are worthy of further critical and nuanced study.

Finally, as suggested by reviewers, although the analysis concentrates on the intimate and familial/parental contexts, it would be interesting to explore whether and how transnational media consumption interplays with how *namus* persist in the diaspora. So it is that *namus* continues to be a prevalent theme in Turkish TV dramas, which are very popular among Turkish migrants (Karagöz, 2020, Karanfil, 2007).

Statement of Key Contribution to Study of Namus

This thesis demonstrated how *namus* has been used as a springboard to transform, negotiate, find, resist, or accommodate self-worth. The study of the conceptualisation and experience of *namus* thus provides an opportunity to cut across the tendency toward stratification and dichotomisation of women's *namus*. It has a regulative and agentive frame, which enables reproduction and continual updating of cultural knowledge and identity in diaspora, but it also serves as a site for resistance and negotiation of that very same cultural knowledge and identity. I showed how the participants of this study possessed agentic and strategic capacities to negotiate their positionality as Muslim women and Turkish Australian women.

Bibliography

- Abadan-Unat, E. N., & Kandiyoti, D. (Eds.). (1981). *Women in Turkish Society*. Brill.
- Abdo-Zubi, N., & Mojab, S. (2004). *Violence in the Name of Honour: Theoretical and Political Challenges*. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Abboud, S., Jemmott, L. S., & Sommers, M. S. (2015). "We are Arabs:" The Embodiment of Virginity Through Arab and Arab American Women's Lived Experiences.. *Sexuality & Culture*, 19(4), 715-736.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (1983). Reviewed Work(s): Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman by Unni Wikan. *Signs (Chicago, Ill.)*, 9(1), 156–158.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (1986). *Veiled Sentiments : Honor And Poetry in a Bedouin Society*. University of California Press.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (1990). Can There Be a Feminist Ethnography?. *Women & Performance: a Journal of Feminist Theory*, 5(1), 7-27.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (1996). Writing Against Culture. In R. G. Fox (Ed.), *Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present* (pp. 137–162). School of American Research Press.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (2002). Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others. *American Anthropologist*, 104: 783-790.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (2001). "Orientalism" and Middle East Feminist. *Feminist Studies*, 27(1), 101-113.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (2011). Seductions of the "Honor Crime". *Differences*, 22(1), 17-63.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (2016). The Cross-Publics of Ethnography: The Case of "The Muslimwoman". *American Ethnologist*, 43(4), 595-608.
- Abu-Zahra, N. (1970). "On the Modesty of Women in Arab Muslim Villages": A Reply. *American Anthropologist*, 72(5), 1079–1088.
- Ackland, J. (2006). *A Study of Hybridity: Exploring Language and Identity Experiences of Bicultural Turkish-Australians*. University of Melbourne.
- Adal, F. Y. (2013). *Turkish Cypriot Women in Australia: Experiences of Migration and Belonging*. (Doctoral dissertation, LaTrobe University).
- Ahmed, L. (1992). Women and the Rise of Islam. In *Women and Gender in Islam* (pp. 41-63). Yale University Press.

- Akbulut, Z. (2015). Veiling as Self-Disciplining: Muslim Women, Islamic Discourses, and the Headscarf Ban in Turkey. *Contemporary Islam*, 9(3), 433-453.
- Akçelik, R. (1993). Turkish Youth in Australia: conference papers, 29 August 1992, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. Australian-Turkish Friendship Society.
- Akpınar, A. (2003). The Honour/Shame Complex Revisited: Violence Against Women in the Migration Context. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 26(5), 425-442.
- Al, S. (2015). An Anatomy of Nationhood and the Question of Assimilation: Debates on Turkishness Revisited. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 15(1), 83-101.
- Alemdaroğlu, A. (2015). Escaping Femininity, Claiming Respectability: Culture, Class and Young Women in Turkey. In *Women's Studies International Forum*, 53, 53-62.
- Ali, L., & Sonn, C. C. (2009). Multiculturalism and Whiteness: Through the Experiences of Second Generation Cypriot-Turkish. *Australian Community Psychologist*, 21(1), 24-38
- Ali, L., & Sonn, C. C. (2010). Constructing Identity as a Second-Generation Cypriot Turkish in Australia: The Multi-hyphenated Other. *Culture and Psychology*, 16(3), 416-436.
- Amir-Moazami, S., Jacobsen, C. M., & Malik, M. (2011). Islam and Gender in Europe: Subjectivities, Politics and Piety. *Feminist Review*, 98(1), 1-8.
- Anthias, F. (2002). Where Do I Belong? Narrating Collective Identity and Translocational Positionality. *Ethnicities*, 2(4), 491-514.
- Antoun, R. T. (1968). On the Modesty of Women in Arab Muslim Villages: A Study in the Accommodation of Traditions. *American Anthropologist*, 70, 671-697.
- Apeyitou, E. (2003). Turkish-Cypriot Nationalism: Its History and Development (1571-1960). *Cyprus Review*, 15(1), 67-98.
- Arat, Y. (2008). Contestation and Collaboration: Women's Struggles for Empowerment in Turkey. *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, 4, 388-418.
- Archetti, E. P. (1988). *Argentinian Tango: Male Sexual Ideology and Morality* (Vol. null).
- Asad, T. (1973). Two European Images of non-European Rule. *Economy and Society*, 2(3), 263-277.
- Asad, T. (2009). The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam. *Qui Parle*, 17(2), 1-30.
- Asano-Tamanoi, M. (1987). Shame, Family, and State in Catalonia and Japan. *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, 104-120.
- Asaroglu, A. (2006). *Reshaping Identities: A Study of Religion and Culture Among Second Generation Turkish-Australians*. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Melbourne, School of Graduate Studies, Asia Institute).

- Aunina, E. (2018). Perpetual Conflict of 'Turkishness': The Turkish State and its Minority Groups. *E-International Relations*, 8. Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info/2018/11/04/perpetual-conflict-of-turkishness-the-turkish-state-and-its-minority-groups/#_ftn3
- Baldassar, L. (1999). Marias and Marriage: Ethnicity, Gender and Sexuality Among Italo-Australian Youth in Perth. *Journal of Sociology*, 35(1), 1-22.
- Barlas, A. (2002). *"Believing Women" in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur'an* (1st ed.). University of Texas Press.
- Başarın, H.H. & Başarın, V. (1993). *The Turks in Australia: Celebrating Twenty-Five Years Down Under*. Turquoise Publications.
- Baxter, D. (2007). Honor Thy Sister: Selfhood, Gender, and Agency in Palestinian Culture. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 80(3), 737–775.
- Baykara-Krumme, H. (2015). Three-generation Marriage Patterns: New Insights from the 'Dissimilation' Perspective. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41(8), 1324–1346.
- Benedict, P. (1974). The Changing Role of Provincial Towns: A Case Study From Southwestern Turkey. *Turkey. Geographic and Social Perspectives*, 9, 241–280.
- Benthall, J. (2019). From Hospitality to Grace: A Julian Pitt-Rivers Omnibus de Julian a Julio Y de Julio a Julian: Correspondencia Entre Julio Caro Baroja Y Julian Pitt-Rivers (1949-1991). *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 25(3), 609–611.
- Beykont, Z. F. (2010). 'We Should Keep What Makes Us Different': Youth Reflections on Turkish Maintenance in Australia. *International Journal of the Sociology Of Language*, 2010(206), 93–107.
- Beykont, Z. F. (2012). 'Why Didn't They Teach Us Any of This Before?': Youth Appraisal of Turkish Provision in Victoria. *Australian Review of Applied Linguistics*, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 156-169.
- Boissevain, J., Aceves, J. B., Beckett, J., Brandes, S., Crump, T., Davis, J., Gilmore, D. D., Griffin, C. C. M., Padiglione, V., Pitt-Rivers, J., Schönegger, D., & Wade, R. (1979). Towards a Social Anthropology of the Mediterranean [and Comments and Reply]. *Current Anthropology*, 20(1), 81–93.
- Bourdieu, P. (1979). *Algeria 1960: The Disenchantment of the World, The Sense of Honour, The Kabyle House or The World Reversed*. Cambridge [Eng.]; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (2011). The Forms of Capital.(1986). *Cultural theory: An anthology*, 1, 81-93.
- Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (2013). Symbolic Capital and Social Classes. *Journal of classical sociology*, 13(2), 292-302.
- Bourdieu, P. (2020). *Outline Of A Theory Of Practice*. In *The New Social Theory Reader* (pp. 80-86). Routledge.

- Bowen, J. R. (2007). *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves : Islam, the State, and Public Space*. Princeton University Press.
- Boz, T., & Bouma, G. (2012). Identity Construction: A Comparison Between Turkish Muslims in Australia and Germany. *Epiphany*, 5(1).
- Bridgwood, A. (1986). *Marriage, Honour and Property : Turkish Cypriots in North London*. (Doctoral dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London).
- Brookes, A. (1985). *Educational Disadvantage to Turkish Girls in Melbourne's North-Western Suburbs*. Department of Community Services North Western Suburbs Regional Centre and Regional Consultative Council.
- Buitelaar, M. W. (2002). Negotiating the Rules of Chaste Behaviour: Re-Interpretations of the Symbolic Complex of Virginity by Young Women of Moroccan Descent in the Netherlands. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 25(3), 462-489.
- Butler, J. (1988). Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory. *Theatre Journal*, 40(4), 519–531.
- Butler, J. (1990). *Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion Of Identity*. Routledge.
- Butler, J. (1993). *Bodies That Matter : On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"*. Routledge.
- Cahill, D. (2015). Turkish Cypriots in Australia: The Evolution of a Multi-hyphenated Community and the Impact of Transnational Events. In M. Michael (Ed.), *Reconciling Cultural and Political Identities in a Globalized World : Perspectives on Australia-Turkey Relations* (pp. 211–226). Palgrave Macmillan Limited.
- Campbell, J. K. (1964). *Honour, Family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community* (Vol. 1). Clarendon Press.
- Canefe, N. (2002). Markers of Turkish Cypriot History in the Diaspora: Power, visibility and identity. *Rethinking History*, 6(1), 57-76.
- Carr, D. (2002). Personal and Moral Selfhood. In A. W. Musschenga, W. van Haften, B. Spiecker, & M. Slors (Eds.), *Personal and Moral Identity* (pp. 99–121). Springer Netherlands.
- Cassaniti, J. L. H., Jr., & Hickman, J. R. (2014). New Directions in the Anthropology of Morality. *Anthropological Theory*, 14, 251–262.
- Çevik, M. and Cahill, D. (1993). Of Marriage, Family and Domestic Violence: Issues for Young Turkish-Australians, in Akcelik (ed) *Turkish Youth in Australia* (pp. 87-97), Australian-Turkish Friendship Society Publications, No. 4, Melbourne.
- Chapman, M. (2016). Feminist Dilemmas and the Agency of Veiled Muslim Women: Analysing Identities and Social Representations. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 23(3), 237-250.
- Chin, R. (2010). Turkish Women, West German Feminists, and the Gendered Discourse on Muslim Cultural Difference. *Public Culture*, 22(3), 557–581.

- Cihangir, S. (2013). Gender Specific Honor Codes and Cultural Change. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 16(3), 319–333.
- Clare, S. (2009). Agency, Signification, and Temporality. *Hypatia*, 24(4), 50–62.
- Clifford, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1986). *Writing Culture : The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. A School of American Research Advanced Seminar. University of California Press.
- Cockburn, C. (2004). *The Line: Women, Partition and the Gender Order in Cyprus*. Zed Books.
- Cole, J. W. (1977). Anthropology Comes Part-Way Home: Community Studies in Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 6, 349–378.
- Collins, J. (2013). Multiculturalism and Immigrant Integration in Australia. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 45(3), 133–149.
- Cooke, M. (2007). The Muslimwoman. *Contemporary Islam*, 1(2), 139–154.
- Das, V. (2012). Ordinary Ethics. A Companion to Moral Anthropology, 133-149.
- Davis, J. (1977). *People of the Mediterranean : An Essay in Comparative Social Anthropology*. Routledge & K. Paul.
- Dawson, A. (2000). The Poetics of Self Depreciation: Images of Womenhood Amongst Elderly Women in an English Former Coal Mining Town. *Anthropological Journal on European Cultures*, 9(1), 37–51.
- Dawson, A. (2015). Mobility's Turns. *Social Anthropology*, 23(3), 352–354.
- Dawson, A., & Goodwin-Hawkins, B. (2018). Moralities of Care in Later Life. *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, 29(2), 141–145.
- Dawson, A. (2021) Let's Talk About Me – 101: Epistemological Vanity in Anthropology and Society, *Etnofoor*, 33(1), 73-90.
- Deeb, L. (2015). Thinking Piety and the Everyday Together: A Response to Fadil and Fernando. *HAU*, 5(2), 93–96.
- Deeb, L., & Winegar, J. (2016). *Anthropology's Politics: Disciplining the Middle East*. Stanford University Press.
- Delaney, C. L. (1991). *The Seed and the Soil : Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village Society*. University of California Press.
- Dilmaç, J. A. (2014). The Civilized and the Barbarous: Honor in French and Turkish Contemporary Societies. *International Social Science Review*, 89(1), 1–22.
- Dilmaç, J. A. (2014b). "Our" Honor And "Their" Honor: The Case Of Honor Killings In Turkey. *Advances in Gender Research*, 18B, 251–274.

- Dilmaç, J. A. (2016). Honor in Everyday Life in Turkish Society: A Barrier Against Deviance? *Deviant Behavior*, 37, 302-314.
- Doğan, R. (2011). Is Honor Killing a “Muslim Phenomenon”? Textual Interpretations and Cultural Representations. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 31(3), 423–440.
- Doğan, R. (2014). Different Cultural Understandings of Honor That Inspire Killing. *Homicide Studies*, 18(4), 363–388.
- Dorothea, S. (2011). Renewal and Enlightenment: Muslim Women’s Biographic Narratives of Personal Reform in Mali. *Journal of Religion in Africa. Religion en Afrique*, 41(1), 93–123.
- Eberhardt, N. (2014). Piaget and Durkheim: Competing Paradigms in the Anthropology of Morality. *Anthropological Theory*, 14(3), 301-316.
- El Guindi, F. (1999). *Veil: Modesty, Privacy And Resistance*. iUniverse.
- Elley, J. (1982). *The Powerless Turkish Woman: Ethnographic Fact or Ethnocentric Perception?* Paper presented at the Women, Asia and Islam, Monash University.
- Elley, J. (1985). *Party Selling: A New Form of Traditional Hospitality Amongst Turkish Women Migrants in Melbourne*. Monash University.
- Elley, J. (1985). *Guestworkers or Settler? Turkish Migrants in Melbourne*, (Doctoral dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Monash University Melbourne).
- Elley, J. (1988). ÇAlisan Hanimlar: Turkish Migrant Women at Work. *Turkish Community in Australia*. Australian-Turkish Friendship Society Publications.
- Elley, J. (1993). I See Myself as Australian-Turkish”: The Identity of Second-Generation Turkish Migrants in Australia. In *Turkish youth in Australia: conference papers, 29 August 1992, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology*. Ed. Rahmi Akçelik (pp. 55-76). Australian-Turkish Friendship Society.
- Elley, J. & Inglis, Ch. (1995). Ethnicity & Gender: The Two Worlds of Australian Turkish Youth. In *Ethnic Minority Youth in Australia* (pp. 193-202). National Clearinghouse for Youth Studies.
- Esterberg, K. G. (2002). *Qualitative Methods in Social Research*. McGraw-Hill.
- Ewing, K. P. (2006). Revealing and Concealing: Interpersonal Dynamics and the Negotiation of Identity in the Interview. *Ethos*, 34(1), 89–122.
- Ewing, K. P. (2008). *Stolen honor. [electronic resource] : stigmatizing Muslim men in Berlin*. Stanford University Press.
- Fadil, N. (2011). Not-/Unveiling as an Ethical Practice. *Feminist Review*(98), 83-109.
- Fadil, N., & Fernando, M. (2015). Rediscovering the “Everyday” Muslim: Notes on an Anthropological Divide. *HAU*, 5(2), 59–88.
- Farahani, F. (2007). Diasporic Narratives on Virginity. In *Muslim Diaspora* (pp. 212-230). Routledge.

- Fernando, M. (2009). Exceptional Citizens: Secular Muslim Women and the Politics of Difference in France. *Social Anthropology*, 17(4), 379–392.
- Fine, G. A. (1993). Ten Lies of Ethnography: Moral Dilemmas of Field Research. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 22(3), 267–294.
- Geertz, C. (1971). *Islam Observed : Religious Development in Morocco And Indonesia*. University of Chicago Press.
- Gellner, E. (1981). *Muslim Society*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gellner, E. (1992). *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*. Routledge
- Gilmore, D. D. (1987). *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*. American Anthropological Association.
- Göle, N. (1996). *The Forbidden Modern : Civilization and Veiling*. University of Michigan Press.
- Grigoriadis, I. (2007). Türk or Türkiyeli? The Reform of Turkey's Minority Legislation and the Rediscovery of Ottomanism. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43, 423–438.
- Guerra, C. (1993). Young Women of Ethnic Minorities and Turkish Young Women - The Hidden Factor. In R. Akcelik (Ed.), *Turkish Youth in Australia* (Vol. 4). Australian-Turkish friendship society publications.
- Gültekin, M. N. (2011). Tradition, Society and the Concept of Honor: Stories on Implementation. *Eurasian Journal of Anthropology*, 2(2), 70–84.
- Hann, C. (1993). Culture and Anti-Culture: The Spectre of Orientalism in New Anthropological Writing on Turkey. *JASO*, 24(3), 223–243.
- Hart, K. (2007). Love by Arrangement: The Ambiguity of 'Spousal Choice' in a Turkish Village. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 13, 345–362.
- Heinonen, P. (2011). *Youth Gangs and Street Children: Culture, Nurture and Masculinity in Ethiopia*. Berghahn Books.
- Herzfeld, M. (1980). Honour and Shame: Some Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems. *Man*, 15, 339–351.
- Herzfeld, M. (1987). *Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass : Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Herzfeld, M. (1997). *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State*. New York: Routledge.
- Hopkins, L. (2008). Young Turks and New Media: The Construction of Identity in an Age of Islamophobia. *Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & Policy*, 126(1), 54–66.
- Hopkins, L. (2009a). Citizenship and Global Broadcasting: Constructing National, Transnational and Post-national Identities. *Continuum (Perth)*, 23(1), 19–32.

- Hopkins, L. (2009b). Turkish Transnational Media in Melbourne: A Migrant Mediascape. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 11(2), 230–247.
- Hopkins, L. (2011). 'I Feel Myself to Be a World Citizen': Negotiating Turkish and Alevi Identity in Melbourne. *Social Identities*, 17(iii), 443–456.
- Hopkins, L., & McAuliffe, C. (2010). Split Allegiances: Cultural Muslims and the Tension Between Religious and National Identity in Multicultural Societies. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 10(1), 38–58.
- Humphrey, M. (2009). Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam: Turkish Immigrants in Germany and Australia. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 11(ii), 136–154.
- Hüssein, S. (2007). *Yesterday and Today: Turkish Cypriots of Australia*. Serkan Hussein.
- İçduygu, A. (1990). *Migrant as a Transitional Category : Turkish Migrants in Melbourne, Australia*. (Doctoral dissertation, Monash University, Melbourne)
- İçduygu, A. (1993). The Turkish Immigrant Households and Families in Melbourne, Australia. *Nüfusbilim Dergisi*, 15, 3–22.
- İçduygu, A. (1994). Facing Changes and Making Choices: Unintended Turkish Immigrant Settlement in Australia. *International Migration (Geneva, Switzerland)*, 32(1), 71–93.
- İçduygu, A. (1996). Becoming a New Citizen in an Immigration Country: Turks in Australia and Sweden and Some Comparative Implications. *International Migration (Geneva, Switzerland)*, 34(2), 257–272.
- Inglis, C., Elley, J., & Manderson, L. (1992). Making Something of Myself : Educational Attainment and Social and Economic Mobility of Turkish Australian Young People. Australian Govt. Pub. Service.
- Inglis, C., Akgönül, S., & Tapia, S. d. (2009). Turks Abroad: Settlers, Citizens, Transnationals - Introduction. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 11(ii), 104–118.
- Inglis, C. (2011). The Incorporation of Australian Youth in a Multicultural and Transnational World. *Multiculturalism and Integration*, 151-177.
- Jakubowicz, A., & İçduygu, A. (2015). After Gallipoli: Empire, Nation and Diversity in Multicultural Turkey and Australia. In *Reconciling Cultural and Political Identities in a Globalized World* (pp. 63-90). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Joppke, C. (2009). *Veil : Mirror of Identity*. Polity.
- Kadioğlu, A. (1994). Women's Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the Villain?. *The Middle East Journal*, 645-660.
- Kandiyoti, D. (1988). Bargaining With Patriarchy. *Gender & Society*, 2(3), 274-290.

- Kandiyoti, D. (1991a). End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism and Women in Turkey. In D. Kandiyoti (Ed.), *Women, Islam and the State* (pp. 22–47). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kandiyoti, D. (1991b). *Women, Islam, and The State*. Temple University Press.
- Kandiyoti, D. (1998). Some Awkward Questions on Women and Modernity in Turkey. In: Abu-Lughod, L., (ed.), *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East* (pp. 270-87). Princeton University Press.
- Karagöz, O. (2020). *Preserving Turkishness in the Daily Life of Broadmeadows*. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Melbourne)
- Karanfil, G. (2007). Satellite Television and Its Discontents: Reflections on the Experiences of Turkish-Australian Lives. *Continuum*, 21(1), 59-69.
- Kardam, F. (2007). *The Dynamics of Honor Killings in Turkey: Prospects for Action*. Retrieved from New York: <https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/honourkillings.pdf>
- Keane, W. (2014). Affordances and Reflexivity in Ethical Life: An Ethnographic Stance. *Anthropological Theory*, 14(1), 3-26.
- Keceli, B. (1998). *Ethnic Identity and Boundary Maintenance: A Study of First and Second Generation Turkish Migrants* (Doctoral dissertation, Department of Language and International Studies, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne).
- Keceli, B. C. D. (1998). Education and Inequality: A Case Study of Second-Generation Turkish Australians. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 19(2), 207-213.
- Kenway, J., & McLeod, J. (2004). Bourdieu's Reflexive Sociology and 'Spaces of Points of View': Whose Reflexivity, Which Perspective?. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 25(4), 525-544.
- Khoo, S. E., Birrell, B., & Heard, G. (2009). Inter-marriage by birthplace and ancestry in Australia. *People and Place*, 17(1), 15-28.
- Kiliç, S. (2002). *The Cultural Construction of Alevi Female Identity*. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Melbourne).
- King, D. E. (2008). The Personal Is Patrilineal: Namus as Sovereignty. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 15(3), 317-342.
- Klenk, M. (2019). Moral Philosophy and the 'Ethical Turn' in Anthropology. *Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie*, 2(2), 331-353.
- Kogacioglu, D. (2004). The Tradition Effect: Framing Honor Crimes in Turkey. *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 15(2), 119-151.
- Korteweg, A. C., & Yurdakul, G. (2009). Islam, Gender, and Immigrant Integration: Boundary Drawing in Discourses on Honour Killing in the Netherlands and Germany. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32(ii), 218-238.

- Kulczycki, A., & Windle, S. (2011). Honor Killings in the Middle East and North Africa: A Systematic Review of the Literature. *Violence Against Women, 17*(11), 1442-1464.
- Laidlaw, J. (2002). For an Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom. *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 8* (2): 311–332.
- Laidlaw, J. (2014). *The Subject of Virtue : An Anthropology of Ethics And Freedom*: Cambridge University Press.
- Lambek, M. (2015). *The Ethical Condition: Essays on Action, Person, and Value*. University Chicago Press.
- Lamphere, L. (2006). Foreword: Taking Stock - The Transformation of Feminist Theorizing in Anthropology. In P. L. S. Geller, M. K. (Ed.), *Feminist Anthropology: Past, Present, and Future*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Latifoglu, A. (2001). *The Educational Experiences of Turkish Background Students in Middle Secondary School* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Melbourne).
- LeBlanc, M. N. (2014). Piety, Moral Agency, and Leadership: Dynamics Around the Feminization of Islamic Authority in Côte D'Ivoire. *Islamic Africa, 5*(2), 167-198.
- Lynch, R. A. (2011). Foucault's Theory of Power. In D. Taylor (Ed.), (pp. 13-26): Routledge.
- Magnarella, P. J. (1974). *Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town*: Schenkman Pub. Co.
- Mahmood, S. (2001). Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival. *Cultural Anthropology, 16*(2), 202-236.
- Mahmood, S. (2005). *Politics of Piety : The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton University Press.
- Mahmood, S. (2006). Feminist Theory, Agency, and the Liberatory Subject: Some Reflections on the Islamic Revival in Egypt. *Temenos, 42*(1), 31–71.
- Mandel, R. E. (1994). 'Fortress Europe' and the Foreigners Within: Germany's Turks. In V. L. Goddard, J; Shore, C. (Ed.), *The Anthropology of Europe: Identities and Boundaries in Conflict* (pp. 113-124). Berg.
- Mandel, R. E. (2008). *Cosmopolitan Anxieties : Turkish Challenges to Citizenship And Belonging in Germany*. Duke University Press.
- Manderson, L. I., Ch. (1984). Turkish Migration and Workforce Participation in Sydney, Australia. *The International Migration Review, 18*(2), 258-275.
- Manderson, L., & Inglis, C. (1985). Workforce Participation and Childrearing Amongst Turkish Women in Sydney, Australia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 8*(2), 194-208.
- Mansur, F. (1972). *Bodrum: A Town in The Aegean* (Vol. 3): Brill Archive.
- Marranci, G. (2008). *The Anthropology of Islam*. Berg.

- Mattingly, Ch. (2012). Two Virtue Ethics and the Anthropology of Morality. *Anthropological Theory*, 12(2), 161-184.
- Mattingly, Ch. (2013). Moral Selves and Moral Scenes: Narrative Experiments in Everyday Life. *Ethnos Journal of Anthropology*, 78(3), 301-327.
- Mattingly, Ch., Throop, J. (2018). The Anthropology of Ethics and Morality. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 47(1), 475–492.
- Meeker, M. E. (1976). Meaning and Society in the near East: Examples from the Black Sea Turks and the Levantine Arabs (II). *International Journal of Middle East studies*, 7(3), 383-422.
- Melhuus, M. (1990). A Shame to Honour-a Shame to Suffer. *Ethnos*, 55(1-2), 5-25.
- Mernissi, F. (1987). *Beyond the Veil : Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society*. Indiana University Press.
- Mernissi, F. (1991). *Women and Islam : An Historical and Theological Enquiry*: B. Blackwell.
- Mernissi, F., & Lakeland, M. J. (1991). *The Veil and the Male Elite : A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*. Addison-Wesley.
- Michális, M. S. (2015). *Reconciling Cultural and Political Identities in a Globalized World : Perspectives on Australia-Turkey Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mohanty, C. T. (1984). Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses. *Boundary 2*, 333-358.
- Moore, H. L. (1988). *Feminism and Anthropology*: Polity Press in association with B. Blackwell.
- Moore, H. L. (1998). "Is Female To Male As Nature Is To Culture?": Thoughts on Making Gender. *Social Analysis*, 42(3), 159-163.
- Ogan, C. (2007). Methodological Approaches to Studying Immigrant Communities: Why Flexibility Is Important. *Communications : the European Journal of Communication Research* (2 Media and ethnic minorities in Europe), 255-272.
- Olson, E. A. (1986). Anthropological and Sociological Studies of Turkey: An American Perspective. *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 10(2), 69-78.
- Ortner, S. B. (1974). Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture? In M. Z. L. Rosaldo, L (Ed.), *Woman, Culture, and Society* (pp. 68-87). Stanford University Press.
- Ortner, S. B. (1978). The Virgin and the State. *Feminist Studies*, 4(3), 19-35.
- Ozcetin, H. (2015). *Dressing Up Ahlak: A Reading of Sexual Morality in Turkey* (Doctoral dissertation, Arts & Social Sciences: Department of Sociology and Anthropology).

- Özkan, N. (2019). Representing Religious Discrimination at the Margins: Temporalities and “Appropriate” Identities of the State in Turkey. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 42(2), 317-331.
- Ozyegin, G. (2009). Virginal Facades: Sexual Freedom and Guilt Among Young Turkish Women. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 16(2), 103-123.
- Parla, A. (2001). The “Honor” of the State: Virginité Examinations in Turkey. *Feminist studies*, 27(1), 65-88.
- Périshtiany, J. G. (1965). *Honour and Shame : The Values of Mediterranean Society*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Pitt-Rivers, J. A. (1965). Honour and Social Status. In J. G. Perishtiany (Ed.), *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (pp. 19-77). Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Prieur, A. (2002). Gender Remix: On Gender Constructions Among Children of Immigrants in Norway. *Ethnicities*, 2(1), 53-77.
- Rapp, R. (1975). *Toward An Anthropology Of Women*. Monthly Review Press.
- Rapport, N. (2014). *Social and Cultural Anthropology: the Key Concepts*. Routledge.
- Redfield, R. (1955). The Social Organization of Tradition. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 15(1), 13-21.
- Rexvid, D. S., A. (2012). Heroes, Hymen and Honour: A Study of the Character of Attitude Change among Male Youth with Their Roots in an Honour-Based Context. *Review of European Studies*, 4(2). 22
- Robbins, J. (2007). Between Reproduction and Freedom: Morality, Value, and Radical Cultural Change. *Ethnos*, 72(3), 293–314.
- Robbins, J. (2013). Beyond the Suffering Subject: Toward an Anthropology of the Good. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 19(3), 447-462.
- Rosaldo, M. Z. (1974). Woman, Culture and Society: Theoretical Overview. In M. Z. L. Rosaldo, L. (Ed.), *Woman, Culture And Society*.
- Rosaldo, M. Z., Lamphere, L., & Bamberger, J. (1974). *Woman, Culture, And Society*. Stanford University Press.
- Safilios-Rothschild, C. (1969). 'Honour' Crimes in Contemporary Greece. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 20(2), 205-218.
- Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism* (1st ed. ed.). Pantheon Books.
- Sametoğlu, S. U. (2015). Halalscapes: Leisure, Fun, and Aesthetic Spaces Created by Young Muslim Women of the Gülen Movement in France and Germany. In E. Toğuşlu, *Everyday Life Practices of Muslims in Europe*, 3, (pp. 143-162), Leuven University Press.

- Scalco, P. D. (2015). *City Life, Premarital Sexuality and the Politics of Chastity: An Ethnographic Approach to Sexual Moralities and Social Reproduction in the Context of Istanbul* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Manchester).
- Scheper-Hughes, N. (1983). The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and Feminist Anthropology. *Women's Studies, 10*(2), 109-116.
- Schielke, S. (2009). Being Good in Ramadan: Ambivalence, Fragmentation, and the Moral Self in the Lives of Young Egyptians. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 15*, 24-40.
- Schielke, S. (2010). Second Thoughts About the Anthropology of Islam, or How to Make Sense of Grand Schemes in Everyday Life. In *Research in the Islamic Context* (pp. 42-68). Routledge.
- Schlytter, A. L. (2009). Girls With Honour-Related Problems in a Comparative Perspective. *International Journal of Social Welfare, 19*, 152–161.
- Schneider, J. (1971). Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies. *Ethnology, 10*(1), 1-24.
- Schubert, V., & Joubert, L. (2016). Mutuality, Individuation and Interculturality. In *The Routledge International Handbook of Intercultural Arts Research* (pp. 359-369). Routledge.
- Schubert, V. (2020). *Modernity and the Unmaking of Men* (Vol. 1). Berghahn Books.
- Sehlikoglu, S. (2018). Revisited: Muslim Women's Agency and Feminist Anthropology of the Middle East. *Contemporary Islam, 12*(1), 73-92.
- Şenay, B. (2009). A "Condition of Homelessness" or a "State of Double Consciousness"? Turkish Migrants and Home-Making in Australia. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 11*(2), 248-263.
- Şenay, B. (2010). State of Origin: Turkish Migration and Multiculturalism in Australia. In M. M. Erdogan (Ed.), *Yurtdışındaki Türkler 50 : Yılında Göç ve Uyum = Turks abroad : migration and integration in its 50th year* (pp. 287-296). Orion.
- Şenay, B. (2012). Trans-Kemalism: The Politics of the Turkish State in the Diaspora. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 35*(9), 1615-1633.
- Şenay, B. (2013). *Beyond Turkey's Borders : Long-Distance Kemalism, State Politics And The Turkish Diaspora*. I.B. Tauris.
- Şenay, B. (2015). Masterful Words: Musicianship and Ethics in Learning the Ney. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 21*(3), 524-541
- Sev'er, A., & Yurdakul, G. (2001). Culture of Honor, Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of Honor Killings in Rural Turkey. *Violence Against Women*(9), 964–998.
- Shively, K. (2014). Entangled ethics: Piety and agency in Turkey. *Anthropological Theory, 14*(4), 462–480.

- Silverstein, B. (2008). Disciplines of Presence in Modern Turkey: Discourse, Companionship, and the Mass Mediation of Islamic Practice. *Cultural Anthropology*, 23(1), 118-153.
- Sirman, N. (2014). Contextualizing Honour. *European Journal of Turkish Studies. Social Sciences on Contemporary Turkey*, (18).
- Sökefeld, M. (2008). *Struggling for Recognition : The Alevi Movement In Germany and in Transnational Space*. Berghahn Books.
- Steward, J. H. (1956). General and Theoretical: The Little Community. Viewpoints for the Study of a Human Whole. Robert Redfield. *American Anthropologist*, 58(3), 564-565.
- Stewart, C. (1993). Honor and Grace in Anthropology. *Current Anthropology*(3), 330-334.
- Stewart, F. H. (1994). *Honor*. University of Chicago Press.
- Stirling, A. P. (1965). *Turkish Village*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Strathern, M. (1987). An Awkward Relationship: The Case of Feminism and Anthropology. *Signs*, 12(2), 276-292.
- Tauber, A. I. (2005). The Reflexive Project: Reconstructing the Moral Agent. *History of the Human Sciences*, 18(4), 49-75.
- Taylor, C. (1989). *Sources Of The Self : The Making of the Modern Identity*: Harvard University Press.
- Tunçay, M. (2021). Kemalism. In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World* Oxford Islamic Studies Online: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0440#>.
- UNESCO. (2010). Traditional Sohbet Meetings. *Intangible Cultural Heritage*. Retrieved from <https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/traditional-sohbet-meetings-00385>
- Uzer, U. (2016). *An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism: Between Turkish Ethnicity and Islamic Identity*. University of Utah Press.
- Van Eck, C. (2002). *Purified by Blood: Honour Killings Amongst Turks in The Netherlands*. Amsterdam University Press.
- Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-Diversity and Its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(6), 1024-1054.
- Vertovec, S. (2019). Talking Around Super-Diversity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42(1), 125-139.
- Welchman, L., & Hossain, S. (2005). "Honour" [Electronic Resource] : Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence Against Women. Zed Books.
- Wikan, U. (1982). *Behind The Veil in Arabia : Women In Oman*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wikan, U. (1984). Shame and Honour: A Contestable Pair. *Man*, 19(4), 635-652.

- Wikan, U. (2008). *In Honor of Fadime : Murder and Shame*. University of Chicago Press. Revised and extended, partly rewritten version.
- Wills, S. (2008). Migrant Hostels. *eMelbourne: the city past & present*. Retrieved from eMelbourne: the city past & present website: <http://www.emelbourne.net.au/biogs/EM00980b.htm>
- Windle, J. (2004). The Ethnic (Dis)advantage Debate Revisited: Turkish background students in Australia. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 25(3), 271 - 286.
- Withaecx, S. (2011). *(De)culturalising Honour-Related Violence in the Migration Context: The Case of Belgium*. Paper presented at the Second European Conference on Politics & Gender, CEU Budapest.
- Withaecx, S., & Coene, G. (2014). 'Glad to Have Honour': Continuity and Change in Minority Women's Lived Experience of Honour. *Journal of Gender Studies*, 23(4), 376-390.
- Wyatt-Brown, B. (1982). *Southern Honor : Ethics and Behavior in The Old South*. Oxford University Press.
- Wyatt-Brown, B. (2001). *The Shaping of Southern Culture : Honor, Grace, and War, 1760s-1890s*. University of North Carolina Press.
- Yağmur, K. (2004). Language Maintenance Patterns of Turkish Immigrant Communities in Australia and Western Europe: The Impact of Majority Attitudes on Ethnolinguistic Vitality Perceptions. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 165, 121-142.
- Yağmur, K., de Bot, K., & Korzilius, H. (1999). Language Attrition, Language Shift, and Ethnolinguistic Vitality in Australia. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 20(1), 51-69.
- Yağmur, K., Bot, K. D., & Korzilius, H. (2010). Language Attrition, Language Shift and Ethnolinguistic Vitality of Turkish in Australia. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 20(1), 51-69.
- Yağmur, K., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2012). Acculturation and Language Orientations of Turkish Immigrants in Australia, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 43(7), 1110-1130.
- Young, C. (1982). Education, Employment and the Turkish Community in Australia. *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2(2).
- Young, C. M. (1985). 'Turkish Teenage Girls in Australia: Experience, Attitudes and Expectations', in M. E. Poole, P. R. de Lacey and B.S. M. E., de Lacey, P. R. and B. S. Randhawa (eds.) *Australia in Transition: Culture and Life Possibilities*, (pp. 222-231). Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Young, C. (1988). The Changing Demographic Profile of Turks in Australia, in Ackelik, R. and Elley, J. (Eds.), *Turkish Community in Australia*, (pp. 22-43). Australian-Turkish Friendship Society Publications.
- Young, S., & Elley, J. (1980). *The Settlement Process of the Turkish in Outer Suburbs of Melbourne: prepared for Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs*. Surrey Hills, Vic.: MSJ Keys Young Planners.

- Yuval-Davis, N., Anthias, F., & Camping, J. (1989). *Woman, Nation, State*. Macmillan.
- Zevallos, Z. (2003). 'A Woman Is Precious': *Constructions of Islamic Sexuality and Femininity of Turkish-Australian Women*. Paper presented at the TASA 2003, University of New England.
- Zevallos, Z. (2004). 'You Have to be Anglo and Not Look Like Me': *Identity Constructions of Second Generation Migrant - Australian women*. (Doctoral dissertation, Swinburne University)
- Zevallos, Z. (2008). 'You Have to Be Anglo and Not Look Like Me': Identity and Belonging Among Young Women of Turkish and Latin American Backgrounds in Melbourne, Australia. *Australian Geographer*, 39(1), 21-43.
- Zigon, J. (2007). Moral Breakdown and the Ethical Demand. *Anthropological Theory* 7 (2), 131–150.
- Zigon, J. (2008). *Morality. An Anthropological Perspective*. Berg.