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Date:

2019

Citation:

Reuter, T. (2019). German Cultural Diplomacy in Indonesia: Building Cooperation in a Changing World. (1), Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen.

Persistent Link:

<https://hdl.handle.net/11343/233892>

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German Cultural Diplomacy in Indonesia: Building Cooperation in a Changing World

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Monographie / monograph

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:


Reuter, T. (2019). *German Cultural Diplomacy in Indonesia: Building Cooperation in a Changing World*. (ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy). Stuttgart: ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen). <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62399-2>

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ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy

German Cultural Diplomacy in Indonesia

Building Cooperation in a Changing World

Thomas Reuter

German Cultural Diplomacy in Indonesia Building Cooperation in a Changing World

Prof Thomas Reuter

“It is possible to live together, meet together, speak to each other, without losing one’s individual identity; and yet to contribute to the general understanding of matters of common concern, and to develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their well-being and survival on earth.”

President Sukarno, Bandung Conference, 18 April 1955.

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Foreword

“The future is uncertain, perhaps never more so than today, but strong and equitable partnerships such as this will be the best hope for us all.” Thomas Reuter in this study

With a population of 252 million, Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country and also home to the largest Muslim population. Indonesia is growing in terms of economic and political importance, and at the same time, it is transforming socially and culturally at a rapid pace. According to the author of this study this socio-cultural transformation is accompanied by serious tensions, conflicts and systemic risks, as well as new potentials. How could Germany be more engaged in Indonesia in terms of international cultural relations? Which topics are of interest in both countries, which issues could be tackled together?

The author of this study, Thomas Reuter, describes Indonesian traumata and the above mentioned current socio-cultural transformation, and identifies partners in science, education and culture. According to the needs expressed by various interviewees, the author develops possible actions to foster the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Germany. A special focus of this study is dedicated to interfaith dialogue and radicalisation prevention. This publication forms part of ifa’s Research Programme “Culture and Foreign Policy”, in which experts address relevant issues relating to culture and foreign policy with the aim of involving academics, practitioners, policymakers and civil society.

I would like to thank Thomas Reuter for his excellent work and commitment to this research project. In addition, I would like to thank my ifa colleagues Odila Triebel, Sarah Widmaier and Anja Schön for their work on the coordination and editing of this project.

ifa promotes art and cultural exchange through exhibitions, dialogue and conference programmes worldwide. As a competence centre for international cultural relations, ifa connects civil societies, cultural practices, art, media and science. Ruangrupa – an artist collective from Jakarta – has been selected as artistic director of the 15th edition of the Documenta in Kassel. This decision will bring a new, non-European perspective to the international discourse about art. We also have to include perspectives from outside of Europe in our work to be able to continuously reflect on it. To this end, we need research examining the status quo of bilateral relationships which also includes viewpoints of partner countries. This study is not only supposed to address a German audience, but also aims to inform Indonesian stakeholders about possible future collaborations.

Ronald Grätz

Secretary General, ifa

Abstract

This study examines how Germany is engaged in Indonesia through its cultural diplomacy-oriented institutions in the fields of education, science, culture and media. While the focus is on current activities, the history and likely future trends of the bilateral relationship are also explored. With Indonesia's economy rising and likely to surpass Germany's in terms of GDP within the near future, the hitherto very positive and strong relationship between the two countries needs to be sustained by preparing for the inevitable shift in mutual perceptions that will follow. Situated at the heart of the two most significant regional alliances, the EU and ASEAN, a strong partnership between the two countries will be not only of increasing mutual benefit but able to contribute much to maintaining a rules-based international order. The study aims to provide an overview and some specific suggestions for German decision makers responsible for giving direction to future engagement with Indonesia. It may also assist Indonesian actors to better understand and appreciate Germany's principled approach to cultural diplomacy and its intentions in building an ever-stronger partnership with Indonesia. Finally, the study contains a special section focusing on bilateral cooperation in the promotion of interfaith dialogue and radicalisation prevention.

Acknowledgements

Prominent Indonesian and German actors have generously given their time to share their experience with me in support of this study. I would like to express my sincere gratitude. Without their cooperation, the study would not have been grounded in a proper appreciation of the practical realities of German engagement in cultural and educational cooperation with Indonesia. My research on the current state of German cultural diplomacy in Indonesia, and its reception there, benefited greatly from conversations with Mr Valentin Gescher and Mr. Jan Kühn von Burgsdorff (German Foreign Office, Berlin), Dr Ludwig Kammesheidt (German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Berlin), Mr. Marc Seemann and Dr. Svann Langguth (German Embassy, Jakarta), Mr. Thomas Zettler (German Academic Exchange Service, DAAD Jakarta), Mr. Rafael de Bustamente and Ms. Destriani Nugroho (EU Delegation/Erasmus+, Jakarta), Dr Heinrich Bloemeke (Goethe-Institut, Jakarta), Mr. Patrick Benning and Ms. Vidi Legowo-Zitterer (Deutsche Welle), Mr. Philipp Johannsen (GIZ), Mr. Georg Buchholz (FORCLIME, GIZ), Ms. Ute Brockmann (EKONID), Ms. Anna Westerberger and Mr. Frank Malerius (German Trade & Invest, GTAI), Mr. Ida Bagus Narayana (Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, Jakarta), Mr. Sergio Grassi (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Jakarta), Mr. Moritz Kleine-Brockhoff and Ms. Besold, (Friedrich-Naumann Foundation for Freedom, SE Asia/Jakarta), Mr. Jan Senkyr (Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Jakarta), Romo Franz Magnis-Suseno (CITS, Jakarta), Mr. Sanga Pangabea and Mr. Ahmad Saufi (Indonesian Embassy, Berlin), Ms. Birgit Steffan (Rumah Budaya, Berlin), Ms. Ananta Purwoarminta and Ms. Yudawati Cahyarin (Indonesian Academy of Science, LIPI, Jakarta / RWTH Aachen), Prof Bassaruddin (Indonesian National Higher Education Accreditation Office, BAN-PT Jakarta), Prof Jimly Asshiddiqi (Jimly School of Law and Government), Prof Leenawaty Limantara (Rektor, Universitas Pembangunan Jaya), Mr. Ade Darmawan (Ruang Rupa Artist Collective), Ms. Ening Nurjanah (Salihara Cultural Center), Ms. Ekawati Indrawidjaja (Pres., German Teachers Association of Indonesia), Mr. Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif and Mr. Abdullah Darraz (Maarif Institut for Culture and Humanity), Mr. Ahmad Suaedy (Director, Islam Inklusif), Mr. Savic Ali (NU Online), Dr Ahmad Rumadi (NU, Office for Training and Human Resources, Lakpesdam), Ms. Alissa Wahid (Director, Gusdurian Network Indonesia), Mr. Ma'aruf Amin (Chair, MUI-Indonesian Ulema Council/ Vice-Presidential candidate), Prof Azyumardi Azra (State Islamic University Jakarta), Dr Burhanuddin Muchtadi (Indonesian National Bureau of Statistics), Mr. Imam Addaruqutni (Secretary General, Indonesian Council of Mosques and Vice President, Institute Qur'anic Studies), Mr. Ulil Abshar Abdalla (Liberal Islam network, JIL), and Mr. Noke Kiroyan (Chair, International Chamber of Commerce Indonesia, Former CEO, Siemens Indonesia). A few of these interviews had been conducted for other recent and closely related research. A number of further contributors have asked to remain anonymous.

Executive Summary

German cultural diplomacy outreach toward Indonesia is part of an effort to strengthen alliances with nations in Asia with whom Germany shares core values and concerns. Democratic Indonesia is clearly an attractive partner and there are excellent prospects for strategic cooperation. Engagement in the fields of science and technology, education, media and culture in Indonesia is a key aspect of Germany's overall diplomatic strategy, and the main focus of the present study.

An overview of this engagement is provided with an emphasis on identifying emerging trends. This comes at a time when the German-Indonesian relationship approaches a historical crossroads, as does the relationship between Asia and Europe in general. The size of the economies of the largest emerging markets (the E7) were 35% the size of the G7 economies in 1991, but overtook the G7 in 2016, and will be double their size by 2040, marking a dramatic reversal in global economic power. Recent forecasts predict Germany will drop from 5th to 9th largest economy by 2050, while Indonesia will rise from 8th to 4th place. A similar reversal is likely to take place in the knowledge sector. In 2000 the EU and US together still accounted for two-thirds of global R&D expenditure, but their combined share has now dropped below 50%.

To realise this forecast growth potential, Indonesia needs to diversify its economy away from undue reliance on natural resources, develop more effective administrative, political and legal institutions and, most of all, invest in education and scientific innovation. Indonesia's current government, which is likely to be re-elected in 2019, is trying to do precisely that, but will need all the know-how, technical assistance and investment it can get from trusted partners. This is a tremendous opportunity for Germany to build cooperation with Indonesia and set the scene for long-term positive relations.

The inevitable change from asymmetric to symmetric (in the mid 2020s) to reversed asymmetric relations, however, will require a great deal of flexibility in the thinking of leading actors on both sides so as to avoid a malalignment between established perceptions and emerging realities. This study finds that many steps in this direction have been taken already, with scope for some improvement.

Indonesia is also transforming socially and culturally at a rapid pace. Associated tensions pose a risk and could derail Indonesia's development trajectory. Corruption, weak fiscal policies and inequality hold the potential to undermine economic and political stability. On the cultural side, moral panic and resentment towards rapid social change are

giving rise to a sustained wave of Islamic conservatism. A further source of instability is the possibility of catastrophic environmental change, to which Indonesia is contributing as the world's fifth largest emitter of GHGs. Germany has been a key supporter of Indonesian forestry management, renewable energy production and overall sustainable development. This kind of cooperation is destined to intensify, given that climate change will undoubtedly be the dominant driver of global cooperation across all sectors for the foreseeable future.

Overall, Germany and Indonesia share many more common experiences and interests today than ever before in history. Both are middle powers at the core of regional alliances, both are champions of the rules-based international order and its associated peace dividend, defenders of trade liberation and increasingly caught in the diplomatic cross-fire between China and the US within a new and irreversibly multipolar geopolitical landscape, as well as having to face the many challenges of environmental change.

The impact of rapid economic, social, environmental and geopolitical change on the relationship between the two countries are explored in this study from the perspective of cultural diplomacy. Germany's current outreach effort in the fields of culture, language, education and science is assessed in the light of current trends, such as the rising demand for German language tuition and tertiary study in Germany. Indonesia's reception and response to German cultural diplomacy and its reciprocal diplomatic efforts in Germany are also charted. The study concludes with a special focus section on cooperation in inter-faith dialogue and radicalisation prevention, a matter that is of increasingly vital concern to both countries.

Preface: Some Notes on Methodology

Limitations and Scope

This study draws on a wide-ranging search of literature on recent German cultural and educational initiatives in Indonesia, conducted between September 2018 and January 2019. Strict limitations in time and resources did not allow for an exhaustive survey of the vast corpus of written and digital sources available, however, as this easily could have occupied a researcher for an entire year. The project also did not permit designated field research in Indonesia which, as an anthropologist, would have been my preferred method in order to explore what turns out to be a surprisingly large and complex set of social fields populated by regular German-Indonesian interactions.

It was a difficult proposition under these circumstances to try and extend knowledge beyond what is already known by senior actors, some of whom have spent years or even decades inhabiting part of this web of social fields, for example, by working in the Jakarta offices of the German ‘mediator organisations’ (*Mittlerorganisationen*). *Mittlerorganisationen* are funded by, but operate genuinely at arms-length of, the German government. This mediation of policy by semi-independent institutions is widely understood as a distinguishing feature of the German model (Adam 2016: 34). My experience has been that this approach to cultural diplomacy is very effective because it allows professional actors in mediator organisations the freedom to fulfil their given mandates in a rational, efficient and largely depoliticised manner. In global comparative perspective, such a highly professionalised system is by no means something to be taken for granted. Elsewhere cultural diplomacy has been, or has become, the subject of more central political control, as Rivera (2015) has argued in the case of the British Council, for example.

Note that my usage of the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ herein is meant to be understood as approximately synonymous with the German term *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik* (AKBP, lit. ‘cultural and educational foreign policy’).

Whatever preconceived opinion one may have of the relative merits of centralised and politicised vs. at-arms-length and professionalised cultural diplomacy systems, there is no debating the fact that the German system has been highly effective in enhancing the country’s ‘soft power’.¹ Germany was ranked third (after the UK and France and followed by the US and Japan) in the latest worldwide Soft-Power-30 Report (McClory 2018). In the

¹ Following the theory of ‘soft power’ put forward by J.S. Nye (2004), I am arguing that cultural diplomacy contributes significantly to soft power in a wide variety of ways.

subcategories of the report to which cultural diplomacy is most relevant, Germany overtook the UK for the first time to rank second in education, while occupying third place in ‘engagement’ and fourth place in the ‘culture’ and ‘digital’ subcategories (see Figure 1). Considering the language disadvantage Germany and all other non-English-speaking countries have to contend with, this is a remarkable achievement.




Figure 1: Germany's Rank in the Subcategories of the Soft Power 30 Report 2018
Source: McClory 2018: 59

Looking for ways to help improve this system I had at first anticipated that, in the de-centralised and variegated institutional landscape of German ‘mediator organisations’ active in Indonesia, the individual actors would be at risk to remain confined within their respective organisational silos and may not necessarily gain much knowledge of the larger project of German cultural diplomacy as a whole. While this was true for staff with only

short periods of service in Indonesia, it turned out that actors in senior positions with years of immersion in this web of social fields do know one another well and generally collaborate effectively across organisations. In the process, they are able to gain an overview of the wider diplomatic context in which they operate, beyond their own specific professional niche. This is particularly true of long-term embassy staff, who act as a permanent hub of connectivity between the different fields and sometimes as coordinators of joint activities. Continuity of tenure in all institutions involved is a vital prerequisite for the formation and continued existence of such a senior group of key actors. It is also they who have the deepest personal connections with Indonesian partners, reflecting the time and opportunity they have had to build the kind of local, personal networks that are indispensable in Indonesia.

While Indonesia is very familiar to me, following years of in-country research on a very wide range of topics, this particular web of social fields and its associated institutional structures was largely unknown to me prior to commencing this study. I had only had occasional and incidental encounters with German institutional or corporate actors in Indonesia or with prominent Indonesian actors who have a 'German connection'.

The key methodological question driving the design choices of this study was thus: How to produce new knowledge, especially relative to senior actors who already possess broad oversight of the overall field of German cultural diplomacy in Indonesia, notwithstanding the limited time and resources available. Two sets of strategies were employed toward achieving this objective. These strategies relate to research and analysis respectively.

Empirical Research Strategy

At the research end, more than forty telephone interviews were conducted for this study, in four languages with a wide range of key actors between September 2018 and January 2019. Interviews ranged from one to two hours with each interlocutor, sometimes across two sessions.

A first set of interviews, with German actors, provided an up-to-date impression of their current activities as agents of cultural diplomacy, of issues and trends in each of their respective subfields, as well as an overview of the wider web of interaction that constitutes the field of German foreign cultural and educational politics in Indonesia as a whole. Particular attention was directed at identifying any redundancies, mutual blind spots and cooperative deficits between the German institutions.

The second set of interviews were with Indonesian partners with which German actors come into regular contact, as well as with a number of other important Indonesian actors outside their networking range. The Indonesian interviewees were strongly encouraged to voice their concerns freely and make suggestions, so as to gain an accurate impression of how German cultural diplomacy is received in Indonesia. The conversations were indeed free and open, in part because confidentiality was offered to allow for the airing of opinions on sensitive issues, where needed. This proved largely unnecessary as the Indonesian actors' view of Germany and its institutions is overwhelmingly positive. Such concerns as there are were expressed candidly. The exception here were a few Indonesian institutional actors who had all the requisite experience and expert knowledge to comment but felt unauthorised to represent the views of their respective state institutions without formal authorisation.² A few other interviews, conducted for a major research project on Indonesia's national elite in 2009-2015, were also relevant to the aims of this study, particularly interviews with leading Indonesian actors in the fields of education, culture and religion.

Overall, the interviews provided a relatively comprehensive overview of German cultural diplomacy activities and an honest assessment of their reception in Indonesia, thanks to my positioning as a neutral observer unencumbered by vested interests.

In addition, I was able to draw on my prior research experience in Indonesia as a general knowledge base. Spanning 27 years, this experience comprises some five years of in-country research in the form of ethnographic fieldwork, conducted in various parts of Indonesia on a wide range of topics. With this research I was fortunate to be able to explore the life worlds of very different Indonesians, from indigenous people in the (at the time) remote highlands of Bali and the interior of Borneo, to middle-class social movements in urban Java and Bali, to the hidden world of national elite circles in Jakarta. The results of this research were communicated in twelve books, two documentary films and more than 120 scientific articles. Regular interaction with Indonesian universities and the building of agreements and international student exchange programmes between partner institutions were also a part of my engagement. While none of the aforementioned research was tailored to suit the specific needs of this study, it does provide a wealth of contextual knowledge and insights on Indonesian society, politics and culture.

² Authorised official statements follow a process that would have been too protracted to be completed within the time frame of this study. Generally, such statements should be requested by the relevant German authorities. Such statements, in any case, would most likely avoid touching upon sensitive issues.

The overview of German cultural diplomacy gained from interviews with key German actors across the full range of mediator organisations, the exploration of Indonesian actors' perspectives on Germany, and insights derived from extensive prior research together provide this study with sufficient empirical data to make a meaningful contribution to a, hopefully, much wider debate on how German-Indonesian relations can be advanced in future. The study should be particularly useful also to Indonesians seeking to understand and form an opinion about German cultural diplomacy efforts in their country.

Theoretical Model and Analytical Framework

At the analysis end, the strategy has been to draw on the general theoretical tools of socio-cultural anthropology, and on 'practice' and 'actor-network theory' as a specific analytic framework to describe the social field of German cultural diplomacy in Indonesia. Given that this study is written for a general readership, a technical discussion of the potentially very complex theoretical considerations implicit in a study such as this would not be appropriate. It nonetheless may be helpful to explain briefly the characteristics of the specific theoretical model and analytical framework I have adopted.

The anthropological, comparative study of human 'cultures' works with a culture concept that differs radically from popular understandings of the term in Germany and elsewhere, where the word 'culture' (G. *Kultur*) tends to be associated mainly with the arts. In anthropology a people's culture is not confined to artistic expressions. Culture is the sum total of all content obtained by individual learning in the course of people's social interaction within a locally focused field of dense social relations. The content of learnt culture includes language, non-verbal communication, social norms, scripts and strategies, gender relations, intergenerational relations, intra- and interethnic relations, methods of child-rearing and education, all manner of knowledge and skills, material culture, agriculture, art, key symbols, metaphors, tropes and narratives, literature, music, cultural epistemologies and ontologies, human ecologies, insider knowledge of all manner of social, economic and political arrangements, value constructs, customary and religious beliefs, and cosmologies. In short, a culture is an entire way of life. Cultural practice is often so habitual as to be taken for granted by practitioners.

The use of a scientific concept of culture is important because it leads inevitably to a critical perspective on cultural diplomacy, which can sometimes remain caught up in narrow, elitist or simply ill-founded conceptions of what culture is or should be, and hence may not always be the most effective way of promoting genuine and comprehensive cross-cultural understanding in the holistic, anthropological sense. A recent study on

German AKBP literature in relation to 'Dialogue with Islam' similarly notes that there has been "a lack of effort to develop a critical differentiated culture concept" (Ernst 2015: 283, abbreviated quote).³

Within the field of anthropology, and in social science more broadly, different theoretical models compete to explain socio-cultural phenomena. The specific model I have chosen and adapted for my research in Indonesia, as well as for the present study, has three main components. My approach to ethnographic research has been inspired by Pierre Bourdieu's concept of 'social fields' (Fr. *champs*), which explains how networked patterns of human interaction are formed, maintained and altered in the course of persistent strategic contestations in the course of people's practical interactions (Bourdieu 1977, 1998). The advantage of such a 'practice' oriented theory is that it does not mystify human relations through the use of abstractions such as 'Indonesian society' or 'German culture', which can easily lead to the misconception that big words such as these correspond to fixed, monolithic realities. At the same time, Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' recognises that human interactions are necessarily regulated in various ways. They can therefore also be described in general terms, though keeping in mind that behavioural regularity is an emergent property, or the current momentum within a dynamic flux of continuous interaction (Reuter 2002). Focusing on practice is also advantageous because discourse is often a poor indicator of social realities, though it is no doubt also a part thereof. Politically motivated actors at every scale tend to strategically employ discursive claims that are designed precisely to make us forget the emergent character of social realities, and instead to give to social life a false flair of permanence, even an object character. Understanding and recognising such 'regimes of truth' (Foucault 1977) within the social prevents us from unwittingly reproducing and reifying them at the level of analysis. In my approach, critical discourse analysis is therefore a second essential prerequisite.

Along with Bourdieu's methodological scepticism towards discourse, I take aboard many of the core insights of post-colonial critiques of cross-cultural meta-discourses produced in the context of the western project of colonial domination, which has left Indonesia and many other countries with a legacy of very significant historical trauma. This critique raises some uncomfortable and timely questions as to how the rapidly changing relationship between western and post-colonial nations can be liberated from this restric-

³ Full original quote: „Sowohl in den Aussagen der Mittler als auch des Auswärtigen Amts konnte festgestellt werden, dass es wenige Bemühungen gibt, eine kritisch-differenzierte Auseinandersetzung mit Begriffen wie Kultur und interkulturell zu führen. Dies deutet auf eine Ad-hoc Pragmatik und eine unreflektierte Übernahme von Kulturbegriffen hin [...]“.

tive and potentially dangerous legacy, and how it can be set upon a more solid and just foundation. Unlike some post-colonial scholars (e.g. Said 1984), I do not think it is futile or fundamentally immoral to say anything at all about other societies and their cultures, because I know from experience that people's interest in 'others' is often built not on a desire to dominate them but a desire to understand, empathise and make friends. We have choices when we engage with cultural others, and the scope for such choice is broadened by reflexivity and morally grounded engagement.

The final component in my analytical approach draws on a set of ethnographic methodologies I have had to develop in the course of my research in order to do justice to the undeniable impacts of globalisation in Indonesia and everywhere else. Anthropology has often been described as the science of the local, and until the 1970s its main focus indeed had been to chart the staggering diversity of localised human societies and cultures. Globalisation, however, has accentuated that networks of social interaction may be locally focused in many ways, but do not exist in isolation from other networks. In today's world, people living in very distant localities can and do influence one another in significant ways. One could describe contemporary societies as a single social network of global reach within which zones of relatively higher interactive density nevertheless persist.

The strategies I developed to chart the complex intersections between the global and the local (Reuter 1999, 2009) were not inspired by, but happen to be, rather similar to the recommendations put forth by Bruno Latour (2005: 173ff) in his general actor-network theory, and by Anna Tsing (2005) in her work on global-local intersections in modern Indonesia. In essence, these and other social scientists have recognised that the global is always local and the local always global today, in this Anthropocene age of environmental change, where the solution of problems of the global commons depends on local mitigation and adaptation measures underwritten by global agreements (Reuter 2015). More generally, anthropological analysis reveals that globalisation is not at all monolithic or monodirectional. There are countless different local ways of participating in and shaping the 'global' and hence many alternative forms of modernity. The ethnographic task is thus to explore seemingly disparate but interconnected sites (through multi-sited ethnography), to trace the flows between them that produce particular localising or globalising effects, and to explore the accompanying inequalities and frictions, alliances and resonances. Social theories that were already focused on the study of practice within social networks or 'nested fields of social interaction' have been the ones best suited to this task, which explains their increasing popularity.

It is generally characteristic of anthropologists that we tend to adopt a holistic approach. This is not with the aim to substitute other sciences so much as to bridge between them and thereby reveal that various aspects of life, such as the arts, politics and economics, are not isolated domains but elements within encompassing cultural formations that share common features.

Task-oriented studies such as this nevertheless require data sets and analytical methods that do not neatly match the tools available within any one discipline. The disciplinary orientation of the person conducting the research can thus act as a serious limitation. In this case, I happen to be an anthropologist and not an expert historian, media analyst or political scientist of Indonesia. As such I bring specific strengths to the task as well as limitations, which need to be ameliorated. What is helpful in this regard is that I have been crossing disciplinary boundaries for some years now, publishing professionally in fields of research ranging from sustainability to food security, climate change, religion, politics, economics and globalisation. I also have had extensive work experience in highly interdisciplinary intellectual environments, for example, as a past executive member of the International Social Science Council, a board member of Future Earth (Asia) and a fellow of the World Academy (WAAS). My interactions with colleagues in these interdisciplinary fora have encouraged me to make many boundary crossings I otherwise may not have attempted.

A Note on the Role of New Media

Some methodological innovation has become necessary to extend the capacity of 'interactive social field' and 'actor-network' type of models in social science, prompted in particular by the recent rise of a range of new digital media that have facilitated a whole new system of worldwide interactive flows. All social scientists have had to either take this into consideration in their practice as researchers or remain blind to a major category of contemporary social interactions.

In Indonesia, TV remains the leading source of news and entertainment-based socio-cultural information. Between 1998 and 2008 television reach increased almost threefold, and in 2017 it reached 96% of all households according to a recent Nielsen survey (Lubis 2017). Radio remains important also (37% reach) but has been eclipsed by internet-based media (44%). Free-to-air TV too is slowly losing ground to streaming sites like YouTube and online TV portals, according to the same survey. By June 2013, remarkably, Indonesia had almost 64 million active Facebook and about 30 million Twitter users, with Jakarta becoming the world's most tweeted city in 2012, ahead of London, New York and Tokyo

(Stott 2014), prompting CNN to describe Indonesia as the 'Twitter nation' (Carley et al. 2015: 5). By 2018, the number of Facebook users had grown to 130 million, the fourth largest number internationally (Jakarta Post 2018), compared to 28 million German users. Apart from Facebook's 'Messenger' application, WhatsApp is also used prolifically, enabling virtual face-to-face communication via video calling. This growth is underpinned by improved internet access in Indonesia, which reached 143 million users in 2018 and is set to grow further, given that the younger generation are prolific users while the smallest portion (4.2%) of users were those above the age of 54 (Kompas 2018).

In this study, consequently, some attention will be paid to the reception of German cultural diplomacy efforts in Indonesian social media, and on whether social media are actively utilised by the various German actors. Note that Indonesia's love affair with social media contrasts quite strongly with a relatively greater hesitance towards social media use in Germany. As we shall see, this is reflected in a relative low level of attention to such media within German cultural diplomacy strategies in Indonesia.⁴

Special Focus on Interfaith Relations and Radicalisation Prevention

Part of my brief was to pay special attention to existing and potential new areas of German-Indonesian cooperation in the promotion of peaceful relations between different faith communities, and the prevention of religiously framed political radicalism. There are good reasons for focusing on this issue, given that ethno-religious tension has become an important problem for both countries at this moment in their history, if in somewhat different ways, reflecting very different histories and trajectories. Religious conflict and change have also been major themes in my own previous research.

In a separate focus section (Chapter 5), I will discuss current German-Indonesian programmes for cooperation in this field, followed by suggestions on how to expand existing collaboration networks to include additional Indonesian partners who are at the forefront of organisations promoting religious tolerance and peace.

⁴ Germany (and also France) differs from other developed countries with high levels of internet use in that only about half of internet users engage with social media, most of them in less educated and younger age groups. Concerns about privacy and the strength of traditional media may in part explain this anomaly. For a recent analysis see <https://marketinghelfer.com/en/social-media-germany/> [27/02/2019].

Personal Positioning

A researcher's personal positioning and cultural conditioning inevitably shapes their perspective on the world. Scientific training should reduce the potential for bias therein through various methods of self-reflexivity, but it cannot and need not entirely obliterate a personal perspective. Indeed, some things are visible only from very specific perspectives, and personal perspectives are thus a source of rich knowledge diversity. It is necessary however, to declare one's positioning and thus enable readers to decide for themselves whether it has or has not caused any bias.

In my case, it does matter for this study that I was born and raised in Germany and within a German cultural context. I then spent most of my adult life and my entire research career in Australia, however, which has diversified my perspective significantly. This was interspersed with many years of living in Asia, and especially in Indonesia. After deep and continuous engagement with Indonesian people, their society and culture over a period of a quarter century, Indonesia feels like a second home to me now, and this too has profoundly shaped me as a person.

I approach this study therefore with deeply felt spontaneous empathy for both Germany and Indonesia, coupled with an acquired ability to adopt a critical third-party perspective on both countries where it is helpful to do so. My motive in taking on this task was to make a contribution toward growing cooperation and friendship between Germany and Indonesia, in a spirit of mutual appreciation, respect and fairness, for the wellbeing of people in both countries. English rather than German was chosen as the language of presentation to ensure the report will be useful also to Indonesian audiences who would like to understand how Germany is trying to engage with their country.

The opinions expressed herein are my own, unless otherwise attributed to a specific source. The reader may choose to treat as unconfirmed any views herein attributed to anonymous sources, which was needed in a few cases to facilitate confidential feedback on sensitive issues.

1. Introduction: The German-Indonesian Relationship at a Crossroads

“Only if we know and respect the dreams and especially the traumas that determine the thinking and feeling of the Other, and the historical narratives that shape contemporary responses, can we hope to learn the Other’s perspective and, often only in this way, to develop a well-founded perspective of our own.” Former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (AA 2015a).⁵

1.1 Historical Asymmetries and Affinities

When Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, spoke the words of hope for international cooperation cited in the epitaph, Indonesia had just emerged from a struggle for independence ending centuries of colonial domination at the hands of a European power. Most Indonesians are well aware that the collapse of the Dutch colonial empire was triggered by Germany’s invasion of the Netherlands, one fateful week, in May 1940. Imperial Japan utilised the ensuing power vacuum to occupy the archipelago, while Dutch East Indies troops took refuge in Australia. Indonesia’s nascent independence movement was boosted by these events, and “Indonesia’s” independence was declared by Sukarno and Hatta on 17 August 1945, shortly after the Japanese withdrawal.⁶

When the Dutch attempted to stage a military comeback, they were met with fierce resistance, especially in Java, and the main port of Surabaya was subjected to aerial bombardment. External political support for the Dutch soon evaporated, in their Australian base and internationally, in a climate where former colonies’ calls for independence were echoing around the globe and Europeans were tired of war. By the time the Dutch finally gave up in 1949, many Indonesians had already been killed, however, and their sacrifice in the nation’s now legendary ‘revolutionary struggle’ (*perjuangan revolusi*) is heavily memorialised until today. The Second World War is remembered as a process that ended in the demise of European colonial empires, also more generally in the wider region. Other European powers, including Spain, Portugal, France and Britain, also had long held parts of Southeast Asia and were expelled in often fierce independence struggles in the

⁵ Original text in German: “Nur wenn wir wissen und würdigen, welche Träume - und vor allem auch Traumata! - das Denken und Fühlen des anderen bestimmt, welche historischen Narrative aktuelle Antworten mit beeinflussen, nur dann erlernen wir den fremden Blick – und oft auch erst dadurch einen sicheren eigenen.”

⁶ The original use of the name “Indonesia” is often attributed to the German anthropologist Adolf Bastian (1826-1905), who published a five-volume description of the cultures of the archipelago in 1856 (DÜS 2011).

aftermath of the war.⁷ In the context of this history, Germany is perceived in Indonesia and in Southeast Asia not as a former colonial power so much as a nemesis of the latter, similar to Japan, but without the many negative experiences associated with Japanese occupation.

There had been a German presence in the Dutch East Indies from the 16th century onwards. Some individuals of German ethnicity had partaken in and profited from the plantation economy in the capacity of traders or land holders, four had served as governor general of the VOC (Dutch East India Company), and many others had been active as missionaries across the archipelago. In the 1870s, not long after Germany united into a nation state (1871), the first consulates were opened in Medan, Padang, Makassar, Surabaya and Semarang. Companies like Siemens, Krupp and Benz & Co. had begun trade with the colony from the 19th century, and an initially loosely organised network of German traders was formalised to become a German chamber of commerce from 1924 to 1940. Meanwhile artists, like the German painter Walter Spies (arrived in 1927), discovered the archipelago for very different reasons, namely for its natural beauty and rich cultural heritage.

Indonesians also remember and first drew my attention to the fact that Germans in the colony found themselves on the same side as the independence movement when the Dutch returned, interning many Germans, including Walter Spies, who was left to die together with hundreds of other internees in an infamous incident. Dozens of Germans joined the Indonesian independence struggle, including some marines who were training Indonesians at a Yogyakarta military academy at the time of the Japanese withdrawal (Jo 2015; Geerken 2015).

The early bilateral relationship is thus marked by a lack of any historical enmity and some unexpected affinities, though also and overwhelmingly by a sense of distance – geographical, historical, cultural, and in terms of the two countries' relative development. The development gap became a main characteristic of post-WW2 relations.

⁷ France relinquished in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in 1954. Britain withdrew from Burma in 1947 and Malaysia in 1957. Portugal retained a tenuous hold on Timor Leste until 1974. In the case of the Philippines, formal independence from the US was gained in 1946 but this was subject to conditions that seriously compromised sovereignty.

Independent Indonesia inherited from the Dutch a dual economy, with a subsistence agricultural base and a plantation sector producing export goods (Abdullah 2009, Geertz 1966), which required significant restructuring and land reforms. It also inherited a huge Netherlands colonial government debt to be repaid by the young republic in keeping with the 1949 Round Table Conference agreement (Gouda and Zaalberg 2002). This left Indonesia in need of financial and technical assistance, but also hesitant to accept it due to the risk of sliding back into a new kind of ‘company colonialism’ built on financial and economic domination, similar to the initial phase of Dutch colonialism.

Germany, a European country with a very high level of industrial-technological development, though still in the midst of reconstruction, must have appeared to Sukarno as a nation very different from his own, and different also from the fellow developing countries he had addressed at the Bandung Conference in 1955. He nevertheless saw Germany as a suitable partner for cooperation. The German chamber of commerce was reopened, formal diplomatic relations were established in 1952, and Indonesia opened an embassy in Bonn in 1954. Germany was to become a strong supporter of the new nation on multiple levels. Indonesia also provided political support in return. At a talk at Heidelberg University in 1956, Sukarno became the first foreign head of state to call for German reunification, defending the country’s right to be free of foreign interference.⁸ Under Sukarno, and as a non-aligned nation, Indonesia was able to build trade relations also with the German Democratic Republic.

The bilateral relationship after independence can be described as ‘asymmetric cooperation’, marked by a substantial flow of German investment, technical assistance and aid to Indonesia. In the post-colonial period, Germany’s industry, reborn from the ashes of the war, began to invest in Indonesia on an unprecedented scale, especially from 1955 onward, while the German government became a fairly well-trusted source of development aid to Indonesia. Such asymmetry need not be harmful to a cooperative relationship under the right conditions (Rousselin 2017), but there is of course a heightened risk. What then motivated Sukarno – who famously treated foreign investment and aid with utmost suspicion, as a double-edged sword at best and an instrument of neo-colonialism at worst – to visit Krupp in Essen, Borgward in Hamburg, Hoechst AG and IG Farben in Frankfurt and Daimler-Benz in Stuttgart on an economic mission during his 1956 state visit to Germany? Sukarno, it seems, did not think of the divided post-war Germany as a neo-colonial power with geopolitical ambitions, and hence was finding common ground and much

⁸ <https://www.dw.com/id/merajut-persatuan-ala-sukarno/a-36802992> [27/02/2019].

scope for political and economic cooperation on a basis of non-symmetric but honest and fair mutuality. He actively encouraged these companies to invest in Indonesia, which some of them did.




Figure 2: Map of the Indonesian Archipelago

To some other countries, however, Indonesia was indeed but an instrument for their geopolitical strategic game, which was preoccupied with communist containment during this period. Exactly as Sukarno had feared, and after numerous failed plots to destroy Sukarno (Weiner 2007: 147-153), his left-leaning government was finally toppled in a CIA-backed military coup, and replaced with a more compliant regime under General Suharto in 1965-66. In the course of this 'regime change' between 500,000 and one million unarmed Indonesian civilians, accused of being communists or Sukarno supporters, were brutally butchered in the 20th century's most well-concealed mass murder. The military also enlisted militias to join in the murder, composed of volunteers from Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, the two largest Muslim organisations, and sometimes forced people at gunpoint to bury their own neighbours in mass graves. The well-organised mass killings of 1965/66 are no doubt the greatest historical trauma affecting the country until this day, and one cannot hope to understand anything at all about Indonesia without considering

this cataclysm. Details on the precise chain of events, as far as they can be reconstructed,⁹ can be found in the work of Roosa (2006), details on the killings in Cribb (1990) and Fealy & McGregor (2010), and on the subsequent mythmaking and historical denialism under Suharto's so-called New Order regime in the work of Heryanto (1999).

Suffice to say that Indonesia failed to engage in a truth and reconciliation process, despite some valiant later efforts by Abdurrahman Wahid during his term as president. Suharto's institutionalised denial of history was fully supported by the foreign powers who had installed him and subsequently celebrated him as a Cold War hero and a wonderful business partner. This is a stark contrast to Germany, where the terrible crimes of the Holocaust, committed under the fascist NS regime, have been the subject of a great deal of soul-searching and memorialisation, in full public view and with full state support, though admittedly also under the influence of some international pressure.

It would be wrong to try and compare the two events in terms of the number of victims or the severity of the suffering inflicted upon them, each bearing horrendous testimony in its own right to the darkest of human potentials.¹⁰ One commonality, however, is the heavy burden of collective guilt and shame these historic experiences have placed on the citizens of the two countries. In Indonesia, this guilt and shame is still a severely destructive force, contained temporarily by a wall of denial and false justifications but having lost none of its lethal potential, for example, by giving would-be perpetrators of violence a sense that it is possible to commit unspeakable political crimes with impunity so long as one emerges victorious. In Germany such potential exists the less so for every bit of work that has gone into acts of collective self-reflection and restitution. This work, admittedly, was never quite sufficient and must continue. Germany nevertheless did gain a measure of immunity to fascist propaganda by accepting historical responsibility and by teaching generations of school children how to deconstruct the false logic and understand the psychology of authoritarian propaganda (Adorno 1978). And yet, the recent rise of the reactionary political party AfD shows that the struggle is never over, and complacency

⁹ Some US files have been released but the relevant CIA files are apparently so incriminating that they still remain classified after more than 50 years, which is way beyond the average classified period (HRW 2017).

¹⁰ I have personally heard dozens of eye-witness accounts of the "anti-communist" purge under Suharto, which included detailed descriptions of unspeakable atrocities committed by both military and local militias against innocent men, women, children and even newborn infants. I also conducted a five-hour interview with Suharto's right-hand man and secretary of state, Moerdiono, shortly before his death, in which he confirmed extensive foreign involvement in the coup, in the planning of the killings, and in subsequent upholding of the Suharto regime at any cost.

must not set in. Should Indonesia consider addressing its unresolved issues with the recent past, it would do well to look at the German model of *Erinnerungskultur* ('culture of memory') and also at the strategies used by the truth-and-reconciliation commission under Archbishop Desmond Tutu on the crimes of the Apartheid regime in South Africa (Tutu 1999). Meanwhile, the renewed surge of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia bears testimony to the enduring potential for violence from reactionary political forces.

The 1965 coup set the scene for much of Indonesia's postcolonial history and its relations with the West for 32 years, until the Suharto regime was finally toppled in a popular uprising in 1998. The influence of the US government and US-led Bretton Woods organisations on Indonesia and its policies was extremely strong during the Suharto period. As President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana concisely put it that same year, and not long before he suffered the same fate as Sukarno:

"The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality [however] its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside."
(Nkrumah 1965: ix).

Following an investor conference in Geneva, corporations from the US and its close allies began to divide the natural resources of Indonesia between themselves. German companies did not have most privileged access, perhaps, but some did eventually benefit from the new 'open door' policy on foreign investment (UU No 1/1967) that was quickly legislated, as part of the price Suharto had to pay for power (Winters 1996). The Siemens Indonesia factory (Pulomas), established in 1975, is an example. Perhaps the most notorious economic trophy amongst the rich spoils, however, was the Freeport gold mine of West Papua (Leith 2002). Indonesian public perception of such iconic foreign-owned extractivist enterprises is that they constituted a new form of colonial exploitation and did not benefit the country. These sentiments have not abated until today. In 2018, for example, it was still front-page news when incumbent president Joko Widodo was able to announce the acquisition by Indonesia of a majority share in the Freeport mine, highlighting his economic nationalist credentials in the lead up to the 2019 elections (Jakarta Post 2018).¹¹

¹¹ For a detailed report (in German) on economic nationalist sentiments and protectionism in Indonesia today, see www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/Recht-Zoll/Zoll/freihandelsabkommen,t=nationale-befindlichkeiten-bremsen-indonesiens-freihandelsambitionen,did=2185422.html [27/02/2019].

The Suharto regime, loudly celebrated as a staunch ally by the US and others, clearly constituted a continuation of the pattern of 'elite capture' by foreign powers that had become entrenched in Indonesia during centuries of Dutch colonialism, particularly under the so-called 'self-rule' policy (Dutch *zelfbestuur*). All forms of political opposition were suppressed, as western nations turned a blind eye to associated human rights abuses. The 2.1 billion USD of pre-1966 'Sukarno debt' was rescheduled by the Paris Club of creditor institutions in 1970. New loans and a greatly increased flow of investments lifted Indonesian economic growth, and the government was able to take steps to drastically reduce poverty, improve infrastructure, food security, health services and education. Suharto is thus acknowledged in Indonesia as the 'Father of Development' (I. *Bapak Pembangunan*), a term containing a great deal of irony because his development projects were also known for dispossessing local people, social injustice, environmental damage, and, most of all, corruption. The culture of corruption was so rampant that much of the newly required 'Suharto debt' of 159 billion USD was not spent in productive ways (Buchori and Bahagijo 2000). The full extent of the private fortune amassed by his family may never be known (about 15-35 billion USD), but suffice to say that Forbes ranks Suharto first in its list of the World's All-time Most Corrupt Leaders.¹² While Indonesians themselves still maintain a range of views on this period, my personal view is that, while economic growth and development can be reconciled with authoritarianism, the latter is by no means a prerequisite for development and hence cannot be legitimised in this way.

Germany's relationship to Indonesia was disrupted in 1965, as well as by some disputes about debt relief, but a state visit by Suharto in 1970 and his meeting with Chancellor Willy Brandt led to a normalisation. German investment grew strongly again in the 1970s. Some tensions arose over atrocities committed by the military, especially in Indonesian occupied East Timor and in the context of arms sales to Indonesia. The intensifying economic relationship, however, was not to be jeopardised, and a measure of this new intensity was the formation in April 1975 of a German-Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the opening of the industrial fair INDOGERMA by Suharto in 1979, as well as numerous partnerships in culture, education and science. An important supportive role in these developments was played by B.J. Habibie, who had studied at the Technical University of Aachen and worked for weapons and aeronautics company Messerschmitt Bölkow Blohm between 1955 and 1974, before returning to Indonesia, where he found favour with Suharto and rose to the positions of Minister of Technology and, eventually, Vice-President. Habibie was the go-to person for many economic, science and

¹² <https://www.forbes.com/pictures/eedh45fgjme/mohamed-suharto/#190caa4e4156> [27/02/2019].

political initiatives between the two countries and he received high public honours in Germany in acknowledgement of this contribution.

The Asian Financial Crisis that began in Thailand in 1997 temporarily arrested the advance of the Indonesian economy, which had grown strongly since the late 1970s. Rapidly rising consumer prices caused hardship, providing the trigger for a long overdue political uprising that came to be known as the *Gerakan Reformasi* (Reform Movement), and eventually forced Suharto to step down. Vice-president B.J. Habibie served as interim president and initiated major reforms, leading to decentralisation and free democratic elections in 1999 (the first since 1955). Abdurrahman Wahid became President of Indonesia, followed by Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of Sukarno) in 2001, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004 (two terms), and Joko Widodo in 2014, who is vying for re-election in 2019.

Overall the return to democracy in the *Reformasi* period has been remarkably successful (Reuter 2010). Corruption remains a major challenge, especially due to the dependence of political parties on donations for campaign funds (Reuter 2015b), but significant progress has been made, evidenced by the long series of very high-profile corruption cases led to conclusion by the new KPU (Corruption Eradication Commission). Other challenges relate to the politicisation of Islam, rising economic inequality (the GINI ratio rose from 0.30 in the year 2000 to 0.41 in 2014, and dropped back to 0.397 in March 2016) and an underlying tendency for self-serving transactional politics within a diverse but collusive elite environment. It should be recalled, however, that many European democracies today face similar problems to varying degrees.

Another important development began during the Suharto period, with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that established ASEAN in 1976. Germany responded in 1977 by announcing its commitment to engage strongly with ASEAN, following a state visit by Indonesian foreign minister Malik to Germany. Support for ASEAN has been continuous ever since, no doubt in part due to Germany's similar experience with regional cooperation within the European Union. Inspired in part by the European model, at its 13th Summit in 2007 ASEAN decided to create the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), a single market across member states. The AEC was launched in 2015, but practical implementation continues. The integration of Germany within the EU and simultaneous integration of Indonesia within ASEAN has greatly increased the geopolitical significance and impact of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

In addition, the EU – with prominent German involvement – is also building its cooperation specifically with Indonesia. As European Council president Donald Tusk put it, in a speech at the EU-ASEAN Summit in Manila (14 November 2017):

“The potential for greater engagement is enormous. From trade to climate, from maritime security to counter-terrorism [...]. We both believe in rules-based multilateralism as opposed to geo-political spheres of influence [...]. Further enhancing our relations based on common interests and the shared values of democracy, human rights and rule of law, is a priority for the EU.”¹³

Negotiations towards an EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) entered their sixth round in October 2018. The second EU-Indonesia Working Group on Environment and Climate Change was held in March, the third annual EU-Indonesia Security Dialogue in November, and the third Joint Committee under the EU-Indonesia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in December 2018, just to provide an impression of the intensity of current activity in this space. This also highlights the extent to which the German-Indonesian bilateral relationship is, and increasingly will be, embedded in multilateral and regional cooperation agreements. This has significant implications for future trends in foreign policy, including cultural diplomacy. Increasingly, there is an ambiguity between the German and the European position in this field (Schneider 2017), accompanied by difficult decisions that need to be made on how to split funding across the two levels.

1.2 Germany's Presence in Indonesia Today

For forty years, between 1967 and 2007, Germany and other countries provided financial support and aid to Indonesia under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia and the Consultative Group on Indonesia. It still is true today that economic interests remain central to the relationship between Germany and Indonesia, but there is also strong evidence that the model of asymmetric cooperation is nearing the end of its use-by date.

According to the German Federal Ministry for the Economy and Energy (BMWi), bilateral trade in 2017 reached 6.97 billion USD, with a relatively good balance of

¹³ Source: European Council, press release posted at www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/14/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-asean-eu-summit-in-manila/ [27/02/2019].

3.08 billion USD of German exports and 3.89 billion USD of imports. German exports are mainly focused on machinery, cars and automotive parts, and Indonesian exports on palm oil, agricultural produce, textiles, footwear and minerals. Trade peaked at 8.21 billion USD in 2012 and then declined, with a slight recovery in 2017, followed by a double digit rise in trade volume in 2018.¹⁴ In 2017 German FDI in Indonesia reached 289 million USD, or 0.9% of the total FDI received by Indonesia (2016: 133 million USD or 0.45%). This is a rather small share of the overall FDI flow to Indonesia, the major sources of which were Singapore (19.5%), Japan (17.5%), China (16.4%) and Hongkong (7.5%) in 2017.¹⁵

The German-Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Trade (EKONID) today represents the interests of German companies active in Indonesia, including Siemens, MAN, ThyssenKrupp, and the chemical companies BASF, Bayer, Beiersdorf, Merck, Henkel and Evonik. Daimler/Mercedes-Benz and BMW assemble cars in Indonesia. The Allianz AG and Deutsche Bank represent the banking and insurance sector. Others major players include the logistic firms DHL, Schenker and Hapag Lloyd, as well as Heidelberger Zement, Fuchs Oil und Schott AG.

The ‘Comprehensive Partnership’ negotiations between Indonesia and the EU and the increased attention the EU pays to ASEAN, as described earlier, suggest that geopolitical cooperation may have caught up with trade and investment in relative diplomatic importance. Diplomatic activity in the field of politics has reached an almost frenetic pitch in the wake of rising concerns in Europe over US President Donald Trump’s questioning of the US trade and security relationship with the EU and European NATO partners and his distaste for multilateralism. Indonesia and the EU both support the idea of multilateralism as the foundation for an evolving international rules-based order, an associated process of trade liberalisation, and global cooperation on pressing issues such as climate change.

The shift in US policy may be temporary, but there are underlying structural changes that did not begin with and will not end with the Trump presidency, notably the rise of China and Asia more broadly. The extent of this historic eastward shift of the geographic centre of the global economy and geopolitics warrants some further discussion (below), given that these trends have major policy implications for German cultural diplomacy.

¹⁴ Figures stated in Euro in this and other sources have been converted into USD for consistency, at a rate of 1:1.146. Source (cited in): www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/indonesien-node/bilateral/212386 [27/02/2019].

¹⁵ Source: <https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/indonesia/foreign-investment> [27/02/2019].

Germany, both in its own right and together with the EU, is looking for new alliances with nations in Asia that share similar values. Democratic Indonesia is clearly an attractive partner of utmost strategic importance, and there are excellent prospects for future cooperation. For example, the two countries currently have a major opportunity to advance their shared agenda when they both join the UN Security Council in January 2019 as temporary members for two years.¹⁶

German cultural and educational engagement with Indonesia is also intensifying. This aspect of the partnership is the main focus of the present study and will be discussed in full detail in the following chapter. Nevertheless, the appropriateness of any efforts in cultural diplomacy needs to be assessed against a contextual understanding of current trends in political economy. Indonesia's position in this context is highly dynamic, and with some foresight, cultural diplomacy can be adjusted to adequately reflect this change in a timely manner.

1.3 Indonesia Rising

The German-Indonesian relationship is now arriving at a historical crossroads, as is the relationship between Asia and Europe in general. China, consistently the world's largest economy over many centuries and until the mid-19th century, already has resumed top position – or is about to – depending on whether GDP is adjusted for purchase-power-parity (PPP) or not. The size of the economies of the largest emerging markets (the E7) were 35% the size of the G7 in PPP terms in 1991, but overtook the G7 in 2016 and will be double the size of the G7 by 2040, in a most dramatic reversal in global economic power (PWC 2017). The same is true of knowledge. In 2000 the EU and the US together still accounted for nearly two-thirds of global R&D expenditure, but their combined share has now dropped below 50% (Myklebust 2019). The material and social consequences of this grand transition are certainly extremely palpable to those who, like the author, have regularly travelled to Asia over the last few decades.

Indonesia is part of this process. While the country's full potential is far from realised, it too is fast emerging as a new economic power, averaging 5% of economic growth in recent years. What is the extent of this change and what does this mean for Indonesia's relationship with Germany in particular?

¹⁶ See <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/un-security-council-elects-germany-indonesia-south-africa-and-2-others-as-new-members/articleshow/64513543.cms> [27/02/2019].

Recent forecasts about the likely state of the global economy in 2050 (PWC 2017) illustrate the magnitude of the reversal in the relative size of major economies (Figure 3). Germany is predicted to drop from 5th to 9th, while Indonesia will rise from 8th to 4th place; almost an exact reversal (based on PPP-adjusted GDP).

	2016	2050	
China	1	1	China
US	2	2	India
India	3	3	US
Japan	4	4	Indonesia
Germany	5	5	Brazil
Russia	6	6	Russia
Brazil	7	7	Mexico
Indonesia	8	8	Japan
UK	9	9	Germany
France	10	10	UK

E7 economies
 G7 economies

Figure 3: Indonesia and Germany reverse positions in global economic ranking (PWC 2017:3)

The report notes that “this will open up great opportunities for businesses prepared to make long-term investments in these markets,” but admits that “to realise this growth potential, emerging market governments need to implement structural reforms to improve macroeconomic stability, diversify their economies away from undue reliance on natural resources (where this is currently the case), and develop more effective political and legal institutions” and, last but not least, “invest in education and infrastructure” (PWC 2017: 3, 8).

Indonesia’s current government, which is likely to be re-elected in 2019, is certainly trying to do all that, but will need all the know-how, technical assistance and investment it can get from bilateral and regional partners. This is a tremendous opportunity for Germany to build cooperation with Indonesia and set the scene for maintaining and enhancing long-term positive relations. The inevitable changes in the nature of the relationship, from asymmetric to symmetric (in the mid 2020s) to reversed asymmetric, however, will require a great deal of flexibility in the thinking of leading actors on both sides to avoid a malalignment between habitual perceptions and realities. As will be detailed in the following chapter, many steps in this direction have been taken already, with scope for improvement in some areas and a few remaining blind spots.

When it comes to understanding the emerging context for a forward-looking German cultural diplomacy strategy, however, it is not sufficient to look at Indonesia's rise in terms of economic and political importance. Indonesia is also transforming socially and culturally at a rapid pace. This socio-cultural transformation is associated with serious tensions, conflicts and systemic risks, as well as new potentials.

The social drivers and corollaries of economic development are very visible in contemporary Indonesia, as the country's national and highly diverse regional and local societies and cultures undergo momentous transformations. Major trends include the growth of a large middle class, increasing urbanisation, higher average education levels, increased life expectancy, decreasing population growth rates, increasing median age, and a shift in health issues towards non-communicable diseases.¹⁷ Traditional cultural identities are now operating within the overarching context of a modern, media-driven and increasingly nationalised and internationalised consumer culture, associated with changing conditions in public life, modes of communication, work environments and personal lifestyles. These changes are centred on metropolitan areas, and the urban population, which was only 14.7% in 1960, has now reached 56.0% and is forecast to reach 70.8% in 2050.¹⁸


Some of the associated tensions pose a risk and could well derail Indonesia's development trajectory. On the economic side, persistent and obvious corruption and very high inequality hold the potential to undermine political stability. On the cultural side, moral panic and resentment towards rapid social change is also ripe, giving rise to a sustained wave of Islamic conservatism. Both forms of public resentment are being actively stirred up by political actors at multiple scales, which could escalate interethnic, interreligious and class-based tensions or various combinations thereof.

A further source of instability will be environmental change. The above-cited PWC socio-economic forecast may at first seem very up-beat, but it comes with a major caveat, namely that its calculus assumes "no major civilisation-threatening global catastrophes [...] over the period to 2050." Based on my privileged access to leading scientists and cutting-edge research in the field of environmental change, such a catastrophe is not just possible or likely, in my opinion it is certain. Notwithstanding the diplomatic chatter

¹⁷ Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are diseases caused not by infection but by unhealthy life-styles, such as obesity and diabetes.

¹⁸ Source: www.worldometers.info/world-population/indonesia-population/ [27/02/2019].

about whether the aim should be to restrict global warming to 1.5 or 2.0°C, when we look at the level of actual emissions and actual mitigation measures, and certainly under the E7 economic growth scenario forecast by PWC, we are on a trajectory of 3–4°C of warming or more by 2100. Even the pledges and targets governments have made as of now, and which they may not fulfil, would only be ‘likely’ (66% or greater chance) to restrict warming by 2100 to below 3.2° C (see Figure 4).



By 2050, Indonesia and many other countries will already face very serious food and water security issues in the wake of severe climatic change, which will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable sectors of society. Meanwhile, Indonesia has the highest deforestation-based emissions in the world (almost half of the global total in 2013), and deforestation is largely responsible for making it the world’s fifth largest emitter of GHGs

¹⁹ Copyright 2018 by Climate Analytics, Ecofys and NewClimate Institute, <https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/> [27/02/2019].

overall (Chrysolite et al. 2017).²⁰ Germany has been a key supporter of Indonesian efforts to improve its forestry management, renewable energy production and overall sustainable development. This kind of cooperation is destined to intensify, given that climate change will undoubtedly be the dominant driver by far of global cooperation across all sectors for the foreseeable future.

As far as current formal bilateral agreements are concerned, the most significant perhaps is the Jakarta Charter of 2012. Article 2 led to the establishment of a permanent Indonesian-German Advisory Group (IGAG), with the aim to deepen dialogue and cooperation, foremost in the fields of agriculture, food security, forestry and fisheries (Art. 11). In development, the focus is on the three topics of climate change /sustainable development, private sector development and responsible governance (Art. 18). As far as cultural-educational diplomacy is concerned (Art. 25), the aim is to maintain the direction of an earlier agreement, signed on 28 September 1988, to promote cultural exchange, language programmes, higher education, cultural heritage and more. However, Art. 29 specially highlights the desire to intensify cross-cultural and interfaith dialogue so as to promote peace, tolerance and pluralism. Art. 41, finally, notes the need to intensify work on GHG emissions reduction, REDD+ forest partnership schemes, renewable energy, and climate change mitigation and adaptation. Overall, there appears to be a fairly accurate and realistic awareness of key emerging issues.

Overall, Germany and Indonesia share many more common experiences and interests today than ever before in history. Both are middle powers at the core of regional alliances, both are champions of the rules-based international order and its associated peace dividend, defenders of trade liberation, and increasingly caught in the diplomatic cross-fire between China and the US within a new and irreversibly multipolar geopolitical landscape. Both also will face a future marked by profound environmental and food security challenges.

The relationship has flourished despite its asymmetries, and will continue to do so, as the asymmetry reverses, so long as there is ample flexibility in thinking about the nature of the partnership. The more specific implications of rapid economic, geopolitical as well as social and environmental change on the relationship between the two countries, from a

²⁰ The same report (written for the World Resources Institute) notes, however, that the energy sector is likely to become the largest contributor to Indonesian GHG emissions sometime between 2026 and 2027.

perspective of cultural diplomacy, will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. First, I will provide an overview of Germany's current outreach effort in the fields of culture, language, education and science (Chapter 3), and assess the appropriateness of these programmes in light of the trends discussed above. I will then discuss Indonesia's reception and response to German cultural diplomacy (Chapter 4), followed by a special focus section on cooperation in interfaith dialogue and radicalisation prevention.

2. Reaching Out: Germany's Cultural Diplomacy Networks

It is now time to look more closely at the manifold ways in which 'Germany' reaches out to 'Indonesia' to engage in cultural and educational exchange. Viewed from the hybrid perspective of practice theory and actor network theory that was briefly described above, however, such reified categories immediately suffer collapse, only to reveal an immensely more complex array of actual interactions taking place between individuals networked within multiple social fields, most of which are not defined by any political or administrative fiat.

While a degree of formal as well as informal coordination takes place between the German actors in this web of social fields, it is misleading to imagine their activities as an expression of a single German policy towards Indonesia. There is no fully premeditated German, or for that matter, Indonesian plan (whether sinister or benign) that determines the bilateral relationship. Indeed, from the realist perspective of practice theory and actor network theory, there is not even a 'German' or 'Indonesian' state in any simple, monolithic sense, not to speak of 'nations' or 'peoples.' Such constructs do have the wonderful ability to make abstract conversations easier for us, but they can also hinder us from understanding what is actually happening on the ground.

The task of this chapter is therefore not simply to present a litany of stated policy directives and an inventory of programmes implemented through well-known institutional structures. It is also to convey a sense of the complex, living process of interaction within the vast web of intersecting social fields in which members of German-Indonesia cultural diplomacy actor networks are operating. Like all social actors, these actors seek to influence their social field but are also dependent and influenced by it.

I will begin by presenting an overview of the major networks of designated, professional cultural diplomacy actors in all their complexity and heterogeneity, and by showing how these mediator organisation networks interrelate with networks of non-state actors in Germany as well as in Indonesia.

2.1 Major Cultural Diplomacy Actor Networks in Indonesia and Their Interconnections

The term 'mediator organisations' (*Mittlerorganisationen*) contains an implicit understanding of how cultural diplomacy in Germany is thought to be positioned within the wider context of one's bilateral relationships, and what is expected of it. The German mediator organisations are sets of professional actors, each with a specific mandate to enhance German-Indonesian relations at a cultural level and in education and science on behalf of the German government and the German state. The latter are not identical and neither government nor state is monolithic, nor easy to pinpoint for that reason.

The incumbent government is in a position to set some specific priorities, in keeping with the particular political orientation of the ruling party or coalition at the time, but other political parties also have considerable influence on foreign policy debate. For example, in August 2018 the faction of 'the Left Party', *Die Linke*, lodged a formal inquiry with the government in parliament, asking a number of questions about relations between Germany and ASEAN states, including Indonesia. The government of the day is answerable to parliament, as well as to the public. Foreign policy in Germany, as in many countries, also tends to be non-partisan and depoliticised to a considerable extent. Most individual parliamentarians and members of government, ministers included, moreover, are likely to have very limited knowledge of distant countries like Indonesia, and such knowledge as they have largely tends to be a reflection of the state of public debate, focused as it often is on a number of hot topics regarding places like Indonesia, such as capital punishment, or the destruction of Borneo's rainforests by palm oil companies, or armed conflict between security forces and separatists in the West Papua province.

A specific class of organisations come into play when political actors require privileged, insider knowledge about and contacts in other countries. At the forefront among them are the political parties' own foundations (*Stiftungen*). Although they are not classified as mediator organisations in the narrower sense, recognition of their importance to foreign relations began in the 1960s and has greatly increased in recent years. Active in Indonesia are the 'Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung' of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) since 1968, the 'Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung' of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) since 1968, the 'Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit' of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) since 1969, and the 'Hans-Seidel-Stiftung' of the Christian Social Union (CSU, the CDU's sister party in

Bavaria) since 1993.²¹ Given that these political foundations are publicly funded in Germany, they are subject to set rules concerning their internal governance structure and to fairly strict institutional oversight at home. They are also subject to oversight as foreign NGOs under Indonesian law.

Another major source of information for political decision makers is the fairly nonpartisan and research-focused German Institute for International and Security Affairs (*Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, SWP) in Berlin,²² funded by parliament through the German Chancellery. Another important independent research organisation is the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, which has a major division on Asian Studies.²³ More broadly, a wide range of civil society actors, ranging from independent academic experts to think tanks, civil society activists, the media and vocal members of the public, all seek to inform and/or to influence members of parliament and cabinet. Civil society actors and actor networks thus play a significant role in setting political agendas in Germany.

The political government of the day is not the state, however. In view of the comparatively transitory nature of political office in democratic countries, Germany's long-term policy perspective on Indonesia is thus also very much shaped by country experts within the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA) and among the diplomatic staff of Germany's embassy and consulates in Indonesia. The idea that the state is a set of institutions serving not just the government but the public and the law, is taken very seriously indeed in Germany. This deserves mentioning here because it is not, or no longer, the case in many other western countries where the public service has become subject to a higher degree of politicisation. While they receive instructions from government, public servants within the state apparatus have much professional expertise and experience which politicians rightly tend to respect and to a large extent depend upon. Diplomats and other public servants with Indonesia knowledge in turn also tend to work in mutual consultation with other professional Indonesia experts, such as the senior leadership group of mediator organisation directors. This is necessary, not least because the leading officers of the state have a coordinating function in relation to the mediator organisations, especially relating to fields wherein different mediators' mandates overlap. An example of this is the organisation of cross-cutting events, such as the German Season (*Deutsche Saison*) held in

²¹ The 'Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung' of The Greens (*Die Grünen*) and the 'Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung' of The Left (*Die Linke*) both take an active interest in Indonesia but do not maintain an office there.

²² <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/> [27/02/2019].

²³ <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/giga-institut-für-asien-studien> [27/02/2019].

several Indonesian cities in September-December 2015.²⁴ This festival of events was coordinated at a structural level by the Foreign Office and on the ground by the embassy, with most of the actual project work carried out by the Goethe-Institut,²⁵ the German Chamber of Commerce and numerous Indonesian partners. Contributing mediator organisations would have struggled to produce such a diverse programme of activities by themselves.²⁶ Another, longer-term initiative for which the diplomatic mission in Indonesia has acted as coordinator is the interactive online information platform JERIN (a contraction of 'German' and 'Indonesia'), founded in 2011, which acts as a window on German-Indonesian activities in the fields of politics, economy, culture, education, science and social affairs.

As far as mediator organisations are concerned, an important source of information, research and analysis for the foreign office and diplomatic corps of the state is the 'Institute for Foreign Relations' (*Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen*, ifa), which is also the oldest (founded in 1917) among them. ifa commissions topical and timely research in support of the diplomatic sector, such as the present study, while also running its own event series and exchange programmes in art, culture and civil society.

Mediators, to be deserving of the name and to function effectively as such, must be independent of those between whom they mediate, and yet well connected to, and trusted by, both sides. In my opinion, this description does apply in the present case.

The German mediator organisations receive their mandate and most of their funding from the state (with budgetary approval from parliament), but the funding arrangements for 'cultural diplomacy' (AKBP) are complex. The overall budget (2.025 billion USD in 2016; see *Deutscher Bundestag* 2017: 7) is widely distributed between – in order of magnitude – the Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA), the Commissioner for Culture and Media (*Beauftragter für Kultur und Medien*, BKM),²⁷ the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (*Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung*, BMBF), the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (*Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung*, BMZ), the Federal Ministry of Family, Seniors, Women and Youth (*Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend*, BMFSFJ), and the Feder-

²⁴ <http://deutschesaison.com/wp/?lang=de> [27/02/2019].

²⁵ <https://www.goethe.de/ins/id/de/kul/pkt/dsa/20586747.html> [27/02/2019].

²⁶ http://deutschesaison.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/DeutscheSaison_Magazine_Designed-by-Groupe-Dejour.pdf [27/02/2019].

²⁷ The BKM is not a ministry but an office within the German Chancellery. There are calls to establish a federal ministry, but until now culture has been treated not as a federal but as a state matter.

al Ministry of the Interior, Building and Homeland (*Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat*, BMI). There are also numerous other ministries and government departments that fund international activities in the area of science and education with important cultural diplomacy implications, such as the Ministry for Economics and Energy (*Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie*, BMWi) and the German Research Council (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*). Then there are countless other programmes funded at the level of the sixteen federal states (G. *Bundesländer*), which are constitutionally entitled to set their own priorities with limited federal oversight and with a degree of lateral coordination (Singer 2003: 18). Finally, there are the international cultural and youth exchange programmes of the district and municipal governments, such as the city of Berlin's important partnership agreement with the city of Jakarta, signed in 1993 (Gäßler 1998: 16-17).²⁸




Figure 5: Cultural diplomacy (AKBP) federal budget allocations 2017.
Source: Deutscher Bundestag 2017: 8.

The complex state-funding flows and associated cultural diplomacy actor networks, within the formal designated 'AKBP sector' and beyond, are designed to cover an equally complex array of different mandates (Figure 5). The various ministries involved are by no means subservient to the AA, and their 'state mandate' thus can mean many different things to the different federally funded mediator organisation directors, let alone their programme staff, or the directors and staff funded at subsidiary levels of the state.

²⁸ www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/en/international-relations/city-partnerships/jakarta/artikel.23690.en.php [27/02/2019].

In their capacity as mediators, the professionals in these organisations are of course not at liberty simply to follow a top-down government mandate. They must engage and negotiate with the other, Indonesian side, about what constitutes a desirable outcome, forming partnerships as they initiate specific cooperative projects of variable duration and scope. Public servants in the ministries and in the AA may be qualified to monitor the activity and read the budget reports of the mediator organisations, but they are not as qualified as the latter when it comes to judging their practical value and impact. The mediator organisations therefore are not the state, and from a rational perspective, they should not be. Fortunately, in this case, the official policy of 'at-arms-length operation' for the mediator organisation, as far as I can determine, is indeed reflected in what is happening in practice. From a practical perspective, the mediator organisations are networks of professionals carrying out collaborative cultural diplomacy activities with considerable liberty at the programme level, though confined by certain expectations they face at home and in Indonesia.

The plot thickens further when we consider that the major mediator organisations are not the only German actors in the field of cultural and educational exchange. Apart from whatever priorities politicians, the federal state, or the professional mediator organisations may have, their efforts seem somewhat akin to pouring water into the sea, when compared to the vast volume of social interaction that transpires between private German and Indonesian actors, which is many magnitudes greater and has its own history.

At the individual citizen level, the dominant form of face-to-face interaction with Indonesians is leisure travel, as well as unsponsored business and study related travel. The Indonesian National Bureau of Statistics reports that 267,823 German individuals visited Indonesia in 2017 alone (BPS 2018), a figure that dwarfs the tiny number of employees in German mediator organisations. Conversely, the German Centre for Tourism reports 110,000 arrivals of Indonesian visitors in Germany in 2016 and forecasts massive growth, with 2 million additional annual overnight stays by Southeast Asians expected by 2030 (DTZ 2018: 25). In addition, individual Germans and Indonesians also inform themselves through the internet and engage in mediated interaction through a wide range of social media, for example, with people they befriended during their travels or with whom they share a common interest. At an institutional level, civil society organisations are also very significant non-state players. The German university sector, for example, maintains countless important collaborations with Indonesian universities and other partners in its own capacity, not to mention individual academics. The Protestant and Catholic Churches in Germany maintain a network of congregations as well as running educational and devel-

opment programmes in Indonesia. Large private German-Indonesian cultural associations have been active for many decades. The list could continue.

These individual and institutional private actors are all cultural diplomats in their own right. They do not have a formal mandate to engage in cultural diplomacy or any obligation to follow a particular policy agenda, and hence their contribution to 'German cultural diplomacy' is independent and incidental. This study is not meant to focus on such independent actors, but it is important to understand that they are very much part of the overall web of bilateral relations from a social perspective, and that it could not be otherwise. For example, while the primary designated educational mediator organisation is the German Academic Exchange Service (*Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst*, DAAD), which runs a complex international programme of bidirectional scholarship and joint project schemes, the real substance of academic exchanges lies in the activities of the thousands of students and academics who have applied for these funds to study or do research in Germany and Indonesia, acting according to their own ideas of what is important.

Meanwhile, Indonesia has its own cultural diplomacy policies that shape the landscape of bilateral exchange from the other end, for example by providing Indonesian academics with scholarships to travel to Germany for postgraduate study, or funding German students to visit their country.

The scope for policy makers on both sides to influence cultural exchange between the two countries is thus limited by the independence of their own mediators and by the much larger volume of private interactions. And what scope remains after that, has to be shared between Berlin and Jakarta. Policy makers, in short, can merely set some important accents by promoting activity in certain priority areas, and that is probably as it should be.

The mediator organisations are nevertheless in a somewhat ambivalent position in that their privileged access to state funding comes at the cost of some accountability. Goal agreements and associated monitoring procedures are in place that do create a certain cohesion between policy goals and practice (Hennefeld 2012). While there has been some lip service paid to the need for greater inclusion of networks beyond the mediator organisations, this is not reflected in the allocation patterns of German federal funding. Most cultural diplomacy funding is not available to civil society organisations through an open tender process but allocated directly to mediator organisations under the current system. The three biggest state-funded cultural diplomacy institutions, namely the Goethe-

Institut, the Central Bureau for Schools Abroad (*Zentralstelle für Auslandsschulwesen*, ZfA) and the DAAD, “currently receive around 75% of the funding available to AA in these policy areas” (Adam 2016: 35), while Germany’s international broadcaster, *Deutsche Welle* (DW) receives most of the funds available to the BKM. Be that as it may, it is important to acknowledge that civil society partners who depend on co-funding from the state are also not entirely independent, and also subject to a regime of funding priorities and reporting requirements. Ambiguity is unavoidable here.

Finally, a very influential set of actors within the web of cultural diplomacy-related social fields is the German business sector. This sector shapes political agendas through lobbying at home and abroad, and through prominent involvement in the negotiation of economic and trade agreements between the two countries. It also receives services from state agencies such as the embassy, and interacts with cultural diplomacy-oriented mediator organisations (see examples below). The direct impact of this sector on cultural and educational exchange activities ranges from the occasional sponsorship of cultural and educational activities and events by German companies, to creating demand for German language skills or participating in vocational education programmes. Business is also a major cultural diplomacy actor in its own right, however. Given that German investment and trade consistently has been of central concern in the bilateral relationship, the conduct of the German business community in Indonesia has a massive influence on how Germany as a whole is perceived there by the general public as well as the Indonesian state.

The business sector is a network of semi-independent actors. Business leaders do not take instructions from, and are not generally answerable to, the German government, or captive to its agenda.²⁹ There are nevertheless close ties and interdependencies. Foreign investment would be rather precarious without diplomatic protection and support from one’s home government, and the German government is indeed constantly pursuing new bilateral and multilateral agreements to improve business conditions and create better opportunities for German companies abroad. Conversely, all political parties in Germany receive donations from major companies to varying degrees. What then is the image of Germany projected by this semi-independent business sector? Is there an identifiably German way of doing business, and is there a shared approach to Indonesia among German companies?

²⁹ It was much more difficult to gain interviews with representatives of German companies rather than of mediator organisations. My mandate as an ifa-commissioned researcher meant little in the business sector.

There is some literature on differences in work and business culture between Germany and Indonesia, often aimed at the management training market, which is rather unhelpful because of the difficulty of generalising about national character; and due the further difficulty of drawing relevant conclusions from such generalisations. It may be true, for example, that the German way of communicating is much more direct than that of Indonesians (Ruppert 2004: 9), but what does that really say about business culture? A much better way of understanding business culture is to look at the differences between particular political economies in their national historical context.

The political-economic model Germany has promoted at home and abroad in the post-WW2 period has its own and very particular history, which certainly could be traced back to the political concessions made to the labour movement under Bismarck after the foundation of the unitary German state in 1871, or further back to the German revolution of 1848 and the rise of the labour movement,³⁰ but that is beyond the scope of this study. The most important point to make here is that the contemporary model that has emerged from this history, known as 'social market economics' (*soziale Marktwirtschaft*), is positioned somewhere in the middle of the range between the ideological extremes of planned economy on the one hand and radical market libertarianism on the other. It advocates for a form of economics that is market-based and profit-oriented, but also works actively to sustain itself through socially responsible practices, enshrined within the regulatory framework of the 'social state' (G. *Sozialstaat*) but embedded also in rather unique models of dual education and cooperative labour relations. Many Germans today complain that this model has all but collapsed in Germany itself but, from a comparative perspective, social protections in Germany (and other continental European countries) are still measurably higher than they are under Anglo-American market libertarian models (Hölz 2011).

Being accustomed to doing business in this way at home generates certain tendencies and expectations in German companies and their managers that are noticed as characteristically German and generally well appreciated in Indonesia, as Noke Kiroyan, chair of the International Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta, assured me in an interview. That these characteristics are an extension of experiences at home is reflected in a number of anecdotes I have heard from German managers, who do not wish to be named.

One CEO of the Indonesian branch of a German company told me that, when he assumed his position, he found the union in his industry sector infiltrated by employer-

³⁰ See www.sozialpolitik.com/artikel/die-arbeiterbewegung-entsteht [27/02/2019].

loyalists and their legitimate concerns marginalised. He took steps to stop this practice and entered into a regular productive dialogue with labour representatives, following the German model of the 'company council' (*Betriebsrat*), wherein management and labour strive to take decisions jointly for mutual benefit, at least in theory, if not always in practice. German companies, if they behave in Indonesia as they do at home rather than adopt a double standard, are thus likely to be noted for being comparatively progressive and responsible in their social, and also in their environmental policies.³¹ This does not mean that breaches of responsibility and negative publicity do not occur at times, as Heidelberg Cement recently illustrated.

A transfer of business culture is easier said than done. During the early *Reformasi* period another German manager told me how, after submitting his first company tax return as CEO of the Indonesian branch of a German company, he received a visit from the tax office. He was offered to halve the company's tax liability and split the difference. When he refused, his company was promptly investigated by the same tax office and subjected to prolonged harassment. This is not an isolated case. Frequent requests for 'gifts' by public servants in exchange for expediting bureaucratic procedures, which ought to be simple but can prove extremely onerous, constitute a constant point of friction (Berninghausen 2015: 102-110). Entrenched expectations on the Indonesian side, which are perhaps the legacy of centuries of local elite capture, can thus diminish the positive impact of foreign investment by depriving the Indonesian state of revenue, and can also greatly reduce the ease of doing business from the perspective of foreign companies.

Some progress in corruption eradication has been made in Indonesia since then, and the kind of behaviour described above is hopefully on the way out. Between 2008 and 2017 Indonesia moved up from 126th to 96th rank on Transparency International's corruption perception index (Germany ranks 12th).³² Meanwhile, according to the World Bank, the 'Ease of Doing Business' in Indonesia, which was rated very poorly still at 129th rank in 2008 has greatly improved since then, reaching 72th rank in 2017, where it seems to have stabilised for now (Figure 7).³³

³¹ The first Green Party to achieve national prominence was the German Green Party, founded in 1980 in the wake of popular movements against nuclear power, water pollution and acid rain damage to forests. Germany's environmental regulations were tightened and remain comparatively strict until today.

³² https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 [27/02/2019].

³³ Note that EODB, depending on how it is measured, can also reach a point where it begins to become a trade off with social responsibility.




Figure 6: Progress in EODB in Indonesia. Source: Tradingeconomics.com, World Bank.³⁴

As far as cultivating a shared image of German business and a common approach to Indonesia is concerned, there are a number of mediator organisations for the business sector that play an important role. The most important is perhaps the 'German Chamber of Industry and Commerce Abroad' (*Auswärtige Industrie- und Handelskammer*, AHK) in Indonesia, which is one of about 140 such chambers in 92 countries around the world, coordinated by an umbrella organisation (*Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammertag*, DIHK) and jointly funded by its members and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy (BMWi). The chambers abroad are bilateral organisations, and the German-Indonesian chamber is known as AHK-EKONID (see Chapter 3).

2.2 Policy Debates on the Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany and Beyond

Before presenting a detailed description and analysis of the activities of each of the designated mediator organisations mandated to implement German cultural diplomacy policy in Indonesia, I would like first to assess what can be learnt from the proceeding overview of actor networks in this web of social fields about the limits of such diplomacy, and second, how German cultural diplomacy has developed over time in response to changing perceptions of these limitations and of the purpose of cultural diplomacy by different governments and in different national and world historical contexts.

³⁴ <https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/ease-of-doing-business> [27/02/2019].

From the perspective of an empirical researcher, and within the stated limitations of this study, my impression is that while cultural diplomacy may be considered narrowly as a policy matter, the actual capacity of governments or state institutions or mediator organisations to encourage the exchange of ideas, information, art, language and other aspects of culture among nations and their people, and so to influence the perception of their country abroad is limited by the presence and, indeed, the dominance of independent actors and unplanned events that are not subject to policy control. Policy control is not even very strict with regard to state funded mediator organisations in the German case, given that there is not even a single, monolithic cultural diplomacy policy shared across all organs of government or all sectors and layers of the state apparatus under normal circumstances.³⁵

This points to an underlying dilemma in cultural diplomacy that reminds me of Goffman's classic research on the social psychology of impression management (Goffman 1956). Individuals certainly do spend considerable energy on presenting themselves in such a way as to appear in a favourable light and gain social approval from others, especially when they find themselves in public space. In close, long-term relationships, however, this kind of charade becomes futile. In the long run, a country too can only hope to be understood and appreciated for what it really is. In cultural diplomacy, as in many other social contexts, the messenger is thus the ultimate message. Beyond that, our conscious and systematic presentations of 'self' may just as well be purposely informative and realistic because, as Goffmann found, others are rather adept at discounting unrealistic claims.

Germany early on adopted an approach to cultural diplomacy that reflects this basic insight, following the findings of the 1975 report of the federal parliament's Enquete-Commission, which "over many years was something of a bible of cultural diplomacy" in Germany (Maaß 2015: 48, my translation). The report distances itself from earlier, cultural imperialist notions that 'developed' nations should export their own modernist culture as part of a socio-economic civilising mission, as well as from the idea that cultural diplomacy should be the handmaiden of a foreign policy centred on political and economic self-interest. It recommended instead a bidirectional, symmetric or 'partnership' approach to cultural exchange with other nations, who were to be seen as different but equal. The report noted that this could best be achieved through the presentation of a realistic, con-

³⁵ Normal circumstances prevail in the relationship with Indonesia. Under conflict conditions, however, cultural diplomacy towards a particular country can tighten significantly around security priorities.

temporary and self-critical image of Germany. This approach proved very successful at restoring Germany's international reputation. It also internationally promoted a universalist-pluralist model of diplomacy, which is an essential requirement for building a norms-based international order through multilateral negotiations and voluntary agreements among the world community of nations. There has been a gradual shift in Germany's understanding of itself and of cultural diplomacy, however, which began in the early 1990s.

First, reunified Germany acquired a renewed sense of ambition and increased confidence as an international player, particularly on account of its prominent and central position within an eastward expanding EU (a process which absorbed a large proportion of German foreign policy attention at the time). The scope for the national ambition even of large member states like Germany, however, is simultaneously limited by the EU context. A partial shift to a multilateral European cultural diplomacy, for Germany and other members, has also meant making political concessions and diverting funds from the pursuit of national agendas and programmes to the EU's joint foreign agenda. The EU thus does not serve simply as a useful amplifier of Germany's national interests (which also applies to Indonesia and ASEAN). Such constraints also extend beyond the EU context, arising from Germany's other multilateral commitments, for example, to UNESCO.³⁶

Second, in the late 1990s and especially since 2001, concerns about political stability at the regional and global level grew in Germany, with the realisation that a total victory of the western liberal democratic model and hence a peaceful 'end of history' had not been reached with the fall of the iron curtain after all, as Francis Fukuyama (1989) had prematurely announced. Instead, authoritarianism, politicised religion, terrorism and proxy wars between super powers were on the rise again, within the context of a now irrevocably multipolar world order.

The white paper '*Konzeption 2000*' responded to these mixed sentiments of ambition and fear by firming up on the idea of cultural diplomacy as a "third pillar" of foreign policy. In it "the foreign office made it clear that it would formulate and coordinate the political direction of cultural diplomacy," albeit toward the achievement of libertarian foreign policy aims such as "securing peace, conflict prevention, human rights implementation, democracy promotion and supporting civil society" (Maaß 2015: 49, 50), and without compromising the relative independence of the mediator organisations. Also new was

³⁶ www.unesco.de [27/02/2019].

a sharper thematic focus on emerging global issues, such as the need for better communication with Islam in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the so-called War on Terror. Large emerging market economies (G. *Schwellenländer*) like Indonesia also have received more attention since then.

A heated exchange broke out, however, when a more pointedly ambitious supplementary report (G. *Fortschreibung*) was issued by the CDU-FDP government in 2011. The SPD opposition in parliament formally questioned this document as a signal for an undesirable paradigm shift, explicitly rejecting ideas such as using 'cultural and educational policy abroad' (AKBP) as an 'instrument' of cultural diplomacy, or of more strictly 'directing' the mediator organisations (Deutscher Bundestag 2012). The ambitious proposals in the document never gained much traction as a result, and the matter still remains somewhat unresolved.

The conditions under which German cultural and general diplomacy operates today are both challenging and full of opportunity. Former foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel rightly spoke of "times marked by crises and conflicts" (AA 2016: 4). There is no escaping the fact that Germany, ready or not, has become an important international player. Germany's long-term universalist approach also raises special expectations in other countries, which are well reflected in the New York Times' recent characterisation of Chancellor Angela Merkel as 'the last defender of the liberal West.'³⁷ Intensifying cultural diplomatic efforts, in a now very much more crowded field with increasingly steep competition, therefore does not necessarily mean adopting a more prescriptive and monolithic approach, which would run up against internal and European resistance in any case. Rather, it could also mean more vocal leadership from Germany, especially in building a global alliance for multilateralism, free trade and world peace, notably among middle powers like Germany and Indonesia, in whose declared national interest it is to uphold a norms-based international order. Rather than succumbing to fear, ambition, short-sighted economic self-interest or primordial ethno-religious sentiments, countries like Germany and Indonesia are called upon not to wait for new orders, but to help recreate order themselves, acting with courage and with unwavering faith in universal principles of dialogue and voluntary cooperation.

³⁷ <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/europe/germany-merkel-trump-election.html> [27/02/2019].

Given today's unstable geopolitical conditions it is not surprising to find a recent flurry of publications and debate, not just in Germany but worldwide, on what should be the cultural diplomacy strategies of choice. The debate has many dimensions. For example, the US has banked increasingly on a public diplomacy model designed to influence entire populations abroad (Seib 2009), while Germany and other countries tend to target their programmes more at networks of influential actors or 'multipliers' (G. *Multiplikatoren*), or at facilitating a 'pre-political' space for dialogue among key actors. The US model is based more on indirect, co-funding arrangements with civil society organisations, while the German model rests more on directly state-funded institutions, despite recently stated intentions to engage in more partnerships with civil society (Anheier 2017). Other countries again engage in clandestine information warfare to influence popular sentiments and the outcome of elections in other countries, with the help of fake identities and designated echo chambers in social media for targeted population groups.³⁸ This raises new question as to how cultural diplomacy ought to engage legitimately with digital media.

These and other strategic questions will be considered in a practical context throughout the following analysis of the mediator organisations and their cultural diplomacy networks and activities, while also keeping in mind the implications of the embeddedness of their policy-influenced activities in a much wider network of policy-independent cultural exchange between the two countries.

³⁸ On foreign interference in elections in the US see https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-sad-truth-about-russian-election-interference-is-that-we-knew-about-it-before-election-day/2018/12/09/0d13d30c-fb06-11e8-8d64-4e79db33382f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a95799c755e7, and for Germany see <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/09/20/meddling-germany-election-not-russia-but-u-s-right-wing/676142001/> [27/02/2019].

3. The 'Mediator Organisations' in Indonesia

There is no simple way of classifying the German 'Mittlerorganisationen' according to their mandates and activities. All are in some way engaged in cultural exchange, many provide educational services, and many are involved in science and technology transfer. The order of presentation is thus somewhat arbitrary, but I will begin with the most important among those mediators for whom culture and/or education is the top priority, in that order. All mediator organisation programmes related to interfaith dialogue and radicalisation prevention will be ignored here entirely, to be discussed separately in Chapter 5.



Figure 7: German Cultural Diplomacy Actors in Indonesia in the field of Education.

Source: DAAD 2016: 31.

One general observation can be made in advance. The above map (Figure 7) shows how concentrated the head office locations of German cultural diplomacy networks in Indonesia are within the capital, Jakarta, and on the island of Java. Actual activities and programmes are more dispersed across the archipelago because they do not necessarily require a physical presence. There are also a few branch offices not shown on the map, such as the small honorary consulates in Bali, Makassar, Medan and Surabaya. Given what we already know about Indonesia's enormous internal diversity, however, a concentration of physical offices in the centre of Indonesia is problematic insofar as it prevents a direct and continuous engagement with the regions on a daily basis. On the one hand, the cost of maintaining a physical presence across Indonesia to reach the widest possible cross section of cultural and language groups would be prohibitive for many organisations. On the other hand, internal diversity is a major driver of pluralist-nationalist political leanings in Indonesia, and a greater effort should be made to acknowledge and support it.

I now turn to the individual mediator organisations, beginning with the foremost actors in the field of culture, leading over into education, business and politics. This lead over is not entirely linear and smooth, and cannot be, because of the overlapping mandates of different organisations. To probe the boundary between what is actual and what is possible for German cultural diplomacy to achieve in Indonesia, I am also discussing some mediators who are not yet, or no longer, very active in this country, as well as some organisations that are not mediator organisations in the narrower sense.

3.1 Deutsche Welle (DW)

Germany's international broadcaster, *Deutsche Welle* (lit. 'German Wave'), has a long history that reflects many of the ambiguities of the mediator organisation at large, with the added intensity that comes with the nature of its audience. DW is rather unlike the other mediators in that it is able to address the wider public in other countries directly through electronic media. In short, it is naturally a vehicle of public diplomacy.

A recent study of DW illustrates these ambiguities against the historical background of post-war Germany and changing world politics (Hagedorn 2016). The author observes how DW was at great pains to distance itself from the legacy of fascist abuse of state media as an instrument of propaganda, and yet also found itself in the awkward situation of being encouraged by the foreign office, national press office and interior ministry to contribute to the presumably good cause of Cold War counter-propaganda efforts for the promotion of 'western liberal values,' especially in East Germany and Eastern Europe but also at home. This was further complicated by the different stances of the political parties

in Germany, all of which had an interest in DW. Overall, while complete neutrality in matters relating to the grand 'conflict of systems' of these times was not possible, DW operated independently in every other regard. The situation changed again with the fall of the iron curtain in 1989/90. DW absorbed the German international radio channel *Deutschlandfunk* (DLF). The aims of DW had to be reconceptualised, and also its approach, due to the rise of internet-based media. DW embraced the new media quite successfully, for example, with its YouTube channel attracting 260,000 subscribers and millions of viewers today. Success, however, is relative. BBC's YouTube channel has about 3,640,000 subscribers, similar to RT with 3,300,000. Efforts to catch up with the likes of the BBC and CNN are valiant, but would require a massive increase in investment and a different business model, as the DW's current head, Peter Limbourg, has made clear (Milatz and Wittrock 2014). Until then, Germany will remain what it has been: an economic giant with the media voice of a dwarf.

This imbalance is problematic given that a new conflict of systems has re-emerged in recent years, minus the ideological component, featuring both old and new players equally equipped with a bag of new tricks. Propaganda today takes the form of heavily biased and sometimes outright fake news, as it has always done, but there are also various new forms of mass-psychological manipulation specific to social media that have famously influenced the outcome of recent elections in the US, Europe and Brazil, and threaten to do the same in social media-obsessed Indonesia. The new propaganda can be state-led (as in the case of the Russian broadcaster RT or China's CCTV), or driven by media oligarchs with vested political interests (such as Rupert Murdoch's Fox News), or by influential rogue media actors (such as the alt-right Breitbart News founded by Steve Bannon), or even by single individuals. Subtle editorial bias, of course, remains very widespread in contemporary media, which can be said to constitute the usual state of affairs.

Indonesia is no exception in all this. While the country has made great strides towards press freedom from direct state control and persecution ever since the fall of the Suharto military regime in 1998, the initial flurry of media diversification after *Reformasi* has given way to a consolidation into major media conglomerates, tied to oligarchic and somewhat fluctuating political party interests. And while authoritarian state censorship is gone, there are renewed concerns about censorship as well as self-censorship based on criminal law, in the wake of strict new blasphemy and anti-pornography legislation, the enforcement of which is driven less by the state than by public pressure from ultraconservative Muslim groups. The overall media market remains relatively diverse in international comparison nonetheless, and leans heavily toward social media.

DW-Indonesia has a small team situated in Bonn and no office in Jakarta, relying instead on stringers. It nevertheless produces an enormous amount of attractive multimedia content in Indonesian (I. *bahasa indonesia*), including online reports, web-videos, picture galleries and commentaries. It has a strong presence on social media platforms such as Facebook (932,000 followers),³⁹ Twitter (30,000 followers),⁴⁰ as well as maintaining a designated Indonesian language YouTube channel (127,500 subscribers),⁴¹ with a play list of stories from Indonesians living in Germany (some of this material is being picked up by the chief Indonesian state broadcaster, TVRI). Furthermore, the editorial team regularly uses Facebook Live to connect to followers with news stories on current affairs. In this way, an increasing number of users are encouraged to interact with DW Indonesia. The work of this small team is nothing short of brilliant, and deserves a very much larger budget and additional staff.

Here is one example of the potential impact. On 23 January 2019 the DW Indonesia website, amplified through its social media outlets such as Twitter, published an article in Bahasa Indonesia with a well-nuanced analysis on the release of the imprisoned radical Muslim leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, reminding readers of his background, which includes ties to the perpetrators of the 2002 Bali bombings, and of the relevance of his release in the context of the forthcoming elections.⁴² This kind of news content is widely shared with Indonesian news outlets (see list in footnote).⁴³

Another important online DW-Indonesia initiative is DWNesia,⁴⁴ which provides exclusive material across four sections. #Kolom is a column with short articles written by prominent Indonesians on issues that are socially significant and sometimes sensitive or taboo (including religious intolerance, radicalisation, homosexuality, child marriage and child labour). The platform is very popular as it allows users to engage in lively discussions and form opinions on a range of subjects. #DWKampus provides multimedia material (video, article, picture gallery) detailing the daily lives, struggles and success stories of Indonesian students in Germany. #NegeriOrang is a multimedia platform more generally on the experience of expatriates (Indonesians in Germany and Germans in Indonesia).

³⁹ www.facebook.com/dw.indonesia/ [27/02/2019].

⁴⁰ https://twitter.com/dw_indonesia?lang=en [27/02/2019].

⁴¹ www.youtube.com/user/DWBahasaIndonesia [27/02/2019].

⁴² Web article <https://www.dw.com/id/manuver-yusril-dan-wara-wiri-pembebasan-abu-bakar-baasyir/a-47193367> and Twitter [27/02/2019].

⁴³ SindoNews.com; TribunNews.com; Elshinta.com; Detik.com; Tempo.co; Okezone.com; FaktualNews, Radio Antero; Kompas.com; IndoSport; Kontan.co.id; and JawaPos.com.

⁴⁴ <https://www.dw.com/id/beranda/dwnesia/s-45533466> [27/02/2019].

#Blog, finally, is a blog with comments written by Indonesians living in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Also online are DW's extensive resources for learners of German, supplementing the work of other mediator organisations that are working on language promotion.⁴⁵ More generally, DW often serves as an advertising platform for the events and programme announcements of other German mediators.

DW Indonesia's regular TV programme is another matter. The following three unedited news snippets from DW's blog "Insider" will serve to illustrate, more effectively perhaps than anything else I could say, the very large extent to which DW's work in Indonesia today is dependent upon building effective partnerships with local media and telecommunications industries:

"Parabola Orange TV, Indonesia's latest DTH service has included DW in its programming line-up. DW will be offered in Orange TV's 'Smart Package', alongside other top global news, educational and lifestyle networks. The new DTH service will make DW's English language channel available to viewers in suburban areas surrounding Jakarta." "Indonesia's largest IPTV and OTT provider UseeTV will now be broadcasting DW's TV magazine Inovator, on linear TV and as video on demand. UseeTV is available in 1.2 million households. In addition, regional broadcasters SaktiTV and JawapostTV are now also broadcasting Inovator. The Indonesian news portals Elshinta.com, Kontan.co.id and TribunNews.com are now including DW's online content on their websites." "The Indonesian OTT provider, First Media X, will soon carry DW's Indonesian tech magazine Inovator. First Media X is owned by the Indonesian IPTV market leader First Media. Also in Indonesia, the pay-TV provider K-Vision now includes DW in its basic package. K-Vision offers 100 channels, 50 of which are international broadcasters, and reaches over 100,000 subscribers across the country."⁴⁶

It is difficult to measure exactly the reach DW has in Indonesia today, given the complexity of these kinds of partnerships and broadcasting arrangements, but it is certainly wide and expanding. What is restricting further expansion, however, is an over-reliance on English (not to mention German) as a medium of communication, which also explains why the Indonesian language programmes described above are so valuable. In 2017 and 2018 the AA began to make some amends by funding a programme to provide Indonesian subtitles for the English language channel of DW in Indonesia. This is an important step in the right direction, but considering that the cost of organising in-house translation for TV

⁴⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/user/dwlearnrgerman> [27/02/2019].

⁴⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/user/deutschewelle> [27/02/2019].

programmes into Bahasa Indonesia would be comparatively low if it were done in Indonesia and given that such synchronised material may also be of commercial value to Indonesian media partners, more synchronisation should be seriously considered. Indonesians overwhelmingly prefer to watch programming in their own language. German, English and even subtitled material will likely remain confined to a niche market.

As far as TV programme content in Bahasa Indonesia is concerned, the Science TV magazine 'Inovator' deserves special mention.⁴⁷ This popular 26-minute TV programme reports on cutting-edge developments in the fields of science, research, technology, lifestyle and the environment. It presents Germany as Europe's primary research hub in these fields. The content is popular due to a lack of comparable news on science in Indonesia. The programme is also oriented toward offering solutions to the problems people encounter in their daily lives. Audiences are encouraged to participate in further discussions on social media channels. The programme has its own designated Facebook group.⁴⁸ Moreover, the Magazine is adopted by a vast number of Indonesian state and private TV partners (see list in note).⁴⁹

A seminar on 'The role of media in science and society' was organised by DW Indonesia in Jakarta in 2017, which deserves to become a regular feature. DW as a whole also organises a very important global event, the Global Media Forum, held annually in Bonn, next in May 2019. Indonesian journalists should be more strongly encouraged and supported to attend this forum, or to spend time in Germany on work placements to gain international experience and a greater awareness of Germany. DW already does issue some awards to Indonesian journalists.

Overall, the reason why DW appears first in this overview of mediator organisations is that, in today's information age, it deserves first place in any attempt to promote German culture, education, science and democratic values in Indonesia and elsewhere. DW can reach millions of people, and hence its reach simply cannot be compared to that of the other mediators. Much more could be done in this space. Given the cost of providing an expanded service, the possibility of joining forces with the broadcasters of other EU member states should be contemplated.

⁴⁷ www.dw.com/inovator [27/02/2019].

⁴⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/569122020135718/> [27/02/2019].

⁴⁹ First Media – PT Link Net; TVRI – Televisi Republik Indonesia (national); Jaya TV, regional; Usee TV (national); INTV (regional); TVMU (national); Topas TV, (regional); Matrix TV (regional); RTV Riau (regional); Jak TV (regional); UBTU (regional); Tempo TV (regional); Elshinta TV (regional); Tirta TV (internet-based); TV9 Surabaya (regional); Bali TV (regional); Satelit TV Purkowerto (regional); Jawapos TV (regional); Sakti TV (regional); and ICTA TV (chain with of 200 regional and local broadcasters).

3.2 The Institute for Foreign Relations (ifa)

The '*Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen*' is Germany's oldest mediator organisation, founded in 1917, and is funded by the AA, the state of Baden-Württemberg and the city of Stuttgart, where it is located. The core mandate of ifa for its work at home and abroad includes intercultural dialogue, civil society engagement, the promotion of art and artistic exchange, exhibitions, seminars and conferences, and conflict resolution in crisis regions. It is also a research centre for cultural diplomacy-related projects commissioned by the AA, and the results are made available at the Social Science Open Access repository of the Leibniz Institute for Social Science.⁵⁰ ifa also hosts a unique specialist library designated for this purpose (with 440,000 books, 1,000 print- and online magazines and journals) as well as facilitating information flows and dialogue across this field.

ifa's CrossCulture Programme has run for eleven years, and is a main platform for intercultural dialogue specifically with Islamic countries.⁵¹ Some eighty young professionals and volunteers from abroad have been given the opportunity to gain several months of experience in a different cultural environment through work placements. This has included 14 scholarships to notable Indonesian professionals from a wide range of fields in the period 2008-2019.

In Indonesia ifa has curated and organised 25 travelling exhibitions on photography, art, design architecture and visual art, with somewhat fluctuating frequency due to variable support and interest from local partners. To match its exhibitions abroad, ifa also has its own gallery space in Stuttgart and Berlin where it hosts the work of artists from around the world, including Indonesians. A significant project was a collaboration with Radio Kunci in Yogyakarta in 2016, on exploring cross-culturally variable ideas about the use of space.⁵² ifa's art department also has a Facebook site with some 6,500 followers.⁵³

⁵⁰ www.ssoar.info/ssoar/discover?scope=/&query=institut+für+auslandsbeziehungen&submit=&rpp=10&sort_by=dc.date.issued_dt&order=desc [27/02/2019].

⁵¹ <https://www.ifa.de/en/funding/crossculture-program/> [27/02/2019].

⁵² See www.ifa.de/kunst/radio-kunci.html and also www.yeast-art-of-sharing.de/2016/04/open-space-radio-kunci-ifa-galerie/ [27/02/2019].

⁵³ https://www.facebook.com/pg/ifa.visualarts/community/?ref=page_internal [27/02/2019].

3.3 The German Archaeological Institute (DAI)

Founded in 1829 and funded by the AA, the '*Deutsche Archäologische Institut*' carries out cultural heritage work and archaeological research abroad, with some 300 projects in 20 locations worldwide.⁵⁴ DAI has not been as active in Indonesia and does not have an office there despite a desperate need in Indonesia for technical assistance and capacity building in heritage protection and archaeology, and also despite the fact that in the Indonesian-German Cultural Agreement of 1990, Article 11 says that

"both parties shall strive to carry out joint measures to preserve and disseminate their cultural heritage. In particular, this shall include measures to conserve and restore ancient monuments and works of art as well as co-operation in the field of museums and archives."⁵⁵

At present the DAI is involved in a programme to support the maintenance of some classical temples in Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos und Iran according to its web-site, but as far as I can see there is no current activity in Indonesia. The requisite regional expertise is available. Some excellent research has been carried out by German Universities, such as the FU Berlin's ethno-archaeological project in Kerinci.⁵⁶ Between 2010 and 2017 there was also an important UNESCO project to restore the 8th century Buddhist temple Borobudur after damage from volcanic ash, which was co-financed by the AA's 'cultural preservation programme' and the German UNESCO office.⁵⁷

The need in Indonesia for improving the protection of heritage sites and museums is immense. Museum standards are low, especially in the outer regions. Heritage sites are regularly suffering vandalism at the hands of Islamists, even the iconic Borobudur. This shows how significant these sites are for Indonesian national consciousness. They are links to a pre-colonial and pre-Islamic past which symbolises a common pluralist identity and the origins of nationhood for most Indonesians, barring a small segment of Islamists. Perhaps the most prominent site is the capital of the former empire of Majapahit, near Trowulan in Eastern Java, which has seen some excavation work and features a museum but could do with assistance in research and conservation.⁵⁸ The same could be said of

⁵⁴ www.dainst.org/dai/meldungen [27/02/2019].

⁵⁵ www.ifa.de/akbp-kompakt/kulturabkommen/browse/1.html [27/02/2019].

⁵⁶ www.geschkult.fu-berlin.de/e/vaa/forschung/abgeschlossen/indonesien/ [27/02/2019].

⁵⁷ <https://unesco.diplo.de/unesco-de/aktuelles/2017-04-10-kulturerhalt-borobudur-auswaertiges-amt/1470264> [27/02/2019].

⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trowulan_Museum [27/02/2019].

countless other museums and heritage sites, many of which remain completely uncured.

3.4 The Goethe-Institut (GI)

Founded in 1951, the GI is the largest mediator organisation for German cultural diplomacy, with some 160 domestic and international branches, and its funding comes from the foreign office (AA). Its mandate, spelled out in a 2004 Framework Agreement (G: *Rahmenvertrag*) with the AA, is focused on international cultural collaboration, conveying a contemporary and comprehensive image of Germany and promotion of the German language abroad, in an independent and self-responsible manner.⁵⁹ The GI has some 3,000 employees and an overall budget of about 419 million USD, of which more than half is self-generated from language tuition and testing fees. Funding is also obtained through project-related partnerships or, on a modest scale, from sponsors.

In Indonesia the GI maintains a presence through its head office in Jakarta, a branch office in Bandung, a Goethe Centre in Surabaya, a designated multilingual website,⁶⁰ as well as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts and a YouTube channel. The priorities for Indonesia and the wider region are detailed in four-yearly regional strategy documents, the most recent one covering the period 2015-18 (GI 2014), which are the result of a 'target agreement' (G: *Zielvereinbarung*) between the GI head office in Munich and the AA in Berlin.

Due to the focus on language promotion, the GI's mandate straddles the domains of culture and education, as these categories are understood from an administrative perspective. Referring back to the culture concept in anthropology, as explained in the Preface, however, education is quintessential to culture, which is defined in anthropology as the product of all learning. Conversely, therefore, the cultural programmes of the GI are also very much educational in the broader sense.

The current cultural collaboration and events programme of the GI in Indonesia is very comprehensive, and some recent examples will serve to illustrate this. *German Cinema 2018* was the sixth festival of popular and award-winning German films, screened in 2018 at cinemas in Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Yogyakarta and, beyond the island of Java, in Denpasar and Makassar, supported by twelve local sponsors. A separate *Science Film*

⁵⁹ <https://www.goethe.de/resources/files/pdf83/Rahmenvertrag.pdf> [27/02/2019].

⁶⁰ <https://www.goethe.de/ins/id/de/sta/jak.html> [27/02/2019].

Festival, aimed at introducing youth to cutting edge science, was screened for the ninth time in 2018, with the support of Siemens Indonesia and other companies and in partnership with two Indonesian universities. *5 Islands/5 Villages* explored regional diversity in Indonesia by sending young filmmakers from the University of Fine Arts in Hamburg (HFBK), paired up with young cultural anthropologists from Universitas Indonesia, to explore live on Indonesian islands and in German villages. Also related to film is *DocNet Southeast Asia*, a regional programme supporting documentary filmmaking in Indonesia and Southeast Asia initiated by the GI and funded by the EuropeAid programme 'Investing in People.' *NUSASONIC* (from I. *nusantara*, 'the Indonesian archipelago') is a multi-year project using art labs and festivals (held in Yogyakarta in 2018) to encourage encounters and showcase co-productions of European and Southeast Asian musicians (supported also by numerous local sponsors and media partners as well as 'Creative Europe'). A further music project, *Anders Hören* ('Hearing Differently'), is a project on contemporary applications of classical music. *GAMING* is an AA-funded project in its third year that facilitates direct encounters and cooperation between game developers and creative industry entrepreneurs from Germany and Indonesia. *IKAT / ECUT* (from I. *ikat*, 'to weave') critically explores the past, present and future of textiles in Indonesia, the wider region, and Germany. The *Indonesian Culinary Photography* exhibition is part of an international 'gastro-diplomacy' project and showcases the best works from a photo competition on traditional Indonesian food. GI's *Voices of Indonesia* on-line anthology provides access to stories from the Indonesian archipelago. Finally, the public forum "Postcolonial Perspectives from the Global South" brought together curators, sociologists and historians from South America, Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia to explore various trajectories of modernity cross-culturally, questioning Eurocentric claims of universality. GI's cultural programme is rounded off with a magazine, a dossier series, and services such as an e-library, film archive and translation service, and by providing a constant stream of Germany-related and internal news on social media.

Even this brief overview shows clearly that the GI is not about representing German culture or producing programmes by itself so much as coproducing with Indonesian partners. Its value lies in its extensive networks in Indonesia, ranging from financial partners and project collaborators to programme participants, media connections and sponsors. The last project example also shows that the GI is able to leverage its international network to facilitate South-South cultural exchange, and its commitment to self-critical reflection on issues such as colonialism. The programme is not simply about showcasing German culture, but squarely aimed at encouraging encounters and networking of cultural actors and institutions across the two countries and beyond. One option that could be

explored further is to 'risk more Europe' in the cultural sphere through closer collaboration with other national agencies,⁶¹ or working directly with the European Delegation in Jakarta. Another way to extend networks would be to issue open calls for proposals that do not specify in advance the nature of the proposed collaboration, as current open calls do.

Finally, there is the question of how GI could improve the media presence of its cultural programmes to achieve some public diplomacy impact, rather than just influencing small groups of so-called multipliers. One interesting option would be to develop programmes for subsidising the synchronisation of German films or TV dramas, some of which would serve to provide a good insight into German culture as it unfolds in daily life. Synchronised material could reach Indonesia's vast TV audience of about 258 million people.⁶² German league football would also be very popular on Indonesian TV. Film festivals simply do not have the same kind of reach as TV. New collaborations with Indonesian channels and/or with DW Indonesia would be required, however, and the cost may exceed current budget limitations.

The other major opportunity lies in social media. The current reach of GI on these platforms remains limited, though a great wealth of material is posted. For example, most posts on the GI Indonesia YouTube channel reach audiences of less than 1000, with a minority reaching into the thousands. By comparison, I found that one young Indonesian lady living in Berlin has somehow managed to attract 1,3 million viewers and more than 2000 comments with a homemade, low-tech, head-shot-only video detailing her personal experiences there as a student,⁶³ while another of her videos about experiences with racial prejudice toward Muslims in Germany reached close to half a million (largely Indonesian) viewers.⁶⁴ Short of GI hiring her as a consultant, there are other promising options. Based on my own research on cultural elites within the wider context of the national elite, one option would be for GI to connect more strongly with Indonesia's most charismatic celebrities, whose every social media post demands instant mass attention, a fact that members of Indonesia's political elite know well and make ample use of by cultivating close relations with them, often also at a personal level. Meanwhile, the reception of GI activities in

⁶¹ One opportunity to fund such collaborations with the Institute Française is through the Franco-German Elysée-Fund. See www.france-allemande.fr/Der-Elysee-Fonds-Schaufenster-der,5950.html

⁶² Assuming 96% reach for TV and a current Indonesian population of 268,290,700.

⁶³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOoJS20g344> [27/02/2019].

⁶⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O52KFFKqW-o> [27/02/2019].

the Indonesian press is good and is generally positively received, though it is difficult to measure how many readers such articles attract.

The second major area of GI activity is related to promoting the learning of German as a second language, typically through formal education. The institute has developed a series of exams for learners of German as a foreign language for all levels, from A1 to C2, and runs regular examinations in Indonesia. Language testing is an important hurdle for overseas students applying to the DAAD or directly to universities to study in Germany, as well as for the growing number of migrants. The GI offers its own language courses at all levels, which of course also have a significant German cultural component. The courses are relatively affordable,⁶⁵ participant numbers have tripled since 2010, and there are often waiting lists. There are also online learning options, most of which are free. Indonesian students who would like full immersion can also enrol in a language course in one of thirteen domestic GI branches in Germany. Most Indonesian students of German, however, receive their tuition in state-run or private schools within the vast and complex Indonesian education system, of which more will be said later. Indeed, of just under 20 million German language students worldwide in 2002 only about 80,000 (0.4%) were enrolled in GIs (Harnischfeger 2002). In this wider field of German language teaching in Indonesia, lack of quality is the most glaring issue, which highlights the importance of GI's contribution to language teacher training.

The main platform for the further training of local German language teachers is the GI's network of partner-schools or PASCH, launched in Jakarta in 2008. The network encompasses more than 1800 schools worldwide.⁶⁶ PASCH is a collaboration with the AA, DAAD, ZfA (below) and the state-level 'education minister's conference' (G: *Kultusministerkonferenz*, KMK), which has its own pedagogic exchange programme. Through the PASCH network the Indonesia branch of GI offers a spectrum of advanced professional development options for German-language teachers (such as *Deutsch Lehren Lernen*, DLL), organises alumni events and presents seminars for German-language instructors, often in collaboration with local partners such as the Indonesian Association of German Language Teachers. Access to materials and curriculum development assistance is also provided, and there are a number of competitions and awards, a national youth camp for selected

⁶⁵ A six-week course at 3 x 3.5h /week in Jakarta currently costs IDR 3,200,000 which is roughly equivalent to a local middle class-level monthly salary.

⁶⁶ www.pasch-net.de/de/index.html [27/02/2019].

students (21 met in Bali in 2018) and a national German teachers' conference.⁶⁷ A more select network with links to the Indonesian education department is the 'German (Language) Education Cooperative' (G: *Bildungskooperation Deutsch*, BKD), comprising 46 teachers in 23 locations across Indonesia.

Overall, while the language services and the language student and teacher programmes of the GI are well designed and effective, the system is facing a dual challenge and seems somewhat stressed in its efforts to meet it.

One challenge is the need to improve poor standards among Indonesian language teachers of German and the associated under-supply of qualified instructors. The Indonesian government's very restrictive working visa regime makes it near impossible to bring in native-speaker teachers from Germany and, in any case, the labour market for such teachers in Germany was swept clean by the mass influx of refugees in 2015. This means that catching up with demand for teacher training of Indonesians is imperative.

The second challenge is that demand for German language tuition in Indonesia is likely to continue expanding at a rapid rate, escalating the existing undersupply of teachers. Already there are 187,000 German learners in Indonesia, a 52% increase since 2010 (AA 2015b). More Indonesians contemplating university study in Germany is the largest driver of this increased demand (70% of students enrolled with GI are prospective students, cf. GI 2014: 33). Although the demand from tertiary students is partially mitigated by an increasing availability of English language-based tuition in German universities, Indonesian alumni have told me that speaking German is vital for a positive life experience in Germany even for students taught in English. With the Indonesian middleclass expected to grow from 74 to 141 million (2012 to 2020) and given that universities in most states in Germany do not charge overseas (or domestic) student fees, demand for German language from this sector could double again in a very short time. Another growth driver, on the German side, is the need for labour migration, notably of Indonesian age and health care personnel, a sector that is growing quickly and in urgent need of some regulation.

Overall it can be said that the current commitment of resources is insufficient and needs to be adjusted rapidly. Direct advanced training of Indonesian German teachers,

⁶⁷ On the 2018 youth camp see www.instagram.com/p/Bna8pjXFUzB/?taken-by=goetheinstitut_indonesien, and on the 2018 teacher conference see www.instagram.com/p/BoOPn2Qld-L/?taken-by=goetheinstitut_indonesien [27/02/2019].

ideally in Germany, together with basic and intermediate German teacher training in Indonesia, delivered through closer partnerships with Indonesian higher education institutions featuring German Studies departments, would seem the most effective pathways. As it is, the Indonesian tertiary institutions are not set up for language teacher training so much as for German literary studies. Partnerships thus should aim at influencing policy in these departments through appropriate incentives. These could include well-subsidised opportunities for training the potential trainers within Indonesian university German Studies departments, and perhaps some similar assistance to the private language school sector, insofar as it does or is willing to carry out teacher training.

3.5 The Central Bureau for Schools Abroad (ZfA)

The *Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen* (ZfA) was founded in 1968,⁶⁸ and is a division of the Federal Office of Administration (*Bundesverwaltungsamt*, BVA). ZfA has been mandated with the responsibility for 1,202 'schools abroad' (*Auslandsschulen*) by the foreign office (AA). These schools are divided into three categories: German Schools Abroad (DAS, total 140) are largely privately funded 'encounter schools,' where the children of German expatriates are taught together with local students in a bilingual medium, with a choice of graduating with either a national, German or international high school certificate; German Profile Schools (DPS, 27) are national schools with a strong emphasis on German as a foreign language and at least one other subject taught in a German medium; and finally, German Diploma Schools (DSD, 1035) are a subset of those national schools within the PASCH network that are able to provide language tuition leading to a diploma,⁶⁹ and which hence must meet the high standards set within the so-called 'European common reference framework.' More than 2000 teachers and programme staff in these schools are currently supported by 166 administrators, subject advisors and quality standard managers in the two head offices located in Berlin and Bonn.

The ZfA does not have an independent office in Indonesia, however, and is represented there through its partners, namely the GI, the DAAD and the German embassy. There are indeed no DPS and DSD schools in Indonesia at all, reflecting once again the relatively low standard of German language teaching in this country. The only DAS school is the

⁶⁸ www.auslandsschulwesen.de

⁶⁹ The German Language Diploma (DSD) of the Conference of Ministers of Education can be acquired in two stages by students abroad as proof of proficiency in German. Level I (corresponds to the B1 level) is regarded as proof of the language skills required for admission to a preparatory course. Stage II corresponds to levels B2 / C1 and is proof of German skills as required for a university degree in Germany.

Deutsche Schule Jakarta, founded in 1957 (originally located in Bandung).⁷⁰ There are two networks of schools that receive indirect support through partner agencies, however. The FIT schools (26 in Java, one in Bali and one in Lombok) are local schools seeking to build or extend their programme in German as a foreign language, supported by the Goethe-Institut; while PAD schools are local schools that have partnerships with schools in Germany, whereby two-way exchange programmes for students are supported through the 'Pedagogic Exchange Service' (*Pädagogischer Austauschdienst*, PAD), a service of the State Education Ministers' [Joint] Conference (*Kultusministerkonferenz*, KMK).⁷¹ The reason the ZfA and KMK-PAD are mentioned here despite their limited level of activity in Indonesia is to illustrate untapped potential in the promotion of German language in Indonesia.

The preceding assessment provides a context for the discussion of tertiary academic exchange in the following sections. Given that Indonesian students require language skills to undertake tertiary study in Germany, the establishment of DPS or DSD schools in Indonesia, though it may not yet be in sight, would certainly greatly contribute to increasing the pool of well-prepared prospective applicants to the DAAD or directly to the German University system for undergraduate study abroad. Generally, the key to the success of cultural diplomacy across the entire educational exchange sector hinges on improved professional training for Indonesian language teachers.⁷² The development of more specific strategies on a rational basis, meanwhile, is hindered by the general "lack of scientific research in this field [language teacher training]" (Kühn 2015: 1). This is perhaps the part of the problem that should be rectified most immediately.

3.6 The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)

Founded in 1925, the DAAD is a private, self-governing national agency representing 365 higher education institutions in Germany (100 universities and technical universities, 162 general universities of applied sciences, and 52 colleges of music and art) as well as more than 100 student associations. Federal funding from the AA, BMBF and BMZ is augmented with some European and state-level funding and local partnerships in the target countries. Apart from making a contribution to the promotion of German Studies abroad and

⁷⁰ <https://www.dsjakarta.de/> [27/02/2019].

⁷¹ <https://www.kmk-pad.org/programme/schulpartnerschaften-der-pasch-initiative.html> [27/02/2019].

⁷² Another obstacle is that Indonesian high school certificates (and those of many other countries) do not provide direct access to German tertiary institutions. Two years of tertiary study at home are needed to qualify or alternatively students can do a 10-month special bridging course (*Studienkolleg*) that includes language as well as thematic studies, either in Germany or in one location in Jakarta (run by the University of Hannover, limited places). Making more bridging courses available in Indonesia may be helpful.

building capacity in the university sector in developing countries, the DAAD is primarily focused on promoting international cooperation in science and higher education through its mobility programmes.

DAAD to date has supported more than two million students, postgraduates and scientists in Germany and abroad. In 2015 alone the DAAD supported 127,039 persons around the world, of which 51,627 were foreigners studying in or visiting Germany or collaborating on joint projects. The remainder were Germans spending time abroad for study or research. Future demand for study in Germany is predicted to grow, driven by large numbers of students mainly from Asian countries and some other emerging markets entering the field.

Given that universities in most German states have no fees for foreign students deterring applicants, and considering that some of the best students will find employment in Germany after graduating, it can be concluded that the field of higher education is not an industry in its own right as it is in Australia, the US and UK, for example. The aim is rather to compete internationally for the brightest minds of the next generation, and to network Germany into the global economy through foreign alumni and mobile German academics and students. Issuing stipends to the most promising foreign students is thus a strategic priority. Networking between the approximately 3,000 DAAD alumni in Indonesia is intense and supported with the help of an annual magazine, called NADI.⁷³ Many alumni find work with German companies in Indonesia or Indonesian companies with ties to Germany.

In Indonesia and elsewhere in emerging economies it is not the few DAAD stipend recipients that are driving the rapid demand growth for tertiary study in Germany, however, but rather the growing number of self-funded middleclass students. The number of Indonesian tertiary students in Germany has risen by 87.2% between 2012 and 2017, to a total of 4,669, making Germany their number one destination in Europe and fifth in the world (DAAD 2018: 5). In absolute terms, however, these numbers are still small compared to Indonesian students in the US (about 8,000) and Australia (17,000). This is almost entirely due to the difficulty of obtaining the requisite German language skills in Indonesia. This issue constitutes the main stumbling block on the path of expansion, but it will not stop it, and Germany must make decisions soon as to how it should respond.

⁷³ For the latest issue (2018), see www.daad.id/files/2018/12/NADI-25-Final-Digital-Version2.pdf [27/02/2019].

If Germany decides to retain its current, predominantly fee-free policy despite the rapidly increasing number of foreign students (36% increase between 2010 and 2015),⁷⁴ the decision will have to be founded on other reasons than competition for the few best minds only, which has been and remains the DAAD's main concern. One plausible reason for accepting a more significant spontaneous influx of foreign students is that Germany's aging society, demographic decline and tight labour market may warrant a migration programme. Germany historically has not seen itself as an immigrant country, however, and lacks a fully-fledged, proactive migration policy. Not least due to a high drop-out rate of 50% (which itself requires some research attention), only one in four foreign students end up working in Germany. This may change with the government recently announcing a new scheme for skilled migration (Taube 2018), despite the spectre of a possible populist backlash. This policy could facilitate the retention of foreign graduates.

Another way to rationalise a large expansion of international student numbers (at a cost of currently about 31,000 USD per graduate) would be to commercialise the university sector and introduce course fees, as indeed the state of Baden-Württemberg decided to do in the winter semester of 2017. The fees charged in this state are modest (1,719 USD/semester), however, and more generally across Germany the question of commercialisation remains contentious. The numerous unintended impacts of a full commercialisation, on the already quite serious student housing crisis in many German university towns, for example, would need to be carefully considered alongside potential benefits. In sum, a clear national rationale for expanding international student numbers seems to be lacking or to be still emerging, partly due to the federalised system of education. Meanwhile, universities will operate according to their own logic, depending on what state government funding they do or do not receive for accommodating additional foreign students.

At a level of content, the research funded by the DAAD, and also the research of German universities more broadly, falls into two rather distinct modes of academic engagement with Indonesia. The first mode of engagement is dominated by language, humanities and social sciences, and can be described as the 'study of Indonesia' as such, while the other is characterised by 'studies in Indonesia', which is the mode more characteristic of the natural sciences, technology and engineering. The first is commonly referred to as 'Indonesian Studies,' a field often subsumed within Asian- or Southeast Asian Studies departments in German universities. Germany's national contribution to Indonesian Stud-

⁷⁴ See www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article167363312/Steuer-geld-fuer-auslaendische-Studenten-Das-lohnt-sich.html [27/02/2019].

ies is significant, ranking sixth (excluding Indonesia itself) in terms of the number of scientific papers produced in the period 1992-2000 (Graf 2003: 23), after The Netherlands, US, Australia, UK and France. The amount of natural science and technological activity, as we shall see, is also very substantial, with much of it concentrated in a number of key sectors.

Before I detail the DAAD's support of German research in and about Indonesia, however, it should be noted that a major problem already lies hidden right here, in the gap between the two modes of engagement: There is a serious lack of cross-disciplinary and interdisciplinary integration between social and natural / applied sciences in Germany and elsewhere. This is a global issue for the scientific community, and one that international science organisations and science funders are now striving to address with great urgency. One recent decision pointing in this direction was the historic merger of the International Council of Science (ICSU) with the International Social Science Council (ISSC), a process in which I was involved as a member of the executive of the latter. The push for more interdisciplinarity behind this merger had emerged as an urgent and vital issue because it is the only way to answer the pressing global questions we must now answer, such as: how can we survive this century without an interlocking environmental and socio-political collapse? How can systemic cultural change be achieved without major disruption? When their warnings about climate change were largely ignored, leading natural scientists realised that the challenge is not simply one of technological innovation but of changing human attitudes and behaviours, and hence that social science and humanities knowledge is essential. New funding schemes are currently being established to support such collaborations across 'the great divide' in science, and also across the even greater divide between academia and other sectors. Germany, if it wants to break new ground in Indonesia, or anywhere else for that matter, should consider enabling its educational agencies to be at the forefront of the integration process beginning to unfold in the global knowledge sector. The way to achieve this is through appropriate design or redesign of new and available funding instruments within the DAAD and beyond, reserve at least a portion of all funding for interdisciplinary teams.

In Indonesia the DAAD opened its Jakarta office in 1990,⁷⁵ and it also maintains four endowed lectureships at three different universities (German Studies, marine biology). A wide range of collaborative grants and exchange fellowships are available to Indonesian applicants at various stages of their career, from graduate students to lecturers. The scope for cooperation with the Indonesian tertiary sector is ever growing, but there are also

⁷⁵ <https://www.daad.id/en/> [27/02/2019].

some challenges. To begin with, half of all Indonesian tertiary institutions are concentrated on Java. Among them the public universities dominate in terms of the quantity and quality of research. The bulk of the tertiary sector is made up of numerous private institutions, however, which are not favoured on account of their very variable quality levels. The private institutions are also much smaller on average, with only one third of tertiary educators employed within this part of the sector, even though the number of private institutions is ten times higher than that of state institutions. Only about 4.5% of lecturers in these private institutions have a PhD-level qualification, compared to 19.4% at state-funded institutions, and the country’s 107 PhD programmes are nearly all situated at state institutions (Jansen 2017: 12, 19). Demand for PhD opportunities abroad is very strong, and several government schemes now help to fund such further training for lecturers who are under pressure to upgrade.

Tertiary Institution Category	State	Privat	Total
Akademi (Academy)	83	1,013	1,097
Politeknik (Polytechnic)	109	147	256
Sekolah Tinggi (Upper School)	69	2,388	2,458
Institut (Institute)	52	127	179
Universitas (University)	82	481	563
TOTAL	395	4,156	4,553

Figure 8: Indonesian Tertiary Institutions. Source: Higher Education Data, DIKT⁷⁶

The most research active Indonesian institutions are the ‘Institut Teknologi Bandung’ (ITB), Universitas Indonesia (UI), Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), the ‘Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember’ (ITS), the ‘Institut Pertanian Bogor’ (IPB) and two non-university bodies, the National Science Academy (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI) and the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Of a total of 130 German collaborative projects with 49 Indonesian partner institutions in 2016, 37 projects were with ITB and UGM alone (Gate Germany 2016: 12).

Indonesia as a whole still performs poorly on research output measures (e.g. only 37 local journals are currently listed on Scopus), even though there are strong incentives now in place to gradually make amends, such as making academic promotion dependent on publication track records. In March 2016 Indonesia also launched the ‘Indonesian Science Fund’ (Dana Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, DIPI), its first multi-year funding scheme to

⁷⁶ Posted in 2017 at <https://forlap.ristekdikti.go.id/perguruantinggi/homegraphpt> [27/02/2019], Copyright 2013 - 2019 Kementerian Riset, Teknologi Dan Pendidikan Tinggi.

finance world-class scientific research. The Ministry of Finance provides 3 million USD a year to disburse to researchers, with further support from the US, UK and Australia (Sabarini 2016).

It may take some time, but these and other related reforms are set to improve Indonesia's capacity and attractiveness as an eye-level partner for international research collaboration. There is no denying the fact that, until quite recently, joint research with foreign researchers was asymmetric and aimed at Indonesia's scientific and economic development. This changed quite rapidly in the direction of partnership from the 1980s onward, however, with the return of many thousands of Indonesian graduates who had completed their PhDs abroad at an international standard. Many of them took leading positions in the sector, which also illustrates why alumni are so important for networking with the Indonesian tertiary sector.⁷⁷

Within this shifting context, DAAD has needed to adjust continuously. For example, there are now matching funds available to support lecturers to study in Germany under the auspices of the Indonesian-German Scholarship Programme (IGSP), a collaboration between the Indonesian Directorate General of Higher Education (DIKTI) and DAAD. A programme for lecturers known as BUDI (Beasiswa Unggulan Dosen Indonesia) granted 500 domestic and 50 international fellowships for upgrading lecturers' qualifications in 2017. Meanwhile, the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan, LPDP), a funding agency under the Ministry of Finance, began to provide domestic and international MA and PhD study stipends of its own in 2012 (7200 awarded in 2016, including about 1500 for study abroad). The recent merger between DIKTI and the Ministry for Research (RISTEK) in 2015 will help accelerate these reforms toward greater integration of research with tertiary teaching. These are all signs of 'Indonesia rising' (above), and future success of DAAD will depend on continued flexibility and dialogue with the Indonesian side.⁷⁸

In 2017 DAAD supported 632 Indonesians, which is still significant. At the same time, 314 German individual scholars were supported to visit Indonesia. Most of the growth is located in project rather than individual grants, so that now two thirds of all persons funded are in fact participants in Indonesian-German university partnership projects. To

⁷⁷ For a detailed analysis of the history and structure of the Indonesian education system, see DAAD 2017.

⁷⁸ DAAD has an MoU with RISTEK-DIKTI to serve this purpose, and maintains very close ties.

name just some of the most important of these projects (number of recipients in 2017 provided in brackets), there is: a programme with the government of Aceh Province for MA and PhD stipends (27); the above mentioned, jointly funded IGSP programme (24); stipends for high achieving graduates of ZfA schools (10); stipends for Indonesian PhDs and post-docs to study in Germany (29); scholarships for intensive language summer courses in Germany (14), a BMBF project on Sustainable Water Management (17); stipends for a project on Biodiversity and Health (28); EPOS stipends for graduates in fields with development significance for Indonesia (32); stipends for the project 'Dialogue with the Islamic World' (28); the project 'Transnational Education' (TNB) in liaison with the business sector (1); and various programmes for DAAD alumni (70). Another important programme called 'Dialogue on Innovative Higher Education Strategies' (DIES) provides stipends for the further professional education of administrators in Indonesian universities on topics such as internationalisation, grant writing and financial or HR management.

DAAD also participates in education fairs in Indonesia (such as EHEF and MBA) to provide information sessions for prospective students in Indonesia, as it does in other countries.⁷⁹ In Germany, DAAD provides strategic marketing assistance to universities looking for prospective students abroad or seeking to internationalise their research. Such services to German universities are now partly outsourced to Gate Germany, however, an international marketing consortium of German universities, the offices of which are located in the head office of the DAAD in Bonn.⁸⁰ As the president of the DAAD explained in a recent interview about Gate Germany,⁸¹ the new model of internationalisation pursued therein is more and more a corporate style, top-down model, whereby strategic international partnerships are decided upon by university management, rather than a bottom up model driven by personal contacts between academics. Whether this model will lead Gate Germany and its clients to success, or turns out to be a case of management hubris, remains to be seen. From my experience in international partnership building, specifically in Indonesia, management has an important facilitating role to play in support of academic networking, but is not in a good position to initiate research partnerships. Attempts to arrange "forced marriages" between researchers of different universities often fall flat despite the provision of incentives. This is because academic freedom in making personal contacts with colleagues abroad is an essential prerequisite for fruitful collaboration and

⁷⁹ German universities are not quite as well represented at educational fairs as are universities from countries in which the pursuit of international students is a fully-fledged commercial venture.

⁸⁰ www.gate-germany.de/ [27/02/2019].

⁸¹ Interview posted on 8 March 2018 at www.gate-germany.de/ueber-uns/interview-wintermantel.html [27/02/2019].

creative innovation. This is certainly true in Indonesian Studies, as in other area studies where researchers have ample opportunity and language skills to establish contacts abroad. It is perhaps somewhat less true of natural science and engineering, where researchers tend to lack foreign language skills or reasons to visit the country in the first place. Rather than relying on management-led cooperation, researchers in these fields would be better served by being integrated into interdisciplinary teams that include area studies experts, who do have language and cultural skills as well as local contacts, and hence can assist their science and engineering colleagues in numerous ways.

Without wanting to cast any dispersions on the important work of the mediator organisations, it is important to remind once more that, while the DAAD is a facilitator for international academic exchange for the German universities, the bulk of the 'cultural diplomacy' activity in this sector is done by non-state actors, namely the universities themselves and their staff and students. Some German universities, such as Georg-August University Göttingen, TU Ilmenau and RWTH Aachen, have had intense relationships with partners in Indonesia for decades and maintain a constant flow of interaction. Indeed, the number of current collaborations, joint projects and educational partnerships German universities maintain in Indonesia is too vast to be described within this study. A very good (and very long) list can be found online, however, on pages 59-107 in the appendix of a government response to a 'minor question' (*Kleine Anfrage*, No. 19/4300) tabled in federal parliament on 14 September 2018 by the party Die Linke, about Germany's activities in ASEAN countries, including Indonesia (elsewhere the document also lists recent diplomatic visits).⁸² Another list of collaborations can be found on the website 'International University Partnerships' maintained by the German Vice-Chancellors Conference. It currently lists 139 partnerships with Indonesia.⁸³

The number of connections between individual academics in the two countries is of course much greater again, and not easily measurable. Using my own case as an example, perhaps not atypical for an Indonesian Studies scholar, I have collaborated certainly with more than a hundred Indonesian academic colleagues in one way or another. Almost none of these collaborations were reliant on a state funding agency or on my university in any way. Furthermore, in my capacity as a researcher, I have had the great fortune to come

⁸² <https://kleineanfragen.de/bundestag/19/4300-beziehungen-zwischen-deutschland-und-den-asean-staaten-brunei-indonesien-kambodscha-laos-malaysia-myanmar> [27/02/2019].

⁸³ www.internationale-hochschulkooperationen.de/en/foreign-countries.html [27/02/2019].

into contact with thousands of Indonesians from all walks of life, including hundreds of individuals in positions of influence. Such individual networks do not appear in any list.

3.7 Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation (AvH)

The AvH funds long-term scientific cooperation between German and foreign scientists at the cutting edge of research.⁸⁴ Again, scholarships and prizes allow scientists to visit Germany to collaborate with their partners, and vice versa. But if the DAAD is focused on finding and funding 'the best minds' to engage with, this is much more characteristic again of the AvH. The 28,000-strong worldwide Humboldt alumni network includes 55 Nobel Prize winners. In Indonesia, the third major alumni meeting (Humboldt-Kolleg) was held in Jakarta in July 2017, on the topic of ASEAN rising.

The 2017 annual report shows that, to date, no research prizes were ever awarded to Indonesians, and only 32 regular stipends. By comparison, for example, 40 times that amount were awarded to Indians (AvH 2018: 55). The lack of prize winners may reflect an academic bias in the selection criteria, and it would seem to me some reflection is in order on whether these criteria may not be in need of review. For example, scientists could surely be found in Indonesia and other emerging economies who have had a huge impact on their society and hence deserve a prize, perhaps in a newly conceived category, regardless of the strictly academic merit of their work. The same applies to numerous other countries.

As for the research stipends, the level of support for Indonesians has not been improving. In the 2013-17 period 0 out of 6 Humboldt stipend applications were funded, while 3 of 16 Georg Foster research stipend applications succeeded, and 0 out of 1 Feodor Lynen stipends. Three fellowships were awarded for Indonesians to visit Germany (AvH 2018: 60, 65, 69, 101). Again, one would need to reflect on what is more appropriate: absolute or relative standards, scientific excellence or social impact? The few Indonesian scholars who have been funded to date, however, do tend to become life-long participants and receive generous support within the rather exclusive and tightly knit Humboldt network.

⁸⁴ www.humboldt-foundation.de [27/02/2019].

3.8 European Union Programmes in Indonesia

There is no doubt whatsoever that European countries are gradually increasing the level of their cooperation in the area of cultural-educational diplomacy, in part due to a need to be able to compete on the same scale as major powers like China and the US. This cooperation includes educational fairs, conferences and cultural events organised jointly by two or more national agencies, collaborative programmes directed at ASEAN such as SHARE, and EU-funded programmes such as Erasmus+, a large European exchange programme for students and academics. It is difficult to foresee how far or fast this trend will continue, but the current state of play is such that, in my opinion, the European programmes already cannot be ignored in a discussion of German cultural diplomacy, not least because Germany pays a significant contribution to these programmes (for example, 20.7% of the budget for EU-ASEAN cooperation in 2016).

The European External Action Service (EEAS; G. EAD) has a diplomatic delegation of office in Jakarta which is responsible for coordinating Erasmus+ and other programmes relating to education, cultural exchange, democracy promotion, environmental protection, water management, health, forestry, post-disaster reconstruction and civil society partnerships. In 2014 the EU and Indonesia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, making Indonesia the first ASEAN country to have signed up such a high level and comprehensive agreement with the EU.⁸⁵ The EU has spent more than half a billion USD on development in Indonesia, and is also Indonesia's biggest trading partner. In education and culture, the delegation supports an annual 'European Higher Education Fair' (jointly with four member states, including Germany), which attracts some 20,000 students, as well as the 'Europe on Screen Festival,' which presented 76 films to 31,500 viewers in 2017.⁸⁶ Education is given very high priority and absorbs about 80% of EU funding for Indonesia, including assistance for reforming the education system, policy development and budget support. Much more could be done, however, to integrate and consolidate across some of the vast array of scholarships schemes on offer by EU member states.

National cultural exchange institutions are further networked within the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), and engage in numerous collaborations, some of which – pertaining to Indonesia – were mentioned in the section on GI, above. The EU delegation itself has a special focus on the creative economy at the moment, and

⁸⁵ Agreement text online at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradoc_154810.pdf [27/02/2019].

⁸⁶ https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/43185/europe-screen-2018-indonesia-93-films-24-european-countries-250-screenings-10-days-and-6_en [27/02/2019].

yet there is the same lack of ambition to bring more European films onto Indonesian TV screens. Admittedly, more serious censorship issues would need to be addressed for TV screening compared to cinema, and hence a well-targeted feasibility study would be useful. The delegation also maintains its own links to civil society in Indonesia, including Muslim organisations. A new EU interfaith programme is in the pipeline. There is also some work with journalists on how to detect and combat discrimination and hate speech, with awards for those who stand up as defenders of human rights.

Germany also participates in a number of EU-funded initiatives of limited duration through its mediator agencies. A prominent example is SHARE, a 11.5 million USD EU-funded project with the objective to strengthen regional cooperation within ASEAN between 2015 and 2018 (ASEAN's secretariat is in Jakarta). The focus is on enhancing the quality, competitiveness and internationalisation of higher education institutions and students across member countries, especially in view of the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015. The aim is to provide advice on how to harmonise higher education across ASEAN, loosely based on the experience of the Bologna Process in Europe, as well as the establishment of a common three-tiered education system and regulations for mutual recognition of qualifications. DAAD participates as part of a consortium of similar organisations from other European countries, including the UK, the Netherlands and France, as well as the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) and the European University Association (EUA), and of course ASEAN counterparts. Of the three 'Result Areas' of SHARE, the one DAAD has taken responsibility for (in co-operation with ENQA and EUA as well as relevant national authorities in the ASEAN community) is 'Result 2a and 2b' – ASEAN Qualifications Reference Frameworks and ASEAN Quality Assurance. The goal is to create the necessary systemic preconditions for enhanced academic and labour mobility in the region. There are similar projects on other integration issues, such as the establishment of a common intellectual property regulatory scheme within ASEAN.

A much more permanent programme is Erasmus+ (E+), which began in 2004.⁸⁷ To help spread the benefits of this programme across EU member countries, foreign students with PhD scholarships need to spend time in at least two EU countries. For the whole of Europe, according to data provided to me by the EU delegation, 1686 Indonesians received E+ scholarships and fellowships between 2004 and 2018, steadily increasing to reach 236 in the year 2018 alone. With a recently announced E+ budget increase of 10% for 2019, and

⁸⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/node_en [27/02/2019].

another doubling planned for the 2021-2027 funding period, the rapid upward trend is likely to continue. Success rates of Indonesian applications, however, tend to be rather low compared to some other ASEAN countries.

In 2017 a total of 216,268 USD of EU funding was awarded specifically for mobility programmes between German and Indonesian partner universities, for the following three exchanges.

German Partner	Indonesian Partner	Field of Study
University of Hannover	Institut Seni Indonesia Yogyakarta	Design and Media
Technical University Dresden	Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta; University of Indone- sia	Computational Logic
Westphalian University of Applied Science (WH)	Universitas Katolik Indonesia Atma Jaya	Economics and Journalism

Figure 9: German-Indonesian Collaborations with Erasmus+ Funding

These are all very significant partnerships. For example, the one between the Catholic University of Atma Jaya and the Westphalian University (WH) is an ongoing Erasmus+ International Credit Mobility programme. Students at bachelor level are funded to participate in regular exchanges in both directions, as are academics from the partner universities.

The following organisations, to be discussed below, are not formally classified as 'mediator organisations' (*Mittlerorganisationen*) in Germany. They are discussed here because they nonetheless contribute significantly to German cultural diplomacy in the fields of education, science, media or culture.

3.9 The Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)

The *Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung* provides funding for mediator organisations, particularly the GIZ and DAAD, but also has its own international office in Bonn that coordinates a number of flagship programmes in Indonesia.⁸⁸ The foundation for this engagement is a science and technology partnership agreement between the two countries signed in 1979. Major themes listed for cooperation are marine science, energy, aero-

⁸⁸ www.internationales-buero.de/de/indonesien.php [27/02/2019].

nautics and nautical science, geoscience, social science and humanities, technologies for industrial development, as well as science information and data services.

Perhaps the most famous project was established in response to the devastating Boxing-Day tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004. Between 2005 and 2011 some 120 scientists from the Geo Research Centre Potsdam (GFZ) built a German-Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System (GITEWS) before handing it over to local management in 2011. The GITEWS is deeply appreciated in Indonesia. However, some issues with maintenance have emerged according to feedback I received from the Indonesian side in November 2018, despite the fact that there is also an ongoing Project for Training, Education and Consulting for Tsunami Early Warning Systems (PROTECTS) to train the Indonesian operators on location. This issue again came to light in the wake of the recent tsunami in Western Java after a part of the Anak Krakatau volcano collapsed into the sea. A spokesperson of the Indonesian disaster agency claimed that the tsunami buoy network had not been operational since 2012 due to "vandalism, a limited budget and technical damage" (Martin and Zhou 2018). An investigation would seem in order.

Another recently completed major project funded by the BMBF is a low-temperature geothermal demonstration plant on the island of Sulawesi (Richter 2017). The plant was also developed by the GFZ at Helmholtz Centre Potsdam, this time in collaboration with Indonesian partners BPPT (Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology) and PGE (Pertamina Geothermal Energy). The project is significant in light of the vast potential of decentralised geothermal energy production in Indonesia, which is located on the Pacific Ring of Fire.

In biotechnology a project cluster has been established to identify new medicinal substances from Indonesia's vast reservoir of biodiversity, run through DAAD with local partners RISTEK-DIKTI, LIPI and BPPT. Eight distinct projects form part of this cluster with involvement from 26 German and Indonesian universities.⁸⁹

Finally, the ministry also has an initiative for the 'Development of a Research Presence in Southeast Asia' with two projects. One is a collaboration between RWTH Aachen and UGM to establish a competence network and science campus in the field of geo-resources, the other brings the University of Paderborn and Fraunhofer Institute Braunschweig together with ITB and an Indonesian company to build a joint laboratory for the use of biogenic by-products from palm oil.

⁸⁹ www.daad.id/en/find-funding/daads-biodiversity-and-health-programme/ [27/02/2019].

The BMBF also runs the so-called 'CLIENT II – International Partnerships for Sustainable Innovations' focused on climate, environment and energy. Indonesia did not receive much attention in the last round of this scheme,⁹⁰ but the international office notes that, under the soon to be announced Client III guidelines, Indonesia will see increased activity. Part of the reason is that Indonesia has been identified as a country that contributes greatly to global emissions and plastic waste in the ocean, and is also gravely at risk from environmental change. Two further BMBF schemes that may open new opportunities for German-Indonesian partnerships include the International Disaster Risk Management project scheme IKARIM,⁹¹ and the programme for Sustainable Urban Development.⁹²

3.10 German Vocational Education and Training Initiatives (BIBB, GOVET, IBS, iMove)

In Indonesia the link between education and industry remains relatively underdeveloped, with little cooperation between universities and enterprises for the practical application of academic research findings. Germany could not be more different in this regard, with its world-renowned vocational training system and its research-driven high-tech industries. This disparity has not gone unnoticed in Indonesia. President Jokowi recently issued a memorandum stating his intention to promote university-industry partnerships, and he explicitly has mentioned the German system as a model. Although a transfer of the entire system may not be easily achievable, perhaps German companies in Indonesia could serve as a bridge until the idea takes hold within Indonesian industry at large.

There have been a number of initiatives in this direction with German input. For example, the Swiss-German-University Jakarta has a preference for establishing cooperative relations with technical universities and industry that facilitate annual practicum placements for some 200 of its students in German industry. The DAAD also has a number of programmes to facilitate cooperation with industry, ranging from support for practicum placements in Germany or Indonesia to joint development projects (within the so-called 'Praxispartnerschaften' programme) that feature a 2+1 design (two universities and one private enterprise). The head of DAAD Indonesia, Thomas Zettler, also informed me that in 2019 DAAD is planning to hold a symposium on the theme of the German Technical University (G. *Fachhochschulmodell*) and Vocational Study (G. *Duales Studium*) models, with the aim of discussing with local partners how similar structures can be developed in

⁹⁰ www.bmbf.de/pub/Client_II_eng.pdf [27/02/2019].

⁹¹ www.bmbf.de/foerderungen/bekanntmachung-1782.html [27/02/2019].

⁹² www.bmbf.de/foerderungen/bekanntmachung-1321.html [27/02/2019].

Indonesia. The German 'Federal Institute for Vocational Education' (*Bundesinstitut für Berufliche Bildung*, BIBB) also has advisors who regularly visit Indonesia (under the auspices of GIZ, below) with the aim to help build a dual education system there with local partners, a programme known as TVET.⁹³ The current collaboration with Indonesia is a part of a bilateral project on 'Sustainable Economic Development through Vocational Training' that commenced in 2010. The difficulty will be to gradually cultivate appreciation for this model among Indonesian companies.

Once a stronger foundation is established in Indonesia, there will be great potential for collaboration on vocational education with Germany. For the purpose of such collaboration the Federal Government established the 'German Office for International Cooperation in Vocational Education and Training' (GOVET) in 2013, which has a designated Indonesia portal.⁹⁴ GOVET serves as a single platform for international vocational education cooperation, located within BIBB and supported by BMBF. Actors in Germany and abroad, such as education providers or companies, can approach GOVET for assistance.

In addition, Germany is also seeking to internationalise its technical universities through a central agency for work experience placements abroad (the *Informations- und Beratungsstelle für Auslandsaufenthalte in der beruflichen Bildung*, IBS).⁹⁵ The aim is to allow young people to gain professional experience internationally, whereby the IBS online portal can assist them to find their way through the labyrinth of funding schemes and identify programmes relevant to their specific profession and level of education.

Finally, there is the initiative iMOVE, which stands for 'International Marketing for Vocational Education.'⁹⁶ This is an international marketing platform for private German vocational education providers, supported by the BMBF through BIBB. iMOVE is also active in providing advice to the industry through its 'roundtable on international cooperation on vocational education,' with the aim of enhancing its competitiveness. Advice is also provided to companies, individually or through country-focused market research (none as yet on Indonesia).

⁹³ <https://sustainablekills.org/vocational-education-indonesia/> [27/02/2019].

⁹⁴ <https://www.bibb.de/govet/de/10061.php> [27/02/2019].

⁹⁵ www.goibs.de [27/02/2019].

⁹⁶ www.imove-germany.de [27/02/2019].

3.11 The German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ)

The '*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*' has maintained an office in Indonesia since 1975, which currently has 240 national, 35 international and 9 development specialist employees. The GIZ implements a variety of development programmes funded primarily by the BMZ, but also the AA, the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Security (*Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Nukleare Sicherheit*, BMU), the Federal Ministry for Food and Agriculture (*Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft*, BMEL) and some EU agencies. The BMZ's 'Strategy for Development Cooperation with Global Development Partners' of 2015 (Indonesia is one such partner) and its 'New Asia Policy 2015' set the framework for cooperation with Indonesia. The programme content is then determined in the course of a political dialogue with Indonesian ministries.

Between 2011 and 2017 BMZ has funded initiatives worth 1.37 billion USD, augmented with an additional 2.05 billion USD in development loans, making Germany Indonesia's third largest development partner (BMZ 2017). The language of 'partnership' rather than 'development' is an explicit recognition of Indonesia rising, with the expectation that the approach of BMZ, and hence GIZ, will need to change continuously. The proportion of direct foreign aid (ODA) in Indonesia's annual development budget is already very small. Germany and other EU donor countries are also under some pressure to redirect a larger portion of their aid budgets to Africa to help alleviate the causes for involuntary migration.

Overall, GIZ has nineteen current national projects in Indonesia, with a volume of 21.7 million USD, as well as 32 Indonesia-relevant global and regional projects and 19 ASEAN related projects. Geoscience, marine science and biotechnology have been major focal areas to date. In 2017 new goals were jointly set, partly in order to assist Indonesia to fulfil its obligations toward implementing the UN's 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The goals include increasing sustainable energy to meet NDCs under the Paris Climate Agreement, promoting sustainable development in conjunction with vocational training, and environmental protection with an eye to improved rural livelihoods and urban waste management. Programmes on corruption eradication and public transport improvements have also been carried out. Some of these topics may seem somewhat removed from the core concerns of cultural diplomacy. However, Germany's core contribution herein is based squarely on knowledge transfer in science and technology, and numerous German universities and research centres are involved.

3. The 'Mediator Organisations' in Indonesia




Figure 10: GIZ Activities in Indonesia. Source: Johannsen 2018: 32.

One high impact initiative has been the 'Social Protection Programme' (SPP, 2016–2021) that GIZ has been running in collaboration with the Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) and Ministry of Health since 2011 (GIZ 2018).⁹⁷ Once adopted by the Indonesian government, this SPP programme has provided a social health insurance scheme, a social inclusion scheme for disabled Indonesians, an integrated social assistance programme for poor households, and a finance access scheme for disadvantaged groups. Over the first three-year phase of SPP alone (2016–2018), GIZ invested 5.7 million USD. The outcomes are very significant indeed: Following the '*Bismarckian Sozialstaat*' model, Indonesia established the world's largest contribution-based social health insurance scheme on 1 January 2014 and, since then, the number of persons with health insurance cover has risen from 120 to 177 million (68% of the population) despite some remaining access problems. The number of poor families receiving conditional social security payments ('PKH') has increased ten-fold, from one to ten million between 2011 and 2017. In June 2015, the Indonesian President enacted the National Action Plan for Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities (PP 75/ 2015), and in October 2015 the Minister of Social Affairs launched new curricula developed in order to prepare students with disabilities for the demands of the labour market.

⁹⁷ See also www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2017-en-SPP.pdf [27/02/2019].

In the energy sector, an important BMZ-funded GIZ project in collaboration with the Indonesian Directorate General of New Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation (EBTKE) is the '1,000 Islands - Renewable Energy for Electrification Programme' (REEP).⁹⁸ The objective is to help achieve a 23% share of renewable energy in the national energy mix by 2025, using a decentralised approach to supply power in remote regions, scaling-up from pilot grids, the first two of which are located in Kaledupa and Belitung. To boost private sector involvement in the state electricity company PLN's 10-year power system development plan, an 'Indonesian German Renewable Energy Day' was held in Jakarta in November 2018,⁹⁹ and a similar event was supported by AHK-EKONID in March 2018.¹⁰⁰ German engagement in the energy sector more broadly began with the rural sustainable electrification scheme 'Energising Development' in 2009, which has so far provided grid access to 189,000 people. The prospects of increased renewable energy use in Indonesia in the near future are slim nevertheless, given the strength of the national coal lobby and the fact that national energy provider PLN is already scheduled to build dozens of new coal-fired power plants. More generally, there is a large gap between aspirational discourses and actual achievements in sustainability in Indonesia.

Forestry has been a long-standing area of intense bilateral cooperation since the 1990s, uniquely, with a designated GIZ sub-office right inside the Indonesian forestry ministry. The vitally important current GIZ project managed by this sub-office is the German-Indonesian 'Forests and Climate Change Programme' (FORCLIME),¹⁰¹ which supports and provides technical assistance for the implementation of forestry reforms. As a result of this project, the Indonesian 'Ministry of Environment and Forestry' (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan, KLHK) has been able to develop a National Forestry Plan (RKTN 2011-2030) and a strategic National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN 2015-2019) for the forestry sector to address the problem of deforestation, with rates of forest loss declining but still high.¹⁰² Detailed critical reports on the impact of this project are available (Buergin 2014; Pokorny 2015). It should be added, however, that since then progress has accelerated, especially since 2014 under the new forestry minister Siti Nur-

⁹⁸ www.giz.de/en/worldwide/63533.html [27/02/2019].

⁹⁹ <https://energynautics.com/en/energynautics-presents-at-the-1st-indonesian-german-renewable-energy-day-in-jakarta/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁰⁰ http://indonesien.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_indonesien/Business_Delegations/PV_Hybrid_and_Bionergy/Terms_of_Reference_Conference_.pdf [27/02/2019].

¹⁰¹ www.giz.de/en/worldwide/16728.html [27/02/2019].

¹⁰² Forest fire reduction is also being considered as part of this process.

baya Bakar, who was able to provide the author with an update.¹⁰³ In particular, the collusive practices of ignoring illegal logging and of unlawfully issuing licenses at the regional level have been disrupted, with strong support from the president. Meanwhile, the land rights of local and indigenous peoples are discussed more and more openly. FORCLIME also is engaged in capacity building at the national and sub-national levels in order to support sustainable forest management, designed to benefit local communities, as a consequence of which Indonesia was able to establish 697 participation-based Forest Management Units covering around 100 million hectares (Sahide et al. 2016).

Looking forward, there are plans to establish a disaster risk insurance scheme, which would be of great value in reducing the economic vulnerability of people and businesses in this disaster-prone country. Another planned programme is for taxation reform in collaboration with the Financial Planning Office (Badan Kebijakan Fiskal, BKF), the Taxation Office (Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, DJP) and local think tanks. This deserves special mention, given that Indonesia only had a paltry 27 million registered tax payers and a tax revenue to GDP ratio of 11% in 2015, which together with corruption is perhaps the country's largest developmental handicap. The lack of revenue to fund projects and the loss of project funds on the path to implementation have the overall consequence that Indonesia is struggling to achieve the SDGs. Associated issues to be addressed include a lack of planning capacity to set the right tax incentives to achieve policy goals as well as a still inadequate electronic tax-payer register. The project will fit within the existing framework of TRANSFORMASI, a programme for public sector reform.¹⁰⁴

The GIZ also at times is involved in projects relating to education. An example is a BMZ funded programme in collaboration with the Indonesian education ministry for the promotion of sports education in schools and of amateur sport, known as 'Sport for Development.' As part of the programme there are also plans for a collaboration to promote amateur football with the help of the German Football Union (DFB) and its Australian counterpart. GIZ also supports the 'technical and vocational education transformation' (TVET) roundtable mentioned above in collaboration with GOVET as well as BAPPENAS and other local partners.¹⁰⁵ Several TVET pilot projects are running.

¹⁰³ Cyclical weather patterns such as El Niño could also have influenced the rate of forest loss through fires.

¹⁰⁴ www.giz.de/en/worldwide/26196.html [27/02/2019].

¹⁰⁵ www.giz.de/en/worldwide/70532.html [27/02/2019].

An important partner in GIZ activities is the 'Credit Institute for Reconstruction' (*Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau*, KfW), which has its own office in Jakarta.¹⁰⁶ KfW provides credits, sometimes near market rates and sometimes at a rate that is subsidised by the German government. GIZ projects supported by KfW include the geothermal, participatory forest management, municipal waste management and vocational education reform projects mentioned earlier. GIZ also has a business hub for public-private partnership projects with development relevance (with up to 50% BMZ support).

There appears to be limited coordination between BMZ and the AA. GIZ is seen to be tightly wedded to BMZ, which may explain why the AA does not involve itself as much as it perhaps should. Given the significant political implications of GIZ programmes, however, for example in relation to the SDGs, this warrants some closer reflection and possibly some structural reform.

3.12 The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (FG)

Fraunhofer is the biggest organisation for applied research in Europe, with 72 contract research institutes across Germany and an annual business volume of 2.6 billion USD in 2018. The majority of its 25,000 employees are qualified scientists and engineers. Around 70 percent of contracts are from industry or public sector projects, while about 30 percent of FG's budget comes from BMBF and the state governments in a ratio of 9:1 (Federal Parliament and states approved an increase of 76 million USD in 2017). Major strategic initiatives focus on: battery technology, biological transformation; cognitive systems / data sovereignty; programmable materials; public safety and security; quantum technology; and translational medicine (Thum 2017). At an international level, the offices of subsidiaries as well as partnerships with other research organisations and innovative companies ensure Fraunhofer has global reach. Since 2017 Singapore hosts a Southeast Asian subsidiary office, and there has been a representative office in Jakarta since 2004.¹⁰⁷ The office maintains close ties with the embassy, EKONID, DAAD and other German agencies, but does not restrict its contract business to them.

Fraunhofer is of interest here because it operates in a space situated somewhere in-between German state actors and German businesses, whose agencies in Indonesia will be discussed next. Unlike the universities, FG is focused on applied or directly business-

¹⁰⁶ www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Internationale-Finanzierung/KfW-Entwicklungsbank/Weltweite-Präsenz/Asien/Indonesien/ [27/02/2019].

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.fraunhofer.or.id/> [27/02/2019].

client oriented research, such as feasibility and market studies and project management services.

For example, 10 years ago Fraunhofer and TELKOM Indonesia began working together on 'Next Generation Network Infrastructures' (NGNI) and, in 2013, they signed an agreement. A Future Seamless Communication Forum took place in Bali, organised with TELKOM Indonesia. For RISTEK-DIKTI and BMBF, the Fraunhofer Institute for Production Systems and Design Technology (IPK) conducted an evaluation of the Indonesian science, research and technology landscape with the aim to strengthen the national innovation system. With the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) and the University of Paderborn in Germany, meanwhile, the Fraunhofer Institute for Wood Research (WKI) is establishing an Indonesian-German Polymer Research Centre to develop new coatings and adhesive products based on local raw materials and agricultural waste. The Fraunhofer representative office in Indonesia further told me that up-coming contract research projects are focusing on a range of 'new industry' proposals from the Ministry of Industry, on renewable energy (e.g. with Pertamina) and on biomass technology (start-ups).

Exchange of scientists and knowledge transfer from Indonesia and Germany could be facilitated by the Fraunhofer network, but tight labour market rules make it difficult to bring in foreign experts. Investors also face numerous hurdles, and small foreign start-ups generally struggle to find their way around Indonesia's business environment. The local academic sector is also of little help, as it is not giving much thought to research commercialisation. Together these factors block many business opportunities from being exploited, according to Fraunhofer-Indonesia management.

3.13 The Industry Agencies (EKONID, GTAI and others)

German businesses in Indonesia are institutionally represented primarily by AHK-EKONID, the German 'Chamber of Commerce Abroad' (*Außenhandelskammer*, AHK) in Indonesia, founded in 1970.¹⁰⁸ As a bilateral institution, EKONID represents the shared interests of more than 500 German and Indonesian member companies. EKONID is also networked with counterparts from other EU member states through the EU-Indonesia Business Network (EIBN).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ <http://indonesien.ahk.de/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁰⁹ <http://www.eibn.org/> [27/02/2019].

According to EKONID, current business margins in Indonesia are some of the highest worldwide due to low levels of domestic competition in many areas. National economic growth, steadily above 5%, is robust because it is driven primarily by rising demand in a growing domestic market and, recently, by massive increases in infrastructure spending. German companies' investment grew by 231% between 2010 and 2015, though from a low base. Only about 1% of Germany's total FDI abroad is in Indonesia, leaving much room for expansion.

EKONID services to members include advice on establishing a company in Indonesia, tax and legal information, support for meetings, organising German industry fairs, seminars, trade and investment news and numerous public relation activities. An in-house magazine (SOROTAN) helps to keep members informed and connected.¹¹⁰

In the field of cultural diplomacy, albeit with a business orientation, EKONID provides networking opportunities between German and Indonesian business representatives and thus builds bridges across the gap of understanding between German and Indonesian business culture. EKONID sponsors a number of cultural events in collaboration with GI and also hosts some of its own, such as the Oktoberfest in Surabaya (for the ninth time in 2018).¹¹¹ AHK has much deeper involvement in knowledge transfer and education, however, than in culture.

As part of a BMU's initiative for the export of German environmental technology and the global DIHK initiative 'Chambers for GreenTech',¹¹² EKONID ran a pilot project in the city of Tasikmalaya in 2018 to find solutions for waste management. Poor waste management is a huge concern in Indonesia and for the world's oceans. Indonesia is the second biggest contributor of plastic waste to the oceans due to widespread illegal disposal. Most of the legally disposed waste in turn ends up as landfill. Working with local partners and the community a model was developed to encourage waste separation and recycling that could be emulated across the country.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ www.ekonid.com/SOROTAN/XXVII-4-2018/#16 [27/02/2019].

¹¹¹ See twitter handle @EKONIDWismaJermanOktoberfest or this post on Facebook.

¹¹² www.ahk.de/foerderprogramme/umwelttechnologien/chambers-for-greentech/ [27/02/2019].

¹¹³ <http://indonesien.ahk.de/news/detail-news/artikel/ekonid-connects-tasikmalaya-to-waste-management-solutions/?cHash=a79a534f44abc44b0e1aa15af1b87830> [27/02/2019].

In education, the main focus naturally is on vocational education and training, and EKONID has its own brand called ICCQ.¹¹⁴ EKONID also established the first Indonesian language dual vocational education programme following the German model in 2017. A public vocational school (SMKN 26 Jakarta) provides the theoretical component of the 2.5-year programme (40 %), while Siemens Indonesia, Mercedes-Benz Indonesia, MAN Indonesia as well as the Indonesian state-owned enterprise PT Barata Indonesia train students in the practical part of the program (60%). A similar programme is run in cooperation with PT Astra International. Training for trainers and courses on Indonesian business culture are also offered. Links to Indonesian universities are lacking.

The business advisory work of EKONID is supported and complemented by general research and information services from several other business organisations, most notably GTAI (German Trade and Invest).¹¹⁵ GTAI is quite a large government owned company (362 staff), funded by the BMWi. It has a dual mandate. On the one hand it seeks to attract foreign investors to Germany and promote Germany as a business location, but it is also represented in more than 50 locations around the world, including Indonesia, with the aim to assist German businesses with their internationalisation and with the establishment of new branches or subsidiaries abroad. The agency also runs a number of its own development projects in Indonesia, for example, a programme on youth entrepreneurship and employment in agriculture, funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).¹¹⁶ GTAI's work is further complemented by another BMWi initiative, known as German Accelerator, which specifically addresses the needs of German start-ups in Indonesia and the wider region.¹¹⁷ Note that these German agencies are matched with similar organisations for the promotion of foreign investment from the Indonesian side, such as the government's Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM).¹¹⁸ There are also competing private information and service providers, such as Investment Indonesia.¹¹⁹

Beyond EKONID there are a number of larger organisations that interface with the political sector to represent German business interests not just in Indonesia but in Asia more broadly. One is the German Asia-Pacific Business Association (*Ostasiatischer Verein*,

¹¹⁴ <http://iccq.id/> [27/02/2019].

¹¹⁵ <https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/Weltkarte/Asien/indonesien.html> [27/02/2019].

¹¹⁶ www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/Projekte-Ausschreibungen/Entwicklungsprojekte/suche,t=youth-entrepreneurship-and-employment-support-services-programme,did=2204760.html [27/02/2019].

¹¹⁷ www.germanaccelerator.com/about/ [27/02/2019].

¹¹⁸ www.bkpm.go.id/ [27/02/2019].

¹¹⁹ www.indonesia-investments.com/ [27/02/2019].

OAV).¹²⁰ The OAV has a country committee for Indonesia, which holds meetings regularly, next in Hamburg in March 2019, to share news on the political and business environment in Indonesia and to lobby on Indonesia-specific issues. At a much higher level of integration again, there is the Committee for the Asia Pacific (*Asien-Pazifik Ausschuss*, APA).¹²¹ APA is a joint initiative of the OAV together with the Association of German Chambers of Commerce (*Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag*, DIHK), the Federal Association of German Industry (*Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie*, BDI), the Federal Association for Trade and Services (*Bundesverband Großhandel, Außenhandel, Dienstleistungen*, BGA) and the Federal Association of German Banks (*Bundesverband Deutscher Banken*, or *Bankenverband*). It acts as the united voice of German businesses and investors in Asia *vis-à-vis* the political sector in Germany as well as in Asia itself. It is also a forum where the common political-economic interests of business are discussed and articulated in the first place, which broadly speaking are focused on intensifying trade and investment in Asia through strong partnerships. Economic delegations accompanying German ministers on their state visits to Asia are often recruited through APA and its affiliates. The main event for APA is the Asia Pacific Conference of German Industry, which is jointly organised with the BMWi and the AHKs and rotates around Asia. Jakarta hosted the conference in November 2018.¹²²

Looking in the other direction, toward the members of AHK-EKONID, it is not possible herein to discuss all the individual German enterprises active in Indonesia, but Siemens may serve as an indicative example. For more than 160 years Siemens has been active in Indonesia in the energy, electronics and mobility sectors, including renewable and conventional power generators (wind, gas and steam turbines) and power grid systems, digitised and automated production technology, rail and road signalling and advanced medical imaging equipment. Siemens has two manufacturing sites in Indonesia, generating revenue of 450 million USD in the fiscal year 2017-2018. The company has a comparatively progressive environmental policy across its international operations, and its environmental image in Indonesia is very good. Siemens has successfully reduced its carbon footprint by 17% in Indonesia and is committed to a 50% reduction by 2030. The author was unable to find evidence of environmental scandals comparable to the Heidelberg Cement incident mentioned above, or labour issues such as those that have hit some of the suppliers of Adidas.¹²³

¹²⁰ <https://www.oav.de/laender-und-marktinformationen/indonesien.html> [27/02/2019].

¹²¹ www.asien-pazifik-ausschuss.de/de [27/02/2019].

¹²² www.apk2018.com/ [27/02/2019].

¹²³ Based on a search on Google Indonesia's search engine, google.co.id. [27/02/2019].

About 1,100 people are immediately employed by Siemens and, linked to its wider operations, some 20,000 jobs are created in Indonesia. Siemens promotes continuous re-skilling, with more than 300 of its employees engaged in training programmes. Siemens partners with 14 vocational schools and also has embarked on a pilot vocational school experiment following the German TVET model. The company works with top universities in Indonesia to host a digitalisation forum and national competitions in industrial automation for engineering students. Partnering with GI, Siemens supported science education with the annual Science Film Festival (SFF), held for the ninth time in Indonesia in 2018, with the theme 'The Food Revolution: Meeting the challenges of 2050', and addressing the need to reduce GHG emissions in this sector.¹²⁴ Siemens also collaborated with a local NGO to improve the transparency of public procurement in Indonesia, which is a very major challenge for the country. Finally, the company is a major sponsor of EKONID.

Siemens and all other German companies evidently have a direct influence on the lives of employees, their families and, through corporate social responsibility measures that are mandatory under Indonesian law, the larger communities in which they operate. They are ever present in the media through their promotional activities and have countless partnerships with other businesses and institutions. This adds up to a great deal of cultural diplomatic influence, which is unfolding at quite some distance from the realm of political decision makers and policy makers in Berlin. Businesses operating internationally arguably play a larger role in shaping German foreign policy than vice versa. Whether or not this is putting the cart before the horse is, of course, a matter of opinion, but it would seem to me that, things being as they are, there is good cause for the German business sector to reflect, in its own interest, on what scope there might be for more cohesion in its public diplomacy approach in Indonesia and elsewhere, since the doings of one business can impact on the image of others and on the German brand as a whole. Voluntary agreement to a range of best practice standards and a code of business ethics, duly publicised and building on the already existing positive image of German high-quality manufacturing would be one way to do this.

¹²⁴ www.siemens.asia/id/en/press/press-releases/Siemens_Indonesia_promotes_fun_science-learning_for_children.aspx [27/02/2019].

3.14 The Political Foundations (FES, KAS, FNS, HSS)

Political economy is central to the bilateral relationship between Germany and Indonesia, and while EKONID and other industry agencies work to uphold the economic end, it is the German political foundations that seek to network with political players in Indonesia, including members of political parties but also civil society actors such as trade unions or human rights organisations. Each of the foundations is openly affiliated with one of Germany's political parties, and their political orientation and priorities vary accordingly. Their agenda thus may not match that of the German government of the day.

The four German political foundations with a presence in Indonesia are FES, KAS, FNS and HSS (below). All are treated as foreign NGOs and thus are subject to considerable suspicion and scrutiny, largely undeserved. Under the strict 2014 law on NGOs (*L. ormas*), operating licenses are difficult to obtain and must be renewed every three years through the responsible office (KEMLU, section Sosial-Budaya). The strictness of the laws on NGOs may be a result of negative past experiences with some organisations from other countries acting as a front for espionage or as a platform for intervention in domestic affairs. Direct partnerships with specific Indonesian political parties are not encouraged and it would be difficult, in any case, to decide who to match up with, given that Indonesia's highly transactional political parties generally lack well-distinguishable programmes. All the German political foundations are instead required to link up with an Indonesian government department, with whom they must register each activity in advance. Within these constraints, however, much is still possible and the close collaboration with Indonesian ministries also provides an opportunity to build trust.

The *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (FES) of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) has taken an interest in Indonesia since 1968, with an office in Jakarta and currently a small team of twelve staff, most of whom are Indonesian.¹²⁵ Its designated local partner is the Ministry of Human Development and Culture (PMK). A number of projects focus on labour relations policy and the need to safeguard local jobs in the context of globalisation and automation. Together with its civil society and government partners, FES is supporting Indonesia's social security reform and good industrial relations. For example, with PMK and the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower, FES hosted a regional conference on 'The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Digitalization & Work 4.0' in October 2018 in Jakarta. This conference on the future of work highlighted the need for lifting vocational and tertiary education levels in Indonesia. As a follow up FES is planning to invite German experts on

¹²⁵ www.fes-indonesia.org/ [27/02/2019].

vocational training to visit training centres in Indonesia, such as BBPLK Bekasi.¹²⁶ Policy work also focuses on social welfare, in part through inclusive, sustainable development. One project in this field looks at the concept of the 'social city' as a model of inclusiveness, which is very relevant to many Indonesian cities where extreme wealth and poverty often exist side by side. FES has also produced a substantial online repository of policy relevant publications.¹²⁷

Like all the foundations, FES organises high-level political meetings and events in Germany. For example, in collaboration with the foreign offices of Germany (AA) and Indonesia (KEMLU), FES organised the 'Bali Democracy Forum' on migration and democracy in September 2018 in Berlin.

The topic of trade unions is very controversial in Indonesia, which prevents FES from making direct connections. This is unfortunate because the German model of cooperative employer-union relations would be a very good way to defuse historically founded tension around labour activism in Indonesia, relating to the trauma of 1965. FES-sponsored dialogue on this topic thus has to begin with the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower (Kemnaker). Note that an excellent and very detailed history of the work of FES in Indonesia since the 1960s is available for further information (Hofmann et al. 2010).

The *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* (KAS) of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has been in Indonesia since 1968 also.¹²⁸ Its local partner is the Ministry of the Interior (KEMDAGRI), and their joint activities reflect the core interests of this ministry, including security and governance.

A focal point of KAS activity in Indonesia is democracy and good governance, and one indicative joint project with KEMDAGRI since 2014 is on human rights and de-escalation training for police units responsible for public order (SATPOL-PP). Another joint project addresses a widespread problem in Indonesia of new legislation and rules being passed by regional jurisdictions that are inconsistent with national law, namely by providing training in legal drafting to the responsible provincial officials. Also focused on law and in collaboration with the Jimly School of Law and Government is a seminar series (since 2017) for judges, aiming to provide guidelines on the implementation of ethical

¹²⁶ <https://blkbekasi.kemnaker.go.id/home> [27/02/2019].

¹²⁷ www.fes-indonesia.org/publications/ [27/02/2019].

¹²⁸ www.kas.de/web/indonesien/home [27/02/2019].

codes in the real-life circumstances of their daily practice. Associated with the related focal point on political parties and parliament, KAS has been running a project for women in politics in collaboration with local civil society organisations since 2008. More than 1,800 female parliamentarians and members from all parties received theoretical and practical training on how to communicate effectively and how to get elected. On the focal point of promoting the German socio-economic model of *Soziale Marktwirtschaft* (above), a KAS seminar series for economics lecturers considered the advantages and possible transferability of this model to Indonesia, with some of the 300 alumni (since 2009) receiving a travel stipend to visit Germany. On the topic of sustainability, KAS ran a seminar series for students in collaboration with Yayasan Perspektif Baru (founded by Wim Witolaer), on the political processes involved in achieving progress in climate and renewable energy policy. With SATUNAMA, a Yogyakarta-based NGO, KAS runs the long-standing collaborative programme 'Civic Education for Future Indonesian Leaders,' which aims to strengthen civil society (see KAS 2013).

A very significant KAS initiative from the perspective of the bilateral relationship is the German Indonesian Strategic Dialogue (since 2017), which is an opportunity to discuss the many common interests shared by the two countries, relating to their similar strategic positioning regionally, their joint commitment to multilateralism and also their coinciding non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council in 2019-2020. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a partner in this venture,¹²⁹ with its ability to assemble high level Indonesian dialogue partners. One topic of the meeting in May 2017 was rules-based maritime security, notably the need for keeping trade routes open in the South China Sea, and of strengthening the capacity of Indonesia in this area. The meeting revealed that Germany and Indonesia share similar views on how to adequately address a range of important global challenges. The need for closer ASEAN-EU collaboration was also stressed.

The *Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit* (FNS) of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) opened its very first overseas office in Jakarta in 1969. Major focal areas include democracy, human rights infrastructure, mobility, market economy, climate change and smart cities. The Indonesian partner is the Ministry for Justice and Human Rights (Kemenkumham). Regionally within ASEAN, FNS also partners with the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, ASEAN's Working Group for Human Rights and the Economic Freedom Network Asia.

¹²⁹ www.csis.or.id/ [27/02/2019].

Given the free market economy views of FNS and the fact that Indonesia has by all accounts a very protectionist economic model (for example, only about 80,000 foreigners have permission to work in Indonesia), the FNS works with the Centre for Indonesian Policy Studies to advocate for reforms, such as reducing the role of state-owned enterprises.¹³⁰ FNS also notes Indonesia's large promises and poor performance on GHG emission reduction, which is mainly due to inadequate forest protection and overreliance on coal for current and future power generation (Kleine-Brockhoff et al. 2015). Since 2011 FNS therefore has been supporting educational events in many Indonesian provinces to better inform students, NGOs, political parties and local governments about the very real dangers associated with climate change.

Intolerance, discrimination and religion-based violence in an increasingly conservative Indonesia is also a concern. In Central Java FNS collaborates with the district of Wonosobo on implementing their model concept of a 'human rights city', and also with the civil society group Lembaga Gerak Pemberdayaan (LeGePe) to provide political education.¹³¹ FNS also aims to support journalistic work respectful of diversity and conducive to the creation of peace rather than intolerance, in cooperation with the journalist group SEJUK, founded in Jakarta in 2008. The director is a former employee of Deutsche Welle. SEJUK organised an important conference on 'Reporting Religion in Asia' supported by the International Association of Religion Journalists (IARJ).

The *Hans-Seidel-Stiftung* (HSS) of the Christian Social Union (CSU), finally, has been represented in Indonesia since 1993.¹³² The three main focal areas of activity are to support democracy and the rule of law, to promote security through education towards a modern police force, and the promotion of nature conservation and associated education.

In collaboration with the Ministry for Justice and Human Rights, HSS has lent support to the Indonesian Constitutional Court (MKRI) in dealing with the difficulties of upholding conformity of provincial laws with the constitution and the Pancasila doctrine in the wake of the decentralisation of the Indonesian state during the *Reformasi* process. HSS's work with Indonesian police academies (STIK, PTIK and AKPOL) aims to train a police force that is trusted by the public and aware of human rights. A close network of relationships between Indonesian alumni and the Bavarian police is maintained. In the field of

¹³⁰ See www.freiheit.org/country/indonesien [27/02/2019].

¹³¹ <https://indonesia.fnst.org/content/penandatanganan-memorandum-saling-pengertian-fns-dan-legepe> [27/02/2019].

¹³² www.hss.de/weltweit-aktiv/asien/indonesien/ [27/02/2019].

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environment, HSS works closely with the secretariat of ASEAN in Jakarta, assisting ASEAN with initiatives on climate change, sustainable cities and environmental education, particularly the ASEAN 'Young Leadership' and 'Environmentally Sustainable City' award programmes.

4. Indonesian Perspectives

Sukarno's unexpected statement in support of German reunification in the 1950s serves as a useful reminder that Indonesia was always an active participant in the building of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Even though the formal decolonisation process now lies far behind, it still can be easy to forget that it is no longer just the European actors who are doing the traveling, the reaching out, the shaping of the relationship, the work with 'local partners.' A discussion of German cultural diplomacy (G. *AKBP*) towards Indonesia must therefore look not only at the response of local partners to German initiatives, but also at the efforts of the Indonesian government to actively shape the relationship with priorities and initiatives of its own.

This is a study of German cultural diplomacy, and the primary focus in this section therefore will be on Indonesian partners and institutions within the networks of the German mediator organisations, their experiences, critical perspectives and future expectations towards German initiatives in Indonesia. Perspectives of Indonesian partners are organised thematically into two sections: education and science; language and culture. I will then briefly look at what kind of presence Indonesia maintains in Germany in terms of its own cultural diplomacy initiatives. The aim is to close the circle with an impression, at least, of Indonesia's active interest in its relationship with Germany. This active interest is not new, but as Indonesia rises to become a major economy and a politically influential country, its need and capacity to engage in cultural diplomacy will grow exponentially.

4.1 Partners in Education and Science

Indonesia's sprawling school education system is the product of rapid expansion and it should not come as a surprise that teaching methods are generally regarded as not yet up to international standards of quality. An exception is traditional music education, which has received much recognition for its unique value (Mack 1995), an observation extendable also to other traditional arts. Significant weakness in foreign language education has already been noted, and this is not confined to German. Results in mathematics and science are also still far below the OECD average according to PISA.¹³³ As a consequence, many Indonesian school leavers are not ideally prepared for university study, particularly study abroad that requires a foreign language. Meanwhile, there is pressure on the school system to produce an ever greater ratio of senior high school (SMA) graduates to help fulfil the government's desire for greater domestic tertiary education participation rates.

¹³³ www.compareyourcountry.org/pisa/country/IDN?lg=en [27/02/2019].

While absolute numbers of tertiary students and institutions have indeed been rising fast, the system struggles to keep up with the demand growth arising from a combination of population growth and rising participation rates, and with the simultaneous need to lift quality standards at the tertiary level also. The rapid expansion of the tertiary sector in recent years is hard to reconcile with quality control and yet the government is seeking to do just that, aspiring eventually to reach a PhD standard for all tertiary educators. Domestic graduate programmes lack the capacity to satisfy this demand for further training, and many underqualified university staff thus join PhD programmes abroad.

Indonesian universities and other partners of German actors in Indonesia repeatedly raised this point with the author. Indonesian funding for further education abroad is starting to flow, but for now, support from foreign agencies, such as the DAAD, is seen as extremely valuable. Germany's scholarship scheme, however, is rather complex and broken up into different sub-schemes with only a few Indonesian participants in each category. While the DAAD is considered to be more active in Indonesia than most similar services from other countries, some Indonesian partners noted the benefits of broader based schemes, such as the Australian-funded Endeavour Fellowships.¹³⁴ This is a reminder that Indonesian academics do have choices for studying abroad. Indeed, there is considerable competition for high quality applicants. Often language difficulties and high academic standards in Germany can be a disincentive to choosing a DAAD programme. Another issue that was raised is that private universities are not sufficiently recognised and included in DAAD events, programmes and selection committees, even though they numerically completely dominate the tertiary sector in Indonesia today. Alumni programmes of the DAAD, on the other hand, received much praise, and many postgraduate alumni commented with some emotion on the life-long relationships they have formed with their German professors and fellow students. Stipends and workshops for raising the capacity of Indonesian university leaders and administrators were also very highly valued.

Related to the low educational level of many academics, research output in Indonesia is still relatively weak, even by Southeast Asian standards. The reason is not simply a lack of government funding. The Jokowi government has more than doubled research spending from a paltry 0.09% to a still comparatively low rate of 0.2% of GDP (1,7 billion USD), while Germany spends 2.9% of GDP (102,9 billion USD). There is enormous scope for growing the Indonesian economy by raising the current level of investment in innovation,

¹³⁴ <https://internationaleducation.gov.au/Endeavour%20program/Scholarships-and-Fellowships/about/Pages/default.aspx> [27/02/2019].

and the Indonesian government knows this. There is another dimension to research weakness in Indonesia, however, that is often ignored. The Indonesian government funds 80% of research and only about 20% of research funding comes from the private sector, while in Germany the situation is almost the reverse, with the private sector contributing 70% of research spending in 2015 (Krisnantari 2019). Tax incentives may need to be introduced to encourage industry participation, and this is currently under discussion.


An even deeper challenge is to change business as well as academic culture. With some exceptions, Indonesian companies do not yet consider research a priority. This is a pity, because there is enormous potential for developing new products, notably in the biotechnology sector. On the other side of the equation, universities are also not well prepared or encouraged to think about industry partnerships or research commercialisation.

Indonesian tertiary education partners and the education ministry thus highlighted the value of funding support schemes that link Indonesian universities to the Indonesian private sector, which could well include German companies in Indonesia. The DAAD, as was noted, has trialled 2+1 designs incorporating industry partnerships, the so-called '*Praxispartnerschaften*' programme. This kind of scheme should be reconsidered, amended as needed, and expanded. EKONID could contribute to this by helping to find local business partners, and the Indonesian government may be able to lend some support as well. Indeed, a new national fund of 71 million USD for 'flexible' research that has just been announced may be helpful in this regard.¹³⁵

One interesting blueprint for developing such industry-university partnerships is a new national network of 'centres of excellence' that are designed to help develop the potentials of different regions through applied science research.

¹³⁵ <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2019/01/06/08572021/mulai-2019-ada-dana-abadi-penelitian-nilainya-mencapai-rp-990-miliar> [27/02/2019].

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Source: Adapted from <http://pui.ristek.go.id/>

Figure 11: Indonesian National Centres of Excellence. Secondary source: Jansen 2017: 20.

This network offers many opportunities for partnerships with German universities and businesses, especially for small start-ups. The centres also offer an opportunity to reach out more to the regions, considering the high concentration of German initiatives on Java until now. In addition, there are also incubator schemes and ‘techno-park’ programmes at other Indonesian universities, such as the multimedia unit at the University of Tangerang (supported with special stipends from DIKTI). On the Indonesian side, changes are needed to facilitate the founding of new enterprises by German investors and the importation of expert labour where this is of benefit to Indonesia, a matter that should be prominently discussed as part of the EU-Indonesian trade agreement. On the German side, there is a need for more flexibility in the choice of university partners, particularly in the regions. DAAD and most German universities have been concentrating their collaborations very much on the few top universities until now. So do other countries, however, and with all this competition, reaching for the low hanging fruit may not always be the best long-term strategy.

The ‘centres of excellence’ initiative demonstrates that the Indonesian government is well aware of the need to build a national innovation system, but there is still a great need for assistance in improving the process of policy making towards this end. For middle-income countries to move away from unsustainable and low value-added exports – such as extractive industries – towards a knowledge economy, governments need to review

regulatory frameworks and make the right policy choices. In Indonesia, however, the majority of public servants is not trained in evidence-based policy development, particularly in the regional governments.¹³⁶ In 2016, only 6% of Indonesia's 4.5 million civil servants (including over 1.7 million teachers and health workers) had a master's degree, while 0.3% had a doctorate. Germany certainly has the capacity and experience to provide experience-based policy advice here, so long as it is pitched at the right level. It may not be most productive to lecture Indonesia about Industry 4.0, for example, when the country is still struggling to build a substantial manufacturing industry of any kind and lacks the human resources. The key to building a knowledge economy is rather human capital growth, and – according to the World Bank – this means policies supportive of science and technology research, innovation, education, and lifelong learning.¹³⁷

The need for more Indonesian industry involvement in research and for more partnerships with universities is closely related to a parallel need for more industry involvement in education, and specifically vocational training. Again, the German industry placement plus 'secondary tech school' (G. *Berufsschule*) training for apprentices and of industry employment plus 'tertiary vocational colleges' (G. *Fachhochschulen*) for tradesmen and -women to become technicians and engineers is a world-renowned model, and well respected in Indonesia. Several cooperative initiatives are under way and there is continuous dialogue with Germany on how their system could be adapted to Indonesian needs, as detailed above. Again, EKONID would be able to help set up the necessary partnerships for more pilot schemes through its business networks. The Indonesian side is clearly looking to continue and accelerate progress in this area of collaboration. DAAD was questioned in this context by some partners for not engaging enough with Indonesia's 256 tertiary 'Polytechnic' colleges, perhaps on account of their inferior status in terms of academic output. There seem to be no structural provisions at present for specifically encouraging such engagement, and perhaps the matter needs to be considered as part of the current bilateral discussions on vocational education.

¹³⁶ There is also a great deal of anecdotal evidence that many, if not most, public service appointments are transactional rather than purely merit-based. The Indonesian term for this is '*beli kursi, tinggal duduk saja*', 'to buy a seat or position' and, having bought a seat, the expectation is to 'sit down and rest'. The practice is not funny, however, but rather ruinous for a modern country trying to get ahead.

¹³⁷ <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-1206318727118/4808502-1206318753312/slknowledgechapter1.pdf> [27/02/2019].

In an April 2017 meeting between the German ambassador and Indonesian minister for Research, Technology and Higher Education, the director of vocational education, Patdono Suwignyo, noted that Indonesia prioritises four areas for VHE (vocational and higher education) schools, which are (i) agriculture, (ii) energy, (iii) tourism, and (iv) maritime.¹³⁸ The author was informed that among these fields, vocational training of professional sailors and graduates in nautical science is treated with special urgency because of the aspirations of the Jokowi government to improve Indonesia's security-related as well as civil maritime capability. One very successful double degree bachelor programme in marine engineering was set up through a partnership between the University of Wismar and the high-ranking university 'Institut Sepuluh Nopember' (ITS) in Surabaya with DAAD support. Currently DAAD is funding the creation of a new bachelor programme in marine science and transport logistics at PoliMarin, a well-reputed marine Polytechnic in the harbour town of Semarang (again partnering with Wismar). Indonesian staff teach the lower semesters, while professors from Wismar teach at an advanced level. The eight-semester double-degree course incorporates two obligatory practical semesters (DAAD 2018: 11). This shows that cooperation with Indonesian vocational tertiary institutions is possible, providing a substantial investment in educational capacity building can be made. Indonesia would like to see more initiatives of this kind.

The internationalisation of Indonesian universities is building on a great wealth of partnerships, including with Germany. In conversations with Indonesian university leaders, a strong preference was voiced, again and again, for double degrees, such as the example above. There is also strong demand for joint publications with foreign partners to boost the number of their publications in high ranking journals, and quite often there is disappointment when Indonesian collaborators are forgotten after field research has been completed and the time comes to publish results. In some cases, there have also been problems with German researchers (and those of other countries) failing to gain the appropriate research permits from LIPI, the National Academy of Science, and their institutions being black-listed as a result. There is also growing sensitivity around the question of ownership of intellectual property arising from what Indonesians regard as joint research, especially on Indonesian bio-resources.

¹³⁸ The source of this information was a report on the RISTEKDIKTI website (<https://ristekdikti.go.id/>) that was accessed on 2 October 2018 but is no longer accessible.

It was noted earlier that a rapidly increasing number of Indonesian students are studying in Germany, but more recently there also has been growing demand in Indonesia for short term mobility. Conversely, there is a significant growth in options available to overseas students who would like to complete an overseas semester or internship in Indonesia. Demand for mobility is great among German university students, and Indonesia is set to become an increasingly attractive destination, with many programmes now available in an English medium of instruction. The main state university on the island of Bali, UNUD, is a pertinent example.¹³⁹ Mobility demand is growing also in the area of work placements, and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Work Placement Pilot Program is likely to accelerate this development dramatically. Indonesia joined the programme in 2015, and the sixth and most recent working group meeting was held in Jakarta in June 2018.

As far as Indonesian students in Germany are concerned, the expected expansion of demand is promising but measures are urgently required to ensure a better rate of completion. Alumni told the author that many Indonesian students are not adequately prepared before departure to Germany, particularly in terms of their language and intercultural skills, and hence struggle to integrate and successfully complete their courses. The very high rate of non-completion is confirmed by research (Syafitri et al. 2014). The rate of retaining successful graduates to live and work in Germany also remains low, perhaps requiring some adjustment of German skilled immigration policy.

Another concern that was raised frequently is about communication and mobility. Digital conferencing may be a useful way for Indonesians to communicate virtually with German partners, when travel is not an option, but facilities are often lacking and the German mediator organisations could perhaps look into providing such facilities at their offices. Meanwhile, the difficulty of obtaining visas for visiting Germany is a constant source of frustration. In particular, holders of so-called 'blue passports,' which are issued only to Indonesian government employees and are to be used exclusively for travel on official business, complain that they can travel to France and other countries without a visa for up to one month, but not to Germany. This should be remedied immediately, as such a change of visa policy hardly can be said to constitute a risk in this case.

¹³⁹ www.asiaexchange.org/study-destinations/bali-indonesia/udayana-university/ or [27/02/2019].

Concerning DAAD's support for education integration at the ASEAN level, the author was able to consult with the director of the Indonesian 'National Higher Education Accreditation Agency' (Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi, BAN-PT). The ability to draw on European models and experiences is very highly valued indeed, for example, in relation to building the 'ASEAN Quality Assurance Network' and 'Qualifications Reference Framework,' which together address the issue of mutual acceptance of qualifications and associated academic and labour mobility between member states. One of the challenges for harmonisation between education systems, however, are the significant variations in the degree of university independence from state control across ASEAN countries. The process of harmonisation thus touches upon questions of political reform with regard to academic freedom.

4.2 Partners in Language and Culture

A prerequisite for educational exchange at the tertiary level is that students acquire adequate skills in German as a Foreign Language (GFL). As was noted already, GFL teaching in Indonesia is an area characterised by an undersupply of teachers and inadequate quality of teaching. The measures taken by GI and other mediators to overcome this problem have been detailed above. Indonesian partners also have their views on this matter, however. The Indonesian German Teachers Union (*G. Deutschlehrerverband*) noted that the few German Studies programmes found at Indonesian universities tend to produce graduates who are well versed in German literature, but lacking in high-level oral language skills. These programmes do receive some assistance from German funders, and perhaps should be encouraged and enabled through these channels more specifically to produce graduates capable of teaching GFL at an international standard. A further suggestion is to develop a programme for undergraduates to spend a semester in Germany for intense immersion learning, but for now DAAD is not mandated to support such undergraduate level exchange. Another option would be to provide a year of additional preparatory in-house training for these graduates, which could be fee-paying courses in view of the fact that students are likely to have good job prospects afterwards. This would need to be intensive training, perhaps requiring facilitation or supervision by GI in collaboration with the local German Teachers Union.

Conversely, partners also noted the poor average standard of Indonesian language and cultural skills among incoming German students, business people and employees of mediator organisations. Indonesian language programmes and Indonesian Studies departments at German universities must not be forgotten if there is to be any serious push to deepen the bilateral relationship.

In a speech in Bali on 23 June 2018, President Jokowi said that “Our DNA is Art and Culture.” This emphatic statement hints at the fact that arts and culture in Indonesia are still largely seen as embedded in traditional life, left to traditional institutions to promote, and then taken for granted as marketable tourism attractions. Cultural heritage sites and institutions, such as museums, are chronically underfunded and there is desperate need for foreign assistance in capacity building. Progressive and critical arts that would help raise public reflexivity are also not supported with public funding to any great extent. In the same speech, the president more or less conceded that he had pressed ahead with infrastructure development and other priorities in his first term at the expense of neglecting the arts and culture.

The financial as well as moral support of the Goethe-Institut is thus much appreciated by local partners in the arts sector, which are mainly in the progressive arts field and less so in traditional art. For example, in 2012, GI partner Salihara made a significant contribution to freedom of thought in Indonesia by being the first to screen Joshua Oppenheimer’s movie on the 1965 genocide, ‘The Act of Killing’, which remains controversial in Indonesia and certainly has encouraged reflexive thought on the need to heal this historical trauma.

Local partners generally prefer exchange programmes that allow them to engage in workshops and co-productions with German artists, rather than simply hosting German exhibitions or performances. Reciprocal residency programmes thus are seen as particularly valuable. Exhibition and performance programmes should be reciprocal, that is, designed also to bring Indonesian art to Germany.

Insofar as there is room for expanding the GI network to include new partners, the following suggestions may be considered. Museum Macan, in Jakarta, is an excellent art collection and exhibition space with strong research capacity.¹⁴⁰ PT Lawangwangi, located in Bandung and founded in 2012, is an art, design, architecture and cultural heritage centre with a vision to integrate these concerns into the hospitality sector.¹⁴¹ Selasar Sunaryo Art Space (SSAS), also in Bandung, has been dedicated to the development of arts in Indonesia for more than twenty years and has a record of path-breaking exhibitions.¹⁴² Cemeti Institute for Art and Society is the longest standing platform for contemporary art in Yogyakarta, and runs a host of projects as well as a residency programme.¹⁴³ Finally, the

¹⁴⁰ www.museummacan.org/ [27/02/2019].

¹⁴¹ www.lawangwangi.com/ [27/02/2019].

¹⁴² www.selasarsunaryo.com/ [27/02/2019].

¹⁴³ www.cemeti.org/ [27/02/2019].

‘Galeri Nasional’ in Jakarta has a permanent as well as many temporary exhibitions, and would make an excellent collaboration partner for such purposes, for example, to host ifa’s traveling exhibitions.¹⁴⁴

4.3 Indonesian Actors in Germany

Until recently Indonesia has not had the means to maintain a large cultural diplomacy programme in Germany but diplomatic aspirations are now gradually developing in this G20 country. With regard to culture, showcasing Indonesia’s cultural wealth to a German audience has been a long-standing priority, aimed at increasing German tourism arrivals, as was noted earlier. Conversely, and apart from Indonesians living permanently in Germany, there now is a growing flow of business and tourism arrivals from Indonesia. In education, while Indonesian student numbers may be rising in Germany, there now also are advertisement campaigns encouraging German students to study in Indonesia, which shows that the connection between the two countries’ education sectors is no longer a one-way street. These are the early signs of a fundamental shift towards equilibrium in the bilateral relationship and such developments can be expected to gather pace in the years to come.

As far as cultural diplomacy is concerned, an important Indonesian government initiative is the cultural centre Rumah Budaya Indonesia (lit. ‘House of Indonesian Culture’), which was founded in 2012 and relocated to a new site in Berlin in 2017.¹⁴⁵ The aim of this institution is to hold exhibitions and seminars to promote Indonesian culture. In 2018, the programme included events on the Humboldt brothers and their research in Indonesia, the revival of the Sultanates in Indonesia, the cultural collector Oscar von Kessel, the Javanese painter Eko Nugroho, two relevant book launches on the German artist Ekkeland Götze’s work in Indonesia, a talk on Indo-German cooperation in maritime education by a representative of the University of Wismar and on science cooperation by the head of BMBF’s Indonesia office, an opening of an art exhibition on Wayang Beber theatre, and a reflection on the impact of a German exhibition that travelled to Java in 1929. In 2019, Rumah Budaya will also commence screening an Indonesian film series.

The current ambassador is generally very determined to lift Indonesia’s public profile in Germany. Since 2008 Indonesia has been very active in the Frankfurt International Book Fair, for example, and was guest of honour in 2015, leading to a big increase in interest in

¹⁴⁴ <http://galeri-nasional.or.id/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁴⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/RBI.Berlin/> [27/02/2019].

Indonesian literature. More cooperation in the area of sport, particularly football, is also an area of interest.

There are also a lot of cultural activities originating within the Indonesian community in Germany, which includes 16,000 Indonesian immigrants (in 2014) and about 4,500 students. Their organisations include expatriate, student as well as church and Muslim networks (including PERMIF, PPI and KMKI/PERKI/NU respectively), as listed on the website of the Indonesian consulate in Frankfurt.¹⁴⁶ These networks partly overlap in their membership with German-Indonesian friendship associations, the oldest of which, DIZ Cologne, was founded in 1950, thus preceding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

When diaspora groups engage in cultural diplomacy they do so very much in their own way. The Indonesian government has limited influence on their activities, but it does have a policy to involve the community in its diplomatic efforts (by supporting their cultural events, for example). In 2013, a special Diaspora Desk (DDI) was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to this end (see GIZ 2016). Indonesian political parties such as the ruling PDI-P and the Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) have representatives in Germany, as does the largest Muslim movement in Indonesia, NU.

As far as education is concerned, a simple Google search of the term “*in Indonesien studieren*” (G. ‘studying in Indonesia’) is sufficient to illustrate the changes that have occurred in this space. Alongside DAAD scholarship schemes, the Indonesian government is now visible, offering its own scholarships to some German students through the so-called Darmasiswa programme, financed by the Indonesian Ministry of Education (16 students in 2018, compared to 630 DAAD stipends for Indonesian students to visit Germany).¹⁴⁷ There are also numerous large and small private agencies at the German end serving the tremendous student demand for international mobility, to Indonesia and elsewhere, such as EDU-CON or College-Contact or Indojunkie.¹⁴⁸ The Indonesian Embassy also has produced a guide for study and work experience in Indonesia (Steffan 2010), and has established a network of Indonesian teachers in German universities to help raise the quality of Indonesian language training available in Germany for students who are looking to travel

¹⁴⁶ www.indonesia-frankfurt.de/events/deutsche-kontribution-in-indonesien/?lang=de [27/02/2019].

¹⁴⁷ According to data received from the Indonesian embassy in Berlin: <http://botschaft-indonesien.de/de/bildung/darmasiswa.htm> [27/02/2019].

¹⁴⁸ See www.studieren-in-indonesien.de/ and www.college-contact.com/indonesien and <http://indojunkie.com/studium-indonesien/> [27/02/2019].

to Indonesia. In conjunction with this, an Indonesian language testing standard (7 levels) has been developed. There are also Indonesian initiatives for mobility in the other direction. In vocational education, for example, the Indonesian Ministry of Education (Direktorat Pembinaan Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan) in cooperation with FESTO Academy near Stuttgart has sent 30 teachers for a training-of-trainers programme in automation.¹⁴⁹

Indonesia is pursuing a whole range of distinct diplomatic aims in Germany, which can only be discussed here in a cursory fashion. For example, Indonesia would like better provisions to allow nursing staff from Indonesia to be able to meet educational requirements and gain permission to work in Germany, and there have been talks with Hamburg and Frankfurt University on how to achieve this. Cooperation in aeronautics and space industry, marine science and biotechnology is pursued through a science and technology bilateral ministerial meeting. Specifically, there is a current interest to explore the promotion and perhaps assembly of electric cars in Indonesia, and advice is needed on how to regulate this and how to provide incentives for buyers. A renewable energy bilateral forum is in the process of being set up, and seen as a high priority. Recent German financial support for the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry's sustainable forests programme is greatly valued.

In order to encourage German investment, Indonesia is starting to reach out in a variety of ways to the German business community. For example, the Indonesian embassy held a meeting aimed at start-ups in Berlin in September 2018,¹⁵⁰ drawing on networks established through the city partnership between Berlin and Jakarta.

Regarding the FTA between Indonesia and the EU, issues that concern the Indonesian side include the tendency to reject palm oil imports on environmental grounds, which they see as a nontariff barrier aimed at protecting the EU's sunflower and rape seed oil industry, which is much less productive per hectare and thus arguably has a higher environmental cost. There is also concern about non-trade barriers against horticultural products, fish or seafood based on quarantine regulations.

In the domain of security cooperation, there has been an annual bilateral ministerial meeting since 2016; but there is some disappointment at the still rather tight controls on weapons exports to Indonesia, as well as strict end-user controls. Some weapons for the

¹⁴⁹ www.festo.com/cms/zh_corp/11532_12437.htm#id_12437 [27/02/2019].

¹⁵⁰ www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/18/09/13/peyr7u291-kbri-berlin-gelar-indonesia-german-start-up-gathering [27/02/2019].

Indonesian police were refused due to human rights concerns, and a lack of open discussion of the issues was noted. And as far as security concerns about German NGO activity in Indonesia is concerned, the hope is that these matters can be resolved through more transparency about NGO's financial sources and activities and through long-term partnerships that will help build trust.

In the field of radicalisation prevention and religious tolerance promotion the Indonesian government has its own domestic concerns, and hence there is a willingness to explore the establishment of a formal inter-ministerial forum on religion. Note that Indonesia is also aware and concerned to see the rise of new right-wing extremist groups in Germany, whose racist propaganda and criminal activities are prominently focused on Muslims. The Indonesian government is currently exploring the establishment of an inter-faith scholarship scheme for Germans, including AfD members, to visit Muslim communities and institutions in Indonesia. This is part of the promotion of Islam Nusantara as a marker of national identity.

5. Special Focus: Cooperation in Interfaith Dialogue and Radicalisation Prevention

5.1 Introduction

Although in many countries religious law has been superseded by secular law, secular law has religious foundations in most cases. A key aspect of religions is thus that they have served to underwrite with divine sanction the moral codes by which many societies have lived and continue to live, mostly, in peace. Religions are also used as markers of identity, however, and hence as instruments of inclusion and exclusion. This allows ruthless political actors to utilise people's religious commitments for their own ends, creating division and conflict along the way. Individuals too can draw inspiration for acts of violence from their idiosyncratic and negative interpretation of religious texts and traditions, but this rarely creates a problem on a societal scale unless they are participants in larger social movements.

National governments in Germany and Indonesia alike seek to promote peaceful dialogue between faith communities and to counteract or at least restrict the influence of religious extremists, whose actions range from committing or inciting acts of violence to simply trying to gain votes or political leverage by appealing to people's primordial fears of "otherness" and resentments about social change or injustice. Both Germany and Indonesia have experienced increasing problems in this regard, but the problems take a rather different form in each case.

For Germany, the question is how best to accommodate an unfamiliar state of religious diversity that is the consequence of a post-WW2 influx of millions of immigrants, at first mainly through labour migration programmes and more recently in the wake of the 2015 refugee 'crisis'. The largest number of Muslim arrivals originated from Turkey, followed by Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and South Asia, and together Muslims now form a sizeable minority of about 5% in Germany (SB 2017). This development must be seen against the backdrop of a process of radical secularisation over the past century, resulting in a situation where the largest confession in Germany today is to have no religious confession at all (37%). In combination, however, Catholics (28%) and Protestants (29%) together still add up to an absolute majority and Christianity still dominates religious conventions in Germany, if at a dramatically reduced level of intensity, with remaining interest pertaining mainly to the need for lifecycle ritual and to major feast days that have a strong pagan component, rather than to faith in Christian dogma as such (FOWID 2018). Nevertheless, fear of societal change and associated anti-Muslim sentiments are strong in some sectors of society. This has been exploited by the new political party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD), who have tended to portray Muslims as emblematic of all that is for-

eign. Unlike its various predecessors, AfD has been able to establish itself in state and federal parliaments and is no longer just a fringe phenomenon in German politics. This trend has also found expression in increasingly serious incidents of violence against foreigners led by new-right extremists, particularly in regions of former East Germany.

Indonesia's difficulties with religion are not the historical result of a migration of people but of ideas. The vast archipelago which, if superimposed onto Europe, would stretch from Portugal to the Ural Mountains, is home to an ethnically extremely diverse population, with over 700 different indigenous languages still spoken today, the largest of which – Javanese – has almost as many native speakers as does German (Lewis 2009). This ethnolinguistic diversity was paralleled by a similar religious diversity before the arrival of world religions, and has persisted in whole or in part in many regions until today. Indigenous languages, cultures and religions in Indonesia are nevertheless closely related and similar to one another. Common characteristics include shamanistic practices, the veneration of ancestors and especially ancestral founders, and a related belief in the sacredness of places of origin (Fox and Sather 1996).

On the central Indonesian islands, a second layer of religious culture was added some 2000 years ago with the arrival of Indic religions (Buddhism, Shivaism and Vaishnavism), which eventually merged into one diverse belief system and, together with elements of indigenous religious tradition, became the main state religion of pre-colonial Indonesian Indic states (*negara*) for a millennium, more or less until the fall of the Majapahit empire around 1500 CE.

By that time Islam had arrived, following the same trade routes, and had gained strength in coastal cities. The fall of Majapahit, widely understood as the result of a betrayal of the last king, Brawijaya V, by his Muslim convert son, is seen as another major watershed in Indonesian history and, like 1965, is still a very contentious issue. In any case, the state religion of the state of Mataram and other, subsequent *negara* in Java was 'Islam Java', a syncretised form of religious culture, featuring a complex assemblage of Muslim faith and strong Indic and indigenous cultural and ritual elements. In Java this compromise held until modern times, and it was on this cultural foundation that the 1945 constitution was written. In other parts of Indonesia Islam is less syncretic, in others indigenous religion or Indic religion has remained dominant, while in others again there is a Christian majority (also superimposed on a layer of indigenous religious traditions) due to the impact of missionary work during the colonial period.

Today the vast majority of Indonesians self-describe as Muslims (87.2% in 2010), though many people, including many nominal Muslims, still value or even prefer the old religions and the rich cultural heritage associated with them. The struggle between pious and increasingly political Islam vs. nationalism has been a perpetual motif in modern Indonesian history (Ricklefs 2006, 2007), and was implicated in many major conflicts, from struggles over the wording of Indonesia's founding constitution in 1945, to the mass killings of left-leaning nationalists in 1965 (above) and until today. The only major change is that the struggle has gradually shifted more and more into the midst of the Muslim community itself, which is internally diverse and more or less split into a large moderate nationalist and a small, heavily politicised Islamist camp. Reflecting this shift, Indonesia's cultural diplomacy, under the leadership of foreign minister Hassan Wirayudha, began to present to the world a self-image no longer of secular nationalism but of moderate Islam (Salim 2018).

While Indonesia defines itself as a secular state, the first, monotheistic principle of Indonesia's national philosophy, Pancasila (Sanskrit, 'the five principles'), requires citizens to have a belief in the 'one and only' God. Indonesian law further requires all citizens to hold an identity card that identifies the person with one of the seven state-recognised religions. Followers of minority religions, including indigenous traditions, are routinely subjected to administrative harassment, for example when they require a birth or marriage certificate, let alone a building licence for a place of worship. Indonesia does not recognise agnosticism or atheism, which since 1965 is automatically equated with communism, while blasphemy and pornography have been criminalised.

Islam is heavily politicised through the tireless efforts of an Islamist minority that is extremely vocal, makes skilful use of new media and also has the clandestine support of rogue elements in the security sector and the current political opposition (who privately care little about religion). It also receives strong financial support from Saudi Arabia. A recent example of the power of this Islamist populist alliance of convenience was the campaign to topple Jakarta's Christian and ethnic Chinese governor, Basuki 'Ahok' Tjahaja Purnama, for alleged blasphemy against Islam in 2016. The campaign whipped up primordial sentiment and eventually succeeded, with Ahok sentenced to jail.

From a cultural diplomacy perspective, one simply cannot afford to look past the massive influence of Saudi money in Indonesia. In March 2017 Salman bin Abdul Aziz was the first Saudi king to visit Jakarta in 47 years, with an entourage of 1500 assistants and 560 tons of luggage, ironically to be greeted at the airport by the president and also the al-

ready embattled Governor Ahok. Salman allocated a \$13 billion budget for partnerships in business, education and religion in Indonesia (Dagur 2017). Saudi funding to Indonesia dates back to the 1980s, however. A prominent example is the Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA) in Jakarta. As recently reported by Malik and Edwards (2018), the institute was founded on Saudi money and is famous for promoting ultraorthodox Islamic views, with male students urged to grow their beard and women to fully cover themselves. Students study the writings of Imam Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism. LIPIA has strong links to Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh and is strictly monitored by the Saudi embassy. Khalid bin Muhammad Al-Deham, a Saudi national, leads LIPIA's management. The institute produced 11,535 graduates from 1982-2013, and numbers are rising each year (750 in 2017). During the state visit of King Salman, the Jokowi government signed off on an agreement allowing LIPIA to open new campuses in Medan, Surabaya and Makassar (Macdonald 2018). Not everyone in Indonesia is happy about this influence, but economic interests weigh strongly as well as a religious dependency in the context of negotiating quotas for Indonesian pilgrims to the holy city of Mecca. The matter is also complicated, for Indonesia and everyone else, by the fact that Saudi Arabia is among the closest allies of the United States and, as US handling of the recent case of murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi suggests, more indispensable to it than European NATO partners. To be fair, the rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia itself in part also bears testimony to a long history of foreign intervention in the region.

Regardless of the vocal presence of Islamism in public space, Indonesian voters remain predominantly centrist and nationalist-oriented. There are several 'Islamic identity' parties, which together received 34.43 % of votes in the last parliamentary election of 2014 (see Reuter 2015b). The largest were the National Awakening Party (PKB, chair: Muhaimin Iskandar) at 12.62%, the United Development Party (PPP, chair: Dr. Suryadharma Ali) at 10.71%, the National Mandate Party (PAN, chair: minister of economics Hatta Rajasa) at 7.12%, the Crescent Star Party (PBB, chair: Prof Yusril Ihza Mahendra) at 2.62%, and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, chair Muhammad Anis Matta) at 1.36%. These five parties, however, are by no means a coalition. PKB and PAN are both very much on the nationalist side of politics and are affiliated with the two large mainstream civil society Muslim associations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah respectively. Overall, pushing an Islamist agenda has not been a recipe for electoral success.

Neither is it possible today for successful political candidates to ignore Muslim sentiments, let alone provoke them, as the case of governor Ahok illustrates. Jokowi's choice of a Muslim conservative, Ma'aruf Amin, as his running mate for this year's election – a man who supported the case against Ahok, wants to criminalise homosexuality and lobbied for the early release of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir – has disappointed many of his more modern and open-minded nationalist supporters (Arifianto 2018). It also underscores the extent to which essentially nationalist politicians are now forced to kowtow to Muslim sentiments of an exclusionist, self-congratulatory and intolerant nature.¹⁵¹ The 2019 election will show just how much further this radical populist pressure is able to drive mainstream politics (Coca 2018), along with associated misinformation and fake news.¹⁵² Such problems are not unfamiliar in contemporary Germany and elsewhere in Europe, where mainstream political parties similarly have been driven towards partial accommodation of populist views about migration.

5.2 German Engagement with Muslims in Indonesia

The mediator organisations and their networks of interaction play an important role in German engagement with Muslims in Indonesia, though again this takes place within a wider field of interactions between the two societies and, more specifically, their Muslim and other faith communities. The 'German Islamic Conference' (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, DIK) has Indonesian participants in its seminars,¹⁵³ which shows that a growing community of Indonesian Muslims is interacting with their fellow Muslims in Germany. The 'Foundation for Islam in Germany' (Stiftung Islam in Deutschland, SID) organises educational trips to Indonesia.¹⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany have a very substantial network in Indonesia within and beyond their own faith communities, and there are regular contacts. The 'Working Group of German Christian Churches' (Arbeitsgruppe Christlicher Kirchen in Deutschland, ACK), for example, is very active in promoting interfaith dialogue in Germany and beyond,¹⁵⁵ and has close ties to Indonesia. The proposals for the ACK 'prayer week' held by the Working Group of

¹⁵¹ See also <https://theconversation.com/power-at-what-cost-those-left-out-of-indonesias-2019-presidential-election-102123> [27/02/2019].

¹⁵² <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/13/muslim-cyber-army-a-fake-news-operation-designed-to-bring-down-indonesias-leader> [27/02/2019].

¹⁵³ www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/DE/DIK/4ReligioesesPersonal/ImameTheologie/ProjektelImame/projekteimame-node.html [27/02/2019].

¹⁵⁴ <https://stiftung-iid.de/reisen/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁵⁵ www.oekumene-ack.de/themen/interreligioeser-dialog/ [27/02/2019].

German Christian Churches, will be presented by the Indonesian Christian community in 2019.¹⁵⁶ These are just some impressions of countless civil society interactions in the domain of religion. There is room for intensifying interactions in this field, however, and much scope for the two countries to learn from one another. The mediator organisations thus have much scope for contributing, and they do. Their work is an important part of a wider diplomatic effort to reach out to Islamic countries in Germany (Kreft 2015), and also at the EU level.

An important initiative by the Goethe-Institut is aimed at giving Indonesians the opportunity to witness 'Muslim Life in Germany.' In 2017 and 2018 there was a two-week summer school programme in which forty moderate (but deliberately not liberal) Muslims were brought to Germany to meet with German Muslims. Participants were recruited through an open call and 'multipliers' were selected from hundreds of applications, with the help of Paramadina University. In Germany the visitors met with scholars in Islamic Studies and other Muslim leaders. Back home they were required to hold sharing sessions in their communities or institutions or at a GI event. Seeing Muslims living as a minority in a Christian-secular society and engaging in interfaith activities with Christians led to much positive reflection, which extended into the Indonesian press.¹⁵⁷ A multilingual website with information and testimonials about the programme was also set up.¹⁵⁸ The programme created a network that could serve as a platform for future exchange activities. GI also maintains close contacts with prominent progressive Muslim intellectuals, such as the family members of former president Abdurrahman Wahid and a number of human rights groups with a focus on religious freedom, and makes its venues available for critical Muslim voices to be heard. There is also collaboration with the German political foundations and embassy, such as the 2015 conference 'Religion, State and Society in the 21st Century' in Yogyakarta.¹⁵⁹

DW provided a training programme for Indonesian journalists in 2018, with TVRI and other local partners, called 'Allah, God, Buddha and the Media.' The aim was to enable participants to produce balanced, high-quality reports on religious issues. The programme

¹⁵⁶ [www.oekumene-ack.de/index.php?id=467&tx_news_pi1\[action\]=detail&tx_news_pi1\[controller\]=News&tx_news_pi1\[news\]=642&cHash=4890aeb1ca57b8da4f5cd517d8f23e90&L=0](http://www.oekumene-ack.de/index.php?id=467&tx_news_pi1[action]=detail&tx_news_pi1[controller]=News&tx_news_pi1[news]=642&cHash=4890aeb1ca57b8da4f5cd517d8f23e90&L=0) [27/02/2019].

¹⁵⁷ E.g. www.radartasikmalaya.com/dosen-fekon-uniga-pelajari-kehidupan-muslim-di-jerman/ [27/02/2019].

¹⁵⁸ www.goethe.de/ins/id/en/kul/dos/mid.html [27/02/2019].

¹⁵⁹ www.goethe.de/resources/files/pdf94/press_release_-_conference_-_religion_state_and_society_in_the_21st_century_-_en.pdf [27/02/2019].

included stipends for further study in Germany. Journalists are multipliers par excellence, and this programme deserves expansion, perhaps in collaboration with the Maarif Institute, which has a programme called #1nDONESia on 'journalism for National unity' (*Jurnalisme Kebinekaan*) to prevent radicalisation among Muslim journalism students.

The DAAD's most important initiative in this field is called 'University Dialogue with the Islamic World,'¹⁶⁰ and aims to improve intercultural understanding. This is an international programme that began in the Middle East. One activity took place in Indonesia in 2018, focusing on the place of human rights in Islam and involving UGM and the University of Vechta as partners.¹⁶¹ Activities in Indonesia should be extended.

FES runs an interesting initiative led by well-known Muslim intellectual Yudi Latif, from the Institute for Education Reform (IER) at the University of Paramadina. Latif was certainly a multiplier in that he subsequently served for some time as a presidential advisor on Pancasila, and ran a programme of events throughout Indonesia on a revitalisation of the nationalist concept in defence of pluralism. The cooperation culminated in the publication of an important monograph on the contemporary phenomenon of populism in Indonesia.¹⁶² The ideas generated by the programme were also disseminated into the education system through teacher seminars.

KAS also has been running a programme with the IER at Paramadina since 2007, in the course of which some 1,200 teachers in state schools participated in seminars on how to provide democratic citizenship education, based on a contemporary interpretation of the national constitution. This is a very timely debate to have, given that the public image of the nationalist Pancasila doctrine was significantly tarnished by the way it was abused under Suharto's authoritarian regime for 32 years. More generally, given what was said earlier about the history of religion in Indonesia, efforts to prevent the spread of Islamist thought should not just consist of attempts to discredit this way of thinking but also actively promote the alternative, positive message of a pluralist democratic nationalism. As one of the most knowledgeable scholars about Indonesian Islam, the Jesuit brother Franz Magnis Suseno, puts it succinctly, "Indonesian national consciousness has a de-

¹⁶⁰ Hochschuldialog mit der islamischen Welt, see <https://www.daad.de/hochschulen/programme-regional/arabischer-raum/de/11943-hochschuldialog-mit-der-islamischen-welt/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁶¹ www.daad.de/medien/hochschulen/regional/arabien/dialog/projektprofil_u_vechta_merle.pdf [27/02/2019].

¹⁶² www.fes-indonesia.org/e/en-nation-building-in-the-era-of-populism-and-the-muslim-intelligentsia-the-indonesian-experience-by-yudi-latif/ [27/02/2019].

radicalising effect” (2016: 2). KAS rightly observes that Indonesia’s moderate Islam Nusantara (I. ‘Islam of the Archipelago’) deserves more international recognition as well as support within Indonesia itself. Together with IER, KAS and other German and Indonesian actors also organised an important conference entitled ‘Radicalisation / Deradicalisation: Comparing Experiences, Germany Indonesia and Beyond’, as part of the one-off mega event ‘German Season’ (G. Deutsche Saison) in Yogyakarta in 2015.¹⁶³

KAS runs another important initiative called ‘Pesantren for Peace,’ which has its own Indonesian language website.¹⁶⁴ The project was BMZ/EU co-funded for thirty months from 2015 to 2018, but began independently in 2008 and continues until today. The focus is on exploring the compatibility of Islam with democracy and human rights, on peaceful resolution of interreligious conflict, training of trainers, production of appropriate teaching materials and on the networking of participating teachers from different Quran schools (*pesantren*) within an alliance of moderates. Almost one thousand teachers from Quran Schools throughout the country have participated in interactive training on human rights, tolerance and inter-religious peace. One aim of the training is to enable moderate teachers to combat the rhetoric of radical Islamist preachers effectively, based on the sacred scriptures.¹⁶⁵ Since 2008 this training programme has been realised in partnership with the Centre for the Study of Religion and Culture at the State Islamic University, led by Irfan Abubakar (CSRC at UIN). The centre also runs its own programmes, for example, on combatting hate speech.¹⁶⁶

With their partner KEMDAGRI, KAS also holds a joint annual conference on anti-terrorism cooperation, and provides deradicalisation programmes for returned foreign fighters or released terrorism convicts. This is an area where Germany can learn from successful Indonesian experiments, for example with family focused deradicalisation programmes. Mutual interest in radicalisation prevention and counter-messaging on social media and in schools and universities has led to much interest in further cooperation.

¹⁶³ <http://deutschesaison.com/wp/radikalisierung-deradikalisierung/?lang=de> [27/02/2019].

¹⁶⁴ www.pesantrenforpeace.com/ [27/02/2019].

¹⁶⁵ www.pesantrenforpeace.com/index.php/publikasi/berita/item/558-training-kontra-narasi-ekstremis-suara-pesantren-untuk-perdamaian-dan-toleransi [27/02/2019].

¹⁶⁶ www.uinjkt.ac.id/csirc-uin-jakarta-explained-the-study-of-hate-speech-2/ [27/02/2019].

5.3 New Strategies and Potential Partners

If some German observers are concerned about radicalisation and extremist points of view within certain sectors of the Muslim community, so are Indonesians. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Religious Affairs are thus already well networked with regional and international interfaith networks. The latter has run religious dialogue programmes in all 33 provinces and over 400 districts.¹⁶⁷ There are also countless initiatives for interfaith dialogue and mediation being carried out by a wide range of non-state actors, from the two large Muslim organisations to civil society organisations and academic institutions. To name just three examples: The largest Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), ran the important International Summit of Moderate Islamic Leaders (ISO-MIL) in May 2016 in Jakarta, promoting *Islam Nusantara* to the world (Bender 2017: 81); the Centre for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies in the graduate school of Universitas Gajah Mada held a very high-impact conference in October 2017 on 'Institutionalising Interfaith Mediation,' and hosts many other events on this topic;¹⁶⁸ and the Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity, named after the prominent moderate Muslim intellectual Sya'afi Maarif, runs numerous interfaith activities as a civil society organisation.¹⁶⁹

In this crowded field there is perhaps no shortage of potential partners for future collaboration with German actors. It is thus more a matter of selecting and supporting some of the most promising and strategic initiatives. In the author's opinion, the following are five prime candidates. All are relatively new initiatives that would benefit from support.

Alissa Wahid and other members of the Wahid family are now linked up through a twitter network and website called Gusdurian, which is very active in promoting a modern, tolerant and open brand of Islam.¹⁷⁰ Wahid was the chair of NU before he became the first Indonesian president to be elected in the *Reformasi* period. The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy awarded this network the Asia Democracy and Human Rights Award 2018.

'Yayasan Inklusif Indonesia' is a very active group run by well-known Muslim intellectual Ahmad Suaedy and others.¹⁷¹ The network provides inclusiveness training across a

¹⁶⁷ <http://icrd.org/wp-content/uploads/Monthly-Update-Website-Version-.pdf> [27/02/2019].

¹⁶⁸ <https://crcs.ugm.ac.id/id/berita-utama/11686/pelembagaan-mediati-antariman-apa-mengapa-dan-bagaimana.html> [27/02/2019].

¹⁶⁹ <http://maarifinstitute.org/profil/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁷⁰ <http://www.gusdurian.net/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁷¹ http://wahanainklusif.org/fusion/viewpage.php?page_id=3 [27/02/2019].

wide range of institutional and community settings. Suaedy used to work at the Wahid Centre at the University of Indonesia and directs the joint Institute for Southeast Asian Islam (ISAI) of UIN and University Sunan Kalijaga.¹⁷² He has written on many relevant topics, including religious minority communities at risk (Suaedy 2016).

NU Online is an important initiative directed by Savic Ali.¹⁷³ The aim is for NU to develop the technical and social capacity to combat the strong negative online influence of often small but vocal groups of radicals. NU Online is a kind of virtual pesantren, linking the country's 20,000 actual pesantren through the internet and social media.¹⁷⁴ Apart from the exchange of news within the NU, the small team of about fifteen staff are vital for NU's public relations and the platform is probably the most important voice of moderate Indonesian Islam on the internet. Part of this effort is also the Youtube channel '164' (18,500 subscribers) and the site Islami.co.¹⁷⁵ But – their visiting number rating among online Muslim voices is still only forth, while Wahhabism networks continue to claim the first places.

The NU's 'Office for Training and Human Development' (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia, Lakpesdam), is another important new institution, headed by Ahmad Rumadi. He coordinates an education programme for young Islamic teachers (*ulama*) that, among other things, prepares them for the challenges of protecting communities from radical influences. This long-standing NU programme is called 'Pendidikan Pengembangan Wawasan Keulamaan' (PPWK).¹⁷⁶ Participants also receive social media and anti-corruption training, in partnership with NU-Online and the national Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) respectively. Due to its reach, extending to thousands of pesantren across Indonesia, any support for this programme would have a large multiplier effect. There has been some contact with the German embassy already, but further support would be welcome in order to add an interfaith component to the PPWK programme and also to enable dialogue with ulama in countries where Islam is a minority. Note that NU already has a branch in Berlin.

¹⁷² <https://ahmadsuaedy.wordpress.com/about/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁷³ <http://www.nu.or.id/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁷⁴ <http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/90636/savic-ali-saatnya-membangun-pesantren-virtual> [27/02/2019].

¹⁷⁵ www.youtube.com/channel/UCHpbYgAvNyjJTE0VLe50pFQ and <https://islami.co/kenapa-aku-bikin-islami-dot-co/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁷⁶ <http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/93259/gelar-ppwk-ii-lakpesdam-pbnu-jawab-tantangan-keulamaan> [27/02/2019].

Abdullah Darraz, a graduate of Paramadina and executive director at the Maarif Institute,¹⁷⁷ is involved in the journalism programme mentioned earlier, which has synergies with the recent DW initiative for journalists. Moreover, he was head of research and training at HMI, the most powerful national Muslim student network. At the Maarif Institute one priority is interfaith dialogue at a grassroots level, especially arranging direct encounters between young people of different faiths. Since 2011 they have run an innovative programme called *Jambore Pelajar Teladan Bangsa* every year,¹⁷⁸ and then three times in different locations in 2018.¹⁷⁹ Students from different faiths come together, receive training and hold discussions and workshops. They also complete a social work placement in communities or houses of worship of another faith. The initiative met with initial resistance from hardliners but now has broad support, from the Ministry of Education to student activists, enjoys excellent media exposure, and recently received an award from the president. Funding is very limited, but includes help from private sector companies such as Garuda and BCA Bank, the government of Japan, the Ministry of Education and a number of programme partners, such as Paramadina University. The programme may also serve as an inspiring model for interfaith education in Germany. The Maarif Institute also would like to expand another new grassroots project, which gives awards to people who quietly stand up for tolerance and social harmony in their local communities, and are never otherwise recognised for their courage. About twenty such awards have been awarded so far, based on community nominations. The institute also recently held a gathering of 2,000 school students from four cities to train them in media literacy and how to produce positive social media content, leading to the production of 800 short videos.¹⁸⁰ Finally, the institute conducts a survey to determine which cities are safest in Indonesia from the perspective of religious freedom, to raise awareness on this issue and, conversely, to expose the tendency of some local political actors to divide their communities. All of these programmes are highly innovative and timely.

Some of the interfaith initiatives run by other countries in Indonesia also deserve consideration as an inspiration for new initiatives. A good example is the very high-profile Australia-Indonesia Muslim Exchange Program (AIMEP) established in 2002 in collaboration with Paramadina University.¹⁸¹ With appropriate funding, a comparable programme could emerge from the GI initiative described above.

¹⁷⁷ <http://maarifinstitute.org/profil/muhd-abdullah-darraz/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁷⁸ <http://maarifinstitute.org/jambore-2018/> [27/02/2019].

¹⁷⁹ This was initially a response to a government call for initiatives in 'national character education.'

¹⁸⁰ See Instagram #mudahcintadamai or #PercayaIndonesia

¹⁸¹ www.aimep.com.au/ [27/02/2019].

In terms of overall strategy, the importance of internet-based media cannot be emphasised enough and, along with support for positive civil society initiatives, a closer security dialogue on new media is needed to combat divisive fake news and other interventions by ruthless domestic or foreign actors. The Indonesian government may need advice on how best to deal with cyber security measures to curb fake news. The government also needs to find ways to sever clandestine support for extremist groups from domestic and foreign actors to stop the instrumentalisation of religion for political ends.

6. Concluding Remarks

Aristotle taught that ‘political friendship’ (*politike philia*) could be, and most often is, found where individuals are united in a communal pursuit of a shared goal, “for friendship depends on community” (Aristotle, NE1159a33).¹⁸² It is fortunate that these happen to be precisely the circumstances under which the bilateral relationship between Germany and Indonesia is currently unfolding. The two countries have everything to gain from a closer cooperation, and are well on the way to achieving this. While nothing should be taken for granted, I am confident that the relationship is also robust enough to survive the inevitable transformations that will accompany the rise of Indonesia. The future is uncertain, perhaps never more so than today, but strong and equitable partnerships such as this will be the best hope for us all.

Much can and has been said about how to build trust in German and Indonesian intercultural encounters across different contexts, from business (Schwegler 2008) to education (Ekawati 2014), and there has been much recent debate on trust in international relations generally (Rathbun 2018). As Hollis (1998) has argued rather convincingly, however, trust always should be based on the appropriate observation of facts and their rational interpretation. This study, in a language accessible to most educated Indonesians, hopes to make a contribution by stating the facts of this case, insofar as they could be ascertained in the course of this rather modest research project.

To develop trust and deepen the potential for collaboration one should therefore focus not on publicity but on changing the facts of a relationship for the better. From the German cultural diplomacy perspective, this necessitates a perpetual self-reflexive examination of motives, because our motives make us who we are, they inform our approach to life, and in this case, our conduct in international relations. Right action follows from positive, constructive motives, measured by universal reciprocal principles of mutual recognition.¹⁸³ The real motives we harbour will ultimately drive our actions, and only positive motives lead to consistent right action. Honesty, transparency and genuineness are then rather easy to manifest in interaction with others, and trust will follow by itself.

¹⁸² Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” translation by W.D. Ross. In Richard McKeon (ed.) 1947, *Introduction to Aristotle*. New York: Random House.

¹⁸³ For an explication of this point I refer the reader to Jean Paul Satre’s *Notebooks for an Ethics*.

Germany has undergone a profound process of critical self-reflection to rebuild its reputation after WW2. May this difficult work never be forgotten, nor cast aside out of fear in the face of the great challenges and turmoil that lie ahead. Standing up with courage for our values is honourable even in defeat, and is there really any other way? The world, when it comes to its senses, hopefully in the nick of time, will realise that only through honourable engagement and strong trusting partnerships between nations can we hope to survive this most fateful century.

Indonesia, meanwhile, is forced by the regional and global circumstances in which it now finds itself to mature rapidly as a society, an economy and a nation, with ever increasing responsibility and impact on fellow nations. Not an easy task, and one that will require much courage, and indeed a new sense of confidence, in remembrance perhaps of the millennia of culturally advanced civilisation that lie behind, and drawing strength from the healing of past trauma. Reaching out to embrace ASEAN neighbours and trustworthy friends in Germany and in the EU, in the founding spirit of 'internasionalisme dan musyawarah',¹⁸⁴ will lie at the heart of this process.

¹⁸⁴ I.: 'internationalism and seeking consensus.' This refers to the first iteration of Pancasila before the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan) by the founding president of Indonesia in 1945.

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List of Abbreviations

AA German Federal Foreign Office
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AHK German Chamber of Industry and Commerce Abroad
AKBP Cultural and Educational Foreign policy
APA Committee for the Asia Pacific
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AvH Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation
BANPT Indonesian National Higher Education Accreditation Office
BAPPENAS Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning
BDI Federal Association of German Industry
BGA Federal Association for Trade and Services
BIBB German Federal Institute for Vocational Education
BKD German (Language) Education Cooperative
BKF Indonesian Financial Planning Office
BKM German Commissioner for Culture and Media
BKPM Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board
BMBF German Federal Ministry of Education and Research
BMEL German Federal Ministry for Food and Agriculture
BMF German Federal Ministry of Finance
BMFSFJ German Federal Ministry of Family, Seniors, Women and Youth
BMI German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Homeland
BMU Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
BMWi German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BPPT Indonesian Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology
BVA German Federal Office of Administration
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CEPA Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CIFOR Indonesian Centre for International Forestry Research
CISS Centre for International and Strategic Studies (Jakarta)
CLIENT II German International Partnerships for Sustainable Innovations
CSU Christian Social Union
DAAD German Academic Exchange Service
DAS German Schools Abroad
DFB German Football Union
DFG German Research Council
DIES Dialogue on Innovative Higher Education Strategies (program)

DIHK Association of German Chambers of Commerce
DIKTI *see* RISTEKDIKTI
DIPI Indonesian Science Fund
DJP Indonesian Taxation Office
DLF The German international radio channel (*Deutschlandfunk*)
DPS German Profile Schools
DSD German Diploma Schools
DW Deutsche Welle (Germany's international broadcaster)
Erasmus+ (E+) European exchange programme for students and academics
EBTKE Indonesian Directorate General of New Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation
EEAS The European External Action Service
EIBN EU-Indonesia Business Network
EKONID German-Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Trade
ENQA European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education
EU European Union
EUA European University Association
EUNIC European Union National Institutes for Culture
FDI Foreign direct investment
FDP Free Democratic Party
FG The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (for applied research)
FORCLIME German-Indonesian Forests and Climate Change Program
G. German language
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFZ Geo Research Centre Potsdam
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GI The Goethe-Institut
GINI Coefficient a measure of inequality
GITEWS German-Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System
GIZ The German Society for International Cooperation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GOVET German Office for International Cooperation in Vocational Education and Training
GTAI German Trade & Invest
HFBK University of Fine Arts Hamburg
I. Indonesian language
IBS German agency for work experience placements abroad
ifa Institute for Foreign Relations
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAG Indonesian-German Advisory Group
IGSP Indonesian-German Scholarship Programme

IKARIM International Disaster Risk Management project scheme
IMOVE International Marketing for Vocational Education
IPK The Fraunhofer Institute for Production Systems and Design Technology
JERIN An interactive online information platform
JIL Liberal Islam Network
KfW German Credit Institute for Reconstruction
KLHK Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry
KMK German education minister's conference
KPU Corruption Eradication Commission
LIPI Indonesian Academy of Science
LPDP Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education
NDCs national determined contributions (Paris COP agreement)
NGNI Next Generation Network Infrastructures
NU Nahdlatul Ulama (Muslim organisation)
OAV German Asia-Pacific Business Association
ODA Overseas Direct Aid
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAD German Pedagogic Exchange Service
PASCH Goethe-Institut's network of partner-schools
PCA EU-Indonesia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PGE Pertamina Geothermal Energy
PKH Indonesian conditional social security payments
PLN Indonesian national energy provider
PPP Purchase-power-parity
PROTECTS Project for Training, Education and Consulting for Tsunami Early Warning Systems
R&D Research and development
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REEP '1,000 Islands' Renewable Energy for Electrification Programme
RISTEK-DIKTI Indonesian Ministry for Research and Education
RKTN Indonesian National Forestry Plan
RPJMN Indonesian National Medium-Term Development Plan (forestry)
RWTH Indonesian Academy of Science
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SHARE EU-funded project to strengthen regional cooperation within ASEAN
SOROTAN In-house publication of EKONID
SPD Social Democratic Party
SPP Social Protection Programme
SWP Foundation for Science and Politics
TVET German technical and vocational education transformation program p84

List of Abbreviations

UN United Nations

USD United States Dollars

WKI The Fraunhofer Institute for Wood Research

ZfA The Central Bureau for Schools Abroad

About the author

Prof Thomas Reuter (*18 January 1961 in Germany) is Professor at the Asia Institute of the University of Melbourne (UoM) in Australia, but currently living in Germany and affiliated with the University of Bonn's SE Asia Institute. After obtaining his PhD from ANU in Australia in 1997, he taught at Heidelberg University in his native Germany, before taking up post-doctoral and Queen Elizabeth II Fellowships at UoM, a Monash University Research Fellowship and an ARC Future Fellowship and professorship back at UoM.

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Imprint

The study is created within the framework of ifa's Research Programme "Culture and Foreign Policy" and is published in the ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy.

The Research Programme is funded by the Federal Foreign Office.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ifa.

Publisher:
ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen
e. V.), Charlottenplatz 17,
70173 Stuttgart, P.O. Box 10 24 63, D-
70020 Stuttgart, info@ifa.de,
www.ifa.de
© ifa 2019

Author: Prof Thomas Reuter

Editing: ifa's Research Programme
"Culture and Foreign Policy"

Credits: Thomas Reuter

Design: Eberhard Wolf, Munich

ISBN: 978-3-921970-02-7

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Available online: publikationen.ifa.de; ssoar.info



German Cultural Diplomacy in Indonesia

Building Cooperation in a Changing World

"It is possible to live together, meet together, speak to each other, without losing one's individual identity; and yet to contribute to the general understanding of matters of common concern, and to develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their well-being and survival on earth."

President Sukarno, Bandung Conference,
18 April 1955

This study examines how Germany is engaged in Indonesia through its cultural diplomacy-oriented institutions in the fields of education, science, culture and media. It aims to provide an overview for German decision makers and may also assist Indonesian actors to better understand and appreciate Germany's principled approach to cultural diplomacy and its intentions in building an ever-stronger partnership with Indonesia. Finally, the study contains a special section focusing on bilateral cooperation in the promotion of inter-faith dialogue and radicalisation prevention.