

A Comparative Analysis of the Normative Power of the EU and China

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Abstract:

This thesis examines how the normative power of China compares to that of the European Union (EU). It seeks to contribute to the literature on normative power through the incorporation of interests in the analysis of normative power, the systematic examination of China's normative power, and case studies of multilateral institutions in which multiple actors exercise normative power. This thesis examines normative power through an analytical framework comprising three core components: norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion. It applies this framework to the EU and China to assess whether these two actors possess normative power in global governance. It studies the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Paris Agreement (PA) to investigate how the EU and China exercise normative power in multilateral institutions. It also examines how these two actors address their norm divergence through compromise in the AIIB and the PA and the outcomes of their compromises in these two institutions. In addition to comparing the norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion of the EU and China, this thesis compares the two case studies of the AIIB and the PA. It argues that both the EU and China are predominantly driven by their own interests in their exercise of normative power. It demonstrates the centrality of interests in all three core components of normative power, namely norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes.

Declaration

This is to certify that:

- i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where indicated in the Preface,
- ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,
- iii. the thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

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Date _____

Preface

This thesis benefited from professional editing by The Expert Editor. In compliance with the University of Melbourne's Graduate Research Training Policy, the services they provided were restricted to copyediting and proofreading, as covered in Parts D and E of the Australian Standards for Editing Practice.

Chapter 5 is partly based on the article entitled 'The AIIB and China's Normative Power in International Financial Governance Structure', published by the Chinese Political Science Review in 2016 (Peng & Tok, 2016). The author of this thesis is the first author of the article with an overall contribution of 80%. As the second author of the article, Dr Tok has given permission for the article to be included in the thesis.

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Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AOA	Articles of Agreement
APL	Anti-Personnel Landmines
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COP	Conference of the Parties
EC	European Community
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPSC	European Political Strategy Centre
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plan
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESF	Environmental and Social Framework
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy

Exim Bank	Export-import Bank
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
HR/VP	High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs/Vice-President of the European Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MDB	multilateral development bank
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NPE	Normative Power Europe
PA	Paris Agreement
PFM	Prospective Founding Member
PRC	People's Republic of China
R2P	responsibility to protect
SAA	Stability and Association Agreement
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCHR	UN Commission for Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States
WB	World Bank

WPS	Women, Peace, and Security
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Chapter 1—Introduction

Introduction

The promotion of the European Union's (EU's) global governance norms constitutes an essential objective of the Union's foreign policy. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) identifies that a principal objective of the EU's external relations is to promote “democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity” (EU, 2007b, Article 21). In the words of Catherine Ashton (2010), former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, norms such as human rights, democracy and good governance, and the rule of law, constitute “a silver thread” that runs through all aspects of EU external relations. The *EU Global Strategy* (EUGS) explicitly states that establishing “an international system based on rules and on multilateralism” remains the priority of the EU's external relations (EUGS, 2016, Foreword).

This, Ian Manners would claim, is evidence of the EU possessing “normative power”. In an article published in 2002, he conceptualises normative power as “the ability to change the concept of ‘normal’” in international affairs through the diffusion of an actor's norms externally (Manners, 2002, p. 251). Manners' conceptualisation of normative power subsequently started an extensive scholarly discussion focusing on the examination of whether or not the EU can be conceptualised as Normative Power Europe (NPE) (Whitman, 2011). However, until now these studies focus primarily on the EU's normative power but pay insufficient attention to wider application of the concept to analysing activities of other actors in global governance: the role of the United States (US) in setting up the Bretton Woods system (Diez, 2005), the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) group in pushing for the reform of the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) (Lu, 2011), and the small island states' promotion for a 1.5°C target of controlling global warming in international climate change negotiations (de Águeda Corneloup and Mol, 2014), to name a few.

Since the outset of the 21st century, China has developed an interest in advancing its norms in global governance (Callahan, 2016; Pu, 2012). In 2005, then-President Hu Jintao presented the discourse of “harmonious world”, which envisages a global structure underpinned by “harmony and peace” among actors with different regimes. China argued that “harmonious world” is underpinned by Chinese norms such as sovereignty, mutual respect and mutual benefit. In other words, “harmonious world” constitutes an attempt by the Chinese leadership to assert Chinese norms in global governance. This is followed by the idea of a “community of shared destiny”, proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2015. Xi (2015) asserted that a “community of shared destiny”, which is supposedly built upon “mutual understanding, development, harmony and environmental protection”, would pave the way to realising “peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom” in global governance. “Harmonious world” and a “community of shared destiny” discourses, both underpinned by Chinese norms of global governance, illustrate Beijing’s growing interest in expanding the influence of its norms in international affairs.

Given its growing influence in the global governance structure, it is imperative that we start asking if China possesses normative power in global governance, and if so, is China’s normative power the same as that of the EU? The thesis suggests that such a comparative analysis demonstrates how normative power is exercised by international actors in global governance and that international norms are intrinsically a product of politics among international actors.

Hence, the key research question for this thesis is: *How does the normative power of*

China compare with that of the EU in global governance? Through a systematic comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China, the thesis examines how the EU and China wield their respective normative power in global governance in terms of the norms they seek to diffuse, the diffusion mechanisms they utilise, and the outcomes of their norm diffusion actions. The thesis also investigates how the EU and China exercise normative power in the AIIB and the PA.

Based on an analytical framework devised from Manners' (2008) and Tocci's (2008) theses on normative power, which identifies *norms*, *diffusion mechanisms* and *outcomes* as the three core components that capture normative power in practice, the thesis argues that both the EU and China are actors that possess normative power in global governance. The comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China demonstrates that the norms each is attempting to promote are strongly driven by individual state/union "interests". This contributes to different interpretations of terms such as sovereignty and human rights, as well as different hierarchies of norms regarding financial governance and climate change governance. Furthermore, when interests are in conflict with the norms each promotes, both actors tend to fall back to fulfilling their respective interests by adjusting their approach to norm diffusion. When they have overlapping interests, the EU and China address their norm divergence through compromise: in the AIIB, China selectively adopted transparency, social security and environmental protection, although not human rights norms, in exchange for the accession of the EU Member States; during negotiation of the PA, China endorsed the EU's diffusion of a progressive and ambitious target of controlling global warming in exchange for the EU's support of the CBDR principle asserted by China. In both cases, the EU and China were willing to support the norms of each other that are inconsistent with some of their own norms to obtain endorsement from their counterparts regarding some other norms they seek to diffuse. The two actors made

these compromises essentially to advance their respective economic and political interests in global financial governance and climate change governance.

1.1 Concepts

Normative power is defined in this thesis as the power to codify an actor's norms in global governance structures through norm diffusion. Actors that exercise normative power "set out to alter the prevalent normative order according to certain ideas or norms that they deem more suitable as compared to the existing ones" (Wunderlich, 2013, pp. 27–28). Therefore, the first component of normative power is the *norms* actors seek to diffuse in global governance. To achieve the objective of changing international norms with the norms it prefers, actors take actions that are characterised by "proactivism", which denotes "a considerable degree of consistency, strength of purpose, and intentionality, are future-oriented, and show a continuously high level of activism" (Wunderlich, 2013, p. 28). This demonstrates that it is essential to examine an actor's normative power through the analysis of the deliberate actions it takes to diffuse its norms. Drawing on the norm diffusion literature, this thesis focuses on *diffusion mechanisms*, referring to the policy tools utilised by an actor for norm diffusion, as another core component of normative power. It examines the different mechanisms and approaches that the EU and China respectively utilise in diffusing their norms. Moreover, Hart (1976, p. 293) suggested that the analysis of power needs to observe both the "actual attempts to exercise power" and "the results of these attempts". Indeed, if norm diffusion does not bring about outcomes that are consistent with the objectives of the actor, it becomes questionable to argue that this actor possesses normative power (Manners, 2008). Therefore, the analysis of normative power needs to examine the *outcomes* of norm diffusion to assess the normative power of an actor. Norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes constitute the core components of the analytical framework of normative power in this thesis.

Norms

The thesis adopts Manners' (2008, p. 55) definition of norms as referring to the "constitutive principles" of an actor that are promoted in external relations. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 893) identify "a two-level norm game" between domestic and international norms, in which domestic norms become international norms through norm promotion and international norms "work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms". The thesis focuses on the process in which domestic norms are institutionalised in global governance, which is the stage Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896) call "norm emergence" or "norm building". The thesis regards international norms as fluid, constantly being shaped by different actors. Because actors have different regime settings, historical experience, and interests, global governance is characterised by different interpretations of norms and different hierarchies of norms among actors (Pu, 2012). The thesis uses "norm divergence" to conceptualise these two types of differences. The issue of norm divergence is particularly important for the analysis of the thesis since the EU and China, as discussed below, are two actors with significant differences in terms of their regimes, norms, and policies in global governance. The thesis examines such divergence in the norms of the EU and China to investigate major factors that shape the norm divergence between the EU and China.

Since this thesis focuses on the divergence between the EU and China in terms of the norms they diffuse, it does not emphasise categorising norms. Wiener (2017b) categorises norms into three types. First, there are fundamental norms such as human rights, sovereignty and the rule of law, which are characterised by their "universal quality" (Wiener, 2017b, p. 117). Second, there are organising principle norms, such as CBDR. Compared with fundamental norms, organising principle norms are "closer [in] proximity to politics and policy-making processes" and "more directly linked to

stakeholder expectations than are fundamental norms” (Wiener, 2017b, p. 119). Third, there are standards and regulations such as greenhouse gas emission reduction targets that regulate the specific behaviour of actors. For Wiener (2017b), this typology of norms contributes to distinguishing the varying “moral reach” of different types of norms, so as to examine which stakeholders are involved in the contestation of these norms in global governance. Since this thesis is designed to examine the EU’s and China’s exercise of normative power, its focus is not on “who” is involved but “how” these actors engage in the shape of global governance norms. This research objective is fulfilled by examining how the EU’s and China’s diffusion of their norms shape the structures and regulations of international institutions. Hence, rather than focusing on the categorisation of different types of norms, this thesis explores how standards and regulations of an institution can be conceptualised as the codification of norms diffused by international actors. For example, as Chapter 6 will demonstrate, the greenhouse gas emission reduction arrangements in the PA codify the EU’s and China’s approaches to CBDR. Specifically, the PA regulates that all parties should adopt progressive emission targets, which is the EU’s approach to CBDR. It also states that developed states should take the lead in curbing greenhouse gas emission, which accords with China’s emphasis on a differentiation between developed and developing states.

Compared to Wiener’s (2017b) categorisation of norms, Duffield’s (2007) typology of norms is narrower because it focuses on norms that constitute institutions per se. For Duffield (2007, pp. 12-14), norms can be divided into constitutive norms, which define the type of actors that constitute the institution; regulative norms that “regulate the everyday behavior of actors”; and procedural norms, which are concerned with the relationship among actors and between actors and the institution. Since this thesis examines the norms of the EU and China both in bilateral relations and multilateral settings, it incorporates a broader range of norms than Duffield’s (2007) typology. It

incorporates constitutive norms such as sovereignty, but also other fundamental norms, such as human rights and democracy. In addition, this thesis also examines the EU's interpretation and diffusion of "resilience", as well as China's promotion of "peaceful development". As Chapter 3 will demonstrate, resilience has become a guiding principle of the EU's external relations since the Union established its 2016 global strategy (EUGS, 2016). Chapter 4 will illustrate the central role of peaceful development in Chinese foreign policy thinking since the mid-2000s. Even though these two norms do not fall into Duffield's (2007) categorisations, their importance for the EU's and China's foreign policy determines that they are "constitutive principles" of these actors' external behaviour. Hence, the thesis will examine these norms in its analysis of the normative power of the EU and China.

Diffusion mechanism

According to Börzel and Risse (2012, p. 5), norm diffusion refers to "a process through which ideas, normative standards ... spread across time and space". This thesis studies the norm diffusion of the EU and China by examining their approach to their diffusion mechanisms, namely the policy tools utilised by the EU and China to promote their norms in global governance. It draws on norm diffusion literature, including Björkdahl (2013), Börzel and Risse (2012), Jetschke and Murray (2012), Lenz (2013), and Manners (2002, 2008), to identify the major diffusion mechanisms adopted by the EU and China in their exercise of normative power. The norm diffusion literature has demonstrated that both *direct* mechanisms, such as persuasion and coercion, and *indirect* mechanisms, such as lesson-drawing and emulation, are plausible tools for norm diffusion (Börzel & Risse, 2012; Jetschke & Murray, 2012). This thesis suggests that the problem with indirect mechanisms is that, without a clear connection between the actor's deliberate attempts of norm diffusion and the outcomes that occur, it becomes difficult to attribute the policy changes in other states or the codification of

norms in international institutions to the exercise of normative power of that actor. To establish an assessment of the normative power of the EU and China, the thesis focuses on the direct diffusion mechanisms, namely persuasion, coalition building, inducement and coercion. It illustrates how the EU and China develop their distinctive approaches to these mechanisms in their norm diffusion actions. The thesis also compares their approaches to norm diffusion to demonstrate not only their different approaches to norm diffusion, but also how their exercises of norm diffusion show the same patterns as a result of the influence of their interests.

Outcomes

Outcomes refer to the results of norm diffusion (Manners, 2008). The examination of outcomes is essential to the analysis of normative power because it verifies the effectiveness of norm diffusion (Tocci, 2008, p. 11). If the outcomes of the norm diffusion are consistent with the actor's norms, they constitute *positive outcomes* (i.e., a positive correlation with the prescribed norm) for the norm promoter. An exercise of norm diffusion with positive outcomes is a manifestation of the actor's normative power, otherwise it is just an intent or an ineffective attempt of norm diffusion. The thesis examines two types of outcomes. In bilateral relations, it focuses on *policy changes* in the partners of the EU and China as a result of their norm diffusion. It suggests that the acceptance of the norms advanced by the EU and China by their partners illustrates their ability to shape the norms of other actors. Therefore, policy changes constitute an important indicator for this thesis to assess the effectiveness of their exercise of normative power in bilateral relationships. In multilateral settings, this thesis emphasises the *codification of norms* advanced by the EU and China in international institutions. Both the EU's and China's norm promotions in multilateral institutions are guided by the objective of implementing their norms in the institution. Therefore, the codification of their norms constitutes a positive outcome of their norm diffusion in

international institutions. When a connection is observable between these two types of positive outcomes—that is, policy change and codification of norms—and either the EU’s or China’s intentional norm diffusion, the agent is deemed to possess normative power in international governance arenas.

In addition, in the analysis of the outcomes of the norm diffusion of the EU and China in multilateral institutions, the thesis identifies that in some cases, both the norms of the EU and those of China are incorporated in a particular policy of the institution. The incorporation of norms promoted by different actors in an international institution is an outcome that has received insufficient attention in the normative power literature. To date, the majority of the studies on normative power tend to focus on cases in which only one actor (most often the EU) exercises norm diffusion (Björkdahl et al., 2015; Manners, 2002, 2008), whereas other actors can only influence how norms are “adopted, adapted, resisted or rejected” (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p. 2). Through the analysis of the AIIB and the PA, the thesis demonstrates that the exercise of normative power by multiple actors in an institution could lead to the incorporation of all their norms. This shows that different norms promoted by different actors are not mutually exclusive by default, but can co-exist in international institutions. In addition, the incorporation of both the norms of the EU and those of China in the AIIB and the PA was, to a large extent, brought about by the compromise made between these two actors. Therefore, the exercise of normative power “does not preclude, but rather requires, tactical and strategic action” (Wunderlich, 2013, p. 28).

Interests

In its analysis of the norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of the EU and China, a key element running through the thesis is the role *interests* play in shaping all these core components of the normative power of these two actors. Regarding the conceptualisation of interests, this thesis considers interests as evolving, which is

similar to a constructivist understanding of interests and in contrast with a realist understanding of interests. For many realists, the interest of an international actor is given (Weldes, 1996). Weldes (1996, p. 278) points out that from a realist perspective, the anarchic character of international politics determines that states tend to prioritise those that can “meet their security requirements”—such as wealth and power—as their interests. This thesis contends that this understanding of interests does not pay adequate attention to “threats” and “distribution of power” having different meanings and policy implications for different actors because of their varying preferences, culture and history. Hence, an actor’s interests in a given situation are “fundamentally matters of interpretation” (Weldes, 1996, p. 278). This constructivist understanding of interests has two implications for the thesis. First, it means that interests are not limited to those that can contribute to an actor’s security and survival but have a broader framework. Based on this approach, this thesis focuses on security interests, interests in expanding political influence and interests in fostering economy in its analysis. Second, the evolving character of interests means that in the same issue area, the interests of different actors can diverge or overlap. This thesis focuses on the relationship of the EU’s and China’s interests as an essential factor that shapes the relationship between the EU’s and China’s norms, as well as the relationship between these two actors in their exercises of normative power.

In terms of the relationship between norms and interests, Carmen Wunderlich (2013, pp. 16–17) suggests that there are two major approaches. On the one hand, there is the approach that “constrain the role of norms to the instrumental implementation of exogenous interests: actors observe norms motivated by their utilitarian cost-benefit calculations when they perceive the benefits of compliance as outweighing the costs of norm adherence” (Wunderlich, 2013, p. 16). From this perspective, actors do not genuinely abide norms unless these norms are consistent with their interests or they are

forced to do so (Krasner, 1999). On the other hand, there is another approach that conceptualises interests as socially constructed (Wendt, 1987) and therefore have “an underlying normative underpinning” (Wunderlich, 2013, p. 17). In other words, norms constitute the institutionalised expression of interests, whereas “interests are defined by norms” (Wunderlich, 2013, p. 17). This approach understands the adherence to norms as a result of an actor’s feeling of obligation and “oughtness” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Hence, interests cease to influence an actor after norms are structured.

This thesis takes the middle ground between these two approaches by suggesting that norms can shape interests as much as interests can shape norms. The thesis, to enhance the understanding of the normative power of the EU and China, focuses on how interests constitute a predominant factor that shapes the exercise of normative power. When an actor exercises normative power, its objective is usually two-fold: it seeks to transform the status quo with its norms, and at the same time aims to fulfil its interests that are best served in the alternative governance structure underpinned by those same norms (Brown, 2001). Hence, norms are not just a veil to cover interests, both the sense of appropriateness and interests drive an actor’s exercise of normative power. In addition, as Tocci (2008, p. 6) points out, “underlying interest configurations” constitute an essential factor that determines an actor’s “different interpretations of norms and different hierarchy between them”. Therefore, interests play a central role in shaping an actor’s interpretation of the norms and its hierarchy of norms. Moreover, the thesis suggests that interests do not fade away after an actor’s norms are institutionalised. Rather, among the various ways of diffusing norms, those that are adopted by actors tend to be consistent with their interests. Interests persistently shape how norms are diffused by actors.

The thesis scrutinises the influence of different types of interests, especially political,

economic, and security interests, on the normative power of the EU and China. Storey (2006, p. 340) contends that the EU was diffusing “a particular model of ‘good governance’” with an emphasis on the liberalisation of public procurement in its relationship with the ACP states to fulfil its interest in ensuring “European firms receive at least as favourable treatment as local ones in the ACP countries”. Kinzelbach (2016) suggests that China’s interpretation of human rights, with an emphasis on the rights to subsistence, is to a large extent driven by Beijing’s interest in countering international criticism against its civil and political rights and protecting its sovereignty. These studies demonstrate that an actor’s political, economic, and security interests could be at play in shaping its distinctive interpretation of international norms.

Interests also shape an actor’s approach to norm diffusion. Youngs (2004) suggests that political interests shape the EU’s human rights diffusion in a number of ways. He contends that the EU’s use of human rights aid programs could be guided by the Union’s geopolitical purposes in terms of undermining Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe (Youngs, 2004). In addition, the EU’s interest in preserving regional stability shapes its selectiveness in applying human rights conditionality and sanctions. Del Sarto (2016, p. 215) argues that in its relationship with the neighbouring states, the Union’s “normative policies ... primarily serve the security and economic interests of the EU and its Member States”. He posits that whereas the EU commits to the promotion of peace and democracy in the neighbourhood, it emphasised cooperation on energy, anti-terrorism and migration after the Arab Spring in the Union’s relationship with its neighbourhood states (Del Sarto, 2016, p. 226). These studies show that political, economic and security interests constitute important factors that could lead to selectiveness or inconsistencies in an actor’s approach to norm diffusion. Hence, in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the normative power of the EU and China, unpacking how their respective interests impact on norm interpretation and norm

diffusion becomes pertinent task on hand. Throughout the chapters, the thesis frames interests as an essential element in explaining why the normative power of the EU and that of China exhibit in their current forms.

1.2 Scope of the Thesis

This thesis differentiates itself from the broad literature of examining an agent's capacity to exercise its will in an international setting. As the title of the thesis suggests, it applies the concept of normative power, rather than parallel concepts such as "normative influence" and "actorness".

In their study of power and influence, Mokken and Stoke (1974, p. 37) define influence as the ability of an actor to "determine the outcomes of the behaviour of others, without the restriction or expansion of their freedom of action". In other words, influence is regarded by these scholars as a non-coercive and indirect way of shaping the behaviour of others, in contrast to power, which is defined by Mokken and Stoke as to "fix or change" the actions of others directly (Mokken & Stoke, 1974, p. 38). Because of its focus on the "direct" actions of the EU and China to apply their norms on other actors and international institutions, this thesis focuses on normative "power" rather than normative "influence". This approach helps to draw a sharp distinction of the connection between the overt attempts of the EU and China to diffuse their norms and the outcomes of their norm diffusion.

Meanwhile, actorness is defined by Jens-Uwe Wunderlich (2012, p. 6) as a combination of "internal self-understanding and self-image", "recognition and presence" and "institutionalisation and decision-making structures". In this definition, actorness is determined by internal elements including self-image and the extent to which it has institutionalised and established its decision-making structures; actorness is also dependant on whether or not it is recognised by other actors. Actorness is not considered

in this thesis for two reasons. First, actorness emphasises how *internally* an actor perceives itself and develops its institutions and decision-making structures. Since this thesis examines how the EU and China exercise norm diffusion *externally*, their self-perception and internal structures are not of concern here. Second, as a number of studies have pointed out, the EU's role as a norm promoter is not recognised by a considerable number of its partners as the predominant aspect of its international role (Allison, 2015; Chaban, Elegstrom, Kelly, & Yi, 2013). Yet, the lack of external recognition of the EU as a normative actor does not equate to its lack of "normative power"; that is, its ability to shape norms through norm diffusion. This thesis examines and compares the normative power of the EU and China to develop an understanding of the objectives, actions and outcomes of these two actors in shaping international norms.

Due to its emphasis on the EU's power in terms of shaping international norms, this thesis distinguishes itself from a substantial number of studies on the EU's international role that have conceptualised the Union as representing "civilian", "ethical", or "market power" (Aggestam, 2008; Damro, 2012; Duchêne, 1973). For example, Duchêne (1973) suggested that Europe constitutes a "civilian power", since it prefers the use of economic and political means in its external relations rather than military instruments. As Diez and Manners (2007) suggest, Duchêne's idea was formulated in the Cold War era to distinguish the difference between the role played by the EU and those played by the US and the Soviet Union in international affairs: the former was a civilian power, whereas the latter two were military powers. Aggestam (2008) proposed using ethical power to capture the increasingly complex civilian, military, social and material combination of EU's power after the Cold War, especially after the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999. EU's motivations for actions become "mixed", as material interests and ethical considerations "closely intertwine"

(Aggestam, 2008, p. 4). Damro (2012, p. 682) argues that the EU, as a “large single market with significant institutional features and competing interest groups”, makes it a market power that “exercises its power through the externalisation of economic and social market-related policies and regulatory measures”.

These studies share common ground by linking the EU’s external policies to its identity (Aggestam, 2008; Damro, 2012; Duchêne, 1973; Nunes, 2011). That is to say, they are concerned about answering the question: what type of power is the EU? Contrastingly, this thesis regards power as an ability (Forsberg, 2011); it is about whether or not the EU and China possess a particular form of power: normative power, in global governance. Therefore, whereas the studies on civilian power, ethical power, and market power “seek definitional categories to explain external behaviour” (Nunes, 2011, p. 2), the thesis identifies the “exercise” of norm diffusion of the EU and China and their ability to shape international norms as its research objective. To borrow the words of Birchfield (2013, pp. 908–909), the thesis investigates “the ‘positivist’ dimension” of normative power—how the EU and China “[act] to change norms in the international system”.

The thesis, with its focus on norms, norm diffusion, and outcomes of norm diffusion, further distinguishes itself from studies of the soft power of the EU and China. Nye (2008, p. 2) conceptualises soft power as “the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payments”. Most conceptions of soft power incorporate norms and norm diffusion. Nielsen (2013, pp. 724, 729) suggests that since soft power incorporates the “ideological” aspect of an actor’s power, the EU’s soft power is “primarily derived from ‘European’ norms and values”, such as the EU’s commitment to human rights and democracy. Song and Chen (2011) suggest that the principle of non-interference and the focus on economic development in domestic

governance constitute China's sources of soft power. In addition to the potential of norms being a source of soft power, Nye's (2008) suggestion that a leader's need to obtain support from followers constitutes an important issue in norm diffusion, which will be analysed in detail in Chapter 7.

Despite these connections with norms and norm diffusion, soft power is essentially a broader concept than normative power: the instruments of soft power incorporate not only the diffusion of norms but also the use of economic and cultural mechanisms (Nye, 2008). In addition, whereas soft power broadly aims to "affect others to obtain the outcomes you want" (Nye, 2008, p. 94), the exercise of normative power focuses on shaping international norms. Therefore, normative power provides a more appropriate framework to examine the objectives, actions and outcomes of the EU and China in shaping the global governance structure.

The focus on the diffusion and codification of international norms also distinguishes the thesis from the emerging studies on China's "discourse power (huayuquan)". In 2016, President Xi posited that China needs to "construct an external discourse system" and "enhance its discourse power internationally" (Xinhuanet, 2016). Whereas the emerging discussions of discourse power among Chinese scholars demonstrate the growing awareness of the importance of norm-setting in China's international influence, there tend to be diverging approaches to the role of norms in Chinese scholars' conceptualisation of discourse power (Wang, 2013; Zhang, 2016; Zhao, 2016). For instance, Wang (2013) suggests that discourse power is underpinned by the promotion of China's interpretation of international norms such as human rights to challenge the prevalent "Western" interpretations of these norms (Wang, 2013). However, such emphasis on China's global governance norms is not shared by Zhao (2016), who posits that China's discourse power can be facilitated in three ways: fostering party

propaganda, enhancing media influence and conducting public diplomacy (Zhao, 2016). Hence, for Zhao (2016), only the norms embedded in the party's ideology are elements of China's discourse power. For Zhang (2016), the key to obtaining discourse power is to proactively advance China's traditional cultural values and political culture internationally. Although Zhang (2016) suggests that Western norms such as democracy and human rights are at the centre of the cultural conflicts between China and the US, he does not clarify the role of Chinese norms in Chinese political culture, or how the promotion of Chinese norms can contribute to China's discourse power. The diverging conceptualisations of norms in the discourse power literature indicate that this emerging concept is not suitable for the theme of this thesis, which focuses exclusively on norms interpretation, diffusion and codification. Hence this thesis adopts the framework of normative power, rather than discourse power, as its analytical framework.

Regarding the time frame, this thesis analyses the normative power of the EU from 1993 to 2019. The year 1993 marks the starting point of the EU's normative power in its contemporary form (Manners & Whitman, 1998). This was when the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, which marked the establishment of the EU and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Maastricht Treaty incorporated norm diffusion in the EU's CFSP by stating that "democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" constitute essential objectives of the EU's foreign policy (Article J.1). Hence, the CFSP framework provided the EU with a common policy platform to advance its norms in global governance.

The thesis acknowledges that norm and norm diffusion have a longer history in the EU's foreign policy than is examined in the thesis.¹ Nevertheless, most of the EU's

¹ For example, human rights were adopted in the *Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity* (European Council, 1973) as a "fundamental element" of the EU's external relations. The human rights clause, which makes the compliance to human rights norms of the recipient a precondition of the EU's external assistance, was firstly applied

foreign policies related to norm diffusion have been re-established or amended after the establishment of the Union in 1993. For example, the EU started human rights dialogues with China in 1995 as a formal platform for its promotion of human rights towards the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Baker, 2002). Also noteworthy are the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), which sets the promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and other norms as the EU's foreign policy objective (Article 21); the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and an Action Plan (2012), which the EU formulated to guide its promotion of human rights in developing states, with an explicit emphasis on civil and political rights (Council of the EU, 2012); and the New European Consensus on Development (EU, 2017a), which explicated that the EU's development policy should contribute to "supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights" among other objectives of EU foreign policy listed in the Treaty on the EU (EU, 2017a, p. 6). Moreover, important institutions that are underpinned by the EU's norms, such as the Cotonou Agreement (2000), were established after 1993. Such a time frame enables the thesis to emphasise the most recent statements, policies, actions, and impacts coming out of the EU to establish an understanding of the EU's normative power in its latest form.

Regarding China, this thesis examines China's normative power from the year 2000. This year represents a watershed from which China became increasingly proactive in shaping pre-existing global governance structures and establishing new institutions according to its pronounced norms. Arguably, China has a longer past in relation to wielding its normative power. For example, PRC's adoption of norms in its foreign policy and its attempt to diffuse its norms can be traced back to as early as the 1950s, when the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, a central principle of Chinese

in 1977 (Bartels, 2008).

foreign policy, was adopted by the Chinese government (Zhou, 1989).² However, it was from that point that China transited from one of “keeping a low profile [*taoguang yanghui*]” (Deng, 1985), to one of “striving for achievement [*fenfa youwei*]” (Yan, 2014). This change in foreign policy thinking has led to China’s growing activeness in advancing its norms of global governance, in discursive forms such as Hu Jintao’s “harmonious world” (2005) and Xi Jinping’s “community of shared future” (2015). In practice, the reform of the IMF from 2007 to 2009, and the negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord in 2009, are examples of China’s active norm diffusion in international institutions. An investigation into how China applies its norms and diffusion mechanisms, and the outcomes achieved during this period, helps the thesis demonstrate the characteristics, progress, and limitations of China’s normative power.

The thesis acknowledges that the EU and China are by no means the only two actors that exercise normative power in global governance. The US creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism in the late 1990s (Hamilton, 2008), Canada’s leadership role in formulating the anti-personnel landmine ban treaty (Behringer, 2005), and Norway’s promotion of the norms of women, peace and security (WPS) in the Peacebuilding Commission of the United Nations (Tryggestad, 2014) are all examples of actors asserting their norms in global governance. However, a detailed analysis of the normative power of these actors is beyond the scope of this thesis; instead, it focuses on a more modest endeavour of comparing the normative power of the EU and China.

This thesis examines two case studies, namely the AIIB and the PA. Vennesson (2008, p. 226) suggests that case studies aim to investigate a small number of phenomena to

² Other examples of PRC’s norm diffusion include the spread of communist revolutions the 1960s by China (Womack, 2008, p. 271) and the publication of human rights white papers since the early 1990s (Information Office, 1991).

“explore the configuration of each case, and to elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena, by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations”. The AIIB and the PA are chosen as case studies because they are both important multilateral bodies in which the EU and China play a major role. The AIIB is the first multilateral bank dedicated to investment in infrastructure projects. It has a capital stock of 100 billion USD and a membership of 100 countries, including China and 20 of the 28 Member States of the EU (AIIB, 2019). The PA is a legally binding climate change agreement that regulates global efforts towards tackling climate change. Over 170 countries, China and the EU (as a bloc) inclusive, have ratified the PA, making it a “monumental triumph” in global climate change governance (UN, 2015). Furthermore, both the EU and China are major players in establishing these institutions: China is the largest (25%) shareholder of the AIIB, while the EU Member States as a group constitute the second-largest holding (20%); and the EU and China are both considered leading players in the conclusion of the PA (Dimitrov, 2016). The examination of these two cases helps this thesis to investigate the norms the EU and China diffuse, the mechanisms they utilise for diffusion, and the outcomes of their norm diffusion in two important areas of global governance: financial governance and climate change governance.

An important merit of the choice of these two cases is that they demonstrate two different types of EU actorness in its practice of normative power. Delrex (2014) and Kissack (2008) point out that the EU’s actorness in international institutions can be demonstrated by “speaking a single voice through a single mouth”, or “a single voice through multiple mouths”. The former refers to the EU acting as a bloc in an international institution, while the latter refers to Member States having a cohesive position in an institution that is consistent with the EU’s position. This cohesiveness can “reinforce the EU position by giving additional arguments or examples” (Delrex,

2014, p. 1026). Hence, it is an important issue for this thesis to explore if the different types of actorness of the EU can shape its ability to exercise normative power in international institutions. In this sense, the AIIB and the PA are appropriate cases as they constitute two instances that demonstrate these two types of EU actorness. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) case is one in which the EU's normative power is exercised through the cohesive actions of its Member States that are consistent with the norms adopted by the EU; whereas, in the PA case, the EU exercises its normative power as a bloc. Through the examination of the EU's normative power in these two cases, the thesis demonstrates that the EU can both exercise its normative power as a bloc in the PA and through the cohesive actions of its Member States in the AIIB.

1.3 Significance of the Research

The aim of this thesis is to examine and assess the normative power of the EU and China through a systematic comparative analysis. The thesis analyses and compares the norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of these two actors in their exercise of normative power in global governance. It makes three major contributions to the normative power scholarship. First, there is insufficient systematic analysis of how interests drive the exercise of normative power. The majority of the existing studies tend to analyse the norms and approach to norm diffusion of actors based on their discourses in policy statements (Kavalski, 2013; Pan, 2012; Tocci & Manners, 2008). Only a limited number of studies have examined the role of interests in shaping the exercise of normative power (Youngs, 2004). More detailed discussion follows in Chapter 2. The thesis contributes to the study on normative power with a systematic analysis of how the interests of the EU and China shape a more nuanced structure of their interpretations of norms, approach to norm diffusion, and outcomes of norm diffusion than the policy statements of the EU and China illustrate. It demonstrates that

interests constitute the predominant driver of the exercise of normative power of these two actors. This indicates that interests constitute the centrality of normative power.

Second, to date the majority of studies on normative power have focused on the EU's normative power (Balducci, 2010; Lenz, 2013; Manners, 2002, 2008; Whitman, 2011), with only a handful of studies applying the concept of normative power on non-EU actors (Behringer, 2005; Kavalski, 2013; Tryggestad, 2014). There is a gap between the increasingly important role China plays in global governance and the limited number of studies that investigate China's normative power, important exceptions include Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008). This thesis broadens the scope of normative power literature through a systematic analysis of China's norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion. In its assessment of China's normative power, the thesis also complements existing studies on China's norms and norm diffusion (Kavalski, 2013; Pan, 2010; Womack, 2008) by investigating how interests drive China's exercise of normative power. Therefore, the thesis not only demonstrates that normative power is not exclusive to the EU, but also sheds light on the nuances in China's normative power driven by its distinctive interests.

Third, the existing body of literature on normative power primarily focuses on the exercise of normative power of a single actor in a bilateral relationship or an international institution (Behringer, 2005; Manners, 2002, 2006; Tocci, 2008; Womack, 2008). Cases where multiple actors, each attempting to exercise its normative power through the diffusion of its distinctive norms, have, to date, received little attention in the studies. In addition, whereas there are several comparative studies on the norms and norm diffusion mechanisms of the EU and China (Pan, 2012; Tocci & Manners, 2008), few have compared the normative power of these two actors through case studies in which they both seek to exercise normative power. Thus, there are gaps in the literature

on comparing the normative powers of different actors in a multilateral setting, the interactions between these actors during norm diffusion, and the factors that determine the outcomes. This thesis bridges this gap with two case studies: the AIIB and the PA, through which the thesis demonstrates how the exercise of normative power constitutes an important aspect of the politics of norm-setting in global governance. It demonstrates that international norms could be a product of the politics among international actors, which include bargaining and compromise. Therefore, international norms represent a deal that fulfils the interests of actors in shaping global governance structures with their norms. The thesis could also have significant implications for policymakers, as it illustrates how the EU could compromise with China and establish a collaborative relationship in global governance despite their norm divergence. It indicates that the EU and China, on the condition that they have overlapping interests, could be partners in global governance.

1.4 Methodology

Analysis of the research questions was based on primary documents, secondary sources and elite interviews. The primary documents included the agreements of the AIIB and the PA and the policies, project information and annual reports of the AIIB. Also included are official documents published by the EU and China, including Council conclusions, Commission reports, China's white papers, policy reports of the Chinese government, reports of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and speeches of EU leaders and Chinese leaders, which are also primary documents that are central to the analysis. Primary documents also include official statements and policy papers of other participants in the negotiations of the AIIB and the PA, as well as an official response via email from the AIIB to questions asked by the author.³ As

³ Due to the refusal of AIIB staff to take one-on-one interviews, the interview questions (see Appendix A) were submitted to the AIIB through its official website. The AIIB provided a response to these questions based on the

Lamont (2015, p. 80) indicates, having access to these official documents “give us a detailed insight of the organisation”. The analyses of these documents enable the thesis to identify what norms constitute the guiding principle(s) of the EU’s and China’s external relations, how they interpret their norms, and what is the hierarchy of norms in their policy documents and leadership statements. This thesis also investigates the official documents and statements of these two actors to identify the foreign policy tools used by the EU and China as platforms for their norm diffusion. Moreover, this thesis examines the relevant policies of the EU’s and China’s partners to investigate whether or not their norm diffusion to their partners has brought about policy changes that accord with their norms. It also examines the policy frameworks and regulatory frameworks of international institutions to assess whether the norms of the EU and China are codified. Identification of the connection between these outcomes and the norm diffusion practices of the EU and China helps the thesis assess whether or not these two actors possess normative power in global governance.

The analysis also draws on existing academic scholarship, including journal articles, conference papers and books, to supplement the primary documents. Secondary sources also include media reports provided by international media networks such as the BBC and CNN (Lamont, 2015, p. 81). It further utilises reports of official news agencies, such as the *Xinhua Net* and the *People’s Daily*, as the source of official activities and approaches of the Chinese government. This approach provides the analysis with supplemental information to the primary sources while preventing the analysis from being influenced by reports that are catered to “a particular ideological or political grouping” (Lamont, 2015, p. 81).

This analysis is complemented by 11 interviews conducted with EU officials involved

collection of answers from its staff.

in climate change negotiations and scholars whose research area overlaps with that of the present thesis in spans from December 2015 to July 2019. Interviews were semi-structured, and consisted of a set of questions that can be found in Appendix A. Five interviews with Chinese scholars were conducted in December 2015 and January 2016. Two interviews with officials from the European Commission's Directorate-General for Climate Action were conducted in February and March 2019. Interviews with one European scholar in EU-China relations and two scholars who study climate change politics were conducted in March 2019. An interview with one Chinese scholar based in the US who studies China's international role was conducted in July 2019.

This research project was approved by the Human Ethics Advisory Group (HEAG) and the Human Ethics Sub-Committee (HESC) at the University of Melbourne (Ethics ID: 1544647.2). The research was conducted in accordance with the University of Melbourne's HEAG and HESC ethical guidelines. All participants were contacted via publicly available contact information. Following the HEAG's regulation that "[r]esearchers generally need to obtain the prior informed consent of participants before involving them in a research project" (HEAG, accessed 23 Dec 2019), prior to interviews, informed consent was acquired from each participant through the provision of a plain language statement that introduced the scope and purpose of the research. All respondents were given the option to be anonymised or not to be quoted directly in the thesis. When required, direct quotes were sent and reviewed by the participants to ensure accuracy. In accordance with the HEAG and HESC ethics guidelines that "[t]he minimum retention period for research data and primary materials is five years after the last publication, or public release" (Human Rights Ethics Committee, 2015, p. 6), interview transcripts will be kept for at least five years from the completion of research on a password-protected university server, after which time they will be destroyed.

Interviews with officials and scholars often face the challenge of small sample sizes, as respondents are spread out across several institutions and research areas. As Ross (2011, p. 22) notes, this could limit the study to reach “statistically significant conclusions” through the interviews. This thesis uses a grounded theory method, which emphasises the “iterative process of moving back and forth between empirical data and emerging analysis [making] the collected data progressively more focused and the analysis successively more theoretical” (Bryant & Charmaz, 2011, p. 2). Specifically, each interview respondent was asked a standard set of semi-structured questions⁴ within approximately 30 minutes. The merit of semi-structured questions is that they allow interview respondents to provide further elaboration of their answers where necessary. This approach also enables follow-up questions when further information is deemed necessary. Moreover, some interview questions were designed to be open-ended where possible. In asking these open-ended questions, interviewees were encouraged to emphasise information they regard as important or relevant “without being constrained by a fixed set of possible responses” (Bray, 2008, p. 310). This design of the interviews makes the research inductive in the sense that research questions could develop throughout the course of the interviews (Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 29).

Intensive open-ended interviews, combined with document analysis, help uncover the reasons behind actors’ actions as well as their perceptions of the relationships with other actors (Venesson, 2008, p. 234). Interviews with EU officials and scholars who have participated in the negotiation of the PA provided information on the actors’ motivations for their norm diffusion and the interactions among actors that are not readily available through media or official documents. Thus, interviews provide a valuable source of information on the negotiation process. Furthermore, since normative power is initially

⁴ See Appendix A

an academic concept developed to conceptualise the impact of the EU on international relations (Manners, 2002), interview respondents with an academic background provide different perspectives regarding how the external relations of the EU and China can be understood through the analytical framework of normative power. Overall, the combination of document-based analysis, secondary sources and elite interviews supports the robustness and consistency of the findings (Patton, 2002).

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

As discussed above, the purpose of this thesis is to firstly examine whether the EU and China possess normative power in global governance, and secondly, to compare their exercise of normative power in international institutions. To achieve these objectives, we return to the central research question: *How the normative power of China compares with that of the EU?* Based on the central question, five research sub-questions can be derived:

1. How should we conceptualise the normative power of an actor in global governance?
2. Do the EU and China possess normative power in global governance?
3. How do the EU and China exercise their normative power in multilateral institutions?
4. How do the EU and China address their norm divergence and why?
5. What theoretical and empirical implications can be drawn from the comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China?

Chapter 2 answers the first research question and sets out the analytical framework of the thesis. The chapter commences by providing its definition of normative power;

namely, the power to shape the global governance structure through the diffusion of the norms of an actor. It then provides three critiques to the existing literature on normative power. First, it suggests that there is insufficient systematic analysis of the impact of interests on an actor's normative power. Second, it argues that the normative power literature is overwhelmingly concentrated on the normative power of the EU, whereas the normative power of other actors, including that of China, has received inadequate scholarly attention. Third, the chapter suggests that existing studies on normative power focus on a single actor's exercise of normative power, but pays insufficient attention to multilateral institutions in which multiple actors wield normative power. The chapter then argues that the thesis connects with the normative power literature by demonstrating interests as the predominant driver of normative power; providing a nuanced analysis of the normative power of the EU and China through the incorporation of interests; analysing multilateral institutions in which both the EU and China exercise normative power; and examining the compromises made by the EU and China driven by their overlapping interests.

The chapter then establishes the analytical framework of normative power in this thesis, which emphasises norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes as the core components of normative power. Norms, as defined by Manners (2008), are constituted principles that are promoted in an actor's external relations. Diffusion mechanisms refer to the policy tools utilised by an actor to advance its norms. In terms of outcomes, the chapter identifies policy changes in other actors, as well as the codification of norms in international institutions as two observable outcomes of norm diffusion efforts. It argues that the definition of normative power and the conceptualisation of the three core components establish a focus of this thesis on the deliberate norm diffusion of the EU and China and on assessing the goal achievement of norm diffusion.

Chapters 3 and 4 answer the second research question: *Do the EU and China possess normative power in global governance?*. Chapter 3 examines whether the EU has normative power in global governance through an analysis of the Union's norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes. The chapter commences by examining the EU's interpretations of human rights, democracy and good governance, resilience and climate change norms. It also demonstrates how the interests of the EU constitute an important driver of its interpretations of these norms. The chapter then examines two important diffusion mechanisms of the EU, namely the EU's development assistance policy and EU-China human rights dialogues. The chapter makes the case that interests are at play in driving the EU's approaches to these two diffusion mechanisms. Moreover, the thesis studies two positive outcomes of the EU's norm diffusion: the codification of the EU norms in the Association Agreements with Macedonia and the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The chapter suggests that the incorporation of the EU's standard of human rights, democracy and good governance in these institutions through the EU's norm diffusion verifies the EU's normative power in terms of shaping its relationships with candidate states, such as Macedonia, as well as with the ACP states.

Chapter 4 examines China's normative power in global governance through an analysis of China's norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of norm diffusion. It argues that China is an actor that possesses normative power, which brings to the fore an alternative structure of global governance to the one promoted by the EU. It also demonstrates that China's exercise of normative power is to a large extent driven by its interests. First, the chapter analyses China's interpretation of sovereignty, human rights, peaceful development and CBDR. It emphasises how China's interpretations of sovereignty, human rights, and CBDR are different from those of the EU. The analysis also illustrates that China's distinctive hierarchy of norms and interpretations of its norms

are to a large extent shaped by its distinctive interests. Second, the chapter analyses the peripheral diplomacy and external assistance programs as two mechanisms of Chinese norm diffusion. The thesis suggests that peripheral diplomacy illustrates the growing proactiveness in China's norm diffusion, driven by its increasing interest in shaping a Sino-centric order underpinned by Chinese norms. In addition, the chapter demonstrates that China's external assistance programs are characterised by its selective use of conditionality in accordance with China's political and economic interests. Third, the chapter examines two positive outcomes of Chinese norm diffusion: the Beijing Declaration (2017) and the Copenhagen Accord (2009). The codification of Chinese norms in these institutions through China's deliberate norm diffusion demonstrates China's normative power in human rights governance and climate change governance. They also illustrate that China's norm diffusion is leading to the emergence of new institutions that are underpinned by China's norms rather than those of the EU.

Chapters 5 and 6 are case studies that answer the third and fourth research questions: *How do the EU and China exercise their normative power in multilateral institutions?* and *How do the EU and China address their norm divergence and why?* Chapter 5 analyses the normative power of the EU and China in the AIIB and Chapter 6 analyses the normative power of these two actors in the PA. In these two chapters, the thesis compares the norms promoted by the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA to show the norm divergence between these two actors in these two institutions. The thesis also examines and compares the diffusion mechanisms adopted by the EU and China. The analysis shows that in the AIIB, the two actors had different approaches to norm diffusion because China was the leader and the EU was the follower. In the PA, their approaches to norm diffusion are considerably overlapping as they both emphasised the establishment of progressive mitigation targets and coalition building as a means of diffusion. The two chapters argue that the EU and China had overlapping interests in

both the AIIB and the PA, which drove them to reach compromises regarding the norms of these two institutions. Moreover, the two case studies examine the policy frameworks of the AIIB and the regulatory framework of the PA to evaluate the outcomes of the norm diffusion of the EU and China. The thesis argues that both the norms of the EU and those of China are codified in the policy frameworks of the AIIB and the PA. The thesis argues that these positive outcomes, together with the norm diffusion actions of the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA, demonstrate that they are two actors that possess normative power in these two institutions. Furthermore, the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) of the AIIB and the mitigation and transparency arrangements of the PA incorporate the norms of both the EU and China. This suggests that the EU and China are both norm-makers and at the same time norm-takers in these institutions.

Chapter 7 answers the final research question: *What theoretical and empirical implications can be drawn from the comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China?* It utilises a comparative analytical framework to “find similarities and differences to draw generalisations, or invalidate existing ones” (Söderbaum, 2013, p. 3). The chapter compares the EU’s and China’s interpretations of sovereignty and human rights, as well as their hierarchies of norms in financial governance and climate change governance in the two case studies. It also compares the approaches to norm diffusion of the EU and China in their exercise of normative power. It then compares the outcomes of their diffusion of these norms. The chapter argues that interests constitute the centrality of all three core components of normative power: norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of norm diffusion. It suggests that the diverging interests the EU and China seek to fulfil through norm diffusion drive the norm divergence between these two actors. This indicates that China’s distinctive norms are essentially due to its distinctive interests in global governance. It also indicates that norms are institutionalised interests of individual actors. In addition, the chapter

demonstrates that when interests are in conflict with their norms, both the EU and China tend to adjust their approaches to norm diffusion so as to fulfil their interests. It further reveals that the compromises made between the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA were driven by their overlapping interests. The chapter suggests that international norms are products of the politics among nations. It also suggests that leaders, driven by the interest in obtaining support from other actors, need to adopt the norms of other actors. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that both the AIIB and the PA incorporate the norms of the EU and China. The incorporation of the norms of different actors indicates that international norms represent a deal that fulfils the interests of all actors in terms of shaping global governance with their norms. This also indicates that the EU and China could establish a partnership in global governance, despite their norm divergence.

Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the key findings and policy implications of the thesis. It also outlines the significance of the research and future research agendas. It suggests that the thesis contributes to the normative power scholarship through the systematic analysis of the role interests play in the exercise of normative power, a systematic study of China's normative power, and the two case studies in which multiple actors exercise normative power. The thesis also makes important policy implications by demonstrating the conditions of EU-China collaboration in global governance. It paves the way for future studies to examine the normative power of other actors; other cases in which both the EU and China exercise normative power; and the relationship among different actors in their exercise of normative power.

Chapter 2—The Analytical Framework for Normative Power

Introduction

This chapter sets out the analytical framework employed in this thesis to examine whether the EU and China possess normative power in global governance. It does so to analyse the similarities and differences between their exercise and implementation of normative power, and to investigate their normative power in two case studies, namely the AIIB and PA. It aims to answer the research question: *How should we conceptualise the normative power of an actor in global governance?*

Drawing on the existing literature on normative power, this chapter establishes the definition of normative power used in this thesis. In addition, building on the analytical frameworks of normative power—especially the frameworks proposed by Manners (2008) and Tocci (2008)—the analytical framework in this thesis emphasises three core components of normative power: norms, defined by Manners (2008) as constitutive principles promoted in external relations; diffusion mechanisms, which refer to the policy tools utilised to promote norms externally; and outcomes of norm diffusion, which include policy changes in the target state of norm diffusion and the codification of norms in institutions. The definition of normative power and conceptualisation of the three core components allow this thesis to examine the deliberate actions of norm diffusion of the EU and China, to assess the goal achievement of norm diffusion, and to identify the connection between norm diffusion and the impacts on international institutions.

Based on an examination of the existing normative power literature, this chapter argues that there is potential for exploration and advancement of the scholarly understanding

of the normative power of both the EU and China, their similarities and differences, as well as their interactions. Since Manners (2002) introduced the ideas of normative power and normative power Europe (NPE), a wide range of scholars, including Balducci (2010), Birchfield (2013), Björkdahl (2005), Diez and Manners (2007), Hyde-Price (2008), Pace (2007) and Whitman (2011), have either supported or challenged the idea of NPE. Aside from the literature on NPE, some studies have explored the attempts of other actors to advance their norms in global governance (Behringer, 2005; Tryggestad, 2014). However, only a small number of studies have been conducted on the normative power of China (Kavalski, 2013; Womack, 2008). An important reason for this is that many Chinese scholars conceptualise normative power as the attempt of the EU to impose its standards of governance on other states (Cui, 2007; Hong, 2010; Song, 2008). Even less literature has incorporated a comparative analysis of the normative power of these two actors or investigated their interactions in global governance bodies (Kavalski, 2013). Important exceptions include Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008), who have suggested that the Chinese government seeks to establish its normative power in global affairs through the promotion of a relationship based on mutual respect and mutual benefit. The analytical framework set out in this chapter builds on the literature that has analysed components of the normative power of the EU and China. Based on this framework, which emphasises norms, diffusion mechanisms and the outcomes of norm diffusion as the core components of normative power, the thesis analyses the ways in which the EU and China interpret and diffuse their core norms, as well as the positive outcomes of their norm diffusion, to enhance scholarly understanding of the differences and similarities between their normative power. In addition, an analysis of how the EU and China compromised with each other in the AIIB and PA constitutes a more sophisticated understanding of the interactions between these two actors in their exercise of normative power than presented in some existing studies, which suggest a conflictual relationship between these two actors because of

their norm divergence (Pan, 2010; Tocci & Manners, 2008).

This chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first section, the chapter outlines the concept of normative power as coined by Manners (2002), which constitutes the starting point of this thesis's analysis of the normative power of the EU and China. The chapter then defines normative power, and emphasises that in this thesis, power is assessed by the actions to cause effects and the results of the actions (Bickerton, 2011; Forsberg, 2011). Drawing on the existing conceptualisations of normative power that emphasise the actions taken in building governance frameworks that incorporate the norm of an actor (Laïdi, 2005; Bickerton, 2011), this thesis defines normative power as the power to shape the global governance structure through the diffusion of the norms of an actor. This definition denotes that this thesis focuses on examining the EU's and China's deliberate attempts to diffuse their norms, assessing the outcomes of their norm diffusion, and analysing the connection between norm diffusion and positive outcomes.

In the second section, the chapter establishes the thesis's connections with existing normative power literature. First, it draws on the critiques of NPE, especially those that demonstrate the different ways interests drive the EU's approach to norms and norm diffusion. It argues that the incorporation of interests could contribute to a nuanced understanding of the exercise of normative power. Second, existing studies on normative power overwhelmingly focus on the normative power of the EU. Only a small number of studies have examined the normative power of non-EU actors, such as Canada (Behringer, 2005), Norway (Tryggestad, 2014) and China (Kavalski, 2013; Womack, 2008). This chapter draws on and complements the studies of Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) by providing a systematic analysis of China's norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion. This thesis contributes to the normative power literature by bridging the gap between China's growing importance in global

governance and the inadequate scholarly attention on its normative power. Third, whereas the existing studies focus on a single actor wielding normative power in bilateral relationships or international institutions, this thesis examines two multilateral bodies, namely the AIIB and the PA, in which both the EU and China exercise normative power. Through the two case studies, this thesis demonstrates that an important aspect of the norm divergence between the EU and China is their diverging hierarchies of norms in certain areas of governance. It also illustrates that in multilateral settings, a norm-maker can at the same time be a norm-taker. Furthermore, whereas a number of studies suggest a conflictual relationship between the EU and China because of their norm divergence (Pan, 2010; Tocci & Manners, 2008), the two case studies suggest that the EU and China could reach compromises in addressing their norm divergence in multilateral settings. Finally, the thesis explores the impact of overlapping interests in driving the EU and China to reach compromises in their exercise of normative power, which constitutes a new research agenda for the normative power literature.

In the third section, the chapter formulates the analytical framework of normative power, which is utilised in subsequent analysis. Building on the analytical frameworks of normative power, especially those put forward in the studies by Manners (2008, 2009) and Tocci (2008), this chapter identifies norms, diffusion mechanisms and positive outcomes as the three core components of the analysis of normative power. The analysis of these three components allows this thesis to systematically examine the attempts of the EU and China to diffuse their norms in global governance institutions and the results of these attempts. In its conceptualisation of norms, the chapter emphasises that in the study of the norms promoted by the EU and China, the thesis needs to analyse both the different interpretations of a certain norm between the two actors, such as sovereignty and human rights, as well as the cases in which they promote two different hierarchies

of norms in an area of global governance. For example, in the AIIB, the EU and China diffused different hierarchies of financial governance norms. In the negotiation of the PA, the two actors diffused their different sets of norms regarding climate change governance. The chapter then moves on to list persuasion, coalition building, inducement, and coercion as the four direct diffusion mechanisms. These diffusion mechanisms are essential to the study of the attempts of the EU and China to deliberately shape the global governance structure with the norms they prefer. Drawing on the studies of direct and indirect means of norm diffusion in Manners (2002), Börzel and Risse (2009, 2012), Lenz (2013), and Jetschke and Murray (2012), the chapter incorporates persuasion, inducement and coercion as three direct diffusion mechanisms. It also emphasises coalition building as an essential diffusion mechanism, especially in multilateral institutions in which normative power operates through a joint effort of different actors to establish consensus on the norms of the institution (Arts, 2003; Björkdahl, 2013). It emphasises that since the thesis focuses on the active norm promotion of the EU and China and their outcomes, indirect diffusion mechanisms such as emulation and lesson-drawing will not be encompassed in the analysis in the following chapters. The chapter then suggests that positive outcomes are an essential component of the analysis of normative power since they enable the assessment of the impact of norm diffusion. Drawing on existing studies on the impacts of norm diffusion (Manners, 2008; Tocci, 2008), this thesis focuses on policy changes resulting from norm adoption and the institutionalisation of norms in international institutions as the two types of positive outcomes of the normative power of the EU and China.

2.1 Definition of Normative Power

In Chapter 1, this thesis distinguished itself from the literature that utilises “influence” or “actorness” to conceptualise an actor’s role in an international setting. This is due to the thesis’s focus on the direct actions of the EU and China to advance their norms and

their ability to shape international norms. The thesis has also distinguished itself from studies that conceptualise the EU as a “civilian power”, an “ethical power”, or a “market power”, since it seeks to examine whether or not the EU possesses the power to shape international norms rather than link the EU’s external policies to a specific identity. Furthermore, the thesis suggests that soft power is not the appropriate concept for the study since it incorporates economic and cultural mechanisms in addition to the diffusion of norms. Soft power also investigates a wide range of outcomes in addition to shaping international norms in an actor’s likeness, making it unsuitable for this thesis. Therefore, this thesis identifies the concept of normative power as the appropriate framework for analysing how the EU and China apply their norms in reforming the global governance structure or creating new governance institutions. Drawing on the conceptualisations of normative power in the literature (Birchfield, 2013; Forsberg, 2011; Laïdi, 2005; Manners, 2002), this section seeks to establish the definition of normative power of this thesis.

The concept of normative power was introduced by Ian Manners in 2002 to conceptualise the “ideational impact” of the EU’s international role (Manners, 2002, p. 238). Manners (2002, p. 239) argues that normative power, defined as the “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations”, captures the EU’s “ideational nature characterised by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions”. The idea of NPE is intrinsically connected with the concept of “civilian power” introduced by Duchêne in 1973 (Whitman, 2011, p. 2). Duchêne (1973) suggested that Europe represents a “civilian power” that prefers economic and political means rather than military ones in its foreign policy. Duchêne’s suggestion was criticised by Bull (1982), who argues that “civilian power Europe” is a “contradiction in terms” since Europe’s civilian power is conditioned upon its military power. Manners (2002, p. 238) suggests that Duchêne’s conceptualisation of the EU as a civilian power

and Bull's emphasis on the military power of Europe are both problematic since they are based on "the centrality of the Westphalian nation-state" and physical power. Manners distinguishes the concept of normative power from civilian power and military power by focusing on the "non-material exemplification found in the contagion of norms" (Whitman, 2013, p. 174). For Manners (2002), the EU should be understood as a normative power in international affairs for two reasons. The first is the EU's "normative difference". Manners (2002, pp. 242–243) argues that because of its history, its nature as a hybrid polity and its political and legal framework, the EU is constituted as a normative entity that commits to a series of "universal norms and principles". As Table 2.1 shows, Manners (2002, p. 242) lists peace, liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law as the core norms of the EU. Further, Manners (2002, pp. 242–243) regards social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance as the four secondary norms in the EU's internal governance. Second, the EU's normative nature "pre-disposes it to act in a normative way" (Manners, 2002, p. 242). Manners (2002, pp. 244–245) suggests that contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter are the six ways in which the EU's norms are diffused. Thus, normative power denotes "a normative form of power, the emphasis is on the ability to use normative justification rather than on an ability to use material incentives or physical force" (Manners, 2013, p. 310).

Manners' conceptualisation of normative power constitutes the starting point of this thesis. As Chapter 1 suggested, an essential aspect of the international role of the EU and China is their interests in shaping the international governance structures with their standard of norms. Therefore, this thesis seeks to build on the concept of normative power and the existing literature to establish its analysis of the drivers, actions and impacts of the EU's and China's efforts to advance their norms in global governance.

Table 2.1 *The EU's norms listed by Manners (2002)*

Core Norms	Secondary Norms
Peace	Social solidarity
Liberty	Anti-discrimination
Human rights	Sustainable development
Democracy	Good governance
The rule of law	

Source: Manners (2002, pp. 242–243)

Forsberg (2011, p. 1190) suggests that there exist two understandings of “power” in international relations studies: “power as ability to cause effects” and “power as a powerful actor”. Forsberg correctly points out that whereas the concept of NPE refers to the latter interpretation of power, Manners’ definition of normative power, namely “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics”, refers to the former understanding of power (Forsberg, 2011 p. 1190; Manners, 2002, p. 236). Birchfield (2013) also notes that the idea of NPE incorporates two approaches to conceptualising and examining the EU’s external role: one is to “affirm the *sui generis* character of the EU as a unique and different kind of international actor”; and the other is to investigate “the ‘positivist’ dimension” of normative power, which refers to how the EU “acts to change norms in the international system” (Birchfield, 2013, pp. 908–909). This thesis formulates its conceptualisation of normative power based on the latter understanding of power mentioned by Birchfield (2013), which refers to the action of an actor to cause effects and the outcomes of that action. As such, this thesis focuses on assessing and comparing the practices of norm diffusion of the EU and China and their impacts on global governance. The thesis agrees with Birchfield (2013, p. 909) that the idea of NPE “had as an object of inquiry the assessment of the EU’s external actions and policies”. From the same perspective, the study of China’s normative power also needs to assess

what Birchfield (2013, p. 909, emphasis in original) calls the “positivist dimension” of normative power, namely how the actor “acts to change norms in the international system”. Therefore, this thesis draws on scholars who have also conceptualised normative power as the power to shape the global structure with the norms preferred by the actor. For instance, Laïdi (2005, p. 49) defines normative power as “the capacity to produce and put in place on a global scale a framework as large as possible of norms capable of organizing the world ... offering ... the possibility at least in part of making sure that these norms apply to all, including the most powerful”. Bickerton (2011, p. 36) suggests that the EU’s normative power denotes “build[ing] at the global level a normative framework corresponding to the EU’s social preferences”. These two definitions illustrate that normative power incorporates both the diffusion of an actor’s framework of norms and the positive outcomes of norm diffusion. Drawing on these definitions of normative power, the thesis defines normative power as *the power to shape global governance structure through the diffusion of the norms of an actor*.

This thesis draws on Hart’s (1976, p. 293) approach to the analysis of power; namely, “to observe systematically actual attempts to exercise power (i.e., positive, coercive, and intentional power) and the results of these attempts” to establish its focus of analysis. This approach indicates that the analysis of the normative power of the EU and China needs to encompass three elements:

1. Deliberate actions—the actor purposefully diffuses its norms to the recipient or in the negotiation of an institution.
2. Goal achievement—the positive outcomes should be consistent with the targets of the norm promoter.
3. Connection—there should be a causal relationship between the norm diffusion actions and the positive outcomes produced.

These three elements establish the focus of this thesis, which is placed on the deliberate attempts of the EU and China to diffuse their norms and the positive outcomes directly caused by these attempts, namely policy changes in the recipient country and the institutionalisation of their norms in global governance bodies. The chapter suggests that this focus allows for a verification of the normative power of the EU and China in global governance. It also offers opportunities to compare the normative power of the EU and China in terms of their core components and explore their dynamic interactions in global governance bodies.

The power literature has encompassed the different ways to understand power relations that can be adopted in the analysis of normative power in this thesis. One conceptualisation of power defines it as “the ability of A to get B to do something which he would otherwise not” (Dahl, 1957, p. 202). This chapter suggests that in the context of normative power, this Dahlian understanding of power refers to the cases in which B, as the recipient of the norms diffused by norm promoter A, makes policy choices that it otherwise would not have made as a result of the adoption of the norms of A. In the analysis of the norm diffusion of the EU and China in bilateral relations, Chapters 3 and 4 will investigate their normative power by examining whether their norm diffusion has led to policy changes in the recipient state.

Since this thesis focuses on the analysis of the normative power of the EU and China in international institutions, especially the two multilateral institutions of the AIIB and the PA, in addition to exploring the direct policy changes caused by the norm diffusion of the EU and China, it also emphasises how normative power is exercised in multilateral institutions. At the multilateral level of global governance, changing the behaviour of other actors is usually one way for an actor to achieve its key objective: to establish a multilateral institution that is shaped by its standard of norms. Bachrach

and Baratz (1962, p. 948) state that power can be exercised “when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A”. Goh (2016, p. 9) contends that this conceptualisation of power means that actors can “deliberately work to improve their structural position and agenda- and norm-setting capabilities” in order to shape others’ choices. Therefore, in international institutions, an actor can exert power on others by controlling the institutional arrangements rather than through direct interaction (Barnett & Duvall, 2004, p. 16). Thus, this thesis suggests that in multilateral institutions, normative power can be exercised by shaping the norms of the institution with the norms preferred by an actor to obtain control over the institutional processes. Therefore, in the analysis of the normative power of the EU and China, this thesis systematically explores whether the two actors seek to exercise their normative power by shaping the normative structure of international institutions. It also investigates how they practice their norm diffusion and the resulting outcomes of their diffusion actions, especially the institutionalisation of their standard of norms in the structure of the institution.

2.2 The Normative Power of the EU and China: Broadening the Scope of Research

2.2.1 Critiques of NPE: Interests are at play

In its analysis of the normative power of the EU and China, this thesis draws on scholarly critiques of NPE, especially those that emphasise the critical role of interests in shaping the EU’s norms and norm promotion actions, to establish a nuanced understanding of the norms and norm diffusion approaches of these two actors. To date, there is insufficient systematic analysis of the impact of interests on norms and norm diffusion in the normative power scholarship (Martin-Mazé, 2015). Some studies contend that normative power is indeed based on the exclusion of interests in norm diffusion (Birchfield, 2011; Manners, 2002). For instance, Manners (2002, p. 253)

contends that the EU's promotion of abolishing the death penalty is characterised by "the absence of material gain from its interventions". In this regard, Manners (2002) suggests that NPE distinguishes itself from other international actors as its policy pursues a series of universal norms rather than economic or political interests. Birchfield (2011, p. 140) also suggests that the EU's exercise of normative power through development policy is "based on normative, ideational values that transcend narrow national interests".

To fully investigate the role interests play in an actor's exercise of normative power, this thesis draws on a number of studies that criticise NPE (Del Sarto, 2016; Hyde-Price, 2008; Pace, 2007, 2009; Storey, 2006; Youngs, 2004). These studies have pointed out that interests drive an actor's normative power in three ways. First, interests could drive an actor to interpret its norms in a specific way. Storey (2006) suggests that interests play an important role in driving the EU to emphasise market liberalisation in its diffusion of good governance in developing states. He contends that in the EU's partnership negotiations with African states, "what is being promoted is a particular model of 'good governance', narrowly focused on specific norms concerning liberal democracy and market economics" (Storey, 2006, p. 343). He posits that an important factor driving the EU to adopt this interpretation of good governance is the Union's interests in "allowing EU firms to bid for public works contracts there and not allowing ACP governments support or prioritise local contractors" (Storey, 2006, p. 340). Therefore, Storey's analysis shows that interests constitute an important driver for an actor to adopt a "specific" interpretation of a certain norm in its exercise of normative power.

Second, interests also drive the actor to adopt certain hierarchies of norms. Youngs (2004) suggests the EU's emphasis on human rights aid initiatives is to a large extent

driven by the interest in preventing Eastern European countries from slipping back to Russia. Hence, the priority of human rights in the EU's neighbourhood policy is considerably driven by the Union's geopolitical purposes. Pace's (2007) study on the EU's policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the mid-2000s illustrates that the EU's normative power is not underpinned by a consistent hierarchy of norms, but shaped by its political interests in different cases. Pace (2007) asserts that there was an inconsistency between the EU's discursive support of democracy and its refusal to recognise the democratically elected Hamas government in 2006. For Pace (2007, p. 1056), such inconsistency was partly a result of the EU's interest in avoiding "Israeli critical references to the EU as anti-Semitic, conjuring up negative images of the past of some EU Member States". Because of such an interest, the EU did not impose concrete sanctions on Israel despite that "Israeli policies have destructed Palestinian projects funded by the EU" (Pace, 2007, p. 1056). Pace (2007, p. 1050) further suggests that Hamas being on the EU's list of terrorist organisations makes it impossible for the EU to regard Hamas "as a valid partner in the resolution of the Middle East conflict (until it accepts the EU's principles)". Therefore, it is the interests in preventing criticisms and tackling terrorism that drove the EU to privilege the principle of human rights over democratic election in its Middle East policy (Pace, 2007).

Third, interests also play a predominant role in driving an actor's approach to norm diffusion. From a realist perspective, Hyde-Price (2008) argues that the EU's norm diffusion is essentially based on the fulfilment of the interests of its Member States. He contends that the EU has three main functions as a political entity: to enhance the collective economic interests of its Member States; to shape a benign regional milieu; and to satisfy the normative concerns of the Member States, which constitutes the theoretical basis for the concept of NPE (Hyde-Price, 2008). However, there is a potential contradiction between the EU's function as a vehicle of Member States'

interests and the claim that the EU is a normative power that champions universal principles and norms, in the sense that “member states will only allow the EU to act as the repository for shared ethical concerns as long as this does not conflict with their core national interests” (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 223). Hyde-Price (2008, p. 33) suggests that one example of the interests of Member States eclipsing the EU’s norm promotion is Member States’ continued arms sales to China despite the EU’s imposition of an arms embargo against China. Hence, Hyde-Price (2008, p. 32) contends:

No actor can effectively pursue its own interests in a diverse and pluralist international system, and claim to be “doing good” by others, at the same time—unless one uncritically accepts liberal–idealist claims that there are cosmopolitan or universal values and interests that transcend those of individual political communities.

In addition to the impact of Member States’ interests on the EU’s norm diffusion, a number of studies also suggest that interests can cause adjustments in an actor’s approach to norm diffusion (Del Sarto, 2016; Pace, 2009; Youngs, 2004). Youngs (2004) posits that a number of the EU’s policies on human rights conditionality and sanctions are biased; namely, that the EU applies human rights conditionality not to promote the protection of rights in the country but as a reaction to the state’s behaviour that threatens stability in the region. He contends that the internal decision-making process of European human rights policy is a “result of compromise, not ‘thick’ understandings of common morality” (Youngs, 2004, p. 430).

Pace (2009) suggests that the EU’s interests in preserving regional stability caused inconsistency between the EU’s rhetoric of norm promotion and practical policy execution in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU’s official statement explicitly states that the ENP focuses on “promoting deep and sustainable democracy”,

which includes in particular “free and fair elections, efforts to combat corruption, judicial independence, democratic control over the armed forces, and the freedoms of expression, assembly and association” (European Parliament, 2019). However, Pace (2009) notes that the EU refused to impose political reform issues on the authoritarian leaders in Egypt and Arabian states because of the view among some EU Member States that the replacements of these leaders “might seriously challenge the status quo of EU–[Middle East and North Africa] MENA cooperation on counterterrorism strategies and ‘stability and peace’ policies”. Pace (2009, pp. 42–43) thus contends that the EU’s norm diffusion in MENA was considerably shaped by its interest in maintaining stability in the region.

Consistent with Pace’s argument, Del Sarto (2016, p. 2226) suggests that the EU’s response to the Arab Spring “displays the same old primary concern for stability in the periphery, together with the prioritization of the security and economic interests of the EU and its members”. Specifically, Del Sarto contends that whereas the EU commits to the promotion of peace and democracy in the neighbourhood, it has continued to cooperate with authoritarian governments in the region, such as Algeria and Egypt. In addition, after the Arab Spring, the EU emphasised cooperation on those issues “of particular interest to the Union and its members”, including energy, anti-terrorism and migration (Del Sarto, 2016, p. 226). Therefore, Del Sarto (2016, p. 215) argues that in its relationship with the MENA states, the Union’s “normative policies ... primarily serve the security and economic interests of the EU and its Member States”.

These critiques of NPE show that interests drive an actor’s interpretation of its norms, hierarchies of norms, and approach to norm diffusion. As Diez and Pace (2011, p. 224) point out, “although the EU’s aims of its external policies are often dressed in ‘the universal good’ clothes, in practice, this masks the short-term focus of the EU’s self-

interest”. In fact, the EU’s promotion of its core norms, as Langan (2012, p. 244) observes, involves both the “utilisation of moral norms in the public legitimization” and “self-rationalisation of geopolitical interest and commercial gain in its relations with external ‘partners’”. All these studies indicate that a systematic analysis of normative power needs to incorporate the role interests play in driving the norms and norm diffusion approaches of the actor. Drawing on the critiques of the NPE, this thesis seeks to examine the nuances in the normative power of the EU and China driven by their interests.

2.2.2 Expanding the research on normative power: The normative power of China

As the previous sections demonstrate, the existing studies on normative power, whether they support or criticise the idea of NPE, overwhelmingly focus on the normative power of the EU (Birchfield, 2013; Forsberg, 2011; Hyde-Price, 2008; Läidi, 2005; Manners, 2002, 2008; Pace, 2007, 2009; Youngs, 2004). To date, the potential of non-EU actors possessing normative power has received inadequate scholarly attention. This thesis argues that there is a gap between China’s increasingly important role in global governance and a lack of analysis of its normative power, with the exception of Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008). Therefore, it seeks to contribute to the normative power literature with a systematic study of China’s normative power in global governance.

To start with, there are studies that demonstrate the normative power of non-EU actors, such as Tryggestad (2014) and Behringer (2005). These studies indicate that “the EU’s normative power is by no means a unique phenomenon” (Diez, 2005, p. 614). Tryggestad (2014) analyses Norway’s normative power through the promotion of the norms of women, peace and security WPS in the Peacebuilding Commission of the UN on Burundi from June 2006 to July 2008. First, Tryggestad (2014, p. 470) states that

since the mid-1990s, the foreign policy of Norway was underpinned by its emphasis on women and gender equality issues. Second, she suggests that to promote “such a perspective in strategies discussed and recommended by the Peacebuilding Commission”, Norway adopted both political and economic policy tools to foster the diffusion of the WPS norms (Tryggstad, 2014, p. 470). Politically, the Norwegian government took advantage of its role as the co-chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and chair of the Burundi country configuration. It utilised diplomatic negotiations with Burundi diplomats to persuade the Burundi government to incorporate women’s issues in the peacebuilding agreement. Financially, Norway pledged an annual budget of NOK 60 million for Burundi during 2007–2009 (Tryggstad, 2014, p. 473).

Third, Tryggstad (2014, p. 476) contends that through the use of political and financial tools, Norway successfully included women’s rights in the Peacebuilding Commission’s founding resolutions, which “call upon the Commission’s members to integrate the WPS agenda into all aspects of its work”. In addition, the final Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi also adopted the norms of women’s rights and gender equality (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2007). Tryggstad (2014, p. 477) argues that these outcomes illustrate that Norway could “promote and/or reinforce a given issue” through the exercise of normative power. Thus, Tryggstad’s study demonstrates Norway’s normative power in terms of shaping the policy frameworks of international institutions through the diffusion of its norms.

Behringer’s (2005) study demonstrates that Canada is also an actor that possesses normative power, particularly through the promotion of human security in the formulation of the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL). The concept of human security was introduced in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report. The report defined human security

as a concept that includes both “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” across seven categories: economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, health security, community security, and political security (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, pp. 24–25). Behringer (2005, p. 309) suggests that Canada “embraced human security issues as ‘niche’ areas of their foreign policies” since this concept was presented by the UNDP by taking a leading role in the movement of banning anti-personnel landmines (APLs).

In addition to the adoption of human security norms, one of the key actions of Canada to diffuse these norms was the initiation of the Ottawa Process in 1996, which aimed to establish a legally binding international agreement for an APL ban (Behringer, 2005). Canada collaborated with like-minded states such as Norway, Austria and South Africa (English, 2013, p. 6) and international humanitarian organisations in the formulation of the Ottawa Convention, which prohibits the production, transfer and use of APLs (Behringer, 2005). The Ottawa Convention entered into force in 1999, and 164 states had signed the Convention as of January 2018 (Arms Control Association, 2018). Even though some major actors such as the US, China and Russia remain non-signatories, the Convention has established an international norm “that discourage[s] any country, signatory or not, from using mines” (Arms Control Association, 2018). Indeed, despite being a non-signatory, the US is in de facto compliance with the Ottawa Convention as it “bans the production and acquisition of APLs” (Arms Control Association, 2018). Russia and China have also ceased the production of landmines (English, 2013, p. 11). Therefore, the Ottawa Convention illustrates Canada’s ability to codify its norms in international institutions. In 2017, the Canadian government reiterated that “[m]ine action remains at the core of Canadian foreign policy” and it will “continue to champion a mine-free world on the international stage, through its mine action projects and through advocacy with international partners” (Government of Canada, 2017). The

insistence on eliminating landmines to promote human security shows that Canada is another actor that exercises normative power in global governance.

The normative power of non-EU actors such as Canada and Norway indicates that it is imperative to examine whether or not China possesses normative power in certain areas of global governance. All five Chinese scholars interviewed for this study concur that China is seeking to promote its norms in global governance. One scholar suggests that “since the articulation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the 1950s, China has been emphasising the importance of norms in governing international relations” (Interview Respondent 3, 11 Jan 2016). What the interviews suggests is that although normative power is originally a European concept, from the perspective of Chinese scholars, China is also an actor that aims to establish its normative power in global affairs.

The scholarly discussions on China’s “values”, “model”, and “discourse power” (Lee 2016; Wang 2013; Zhao 2016) incorporate some discussions of the role Chinese norms play in China’s external relations⁵. These studies demonstrate that although norms have not been systematically examined in Chinese literature, there is a growing recognition of the influence of Chinese norms among scholars. For example, Lee (2016, p. 115) posits that China is promoting a Chinese development model that is “based on consultative democracy under the leadership of the communist party, a rule of law that is enacted by the communist party-controlled legislature, the protection of human rights

⁵ Despite the extensive discussions regarding “soft power” in Chinese literature, few studies have incorporated the concept of norms as an element of Chinese soft power. Among a handful of exceptions, Song and Chen (2011) suggest that China’s non-interference principle is a source of its soft power. Lu (2018) posits that the ability to shape the norms of international institutions is an important part of soft power. But these studies do not examine how China’s promotion of its norms can enhance Beijing’s soft power in global affairs.

in accordance with the law, and a state-regulated hybrid bureaucratic private economy”. China’s distinctive interpretations of human rights and democracy constitute important elements of this development model, which is regarded by Lee (2016) as having the potential to influence developing states. Wang (2013) also suggests that the “China model” is challenging the so-called “universal values” advocated by Western states. He argues that China needs to advance its own “values”, including its interpretation of norms such as democracy and harmony, to counter “universal values” that are intrinsically the manifestation of Western hegemony in global affairs (Wang, 2013). Zhao (2016, pp. 551–552) contends that China’s promotion of “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” since 2003 is an important practice to implement its “discourse power”, which aims to “actively introduce the world to a more genuine vision of China, creating an objective international opinion about China and building an image of a responsible power”. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” are both important norms of Chinese foreign policy. Hence, Zhao’s (2016) study shows that norms are becoming a central element in the analysis of China’s external behaviour.

However, although the above scholars have recognised the expansion of China’s norms in global governance, to date there is a lack of a systematic analysis regarding the norms, diffusion mechanisms and, more importantly, the outcomes of China’s norm diffusion in the global governance structure. This is partly because Chinese scholars tend to refer “normative power [*guifanxing quanli*]” as a policy instrument of the EU to promote its standard of governance in its external relations (Cui, 2007; Song, 2008; Hong, 2010). Few, if any, Chinese scholars have attempted to analyse China’s international behaviour through the lens of normative power. For instance, Cui (2007, p. 58) argues that the EU’s “normative power” is based on the externalisation of its norms to promote the interests of the EU. Hong (2010, p. 63) also regards normative power as the EU’s

attempt to translate “EU norms” into “universal norms”. The focus on the EU’s conceptualisation and practice of normative power leads to the lack of international relations research exploring China’s normative power that is written in Chinese.

Whereas studies written in Chinese have not focused on China’s normative power, some studies written in English, such as by Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008), have examined China as a rising and distinctive “normative power” in global governance. In examining the normative power of China and conducting a comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China, this thesis draws on and complements these studies. First, whereas Kavalski (2013) focuses on the norms and norm diffusion of China, this thesis incorporates the outcomes of China’s norm diffusion to systematically examine the normative power of China. Kavalski (2013, p. 250) suggests that normative power is a type of power that “emerges *in relation* to the inter-subjective environment to which its agency is applied”. He argues that China’s normative power is based on dialogue and mutual respect with its partners; further, China’s normative power “engages other states in the practice of doing together—that is to say, they do as China does” (Kavalski, 2013, p. 254). This approach is manifested in China’s foreign policy principles, including peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states (Zhang, 2011). Based on his observation of China’s interactions with other countries, Kavalski (2013, p. 253) draws the conclusion that “China’s unique experience should not be inflicted upon others by force, but by making Beijing attractive to them”. He agrees with Womack’s (2008) contention that treating others as equal partners constitutes the “cardinal virtue” of China’s normative power.

Whereas Kavalski (2013) encompasses the norms that underpin China’s foreign policy and China’s approaches to norm diffusion, his analysis does not examine the outcomes of China’s norm diffusion in terms of changing the policies of other states or the

codification of Chinese norms in international institutions. Hence, his study does not provide an assessment of China's normative power based on the connection between Beijing's attempt at norm diffusion and the outcomes it achieves. This thesis provides a systematic approach to the study of China's normative power since it incorporates not only the norms and diffusion mechanisms, but also the outcomes of China's norm diffusion. This approach enables the thesis to assess whether or not China has normative power in terms of shaping the global governance structure with its norms.

This thesis also complements Womack (2008), as it examines the codification of Chinese norms in international institutions. Womack (2008) investigates China's normative power based on the study of a number of cases of Chinese external actions vis-a-vis its neighbouring actors, including Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Vietnam, North Korea, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Womack (2008, p. 20) argues that, in its interactions with these actors, China "tend[s] to emphasise the logic of relationships rather than the logic of transactions". Guided by such a principle, "China does not use preponderance of power to optimise its side of each transaction, but rather to stabilise beneficial relations" (Womack, 2008, p. 20). Womack (2008, p. 21) suggests that by emphasising mutual benefit and mutual respect, China provides an alternative logic of world governance; that is, one that "does not require symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does require reciprocity". In this respect, Womack (2008) contends that China qualifies as a normative actor in foreign policy. In its analysis of China's normative power, this thesis incorporates both the bilateral relations and multilateral institutions in which China exercises norm diffusion. Thus, it broadens the scope of research of China's normative power, as while Womack (2008) explores China's normative power in terms of shaping bilateral relationships, this thesis demonstrates China's power to shape the policy frameworks and regulatory frameworks of international institutions.

Moreover, the thesis provides a more nuanced understanding of China's normative power than the analyses in Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) through the incorporation of interests. Both Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) make the case that China's normative power is distinctive, primarily because China adheres to a set of norms that are different to those of the liberal democratic actors in North America and Europe. This thesis suggests that whereas their suggestions accord with Chinese official documents and statements, in practice, China's interpretations of its norms, hierarchies of norms and approach to norm diffusion are considerably driven by its interests. For example, the norm of peaceful development, which will be further discussed in Chapter 4, was adopted by Beijing essentially because of its interests in tackling the "China threat" theory in international relations. Chapter 4 also suggests that China's prioritisation of sovereignty over peaceful development in the South China Sea issue shows that its hierarchy of norms is significantly driven by its interests in protecting its territorial claims. Hence, this thesis suggests that the incorporation of interests contributes to a nuanced understanding of Chinese norms.

In addition to the nuances in Chinese norms, this thesis suggests that the incorporation of interests can establish a more nuanced understanding of China's norm diffusion than Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008). What Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) do not examine is the predominant role interests play in driving the growing proactiveness of Beijing in terms of norm diffusion. When asked about the prospect of China's norm diffusion, a Chinese interview respondent argued that China "will be more proactive in terms of reforming existing institutions" to spread its core norms such as the non-interference principle and development rights (Interview Respondent 4, 12 Jan 2016). Pu (2012, p. 342) also contends that there is growing momentum for the Chinese leadership to advance China's norms of global governance in international affairs. This thesis suggests that the interests in shaping global governance structure in its likeness

constitute the predominant driver for China's proactiveness in norm diffusion, especially in the case of China's Peripheral Diplomacy in Xi Jinping's administration (Callahan, 2016).

Moreover, whereas Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) suggest that China's norm diffusion is characterised by the emphasis on equality between China and its partners, in practice, China's approach to norm diffusion is constantly being adjusted to fulfil Beijing's interests. In Chapter 4, this thesis argues that China adjusted its approach to sovereignty in the Darfur issue as Beijing placed significant pressure on Sudan to accept UN interference between 2006 and 2007. The thesis suggests that this adjustment was driven by China's interests in establishing a responsible image in global affairs. Hence, the Chinese government could step back in the promotion of its norms to prevent its interests from being undermined. Considering these impacts of interests on China's norm diffusion practices, the thesis suggests that a detailed analysis of China's norm diffusion needs to take interests into account.

2.2.3 Multiple actors exercising normative power in multilateral governance bodies

This thesis further distinguishes itself from the existing normative power literature by examining the normative power of the EU and China in two multilateral institutions, namely the AIIB and the PA. Existing normative power scholarship tends to focus on a single actor exercising normative power in bilateral relationships or international institutions (Behringer, 2005; Manners, 2002; Tocci, 2008; Tryggestad, 2014; Womack, 2008). For instance, Behringer's (2005) study examines Canada's normative power in establishing the Ottawa Treaty. However, his analysis does not investigate the potential normative power of other important actors in the Ottawa Process, such as Belgium, and how actors interact with each other in exercising their normative power (Tomlin, 1998).

Moreover, whereas Tocci (2008) and Womack (2008) examine the normative power of the EU and China, respectively, their studies do not incorporate cases in which *both* the EU and China exercise normative power and how they address their norm divergence in international institutions. This thesis complements these studies with two case studies, namely the AIIB and the PA, in which both the EU and China exercise normative power. Such an approach contributes to the normative power literature in three ways.

First, the two case studies show that an important aspect of the norm divergence between the EU and China is their diverging hierarchies of norms in certain areas of governance. This aspect of norm divergence has not been adequately examined in the existing literature. For example, Tocci and Manners (2008, pp. 308–310) suggest that the EU and China are two actors with significantly different priorities of norms: the EU prioritises “individual rights and freedoms”, whereas “China’s understanding of norms and normative action hinges on the idea of sovereignty and sovereign relations conducted in search of the common good”. Hence, for Tocci and Manners (2008), the EU and China stand at the two extremes of a spectrum with individual rights on the one end and “collective rights, self-determination and state sovereignty” on the other. Pan (2010) suggests the EU and China have diverging interpretations regarding sovereignty. Whereas China perceives sovereignty as “inseparable and non-transferable”, the EU perceives sovereignty as transferrable and divisible (Pan, 2010, p. 230). In addition to the different interpretations of the same norm and different priorities regarding human rights and sovereignty, the two case studies of the AIIB and the PA demonstrate that the EU and China have diverging hierarchies of norms regarding financial governance and climate change governance. Specifically, the EU diffuses transparency, social security and environmental protection in the AIIB, whereas China promotes “no strings attached”, infrastructure development and a “fair” governance structure. In the PA, the EU diffuses progressive mitigation and transparency arrangements for all parties,

whereas China aims to preserve the binary differentiation between developed and developing states. The analysis of these differences in this thesis contributes to a nuanced understanding of the norm divergence between the EU and China in global governance.

Second, through the two cases studies this thesis shows that in multilateral settings, the roles of norm-maker and norm-taker are not as distinct as illustrated in the studies by Björkdahl (2005) and Björkdahl et al. (2015). From the perspective of these studies, the norm-maker (in these studies, the EU) is the actor that “exports” its norms to the norm-taker. In their conceptualisation, the EU is the “source of norms and values [that] shapes the world” (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p. 1). The Union’s attempt “to externalize these norms guiding the interaction among its Member States in its relations with other states” makes it the norm-maker in its relationship with other states (Björkdahl, 2005, pp. 257–258). Norm-taker refers to the recipients of the norm promotion; they have the ability to determine how the norms of the norm-maker are “adopted, adapted, resisted or rejected” (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p. 2). However, whether and how the norm-maker is shaped by the principles of the norm-taker during this interaction is not fully explored in this dyadic norm-maker/taker framework.

The two case studies show that the norms of the EU and those of China are both codified in the policy framework of the AIIB and the regulatory framework of the PA. In addition, the Environmental and Social Framework of the AIIB and the mitigation and transparency arrangements of the PA incorporate the norms of the EU and China simultaneously. Therefore, the EU and China are both norm-makers and at the same time norm-takers in the AIIB and the PA, since they both codify their norms in these two institutions while having to accept the norms of each other that are not consistent with their approach to financial governance and climate change governance. Therefore,

this thesis demonstrates that in the context of multilateral institutions, a norm-maker could also be a norm-taker, and vice versa.

Third, the studies of the AIIB and the PA demonstrate that the EU and China addressed their norm divergence in the AIIB and the PA through compromises. This illustrates that the EU and China can establish a collaborative relationship in global governance despite their diverging norms. The demonstration of a collaborative relationship between the EU and China distinguishes the thesis from Pan (2010) and Tocci and Manners (2008), who suggest a conflictual relationship between the EU and China because of their norm divergence. Tocci and Manners (2008) perceive potential conflicts between the exercises of normative power of the EU and China stemming from their different approaches to individual rights and sovereignty. They argue that there is a “clash of norms”, as whereas “the EU push for the rights of individuals, to the point of discursively justifying military intervention in breach of a third state’s sovereignty to secure such goals, China, Russia and India are far more inclined to defend the principle of non-interference at the cost of tolerating gross violations of human rights and democratic” (Tocci & Manners, 2008, p. 315). The authors suggest that such normative divergence between different actors may lead to “mistrust among major powers”, especially when “one international actor interprets a normative difference as another party’s violation of a universal norm rather than as a legitimate challenge to its own norms” (Tocci & Manners, 2008, p. 316).

Pan (2010, p. 238) contends that the gap between the understandings of the sovereignty of the EU and of China “breeds misunderstandings and fosters tension in China–EU relations”. He emphasises that the EU-China relationship was in a “historical nadir” in 2008, particularly because the two actors applied their different understandings of sovereignty in their conflict regarding the Tibet issue. Pan (2010) suggests that the EU

“reacted to the unrest in Tibet by publicly denouncing Beijing’s policy, passed condemning parliamentary resolutions, attempted to boycott the Olympic Games” because it interprets the Tibet issue as a human rights issue rather than a sovereignty issue. Conversely, Beijing perceived the EU’s actions as interference in its domestic affairs and responded with a series of punitive actions, including calling off the scheduled 11th EU-China Summit in France (Pan, 2010, pp. 238–239).

This thesis posits that the EU and China reached compromises on the norms of the AIIB and the PA in their exercise of normative power in these two institutions. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, in the negotiation of the AIIB, China compromised by adopting the EU’s norms regarding transparency, social security and environmental protection. The EU Member States made a compromise by accepting the exclusion of human rights norms in the AIIB’s policy framework. Chapter 6 suggests that in the negotiation of the PA, China made a compromise with the EU by supporting a progressive and ambitious climate change agreement, while the EU made a compromise by supporting the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle as the guiding norm of the PA. Therefore, the thesis shows that the EU and China can address their norm divergence through compromise.

More importantly, this thesis reveals that the predominant driver of the compromises made between the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA was their *overlapping* interests in the two institutions. The idea that the interests of different actors can be overlapping and constitute a predominant driver of their exercise of normative power has not been studied in the existing normative power literature. Therefore, this thesis explores a new research agenda for the study of normative power. In the case of the AIIB, the thesis asserts that the overlapping interests in enhancing the global profile of the Bank drove the compromise between the EU Member States and China. In terms of the PA, the

overlapping interests in building new coalitions led to the compromise between the EU and China. The compromises between the EU and China contributed to the incorporation of both the norms of both parties in the AIIB and the PA. Hence, this thesis demonstrates that overlapping interests can lead to compromises between actors with diverging norms. The outcome of such compromises is that the norms of both parties can be codified in the institution. This suggests that in multilateral settings, normative power operates through a joint effort of different actors to achieve a “concert” of norms and actions (Arts, 2003; Goehler, 2000, p. 42). The conception of “normal” is therefore not universal *a priori*, as Manners (2002) suggests in his conceptualisation of normative power. Rather, what becomes the conception of “normal” is indeed a result of the politics among actors that exercise normative power. Therefore, international norms could be a deal among actors based on bargaining and compromise.

2.2.4 How this thesis connects with the above groups of literature

In Chapter 1, this thesis identified three major gaps in the literature on normative power: 1) there is a lack of a systematic analysis of how interests shape the normative power of the EU and China; 2) the normative power of non-EU actors, including China, has received inadequate scholarly attention; and 3) there have been insufficient studies on cases in which multiple actors exercise normative power. In bridging these gaps, this thesis connects itself with the existing literature on normative power in four ways. First, it affirms that interests constitute a *predominant* factor that drives an actor’s norms and norm diffusion (Hyde-Price, 2008; Pace, 2007; Storey, 2006; Tomlin, 1998; Youngs, 2004). Second, the thesis complements the literature on the normative power of China by incorporating interests in its analysis (Kavalski, 2013; Womack, 2008). Third, the thesis shifts away from the literature that primarily focuses on a single actor wielding normative power in a particular case by examining multilateral institutions in which *both* the EU and China exercise normative power (Behringer, 2005; Manners, 2002;

Tryggestad, 2014; Womack, 2008). Fourth, the thesis examines compromise between actors in their exercise of normative power driven by *overlapping* interests, an issue that has not been studied in the existing literature.

First, the thesis draws on the existing literature that demonstrates the different ways interests can shape normative power. The incorporation of interests distinguishes the thesis from the literature that conceptualises normative power as exclusively driven by normative considerations (Forsberg, 2011; Manners, 2002). This thesis affirms the findings of Storey (2006) and Pace (2007) that interests play an important role in shaping the actor's norm interpretation and hierarchies of norms. Supporting these studies, this thesis finds that an actor's interpretations and hierarchies of norms are not only driven by its vision of a better governance structure than the status quo (Wunderlich, 2013), but also its interests that can be fulfilled in a governance structure underpinned by the actor's norms. More importantly, this thesis reaffirms that interests constitute a *predominant* factor that drives norm diffusion. This is consistent with a number of studies outlined in Section 2.2.1 that examine the influence of interests on norm diffusion. This thesis suggests that interests can lead to selectiveness in an actor's norm diffusion; namely, that the actor could practice its norm diffusion only in countries in which it has considerable interests, or exclude certain countries in its norm diffusion to protect its interests (Pace, 2007; Youngs, 2004). Interests can also contribute to the inconsistencies between an actor's norm diffusion objectives and its policy practices (Del Sarto, 2014; Diez & Pace, 2011; Pace, 2009). Moreover, in the case of the EU, the fulfilment of the interests of its Member States constitute an important condition for the Union's norm diffusion (Hyde-Price, 2008). Drawing on these studies, this thesis suggests that actors tend to adopt the norms and practice their norm diffusion in a way that allows their interests to be fulfilled.

Second, this thesis systematically assesses China's normative power through the examination of its norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion. This assessment broadens the scope of normative power literature where, other than the works of Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) discussed in Section 2.2.3, China's normative power has, to date, received limited attention. Furthermore, whereas Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) examine China's normative power primarily based on how China describes its norms and norm diffusion mechanisms in its policy documents and leadership statements, this thesis complements their study by investigating the role of interests in driving China's interpretations of its norms, its hierarchy of norms, as well as its approach to norm diffusion. It studies how China's interpretations of human rights, sovereignty, peaceful development, and CBDR are shaped by its political and economic interests. It also provides a nuanced understanding of how Beijing's interests in protecting its territorial integrity and defending its political regime from external interferences shape China's hierarchy of norms. Moreover, the thesis demonstrates how China's political and economic interests drive its proactiveness of peripheral diplomacy and selectiveness in applying conditions in its external assistance programs. These effects of interests have not been fully examined in the existing studies on China's normative power. Hence, whereas Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) attribute the distinctiveness of China's normative power to its distinctive norms, this thesis suggests that the distinctiveness of China's normative power is also due to its distinctive interests.

Third, by examining two multilateral institutions in which both the EU and China exercise normative power—namely the AIIB and the PA—the thesis shifts away from the literature that primarily focuses on a single actor wielding normative power in a particular case (Behringer, 2005; Manners, 2002; Tryggestad, 2014; Womack, 2008). In the two case studies, the thesis demonstrates that an important aspect of norm

divergence between the EU and China is their different hierarchies of norms regarding financial governance and climate change governance. It also shows that the EU and China addressed their norm divergence in the AIIB and the PA through compromises. This illustrates an alternative form of interaction between the EU and China to the conflictual one suggested by Pan (2010) and Tocci and Manners (2008). The thesis departs from these studies by showing that the EU and China can establish a collaborative relationship in global governance despite their diverging norms.

Finally, this thesis explores a new aspect of normative power by examining the compromise reached between actors driven by their *overlapping* interests. The two case studies demonstrate that the compromises reached between the EU and China on the norms of the AIIB and the PA were based primarily on their overlapping interests in these two institutions. The incorporation of both the norms of the EU and those of China in the AIIB and the PA shows that the exercise of normative power in multilateral settings is not a zero-sum game. Rather, when actors have overlapping interests they can reach compromises to codify the norms of all parties in the institution. This analysis broadens the normative power scholarship that, to date, has not examined the potential for interests to be overlapping and how overlapping interests influence the exercise of normative power.

2.3 Core Components of Normative Power: Norms, Diffusion Mechanisms and Outcomes

This thesis mainly draws on the studies by Manners (2008, 2009a, 2009b) and Tocci (2008) to establish the analytical framework of normative power that will be utilised in the following chapters. Such an analytical framework incorporates three components: norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes. Analysis of these three components illustrates the goals and means of intentional norm diffusion by the EU and China. The

thesis also assesses the outcomes of the exercises of normative power by the EU and China and explores the connection between these impacts and norm diffusion. This analytical framework further enables a systematic comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China that emphasises the similarities and differences between their norms and diffusion mechanisms.

This thesis draws on and develops the studies by Manners (2008, 2009a) that list norms, actions and impacts as the three aspects of normative power to establish its analytical framework of normative power. Manners (2008, p. 46) suggests that the concept of NPE “aims to contribute to a better understanding of what principles the EU promotes. How the EU acts, and what impact the EU has by attempting both to analyze and to judge the EU’s normative power in world politics”. Manners (2008, p. 55) states that the first part of this analytical framework of normative power is to “examine the constitutive principles of the EU and how these become promoted as aims and objectives of the EU in world politics”. This thesis argues that China also adheres to and promotes a set of norms, such as sovereignty, the right to development and peaceful development in global governance (Womack, 2008). Therefore, Manners’ approach to the analysis of norms can be applied to the norms of the EU and China. In addition to norms, Manners (2008, p. 57) suggests that “how the EU promotes its constitutive principles as actions and policies in world politics” constitutes the second part of the analysis of the EU’s normative power. He defines “persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame” as plausible actions to promote normative principles (Manners, 2009, p. 13). He also contends that such norm promotion “should ultimately be envisaged as socialising in the impact of the actions taken to promote such principles” (Manners, 2009, p. 14). Drawing on the discussion of norm diffusion mechanisms by Manners (2008) as well as other scholars such as Lenz (2013), Börzel and Risse (2012) and Jetschke and Murray (2012), this thesis asserts that persuasion, coalition building,

inducement and coercion are the major direct diffusion mechanisms adopted by the EU and China. The third component of Manners' (2008, p. 58) framework is the "impact and outcomes of EU actions taken to promote its constitutive principles in world politics". He suggests that the analysis of impacts should focus on "the interplay between actors and consequences" (Manners, 2008, p. 58). Manners (2009, p. 5) emphasises three types of impacts involved in norm promotion: socialisation, namely that norm promotion becomes "part of an open-ended process of engagement, debate and understanding"; partnership, which refers to "institutionalised relationships created by the participating parties whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational; and ownership, which "involves practices of joint or local ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation". As mentioned earlier, since this thesis focuses on intentional norm diffusion and the outcomes, it examines two types of outcomes: the policy changes of the recipient state and the institutionalisation of the norms in international institutions. The thesis suggests that these outcomes constitute an important indicator in assessing the effectiveness of norm promotion, on the condition that a connection can be identified between the outcomes and intentional norm diffusion.

Since the thesis focuses on examining the norm diffusion actions of the EU and China and the direct outcomes brought about by norm diffusion, external perception, which is identified by a number of studies as another important component of normative power (Lucarelli, 2007; Kavalski, 2013), is not emphasised in the research. Kavalski (2013, p. 250, emphasis in original) argues that since "normative power emerges *in relation* to the inter-subjective environment to which its agency is applied", the recognition of the counterparts is an essential condition for an international actor to qualify as a normative power. Lucarelli (2007, p. 257) also argues that the role of the EU is "determined by both an actor's own conceptions about appropriate behavior and by the expectations of

other actors”. Zupančič and Hribnik (2013, p. 111) also contend that normative power needs to be “recognised and, consequently, accepted as ‘good’ by the other”. These studies illustrate that the perceptions of other actors are an important issue if the study focuses on whether or not the actor’s role as a normative power is accepted by its partners. Since this thesis conceptualises normative power as the actions of the norm promoter to shape global governance and the direct results of these actions, it does not incorporate external perceptions as a component of its analysis.

This chapter suggests that norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes formulate a complete causal link of an actor’s exercise of normative power. Normative power incorporates the establishment of a set of norms, the promotion of these norms, as well as the outcomes of the promotion. These three aspects of normative power correspond to the three dimensions of the normative foreign policy defined by Tocci (2008, p. 5); namely, “what an actor wants (its goals), how it acts (the deployment of its policy means) and what it achieves (its impact)”. For Tocci (2008, pp. 1–3), whether the EU is a normative power depends on its performance in “pursuing normative goals through normatively deployed instruments and having a discernible normative impact”. Tocci (2008, p. 7) defines normative goals as “those which, while indirectly related to a particular actor’s specific interests, are essentially concerned with the wider environment within which international relations unfold”. Normative means refer to “economic, social, diplomatic and cultural instruments as opposed to military ones” (Tocci, 2008, p. 8). Normative impact includes “a traceable path ... between an international player’s direct or indirect actions and inactions” and “the effective building and entrenchment of an international rule-bound environment on the other” (Tocci, 2008, p. 11). Tocci’s analytical framework, similar to that of Manners (2008), also places emphasis on the causal connection between the diffusion actions of an actor and the outcomes. Drawing on these studies, this thesis seeks to systematically examine

the normative power of the EU and China by analysing their norms, norm diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of norm diffusion.

2.3.1 Norms

The first core component of the analytical framework of normative power is norms. Norms such as sovereignty, human rights, peace and democracy constitute the guidelines of an actor's external relations (Manners, 2002; Pan, 2012). They are what actors seek to promote in their practices of normative power. As suggested in Chapter 1, this thesis focuses on what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896) call "norm emergence"; namely, how norms of an actor become institutionalised in global governance. One particularly important issue to understanding "norm emergence" that remains inadequately examined in the literature is how different actors could promote different norms in a certain area of global governance, and how the diffusion of different and sometimes contrasting norms shape the norms of global governance. Wiener (2017a) points out that the implementation of international norms, such as the rule of law, are subject to diversified translation and interpretation by actors with different social conditions. However, such an approach focuses on the "implementation" phase of the norm life cycle, namely the localisation of international norms (Acharya, 2004). Therefore, it does not examine how the diverging conditions of different actors shape the "emergence" of international norms in the first place.

A number of Chinese studies, such as Pu (2012) and Zhang (2018), have adopted a bottom-up approach to norm emergence; specifically, to examine the emerging norm divergence among actors and its impact on our understanding of the generation of international norms. For example, Pu (2012) emphasises that existing norms are underpinned by liberal values of European states and the US, and norms such as human rights and democracy are indeed a result of the dominance of "the West" in international

governance. Further, Pu (2012) points out that the rise of China will inevitably lead to the emergence of an alternative set of norms to the existing ones. Zhang (2018) also posits that rising BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and other developing states are not only the recipient of existing “Western” norms but share an interest in shaping global governance with the norms they prefer. Therefore, norm divergence is a vital issue in the analysis of international norms.

As Chapter 1 noted, the EU has realised that what China promotes are “alternative models of governance” (European Commission, 2019a). In its comparative analysis of the norms promoted by the EU and China, this thesis seeks to explore how the norms of the EU and China differ. As Womack (2008, p. 1) indicates, the merit of exploring the divergence between the norms promoted by the EU and China is that:

If we allow for the possibility that “our” norms are not the only possible norms, and perhaps not the only valid ones, then the distance between China’s behaviour and that of the West may not be a measure of China’s moral defects, but rather of the distinctiveness of China’s perspective in its external relationships.

This thesis investigates two aspects of divergence between the norms of the EU and China in the following chapters. First, the thesis emphasises that “values such as ‘democracy’, ‘peace’, ‘justice’ or ‘order’ can be interpreted in a myriad different ways by different actors at different points in time” (Tocci, 2008, p. 6). Such potential divergence between the norms promoted by the EU and China is also suggested by Aggestam (2009, p. 35), who contends that “we have to accept that there exist diverse, and, at times, competing ethical practices and concept of rights”. In other words, the EU and China may have different interpretations regarding a certain norm, such as sovereignty and human rights. Indeed, international norms are often comprehensive

enough to allow different actors to develop their specific interpretations of the same norm. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) encompasses political, civil, economic, cultural and educational rights. In the EU's human rights dialogues with other states, the Union privileges political and civil rights, including "freedom of expression, the role of civil society and the protection of human rights defenders...promotion of the processes of democratization and good governance, the rule of law and the prevention of conflict" (EU, 2017b, p. 6). As Chapter 4 illustrates, China's interpretation of human rights prioritises economic and social rights, especially the right to development (Information Office of the State Council, 1991). Therefore, the two actors have different interpretations of human rights, especially regarding the issue of which human rights should take priority in developing states. The comparative analysis of the norms promoted by the EU and China in Chapters 3 and 4 will further examine their diverging interpretations of sovereignty and human rights. These two chapters and the comparative analysis in Chapter 7 also seek to illustrate how the historically established preferences and evolving interests of the EU and China contribute to such divergence.

The second aspect of the difference between the norms of the EU and China that this thesis aims to explore is the cases in which the EU and China promote different sets of norms in a global governance institution. Sjursen (2006, p. 243) points out that "in a given context we often face several universalizable norms that have conflicting content and that would point us in different directions". A number of scholars have observed that some norms promoted by the Chinese government, such as a harmonious world, mutual benefit (Womack, 2008) and the strong support for development rights (Peerenboom, 2003), are not core norms of Western liberal democratic systems. Drawing on these studies, Chapter 4 examines China's interpretations and promotion of these norms to illustrate the distinctive ways the Chinese government conceptualises

its norms regarding global governance. The point made here is that, in addition to different interpretations of the same norm, the difference between the sets of norms promoted by the EU and China is also a major point of divergence in the normative power of these two actors. This thesis suggests that, particularly in the two case studies of the AIIB and the PA, the EU and China advance two different sets of norms regarding financial governance and climate change governance. Such divergence illustrates that the emergence of Chinese norms of global governance indicates the development of a decentralised structure of norm diffusion, in which multiple actors play an active role in spreading their own norms in international governance (Pu, 2012, p. 349). This could lead to the diversification of the standard of global governance, as both the EU and China, together with other actors that exercise normative power, have the ability to codify their norms as principles of global governance.

2.3.2 Diffusion mechanisms

The second core component of normative power is the diffusion mechanisms, namely the policy tools that an actor uses to diffuse its norms in global governance. The norms that guide an actor's external relations cannot be diffused in international governance institutions unless they are promoted through external behaviour. Therefore, the means adopted by an actor to diffuse its norms externally are an essential component of its exercise of normative power (Tocci, 2008, p. 3).

This thesis emphasises intentionality as the starting point of conceptualising normative power. Therefore, it focuses on these direct mechanisms of norm diffusion: 1) persuasion, which refers to the diffusion of norms through political dialogues and negotiation (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 6); 2) coalition building, namely that an actor forges coalition with other actors that share the same norm(s) to advance this set of norms in global governance bodies; 3) inducement, by which an actor offers positive

incentives to diffuse its norms (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 6); and 4) coercion, namely compelling the other actor to adopt norms by using negative incentives (Goh, 2016, p. 7). Such a categorisation of diffusion mechanisms allows this thesis to focus on examining and comparing the direct means of norm diffusion conducted by the EU and China.

Persuasion refers to actors seeking to persuade each other to adopt certain norms in their relationship or in international institutions. It often takes the form of political dialogues (Börzel & Risse, 2012). The EU's human rights dialogues with third countries are a predominant example of persuasion. In these dialogues, the EU seeks to raise its concerns regarding human rights with these countries and persuade them to enhance human rights protection (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2016). However, as Chapter 3 illustrates, as one of the long-lasting dialogues of this kind, the EU-China human rights dialogue has not facilitated a consensus between the two actors on human rights protection since it was launched in 1995 (Kinzelbach, 2014). This indicates that whether or not norm diffusion produces positive outcomes is an important component of the analysis of normative power.

In multilateral institutions, coalition building with other actors that share the same norms is an important diffusion mechanism. This mechanism refers to the situations in which an actor attempts to find a consensus among the norms promoted by a group of actors (Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013). Establishing a shared vision of a certain norm will provide a common ground for these actors to advance this norm collectively. During the forge of coalitions, actors may need to compromise on some other norms (van Schaik & Schunz, 2012). However, compared to promoting norms by itself, a coalition with other parties will provide a broader platform for the actor to advance the norms it supports in the negotiation (van Schaik & Schunz, 2012). The importance of

coalition building is illustrated in Chapter 6. The chapter demonstrates that both the EU and China forged coalitions before and during the negotiation of the PA to advance their norms on climate change. The EU established the High Ambition Coalition with small island countries and developed countries that support a progressive agreement. This coalition considerably contributed to the EU's promotion of an ambitious agreement applying to all parties during the Paris Conference (COP 21). Chapter 6 will also show that coalition building was adopted by China during COP 21 as Beijing formulated bilateral agreements with the US to advance CBDR as the essential norm of the PA.

Inducement refers to the use of positive incentives to induce other actors to adopt certain norms through cost-benefit calculations (Börzel & Risse, 2012). This includes the use of both political and economic incentives. The use of economic incentives usually manifests in the form of free trade agreements, granting market access, foreign aid and foreign investment programs. During the development of these economic relationships, the actor may provide such benefits to other actors in exchange for their acceptance of its norms. In addition, the norm promoter can also offer political benefits, such as the membership of an institution and improvement of the political relationship as rewards for norm adoption. As Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate, the EU's and China's external assistance programs encompass the use of positive incentives, as the EU and China offer foreign aid to developing states to induce them to adopt their financial governance norms.

The fourth diffusion mechanism this thesis examines is coercion. In the use of coercion, the actor can threaten to withdraw the benefits and assistance it has provided to push for the adoption of its norms by the recipient actor. It can also impose sanctions to force the target actor to make policy changes. Sanctions can be imposed in the form of a suspension of the bilateral negotiations with the other actor that violates the norms or

imposing arms embargoes (European Commission, 2017). In addition, economic sanctions, such as freezing funds and economic resources, withdrawing preference of market access and other forms of trade sanctions, are also an important form of coercive diffusion (Brummer, 2009; Portela & Vennesson, 2013). Chapter 3 illustrates that the EU has extensively utilised sanctions as a coercive means of norm diffusion. It also shows that, as Portela (2015) and Del Biondo (2011) suggest, the security, political and economic interests of Member States, especially powerful states such as France and Germany, drive the EU's selective practices of sanctions against Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. This illustrates how an actor's approach to norm diffusion is oriented by its interests.

Further to these direct diffusion mechanisms, indirect norm diffusion mechanisms have also received much scholarly attention in the existing norm diffusion literature. Manners (2002) lists contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filters as the six mechanisms of the EU's norm diffusion (see Table 2.2). Among these six mechanisms, contagion, overt diffusion and cultural filters are indirect mechanisms. Contagion is defined by Manners (2002, p. 245) as the unintentional norm diffusion of the EU as a "virtuous example" in global governance areas such as regional integration. Overt diffusion is a result of "the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations" (Manners, 2002, pp. 244–245). These two diffusion mechanisms refer to the diffusion of the EU's norms through the presence of the Union as a model of its core norms of governance, such as human rights and democracy (Manners, 2002). Cultural filter is another indirect means of diffusion that functions through the "impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection" (Manners, 2002, pp. 244–245). In other words, cultural filter is the actions of other actors as a response to the norms of the EU regardless of the EU's norm

promotion. The other three mechanisms listed by Manners (2002), namely informational diffusion, procedural diffusion and transference diffusion, are direct mechanisms as they incorporate the active promotion of the Union. Informational diffusion is defined as the result of strategic and declaratory communications of the EU; procedural diffusion is “the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party”; and transference diffusion is the diffusion of norms “when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means” (Manners, 2002, pp. 244–245).

Table 2.2 *Manners’ conceptualisation of direct and indirect diffusion mechanisms*

Direct Mechanisms	Indirect Mechanisms
Informational Diffusion	Contagion
Procedural diffusion	Overt diffusion
Transference diffusion	Cultural filter

Source: Manners (2002, pp. 244–245)

Börzel and Risse (2009, 2012) distinguish between direct influence mechanisms and indirect mechanisms. They suggest that direct mechanisms include coercion, manipulating utility calculations (i.e., the use of rewards and punishments), socialisation and persuasion. In addition to these direct mechanisms, emulation, lesson-drawing and competition are regarded by Börzel and Risse (2012) as forms of indirect diffusion. They refer to the decisions of other actors to emulate the EU’s norms without the Union’s active promotion. This framework is incorporated in the study by Jestchke and Murray (2012), who argue that the EU’s diffusion of regional integration to the (ASEAN) mainly relies on indirect mechanisms, such as emulation. This is mainly caused by the relatively symmetric power relation between the ASEAN and the EU (Jestschke & Murray, 2012, p. 187). The authors suggest that persuasion and

socialisation as forms of EU norm promotion to ASEAN “are not the key drivers” of ASEAN’s institutional changes in the first decade of the 21st century. This is because ASEAN “accepted the EU’s influence after its own policy failure in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and it was less the message per se than the circumstances that made the EU model attractive” (Jestchke & Murray, 2012, p. 179).

This thesis focuses on the exercises of normative power of the EU and China in which a clear connection between norm diffusion and positive outcomes can be identified. This chapter suggests that it could be difficult to empirically verify whether there is a clear causal connection between indirect diffusion and the alleged impacts it creates. The understanding that indirect diffusion can produce normative power can be traced back to Manners (2002, p. 252), who argues that the EU’s normative power is based on “not what it does ... but what it is”. Such an argument suggests that the EU has the ability to cause changes in other actors’ conceptions of international norms even without active promotion. For instance, Börzel and Risse (2012, p. 9) suggest that other actors may actively “look around for institutional solutions which are suitable to solve their problems” and then import the norms of the EU in the cases that the Union’s policy practices have effectively solved the same problems.

However, in the cases of indirect norm diffusion, the outcomes produced could be hard to assess methodologically and trace empirically. As Arts (2003, p. 13) contends, B’s anticipation of A’s potential behaviour “is something that takes place in the heads of decision-makers and there are no traces of attempts by societal actors to influence them”. Therefore, in the cases in which an actor does not have the intention to exert its norms on a certain partner, how can we attribute the change of policy of that partner to the actor’s normative power, considering that such a policy change can be caused by domestic pressure and other factors? (Allison, 2015). For instance, in her study of the

EU's promotion of human rights towards ASEAN, Allison (2015, p. 211) finds that "the increasing pressure put on ASEAN by its member states to promote and protect human rights" and the Vienna World Conference in 1993 have been the essential factors that led to the acceptance of human rights protection in ASEAN. Since "ASEAN has numerous sources of inspiration and pressure on which to draw other than the EU" (Allison, 2015, p. 211), it becomes problematic to suggest that the EU has visible normative power since there is a lack of a causal relationship between the EU's norm promotion and the implementation of human rights norms in ASEAN. Hence, this thesis focuses on the direct diffusion mechanisms utilised by the EU and China to advance their norms. Such an approach contributes to the identification of "the distinct causal claim that the decisions in one unit of analysis—be it bureaucratic organizations, states or regional organizations—systematically affect the decisions in other units through 'interdependent decision-making'" (Lenz, 2013, p. 213).

2.3.3 Outcomes

In addition to norms and norm diffusion mechanisms, outcomes, namely the results of norm diffusion activities, are indeed an essential component of normative power. Manners (2008, p. 58) suggests that "[w]hereas analysis of principles and actions focuses on the origins and practices of EU external actions, an emphasis on impact requires wider reading of the way in which policies change and shape the partners and targets of such actions". As mentioned in the definition of normative power in this chapter, whether the actor has achieved the goal that drives its norm promotion is an important element of this thesis's analysis of normative power. Therefore, without a discussion of the outcomes of norm promotion, the studies of normative power remain somewhat incomplete or less than comprehensive because of the limited verification and test of the actual impact of the EU and China's promotion activities. The importance of examining the outcomes of norm diffusion is demonstrated by Tocci's (2008, p. 11,

emphasis in original) claim:

Yet highlighting what a foreign policy actor actually does or does not do—its external impact—seems to be as important as an analysis of its internal aims and instruments. First, a focus on results would act as a double check on what a foreign policy actor’s objectives actually are ... Second, the analysis of results derives from an understanding of normative foreign policy grounded upon consequentialist ethics ... A normative foreign policy would thus pursue normative goals through normatively deployed means *and* it would be effective in fulfilling its normative intent.

Therefore, in exploring the goal achievement of the normative power of the EU and China and investigating the connection between norm diffusion and impacts, this thesis argues that outcomes of norm diffusion constitute the third core component of the analytical framework of normative power. Manners (2008, p. 58) suggests that the analysis of outcomes should focus on whether “policies change and shape the partners and targets of such actions”. This way of assessing outcomes is useful when the practice of normative power occurs in a bilateral relationship. For instance, Tocci (2008, p. 29) argues that the Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007 “has widely been acknowledged as the EU’s biggest foreign policy successes”. This is mainly because Eastern European countries, due to the EU’s promotion of liberal democracy as a criterion of EU membership, “established the institutional foundations of modern states and transformed themselves from being full-blown dictatorships into liberal democracies with vibrant pluralism and engaged civil societies” (Tocci, 2008, p. 29). Such policy change, as a positive outcome of the EU’s norm promotion, illustrates the effectiveness of the EU’s exercise of normative power. Therefore, in the analysis of the EU-China human rights dialogues in Chapter 3, the thesis examines whether or not there are

changes in China's human rights policy caused by the EU's human rights diffusion through the dialogues to assess the effectiveness of the EU's norm diffusion. The chapter also examines whether or not the candidate states of EU membership have changed their policy in accordance with the EU's norms of governance. In Chapter 4, China's diffusion of peaceful development is also assessed through the examination of whether or not its neighbouring states have changed their policy in accordance with this norm of China.

In addition to assessing domestic policy changes brought about by norm diffusion of the EU and China, this thesis, especially the two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, pays particular attention to the codification of the norms of the EU and China; that is, whether or not their norms are codified in the policy frameworks or regulatory frameworks of international governance institutions. Some studies have examined this type of outcome to assess the results of norm promotion in global governance. For example, as previously discussed in this chapter, Behringer (2005, p. 306) emphasises that the codification of banning APLs in the Ottawa Convention constituted a positive outcome of Canada's promotion of its standard of human security. Tryggestad (2014) also verifies the outcome of Norway's diffusion WPS agenda through the examination of the codification of this norm in the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Therefore, if there is codification of the norms promoted by the EU and China as a result of their norm diffusion in the institution, then the thesis suggests that their exercise of normative power has led to positive outcomes. Otherwise, their norm diffusion is regarded ineffective by the thesis.

In addition, the examination of the codification of norms, as Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, enables the thesis to investigate the incorporation of both the norms of the EU and those of China in the AIIB and the PA. The incorporation of norms of different

actors in an institutions was regarded by Tocci and Manners (2008, p. 326) as a possible result of the interactions between different actors, in the sense that “the spread of global norms may come about through the convergence and joint pursuit of norms between different players”. The incorporation of the norms of both the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA provides empirical evidence for this suggestion. Specifically, the norms promoted by the EU and by China are both codified in the ESF of the AIIB and the mitigation and transparency arrangements of the PA. This shows that diverging hierarchies of norms can co-exist in international institutions as a result of the compromise reached between actors.

Overall, drawing on the existing studies of normative power, the chapter has set out the analytical framework of normative power, which incorporates norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes as the three core components of normative power. Norms refer to the constituent values of an actor’s external relations. The comparative analysis of norms in this thesis examines both the different interpretations of the same norm of the EU and China and the different hierarchies of norms promoted by the EU and China in the same area of global governance. Diffusion mechanisms refer to the policy tools utilised by an actor to promote its norms externally. The thesis focuses on deliberate norm diffusion of the EU and China. Therefore, the analysis emphasises direct diffusion mechanisms: persuasion, inducement, coalition building and coercion. Outcomes are the impacts of norm diffusion. The thesis emphasises two types of positive outcomes: the policy changes in the target state of norm diffusion and the codification of the norms in international institutions. The analysis of these three components enables the thesis to investigate the connection between the deliberate attempts of the EU and China to diffuse their norms and the outcomes of their norm diffusion. The conceptualisation of these components also allows the thesis to compare their norms and diffusion mechanisms, and to examine their interactions in the exercise of normative power in

international institutions.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has set out the analytical framework of normative power that will be used in the thesis. Drawing on the existing literature on normative power, this chapter provided the definition of normative power employed in this thesis. It also established the focus on deliberate attempts of norm diffusion, goal achievement and connections between outcomes and norm diffusion to guide the analysis of normative power in the following chapters.

The chapter established its connection with existing normative power literature based on four major critiques. First, it suggested that the impact of interests has not been systematically examined in the normative power literature. Hence, this thesis seeks to incorporate interests in its analysis of the normative power of the EU and China. Second, despite the growing importance of China in global governance, the normative power of China has received inadequate scholarly attention. The thesis bridges this gap by assessing the normative power of China through a systematic examination of its norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes. Third, there is a lack of analysis regarding multilateral institutions in which multiple actors exercise normative power. Hence, the thesis contributes to normative power scholarship through two case studies, namely the AIIB and the PA, in which both the EU and China wield normative power. Fourth, the thesis examines the impact of overlapping interests on normative power, a research agenda that has not been examined in existing studies.

The chapter then identified and conceptualised the core components of normative power, namely norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes. These components will be used in this thesis to illustrate the characteristics of the normative power of the EU and China in Chapters 3 and 4. They also establish the analytical framework to examine the

exercises of normative power of these two actors in the two case studies of the AIIB and the PA in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. Moreover, Chapter 7 will incorporate a comparative analysis based on these core components.

Chapter 3—The Normative Power of the EU

Introduction

This chapter utilises the analytical framework set out in Chapter 2 to examine the normative power of the EU. In Chapter 2, the thesis identified three core components of normative power: norms, namely the constituted principles that are diffused through the actor's external relations; diffusion mechanisms, namely the policy tool utilised by the actor to diffuse its norms externally; and outcomes of norm diffusion. This chapter seeks to answer the following research question: *Does the EU possess normative power in global governance?* Through an application of the analytical framework of this thesis on the EU, this chapter demonstrates that the EU's normative power can be assessed through an examination of three components: norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes. It also suggests that the Union's interpretations of its norms are considerably driven by the interests the EU seeks to fulfil through the promotion of these norms. Moreover, the political, economic and security interests of the Union and its Member States drive the EU's approaches to development assistance policy and human rights dialogues with China. Therefore, interests constitute a predominant driver of the EU's exercise of normative power.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first examines four norms that underpin the EU's foreign policy: human rights, democracy and good governance, resilience and climate change norms. The EU's adoption of these norms in its external relations constitutes the first aspect of its normative power. This chapter investigates how the EU interprets these norms. It suggests that the EU's prioritisation of civil and political rights in human rights diffusion is primarily driven by the Union's interest in spreading a democratic regime that accords with the EU's standards. In addition, the chapter

demonstrates that the EU's interpretation of democracy and good governance is essentially based on its internal regime. The EU also emphasises market liberalisation in its interpretation of good governance. The chapter suggests that the EU's interpretation of democracy and good governance is thus driven by its interest in changing the governance structures of other states in its likeness, as well as the interest in establishing an economic structure in other states that favours European companies. Moreover, this chapter suggests that resilience is an emerged norm that underpins the EU's foreign policy. The EU's adoption of this norm, as well as its interpretation of this norm, is considerably driven by its growing interests in tackling regional "fragility" and migration issues. The chapter further examines the EU's climate change norms. It suggests that the EU's emphasis on quantifiable mitigation targets that apply to all actors demonstrates that the Union's interpretation of climate change norms is driven by its interest in shaping climate change governance with the norms it prefers. Hence, the chapter concludes that interests constitute an essential factor that drives the EU's interpretation of its norms.

The second section studies the second core component of the EU's normative power: the diffusion mechanisms it utilises to advance its norms. The chapter examines the EU's development assistance policy and human rights dialogue with China as two important platforms for the Union to practice norm diffusion. In its practice of development assistance policy, the Union has been attempting to diffuse its norms of human rights, democracy and financial governance norms, including transparency, social security and environmental protection, to the recipient states. The Union has also been seeking to promote its standard of human rights protection through its dialogues with China since 1995. This chapter demonstrates that interests are at play in driving the EU's norm diffusion. On the one hand, the chapter suggests that the interests of the EU and its Member States lead to the selectiveness in its practice of sanctions invoked

by the human rights clause. On the other hand, it argues that the growing economic interests of the Union and its Member States contribute to the diminishing assertiveness in the EU's approach to human rights diffusion through the EU-China human rights dialogue.

In the third section, the chapter examines the normative power of the EU in terms of the outcomes of its norm diffusion. It studies two outcomes, namely the Stability and Association Agreements (SAA) with Macedonia and the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Chapter 2 argued that whether or not an actor achieves positive outcomes through its norm diffusion actions is essential for the verification of its normative power. It further suggested that the policy changes in the target state and codification of norms in international institutions constitute essential positive outcomes of norm diffusion. The analysis illustrates that the EU's standards of human rights, democracy and good governance are codified in these institutions. In addition, it contends that Macedonia has made changes to its policies in accordance with the good neighbourly relationship norm promoted by the EU. Therefore, these agreements constitute positive outcomes of the EU's exercise of normative power. The EU's norm diffusion in the negotiation of these agreements and the positive outcomes of the norm diffusion demonstrate the EU's normative power in its neighbourhood as well as in its relationship with the ACP states.

3.1 The Norms of the EU: Characterised by the EU's Standards of Governance

3.1.1 Human rights

Chapter 2 argued that the adoption of a set of norms as guiding principles of foreign policy constitutes the first component of normative power. Therefore, the EU's normative power is firstly demonstrated by the norms that guide its external relations. This chapter argues that the EU's interpretation of human rights, the norm that

“underpin all aspects of the internal and external policies of the European Union” (Council of the EU, 2012), demonstrates that the EU’s exercise of normative power is considerably driven by the interest in shaping global governance with the Union’s norms. The incremental incorporation of human rights in the EU’s external relations can be traced back to the *Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity* (European Council, 1973). The declaration states that the objective “to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice—which is the ultimate goal of economic progress—and of respect for human rights” constitutes a “fundamental element” of the European Community’s identity as well as its external relations (European Council, 1973, p. 1).

After the establishment of the EU, in 2000, the EU Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was signed by the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, making human rights a “general principle of the EU’s law” (Manners, 2008, p. 51). The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 recognises that the Charter “shall have the same legal value as the Treaties” (EU, 2007b, Article 6). Thus, the Treaty further identifies human rights as both a norm and a constitutional feature of the EU’s domestic policy, as it ensured that the Charter is “a legally binding component of the EU’s legal order” and a major source of the EU’s interpretation of human rights both domestically and internationally (Groussot & Pech, 2010, p. 1).

As Smith (2004) observes, in practice, since its establishment, the EU has been actively diffusing human rights norms in its external relations. For instance, in 1995 the Commission of the European Community established the human rights agenda in its development policy by stating that “European Community development cooperation policy shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental

freedoms” (European Commission, 1995a). In addition, the 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) identified the protection of human rights as one of the “best means of strengthening the international order” (Council of the EU, 2003). Furthermore, iIn 2012 the Council of the EU adopted a *Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy* and an *Action Plan* to implement the framework (Council of the EU, 2012). This framework establishes an overarching strategic objective of the EU to implement its standard of human rights protection in “all areas of its external relation without exception” (Council of the EU, 2012). Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty and the *Strategic Framework on Human rights and Democracy* indicate that through an incremental incorporation process over the past four decades, human rights protection has been established as a central norm in the EU’s internal legislation of its Member States as well as in external relations.

The EU’s diffusion of human rights is characterised by its prioritisation of civil and political rights (Butler, 2008). For instance, the EU’s *Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues with Third Countries* list a set of priority issues that “should be included on the agenda for every dialogue” in the EU’s promotion of human rights to developing countries, including:

Combating the death penalty, combating torture, combating all forms of discrimination, children’s rights, and in particular those of children in armed conflicts, women’s rights, freedom of expression, the role of civil society and the protection of human rights defenders, international cooperation in the field of justice, in particular with the International Criminal Court, promotion of the processes of democratization and good governance, the rule of law and the prevention of conflict (EU, 2017b).

Most of these priority issues fall into the category of civil and political rights in the

UDHR, illustrating the EU's emphasis on these two types of human rights in its norm diffusion. The EU's emphasis on civil and political rights is also evident in the *Strategic Framework on Human rights and Democracy* and its Action Plan (Council of the EU, 2012). The framework identifies "implementing EU priorities on human rights" as a principal aim of the Union's human rights, stating that:

The EU will continue to promote freedom of expression, opinion, assembly and association, both on-line and offline; democracy cannot exist without these rights. It will promote freedom of religion or belief and to fight discrimination in all its forms through combating discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, age, gender or sexual orientation and advocating for the rights of children, persons belonging to minorities, indigenous peoples, refugees, migrants and persons with disabilities. The EU will continue to campaign for the rights and empowerment of women in all contexts through fighting discriminatory legislation, gender-based violence and marginalization (Council of the EU, 2012).

Again, the rights the EU privileges in this framework, including freedom of expression, assembly and association, as well as non-discrimination, are civil and political rights. In addition, these documents demonstrate that economic rights and cultural rights receive minimal attention in the EU's promotion of human rights to developing states. Indeed, this hierarchy of human rights determines that "the range of rights recognised under EU Law is narrower than that guaranteed under the UN treaties" (Butler, 2008). Consistent with its prioritisation of civil and political rights, the EU's human rights dialogues with other states have focused on civil and political rights issues, such as the freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly, the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief and the freedom of movement

(European Commission, 2020; Majtényi et al., 2016). An example of this is the EU-China human rights dialogues since 1995, which will be examined in further detail in Section 3.2.2 of this chapter.

This chapter posits that the prioritisation of civil and political rights in the EU's human rights diffusion is primarily driven by the EU's interest in triggering "controlled change" in other states, which refers to the establishment of a democratic regime that accords with the EU's standards (Youngs, 2004, p. 422). In particular, the EU "backs national reform processes and democratic institution-building" (European Commission, 2020), as autocratic regimes are more likely to "generate conflict and instability in their region", whereas democratic governments "are less likely to resort to nationalism, violence or aggression, either internally, against their neighbours or further afield" (European Commission, 2001, p. 4). Therefore, the EU emphasises its significant interest in promoting democratisation with a focus on "empowering disenfranchised groups, promoting dialogue and mediation between diverse interests within societies and encouraging political pluralism, transparency, accountability and consultation" (European Commission, 2020).

Driven by this interest, the EU prioritises civil and political rights as they are more closely connected with democratisation than economic, social, and cultural rights (Warkotsch, 2010, p. 110). For example, the EU emphasises freedom of expression, opinion, assembly and association because these rights are of "crucial importance of encouraging broad participation in political decision-making and local ownership of development processes" (European Commission, 2020). In addition, the EU suggests that the development of civil society could foster "accountable institutions and practices, as well as inclusive national reform processes" (European Commission, 2001, p. 9). Thus, the promotion of civil and political rights is essential for the EU's promotion of

democratisation as empowering the civil society of other states can contribute to establishing “alternative centres of power” in other states (Warkotsch, 2010, p. 110). Therefore, the EU’s interest in spreading its preferred standard of democracy largely drives its focus on civil and political rights in human rights diffusion. The thesis argues that this demonstrates that the EU’s exercise of normative power is essentially driven by the interests it seeks to fulfil through norm diffusion.

3.1.2 Democracy and good governance

Democracy and good governance constitute another important norm of EU’s foreign policy. Democracy and good governance, together with human rights and the rule of law, are described by former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton (2010), as “a silver thread” that runs through all aspects of EU external relations. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty lists the promotion of “an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” as one of the central aims of the EU’s common policies and actions (EU, 2007b, Article 21-2). The EU’s adherence to democracy and good governance is further illustrated by the 2009 *Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations*. The Conclusion affirms that “[t]he EU and its Member States act in support of democracy drawing on strong parliamentary traditions, based on the role of national Parliaments and regional and local assemblies in the Member States and that of the European Parliament” (Council of the EU, 2009, p. 2). Having identified the principles of democracy and good governance as central norms of the EU, the Conclusion reaffirms that these norms are essential elements in the EU’s “partnerships and dialogues with third countries” (Council of the EU, 2009, p. 8).

This thesis asserts that the EU’s interpretation of democracy and good governance is significantly driven by its interests in changing the governance structures of other states

in accordance with the EU's preferred standards. This demonstrates that what the EU seeks to diffuse through its exercise of normative power is not universal norms, but norms that constitute a governance structure in the Union's likeness. To start with, although the EU argues that "democracy has evolved into a universal value" (Council of the EU, 2009, p. 6), to date the EU's definition of democracy is primarily based on the EU's internal democratic regime rather than the UN General Assembly's 2005 definition of democracy (Wetzel, 2015, p. 1). For instance, the 2009 Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations stresses that "a special focus" of the EU's promotion of democracy is "the role of elected representatives and political parties and institutions, independent media and civil society. The EU support should take into account the full electoral cycle and not focus on ad hoc electoral support only" (Council of the EU, 2009, p. 7). Similarly, the New European Consensus on Development describes that democracy should be based on "accountable and transparent institutions, including national parliaments ... participatory decision-making and public access to information ... independent and impartial courts" (EU, 2017a, p. 32). The focus on representative election, social society and participation of different actors considerably overlap with the operating principles of the majority of EU Member States and the EU, which include "proportional representation electoral systems, coalition governments and power-sharing among parties" (Manners, 2008, p. 50).

Yet, these principles are not included in the UN General Assembly's definition of democracy in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, which states that "universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives" (United Nations General Assembly, 2005, p. 30). This definition is a broad one since it does not identify any "specific" types of electoral system, government structure, or

party system, as the components of a “democratic” regime. However, to date, the EU has not endorsed the UN General Assembly’s definition of democracy as the reference point of its interpretation of democracy (Wetzel, 2015). This indicates that the EU’s interest in democracy promotion is not to spread the democratic principles adopted in the UN framework, but to promote its preferred standard of democracy.

The interest in shaping the governance structures of other actors in its likeness also drives the EU to interpret liberal democracy as the predominant aspect of good governance (Crawford, 2002). For example, the European Commission (1998, p. 8) suggests that good governance is intrinsically connected with “the existence of competent and effective institutions respecting democratic principles”. In the communication titled *Governance in the European Consensus on Development*, the EU asserts that good governance largely overlaps with “democratic governance”, which incorporates the “strengthening the role of civil society and the media, protection for multiparty democracy and electoral competition, a transparent system for financing political parties and support for parliamentary oversight and for other public and judicial institutions” (European Commission, 2006, pp. 5-6). Therefore, the elements in the EU’s interpretation of good governance to a large extent overlap with its standard of democracy. This shows that good governance from the perspective of the Union depends on the implementation of a democratic regime consistent with the EU’s standards (Knodt & Jünemann, 2008).

However, democracy is a description of a particular form of regime setting, whereas good governance constitutes an evaluation of the actual performance of a government. These two ideas fall into different categories. Therefore, as Fukuyama (2013, pp. 347, 350) argues, since no “codified international agreement on the definition of good governance” exists, the orthodoxy that claims democracy and good governance are

“mutually supportive” is “more of a theory than an empirically demonstrated fact, and that we cannot empirically demonstrate the connection if we define one to include the other”. In this sense, the EU’s interpretation that democracy and democratisation are the keys to achieving good governance shows that what drives the EU’s exercise of normative power is the interest in spreading its specific understanding of international norms and governance.

Moreover, the EU’s interpretation of good governance in its policy practices in developing states is predominantly driven by its economic and security interests (Carbone, 2010). Carbone (2010, p. 23) suggests that in the EU’s promotion of good governance in developing states, “economic governance was defined very narrowly, referring exclusively to the private sector and market-friendly environments, and to issues that were not identified as priorities by recipient governments”. As Storey (2006, p. 340) points out, these demands for market liberalisation in the developing states are to a large extent driven by the EU’s interest in ensuring European firms receive “at least as favourable treatment” as local companies in these countries. This shows that the EU seeks to diffuse a specific form of good governance in favour of its economic interests. Additionally, security issues, especially combating terrorism, have attained significant importance in the EU’s policy-making since the 9/11 attack (Knodt & Jünemann, 2008, p. 271). The EU’s growing interest in combating terrorism drives the Union to give “high prominence ... to the fight against international terrorism” in its promotion of good governance (Carbone, 2010, p. 23). For example, in *The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy*, the EU proposed that the promotion of good governance and democracy were “key priorities” to prevent the emergence of terrorism (European Council, 2005, p. 8). The EU’s interpretation of good governance as a precondition to prevent terrorism shows how its security interests changed the EU’s norm interpretation.

To sum up, two characteristics of the EU's interpretation of democracy and good governance show that its exercise of normative power is considerably driven by its interests. First, the EU's interpretation of democracy and good governance is intrinsically based on its distinctive form of governance, rather than an internationally recognised definition of these norms. Hence, the EU's diffusion of democracy and good governance is essentially driven by the Union's interest in triggering policy and/or political changes according to EU standards and values in other countries (Knodt & Jünemann, 2008). Second, the EU's economic and security interests play an essential role in shaping the Union's interpretation of good governance in its relationship with developing states. The emphasis on market liberalisation and counterterrorism demonstrates that the EU's interpretation of good governance is heavily focused on specific principles that best serve its economic and security interests. These characteristics demonstrate that interests constitute an essential driver of the EU's interpretation of its norms in norm diffusion.

3.1.3 Resilience

The concept of resilience underpins the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), making it one of the essential principles driving the EU's external behaviour. The EUGS (2016, p. 23) defines resilience as “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises” and mentions this term more than 40 times in the 60-page document (Juncos, 2017, p. 3). State and social resilience is listed as one of the five priorities of the EU's external actions, together with the security of the Union, an integrated approach to conflicts, cooperative regional orders and global governance. Thus, resilience is an essential principle that the EU seeks to promote through its foreign policy. This chapter, based on Manners' (2008) definition that norms are constituted principles that are promoted through external relations, identifies resilience as a norm of the EU.

The adoption of resilience as a norm of the EU's foreign policy demonstrates that changes in EU interests could lead to the emergence of new norms. The EUGS was underpinned by the growing interest of the EU to protect its own security in an increasingly complex global environment (Ye, 2017). Whereas in the 2003 ESS the EU stated that "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history" (Council of the EU, 2003, p. 1), the EUGS starts with a warning notice from Mogherini, High Representative/Vice President of the EU: "The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned ... Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure" (EUGS, 2016, Foreword). The EUGS (2016, p. 7) further states that "[w]e live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned". This shows that, due to the rising crisis and uncertainties in the global governance structure that threaten its position in international affairs, it becomes an increasingly important interest of the EU to safeguard its own security and values (Ye, 2017, p. 228). Resilience is adopted by the EU as an essential norm to fulfil this interest (Ye, 2017, p. 229). As the EUGS (2016, p. 7) states, "[i]t is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa". This indicates that newly emerged interests can change the EU's conceptualisation of the norms of its external relations, leading to the adoption of new norms to guide its foreign policy.

Further, the EU's interpretation of resilience is considerably driven by its interests in tackling regional "fragility", which is described by the EUGS as an opposite status to resilience, and controlling migration problems. For instance, the EUGS (2016, p. 23) states that resilience "benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the

seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies”. It interprets a resilient state as “a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy” (EUGS, 2016, p. 23). Such an interpretation of resilience corresponds to the EU’s interest in tackling “fragility”, which is identified by the EU as an emerging problem that “threatens all our vital interests” (EUGS, 2016, p. 23). The Union raises a series of emerging problems the EU faces because of the problem of “fragility”:

To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption (EUGS, 2016, p. 7).

Therefore, resilience, which emphasises state-building in the surrounding countries, is a solution for regional fragility (Tocci, 2016). This shows that the EU’s emerging interests considerably drive its interpretation of resilience in its policy thinking.

Another interest that drives the EU’s interpretation of resilience is tackling migration issues. The EUGS was formulated when the refugee crisis was spreading in Europe (Biscop, 2016, p. 92). Hence, the EUGS (2016, p. 27) states that “a special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants and refugees. We will significantly step up our humanitarian efforts in these countries, focusing on education, women and children”. Driven by the EU’s interest in reducing the number of migrants and asylum seekers approaching the EU, a number of instruments and policies to foster resilience are directly related to migration, with an emphasis on “origin and transit countries” (EUGS, 2016, p. 27). For instance, the EUGS (2016) aims to establish an effective European asylum system by helping origin and transit countries enhance their reception and asylum management capacities. Further, the EU introduced

the Partnership Framework on Migration in June 2016 to strengthen the coordination and cooperation among countries of origin and transit on all migration routes (EUGS, 2018). These arrangements demonstrate that migration plays an essential role in shaping the EU's approach to resilience (Ceccorulli & Lucarelli, 2017). This further indicates that the EU's conceptualisation of its norms is primarily driven by the interests the Union seeks to fulfil.

3.1.4 Climate change norms

Climate change is an area in which the EU seeks to play a leading role (EUGS, 2016). Hence, the EU's norms regarding climate change are important for the analysis of its normative power, especially in climate change governance. This chapter suggests that the climate change norms the EU diffuses since the mid-2000s are to a large extent driven by the Union's interest in shaping the climate change governance in its likeness.

Such an interest is firstly demonstrated by the EU's "leadership by example" strategy; namely, the EU's establishment of compulsory mitigation targets internally to persuade other actors to follow the same approach to tackling climate change (Oberthür & Kelly, 2008). This approach indicates that the EU's norm diffusion in climate change negotiations is essentially an attempt to spread its model of climate change governance to other states. One example of the leadership by example strategy was the EU's announcement in 2007 to "achieve at least a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990" (Council of the EU, 2007, para 32) and a further commitment to reduce its emissions by 30% on the condition that "other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities" (Council of the EU, 2007, para 31). The strategy of the EU, as a form of persuasion, was to take the first step in making an

“independent commitment” to persuade other major emitters to adopt similar ambitious reduction targets (Oberthür & Kelly, 2008, p. 41). In addition, on 6 March 2015, the Union and its Member States submitted their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which was a “binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990” (EU, 2015). The EU (2015) urged all other actors to follow its actions, stating that “all Parties which have not yet done so to come forward with fair and ambitious INDCs as soon as possible in the coming few weeks”. This shows that, as an EU negotiator suggests, the leadership by example strategy “remains as the key strategy” of the EU’s norm promotion in climate change (Interview Respondent 7, 1 March 2019). This strategy demonstrates the EU’s interest in “convinc[ing] others of the necessity to strive for the 2 degrees Celsius objective in line with its long-standing positions, and adopt emission reduction targets and measures in line with this aim” (van Shaik & Schunz, 2012, p. 181). Thus, the EU’s exercise of normative power in climate change governance is driven by its interest in making other actors follow its distinctive way of tackling global warming.

Secondly, the EU’s interest in diffusing its preferred climate change governance structure is also illustrated by its emphasis on quantifiable mitigation targets (European Commission, 2007). The EU (2009) stated before the Copenhagen Conference in 2009 that “to keep the 2°C objective within reach, global greenhouse gas emissions need to peak by 2020 at the latest and be reduced by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 1990 and continue to decline thereafter”. As Chapter 6 illustrates, these quantifiable targets were also proposed by the EU before the Paris Conference in 2015 (EU, 2015). This preference for a quantitative objective of controlling global warming was based on, in the words of an EU negotiator, the “belief in science” that “shows the correlation between carbon emission and global warming” (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019). Specifically, the EU’s emphasis on quantifiable mitigation arrangements is based

on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, which suggest global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions need to be reduced by 40% to 70% by 2050 compared to 2010 “to maintain warming below 2°C over the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels” and to decrease “severe, widespread and irreversible impacts” caused by climate change (IPCC, 2014, p. 17). Therefore, the EU’s diffusion of quantifiable mitigation targets is an attempt to spread its preferred mitigation arrangements in climate change governance (Oberthür & Groen, 2017).

Thirdly, since the mid-2000s, the EU has sought to establish a climate change structure in which both developing and developed states need to curb their GHG emissions. This further shows the EU’s interest in reforming the climate change governance structure in its likeness. The EU stated in 2009 that not only developed states “need to cut their greenhouse gas emissions to 25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020”, but developing countries also need to limit their emission growth “to around 15–30% below projected business as usual levels in 2020” (EU, 2009). The EU’s preference for such a climate change structure was based on changes in the global emission structure since the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2008, while the emissions of Annex I countries remained the same, the amount of GHG emissions of non-Annex I countries increased by 223%. As a result, developed countries now account for less than 35% of total emissions, while developing countries account for around 65% (Cañete, 2015). Since 2009, the amount of GHG emissions of non-Annex I (developing) countries has surpassed that of Annex I (developed) countries (Wang & Zheng, 2015, p. 4). China is a conspicuous example of developing countries with increasing GHG emissions. By 2015, China accounted for around 30% of the global GHG emission, more than twice that of the US (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2016). India (7%), Russia (5%) and Brazil (3%) have also become important emitters (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 9). Compared to the growing amount of emissions of these large developing states, in 2012,

the EU was responsible for only 10% of global GHG emissions. Therefore, from the perspective of the EU, in order to effectively address climate change it is necessary to establish a governance structure in which all large emitters—regardless of whether they are developing or developed states—need to take concrete actions to reduce their GHG emissions (Council of the EU, 2011). As illustrated in Chapter 6, this norm of the EU denotes the reform of the binary differentiation between developed and developing states in terms of mitigation established in the Kyoto Protocol (1997). Hence, the EU's diffusion of its climate change norms is essentially an attempt to reform the climate change governance structure with its preferred norm regarding tackling climate change.

3.2 The EU's Norm Diffusion Mechanisms: Making Adjustments to Fulfil Interests

3.2.1 Development assistance policy

Having illustrated the first component of the EU's normative power, namely the norms underpinning the Union's foreign policy, the second section of this chapter analyses another component of the Union's normative power, namely the diffusion mechanisms adopted by the EU to promote its norms in external relations. An important mechanism of the EU's norm diffusion is its development assistance policy. In the practice of this policy, the EU deliberately diffuses its standards of human rights, democracy and good governance, the rule of law, sustainable development and financial governance norms through inducement and coercion. This chapter suggests that the political, economic and security interests of the EU and its Member States drive the Union's practices of external assistance policy. This indicates that interests constitute an important driver of the EU's exercise of normative power.

The EU and its Member States combined constitute the world's largest aid donor, providing around 60% of global development aid in 2017 (EEAS, 2018a). The 2017 *New European Consensus on Development* (hereinafter the New Consensus)

establishes a close connection between the EU's development policy and its norm diffusion by stating that:

Development policy also contributes, *inter alia*, to supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights, preserving peace and preventing conflict, improving the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, assisting populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters, and promoting an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance (EU, 2017a, paragraph 11).

In addition to the objective of diffusing human rights, democracy, the rule of law and sustainable development through the development policy, the New Consensus (EU, 2017a, paragraph 16) also states that the EU and its Member States “will promote inclusion and participation, non-discrimination, equality and equity, transparency and accountability” and that they commit to “social inclusion and environmental responsibility” (paragraph 4). This shows that the EU's development policy is set up as an important diffusion mechanism for the EU and its Member States to jointly promote both liberal democratic norms and norms that constitute “standards for the conduct of governing” in the financial governance area (Huelss, 2012, p. 99).

Transparency, social security, and environmental protection are constituted in the Lisbon Treaty as the guiding principles of the EU's financial governance. For instance, transparency is established as a fundamental principle of the operation of all EU institutions in the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 15). The Treaty states that “[e]ach institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents” (EU, 2007b, Article 15). The Treaty also incorporates social objective by

stating that the EU aims to “combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection” (Article, 2). In terms of environmental protection, the Treaty of Lisbon asserts that the EU follows the objectives of “preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment”, as well as “promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change” (EU, 2007a, Article 191). The EU’s diffusion of these constituted financial governance—for example, in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (See Chapter 5)—illustrates the EU’s interest in spreading its distinctive structure of financial governance through the exercise of normative power.

Development aid is often considered a norm diffusion mechanism based on inducement, as the norm promoter uses aid programs to induce the recipient state to adopt the norms that are diffused in the negotiation (Börzel & Risse, 2012; Goh, 2016). In addition to inducement, the adoption of the human rights clause in the EU’s aid agreement shows that coercion is an essential mechanism of the EU’s norm diffusion (Hurt, 2003). Since 1995, the EU has established a formal policy that all its international trade and cooperation agreements should incorporate a “human rights clause” (Smith, 2014). This clause defines human rights principles as the foundation of the relationship between the EU and the recipient state (Bartels, 2008; Hilpold, 2002, p. 64). The chapter regards the human rights clause as a coercive means of diffusion because it provides the EU with the right to suspend its aid in cases of human rights principles violations (Council of the EU, 1995). The Council of the EU (1995) referred to the human rights clause as “a suspension mechanism [that] should be included in Community agreements with third countries to enable the Community to react immediately in the event of a violation of essential aspects of those agreements, particularly human rights”. The Cotonou Agreement (2000) and EU-Central America Association Agreement (2012) are two

examples in which the EU establishes the compliance of human rights and democratic norms as a criterion of development aid (European Parliament, 2008). The agreements regulate that in the case of “non-compliance”, the EU can suspend the flow of development aid (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Article 67; EU-Central America Association Agreement, 2012, Article 107). For instance, Article 366a(2) of Lomé IV (1990), which is the framework of the EU-ACP relationship between 1990 and 2000, regulates that if “one Party considers that another Party has failed to fulfil an obligation in respect of one of the essential elements referred to in Article 5”, and if no solution has been made after consultation, the Party “may take appropriate steps, including, where necessary, the partial or full suspension of application of this Convention to the Party concerned”.

The existence of coercive means of diffusion in the EU’s development assistance policy constitutes a counterexample to Börzel and Risse’s (2012, p. 6) contention that “coercion is only relevant with regard to internal diffusion following the obligation by member states to comply with EU law. In its external relations, the EU hardly uses coercion”. It also contrasts Tocci’s (2008, p. 3) assertion that “the EU was more inclined to encourage and reward performance than to sanction underperformance, except indirectly”. The EU’s implementation of a human rights clause shows that the determination to use coercive means is an important characteristic of the EU’s approach to norm diffusion.

This chapter argues that the EU’s practice of development aid shows the Union’s selectiveness in norm diffusion because of the interests of the Union and its Member States. This indicates that interests constitute the predominant driver of the EU’s exercise of normative power. First, an important characteristic of the EU’s development assistance policy is the significant emphasis on ACP states, the majority of which are

former colonies of European states (Holland, 2002). This focus on ACP states is mainly driven by the EU Member States' political interest in maintaining their influence on those countries (Neumayer, 2003, p. 653). For example, Aronow, Carnegie and Marinov (2012) reveal that when a country's former coloniser is the president of the EU Council during the budget-making process, the country is allocated considerably more EU aid than average. They suggest that "for a country otherwise receiving 20 million dollars in aid from the EU (approximately the sample mean), colonial status during the budgetary period increases the amount of aid received by 3.64 million dollars, or 18%" (Aronow et al., 2012, p. 13). Therefore, aid constitutes an essential mechanism of the EU and its Member States to project political influence on their former colonies (Aronow et al., 2012). The Union's focus on states with colonial links in development aid shows that the EU's political interests constitute an important driver of the EU's selectiveness in its norm diffusion through external assistance policies.

In addition to the selectiveness in choosing the primary recipients of its aid, interests also drive the EU's selective approach in its application of sanctions in response to the violation of human rights in recipient states. This further shows that the EU's practice of its diffusion mechanism is considerably driven by its interests. Between 1995 and 2009, the EU invoked the human rights clause and proceeded to sanctions in 20 cases, all of which involved ACP countries (Smith, 2014, p. 111). Specifically, 10 of these cases involved countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Del Biondo, 2011). Conversely, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Ethiopia, the EU was "deeply reluctant" to use conditionality despite the severe human rights problems in these countries (Smith, 2014, p. 112; Yacoubian, 2004). This discrepancy indicates that "aid sanctions have generally been implemented in countries where there are few EU strategic and economic interests and not elsewhere" (Crawford, 2015, p. 153). Del Biondo's (2011) study of five "non-cases" of the EU's human rights sanctions in sub-Saharan Africa

(Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda) provides strong evidence for this suggestion. All five states have experienced seriously flawed elections, but the EU has not invoked the human rights conditionality. Del Biondo (2011) posits that security interests are the most significant explanatory factor, since Ethiopia and Kenya are important allies of the EU in the “fight against terror” and Islamist influence in the Horn of Africa (Del Biondo, 2011). Regarding Chad, it is the strategic interests of France as the former colonial power in this area, particularly its large military base, that prevent the EU from imposing sanctions to this state (Del Biondo, 2011, p. 15). Moreover, Nigeria becomes a “non-case” mainly because it is an important oil producer of the EU (Del Biondo, 2011, p. 16).

Hence, the EU’s selective imposition of sanctions demonstrates that the Union tends to adjust its approach to norm diffusion to fulfil its interests. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, selectiveness also exists in China’s approach to external assistance policy. Specifically, driven by its interests in consolidating the relationship with developing countries and protecting its sovereignty, Beijing selectively applies political conditions in its aid agreements. This indicates that in the exercise of normative power, how an actor practices its norm diffusion mechanisms is essentially determined by the interests it seeks to fulfil.

3.2.2 Human rights dialogue with China

Human rights dialogues constitute an important norm diffusion mechanism for the EU to “raise human rights issues vigorously in all appropriate forms of bilateral political dialogue, including at the highest level” in its relations with other countries (Council of the EU, 2012). The EU-China human rights dialogue is one of the few “highly structured dialogues” held by the Union on a regular basis (EEAS, 2019). Since 1995, 37 rounds of the dialogue have been held in Beijing and EU presidency states. These

dialogues are a form of persuasion, in the sense that the EU seeks to diffuse its human rights norms to China through raising human rights issues “systematically and regularly” (European Commission, 1995b, B.2). However, to date, the EU and China still stick to their significantly different positions regarding human rights protection in these human rights dialogues. For example, after the 37th EU-China human rights dialogue, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated that the Chinese delegation “gave an in-depth introduction to the path, philosophy and achievements of human rights with Chinese characteristics” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2019). The EU’s press release after the dialogue also pointed out that the Chinese delegation “focused on achievements in economic and social rights, in particular as regards employment, poverty alleviation and social protection” (EEAS, 2019). As Chapter 4 illustrates, this emphasis on economic and social rights is consistent with Beijing’s hierarchy of human rights since the 1990s (Information Office of the State Council, 1991). This result shows that the dialogue has not changed China’s human rights policy in accordance with the EU’s standard of human rights protection. As Chapter 2 suggested, policy changes in accordance with the norms of the norm promoter constitute an important positive outcome of norm diffusion. Therefore, the EU’s norm diffusion through the EU-China human rights dialogue has not produced positive outcomes for the EU since it has not achieved the EU objective to persuade China to “to establish a civil society based on the rule of law” through the diffusion of the EU’s human rights norms (European Commission, 1995b, section B.2). Hence, the EU’s human rights dialogue with China is an important mechanism of norm diffusion of the EU but has not produced positive outcomes for the Union (Isa et al., 2016).

This chapter suggests that the EU’s interests drive its approach to the EU-China human rights dialogues in two ways. First, although the EU asserted that the human rights dialogue with China would cover “all aspects of human rights” (European Commission,

1995b, B.2), major issues raised by the EU during the dialogues are related to civil and political rights, including abolishing the death penalty, the labour re-education program, rights of ethnic minorities and civil and political freedoms (EEAS, 2016). For example, at the 37th human rights dialogue in 2019, the EU emphasised “the deteriorating situation of civil and political rights in China, marked by the arrest and detention of a significant number of human rights defenders and lawyers” (EEAS, 2019). The EU also raised the issues of the protection of freedom of religion and belief and the rights of persons belonging to minorities in the dialogue, illustrating its focus on civil and political rights (EEAS, 2019). Therefore, what the EU seeks to diffuse through the human rights dialogue is its hierarchy of human rights protection, which privileges civil and political rights. This provides evidence for the argument of this chapter that the EU’s exercise of normative power is driven by the interest in shaping the governance structures of other actors in its likeness.

Second, the analysis of the formulation and the development of the EU-China human rights dialogue shows the diminishing assertiveness in the Union’s approach to norm diffusion. The chapter suggests that such diminished assertiveness, which is regarded by some scholars as the major reason the human rights dialogue has not produced positive outcomes for the EU’s norm diffusion towards China (Baker, 2002; Kinzelbach, 2014), is mainly driven by the economic interests of the EU and its Member States in their relationships with China. In particular, the decision to establish the human rights dialogue and abandon the sponsorship for UN resolution against China’s human rights condition was driven by the growing interests of the EU Member States in enhancing their political and economic relationship with Beijing. Before starting its human rights dialogue with Beijing, the EU mainly utilised the mechanism of formulating or sponsoring resolutions critical of China at the annual meetings of the UN Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) since 1989 (Balducci, 2010). According to Baker (2002,

p. 53), between 1991 and 1996, the EU and all its Member States co-sponsored six UNCHR resolutions that were proposed on the human rights conditions of China. This approach sought to transform China's governance structure of human rights through the "naming and shaming" strategy (Kinzelbach, 2014).

However, the growing economic interests in China of some Member States, in particular, France and Germany, drove the EU to adopt a less assertive approach in its diffusion of human rights norms to China; that is, the human rights dialogue (Balducci, 2010). After Germany decided to impose sanctions on China as a response to the human rights crisis that occurred in China in 1989, the value of bilateral trade between China and Germany dropped 8.9% in 1990, with Germany's exports to China decreased by more than 20% (Yang, 2007). This motivated the German government to adjust its support for the UNCHR resolutions (Zhang, 1997). In 1994, Germany articulated the importance of building a comprehensive strategic and economic relationship with China in its policy paper on Asia, indicating the declining importance of human rights issues in Germany's China policy (Balducci, 2010, p. 42). France was also driven by its economic interests in China to support engagement rather than "name and shame" (Wang, 1997, p. 32). For instance, Sino-French trade merely increased by 20% from 1992 to 1993, while trade between China and Germany increased by 90% and Sino-Italy trade increased by 83% (Wang, 1997, p. 32). This development put considerable pressure on the French government to place more emphasis on the economic relationship with China than human rights issues, since China is "too big a market and too strong a financial power to ignore" (Wellons, 1994, p. 344). The interest in improving economic ties with China drove France to establish a comprehensive partnership relationship with China and made a joint statement that "the world is moving from bipolarity to multipolarity" and economic cooperation is "an essential component of Sino-France relationship" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 1997; translated by the author).

The deepening trade interests in China contributed to the agreement between France and Germany in 1996 to oppose an EU action in UNCHR on the condition that the Chinese government make certain commitments and promises regarding human rights (Balducci, 2010, p. 42). This led to the EU's adoption of human rights dialogues to replace the sponsorship of UN resolutions regarding China's human rights (Baker, 2002). Compared with the sponsorship of UN resolutions, human rights dialogue puts significantly less pressure on the Chinese government. On the one hand, the dialogues take place on a bilateral level rather than in international fora and therefore draw less international attention regarding China's human rights. Hence, compared with the UNCHR resolutions, there is less pressure for the Chinese government to respond to the human rights issues raised by the EU in the dialogue. On the other hand, EU-China human rights dialogues need China's consent to be held (Kinzelbach, 2014). Therefore, this mechanism can be used by the Chinese government to express Beijing's concern about the EU's China policies. For instance, Beijing cancelled the dialogue in December 2010 to show its dissatisfaction with Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese political dissident, winning the Nobel Peace Prize that year ("EU-China human rights dialogue", 2011). Therefore, the establishment of the human rights dialogue illustrates how the interests of major Member States drove a less assertive approach in EU's norm diffusion towards China (Kinzelbach & Thelle, 2011). It indicates that the interests of Member States, especially those of the major ones, constitute an important driver of the EU's approach to norm diffusion.

The parallel trends of increasing economic interests in China and the diminishing assertiveness in the EU's approach to diffusing human rights to China are also evident after the human rights dialogue commenced in 1995. Sino-EU trade value increased from 13.7 billion USD in 1990 to over 682 billion USD in 2018. China has been the second-largest trade partner of the EU since 2004 (EU, 2019). Accompanying the

increasing importance of China in the EU's external trade, the EU's approaches to human rights and human rights dialogues in its China policies have become less assertive. In the 1995 China policy entitled "A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations" (European Commission, 1995b), an essential objective of the EU was to transform the Chinese society to one that is "open to the free flow of trade, investment, people, and ideas" so as to protect human rights in China (European Commission, 1995b, Section B.2). Human rights dialogue was identified by the EU as an important mechanism to foster the transition of China (European Commission, 1995b), as the dialogues would "provide an opportunity for detailed discussion leading to concrete action" (section B.2).

However, in its 2006 China policy, rather than focusing on concrete actions in human rights diffusion, the EU merely stated its dissatisfaction that its expectations of the dialogue "are increasingly not being met" and suggested that the dialogues should be more focused, more flexible and with better coordination (EU, 2006, pp. 4–5). The lack of emphasis on actions and concrete results demonstrates that the EU paid less attention to the EU-China human rights dialogue as a diffusion mechanism of promoting human rights in China in 2006 than it did in 1995. This trend of diminishing assertiveness was also evident in the EU's 2016 China policy entitled "Elements for a new EU strategy on China" (European Commission, 2016). In this policy, the objective of supporting societal transition in China was replaced by the EU's proposal to "work with China and its people to promote human rights" (European Commission, 2016, p. 4). In addition, the policy made no reference to the EU-China human rights dialogue. This shows the EU-China human rights dialogue was not regarded as a core diffusion mechanism of the EU in its 2016 China policy. Moreover, the 2016 China policy stated that the "EU's relationship with China is that it should be based on reciprocal benefit in both political and economic terms" (European Commission, 2016, p. 5). The 1995 and 2006 policies

did not place economic ties at the centre in such an explicit way. This change illustrates that whereas the EU is placing increasing emphasis on its economic interests in China, the assertiveness in its diffusion of human rights towards China is diminishing. This shows that when economic interests emerge, the EU tends to adjust its approach to norm diffusion by placing more emphasis on the protection of interests than the objective of norm promotion.

3.3 Outcomes of the EU's Norm Diffusion

3.3.1 Stability and Association Agreement with Macedonia

Having illustrated the EU's interpretations of its norms and its approach to diffusion mechanisms, this chapter moves on to investigate the outcomes of the EU's norm promotion in global governance assessed as policy changes in the recipient country or the codification of norms in international institutions. As suggested in Chapter 2, if there are policy changes in other states that are in accordance with the norms of the norm promoter, or there is codification of the norms of the norm promoter in an institution, then it can be argued that the norm diffusion attempt has produced positive outcomes. The chapter examines two positive outcomes of the EU's norm diffusion. The first is the codification of the EU's norms in the SAA between the Union and Macedonia⁶ in 2004 that paved the way for Macedonia's EU membership.

The candidate states of EU membership need to adopt a number of norms defined by the EU as the criteria for any state to become an EU member (European Council, 1993). In the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, the EU defines that the "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to

⁶ Macedonia changed its name to North Macedonia in February 2019. The thesis uses Macedonia in its analysis for consistency.

cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” constitute an essential criterion for EU membership (European Council, 1993). With regard to the countries of the Western Balkans, such as Macedonia, the EU adds “regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations” as another norm that they need to adopt prior to their membership (EU, 2016). Specifically, the Commission stated in the Agenda 2000 that “before accession, applicants should make every effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute among themselves or involving third countries. Failing this they should agree that the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice” (European Commission, 1997).

All these norms promoted by the EU, including democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good neighbourly relationships, were codified in the SAA with Macedonia in 2004 (EU, 2004). The codification of these norms constitutes a positive outcome that verifies the EU’s normative power in shaping its relationship with the candidate states. The SAA implements the liberal democratic norms preferred by the EU as the basic normative framework of the EU-Macedonia relationship. For instance, in the foreword, the two parties commit to “respect human rights and the rule of law, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, and democratic principles through free and fair elections and a multiparty system (EU, 2004, Foreword). In addition to its commitment to the liberal democratic norms of the EU, the Macedonian government adopts the EU’s norm of stability and good neighbourliness as it makes the commitment to contribute to “regional stability and cooperation among the countries of the region”, defined by the EU in “the Helsinki Final Act, the concluding documents of the Madrid and Vienna Conferences, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and of the Cologne Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe” (EU, 2004, Foreword).

The SAA also regulates that the EU’s norms of democracy and good neighbourly

relations will underpin the internal and external policies of Macedonia. Article 2 states that “the democratic principles and human rights” that “shall form the basis of the domestic and external policies of the Parties” are those “defined” in EU documents, such as “the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe” (EU, 2004, Article 2). In Article 4, the Macedonian government states that it:

Commits itself to enter into cooperation and good neighbourly relations with the other countries of the region including an appropriate level of mutual concessions concerning the movement of persons, goods, capital and services as well as the development of projects of common interest.

Hence, the EU’s norm diffusion towards Macedonia not only leads to the codification of the Union’s norms in the SAA, but also brings about policy changes in Macedonia in accordance with the EU’s norms. For example, Macedonia implemented the EU’s norm of establishing good neighbourly relations by signing “the historic agreement reached with Greece in June 2018” in which it resolved the disputes with Greece by changing its name to North Macedonia (European Commission, 2019b, p. 3). This policy change in Macedonia provides evidence of the EU’s normative power in shaping the policies of this candidate state with its norms.

3.3.2 The Cotonou Agreement

Another positive outcome of the EU’s norm diffusion is the Cotonou Agreement (2000). The Agreement, which establishes the political, economic and social relationship between the EU and ACP countries, is characterised by the codification of the EU’s human rights, democracy and good governance norms. Since these norms “underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties and constitute the essential elements of this Agreement” (Article 9-2), the codification of the EU’s norms in the Cotonou Agreement illustrates the Union’s normative power in its relationships with

ACP states.

The Cotonou Agreement codifies the EU's standards for human rights, democracy and good governance in a number of ways. Specifically, the "Political Dimension" part of the Agreement establishes and elaborates these norms as the guiding principle of the ACP-EU relationship. In addition, the EU's interpretation of human rights and good governance shapes the Agreement's regulation of the trade relationship between the two parties. For example, the Agreement adopts the EU's view that human rights and good governance are contributing factors to economic development. In its foreword, the Cotonou Agreement acknowledges that "a political environment guaranteeing peace, security and stability, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and good governance is part and parcel of long term development" (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Foreword). The Agreement reiterates this position by stating that "[r]espect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable are an integral part of sustainable development" [Article 9-1]. As previously mentioned, emphasising the causal relationship between democratic liberalism and economic development is one of the essential characteristics of the EU's interpretation of human rights and democracy. Thus, the implementation of such a position in the Cotonou Agreement demonstrates the EU's ability to codify its norms in this governance institution.

Additionally, the Cotonou Agreement adopts a number of important interpretations of human rights and democracy of the EU, making it a positive outcome of the EU's attempt to externalise its standard of human rights in the relationship with ACP states through the exercise of normative power. The Agreement makes the case that human rights are "universal, indivisible and inter-related" (Article 9-2). It also states that human rights protection in ACP-EU relations should be based on a series of

international human rights conventions, including the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the conclusions of the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights and the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Foreword). These interpretations of human rights correspond to the EU's approach to human rights, which urges "all States to implement the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to ratify and implement the key international human rights treaties" (Council of the EU, 2012).

Moreover, democracy is identified as a universal norm in the Cotonou Agreement, which states that "[d]emocratic principles are universally recognised principles underpinning the organisation of the State to ensure the legitimacy of its authority" (Article 9-2). Although the Agreement allows each country to develop its "democratic culture", it underscores that such a choice should be based on "universally recognised principles" that ensure "the legality of its actions reflected in its constitutional, legislative and regulatory system, and the existence of participatory mechanisms" (Article 9-2). Hence, the EU's standards of human rights and democracy constitute an important characteristic of the Cotonou Agreement, illustrating that the EU's norms shape the relationship between the Union and the ACP states.

Furthermore, the Cotonou Agreement embodies the EU's conceptualisation of good governance. Before the Agreement was negotiated, the EU Commission formulated its vision of good governance in a communication to the Council and the European Parliament (European Commission, 1998). This document describes good governance as managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable, participative and equitable manner, respecting human rights and the rule of law, public participation in the decision-making process, transparency and "establishing a climate conducive to economic and social development and its responsibility for the equitable division of

resources” (European Commission, 1998). All these elements were reiterated by the EU in 2014 as “key criteria” for a country to fulfil to achieve good governance (European Commission, 2014, p. 4). All these components of the EU’s interpretation of good governance are implemented in the Cotonou Agreement as principles for parties to promote and sustain democracy, social justice and pluralism, protect human rights, ensure the rule of law and foster transparency and accountability (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Article 33). The codification of the EU’s good governance norms in the Cotonou Agreement suggests that the Union has effectively established its norms as principles that are endorsed by both the EU and ACP states. This outcome provides further evidence of the EU’s normative power in terms of shaping the EU-ACP relationship through the diffusion of its norms.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the EU’s normative power through an analysis of three components. It showed that the EU’s normative power is demonstrated by the norms the EU seeks to advance in global governance, including human rights, democracy and good governance, resilience and climate change norms. The chapter argues that the EU’s interests shape its norm interpretation in two ways. On the one hand, the EU’s norms are essentially based on its interest in shaping the standards of global governance in accordance with the Union’s preferred governance structures. On the other hand, the EU’s interpretation of its norms is also shaped by its interests that can be best served in a global governance structure underpinned by its norms.

Secondly, the chapter demonstrated that the EU’s normative power also comprises the diffusion mechanisms it adopts. It investigated the EU’s approach to development assistance policy and human rights dialogue with China as a means of diffusion. The chapter also showed that interests are at play in the EU’s practice of normative power.

The interests of the EU and the Member States have led to its selectiveness in imposing sanctions invoked by the violation of the human rights clause. Interests also hinder the EU from assertively promoting its norms on human rights to China.

Thirdly, the chapter suggested that the codification of the EU's norms in its SAA with Macedonia, as well as in the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP states, demonstrates another component of the EU's normative power: the positive outcomes of norm diffusion. These outcomes verify the EU's ability to shape its relationships with candidate states and ACP states with its norms.

Overall, this chapter shows that the EU's normative power can be assessed through the examination of norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes. This approach will be implemented in the next chapter to assess whether China possesses normative power in the same sense as the EU. This chapter also demonstrates the important role interests play in the EU's exercise of normative power. Chapter 4 will examine the impact of interests on China's norms and norm diffusion and compare it to the impact of interests on the EU's normative power to draw generalisations, or invalidate existing ones (Söderbaum, 2013, p. 3).

Chapter 4—The Normative Power of China

Introduction

By applying the analytical framework set up in Chapter 2 on the EU's external relations, Chapter 3 has illustrated the EU's normative power in terms of its norms, norm diffusion mechanisms and the outcomes of norm diffusion. This chapter applies this framework to China to investigate if these three components of normative power can be identified in Chinese foreign policy. Through this analysis, the chapter answers the research question: *Does China possess normative power in global governance?* This chapter argues that China possesses normative power as it adopts a set of norms in its external relations, utilises diffusion mechanisms to promote its norms, and achieves positive outcomes through norm diffusion. It contends that China's normative power brings to the fore an alternative set of standards of global governance to those promoted by the EU. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the normative power literature with a systematic assessment of China's normative power in terms of its norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes.

In addition, Acharya (2019, p. 487) suggests that an essential characteristic of Chinese foreign policy is that “policy statements that stress a universal, inclusive, egalitarian, and just world order, on the one hand, actions that seem geared to national interest, realpolitik, hierarchy, and territorial sovereignty, on the other”. The chapter supports this assertion by arguing that the political, economic and security interests of Beijing are an important factor that drives China's interpretations of its norms, hierarchies of norms, as well as the approach to norm diffusion. Thus, the thesis argues that interests constitute a predominant driver of China's exercise of normative power.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first identifies the norms that guide Chinese foreign policy. It examines four important norms that underpin China's external relations after the year 2000, namely sovereignty, human rights, peaceful development and CBDR. The chapter emphasises how China's interpretations of sovereignty, human rights and CBDR constitute a different set of governance standards compared with the EU's norms of global governance. In addition, this chapter examines how China's interpretations of norms and hierarchy of norms are considerably shaped by its interests. It demonstrates that China's interpretation of sovereignty is shaped by its interests in protecting its territorial integrity and consolidating its relationship with other developing states. These interests also drive Beijing to establish a hierarchy of norms in which sovereignty is the top priority. It then demonstrates that China's interpretation of human rights is to a large extent shaped by its interests in countering external interference and maintaining the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China's political system. Moreover, Beijing's adoption of peaceful development was predominantly driven by its interest in shaping a benign image in global affairs. This interest also drove China to adopt a less rigid position on the non-interference principle in the Darfur issue. Furthermore, China's interpretation of CBDR is driven by its interest in protecting the autonomy of developing states, including China itself, in formulating their own mitigation policies and developing their domestic economy. Hence, the chapter suggests that the distinctiveness of China's norms is to a large extent due to its distinctive interests.

The second section investigates what norm diffusion mechanisms are utilised by China to advance its norms externally. It identifies two important diffusion mechanisms utilised by Beijing: peripheral diplomacy and external assistance programs. This chapter suggests that China's practice of peripheral diplomacy illustrates the growing proactiveness of China in diffusing its norms under Xi Jinping's administration,

especially compared to the good neighbourliness policy of Hu Jintao's era. It posits that this growing proactiveness is largely driven by China's interest in shaping the regional governance order with its norms. In addition, the chapter scrutinises China's approach to external assistance programs. It suggests that China's practice of "no strings attached" principle is indeed a selective use of conditionality to fulfil its political and economic interests. Therefore, China's approach to norm diffusion is predominantly driven by its interests.

The third section studies the outcomes of China's norm diffusion. It identifies the codification of China's norms in the Beijing Declaration (2017) and the Copenhagen Accord (2009) as two positive outcomes of China's norm diffusion practices. These positive outcomes provide further evidence for the argument that China possesses normative power in global governance. The analysis also demonstrates that China's norm diffusion is leading to the emergence of new institutions that are underpinned by norms preferred by China, rather than those preferred by the EU.

4.1 Chinese Interpretations of Norms: Establishing Distinctive Standards of Global Governance

This section seeks to identify if the Chinese government adopts a set of norms as the guiding principles of its foreign policy after the year 2000. It examines leadership announcements, policies and agreements, with particular attention to the reports to the 16th–19th Chinese Communist Party National Congress (Hu, 2007, 2012; Jiang, 2002; Xi, 2017) and the white papers published by the Chinese government. The former series of documents is presented by the General Secretary of the CCP, who is also the leader of the Chinese government, to the Party's National Congress held in Beijing every five years. Foreign policy has always been a separate section in this report. White papers represent the official position of the Chinese government regarding important domestic

and external issues. In this sense, these two series of documents illustrate the policies of the CCP and the Chinese government, respectively. This chapter identifies four norms that underpin Chinese foreign policy in global governance: sovereignty, human rights, peaceful development, and CBDR. Beijing's adoption of these norms as guiding principles of its external relations constitutes the first component of its normative power.

4.1.1 Sovereignty

This chapter suggests that there are two major characteristics in China's approach to sovereignty, both of which are considerably shaped by Beijing's political, economic and security interests. First, sovereignty constitutes the central norm in China's foreign policy. China's hierarchy of norms is based on the priority of sovereignty when compared with other norms, such as human rights and peaceful development. The chapter asserts that this is due to China's interest in protecting its sovereign integrity and consolidating its relationship with other developing states. Second, the Darfur issue shows that China could fall back from its adherence to non-interference. This chapter argues that Beijing's interest in establishing a responsible image constitutes an essential impetus for this adjustment with regard to the approach to sovereignty.

Sovereignty as the central norm of Chinese foreign policy

Sovereignty is the central norm of Chinese foreign policy both before and after the year 2000. Sovereignty started to underpin China's external relations in the 1950s, when then-Premier Zhou Enlai⁷ articulated the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence"—mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference and equality—as the fundamental principles of international affairs (Zhou, 1989). Based on these principles, China's interpretation of

⁷ There are five generations of leadership in the history of the PRC: Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), Deng Xiaoping (1976–1989), Jiang Zeming (1989–2002), Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2002–2012), and Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang (2012–).

sovereignty underscores the principles of protecting territorial integrity and non-interference. For example, the Foreword of *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China* states that:

It is the sacred right of each and every sovereign State and a fundamental principle of international law to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity. The Charter of the United Nations specifically stipulates that the United Nations and its Members shall refrain from any action against the territorial integrity or political independence of any of its Members or any State and shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. (Information Office of the State Council, 1993).

The centrality of sovereignty in Chinese foreign policy thinking remains evident after the year 2000. In his speech at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, Jiang Zeming (2000) argued that following the principles of non-interference, mutual respect, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence is essential for countries to “live in amity”. During his visit to the US, Hu Jintao also asserted that the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” is the basis of China’s relationship with all countries (“China’s Hu Jintao”, 2011). The report to the 19th National Congress of CCP reiterates that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is the “basis” for “strengthening friendship and cooperation with other countries” (Xi, 2017b). Therefore, as Holland (2012, p. 3) suggests, sovereignty is at the centre of the “strong normative framework” that underpins Chinese foreign policy.

China’s hierarchy of norms is characterised by sovereignty outranking other norms (Pan, 2010). For example, in terms of the relationship between sovereignty and human rights, the Chinese government asserts that Chinese people “had no access to human rights at all” when they “suffered under the oppression of imperialism, feudalism, and

bureaucrat-capitalism” between 1840 and 1949, and it was the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that “created fundamental conditions to effectively protect and continuously improve all of their rights” (Information Office of the State Council, 2019, I). Thus, for China, sovereignty is a precondition to developing human rights. As will be discussed later, sovereignty also prevails when it is in tension with “peaceful development”, as observed in the South China Sea issue. This further illustrates the supreme position of sovereignty protection in Chinese norm interpretation.

Sovereignty constitutes an important norm over which the EU and China diverge. Whereas sovereignty is at the centre of China’s foreign policy, it is not listed in Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty as one of the guiding norms of the EU’s external relations (EU, 2007b, Article 21). In addition, the EU is “from the outset a staunch supporter” (EEAS, 2018b) of the responsibility to protect (R2P), a principle established in the mid-2000s that could pave the way for intervention to prevent mass atrocities or other human rights crises (Smith, 2018, p. 1). As a Chinese scholar suggests, China is “more cautious about R2P” than the EU as it “seeks to balance between international intervention and sovereignty” (Interview Respondent 11, 4 July 2019). At the debate on R2P held by the General Assembly in 2018, the Chinese representative asserted that R2P “is consistent with sovereignty principles, which the international community must respect” (UN, 2018). Therefore, the diverging approaches to sovereignty between the EU and China demonstrate that China’s exercise of normative power is an attempt to diffuse a governance structure underpinned by norms different from those promoted by the EU.

China’s emphasis on sovereignty as the central norm is primarily driven by the interest in protecting its own territorial integrity. The 2011 white paper on “China’s peaceful development” identifies “state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and

national reunification” as the “core interests” of the Chinese government (Information Office of the State Council, 2011a). President Xi also asserts that “[n]o country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the ‘bitter fruit’ of harming our sovereignty, security or development interests” (as cited in Zeng, Xiao, & Breslin, 2015, p. 245). Beijing’s interest in protecting its territorial integrity is mainly based on the historical experience of the “century of humiliation” between the 1840s and the 1940s. During that period, China was invaded and colonised by a group of imperialist countries, including Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Russia. As Qin Yaqing (2006), a distinguished Chinese scholar on international relations, suggests, this “century of humiliation” is underpinned by losing sovereignty and struggling to retrieve sovereign integrity. It generates “the sense of sovereignty and the demand for equality among Chinese people” (Qin, 2006, p. 11). Qin’s suggestion is consistent with China’s official narrative, which asserts that:

The modern history of China was a record of subjection to aggression, dismemberment and humiliation by foreign powers. It was also a chronicle of the Chinese people's valiant struggles for national independence and in defence of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity and national dignity. (Information Office of the State Council, 1993)

Hence, as an essential interest of the Chinese government, protecting territorial integrity drives the Chinese government to establish sovereignty as the prominent norm of Beijing’s vision of global governance (Holland, 2012, p. 4).

In addition to the interest in protecting its own territorial integrity, the interests in consolidating the relationship between China and other developing states also drives China’s emphasis on sovereignty. For Beijing, the emphasis on non-interference is essential for the establishment of China’s image as a developing state that “similarly

experienced aggression and oppression by imperialism and colonialism” with other developing states (Zhou, 1964). China interprets this shared colonial experience as the foundation for Chinese and African people to “easily understand each other’s pursuit of independence and freedom and ... have a natural feeling of intimacy” (Qian, 2005, p. 200). Therefore, China’s adherence to sovereignty and non-interference principle consolidates its “superior moral constancy as an ‘all-weather friend’” to African countries (Strauss, 2009, p. 780).

This close relationship between China and other developing states benefits Beijing both politically and economically. Politically, the close relationship enables Beijing to obtain support from developing countries regarding China’s preferred global governance structures. For example, at the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), African states endorsed China’s proposal that “[e]fforts should be made to truly increase the voice and representation of developing countries in international financial institutions and the international monetary system” (FOCAC, 2012). They also supported China’s plan to establish “a new development bank for mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS countries and other emerging economies and developing countries, for the purpose of supplementing the existing multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development” (FOCAC, 2012). This shows that a close relationship with developing states could contribute to China’s promotion of a global governance structure in its likeness.

Economically, developing countries, especially African states, have become an important part of China’s energy security and foreign investment (Strauss, 2009). According to a 2017 McKinsey report, there are over 10,000 Chinese-owned firms operating throughout the African continent with an aggregate value of more than 2

trillion USD (Jayaram, Kassiri, & Sun, 2017). In addition, more than one-third of China's oil comes from Africa (Shepard, 3 Oct 2019). Africa has eclipsed Asia as the largest market for China's overseas construction contracts and Beijing announced a 1 billion USD Belt and Road Africa infrastructure development fund in July 2019 (Shepard, 3 Oct 2019). The growing importance of Africa for the Chinese economy constitutes an important factor that drives the Chinese government to consolidate its relationship with African states through adherence to the non-interference principle. Therefore, China's interpretation of sovereignty not only reflects its normative consideration regarding global governance, it is also driven by the political and economic interests that can be fulfilled through the diffusion of this norm.

Flexibility in Darfur: Driven by the objective to act as a responsible actor

The impact of interests on China's approach to sovereignty is further demonstrated by the Darfur issue, in which Beijing actively persuaded the Sudanese government to accept UN peacekeeping missions due to China's interest in establishing a responsible image in global affairs. This indicates that China is willing to adjust its approach to its norms, such as non-interference and sovereignty, to fulfil its interests.

Then Premier Wen Jiabao (2005) described China as "a responsible country" that contributed to maintaining peace and fostering development in the world after then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called for China to become a "responsible stakeholder" in September 2005 (Zoellick, 2005). The "responsible country" narrative was also adopted by Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping in their reports to the CCP National Congress. Hu's (2012) report to the 18th CCP National Congress stated that China should "get more actively involved in international affairs, play its due role of a major responsible country, and work jointly with other countries to meet global challenges". The report to the 19th Party Congress adopted a similar proposal that China will "continue to play its part as a major and responsible country" and actively participate

in the “reform and construction of global governance system” (Xi, 2017b). This shows that establishing a responsible image has become an important interest that guides China’s foreign policymaking.

As Christensen (2011, p. 2) notes, an important move by China to consolidate its responsible image was the adaptation to “its long-held and once rigid positions on noninterference in the internal affairs of states”. The Darfur issue constitutes an important example of China falling back from its adherence to the non-interference principle to fulfil its interest in establishing a responsible image. This shows that when interests and norms are in tension, China tends to adjust its approach to its norms to fulfil its interests. The Chinese government has been adhering to the principle of non-interference with regard to the escalating disputes and conflicts in Darfur since the early 2000s (Large, 2008, p. 97). However, such a position stimulated intensive criticism against China’s role in the humanitarian crisis in this area among Western states and non-governmental organisations (Shinn, 2009, p. 86). One of the most influential Western critiques was the campaign led by Dream for Darfur to label the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games the “Genocide Olympics” (Budabin, 2011). This movement significantly increased global attention on China’s Darfur policy, including a letter from the US Congress in May 2007 stating that “there are calls to boycott what is increasingly being called the ‘Genocide Olympics’” (Reeves, 2007). The letter further warned Chinese leaders that they should “protect its national image from being irredeemably tarnished, through association with a genocidal regime, for the purposes of economic gains” (Reeves, 2007).

The intensive criticism against China’s “indifferent and non-involved position” needed to be countered by the Chinese government, as it would undermine its interest in establishing a responsible image considerably (Schreiber, 2014, p. 12). An important

move by the Chinese government was to gradually modify its policy on the Darfur issue by supporting external interference missions in the UN framework (Carlson, 2008, p. 10). In 2006, China supported UNSC Resolution 1679, which started UN peacekeeping missions in South Sudan, constituting an important step by the Chinese government towards supporting international intervention in Darfur (Carlson, 2008). After this vote in the UN, then-President Hu Jintao paid a visit to Sudan in February 2007, during which he underlined that “the African Union and the United Nations should play constructive roles in a peacekeeping mission in Darfur” (“Hu puts forward principle”, 2007). In June 2008, Hu Jintao strongly urged Sudan to cooperate in the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force so the people of Darfur could reconstruct their homeland (“China steps up pressure”, 2008). In addition to utilising its political influence to promote UN intervention, the Chinese government sent the first-ever Chinese combat troops to the peacekeeping missions in Sudan since 2007 (Large, 2016, p. 41). All these actions illustrate China’s advocacy for UN intervention in Darfur, which represents Beijing’s increasingly flexible position on the non-interference principle driven by its interests in acting as a responsible state in global governance. China’s changed position on the Darfur issue shows that China’s expanding role in international affairs is generating new interests, which in turn shape its approach to its norms, such as sovereignty and non-interference. Therefore, interests constitute an important factor that drives China’s exercise of its normative power.

4.1.2 Human rights

Human rights are one of the most frequently articulated norms in the white papers of China. Since the Chinese government published its first human rights white paper, entitled “Human Rights in China” in 1991 (Information Office of the State Council, 1991), a series of official documents on China’s position regarding human rights protection have been formulated (Information Office of the State Council, 1991, 2000,

2004, 2009, 2012). Beijing's significant emphasis on explaining and spreading China's interpretation of human rights shows that human rights constitute another norm of China.

This chapter suggests that the two characteristics of China's interpretation of human rights, namely the emphasis on state autonomy in formulating the hierarchy of human rights and the prioritisation of the rights to development, are both considerably driven by Beijing's political interests. First, it is Beijing's interest in preventing external interference in China's domestic politics that drove the Chinese government to argue that each state has the autonomy to determine its own path towards human rights protection based on practical conditions. When asked about China's approach to human rights, a Chinese scholar emphasised that "from the Chinese perspective human rights standard cannot be imposed on other states. The universalist and relativist approaches to human rights can co-exist" (Interview Respondent 1, 29 Dec 2015). Indeed, despite being a signatory of the UDHR, China states in its *National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015)* that it will "[proceed] from China's national conditions and new realities to advance the development of its human rights cause on a practical basis" (Information Office of the State Council, 2012). This statement demonstrates that China interprets human rights as an issue on which each individual country can formulate different policies based on its specific conditions (Freeman & Geeraerts, 2011). As illustrated below, in practice, the Chinese government has adhered to this position by formulating its distinctive human rights policy that prioritises development rights rather than civil and political rights.

Beijing's emphasis on the right of each state to determine its hierarchy of human rights was essentially driven by its interest in legitimising its domestic approach to human rights protection to "counter or appease" the external criticism of its human rights after

4 June 1989 (Kinzelbach, 2016). As Kinzelbach (2016) suggests, this narrative provides Chinese officials and diplomats with “a detailed argumentative guide for dealing with international criticism against China’s human rights situation”. This momentum has been persistent until today, as China’s human rights conditions have consistently been criticised by Western governments and observers because of the lack of protection regarding citizens’ civil and political rights in China (Ng & Lau, 2019). Beijing condemns these criticisms by arguing that they are the product of “Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice”, and that China will continue to follow its distinctive way of promoting and protecting human rights (Xinhuanet, 14 March 2019). Hence, the persistent interest in legitimising its own human rights regime drives China to interpret human rights as a domestic issue over which the government has the authority to decide its distinctive approach.

In addition to the emphasis on state autonomy, China establishes a hierarchy of rights in which the rights to subsistence and development outrank social and political rights (Information Office of the State Council, 2000; Sceats & Breslin, 2012). In the *National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015)*, China states that it “will continue to give priority to the protection of the people’s rights to subsistence and development. It will take proactive measures to ensure and improve the people’s livelihood, spare no efforts to solve the problems of immediate concern to the people.” (Information Office of the State Council, 2012, Chapter 1). The rights China emphasises mainly refer to those in Article 3 of the UDHR, which lists the right to life, liberty and security of person. Consistent with this article of the UDHR, the Chinese governance focuses on the supply of housing and food, growth of the domestic economy and citizens’ income as the major achievements of protecting the right to subsistence (Information Office of the State Council, 2000). As suggested in Chapter 3, the EU has prioritised political rights and civil rights in its norm promotion to developing states since the 1990s.

Therefore, their different priorities in human rights protection constitute a point of divergence in the EU's and China's interpretations of human rights.

A major interest behind China's emphasis on development rights is its need for economic development while maintaining the CCP's dominant role in the Chinese political system (Pils, 2019). On the one hand, the promotion of development rights is consistent with Beijing's emphasis on economic development since the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping argued that development should be regarded as "the hard principle [*Yingdaoli*] since the life of Chinese people is far from prosperity" (Deng, 1993, p. 377; author's translation). Following Deng's mantra, his successor, Jiang Zemin (2002), defined "sustained, rapid and sound development" of the national economy as the first progress of the CCP in terms of domestic governance. The emphasis on economic development was reiterated by Jiang's successor, Hu Jintao (2007), who announced in his report to the 17th CPC National Congress that "[r]apid development represents the most remarkable achievement [of the Chinese government] in the new period". This interest in developing the domestic economy constitutes an important driver of China's emphasis on development rights in its interpretation of human rights.

On the other hand, there is a predominant condition of China's economic development since Deng's era: the CCP's rule should remain undisputed (Pils, 2019). This chapter argues that the Party's interest in consolidating its rule is an essential factor that drives China to prioritise development rights over civil and political rights. As Xi (2017, p. 10) asserts in his report to the 19th CPC National Congress, in achieving economic development, it must be the CCP that "lead[s] and unite[s] the Chinese people of all ethnic groups". Hence, because of the potential to challenge the dominant role of CCP in the Chinese political system, the development of political and civil rights is regarded by the Chinese government as secondary rights in its hierarchy of human rights

(Kinzelbach, 2016). For example, in its “Right to participate” section, the *National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015)* merely states that it will ensure and support “the *participation* of non-Communist parties and figures without party affiliation in the exercise of state power, consultation on major state policies and choice of state leaders, administration of state affairs, and formulation and implementation of state policies, laws and regulations” (Information Office of the State Council, 2011a, emphasis added). Yet, there is no mention of bringing to the fore an *election* system in which parties other than the CCP could obtain power. This shows that to date, the so-called “grand bargain” between the CCP ruling regime and Chinese society, namely that the Party earns its legitimacy through generating economic growth but “would not brook challenge to its rule” (Yang, 2016, p. 49), remains the norm of Chinese politics. The interest in maintaining the CCP’s dominant role in the Chinese political system drives Chinese leadership to privilege development rights over political and civil rights, since the latter two types of rights are closely connected to the liberal democratic system and may undermine the authoritarian rule of the CCP (Pils, 2019, p. 51). This shows that whereas at first glance China’s distinctive approach to human rights is demonstrated by its distinctive interpretations, intrinsically it is significantly driven by Beijing’s distinctive interests.

4.1.3 Peaceful development

Peaceful development, which was adopted by the Chinese government as an important norm since the mid-2000s, demonstrates the impact of interests on China’s normative power in two ways. First, the adoption of peaceful development and the interpretation of this norm are essentially driven by China’s interest in tackling the “China threat” theory and establishing a peaceful image in international affairs, particularly in the Asian region. This shows that the norms diffused by China are considerably driven by the interests Beijing seeks to fulfil in external relations. Second, the South China Sea

dispute shows that Beijing privileges sovereignty over peaceful development when these two norms are contested. Such a hierarchy of norms is driven by China's interest in preserving its territorial claims. This further demonstrates that interests constitute an essential factor in driving Beijing's hierarchy of norms.

The concepts of peaceful rise and peaceful development, both of which refer to the notion that China's emerging power is peaceful, have been incorporated as norms of Chinese foreign policy since the mid-2000s (Glaser & Medeiros, 2007). In November 2003, Zheng Bijian, the executive vice president of the Central Party School of the CCP, gave a speech entitled "Peaceful Rise" at the Boao Conference. In his speech, Zheng (2003) referred to China's rise as "peaceful" and argued that a peaceful rise has always been the target of the Chinese government since the reform and opening-up policy. The key element of Zheng's interpretation of peace is that China's rise in military and economic domains will not be a threat to international peace and stability. Conversely, China's rise will benefit other nations in terms of economic development (Yi, 2005, pp. 79–80). This position was reiterated by then-Premier Wen Jiabao's in 2004, who argued that China's rise "will not impede anyone, threaten anyone, or sacrifice anyone. China does not seek hegemony and will never do so in the future" (Wen, 2004; author's translation).

Since Hu Jintao articulated that China would seek "peaceful development" in his speech at the Boao Conference in 2004, this term has been intensively used in Chinese official discourse as a description of China's emergence and gradually replaced "peaceful rise" (Glaser & Medeiros, 2007, p. 299). One reason behind the change of terminology was that "rise [*jueqi*]" denotes challenge and has a provocative rather than reassuring meaning in Chinese language (Glaser & Medeiros, 2007, p. 304). Despite the change of terms, China's interpretation of peaceful development to a large extent overlaps with

that of peaceful rise. The white paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development” (Information Office of the State Council, 2011a) defines peaceful development as “a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization, make itself strong and prosperous, and make more contribution to the progress of human civilization”. It articulates that “China’s overall goal of pursuing peaceful development is to promote development and harmony domestically and pursue cooperation and peace internationally” (Information Office of the State Council, 2011a). In addition, the report to the 18th CPC National Congress articulates that the goal of Chinese foreign policy is to “promote the noble cause of peace and development for mankind” (Hu, 2012).

China’s Peaceful Development states that peaceful development means China will “remain a good neighbour, friend and partner of other Asian countries” (Information Office of the State Council, 2011a). This interpretation of peaceful development shows that Beijing’s promotion of peaceful rise and peaceful development aims to establish a peaceful image of China’s emerging influence in global affairs, particularly in the Asian region. This approach was mainly driven by Beijing’s growing interest in assuring the rest of the world that “China’s growing power will not be threatening to the outside world” to counter the “China threat theory” (Narayanan, 2007, p. 652). The idea that a rising China presents a threat is raised by a number of Western scholars and observers, who emphasise that China is acting as a revisionist actor; that is, one that could challenge and undermine the existing global order (Roy, 1996; Mearsheimer, 2014). One argument is that China’s “increased relative capabilities make it feasible for a rising great power to exert more control over its surroundings ... China will behave boldly, more inclined to force its will upon others rather than to consult with them” (Roy, 1996; as cited in Broomfield, 2003, p. 274). Another conceptualisation of China’s alleged threat to the regional order is presented by Mearsheimer (2014, p. 2), who argues that China “will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western

Hemisphere”, leading to “an intense security competition with considerable potential for war”. Specifically, Mearsheimer (2014, p. 13) highlights that territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, both in the South China Sea area and with India, are potential reasons for Beijing to become a “regional hegemon”. To alleviate these “hostile” perceptions of China that might undermine the “development goals” of the Chinese government (Breslin, 2013, pp. 618–619), China adopts the peaceful development norm. Beijing also emphasises that “China is a force for global stability, peace and prosperity” in its interpretation of peaceful development (Breslin, 2010, p. 56). Therefore, the adoption of peaceful development as a guiding norm and Beijing’s interpretation of this norm show that China could incorporate new norms to fulfil its emerging interests in global affairs.

China’s approach to peaceful development in the South China Sea dispute illustrates that, as suggested in Section 4.1.1, China has a hierarchy of norms in which sovereignty outranks other norms because of Beijing’s interest in protecting its territorial integrity. This sheds light on the role of interests as a driver of China’s exercise of normative power. The intensive sovereign disputes regarding the South China Sea in the late-2000s created a dilemma between sovereignty and peaceful development for the Chinese government (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2011). As mentioned earlier, the establishment of a peaceful image in the neighbourhood was an essential objective of China’s promotion of peaceful development (Information Office of the State Council, 2011a). However, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s guideline of “sovereignty belongs to China, disputes can be shelved, and we can pursue joint development” has always been the fundamental principle of China’s position regarding the South China Sea disputes (Information Office of the State Council, 2016).

The development of the South China Sea disputes affirms that it was the interest in

protecting territorial claims that decisively shaped China's position regarding this issue (Fravel, 2011, p. 312). Since 2010, the South China Sea has been considered by the Chinese government as part of China's "core interests" that "cannot be challenged" (Xinhuanet, 2015a). Such a position elevates the strategic importance of this area to one equal to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang territory; that is, "integral to China's vision of itself as a nation and that must be protected at all cost" (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2011, p. 46). As a result, in recent years, China has strengthened its South Sea Fleet, increased its naval activities in the South China Sea and conducted several enormous island-building projects (Fravel, 2011; pp. 307–309; Watkins, 2016).

These policies are necessary for consolidating China's territorial claim in this area, but they have undoubtedly increased the competition between China and its neighbours over the territorial sovereignty of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and related natural resources (Dutton, 2011, p. 42). To enhance their control over the disputed lands, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia have expanded their maritime forces and conducted commercial programs to enhance their control over some of these islands (Fravel, 2011). These policies contradict the peaceful development norm that China seeks to promote in its neighbourhood. The lack of policy changes in its neighbouring states in accordance with its norms shows that China's diffusion of peaceful development has not produced positive outcomes.

In addition, in 2016, a tribunal of five judges at the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration issued an award highly favourable to the Philippines in its case against China. The award ruled that China's claim over the nine-dash line has no validity under international law (Panda, 2016). Even though Beijing managed to set aside its conflicts with the Philippines after Rodrigo Duterte became the Philippines' president in 2016, the tensions between China and other states in the area demonstrate that China's goal

to formulate a peaceful relationship with its neighbours is far from being realised (Dutton, 2011, p. 51).

The developments in the South China Sea since the late 2000s are in sharp contrast to the peaceful development narrative. They show that because of Beijing's interest in protecting its territorial claims, sovereignty remains the paramount norm in China's external relations. When conflict emerged between the protection of sovereignty and the appeal of peaceful development in the South China Sea, China tended to insist on sovereignty claims at the expense of fostering peaceful development in the region. This demonstrates that China's hierarchy of norms is essentially shaped by its distinctive interest in protecting territorial integrity.

4.1.4 Common but differentiated responsibilities

Another norm that of considerable importance to China's normative power in global governance is CBDR. This norm has underpinned China's climate change policy since the 1990s (Zhang, 2013). Then Premier Wen Jiabao argued at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in 2009 that "[t]he principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' represents the core and bedrock of international cooperation on climate change, and it must never be compromised" (Wen, 2009). As will be illustrated later in this chapter and in Chapter 6, China's attempts of norm diffusion in the Copenhagen Conference (COP 15) and the Paris Conference (COP 21) were driven by the objective to codify its interpretation of CBDR in climate change agreements. Therefore, the analysis of China's interpretation of CBDR is essential to the study of China's normative power in climate change governance.

China's interpretation of CBDR focuses on the "differentiated" responsibilities between developed and developing states that underpin the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997). The

rationale behind a binary differentiation between developed and developing states is that developed states should take more responsibility regarding climate change governance because of their historical responsibility in causing global warming (Zhang, 2013). Historical data shows that since the 1760s, developed countries contributed to a 60% increase in the amount of carbon dioxide in the air due to the consumption of oil and coal during their industrialisation (Zhang, 2013, p. 6). In 1990, the GHG emissions per capita of developed countries and developing countries were 15.07 tonnes and 2.81 tonnes, respectively. In 2014, the figures were 12.44 and 4.74. (World Resources Institute, 2014). These statistics illustrate that industrialised countries have been the major source of global warming and they continue to have higher levels of energy consumption than developing countries. Based on this historical data, the Kyoto Protocol places most of the industrialised countries in its Annex I and regulates that these countries have an obligation to “take the first step” in curbing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by “at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012” (UNFCCC, 1997, Article 3-1). Developing countries not listed in Annex I can voluntarily decide their policies regarding the climate change issue, as the UNFCCC admits that their “energy consumption will need to grow” to ensure economic development (UNFCCC, 1992, Preamble).

China’s adherence to the binary differentiation and asymmetric mitigation obligations between developed and developing states set out in the Kyoto Protocol underpins its interpretation of CBDR. This approach is to a large extent driven by Beijing’s interest in protecting the economic development of developing states, including China, from the potential restrictions in climate change agreements. Beijing argued that it “is faced with enormous pressures from developing economy, improving people’s livelihood, protecting environment and addressing climate change” (NDRC, 2015a, p. 64). China also stated that the need to maintain economic development while tackling climate

change applies to all developing states (Zhang, 2015). Xie Zhenhua argued in 2012 that “climate issue is in fact an issue of development rights and sovereignty”, since the developing countries’ economic growth would be restricted by a mandatory agreement without differentiation between developing and developed countries (Peng, Zhou, & Ni, 2012).

This interest drives Beijing to emphasise that developed countries, which are responsible for more than 70% of the accumulative GHG emissions of human society, “should take the primary responsibility” in combating climate change (Wen, 2009). In terms of developing states, the Chinese government suggests economic development is an essential precondition for developing states to tackle climate change and opposes any mandatory carbon emissions reduction placed on developing countries in international agreements (Zhang, 2013, p. 7). The 2011 white paper on China’s policy regarding climate change stated that since developing countries “lack the financial strength and technologies to address climate change, and face multiple arduous tasks of developing their economies, fighting poverty and addressing climate change”, their priority should be “developing their economies and fighting poverty” (Information Office of the State Council, 2011b). Then President Hu Jintao announced in 2009 that developing countries should not “be asked to take on obligations that go beyond their development stage, responsibility and capabilities”, unless developed countries have fulfilled their reduction targets (Hu, 2009). These statements illustrate that Beijing’s interest in securing the economic development of developing states considerably drives its support for a binary differentiation between developed and developing states in climate change governance.

In summary, the binary differentiation between developed and developing countries underpins China’s interpretation of CBDR since it participated in international climate

change governance in the early 1990s (Bo & Gao, 2014, p. 58). Since the EU has been promoting a progressive climate change agreement that increases the GHG mitigation targets of both developed states and developing states since the mid-2000s (see Chapter 3), there is considerable divergence between the norms of climate change governance of the EU and China. This chapter suggests that an important factor behind such divergence is China's interest in fostering economic development in all developing states, including itself. This demonstrates that interests constitute an important driver that shapes China's distinctive norms regarding climate change governance.

4.2 The Diffusion Mechanisms of China: Shifting Approaches Driven by Changing Interests

4.2.1 Peripheral diplomacy: Shifting from “keeping a low profile” to establishing a Sino-centric order

In addition to the norms that underpin Chinese foreign policy, China's normative power is also demonstrated by the diffusion mechanisms Beijing utilises to advance its norms. One important diffusion mechanism adopted by China is peripheral diplomacy (*zhoubian waijiao*) (Xi, 2013). As Xi (2014b) states, the core idea of this policy is to:

Turn China's neighbourhood areas into a community of common destiny, continue to follow the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in conducting neighborhood diplomacy, promote friendship and partnership with our neighbors, foster an amicable, secure and prosperous neighborhood environment, and boost win-win cooperation.

Hence, peripheral diplomacy constitutes a platform for China to diffuse its norms in its neighbourhood.

Peripheral diplomacy, particularly when compared with the good neighbourliness

policy during Hu Jintao's era, demonstrates Beijing's increasingly proactiveness in establishing a Sino-centric governance structure in the Asian region (Callahan, 2016, p. 226). This chapter suggests that this growing proactiveness is largely driven by China's increasing interest in shaping global governance in its likeness. Therefore, peripheral diplomacy demonstrates that China's approach to norm diffusion is predominantly driven by its interests.

Peripheral diplomacy is based on the understanding that China has become a "major country" that plays an active role in *shaping* global affairs rather than a participant that seeks to integrate into the existing order (Xi, 2014b). Xi (2014b) stresses that "China should develop a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting its role of a major country", and conceptualises the relationship between China and the world as "China's dependence on the world and its involvement in international affairs are deepening, so are the world's dependence on China and its impact on China". These statements illustrate a considerably more proactive and ambitious approach to norm diffusion under Xi's administration compared to the idea that China should "never take the lead" in global affairs of Deng's and Hu's era (Callahan, 2016, p. 234). It shows that under Xi's leadership, the Chinese government has a growing interest in advancing its norms in global governance (Pu, 2012).

Driven by this interest, Beijing adopts a considerably more proactive approach to norm diffusion in its practices of peripheral diplomacy than in good neighbourliness policy. In the practice of the good neighbourliness policy, China pushed for greater engagement with existing regional governmental arrangements (Chung, 2009, p. 114). For instance, China joined the "ASEAN plus three" talks with Japan and South Korea in 1997. In the same year, China signed an agreement with ASEAN committing to "resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means" in the South China Sea

(ASEAN, 2002). These movements correspond to then-Premier Wen's statement that China's role as a responsible actor was demonstrated by its active participation in existing governance bodies (Wen, 2006).

China's approach to peripheral diplomacy demonstrates Beijing's proactive approach to norm diffusion in two ways. First, President Xi (2014b) claims that China's peripheral diplomacy aims to "turn China's neighbourhood areas into a community of common destiny". As mentioned in Chapter 1, the idea of a "community of common destiny" represents an ambitious conceptualisation of China's international role, as it places China and Chinese norms at the centre of the global governance structure (Callahan, 2016; Xi, 2014a). The peripheral diplomacy manifests this approach since it is set to be conducted "with a salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision" (Xi, 2014b). Therefore, peripheral diplomacy shows that, driven by the interest in shaping global governance in its likeness, China aims to ensure that China and Chinese norms are at the centre of Xi's envisaged future order in the Asian region through norm diffusion (Callahan, 2016, p. 235).

Second, peripheral diplomacy, especially the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is characterised by China's focus on establishing new projects underpinned by Chinese norms. The shift from "participation" in the good neighbourliness policy to "creation" in peripheral diplomacy demonstrates another aspect of proactiveness in China's norm diffusion. This further shows that China's approach to norm diffusion is deeply driven by its evolving interests. The grand project of BRI was announced by President Xi in 2013, which includes the New Silk Road Economic Belt project and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. According to the NDRC's blueprint, the "belt" refers to building a connectivity network of transportation projects and energy lines that connect China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe. Meanwhile, the 21st Century

Maritime Silk Road seeks to establish a network of ports and other coastal infrastructure projects that will connect China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa and the Mediterranean (NDRC, 2015b).

The BRI is underpinned by a number of Chinese norms, including being “open, harmonious and inclusive” (NDRC, 2015b). The BRI also connects with the rejuvenation of the ancient Silk Road, a historical period in which China was at the centre of Asian order (Callahan, 2016; Wang Yiwei, 2015). Therefore, a number of scholars view BRI as an attempt to establish a Sino-centric global order (Callahan, 2016). For instance, Zheng (2015, pp. 197–200) perceives BRI as an opportunity for China to use its norms to guide the values of the post-American global “zeitgeist” (*shidai jingshen*). Similarly, Wang (2015) regards BRI as the key to China’s internationalisation in the 21st century, as it represents “the turn from participating in globalisation to shaping globalisation” with Chinese values, principles and global order. This turn is to a large extent driven by China’s interest in “forg[ing] a new network that is centered on China, organized according to Chinese interests, and guided by Chinese values” (Callahan, 2016, p. 238). Considering that the good neighbourliness policy was characterised by China’s participation in existing institutions, peripheral diplomacy demonstrates how China’s interest in shaping the global governance structure leads to a considerably more proactive approach to establishing new institutions and new orders underpinned by Chinese norms. This shows that the way in which China diffuses its norms is significantly driven by its interests.

4.2.2 China’s external assistance programs: Distinctive interests lead to a distinctive approach

Another important diffusion mechanism adopted by China is its foreign aid and foreign investment programs. The white paper states that China’s external assistance programs

“help recipient countries build up their self-development capacity ... so as to lay a foundation for future development and embarkation on the road of self-reliance and independent development” (Information Office of the State Council, 2011c). Hence, China’s aid policy serves as a mechanism to promote China’s preference for developmental rights; namely, that the right to obtain better living conditions and economic status has a priority over political rights (State Council, 2014). The diffusion of these norms mainly operates through inducement, as demonstrated by President Xi’s plan to enhance the Sino-African relationship in the 6th FOCAC in 2015. Xi promised to provide 60 billion USD of funding to support a series of external assistance programs, covering the areas of industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, poverty reduction and public welfare, public health and people-to-people exchanges (FOCAC, 2015). Xi reiterated China’s focus on economic development by stating that China’s aid programs aim to help “African countries break the three development bottlenecks of backward infrastructure, talent shortage and inadequate fund, accelerate industrialisation and agricultural modernisation, and realise independent and sustainable development” (FOCAC, 2015). This shows that China’s foreign aid programs constitute a mechanism to deliver its “understanding of what development actually entails” (Breslin, 2016, p. 69).

China’s aid programs also serve as a platform to diffuse its interpretation of sovereignty, especially the non-interference principle (Breslin, 2016). Beijing states that it:

Respects recipient countries’ right to independently select their own path and model of development, and believes that every country should explore a development path suitable to its actual conditions. China never uses foreign aid as a means to interfere in recipient countries’ internal affairs or seek political privileges for itself. (Information Office of the State Council, 2011c)

A number of studies use the term “no strings attached” to describe China’s exclusion of conditionality regarding the political structure of other countries in external assistance policies (Brautigam, 2009; Taylor, 2011). Before scrutinising China’s nuanced approach to conditionality, this chapter suggests that China’s approach to external assistance is considerably different from that of the EU, which, as illustrated in Chapter 3, prioritises the development of civil and political rights and routinely applies human rights conditionality in its agreement with other states (Cotonou Agreement, 2000). The diffusion of development rights and sovereignty constitutes the distinctiveness of China’s approach to foreign aid (Information Office of the State Council, 2011c).

This chapter argues that China’s distinctive approach to foreign aid programs is to a large extent driven by its distinctive interests. First, based on its adherence to the non-interference principle, Beijing does not take the internal regime of the recipient state into account in its practices of external assistance programs. Indeed, China’s foreign aid and foreign investment programs in Africa cover both stable democratic states, such as Ghana and South Africa, and less stable and non-democratic regimes, such as Zimbabwe, Sudan and South Sudan (Aidoo & Hess, 2015, p. 120). This constitutes a different approach to external assistance than the EU’s aid programs, which, as illustrated in Chapter 3, cover poverty alleviation, human rights development and enhancing civil society in the recipient states (EU, 2017a).

An important driver of this distinctive approach is China’s economic interests. Specifically, due to its indifference to the political regime of the recipient country, China is able to become a major source of foreign aid for authoritarian states (Hodzi, Hartwell, & de Jager, 2012). Such a position enables Beijing to obtain considerable economic benefits by providing financial support to these states. As Portela (2015, p. 45) points out, if other states have “cut off their links with the target, a third country that

refrains from implementing sanctions is able to benefit from the target's dependence". This is especially true in the case of Zimbabwe, the government of which has constantly been criticised and sanctioned by Western actors, including the EU, due to its corruption and violation of human rights (Hodzi et al., 2012). Despite the poor condition of governance in this country, China has consistently provided development aid to Zimbabwe and obtained benefits from financial support (Hodzi et al., 2012). For instance, a substantial amount of Chinese aid is devoted to building farms in exchange for the supply of tobacco from Zimbabwe. This fulfils China's desire for more farmland and access to food and tobacco (Hodzi et al., 2012, p. 89). This indicates that economic interests constitute an important driver of China's distinctive approach to external assistance programs.

Second, this chapter suggests that China's "no strings attached" approach to conditionality is indeed a selective use of conditionality driven by China's interests. As mentioned earlier, it is an important interest of China to consolidate its relationship with other developing states. This interest is fulfilled by the exclusion of conditions regarding human rights protection, the rule of law, promotion of democratisation, accountability and transparency issues in China's aid programs (Strauss, 2009, p. 793). Liu Guijin, China's special envoy for Africa, proclaimed in 2008 that, "We don't attach political conditions. We have to realise the political and economic environments are not ideal. But we don't have to wait for everything to be satisfactory or human rights to be perfect" (as cited in Brautigam, 2009, p. 217). Liu's statement demonstrates Beijing's reluctance to apply political conditions to transform the internal governance structure of recipient states (Li Angang, 2007, p. 75).

To date, Beijing's focus on establishing "business is business" relationships through this "no strings attached" approach has served its interest in consolidating the

relationship with developing countries (Li, 2017). African leaders repeatedly showed public appreciation of China's norm of unconditionality. They are comfortable that there are no benchmarks and preconditions, and no environmental impact assessment to hinder the negotiations (Brautigam, 2009). Raphael Trotman, speaker of Guyana, described how China's exclusion of human rights and good governance conditionalities shapes the attitude of African elites towards Chinese aid:

What is unique about China is that its involvement in Guyana has never been one that sought to interfere with our internal political structure. Other countries give aid with conditions—whether they be on governance, on trafficking in persons or a raft of legislation on social issues. China has never given with conditionalities coming with them, and that is something we appreciate. (as cited in Li, 2017, p. 206).

Whereas the interest in consolidating relationships with developing states has driven Beijing to exclude most conditionalities from its foreign aid, a “non-negotiable precondition” (Pan, 2010, p. 232) for any country to receive China's foreign aid is to openly express its support for the One-China Principle, which asserts that the government of the PRC “is the sole legitimate government representing the entire people of the People's Republic of China” (Information Office of the State Council, 2000). Acceptance of the One-China Principle means that the actor admits that Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet are “integral parts” of the PRC (Information Office of the State Council, 2013, Foreword). Hence, the use of the One-China Principle serves to protect Beijing's key interest in protecting its territorial integrity by preventing other states from cooperating with the so-called “separatist” groups in Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet (Information Office of the State Council, 2000). This conditionality has been executed strictly, as China has only provided aid to countries that have abandoned their

diplomatic relationship with Taiwan (Brautigam, 2011). For example, China ceased to provide aid to Senegal when it started its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan in 1997, and then restarted the aid in 2005 when Senegal chose to cut its ties with Taiwan (Brautigam, 2011, p. 209). Therefore, China's approach to conditionality is not "no strings attached" *per se*, but a selective application of conditionality that fulfils its distinctive interests. Hence, interests constitute the predominant factor that drives China's approach to external assistance programs as a means of norm diffusion.

4.3 Outcomes of China's Norm Diffusion

4.3.1 The Beijing Declaration

Having investigated the norms and norm promotion policies of China, this section examines the outcomes of China's norm promotion actions. Chapter 2 identified the codification of norms in international institutions as an important type of positive outcomes caused by norm diffusion. This chapter illustrates that China's norm diffusion has led to the codification of Chinese norms in the Beijing Declaration (2017) and the Copenhagen Accord (2009). These positive outcomes show that China is an actor that possesses normative power in governance structures related to human rights and climate change. In addition, the exclusion of the EU's norms in these two institutions illustrates the normative power exercised by China, with these two institutions instead governed by Chinese norms.

The first example of the codification of Chinese norms is the Beijing Declaration (2017), adopted by the first "South-South Human Rights Forum" held in Beijing. This forum was attended by more than 300 representatives from over 70 countries and international organisations ("China focus", 2017). The formulation of a forum of developing countries to discuss human rights issues is itself an exhibition of China's growing proactiveness in exercising normative power in human rights governance (Gao, 2017).

In international affairs, human rights have been an issue on which the Western states have a dominant position (Freeman & Geeraerts, 2011). For instance, as Chapter 3 illustrates, the EU plays an important role in advancing its interpretation of human rights to other countries, especially developing states in African, Caribbean and Pacific regions. As an observer points out, human rights issues constitute the “weakest point” of China’s international image, since it is often critiqued by the EU and other Western actors for violations of human rights (Gao, 2017). Therefore, gathering developing countries in this forum shows China’s intention to advance “human rights ‘with Chinese characteristics’” (Gao, 2017). The leading role of China in this forum is indicated by the Beijing Declaration (2017), the foreword of which “stressed that President Xi Jinping’s proposal to build ‘Community of Common Destiny’ is a major concept which conforms to the trend of the times, fits the requirements of development, and reflects the pursuit of a new human social value”.

In addition to identifying Xi’s idea of a community of shared destiny as a central issue at the forum, the Beijing Declaration also demonstrates Beijing’s normative power in human rights governance through the codification of China’s interpretations of human rights in context. The declaration is underpinned by Beijing’s emphasis on state autonomy in terms of human rights protection. The Beijing Declaration states this approach from the outset:

In order to ensure universal acceptance and observance of human rights, the realization of human rights must take into account regional and national contexts, and political, economic, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds. The cause of human rights must and can only be advanced in accordance with the national conditions and the needs of the peoples. Each State should adhere to the principle of combining the universality and specificity of

human rights and choose a human rights development path or guarantee model that suits its specific conditions (Article 1).

The idea that human rights are subject to the different conditions of countries is consistent with Beijing's approach to human rights. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Chinese government has been emphasising that it is impossible for the development of human rights to be "divorced from its history and its economic, political and cultural realities (Information Office of the State Council, 1991, Chapter X). As a Chinese scholar suggests, China "admits that human rights are a universal issue but underlines that different conditions of different states should be respected and preserved" (Interview Respondent 1, 29 Dec 2015). The implementation of this approach to human rights in the Beijing Declaration demonstrates that it is an institution underpinned by China's standard of human rights governance.

The declaration also codifies China's preference for developmental rights, as it states that "[t]he right to subsistence and the right to development are the primary basic human rights" (Article, 3). In addition, the declaration prioritises development rights by asserting that:

Developing countries should pay special attention to safeguarding the people's right to subsistence and right to development, especially to achieve a decent standard of living, adequate food, clothing, and clean drinking water, the right to housing, the right to security, work, education, and the right to health and social security (Beijing Declaration, 2017, Article 3).

The focus on rights to subsistence and development in the declaration, which is consistent with China's position on human rights protection, further shows the codification of Chinese norms in the Declaration.

Furthermore, the Beijing Declaration adopts sovereign integrity in human rights governance as a priority, which is another feature of China's approach to human rights. The Declaration sets out that the international governance of the human rights issue "should always follow the international law and the universally recognized basic norms governing international relations, of which the key is to respect national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states" (Article 8). Therefore, the Beijing Declaration adopts the position of opposing external intervention in the name of human rights protection and adhering to the non-interference principle. This also accords with China's position that human rights issues should not be utilised to legitimise international intervention, which is demonstrated by its opposition to UN sanctions against Syria since 2011 (Job, 2016).

The codification of China's standards of human rights makes the Beijing Declaration a positive outcome of China's norm diffusion. It shows that China has the power to shape human rights governance structures through the diffusion of the norms it prefers. In addition, it is worthy to note that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is completely excluded in the Beijing Declaration. This, plus the implementation of China's standards of human rights in context, constitutes a major difference between the Beijing Declaration and the EU's human rights treaties, such as the ECHR and the EU Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which make explicit reference to the UDHR. Therefore, the Beijing Declaration constitutes a new institution underpinned by norms that are different from EU standards of human rights. Hence, in addition to being a positive outcome of China's norm diffusion, this institution indicates that China's exercise of normative power can lead to the emergence of an alternative structure of global governance to that promoted by the EU (Pu, 2012).

4.3.2 The Copenhagen Accord

Another example of Chinese norms being codified in an international institution is the Copenhagen Accord on climate change, which was established in 2009 (UNFCCC, 2009). This document was underpinned by China's norms on climate change before the Copenhagen Conference (COP 15). It therefore constitutes a positive outcome of China's exercise of normative power in climate change governance. Moreover, the majority of the EU's norms before COP 15 were not incorporated in the Accord as the Union was isolated in the last stage of discussions at COP 15, during which the Accord was drafted by Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC), and the US. Therefore, the Copenhagen Accord is an example of how China's exercise of normative power contributes to the establishment of new institutions underpinned by norms preferred by China rather than those promoted by the EU.

This chapter has suggested that China adheres to the CBDR principle as the norm of climate change governance. This norm, especially the binary differentiation between developed and developing states, underpinned China's position before COP 15. Then Premier Wen Jiabao (2009) stated that "action on climate change must be taken within the framework of sustainable development and should in no way compromise the efforts of developing countries to get rid of poverty". Wen (2009) made it clear that developed countries should "take the primary responsibility" in tackling climate change since they "account for 80% of the total global carbon dioxide emissions since the Industrial Revolution over 200 years ago". Wen's statement indicates that the principal norm of the Chinese government before COP 15 was to maintain the differentiation between developed and developing states in the agreement. Such an arrangement would make developed states take the lead in terms of curbing GHG emissions, whereas developing states, including China, could be free of mandatory emission reduction targets (Christoff, 2010). This norm contrasts with the norm promoted by the EU before COP 15, which, as Chapter 3 suggested, aimed to replace binary differentiation with a

progressive agreement that covers all major emitters (Council of the EU, 2007).

At COP 15, an important diffusion mechanism adopted by China was the coalition with Brazil, South Africa and India in the formulation of the BASIC group. As suggested in Chapter 2, coalition building is an important diffusion mechanism in multilateral settings since it can provide broad support for the norms promoted by the actor (Björkdahl, 2013). These four developing countries have been among the top 20 emitting countries and top 30 economies since 2008 (Qi, 2011, p. 298). The formation of BASIC at COP 15 was to a large extent stipulated by their shared interest in preventing a mandatory agreement at the Copenhagen Conference (Hallding et al., 2011). As suggested in Chapter 2, building coalitions provides a broader platform for actors to advance their shared norms collectively (Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013). One benefit of the coalition was that it mobilised support for the norms of China. For instance, China was backed by India in terms of removing the objective of reducing global emissions by 50% before 2050 from a draft agreement (Christoff, 2010, p. 639). In addition, BASIC enabled its members, including China, to play an essential role in leading the negotiations at COP 15, along with the US (Christoff, 2010; Curtin, 2010). The Copenhagen Accord was mainly based on the agreement negotiated between the BASIC states and the US in a meeting that “led to an accord that settled a number of issues, including a compromise on wording on the issue of monitoring and verification that satisfied Premier Wen” (Christoff, 2010, p. 639). These events illustrate that coalition building considerably contributed to China’s effort to diffuse its norms at COP 15. Moreover, another benefit China enjoyed from its coalition with the BASIC group was that “this alliance with India, and the developing countries of Africa which China so effectively used to deflect attention from itself” as the largest emitter in the world (Curtin, 2010, p. 9). Therefore, the coalition with the BASIC states was essential for China’s norm diffusion at COP 15. Through norm diffusion, especially the coalition

building with the BASIC group, China's norms of climate change governance before COP 15 were implemented as the guiding norms of the Copenhagen Accord (Qi, 2011; UNFCCC, 2009). The Accord contains no mandatory targets for non-Annex 1 (developing) states; instead, it merely states that these states "will implement" mitigation targets that are not necessarily quantified (UNFCCC, 2009, p. 6). In addition, developed countries have considerably more responsibility as they "commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified economywide emissions targets for 2020" (UNFCCC, 2009, p. 6). The differentiated mitigation obligations manifest China's norm that developed and developing states should be treated separately in the agreement. In addition, the Accord is not legally binding and did not introduce any concrete emissions reduction targets. Instead, the Accord merely "recognised" the need to limit the global temperature rise by 2°C (UNFCCC, 2009). Moreover, the Copenhagen Conference decided to introduce a "pledge and review" system based on voluntary contributions rather than binding commitments (UNFCCC, 2009). The exclusion of mandatory and binding targets of curbing GHG emissions was consistent with China's norms, since the Copenhagen Accord provides China and other developing states with considerable autonomy in formulating its domestic policies regarding climate change so that their economic development is not hindered (Christoff, 2010, pp. 640–643). Therefore, the codification of Chinese norms in the Copenhagen Accord constitutes another example of Beijing's normative power in global governance.

The codification of China's norms in the Copenhagen Accord was accompanied by the lack of codification of the EU's norms in the Accord. Most importantly, the final Accord does not adopt a single arrangement binding all large emitters, which was the norm promoted by the EU before Copenhagen (Council of the EU, 2007). Instead, the Accord states that "mitigation actions taken by non-Annex 1 Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification" and guidelines "will ensure that

national sovereignty is respected” (Curtin, 2010, p. 5). In addition, China’s coalition with BASIC and the US at the Conference led to the isolation of the EU at COP 15. When the BASIC group jointly negotiated with the US to formulate the basis of the Copenhagen Accord before the end of COP 15, the EU was not present (Curtin, 2010, p. 1). Therefore, the Copenhagen Accord indicates that China’s exercise of normative power can contribute to the establishment of new institutions underpinned by norms that are different from those promoted by the EU.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed China’s normative power by examining its norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes. First, the analysis of China’s norms illustrated that China is promoting sovereignty, human rights, peaceful development and CBDR in its external relations. The hierarchies of these norms, as well as China’s interpretations of them, are essentially driven by China’s distinctive interests. The chapter argued that China’s interests in protecting territorial integrity and consolidating its relationship with developing states drive its emphasis on the non-interference principle in its interpretation of sovereignty. These interests also drove China to prioritise sovereignty in its foreign policy. Yet, China’s position regarding Darfur shows that it is adopting a flexible position regarding the non-interference principle to present a responsible image. Beijing’s interests in legitimising its approach to human rights and developing its economy while maintaining the CCP’s rule drive its distinctive interpretation of human rights. China has also been promoting peaceful development since the mid-2000s as a response to the “China threat theory”. The analysis shows that China’s interpretations of sovereignty and human rights are considerably different from the EU’s understanding of these norms. China’s position on CBDR has also diverged from the EU’s norm of climate change governance since the mid-2000s due to China’s interest in protecting economic development of developing states. Thus, the analysis shows that China’s

distinctive norms in global governance are essentially due to its distinctive interests.

Second, the analysis illustrated that China deliberately diffuses its norms in global governance, especially through peripheral diplomacy and development assistance programs. Beijing's approach to peripheral diplomacy illustrates its growing proactiveness in establishing a global order centred on China and Chinese norms in Xi Jinping's era. The chapter also demonstrated that China's economic interests in developing states, as well as its interest in protecting sovereign integrity, drive its distinctive approach to the use of conditionality in external assistance programs

Third, the chapter verified the positive outcomes of China's norm diffusion based on an analysis of the Beijing Declaration and the Copenhagen Accord. The analysis confirmed that China's norm diffusion has brought about the codification of its norms in these institutions, illustrating the normative power of China in human rights and climate change governance. In addition, the exclusion of the EU's norms in these two institutions indicates that China's exercise of normative power is contributing to the emergence of an alternative global governance structure to that promoted by the EU.

Chapter 5—The EU, China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Norm Divergence and Compromise in International Financial Governance

Introduction

The previous two chapters have demonstrated that both the EU and China possess normative power in global governance. They also examined the predominant role interests play in driving the EU's and China's interpretations of their norms and approaches to norm diffusion. This chapter examines and compares the normative power of the EU and China in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which, as stated in Chapter 1, constitutes a multilateral institution in which both these two actors exercise norm diffusion. It seeks to answer these research questions: *How do the EU and China exercise their normative power in multilateral institutions? How do the EU and China address their norm divergence and why?*

Based on the study of their norms, diffusion mechanisms and the outcomes of norm diffusion, the chapter argues that both the EU and China possess normative power in the AIIB, which is based on the diffusion of their norms and the codification of their norms in the policy framework of the Bank. The chapter also argues that interests constitute the predominant driver of the norm divergence and compromise between the EU and China in the AIIB. Shaped by their distinctive political and economic interests, the EU and China promote different hierarchies of norms during the negotiation of the AIIB. In addition, the chapter shows that the EU and China diffused their norms in different ways because of their different roles in the negotiation of the AIIB. At the same time, driven by their overlapping interests in enhancing the global profile of the Bank, the EU and China made compromises on the norms of the Bank. Consequently,

the AIIB incorporates both the norms of the EU and those of China. This shows that the norms of multilateral institutions are essentially an outcome of the politics among actors that exercise normative power.

This chapter is partly based on the 2016 article “The AIIB and China’s Normative Power in International Financial Governance Structure”, published by *Chinese Political Science Review* (Peng & Tok, 2016). The author of this thesis is the first author with an overall contribution of 80%. The second author of the article, Dr Tok, has given permission for the article to be included in the thesis. The next two paragraphs and Sections 5.1.1 and 5.4.1 are based on this published article, with updated information and additional analysis in accordance with the theme of this thesis.

The AIIB was initially announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in October 2013 (Wilson, 2017). This initiative corresponded to the growing need for development finance in the Asian region. In 2010, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) published a report which asserts that the Asia region requires 8 trillion USD to develop infrastructure between 2010 and 2020 (Bhattacharyay, 2010). A recently revised set of estimates has doubled the annual figure to 1.5 trillion USD (ADB, 2017). However, the World Bank (WB) and the ADB combined can only provide about 20 billion USD each year in the Asia region (Overseas Development Institute, 2015). The AIIB, with an authorised capital of 100 billion USD, seeks to narrow this gap. However, in the year following its initiation, the AIIB did not gain much attention in the global media (Wilson, 2017). In addition, the United States and Japan openly expressed their opposition to this institution (Perlez, 2015). The US had also been advising its Western allies to withhold their support from this Chinese initiative. As a result, it was a general assumption in the media that “the AIIB would start out as a modest venture involving mainly Asian and Middle Eastern countries” (Wihtol, 2015,

p. 7).

On 12 March 2015, the announcement by the United Kingdom (UK) of its intention to join the AIIB changed the situation dramatically. Although Luxembourg had submitted its application a few days before the UK made this decision, the UK's political and financial clout in international politics led to a scramble for the founding membership of the AIIB among Western countries. In merely a few days, France, Germany, Australia and other major Western economies made the decision to join the AIIB. Consequently, when the signing ceremony of the Articles of Agreement (AOA) was held in Beijing on 29 June 2015, the AIIB had become a multilateral financial institution involving 57 Prospective Founding Members (PFMs), which included China, other emerging economies and most of the developed economies (AIIB, 2015b). After the AOA had been signed by all 57 PFMs between 29 June 2015 and 31 December 2015, the AIIB opened for business on 16 January 2016, and Jin Liqun, former Ranking Vice President of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), became the first president of the AIIB. By August 2019, the AIIB had 100 members and 20 EU Member States had joined the Bank (AIIB, 2019).⁸

China's leading role in creating the AIIB and the participation of the majority of the EU Member States in the Bank suggest the potential of both China and the EU to exercise normative power in this institution. The EU's normative power in the AIIB is examined through the cohesive actions of its Member States before and after they join the AIIB, since no EU institutions have joined the Bank. As suggested in Chapter 1, one way to demonstrate the EU's actorness in an international institution is through the cohesive actions of the Member States (Delreux, 2014; Kissack, 2008). For example, Kissack

⁸ By 26 August 2019, the EU Member States that had joined the AIIB were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

(2008) suggests that the cohesive actions of the EU Member States in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) demonstrates the Union's actorness in this institution even though the EU is not a member of the ILO. Therefore, the EU can exercise its normative power in the AIIB even without joining the Bank, on the condition that the actions of the Member States are in line with the EU's norms. The consistency between the norms promoted by EU Member States in the AIIB and the financial governance norms supported by the EU is a focus of this chapter, particularly in Section 5.1.

The chapter assesses and compares their normative power in the AIIB in four sections. The first identifies the norms the two actors sought to promote during the formulation of the AIIB. Analysis of the official statements of the EU and China illustrates how their norms in the AIIB reflect their diverging financial governance norms. The second section outlines the diffusion mechanisms utilised by the EU and China to advance their norms in the AIIB. It shows that due to China's leading role in the negotiation of the AIIB and the EU Member States' role as the participant, there was divergence between their approaches to bilateral negotiations. The third section of the chapter illustrates the compromise reached between the EU and China regarding the norms of the AIIB due to their overlapping interests. Finally, the fourth section analyses the policy frameworks of the AIIB to evaluate the outcomes of the norm promotion of the EU and China. In this section, the chapter follows the analytical framework in Chapter 2 by emphasising the codification of the norms of China in the AOA, as well as the codification of the EU's norms in the transparency framework of the AIIB. The section also studies the incorporation of the norms of the EU and China in the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF).

5.1 The Norms Promoted by China and the EU in the AIIB

5.1.1 Norms promoted by China in the AIIB

No strings attached

The first norm advanced by the Chinese government in the AIIB is “no strings attached”, namely that the AIIB does not attach conditions that would transform the political structure of the recipient states in its investment programs. This norm, as a manifestation of the non-interference principle in China’s foreign aid governance (Li X., 2013, p. 90), was underscored by Chinese leaders and officials as the guiding principle of the AIIB’s projects (“China’s AIIB to offer”, 2015; Xinhuanet, 2015b). As Chapter 4 suggests, for China the norm of “no strings attached” refers to the avoidance to transform the political structure of the recipient state through the use of political conditionality (Hodzi et al., 2012). China’s adoption of “no strings attached” can be traced back to then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who defined the principles of China’s foreign aid as “equity and mutual benefit” and stated that China “never considers its assistance as a type of unilateral charity but rather as mutual aid”. He also articulated that China “never asks for any privilege and never poses conditions” in its foreign aid program (Zhou, 1964). As Chapter 4 has demonstrated, the Chinese government has been seeking to maintain an equal relationship with other developing countries since the foundation of the PRC, both because of the shared colonial history and the interests it can obtain from a close relationship with these states (Brautigam, 2009). The “no strings attached” norm is consistent with these objectives since it serves to establish China as a non-coercive source of aid alternative to Western donors that extensively apply political conditionality (Brautigam, 2009).

The exclusion of conditionality has been persistent in Chinese external assistance activities. For instance, the 2014 China’s Foreign Aid White Paper states that:

When providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their right to independently choosing

their own paths and models of development. The basic principles China upholds in providing foreign assistance are mutual respect, equality, keeping promise, mutual benefits, and win–win. (State Council, 2014)

Zhou Enlai’s principles of “mutual benefit”, “no strings attached” and “non-interference” are all repeated in this report, indicating that these norms remain as guidelines for China’s foreign aid and investment activities. Beijing’s adherence to the “no strings attached” norm corresponds to its interpretation of the norm of sovereignty, which, as Chapter 4 suggests, emphasises that the political system is the internal business of each state. Thus, no country has the right to interfere or to decide the structure of governance of another (State Council, 2014). This position determines China’s interpretation of “no strings attached”, which constitutes an important norm that Beijing sought to advance in the formulation of the AIIB.

Infrastructure development

The second norm diffused by Beijing in the AIIB is infrastructure development, which refers to an emphasis on infrastructure construction in aid programs (Brautigam, 2009, p. 11; Jiang, 2015). The focus on infrastructure is a central norm that underpins both China’s domestic economic policy and its external assistance policies (Jiang, 2015). According to the State Council (2014), 44.8% of Chinese aid was used for economic infrastructure, while 27.6% was used for social and public infrastructure during 2010–2012. These infrastructure programs include the construction of hospitals, schools, water supply, public infrastructure, transport and communications, broadcasting and telecommunications and power supply. China has also assisted in the construction of over 70 transport projects, including roads, bridges, airports and ports. In Africa alone, China has built 2233 km of railroad and 3391 km of highway (State Council, 2014). Therefore, infrastructure development constitutes an essential norm of China’s understanding of “what development actually entails” and how development can be

achieved most effectively (Breslin, 2016, p. 69).

The AIIB inherits Beijing's focus on infrastructure development as a guiding norm of its policy framework. The AIIB was proposed by Chinese leaders as a new bank that seeks to "provide financial support to infrastructure development in developing countries in the region" ("China's Xi Jinping", 2013). In the words of President Xi, the AIIB "should pick up speed to promote connectivity of infrastructure in the region and push forward regional economic cooperation to inject new driving force into the economic development in Asia" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2014). Premier Li Keqiang (2013) also stated that the AIIB "aims to pool collective efforts to raise our financing capacity and will give priority to transport, energy, communication and other infrastructure projects in countries of the region". The focus on infrastructure distinguishes the AIIB from other major multilateral development banks (MDBs), such as the WB and the ADB, which aim to alleviate poverty in recipient countries (Kawai, 2015).

This chapter suggests that China's adoption of infrastructure development as a norm, as well as its decision to establish the AIIB as an infrastructure-focused institution, is largely driven by its interests. First, Beijing has considerable interests in spreading its preference for infrastructure development in the Asian region. As illustrated in Chapter 4, China has prioritised economic development in its internal governance since the 1980s (Information Office of the State Council, 2012). Based on its own experience of fostering economic growth since the reform and opening-up policy commenced in 1978, China identifies infrastructure as a priority for the economic development of developing countries (Gu, 2017, p. 144). As President Xi Jinping stated, "[t]o build fortune, roads should be built first" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2014). The importance of infrastructure for economic growth has been identified by the WB's (1994) report,

“Infrastructure for Development”. This report points out that “[i]nfrastructure can deliver major benefits in economic growth, poverty alleviation, and environmental sustainability”. According to the WB’s calculation, there is a close connection between infrastructure and economic growth as “1 percent increase in the stock of infrastructure is associated with a 1 percent increase in gross domestic product (GDP) across all countries” (World Bank, 1994, p. 2). The construction of transportation, water supply, electricity and telecommunication can enhance the flow of other production elements, attract investment and thereby increase production efficiency in the area (Jiang, 2015). China is both an important practitioner and major beneficiary of infrastructure construction. For example, according to Jiang (2015), between 1990 and 2005, China invested more than 600 billion USD in building up a highway network at a length of 410,000 km. Jiang (2015, p. 8) suggests that without such a network, China’s national income would decrease by 6% in 2007. The successful experience of achieving economic growth through infrastructure is therefore an important factor that shapes China’s emphasis on infrastructure in fostering economic development. Thus, Beijing’s intention to establish the AIIB as an infrastructure-focused institution can be understood as an attempt to shape economic development in the Asian region in its likeness (Huang, 2016).

Second, spreading infrastructure construction through the operation of the AIIB also contributes to establishing secure and reliable transportation lines for transporting raw materials, energy supply and semi-finished goods to China, especially those from Central Asian states (Rolland, 2015; Zimmerman, 2015). For instance, Rolland (2015, p. 3) suggests that the development of pipelines, roads, railway lines in Central Asia will “improve China’s ability to transport crucial energy resources from suppliers in Central Asia and the Middle East” and “lessen (China’s) reliance on the Southeast Asian strait” for energy transportation. Hence, establishing the AIIB as an infrastructure-

focused institution serves China's interest in securing its energy and resource supply (Wilson, 2017).

Third, enhancing infrastructure development also serves China's interest in reallocating its excessive production capacity (Hong, 2017). Currently, many of the Chinese heavy industries, particularly the steel, energy and construction sectors, have the issue of major overcapacity (Wilson, 2017). Tackling this issue has become a top economic policy priority for the Chinese government ("China ahead of schedule", 2016). As one of the major financial sources of the BRI project, the AIIB's promotion of infrastructure development in the Asian region paves the way for China to export part of its overcapacity through the operation of Chinese companies. For instance, one of the earliest projects approved by the AIIB, the Pakistan National Motorway M-4 (Shorkot-Khanewal Section) Project, is managed by two Chinese companies: China Railway First Group and Xinjiang Beixin Road and Bridge Group. Thus, China's interest in shaping economic governance in its likeness as well as its security interests and economic interests that can be fulfilled through building infrastructure in the Asian region, were primary drivers of China's promotion of the AIIB as an infrastructure-focused bank. This demonstrates that what China seeks to diffuse through the operation of the AIIB is a governance structure in Asia in which its interests can be best served.

Fair governance structure

The third norm promoted by China in the AIIB was a "fair governance structure", which increases the voting rights of developing states in multilateral institutions. In the words of Jin Liqun, the AIIB "reflects the resolution of the founding members to establish a new type of multilateral financial institution, which shows the characteristic of global governance in the 21st century so as to foster global financial governance and adapt to a multipolar world" (as cited in Xinhuanet, 2017). Central to this Chinese vision of global financial governance is the redistribution of voting rights so that developing

states can have a larger share than they have in other existing institutions, such as the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Xinhuanet, 2017; Zhang and Keith, 2017).

Beijing's diffusion of a "fair governance structure" in the AIIB was predominantly driven by its interest in shaping global financial institutions with its norms. Since the mid-2000s, it has been an important interest of China to reform the major multilateral financial institutions, such as the IMF and the WB, to establish a "fair" governance structure (Lu, 2011, p. 89). The key point of this reform is the redistribution of voting rights "to represent the interests of newly emerging economies and developing countries" (Zhang and Keith, 2017: 186). China has been suggesting that, currently, the share of voting rights of the emerging countries in the WB and the IMF does not correspond to their actual economic status. For instance, before 2010, China had only 2.8% and 5.5% of voting rights in the WB and ADB, respectively, and was ranked only 6th in terms of voting rights in the IMF. Conversely, Japan and the US had a combined 23.6% and 26% in the WB and ADB, respectively. They also have the two largest shares of voting rights in the IMF: the US has 17% and Japan has 6%. The unbalanced distribution of voting rights is also substantial between developed countries and developing countries. Before 2008, the G7 countries had a combined 41.2% of voting rights in the IMF, whereas together, BRICS have only 14.2% (Chen & Tan, 2013). China argues that the developing countries, especially emerging countries such as the BRICS, have a lower proportion of voting rights than their economic weight in the world economy (Cui & Chang 2013). In contrast, although the economic clout of developed countries is diminishing, they still have an enormous share of voting rights, enabling them to control the policy-making process of these organisations. Hence, the interest in establishing a more balanced voting right distribution structure that reflects the growing importance of developing countries in the global economy drove China

to diffuse a “fair governance structure” in the formulation of the AIIB.

5.1.2 Norms promoted by the EU Member States in the AIIB

A policy paper published by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC, 2015, p. 4) states that “[t]he AIIB case highlights the lack of a common strategy among EU Member States”. This is due to the absence of EU institutions in the AIIB and the fact that “Member States decided largely on their own” when joining this China-led institution (EPSC, 2015, p. 4). This chapter suggests that the diffusion of transparency and social and environmental protection by the EU Member States in the AIIB shows that the EU can exercise normative power both as a bloc, as in the Cotonou Agreement (2000), and in cases in which Member States take joint actions to promote the EU’s norms despite the lack of a common strategy designed by the EU. Indeed, despite the lack of coherence in actions, the Member States that joined the AIIB share common ground in terms of promoting transparency, social security and environmental protection norms that are consistent with the EU’s external assistance norms. Clearly, compared with China’s adherence to “no strings attached”, infrastructure development and a fair governance structure, the EU Member States promoted a completely different set of norms in the AIIB, indicating the norm divergence between the EU and China in the Bank.

The statements made by the EU Member States when they decided to join the AIIB illustrate that ensuring the AIIB will meet the highest standards in terms of internal governance, transparency, social security and environmental protection constitutes the central principle of these countries (Wilson, 2017). Luxemburg, the first EU member state that was accepted as an AIIB member, stated that it “will work with the other founding members to ensure that the AIIB will meet the highest and most stringent standards in terms of good governance, transparent lending policies, social and

environmental safeguards as well as state-of-the-art procurement guidelines” (Government of Luxemburg, 2015). The UK presented a similar stance in terms of improving the governance of the AIIB by exerting that it:

Will play a key role in ensuring that the AIIB embodies the best standards in accountability, transparency and governance, which will be essential to ensuring the success of the initiative and to unlocking the potential benefits for the wider global economy (Government of the United Kingdom, 2015).

As illustrated in Chapter 3, the norms emphasised by the EU Member States, including transparency, social security and environmental safeguards, are all important norms of the EU’s Treaty and the *New European Consensus on Development Policy* (EU, 2017a). This chapter suggests that such consistency between the norms of the Union’s external assistance policy and the norms its Member States seek to diffuse in the AIIB establishes the foundation for the EU’s normative power in terms of shaping the governance structure of the AIIB with its norms. For example, Chapter 3 demonstrated that in the *New European Consensus on Development Policy* (EU, 2017a), transparency is an overarching requirement that applies to various areas of the EU’s development policy in developing countries, including public procurement, trade relationships and institutional development, indicating that transparency is an important principle of the EU’s external assistance actions.

In addition to transparency, Chapter 3 also illustrated that social and environmental protection are norms that underpin the EU’s approach to external assistance. The Treaty states that “fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries” is listed in the Treaty of the EU as a principal objective of the Union’s development policy (EU, 2007b, Article 21 (2)(d)). The *New European Consensus on Development Policy* emphasises social protection as “a stronger

foundation for sustainable development” and promised to devote at least 20% of the EU’s Official Development Assistance to social inclusion and human development (EU, 2017a, paragraph 22). It also identifies environmental protection as an important norm by stating that:

The EU and its Member States will promote resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and production, including the sustainable management of chemicals and waste, with a view to decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation and enabling the transition to a circular economy (EU, 2017a, paragraph 43).

Chapter 3 pointed out that the EU’s diffusion of transparency, social safeguards and environmental protection is underpinned by its interest in promoting its standard of financial governance. This chapter suggests such an interest was shared by the EU and its Member States in their response to the AIIB as they sought to shape and influence the governance structure of the Bank in accordance with their financial governance standards. For example, France, Germany and Italy, in the joint announcement of their decision to join the AIIB, said they were “keen to work with the AIIB founding members to establish an institution that follows the best standards and practices in terms of governance, safeguards, debt and procurement policies” (Higgins & Sanger, 2015). Similarly, the EU argued that:

Europe should not inadvertently help to lay the grounds for a world in which Chinese or AIIB finance will be preferred in emerging markets because it comes without the economic prescriptions and economic and social standards upheld by other multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank (EPSC, 2015, p. 5).

This shared interest in shaping the governance structure of the AIIB is therefore an important factor that leads to the consistency between the norms promoted by the Member States and those of the Union's external assistance policy.

The different norms advanced by the EU and China in the AIIB illustrates the considerable divergence between their norms on financial governance. The first aspect of divergence is that whereas transparency and managing environmental and social impacts are institutionalised in the EU's external assistance practices, these norms are not codified in Beijing's overseas investment practices. For instance, the website of the Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China, one of the most important actors in Chinese external assistance programs, does not provide any detailed information about its projects. The only publications the Exim Bank provides are its annual reports. However, these reports do not provide critical information about the bank's programs, such as the amount of finance, the duration of the project or the construction contractors (Exim Bank of China, 2017, 2018).

In addition to the lack of transparency, environmental and social risk management are also absent in Chinese foreign aid and investment practices, despite the increasing emphasis placed on the environment and sustainability in China's domestic policy thinking since the late 2000s. This further shows that there is considerable divergence between the financial governance norms adopted by the EU and those adopted by China. The 13th Five-year Plan of China lists the improvement of ecosystems and the environment as an essential objective of China's domestic development in 2016–2020 and aims to establish “national dynamic monitoring and early- warning system for ecological security and conduct regular comprehensive surveys and assessments of ecological risks” (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2015, Chapter 47). The China Banking Regulatory Commission established the *Green Credit*

Guidelines in 2012, which require Chinese banks to “promote green credit as a strategy, support economy to grow in a green, low-carbon and recycled model through business innovation, manage environmental and social (E&S) risks” (CBRC, 2012, paragraph 3).

Despite the emphasis on environmental protection and sustainable development in Chinese policy-making, these norms have not been fully implemented in China’s external assistance programs (Hameiri & Jones, 2018). Hameiri and Jones (2018) point out that the economic interests of Chinese development banks were an important factor leading to the diverging approaches to social risk management and environmental protection between the EU and China. In particular, Chinese development banks are not interested in transforming their existing governance norms since such a shift towards international standards could undermine their primary interest in obtaining economic benefits through overseas projects (Hameiri & Jones, 2018, p. 592). This shows that the interests of agencies have a significant impact on China’s approach to financial governance norms in its external assistance programs.

Indeed, more than half of the Chinese firms involved in its BRI initiative have “never published *any* CSR (corporate social responsibility) or sustainability reports” (Hameiri & Jones, 2018, p. 588). For example, the Exim Bank does not provide information regarding the evaluation or assessment of the environmental and social impacts of its programs in its annual reports (Exim Bank of China, 2017, 2018). Hence, as Hameiri and Jones (2018, p. 589) argue, “the regulation of Chinese firms’ overseas investment practices remains loose, ineffective and well below ‘best practice’ relating to development projects”. Compared to the EIB’s adherence to the EU’s norm of social and environmental protection, the lack of implementation of these norms in China’s external assistance practices illustrates the norm divergence between the EU and China

in the area of financial governance (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 *Norms promoted by China and the EU in the AIIB*

China's Norms in the AIIB	The EU's Norms in the AIIB
No strings attached -no political condition to transform the governance structure of the recipient state	Social security and environmental protection -evaluate and address the social and environmental risks of the projects
Focus on infrastructure development -establish the AIIB as an infrastructure-focused bank	Transparency -provide public access to detailed information about aid programs
A fair governance structure -increase the voting rights of developing states	

5.2 Norm Diffusion of China and the EU: Different Roles Lead to Different Approaches

The approaches to norm promotion of the EU and China in the AIIB are considerably different because of their different positions in the Bank. As the actor that initiated the AIIB, China played a leading role in the negotiations and has a dominant position in the AIIB's internal management structure since it is the single largest shareholder, holds the presidency, and enjoys veto power in its internal governance. This predominant position enables China to diffuse its norms in the AIIB by setting the agenda and the focus of the Bank's policy framework. The way the EU advances its norms is considerably different, mainly because of its institutional setting. While China shapes the governance norms of the Bank by acting as a singular actor, the EU's promotion is conducted through the actions of its Member States. Therefore, the EU's norm promotion depends on the coherent actions of the Member States (EPSC, 2015). The analysis shows that both the EU and China have been actively promoting their norms during both the negotiation and operation phases of the AIIB through their distinctive mechanisms.

China's norm promotion in the AIIB has two aspects. First, as the state that initiated the formulation of the AIIB, China was in the driver's seat during the negotiations of the institution. This position enabled China to promote its norms by setting the agenda of the negotiations of the Bank. In April 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (2014) stated that "China is ready to intensify consultations with relevant parties in and outside Asia on the preparations for the AIIB". Shortly after this statement, in June 2014, China proposed doubling the registered capital of the bank from 50 billion USD to 100 billion USD. China's pledged contribution was 50%. Later, in October 2014, China signed the Memorandum of Understanding with another 20 countries in Beijing. These moves following Li Keqiang's statement show that the negotiation process of the AIIB clearly took place under Chinese leadership. In addition, the Multilateral Interim Secretariat of the AIIB was led by a Chinese official, Jin Lique. This institution was a key player in the AIIB's negotiations since it was responsible for drafting the proposed charter of the AIIB (Li, 2015). Having Jin Lique as the secretary-general of this important institution that formulates the AIIB's policy framework testifies to China's ability to shape the governance framework of the Bank.

Second, China is also able to advance its norms in the AIIB because of its predominant position in the AIIB's governance structure. The first president of the Bank is Jin Lique, and the AIIB's headquarters are located in Beijing. These arrangements indicate China's central role in the AIIB's operation. In addition, according to the AOA, China contributes 29% of the AIIB's capital and has around 26% of total voting rights. Hence, China has veto power in the AIIB since the Board of Directors needs 75% of the total voting power of the members to "take decisions on major operational and financial policies and on delegation of authority to the President under Bank policies" (AIIB, 2015a, Article 26). These internal regime arrangements, especially China's veto power, ensure China can exert its normative influence in the operation phase of the AIIB (Chiu,

2017, p. 694).

While China promotes its norms by playing a leading role in the negotiations and operation of the AIIB, the EU projects its normative power through the participation of EU Member States. This chapter suggests that the accession of the Member States contributes to the EU's norm promotion in three ways. First, the EU's institutional structure allows the Member States to make their own decisions to join the AIIB despite the lack of a common EU strategy (Menegazzi, 2017). Since no EU institution entered the AIIB, the Member States constitute the only direct channel through which the EU can promote its norms and shape the governance structure of the Bank (EPSC, 2015). This is particularly important as the EU intends to ensure that "good governance standards are respected" by this newly established bank (EPSC, 2015). Therefore, the membership of the EU Member States in the AIIB is an essential mechanism for the Union to exercise its normative power in the institution.

Second, the actions taken by the Member States also enhance the EU's norm promotion since they, as a report by the European Council on Foreign Relations indicates, "did follow Brussels's lead after accession, agreeing to speak with one voice about the significance of the AIIB, and about the EU's role in the Bank's establishment and operations" (ECFR, 2016, p. 137). The EU Member States actively attempted to shape the governance structure of the AIIB with the norms of transparency, environmental protection and social security despite the absence of EU institutions (Chiu, 2017). As already noted, these norms are important principles diffused by the EU in its development policy. Therefore, the Member States' entrance to the AIIB enabled them to transfer the norms of the Union to the governance structure of the Bank through persuasion. For instance, a *New York Times* report notes that China "originally suggested that a technical panel would make final decisions, rather than a board of

senior officials from member countries” to accelerate project approval (Perlez, 2015). However, such a proposal was rejected by the UK for not providing enough transparency in terms of the decision-making process of the Bank. The UK’s opinion persuaded Beijing to make a compromise in terms of establishing a Board of Directors of the AIIB as the governance body (Perlez, 2015). This change in the institutional setting of the AIIB illustrates that, as Wilson (2017) points out, the entrance of European governments brought “significant pressure” on China to “adopt more transparent and rules-based governance practices”. Such pressure shaped the governance structure of the AIIB, indicating that the EU Member States’ actions to advance their norms through persuasion contributed to establishing the EU’s normative power in the Bank.

Third, Chiu (2017, p. 697) argues that although the EU Member States exerted considerable influence in the start-up phase of the AIIB, their chance of “shaping the AIIB from within” after the AIIB starts operation is restricted by “their role as non-regional members”. In contrast to Chiu’s suggestion, the development of the AIIB shows that the EU Member States can and have continued to shape the governance structure of this bank after it opened for business in 2016. Indeed, in its response to the author’s question about the impact of the EU Member States on the Bank, the AIIB recognised their influence by stating that “their experience with high standards of governance and transparency are informing our policies and strategies” (Response to the author, Feb 2019). This is mainly because the EU Member States constitute an important group of actors in the internal management of the AIIB. Since the admission of Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Cyprus, Greece and Romania as prospective members in 2017, the number of participating EU Member States has further increased to 20. Altogether they hold around 20% of the voting power in the AIIB. Therefore, these EU Member States are the second-largest bloc of voters in the Bank (AIIB, 2019). In addition, EU Member States represent two of the 12 constituencies in the AIIB.

Germany also has a seat on the non-resident Board of Directors, representing all Eurozone Member States, while the UK holds another, representing the Wider Europe group. Moreover, three of the five deputies of the AIIB are Europeans, including the German banker Joachim von Amsberg, who is responsible for policy and strategy. He is in charge of developing the AIIB's investment portfolio, which is one of the most important areas of responsibility in the Bank's policy-making (Stanzel, 2017). These internal arrangements show that the European states, as the largest group of non-regional members of the Bank, have considerable ability to influence the Bank's decision-making process (Hujiskens et al., 2017; Stanzel, 2017).

Such ability was demonstrated by the formulation of the ESF in 2016 and the transparency framework in 2018. The ESF establishes an assessment regime that reviews the social risks and environmental impacts of each project of the AIIB (AIIB, 2016). The AIIB's Public Information Policy (AIIB, 2018a) regulates that the Bank discloses all relevant information regarding its institutional arrangements and project operation. These policies, which are analysed in detail in the next section, are shaped by the EU's principle of social and environmental protection, as well as enhanced transparency. The establishment of these policies *after* the operation of the AIIB indicates that the EU Member States have continued their efforts to advance the EU's norms in the governance structure of the AIIB.

5.3 Addressing Norm Divergence Through Compromise

Although China and the EU promote different norms in the AIIB, they addressed such norm divergence through compromises during the negotiations. In particular, China agreed to implement the EU's norms of transparency, social security and environmental protection as the guiding norms of the AIIB. In addition, the EU Member States changed their positions on promoting human rights protection through development

policy, as the Member States did not put this norm forward when joining the AIIB. This chapter argues that the EU's and China's overlapping interest in enhancing the influence of the AIIB in global financial governance was the predominant driver of the compromise reached between these two actors. Therefore, in the AIIB, driven by their overlapping interests, the EU and China addressed their norm divergence through compromise.

Norm adoption underpinned China's policy during the negotiations of the AIIB, illustrating the compromise made by Beijing regarding the norms of the Bank (Wilson, 2017). President Xi states that the AIIB "should learn from the experience and best practices of existing multilateral development banks in terms of governance structure, environment and social benefits policies, procurement policy and debt sustainability" (Xi, 2016). Since the early stage of its formulation, the AIIB has adopted the norms of environmental protection, social security and transparency in its policy framework (Wilson, 2017). The AIIB acknowledges this norm adoption by stating that it "benefits from the high standards of governance in EU members and their experiences have helped us establish strong policies and procedures" (Response to the author, Feb 2019). According to Wilson (2017, p. 16), an example of China's norm adoption is that the initial AIIB template proposed by China during negotiations in 2014 did not place much emphasis on environmental, social or transparency safeguards. However, after the negotiations with major EU Member States, such as the UK, Jin Liqun announced that the AIIB will run a "clean, lean and green" institution operating to the highest international standards, meaning that the bank will "abide by the toughest environmental and social standards in its lending and model itself in many ways on existing multilateral development banks" ("AIIB head vows", 2015). As an interview respondent pointed out, Jin's statement illustrates that China "swiftly adopted the EU's principles of social security and environmental protection" as the governance principles

of the AIIB (Interview Respondent 8, 5 March 2019).

Beijing's adoption of the EU's norms was driven essentially by the objective to obtain the endorsement of European states to enhance the international influence of the AIIB. In early 2015, Chinese diplomats made tremendous efforts to "secure a wider range of major economies from both in and out of Asia" of the AIIB's membership to enhance the international impact of the bank (Wilson, 2017, p. 6). As the AIIB acknowledges, this objective is fulfilled by "the participation of non-regional members [which] reinforced the institution's international characteristics" (Response to the author, Feb 2019). Essentially, this result is achieved by the compromises made by the Chinese government on the issues of environmental protection, social security and transparency (Wilson, 2017). The accession of 19 EU Member States has elevated the AIIB to a "fully-fledged international institution" (Chiu, 2017, p. 691) and significantly improved the "prestige and credibility" of this newly established institution (Wilson, 2017, p. 16). Consequently, the expanded membership has significantly increased the international legitimacy of the AIIB, making it a multilateral development bank with global influence.

The enhanced role of the AIIB contributes to increasing the influence of Chinese norms, including "no strings attached", infrastructure construction and a fair governance structure in global financial governance. For instance, in 2017, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP, 2017, Foreword) stated that "a higher policy focus" should be placed on "improving availability and access to sustainable infrastructure" for the least developing countries and small island developing countries in this region to achieve economic growth and sustainable development. In addition, in March 2015, the ADB decided to raise the annual fund for infrastructure and other projects by nearly 40% to 18 billion USD. This can be regarded as a response to the founding of the AIIB (Pilling, 2015). It also signals that the launch of the AIIB advanced

the norm of infrastructure construction and changed the policy of other institutions. In the financial governance area, the AIIB has also sparked a series of reactions. In December 2015, after more than half a decade of stagnation, the US Congress finally approved the reform plan of the IMF, which was formulated in 2010 to increase the voting rights of China and other emerging countries. This was undoubtedly spurred on by the formation of the AIIB. Therefore, adopting international standards of social and environmental protection contributes to enhancing China's normative power in international development. Moreover, other international institutions have made changes in their policies to accommodate China's appeals regarding the global financial governance structure. These developments shed light on the spill-over effect of the AIIB in the international financial governance structure, and indicate that the exercise of normative power incorporates both promotion and compromise.

The EU Member States also made compromises during their membership negotiations with China. Specifically, human rights protection, which is the overarching norm in the EU's development policy, was not raised by the EU Member States during the negotiations of the AIIB. The absence of a direct reference to human rights in their statements when joining the AIIB shows that European countries adapted their position on this issue when seeking the membership of the Bank. Human rights protection is one of the core principles of the EU's external actions, which aim to "consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law" (EU, 2007b, Article 21-2(b)). *The New European Consensus on Development Policy* incorporates human rights in the EU's approach to external assistance, as it states that the EU's development policy "contributes, inter alia, to supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights" (EU, 2017a, paragraph 11). It also states that the EU and its Member States should "implement a rights-based approach to development cooperation, encompassing all human rights" (EU, 2017a, paragraph 16).

However, the EU Member States made a significant compromise by sidestepping the issue of human rights in their statement when joining the AIIB. An important reason behind this compromise was that the Member States, just as China, have an interest in enhancing the global influence of the AIIB. For instance, a key interest behind the UK's application for membership of the AIIB is to make London City the European centre for managing AIIB transactions (Bustillo & Andoni, 2018). Therefore, the UK prefers to see the AIIB increase its global influence, as this will strengthen London's "future relevance as a global centre of finance" (Bustillo & Andoni, 2018, p. 10). Additionally, Germany and France are aiming to secure construction project contracts from the AIIB because of the advantages in "manufacturing, green energies and financing", which are the core elements of the AIIB's infrastructure projects in Asia (Bustillo & Andoni, 2018, p. 11). These interests can be better served if the AIIB is established as a major institution in financial governance. As Chiu (2017, pp. 692–293) points out, by joining as founding members of the AIIB, "participating EU Member States partake in the AIIB's international status and reputation, hence enjoying additional opportunities for cross-border engagement and networking. Evidently, being part of a rising financial institution is a privilege and one of the primary reasons for joining the AIIB". Therefore, EU Member States intentionally avoid a direct reference to human rights protection so as to ensure their membership. By joining the AIIB and enhancing its global influence, EU Member States can benefit from the operation and expansion of the Bank in regional infrastructure development.

Overall, the thesis illustrates that the EU and China addressed their norm divergence through reaching a compromise on the governance norms of the AIIB. China adopted the EU's norms on transparency and social and environmental protection, while the EU excluded its human rights norms in the negotiation. This compromise indicates that the overlapping interest in enhancing the global influence of the AIIB was an essential

factor determining the interactions between the EU and China in their exercise of normative power. This sheds light on the argument of this thesis that interests are an essential element that drives the normative power of the EU and China in global governance.

5.4 The Codification of the Norms of China and the EU in the AIIB

Having illustrated the divergence between the norms and approaches to norm promotion of the EU and China and, despite this, their ability to reach compromises, this chapter moves on to investigate the codification of the norms of these two actors in the Bank. It shows that the norms of the EU and China jointly shape the policy frameworks of the AIIB. While China's norms of "no strings attached", infrastructure development and a "fair governance structure" constitute the guiding principles of the AOA, the EU's promotion of transparency led to the codification of this norm in the Complaints Handling Mechanism (AIIB, 2017a) and the Public Information Policy (AIIB, 2018a). In addition, the AIIB's ESF incorporates both by the EU's interpretation of social security and environmental protection and China's approach to human rights in foreign aid programs. These positive outcomes of the norm diffusion of the EU and China demonstrate that their diverging norms are not mutually exclusive, as both can be incorporated in an institution.

5.4.1 Chinese norms codified in the AOA

The norms promoted by China, including "no strings attached", infrastructure development and a "fair" governance structure", constitute the fundamental principles of the AOA, which is the constituent instrument of the AIIB. The codification of these norms illustrates China's normative power in the governance structure of the AIIB. First, the principle of "no strings attached" is implemented in the AOA as there is no mention of political requirements among the operating principles of the Bank.

Specifically, Article 13 of the AOA states that “[t]he Bank shall ensure that each of its operations complies with the Bank’s operational and financial policies, including without limitation, policies addressing environmental and social impacts” (AIIB 2015a). The AOA further states its exclusion of political conditionality in Article 31, which regulates that “[t]he Bank, its President, officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned.” (AIIB, 2015a, Article 31). The Bank’s *Operational Policy on Financing* (AIIB, 2017b, Article 3.1.6) interprets this article as showing the AIIB’s position of “no political interference”; namely, that it prohibits “the Bank from interfering in the political affairs of its members”. Adopting the principle of “no strings attached” distinguishes the AIIB from other major multilateral development banks, such as the WB and the ADB, which extensively apply political conditionality in their programs for decades (Menegazzi, 2017, p. 236). Therefore, the AOA’s exclusion of conditionality shows the codification of China’s norm of “no strings attached” in the operation of the AIIB. This verifies China’s normative power in the Bank.

Second, the AIIB’s programs are characterised by a preference for infrastructure construction, which is another central norm advanced by the Chinese government in the Bank. The first article of the AOA clearly announces that “[t]he purpose of the Bank shall be to foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors” (AIIB, 2015a). The AIIB’s first series of projects further demonstrates that infrastructure building is the major target of this Bank. In 2016, the AIIB approved 1.73 billion USD to finance nine projects in the first year of its operation: the national motorway project in Pakistan, the Dushanbe-Uzbekistan Border Road Improvement project in Tajikistan, the distribution system upgrade and expansion project in

Bangladesh, the national slum upgrading project in Indonesia, the hydropower extension project in Pakistan, the Myingyan power plant project in Myanmar, the railway system preparation project in Oman, the Duqm port commercial terminal project in Oman, and the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project in Azerbaijan (AIIB, 2017c). All these projects aim to improve transportation, electric supply and urban infrastructure in Asian developing countries. Similarly, the 15 projects approved in 2017 are devoted to the energy, telecommunication and transportation sectors (AIIB, 2018b). Therefore, these projects demonstrate that China's preference for infrastructure development has shaped the operation of the AIIB, as the Bank has already devoted considerable resources to increasing infrastructure building in the Asian region.

Third, the AIIB codifies another essential Chinese norm regarding financial governance: a supposedly fairer distribution of voting rights. According to the final text of the AOA, the voting rights of AIIB are divided into two parts: Asian countries and regions have 70–75% of voting rights, and the countries and regions outside Asia have 25–30%. The voting rights of individual countries consist of three parts: its share of the capital, basic voting rights, and 600 votes of PFM. Specifically, the share of capital is calculated according to the weighted average of GDP (60% market exchange rate and 40% purchasing power parity). The basic voting rights constitute 12% of the total voting rights and are divided evenly among all members (AIIB, 2015a). Notably, in the AIIB, the basic voting rights and PFM votes have a 15% proportion to the total voting rights, while in the IMF, the basic voting rights count for only 5.5% of the total voting rights. As a result of this complex formula, Asian developing countries, excluding China, have a combined 30% voting power in the Bank. European developed countries together have around 20% of votes (AIIB, 2015a). This distribution ensures that Asian developing countries have a considerably larger influence in the institution than in the WB and the ADB. In addition, the Board of Directors incorporates 12 representatives

from 12 different countries from Asia, Europe, South America and Oceania (AIIB, 2015b). These settings in the AIIB's governance structure can be regarded as being fairer for members, since it increased the basic votes and the decision power of the smallest member quite significantly. To sum up, the codification of Chinese norms in the AOA demonstrates Beijing's normative power in the AIIB in the sense that China effectively shaped the policy framework of the Bank with its norms.

5.4.2 The codification of the EU's norms in the transparency framework

A positive outcome of the EU's norm diffusion is evident in the codification of its norms in the Complaints Handling Mechanism (AIIB, 2017a) and the Public Information Policy (AIIB, 2018a) of the AIIB. The guiding principles of these regimes correspond to those underpinning the transparency policies of the EU's financial institutions, especially the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIB, 2015). The codification of the EU's norms in the AIIB shows that in an institution in which it does not act as a bloc, the EU effectively exercises normative power through the coherent actions of its Member States.

A substantial number of principles of the AIIB's Policy on Public Information (2018) overlap with the EIB's transparency policy (EIB, 2015). The overlapping transparency requirements indicate that the AIIB, in its formulation of internal governance policies, has extensively adopted the norms of the EU. This confirms the AIIB's suggestion that it is informed by the "high standards of governance and transparency" of the EU Member States (Response to the author, Feb 2019). First, both the AIIB and the EIB identify maximum transparency, namely that all information should be disclosed to the public unless it falls within an exception, as a central principle of its operation. The AIIB's AOA established the promotion of transparency as an important task of the Bank by regulating that "[t]he Bank shall establish a policy on the disclosure of information

in order to promote transparency in its operations” (AIIB, 2015a, Article 34–4). Such a task is fulfilled by the Public Information Policy, which seeks to “promote transparency in Bank operations” (AIIB, 2018a, 1.2) by regulating that the Bank “shall disclose information upon request by an external party, consistent with this Policy” (AIIB, 2018a, 7.1). The AIIB’s emphasis on maximum transparency is best reflected by the Bank’s decision to adopt “principle-based” transparency rather than a “list-based” approach to transparency (AIIB, 2018a, 4.2). The difference between these two approaches is that list-based transparency identifies the information that can be accessed, whereas a principle-based transparency policy “ensure[s] transparency and openness by disclosing information that the Bank holds, unless such information falls within an exception stated by this Policy” (AIIB, 2018a, 5.1.1). In other words, list-based transparency tends to restrict the amount of accessible information by providing a “white-list” for public disclosure, whereas principle-based transparency aims for “maximum disclosure” that all information is accessible only if they fall into exceptions (AIIB, 2018a: 4.2). As the AIIB’s Board of Directors state, by establishing these transparency regulations, the Bank “is committed to accountability to its stakeholders” and “intends to generate maximum disclosure and achieve a culture of operational transparency at the Bank” (AIIB, 2018a, 4.1; 4.2).

The AIIB’s emphasis on transparency, accountability, and principle-based maximum transparency, corresponds to the EIB’s transparency requirements (EIB, 2015). Similar to the AIIB, the EIB identifies robust transparency as a core component of its governance structure by stating that “[t]ransparency is therefore an essential condition for a free and open exchange with stakeholders whereby the rules and reasons behind policies and practices are fair and clear to all parties” (EIB, 2015, 2.3). In addition, the EIB states that it is “guided by *openness* and the highest possible level of transparency with the underlying presumption that information concerning the Group’s operational

and institutional activities will be made available to third parties (the public) *unless it is subject to a defined exception*” (EIB, 2015; emphasis added). Such an arrangement shows that the principles adopted by the AIIB, such as ensuring openness by disclosing information unless there is an exception, is also established in the EIB’s transparency policy. Therefore, both the AIIB and the EIB place emphasis on the principle of maximum transparency in their governance structures. This constitutes the first evidence of the codification of the EU’s principles of transparency in the AIIB’s policy framework.

Second, both the AIIB and the EIB promise to disclose information in an active manner. The AIIB’s Public Information Policy (AIIB, 2015, 5.1.2) states that the Bank “shall fulfil its public disclosure requirements by proactively disclosing information on its own initiative”. A similar arrangement can be found in the EIB’s transparency policy, in which the EIB:

Is committed to actively encourage stakeholder input to its policies and practices. Through its commitment to open communication, the Group demonstrates its willingness to listen to third parties so as to benefit from their contributions to its work in fulfilling its mission. (EIB, 2015, 2.6)

A comparison between the two articles shows that the two institutions have both committed to “actively” providing information about their own projects, even without the requirements of other actors. In practice, the AIIB and the EIB have both provided direct links to information about all their projects on their websites. Each project of these two banks has a summary document that shows the details of the program, including location, objective, co-financer, loan amount, and environmental and social risks (AIIB, 2016a; EIB, 2015). The similarity between the policies and practices of the AIIB and EIB in terms of disclosing project information demonstrates that the EU’s

principle of transparency has substantially shaped the governance structure of the AIIB. This further illustrates China's norm adoption during the operation of the AIIB and the codification of the EU's norms in the Bank.

Third, the AIIB and the EIB both regulate that transparency requirements are applied to financial, institutional and operational information (AIIB, 2018a; EIB, 2015). The Public Information Policy of the AIIB states that the Bank "shall proactively disclose information within three event categories that are based upon the functioning of the Bank" (AIIB, 2018a, 6.1). The three categories include financial events, which "comprise the approval or adoption by the Board of Directors of financial statements in either an annual audited, or quarterly unaudited form"; institutional events, referring to "the exercise of the powers attributed to such governance organs by the Articles of Agreement"; and operational events, which include "the administration and operational functioning of the Bank (AIIB, 2018a, 6.1.1-6.1.3). Meanwhile, the EIB is required to publish five types of information: institutional information; policies and strategies; project-related information; procurement information and tender notices for the Bank's own account; and accountability and governance-related information (EIB, 2015, 4.1). In this sense, both the AIIB and the EIB commit to disclosing information regarding project details and institutional operation. Moreover, while the EIB applies transparency to procurement information, the AIIB also establishes its *Procurement Policy* (2016b, 7.1), requiring the "highest standards of transparency, ethics and integrity during the procurement, administration and implementation of Bank-financed contracts". Thus, the analysis shows that the AIIB and the EIB have imposed the principle of transparency on a number of overlapping areas. This substantiates the AIIB's (2017a) statement that it has drawn on "the lessons and experience of other MDBs". As analysed above, the similarities between the principles and practices of the AIIB and the EIB show that the EIB constitutes an important source from which the

AIIB adopts transparency principles. Hence, the establishment of the transparency policy of the AIIB demonstrates that the EU has shaped the policy framework of this Bank with its transparency norms.

5.4.3 The incorporation of the norms of the EU and China in the ESF

Whilst the norms of the EU and China underpin the AIIB's AOA and transparency framework, respectively, the ESF of the AIIB incorporates both the EU's norms of social and environmental protection and China's interpretation of human rights. This shows that the exercise of normative power of multiple actors is not necessarily a zero-sum game, as the norms of different actors can both be incorporated in an institution. The incorporation of both the norms of the EU and those of China also indicates that they are both norm-makers and at the same time norm-takers in the AIIB.

The AOA (Article 13) stipulates that “addressing environmental and social impacts” constitutes a core principle of the AIIB's operations. Based on this position, the AIIB has formulated the ESF to guide its project preparations and implementation. Central to this framework is an assessment system that “determines the Project's category by the category of the Project's component presenting the highest environmental or social risk, including direct, indirect, cumulative and induced impacts, as relevant, in the Project area” (AIIB, 2016, Annex, para 12). It requires that AIIB clients manage “the environmental and social risks and impacts” of their projects (AIIB, 2016, para 10). The framework also regulates that the AIIB should review the client's environmental and social assessments and documentation to determine whether “key potential environmental and social risks and impacts of the Project have been identified” and “effective measures to avoid, minimize, mitigate, offset or compensate for the adverse impacts are incorporated” (AIIB, 2016, para 17).

The norms of the EU are codified in the ESF in two ways. First, the issues covered by

the ESF overlap with those in the Environmental and Social Policy of the EIB considerably, indicating that the EU's structure of environmental and social protection shapes the AIIB's governance structure. Environmentally, the ESF lists biodiversity, protecting habitats, the sustainability of land and water use, pollution prevention and minimising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as major priorities. Most of these issues are also main areas of concern in the EIB's *Environmental and Social Standards* (EIB, 2018). The EIB (2018, p. 4) underscores the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems in its environmental standards. Pollution prevention and control, as "key pillars of EU environmental policy", are also established as an essential component of the EIB's policy so the EIB's partners are required to "comply with EU environmental standards as laid down in applicable Community environmental *acquis*" (EIB, 2018, p. 20). Furthermore, the EIB tracks the GHG emissions of the projects and addresses the "adverse consequences" on climate change vulnerability (EIB, 2018, p. 38). Therefore, biodiversity, pollution and climate change are the three environmental issues covered by both the EIB and the AIIB. This shows that the EU's environmental standards considerably shape the AIIB's regime setting. The same conclusion can also be drawn from comparing the social issues included in the two policies. The ESF encompasses four major issues in terms of social security: managing impacts on vulnerable groups and discrimination; gender equality; assessing involuntary taking of land and resources; and protecting workers' rights (AIIB, 2016, pp. 33–34). Similarly, the EIB identifies "[g]ood labour practices and the use of appropriate codes of conduct", including non-discrimination and gender equality, as the major objectives of its labour standards (EIB, 2018, p. 61). Hence, the AIIB's ESF is characterised by a codification of the EU's norms on social and environmental protection.

Second, similar to the EIB's impact management system, the ESF also adopts an arrangement regime to handle the potential risks of its projects (AIIB, 2016; EIB, 2018).

These institutional arrangements have not been incorporated in other Chinese development banks, showing that the AIIB's governance structure "far exceed[s] those of China's main national development banks" and "is in line with recent efforts of peer MDBs" (Hujiskens et al., 2017, pp. 3–4). Thus, this regime design is another aspect of the AIIB's policy framework that is shaped by the EU's approach to financial governance. According to the ESF, the AIIB reviews whether the client country has identified and addressed the "key potential environmental and social risks and impacts of the Project have been identified" (ESF, para 17). Such a review arrangement is also incorporated in the EIB's Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, which is a process of:

Identifying, predicting, evaluating a project's positive and negative environmental and social impacts on the biophysical and human environment as well as identifying ways of avoiding, minimising, mitigating and compensating, including offsetting in the case of the environment and remedying in the case of social impacts (EIB, 2018, p. 3).

In addition to providing the bank with the authority to assess the environmental and social impacts of projects, both the AIIB and the EIB have established an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) to enhance their competence in environmental and social risk management. The ESMP in the ESF allows the AIIB to "establish the measures to mitigate, monitor and manage the impacts" caused by the projects (AIIB, 2016, p. 28). Similarly, the EIB's ESMP also seeks to "avoid, minimise, mitigate and offset (in the case of environment) or remedy (in the case of social impacts) any adverse environmental and social impacts" (EIB, 2018, p. 4). Hence, the two ESMPs share the characteristic of allowing the banks to review and, more importantly, actively address the adverse impacts of their projects. This illustrates that the AIIB

adopts both the name and key components of the ESMP of the EIB.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, to date there has been an inadequate implementation of social security and environmental protection norms in other Chinese external assistance institutions, such as the Exim Bank of China. Therefore, the AIIB's proactive adoption of the norms of environmental and social protection is mainly a result of China's willingness to adopt the norms of the EU to obtain EU Member States' endorsement of the Bank. This, together with the AIIB's ESF considerably overlapping with the EIB's policy framework, shows that the impact management structure of the ESF is a positive outcome of the EU's norm diffusion of environmental and social protection in the AIIB. In this framework, the EU is the norm-maker while China is the norm-taker.

Whereas the ESF is considerably shaped by the norms of the EU, it is also underpinned by the Chinese approach to human rights protection in development policy. Therefore, the ESF incorporates the norms promoted both by the EU and by China in the policy framework of the AIIB. Firstly, the ESF's position on human rights corresponds to China's human rights approach as it does not place much emphasis on human rights in regulating the AIIB's operations. The ESF mentions human rights only two times, whereas the EIB's Environmental and Social Standard uses the term "human rights" 48 times (AIIB, 2016; EIB, 2018). As mentioned above, Chinese external assistance projects are underpinned by the principle of "no strings attached", which specifically excludes the utility of human rights conditions (State Council, 2014). In this sense, the ESF corresponds to Beijing's approach to marginalising the promotion of human rights in foreign aid and investment activities. Conversely, in the policy framework of the EIB, human rights are listed together with "climate change, biodiversity, resource efficiency, disaster risks, involuntary resettlement, gender and conflict" as a part of the

“comprehensive assessment and decision-making processes” (EIB, 2018, p. 8). Such an emphasis on human rights was not codified in the ESF. Therefore, the lack of reference to human rights suggests that the ESF is shaped by China’s standard on human rights.

Secondly, the ESF adopts China’s approach that human rights should be developed based on local conditions (AIIB, 2016). In defining “inclusion”, which constitutes an important component of the AIIB’s definition of human rights, the ESF states that “inclusion means empowering people to participate in, and benefit from, the development process in a manner consistent with local conditions” (AIIB, 2016, p. 3). In addition, the ESF underlines that “Indigenous Peoples’ identity, dignity, human rights, economies and cultures” should be “defined by the Indigenous Peoples themselves” (AIIB, 2016, p. 42). Therefore, the ESF does not provide a detailed framework of human rights but understands it as a concept that should be determined by local people based on their conditions. This approach is consistent with Beijing’s approach that “no country in its effort to realise and protect human rights can take a route that is divorced from its history and its economic, political and cultural realities” (Information Office of the State Council, 1991, Chapter X). The EU’s approach to human rights is quite the opposite, as the EIB defines human rights in its Environmental and Social Standards as “internationally recognised human rights, including the human rights to adequate housing, food, water, health, education, work, security of the person, freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and freedom of movement” (EIB, 2018, p. 46). The ESF emphasising state autonomy regarding human rights rather than referring to the international standards of human rights shows China’s leading norm-maker role with regard to this issue. It also illustrates that the EU, along with China, is also a norm-taker in the AIIB, as it accepts a standard of human rights protection that is different from the EU’s standard approach. As this thesis argued in Chapter 2, this indicates the

governance structure of multilateral settings is often shaped by different norms promoted by multiple actors. Therefore, the exercises of normative power in multilateral institutions are often characterised by a structure in which actors are norm-makers and, at the same time, norm-takers. This structure is more dynamic than the rigid dichotomy of norm-maker and norm-taker suggested in the study by Björkdahl et al. (2015). It shows that the norms of an international institution are often a deal among different actors reached through negotiations and compromises.

5.4 Conclusion

Based on the analytical framework established in Chapter 2, this chapter has examined the norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of the normative power of China and the EU in the AIIB. It has illustrated that both the EU and China possess normative power in the Bank. It has also illustrated that China and the EU promoted two different sets of norms in their policies towards the AIIB. Beijing sought to establish the AIIB as a bank with “no strings attached”, a focus on infrastructure and a supposedly “fair” governance structure. The EU Member States promoted the principles of social security, environmental protection and transparency. In terms of norm diffusion, China, as the leading actor and largest contributor to the AIIB, has significant ability to shape the governance structure of this bank. As participants of the Bank, the EU Member States utilised their membership to shape the norms of the AIIB. In their practices of normative power, the EU and China made compromises regarding the norms of the AIIB: Beijing adopted the EU’s standards regarding social and environmental safeguards, as well as enhanced transparency, while the EU Member States did not seek to diffuse the EU’s human rights protection standard in the negotiations of the AIIB. The chapter emphasised that this compromise was essentially driven by the overlapping interests of the EU and China in enhancing the global profile of the AIIB.

The chapter also investigated the outcomes of their norm promotion activities through an examination of the codification of their norms in the governance structure of the AIIB. It suggested that Chinese norms of “no strings attached”, infrastructure development and a fair governance structure are codified in the AIIB’s AOA. The EU’s norm of transparency constitutes the guiding principle of the transparency framework of the AIIB. The codification of these norms shows that both the EU and China have established their normative power in the AIIB. In addition, the ESF incorporates both the EU’s principles of social and environmental protection and China’s approach to human rights in foreign aid programs, which indicates that the EU and China are both norm-makers and at the same time norm-takers in the AIIB.

Chapter 6—The EU, China and the Paris Agreement: Norm Divergence and Compromise in International Climate Change Governance

Introduction

Following the analysis of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Chapter 5, this chapter seeks to examine and compare the normative power of the EU and that of China in another multilateral institution: the Paris Agreement (PA). The chapter examines the norms promoted by the EU and China in the negotiations of the PA, the diffusion mechanisms utilised by these two actors and the codification of their norms in the regulatory frameworks of the PA as outcomes of norm diffusion. This chapter aims to answer the following research questions: *How do the EU and China exercise their normative power in multilateral institutions? How do the EU and China address their norm divergence and why?*

The PA was negotiated during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in 2015 and was described by then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as a “monumental triumph” of international climate change negotiation (UN, 2015). The PA fulfils the objective set by the Durban Platform (UNFCCC, 2011) to establish “a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) describes the PA as the first agreement that “brings all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so” (UNFCCC, 2019).

Based on an analysis of the policies of the EU and China, the context of the PA and interviews with EU officials and scholars that study climate change politics, this chapter

presents the following arguments. First, both the EU and China possess normative power in the PA based on effective norm diffusion leading to the codification of their norms in the PA. Second, the EU and China promoted different norms during the negotiations of the PA; however, they have similar approaches to norm diffusion as they both emphasise the formulation of progressive mitigation targets and coalition building. Third, the EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change in 2015 illustrates that the two actors reached a compromise on the norms of the PA. Such a compromise was mainly driven by the overlapping interest of the EU and China in building new coalitions in climate change negotiations.

Compared with Chapter 5, in which the EU does not act as a bloc but exercises its normative power through the cohesive actions of its Member States that are consistent with the Union's norms, the EU has a different type of actorness in the PA—the Union acts as a bloc throughout the negotiation of the Agreement. As Chapter 1 suggested, acting as a bloc is an effective way for the EU to play its role in global governance (Delreux, 2014). The PA meets the three criteria set by Delreux (2014, p. 1019) for the EU's actorness as a bloc. First, the EU has both *de facto* and *de jure* recognition in the PA since it is a formal party of the UNFCCC. Second, as Delreux (2014, p. 1019) points out, the EU is attributed by the Treaty with the authority to act in international environmental negotiations. Third, EU negotiators have a considerable degree of autonomy in the negotiation of the PA, particularly in the formulation of the High Ambition Coalition (see Section 6.2.3 for a detailed analysis). Recognising the EU's actorness as a bloc in the PA, this chapter focuses on examining the actions of the EU institutions—such as the European Commission and DG Climate—to assess the EU's norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of norm diffusion in the PA.

This chapter has three sections. The first section examines and then compares the norms

promoted by the EU and China in the negotiations of the PA. It illustrates how their diverging norms on climate change led to their different positions in three areas in the negotiation of the PA: differentiation, mitigation and transparency. The second section of this chapter illustrates how the EU and China attempted to promote their norms during the negotiations of the PA. It illustrates the similarities between the diffusion mechanisms adopted by the EU and China: enhancing mitigation targets and coalition building. It suggests that the overlapping interest in building new coalitions drove the EU and China to make compromises with each other and with other parties regarding the normative framework of the PA. The third section of the chapter examines the extent to which the norms of the EU and China are codified as governance norms of the PA, in particular in its mitigation and transparency regulations. Therefore, the analysis indicates that the two actors are both norm-makers and norm-takers in the PA.

6.1 The Contrasting Norms of the EU and China Before the Paris Conference (COP 21)

Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated the norm divergence between the EU and China in the area of climate change since the mid-2000s. Specifically, Chapter 3 argued that since the mid-2000s, the EU has placed an emphasis on enhancing the “common” responsibility of all parties, including both developed and developing states, in climate change governance (Council of the EU, 2007). The EU established quantitative GHG mitigation targets in its internal governance and sought to persuade other states to adopt the same approach to curbing GHG emissions (Oberthür & Kelly, 2008). In contrast, Chapter 4 demonstrated that China had maintained its support for the CBDR principle established in the UNFCCC (1997). Beijing emphasised that developed countries should take the most responsibility in terms of reducing GHG emissions and providing financial and technological support to developing states in tackling climate change (Zhang, 2013). This section illustrates how this norm divergence between the EU and

China on climate change governance shaped their different norms regarding differentiation, mitigation and transparency arrangements in the PA.

Before COP 21 was held in Paris in December 2015, the EU and China presented their basic positions in preparation for this upcoming conference. In September 2015, the EU published the Council conclusions entitled *EU Position for the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris* (EU, 2015). This document listed the Union's vision for the new agreement to be formulated during the Paris Conference. Two months later, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a department of the State Council in charge of China's macroeconomic planning, published its annual report titled *China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change*. This report briefly sets out China's basic position at the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference. A more detailed explanation of China's policy towards COP 21 was provided by Xie Zhenhua, China's special representative on climate change, in a report a few weeks before COP 21 (Zhang, 2015). The comparison of the policies of the EU and China before the Paris Conference illustrates that the two actors have diverged norms in three areas: differentiation, mitigation and transparency (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 *Norms promoted by the EU and China before COP 21*

Issue Area	EU's Norms	China's Norms
Differentiation	Non-differentiation	Binary differentiation between developed and developing states
Mitigation	Progressive Mandatory Quantifiable	Asymmetric responsibilities Voluntary Non-quantitative
Transparency	Enhance mitigation transparency for all Parties	Differentiation Enhance funding transparency

Sources: EU (2015), NDRC (2015a) and Zhang (2015)

6.1.1 The norms of the EU and China regarding differentiation

First, the different positions of the EU and China regarding whether to keep the binary differentiation between developed and developing countries are also evident in their approaches to differentiation during the negotiation of the PA. China emphasised that it was essential to maintain CBDR as the central norm of the new agreement. The 2015 *China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change* (NDRC, 2015a, p. 62) states that “China is willing to work actively and constructively with all parties to promote negotiating process under the principles of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’”. Xie also argued that the new deal “should reflect the principles of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’” (Zhang, 2015). The position of the Chinese government was that the binary differentiation between developing and developed states needed to be sustained in the Paris outcome (Zhang, 2015).

In contrast to the preference for a binary differentiation in Chinese official statements, an EU negotiator proposed that an essential position of the EU before COP 21 was that the “arbitrary differentiation between developed and developing states” (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019) needed to be changed to reflect the development in climate change. When asked about the norms promoted by the EU and China in the PA respectively, a scholar studying international climate change also contended that whereas China sought to maintain the binary differentiation, “removing this arrangement from the PA was the ‘red line’ of the EU” before the Paris Conference (Interview Respondent 9, 13 March 2019). The EU’s key principle before the PA had been to establish a flexible and more nuanced differentiation arrangement to replace the binary differentiation in the UNFCCC (EU, 2015). Therefore, whether or not the binary differentiation in the UNFCCC should be implemented in the PA constituted the first point of divergence between the norms of the EU and China in the negotiations.

As suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, the diverging positions regarding the differentiation between the EU and China were based on their different approaches to the global GHG emissions structure. China emphasised that, as the UNFCCC (1992) recognised, “the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries” because of their industrialisation since the 18th century. As the UNFCCC (1992, Article 3) suggests, the major contributor of global warming, developed states, should “take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof”. In terms of developing states, since their per capita emissions are still low compared to developed states, China asserted that economic development rather than curbing GHG emissions should remain the priority of developing states (Zhang, 2013).

In contrast to China’s emphasis on the historical responsibilities of developing states in terms of GHG emissions, the EU focused on the increasing GHG emissions of developing states. As illustrated in Chapter 3, developing states now account for more than 60% of global GHG emissions (Cañete, 2015). China is now the largest emitter of GHG in the world, with India, Russia and Brazil all being large emitters (Oberthür & Groen, 2017). Therefore, Chapter 3 demonstrated that the EU has been promoting quantifiable and mandatory mitigation targets that apply to all large emitters (Council of the EU, 2011).

The different interpretations of the global GHG emissions structure also underpinned their positions on differentiation before COP 21. For instance, Xie Zhenhua stated that “up to this point the relative developmental stages of countries have not changed fundamentally” and therefore the dichotomy between Annex-I and non-Annex I states should be kept in the PA (Zhang, 2015). He also pointed out that remaining as a developing country in the new agreement was a red line for China during the

negotiation (Zhang, 2015). Xie raised the issue of “graduation”, namely that “the US, Japan and Australia say countries such as Korea, Singapore, Qatar, Mexico and Chile should graduate from the ranks of developing nations and be classed as developed, and so should China” (Zhang, 2015). In the words of Xie, if the negotiations would go in that direction, “we won’t see any outcome from this year’s conference” (as cited in Zhang, 2015). Xie’s attitude indicates that the Chinese government would reject any agreement that treated China differently by blurring the line between developed and developing countries. When asked about the norms of China in the negotiation of the PA, interview respondents also affirmed China’s insistence on a rigid binary differentiation between developed and developing states. A scholar in climate change governance identified the “implementation of binary differentiation” as the major interest of China during the Paris Conference (Interview Respondent 9, 13 March 2019). An EU negotiator also perceived China as “a strong supporter of rigid differentiation” (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019).

In contrast to China, the EU regarded the increasing emissions of the developing countries as an imperative to reform the climate change governance structure, since “[w]ithout major developing countries emitters such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa or Indonesia, we simply cannot fix the climate” (Cañete, 2015). Therefore, instead of keeping the rigid differentiation between developing and developed countries based on the CBDR principle, the EU sought to replace the binary differentiation with an “ambitious and durable legally-binding agreement” that should be “applicable to all Parties” (EU, 2015). Hence, before COP 21, the EU preferred “to introduce a spectrum of commitments to establish a more ‘nuanced’ structure of differentiation” in which every party would enhance their contributions in terms of mitigation, adaptation and transparency (Interview Respondent 9, 13 March 2019). Therefore, as argued by an EU negotiator, the EU’s main objective to establish a “common” responsibility of tackling

climate change that “covers all actors” was in sharp contrast to the norm of China regarding differentiation at COP 21 (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019).

6.1.2 The norms of the EU and China regarding mitigation arrangements

The second aspect of normative divergence between the EU and China lies in the mitigation arrangements in the new deal. This divergence was a manifestation of their different approaches to differentiation in climate change governance. In particular, guided by the preference for CBDR, China proposed two norms with regard to mitigation. On the one hand, consistent with its support of the UNFCCC’s interpretation of CBDR, the Chinese government suggested that developed countries should take the lead in terms of mitigation and provide support to developing countries. Beijing asserted that “[t]he developed countries should earnestly fulfil their commitments to emissions reduction as well as financial and technical support by 2020, and continue to provide support for developing countries after 2020” (NDRC, 2015a, p. 63). On the other hand, China opposed any mandatory or quantitative carbon emissions reduction placed on developing countries in international agreements (Zhang, 2013). From the perspective of the Chinese government, alleviating poverty and improving the livelihoods of their people are also important objectives for developing countries, in addition to tackling climate change (Zhang, 2015). Therefore, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, it is essential for China that developing countries keep their autonomy in terms of setting mitigation targets so that their economic development is not impeded.

In contrast to China’s preference for a framework that comprises asymmetric and voluntary mitigation obligations for developing states, to remove the binary differentiation from the PA, the EU promoted a framework in which “all parties” have the obligation to curb carbon emission (EU, 2015). In addition, such a responsibility should be quantitative as well as progressive, so as to achieve the target of controlling

global warming within 2°C (EU, 2015). The Union stated that all parties “must have, maintain and implement” a set of “fair, ambitious and quantifiable mitigation commitments”. In addition, the EU sought to introduce a regime to force all parties to improve their commitments on a regular basis. The EU (2015) designed “a dynamic five-yearly mitigation ambition mechanism in which all Parties should be required to either submit new or updated commitments, without falling behind previous levels of commitment, or resubmit the existing ones”.

An important reason behind the different views of the EU and China regarding whether or not binary differentiation should be implemented in the mitigation arrangements of the PA was their different interests. As suggested in Chapter 4, quantitative mitigation targets sharply contrast with China’s interest in maintaining the autonomy of developing states in balancing economic growth and tackling climate change (Zhang, 2013). This drove China to oppose the mandatory and quantitative framework proposed by the EU. Xie Zhenhua asserted in 2015 that “the developing nations are still poor and need to develop. Quantitative emission reduction targets would often leave them no room to do so, so agreement is hard to reach” (Zhang, 2015).

The EU’s promotion of an enhanced and overarching agreement is considerably driven by the economic interests that can be fulfilled by “building a climate-friendly, low-carbon society and economy” (European Commission, 2018). For example, according to the EU’s calculation, building a low-carbon society and economy could “create up to 1.5 million additional jobs by 2020” and “the value of EU environmental goods and services is expected to double by 2020” (European Commission, 2018). In addition to these benefits, advancing a progressive mitigation policy in the global effort to tackle climate change will also “reduce costs for energy-intensive industries” and “boost their competitiveness”. The EU’s GHG/CO₂ emissions intensity is among the lowest in the

world (Oberthür, 2016, p. 123). A study by the UN Environmental Programme and the European Patent Office (2015) shows that the Union also has a leading role in terms of high-value climate change mitigation technology inventions, accounting for 30–40% of inventions during 1995–2011. The advancement in green technology indicates that industry in the EU can adapt to a low-carbon economy in a more cost-effective way than in other regions. Such a comparative advantage will be amplified once the global climate agreement sets up the target of fostering the decarbonisation of the global economy. Thus, these economic interests provide another reason for the Union to push for a robust climate change governance structure (Raynor & Jordan, 2016). Therefore, the different interests of the EU and China in climate change largely account for the norm divergence between these two actors in the mitigation arrangements in the PA.

6.1.3 The norms of the EU and China regarding transparency

The third aspect of norm divergence between the EU and China is their different norms regarding transparency. This divergence also stems from their different positions on differentiation in climate change governance. The EU (2015) emphasised that “the Paris Agreement must provide for a robust common rules-based regime, including transparency and accountability rules applicable to all Parties”. The major function of such a regime is that of “monitoring, reporting, verification and accounting, and a process for holding each Party accountable for achieving its commitments” (European Commission, 2015a). Hence, the EU’s focus was to establish an enhanced transparency regime in the PA that collects and reviews the commitments of all parties. Such an arrangement would contribute to ensuring parties achieve the mitigation targets they proposed in the agreement (Rajamani, 2016). In addition, in the transparency arrangement proposed by the EU, the dichotomy between developing countries and developed countries would become blurred, as the Union emphasised that the transparency arrangements should be “applicable to all Parties” (EU, 2015). Although

the Union stated that the agreement should place flexible obligations on the parties “for a diverse range of commitment types, national capabilities and circumstances”, it emphasised that “this flexibility should not undermine transparency, accountability and ambition” (European Commission, 2015a). Hence, the EU’s promotion of an enhanced transparency regime for all parties is driven by its interest in shaping climate change governance structure in its likeness; that is, the binary differentiation would be replaced by progressive actions that apply to all parties.

However, the Chinese government held a different position regarding transparency arrangements. Whereas the EU emphasised that transparency requirements should be applied to all parties, Beijing insisted on implementing different arrangements for developing and developed countries, since “[d]eveloping nations don’t have the same capabilities, so the frequency and content of disclosures should be different” (Zhang, 2015). The emphasis on establishing different requirements regarding transparency was consistent with China’s preference for applying binary differentiation between developed and developing states in the PA. Another position of the Chinese government was to increase the transparency of the funding regime in the new deal; namely, that developed countries should “make it clear who you gave it to, what they did with it, which country got it, was anything done with it?” (Zhang, 2015).

China’s emphasis on the transparency of the funding regime was driven by both normative considerations and interests. On the one hand, financial support is “the issue of most concern to developing nations. Without that resolution it will be hard to persuade developing nations to cut emissions” (Zhang, 2015). However, since 2009, developed countries have made insufficient progress in following through on their commitment to provide annual assistance of 30 billion USD for developing countries by 2012 (Peng et al., 2012). A report in 2012 suggested that by 2012, only 23.6 billion

USD had been committed by the developed states, mainly because the US, the EU and Iceland “committed half or less than half of their fair share” (Ciplet et al., 2012). Hence, China sought to put pressure on developed states by enhancing transparency in funding. When asked about the interests behind this position of China, a scholar of climate change suggested that this argument by China is “a principled rather than pragmatic position since the finance will not be provided to China” (Interview Respondent 9, 13 March 2019). Therefore, on this issue, China was driven by the normative consideration to ensure the interests of other developing states in terms of receiving financial support.

On the other hand, raising the issue of funding transparency also provided China with leverage to advance the principle of CBDR in the transparency regime. Beijing realised that mitigation transparency was “what the developed nations are most insistent on” before COP 21 (Zhang, 2015). This is because the majority of developed countries have established robust transparency regimes. Therefore, enhanced mitigation transparency would raise the obligations of developing countries (Zhang, 2015). Hence, this chapter finds agreement with the comment made by a scholar of climate change politics that Beijing’s proposition for funding transparency can be regarded as an effort to “extract concession from other parties, such as the EU”, on other issues such as the mitigation arrangements (Interview Respondent 9, 13 March 2019). This indicates that norm diffusion in multilateral settings could be shaped by the politics among actors that exercise normative power, and thus, as will be demonstrated in the next section, involves bargaining and compromise.

6.2 The Similar Diffusion Mechanisms of the EU and China in the Paris Agreement

6.2.1 Enhancing mitigation targets

Despite the EU’s and China’s significantly different norms regarding the PA, their diffusion mechanisms, namely the policy tools utilised by the two actors to advance

their norms, are similar. Both the EU and China established a progressive NDC before the Paris Conference to advance the influence of their norms in the upcoming agreement. According to China's proposed NDC, the GHG emissions of China will peak at 2030, and the CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP will decrease by 60–65% compared to 2005 levels (NDRC, 2015a). Being the first developing country to establish an accurate date for its emissions to peak, China sought to demonstrate its “sense of responsibility to fully engage in global governance” (NDRC, 2015a, p. 2). Beijing established its ambitious carbon reduction target in the 12th Five-year Plan (2011–2015). The Chinese government articulated that it planned to reduce CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP by 17% and would make “significant reductions in the total emissions of major pollutants” (China's Twelfth Five-year Plan, 2011, Chapter 3). The Chinese government has implemented these progressive targets in its policy practice. According to the NDRC (2016, p. 2), during the 12th Five-year plan period, “China's energy-related carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP was reduced by 20 percent, exceeding the compulsory target of 17 percent reduction previously proposed”. China's commitment to a progressive mitigation target shows that Beijing does not rigidly reject increasing its GHG reduction *per se*. What China underlines is the *de jure* “autonomy” of developing countries in terms of deciding their climate policy in a legally binding agreement (NDRC, 2015a).

An important motivation of Beijing's decision to enhance its GHG emission reductions was its interest in portraying a more responsible and cooperative image of Beijing in climate change governance (Wu, 2016; Zhang, 2013). Zhang Haibin (2013, p. 1) suggests that China's continuous adherence to the principle of CBDR to avoid making mandatory GHG reduction commitments has “won China the reputation of hard-liner in international negotiations”. For example, after the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, then British climate secretary Ed Miliband accused China after Copenhagen stating that

China's refusal to mandatory commitments was the reason "why we did not secure an agreement that the political accord struck in Copenhagen should lead to a legally binding outcome" (Miliband, 2009).

In the years after COP 15, climate change has become one of the main areas in which China seeks to act as a responsible country. This objective is articulated in President Xi Jinping's report to the 19th Party Congress, which states that China is "[t]aking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change, China has become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization" (Xi, 2017b, p. 4). Therefore, the criticisms of China's refusal to support progressive GHG emissions, such as those after COP 15, had a negative impact on China's attempt to establish itself as a responsible actor in climate change governance (Wu, 2016, p. 209). Hence, by voluntarily increasing its GHG reduction targets, the Chinese government is able to demonstrate its enhanced participation in climate change governance without making changes to its position on the principle of CBDR. This helps establish China's "increasingly positive role" in climate change governance (Zhang, 2017, p. 3).

The formulation of progressive NDCs was also adopted by the EU as an important means of promotion. On 6 March 2015, the Union and its Member States submitted their NDCs, which is a "binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990" (EU, 2015). The EU (2015) urged all other actors to follow its actions, stating that "all Parties which have not yet done so to come forward with fair and ambitious INDCs as soon as possible in the coming few weeks". As an EU negotiator suggests, this shows that the "leadership by example" strategy "remains as the key strategy" of the EU's norm promotion (Interview Respondent 7, 1 March 2019). As discussed in Chapter 3, this strategy has been adopted

by the EU since the mid-2000s when the Union set the ambitious target of reducing its GHG emissions by 20% by 2020 (Council of the EU, 2007). The Union also made a further commitment to reduce its emissions by 30% if other industrialised countries adopted the same target (Council of the EU, 2007). As a form of persuasion, the EU aimed to take the first step of making concrete commitments to “convince others of the necessity to strive for the 2 degrees Celsius objective in line with its long-standing positions, and adopt emission reduction targets and measures in line with this aim” (van Schaik & Schunz, 2012, p. 181).

When asked about the interests behind the EU’s promotion of a progressive climate change agreement, an EU negotiator raised economic interests as “an important factor” that drives the EU’s leadership by example approach (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019). The negotiator underscored that it is an important interest of the Union to ensure a “level playfield” with its “major competitors” by enhancing the global climate change regime (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019). Van Schaik (2012, p. 4) also states that the “competitive concern” is an essential factor that drives the EU’s climate change policy since its own mitigation framework would “put EU industry at a competitive disadvantage” if other actors do not follow. Therefore, the EU’s decision to increase its mitigation targets was driven by its strategic and economic interest in shaping the climate change governance structure with its specific standards. This shows that interests constitute an important factor that drives the exercise of normative power of the EU in the PA.

6.2.2 Overlapping interests of the EU and China in coalition building

In Chapter 2, this thesis suggested that coalition building is an important diffusion mechanism, especially in multilateral institutions. The reason for this is because multilateral settings require the joint effort of multiple actors to shape the norms of an

institution. Coalition building contributes to establishing broad support for the norms promoted by the norm promoter (Björkdahl, 2013, p. 326). This support enhances norm diffusion, as it helps to “alter the convictions of reluctant states” (Björkdahl, 2013, p. 326). This chapter suggests that both the EU and China had considerable interest in building new coalitions before COP 21. This overlapping interest, as Section 6.2.3 demonstrates, was a predominant driver of the compromises the EU and China made with each other and with third parties regarding the norms of the PA.

When asked to describe the Union’s strategy at COP 21, an EU negotiator suggested that the EU focused on “forging coalition with other ambitious actors”, which “demonstrates a more flexible and pragmatic” approach of the Union in climate negotiations (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019). This indicates that the EU had an increasing interest in building coalitions in climate change negotiations. This change of strategy was mainly driven by the EU’s failure at COP 15. As indicated in Chapter 4, during COP 15, the EU’s promotion of a mandatory and ambitious agreement was rejected by the coalition between the US and emerging economies, including China, India, South Africa and Brazil (Christoff, 2010). The negotiator stated that after COP15, the EU had realised that its internal policy of tackling climate change “could not be universalised without adjusting the ambition” (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019). A Chinese scholar also pointed out that the EU “is adopting a more pragmatic approach” in climate negotiations which led to “the convergence between the norms of the EU and other actors” (Interview Respondent 5, 16 Jan 2016). Therefore, the EU sought to establish new coalitions with other actors to enhance its normative power in the area of climate change. This interest drove the EU to establish the High Ambition Coalition with the small island states which call for a legally binding agreement to ensure zero net global emissions by 2060–2080.

China's interest in building new coalitions was mainly driven by the growing support from developing countries for a progressive climate change agreement. The small island states joining the High Ambition Coalition led by the EU, which is analysed in more detail below, illustrates the differing interests between the developing states that prefer progressive actions in climate change and those that prioritise their economic development. The fragmentation of G77 made it increasingly difficult for China to forge a consensus among developing states to endorse its principles at COP 21 (Christoff, 2016).

In addition, China also faced mounting disagreements among the BASIC group before and during COP 21. As suggested in Chapter 4, the coalition with other BASIC states, including India, Brazil, and South Africa, was essential for China's normative power at COP 15. However, there was increasing divergence among BASIC states before COP 21, making it essential for China to seek new coalitions to support its climate change norms. Specifically, in its first NDC, South Africa committed to "working with others to ensure temperature increases are kept well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, which could include a further revision of the temperature goal to below 1.5°C" (Department of Environmental Affairs of South Africa, 2015). It further stated that "[t]his temperature goal is an essential starting point for our INDC, and we believe this goal should inform all countries' contributions" (Department of Environmental Affairs of South Africa, 2015). Identifying the 2°C target as the foundation of all NDCs demonstrates South Africa's support for a progressive and, more importantly, potentially quantitative agreement. It indicates that South Africa's stance towards the PA became close to that of the EU, which also supported the 2°C objective and a progressive agreement (EU, 2015). This development indicates that whereas China adhered to the dichotomy between the two groups of states, South Africa supported a progressive agreement that established mitigation responsibilities for all parties. Thus,

the changing position of South Africa created a gap among the BASIC group members.

Further to the different positions between South Africa and China, the divergence within BASIC was illustrated by Brazil's entrance to the High Ambition Coalition during the Paris Conference. This movement is described by the EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete (2015), as "a game changer", as it significantly increased the influence of the High Ambition Coalition and undermined the promotion of China. Since India and China insisted on maintaining the principle of differentiation during the negotiation, Brazil's entrance to a coalition that called for an agreement with progressive and long-term objectives indicates that the BASIC group was not "the unified force it had been in 2009" (Christoff, 2016, p. 774). Moreover, Brazil's action indicated that the rigid dichotomy between developed and developing states was gradually replaced by the dichotomy between parties that emphasised progressive actions and those that were reluctant to do so. As Miguel Arias Cañete (2015) stated, "the debate was not about developed versus developing. It was about the willing versus the unwilling. And no one wanted to be seen as the unwilling". Hence, Brazil's decision to join the High Ambition Coalition significantly undermined the influence of the BASIC group in Paris. As Wu (2016, p. 201) contends, the weakened coalition among G77/China and the BASIC group drove the Chinese government to "[adopt] a strategy of building new coalitions to strengthen its bargaining power". Therefore, it was an overlapping interest of the EU and China to build new coalitions to diffuse their norms in the negotiation of the PA.

6.2.3 Building coalitions through compromise

EU-China joint statement on climate change

In June 2015, a few months before COP 21, the EU and China issued *the EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change* (2015). In this statement, the two actors proposed their joint vision for the new agreement that would be reached at the Paris Conference.

The formulation of this statement demonstrates that the EU and China, driven by their overlapping interests in building new coalitions, reached a compromise on the norms of the PA. When asked about the influence of *the EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change*, an EU negotiator also suggested that this joint statement “demonstrates the bilateral cooperation between the EU and China based on compromise” (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019). This compromise helped the EU and China secure a broad coalition to advance their norms during the Paris Conference.

The joint statement incorporates the norms of both the EU and China regarding the upcoming deal. In this sense, both the EU and China made compromises by supporting some norms of the other party that were inconsistent with their own norms. For instance, the joint statement states that:

The Two Sides recall ... the need to urgently enhance global climate action ... up to and beyond 2020, in light of the latest and best available scientific information, bearing in mind holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, 2015).

This paragraph fully corresponds to the EU’s principles for the Paris Conference, proposing to control global warming within 2°C based on scientific findings in the IPCC (EU, 2015). More importantly, setting a specific temperature target implies the introduction of a quantitative mitigation target, which is a key principle of the EU. As the IPCC report in 2014 indicates, a quantitative mitigation framework is of significant importance to achieving the 2°C target (IPCC, 2014). However, this approach to tackling climate change contrasts with China’s climate change norm, which favours a flexible mitigation arrangement based on voluntary reductions. In this sense, the endorsement of the EU’s norm of establishing the 2°C objective as a joint objective was

a compromise made by the Chinese government.

In addition, the statement affirms its advocacy for CBDR as the norm of the future agreement by stating that the agreement reached at COP 21 should be formulated “on the basis of equity and reflecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances” (EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, 2015). As discussed earlier, CBDR was the central norm of China’s climate change policy but it was not mentioned in the EU’s basic positions for the Paris Conference (EU, 2015). Yet here, this norm is incorporated in the bilateral agreement as a consensus between China and the EU. Therefore, the EU made a compromise by endorsing the norm of CBDR in the Joint Statement.

Based on the compromise made by the two parties, the Joint Statement establishes their consensus on the blueprint of the new agreement as the EU and China “reiterate that the agreement shall be under the Convention and applicable to all, and shall address in a balanced manner, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support” (EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, 2015). This vision for the PA incorporates the norms of both parties. On the one hand, it indicates that CBDR should be the pillar of the new agreement. As Rajamani (2016, p. 507) points out, in the context of climate change governance the term “under the Convention” offers “an avenue to engage the principles and provisions of the Convention, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities”. This is due to the central role of CBDR in the UNFCCC (1992) and the arrangements of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997), as indicated earlier in this chapter. On the other hand, the Joint Statement emphasises the requirement of “applicable to all”, which is a principle held by the EU to replace the binary differentiation between the developed and developing

countries established in the UNFCCC. The combination of CBDR and “applicable to all”, two seemingly contradictory norms, shows that the EU and China “reached compromise with each other” (Interview Respondent 9, 13 March 2019). This compromise on the norms of the PA also contributed to the collaboration between the two actors in COP 21, as the EU and China “commit to work together to reach an ambitious and legally binding agreement at the Paris Climate Conference in 2015 that enhances the implementation of the Convention” (EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, 2015). This shows that the EU and China addressed their norm divergence through compromise before COP 21. Therefore, overlapping interests, rather than norm divergence, constitute the factor that determines how the EU and China interact with each other in their exercise of normative power in the PA.

US-China bilateral agreements

In addition to *the EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change*, both the EU and China, driven by their interests in building new coalitions, forged coalitions with other actors before and during COP 21. This chapter suggests that the compromises made by the EU and China regarding their climate change norms were also essential in building these coalitions. This illustrates that both the EU and China were willing to adjust their approach to norms so as to fulfil their interests in obtaining support through coalition building. In terms of China, in 2014 and 2015 China formulated two joint declarations with the US on tackling climate change: the 2014 *China-US Joint Announcement on Climate Change* (hereinafter Joint Announcement) and the 2015 *US-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change* (hereinafter Joint Statement). These two bilateral agreements constitute an important mechanism of Chinese norm promotion before the Paris Conference, as they provide an important endorsement for Beijing’s major claims in the new agreement. In terms of the principle of CBDR, China and the US asserted in the Joint Statement (2015) that the forthcoming global agreement should

reflect “the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances”. They also underscored that the differentiation between developed and developing countries “should be reflected in relevant elements of the agreement in an appropriate manner”. In addition, the two actors agreed to implement differentiation in the transparency regime. China and the US emphasised that the new transparency arrangement “should provide flexibility to those developing countries that need it in light of their capacities” (Joint Statement, 2015).

A scholar on climate change governance stated that the US-China agreements had “significant influence in shaping the governance structure of the Paris Agreement” (Interview Respondent 10, March 2019). Jacquet and Jamieson (2016, p. 645) also argue that the PA “rests on the back of the 2014 bilateral US/China agreement”. In this sense, the consensus between the US and China on the central role of CBDR in the Paris outcome considerably enhanced the influence of Chinese norms in COP 21. Therefore, the US-China joint announcements on climate change constituted a remarkable diffusion mechanism of the Chinese government before the Paris Conference, as China was able to obtain the endorsement of its interpretation of CBDR from the US.

A major factor that facilitated this coalition between the US and China was the compromise made by China in terms of peaking its emissions before 2030 (Hilton & Kerr, 2017). This shows that compromise is an important element in forging coalitions. In the Joint Announcement, China stated its target to reach its peak of CO₂ emissions around 2030 and would “make best efforts to peak early”. The Chinese government also intended to “increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030” (Joint Announcement, 2014). China further stated in 2015

that it would “reduce carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level by 2030 and increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters on the 2005 level by 2030” (Joint Statement, 2015). Based on these commitments, the two actors formulated the vision to strengthen their cooperation in adopting a new international agreement (Joint Announcement, 2014). Compared to China’s 12th Five-year Plan which merely promised to “cut carbon intensity” (China’s Twelfth Five-year Plan, 2011) without establishing a quantitative target, Beijing’s commitments in the bilateral agreements with the US was a more progressive move, as it sets a hard limit on Chinese carbon emissions. The acceptance of this arrangement was a major compromise made by China. As mentioned earlier, preserving the development rights and rejecting a hard cap on GHG emissions have been essential norms of the Chinese position during climate change negotiations. Nevertheless, by accepting a formal schedule for peaking its emissions, China obtained the endorsement of the US on the principle of CBDR. This demonstrates that to fulfil its interest in building new coalitions, China was willing to step back from some of its norms in climate change negotiations.

The High Ambition Coalition

Before COP 21, the EU played a leading role in forging the High Ambition Coalition in May 2015, which included the 27 EU Member States, developing states in Africa and the Caribbean, and the least developing states, especially the small island states led by the Marshall Islands (Cañete, 2015). In their answers to the strategy of the EU at COP 21, this coalition was identified by EU negotiators as an “essential mechanism” for the Union’s normative power (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019; Interview Respondent 7, 1 March 2019). Through intensive negotiations and expansion, in which the EU was a leading actor, the High Ambition Coalition developed into a group of more than 100 developed and developing countries and thus constituted the majority of

the parties at COP 21 (Cañete, 2015). An example of the influence of the High Ambition Coalition was the entry of Brazil, which is a member of the BASIC group together with China, India and South Africa. An EU negotiator asserted that this incident “tipped the balance” between more progressive parties and less progressive parties during COP 21 (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019). This shows that this coalition was an essential tool in the EU’s practice of normative power in the negotiations of the PA.

This chapter argues that the EU’s compromise on some of its norms, especially the exclusion of quantifiable mitigation targets in the principles of the High Ambition Coalition, was essential for the establishment of this coalition. It shows that driven by its interest in building new coalitions, the EU was willing to fall back on some of its norms. The dramatic emergence of the coalition during COP 21 notwithstanding, its norms have remained consistent since it was initiated. The High Ambition Coalition adhered to four major norms regarding the upcoming new deal: 1) the PA must be legally binding, inclusive, fair, ambitious, durable and dynamic; 2) the Agreement must set out a clear and operational long-term goal that is in line with science; 3) it must establish a review mechanism for countries to come together every five years to consider the progress made and to strengthen collective and individual efforts as appropriate; and 4) the PA must include a transparency and accountability system to track progress on the delivery of national commitments and the sharing of best practice (Cañete, 2015; European Commission, 2015b).

The EU’s efforts in forging this multilateral coalition were characterised by the compromise it made on excluding quantifiable mitigation commitments from the guidelines of the coalition (Oberthür & Groen, 2017). Indeed, whereas the EU (2015) argued for an agreement that contains “fair, ambitious and quantifiable mitigation commitments by all parties”, the High Ambition Coalition did not include “quantifiable”

targets in its vision of the PA (European Commission, 2015b). Therefore, in forging the coalition, the EU adapted its norms by agreeing to exclude the principle of quantified reduction from the agreement among members. This chapter posits that this compromise made by the EU was essential for the coalition to encompass a substantial number of developing states and the US during its development. First, the reluctance to accept quantified limitations on GHG emissions has been a persistent position of the developing countries since the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol (Bodansky & Rajamani, 2015). The exclusion of the call for quantified reduction paved the way for the Union and developing state members of the coalition to reach the consensus that the new agreement should be fair and ambitious. Second, as Falkner (2016, p. 1119) suggests, major emitters—especially the US—are “reluctant to tie themselves into a rigid set of predetermined emissions reductions that are legally binding”. Hence, the exclusion of this principle from the framework of the High Ambition Coalition enabled the EU to establish a common ground with the US based on their consensus on advancing the 1.5°C target and an enhanced transparency regime that reviews the emissions of each country annually (McGrath, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016). Therefore, the compromise made by the EU was essential for the expansion of the High Ambition Coalition, which in turn increased the influence of the EU’s norms regarding progressive NDCs and enhanced transparency.

As a result of the EU’s compromise on mitigation arrangements, the Union was able to establish some other norms in its basic position regarding the PA as the key norms of the High Ambition Coalition (EU, 2015). For instance, a system that reviews and requires the parties to increase their contribution every five years, which is one of the core initiatives of the EU regarding the PA, was fully implemented in the principles of the High Ambition Coalition (Oberthür & Groen, 2017). In addition, the EU’s call for enhanced mitigation transparency was also endorsed by other members of the coalition.

The support of the majority of the actors at the Paris Conference provided a broad platform for the EU's norm diffusion. Therefore, through making compromises, the EU was able to utilise the High Ambition Coalition as an important diffusion mechanism at COP 21. This shows that the exercise of normative power in global governance is not only about norm diffusion, but also encompasses politics based on compromise and bargaining. In this sense, international norms are essentially a product of the politics among actors that exercise normative power.

6.3 Shaping Climate Change Jointly: The Incorporation of the Norms of the EU and China in the Paris Agreement

Chapter 2 suggested that in multilateral governance, the codification of norms in the regulatory framework of international institution constitutes an important outcome of norm diffusion. This section analyses the PA (2015) to identify the outcomes of the norm diffusion of the EU and China in an international climate change agreement (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 *Codification of the norms of the EU and China in the PA*

Issue Area	EU's Norms	China's Norms	Norms of the PA
Limit of global warming	Within 2°C	No specific target	Within 2°C and pursue 1.5°C
Mitigation	Progressive Mandatory Quantitative	Asymmetric responsibilities Voluntary Non-quantitative	Progressive NDCs for all Parties Developed countries take the lead
Transparency	Enhance mitigation transparency for all Parties	Differentiation Enhance funding transparency	NDCs be publicly reviewed Developing countries have more flexibility than developed states

First, on the issue of setting a limit for global warming, China is the norm-taker and the EU is the norm-maker. The EU's call for an ambitious target for global temperature control is codified in the PA, as the agreement aims to "[hold] the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 above pre-industrial levels" (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 2). Compared with the Copenhagen Accord, which merely mentioned that countries would "consider" the 1.5°C target, as a legally binding agreement, the PA has effectively mandated an ambitious target of controlling global warming. Considering that only "[a] limited number of studies provide scenarios that are more likely than not to limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100" (IPCC, 2014, p. 21), it was a surprise to some observers that the PA not only reiterates the 2°C target but also raises a more ambitious 1.5°C objective (Obergassel et al., 2016). Such an outcome actually transcended the EU's position before the Paris Conference, which only mentioned the necessity to "stay below 2°C" (EU, 2015). Nevertheless, emphasising the 1.5°C target is consistent with the EU's normative position on climate change governance since the Union, as mentioned previously, was one of the most active players in promoting more ambitious targets for global temperature control before the Paris Conference. Indeed, as already noted, supporting the 1.5°C target during the Paris Conference paved the way for the EU to build the High Ambition Coalition with countries that have higher ambitions regarding temperature control targets, including small island countries and the US (Obergassel et al., 2016; "US demands 1.5 degree", 2015). The implementation of a 1.5°C target shows that this coalition contributed to shaping the PA as an agreement with ambitious objectives for controlling global warming, which accords with the EU's norm on this issue.

For China, accepting the 2°C target and an aspirational 1.5°C objective constitutes norm adoption. Indeed, a major principle of Beijing has been to block such an ambitious and

concrete limit for global warming, since such an objective implicitly sets a limit for the GHG emissions of developing countries (Zhang, 2013). During the Paris Conference, China opposed setting such a limit “as an impediment to their development if agreed without adequate financial support for its achievement” (Christoff, 2016, p. 776). The outcome of the PA was not in favour of China’s position. Hence, China is a norm-taker in terms of introducing a hard limit on global warming.

Second, both the EU’s and China’s norms regarding mitigation are incorporated in the PA’s legally binding mitigation regime. This makes them both norm-makers and norm-takers. The PA incorporates the EU’s call for “fair, ambitious and quantifiable mitigation commitments by all Parties” by requiring each country to submit their NDCs to an “interim public registry” (Article 30). These NDCs, which include the reduction targets and other mitigation policies, will be reviewed every five years. On each occasion after the five-year evaluation, the PA regulates that “[e]ach Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution, and reflect its highest possible ambition” (Article 4-3). This arrangement accords with the EU’s proposal before the Paris Conference, which suggested a “dynamic five-yearly mitigation ambition mechanism” in which all parties should keep submitting higher commitments (EU, 2015). Hence, the codification of the EU’s mitigation norms in the PA through its norm diffusion at COP 21 illustrates the Union, which acted as a bloc in climate change negotiations, possesses normative power in climate change governance. Together with the case of the AIIB, in which the EU exercised normative power through the membership of its Member States, this thesis illustrates that the Union can shape the global governance structure both as a bloc and through the joint actions of its Member States.

Although the EU’s norms are incorporated in the mitigation arrangements of the PA,

the agreement is also underpinned by Chinese interpretation of CBDR, as it maintains the binary differentiation between developed countries and developing countries and establishes asymmetric obligations between these two groups of states (Rajamani, 2016). The PA states that:

Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances. (Article 4-4)

This provision demonstrates the normative power of China in the PA as it emphasises the necessity for developed countries to “take the lead” in mitigation actions while providing developing countries with the autonomy to decide their own policies. Both of these arrangements comprise core elements of China’s interpretation of the CBDR principle. Therefore, the PA’s mitigation provisions incorporate both the norms of the EU and those of China, as the EU’s preference for an enhanced and progressive mitigation arrangement coexists with China’s interpretation of CBDR. It codifies the call of the *EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change* (2015) to address mitigation arrangements “in a balanced manner”. This shows that the compromise made between the EU and China before the COP 21 contributed to the incorporation of their norms in the mitigation arrangement of the PA.

This outcome, namely that both the norms of the EU and China on this issue are codified in the PA, shows that these two parties have jointly established their normative power in the governance structure of the PA. Thus, it shows that normative power, especially in multilateral settings, incorporates joint efforts as there are multiple actors that can shape the governance structure based on their preferred norms. Therefore, the policy

frameworks and regulatory frameworks of multilateral institutions can incorporate the norms of different actors. It also indicates that the EU and China are both norm-takers since they accept the norms promoted by each other, as well as by third parties. In particular, maintaining the dichotomy between developed and developing countries is inconsistent with the EU's norms. Keeping the binary differentiation in the PA provides developing countries, especially China and India, with more flexibility in terms of mitigation and therefore could hinder the 2°C target. Accepting the progressive NDC regime is a compromise for China as it requires developing countries to take concrete GHG reduction actions. Such an arrangement contrasts with China's preferred norm that developing countries should have autonomy in terms of mitigation (Zhang, 2015). Overall, in the mitigation regime of the PA, both the EU and China codified some of their norms and at the same time adopted the norms of each other and other actors. This makes them both norm-makers and at the same time norm-takers.

Third, the transparency regime is another area in which the PA incorporates the norms of the EU and China. Before COP 21, the EU (2015) strongly supported a "robust common rules-based" transparency and accountability regime. It demanded a common framework that would be applicable to all parties and blur the differentiation between developed and developing countries (Obergassel et al., 2016). Conversely, China argues that GHG reduction policies are a domestic issue, and to protect the sovereignty of individual countries, the international agreement should not include any mandatory transparency review regime (NDRC, 2015a). Both these norms are incorporated in the PA's transparency regime. Consistent with the EU's preference for an enhanced transparency framework, the transparency regime of the PA demands every party submit its NDC plan to "a public registry maintained by the secretariat" for expert review (Article 4-12). In addition, the agreement requires all parties to submit "a national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks

of greenhouse gases” as well as any “information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its nationally determined contribution” (Article 13-7). Therefore, the PA establishes a robust transparency and accountability regime by collecting and tracking whether parties are implementing their commitments and increasing their targets every five years. The transparency framework of the PA therefore codifies the EU’s norm to strengthen transparency requirements in climate change governance.

In addition to the codification of the EU’s transparency norms, some of the transparency provisions of the PA are still underpinned by the differentiation between developed and developing countries, as preferred by China. For instance, the PA states that “developing countries shall be provided flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of that Article, including in the scope, frequency and level of detail of reporting, and in the scope of review” (UNFCCC, 2015, paragraph 90). Further, whereas the developed countries “shall ... provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing country Parties”, the developing countries are not bound to providing such information (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 13-9,10). Moreover, the Agreement underlined that the transparency arrangements should “be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties” (Article 13). The emphasis on protection of sovereignty and the proposal to utilise the mechanism of “naming and shaming” to ensure parties implement their commitments, accord with China’s norm to preserve state autonomy in the transparency arrangement of the PA.

The incorporation of both the EU’s and China’s norms in the PA’s transparency provisions shows that the EU and China are both norm-makers and norm-takers. Both

the EU and China have codified their principles in terms of transparency. On the one hand, the EU's standard of enhanced transparency is codified in the PA's requirement that all parties submit their NDCs for review. On the other hand, a binary differentiation between developed and developing states remains an essential principle of the transparency regime. By maintaining the flexibility of developing states, the PA's transparency regime also codifies China's interpretation of CBDR. Therefore, China agrees to increase the responsibility of developing countries in terms of transparency, and the EU accepts that differentiation between developed and developing countries continues to underpin the PA's transparency regime. Consequently, the EU and China have both codified their norms in the PA, which is also shaped by the norms of their interlocutors and third parties.

In conclusion, although the EU and China have competing norms around climate change governance, many of their norms are incorporated in the mitigation and adaptation framework of the PA. As two actors that seek to advance their norms in the PA, the codification of the EU's and China's norms in the Agreement illustrates their normative power in this international governance institution. This outcome, namely that two actors with distinctive norms jointly implement their norms in a multilateral institution, has important implications for our understanding of the concept of normative power. It shows that in multilateral settings, the exercise of normative power is not a zero-sum game. Through compromise, multiple actors can establish their normative power in the institution simultaneously. Therefore, international norms are a deal that fulfils the interests of all actors in terms of shaping global governance with their norms.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has developed the core arguments of the thesis based on the examination

of the norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of norm diffusion of the EU and China in the PA. The analysis of the norms promoted by the EU and China in the PA illustrated the norm divergence between these two actors. In negotiating the PA, the EU and China had contesting norms in three areas. First, normative divergence exists in their approaches to differentiation. China seeks to maintain the principle of CBDR as the pillar of the new agreement, whereas the EU aims to ensure the binary differentiation between developed and developing states is replaced by a set of obligations that apply to all parties. Because of their different normative positions regarding differentiation and interests, the EU and China also promoted different norms regarding mitigation and transparency arrangements.

Regarding norm diffusion, the chapter illustrated that both the EU and China adopted the adoption of progressive mitigation targets and building coalitions. The chapter asserted that the EU and China had overlapping interests in building new coalitions before and during the PA. This interest drove the two actors to make compromises on the norms of the PA with each other and with other actors. The EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change demonstrated that the EU and China addressed their norm divergence through compromise. In addition, the compromises made by the EU and China with other actors contributed to the formulation of coalitions, which enhanced the diffusion of the norms of these two actors. The chapter argued that these compromises provide evidence for the argument that the EU and China are willing to adjust their approach to norm diffusion to fulfil their interests.

The analysis of the PA illustrated the codification of the norms of the EU and China in the Agreement. This positive outcome, together with the deliberate diffusion practised by the EU and China in the negotiations of the PA, demonstrates that the two actors possess normative power in climate change governance. The analysis also demonstrated

that the norms of the EU and China are both incorporated by the mitigation and transparency arrangements of the Agreement. The PA enhances the responsibility of all parties in these two areas while maintaining the principle of CBDR and differentiating between developing and developed countries. Therefore, the EU and China are norm-makers and at the same time norm-takers.

Chapter 7—Comparing the Normative Power of the EU and China

Introduction

This chapter applies a comparative analytical framework to compare the normative power of the EU and China. It also compares the findings in the two case studies, namely the AIIB and the PA. The chapter seeks to answer this research question: *What theoretical and empirical implications can be drawn from the comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China?* It argues that interests constitute the centrality of all three core components of normative power, namely norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes. With regard to norms, the comparative analysis shows that the norm divergence between the EU and China is to a large extent due to the diverging interests they seek to fulfil through norm diffusion. In terms of diffusion mechanisms, interests constitute the predominant driver of the EU's and China's approaches to norm diffusion. On the one hand, they both adjusted their norm diffusion policies to fulfil their interests. On the other hand, when they have overlapping interests in the AIIB and the PA, the EU and China addressed their norm divergence through compromise. As for the outcomes of norm diffusion, the incorporation of both the norms of the EU and those of China in the AIIB and the PA fulfils the interests of both actors in terms of shaping the global governance structure with their norms. Such an outcome indicates that the EU and China can forge a collaboration in global governance on the condition that their overlapping interests can be fulfilled, despite their norm divergence.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section compares the norms diffused by the EU and China. The chapter demonstrates that the different interpretations of sovereignty and human rights between the EU and China, as well as their different hierarchies of norms regarding financial governance and climate change governance,

are to a large extent driven by the different interests the EU and China aim to fulfil through the promotion of their norms. This indicates that the distinctiveness of Chinese norms is essentially due to Beijing's distinctive interests in global governance. In addition, the centrality of interests in the interpretations of norms of the EU and China shows that "norms express institutionalized interests" (Wunderlinch, 2013, p. 17).

The second section of this chapter compares the diffusion mechanisms adopted by the EU and China to show the centrality of interests in norm diffusion. It demonstrates that the EU adopted a less assertive approach to human rights dialogue with China because of the growing economic interests of the Union and its Member States with China. The interest in establishing a responsible image drove China to fall back from its adherence to the non-interference principle in the Darfur issue. These examples show that when their interests are in tension with their norms, the EU and China tend to adjust their approach to norm diffusion to fulfil these interests. Hence, the chapter hypothesises that interests constitute the predominant driver in an actor's norm diffusion practices. The chapter further demonstrates that in the AIIB and the PA, the EU and China addressed their norm divergence through compromise because of their overlapping interests. This shows that in multilateral settings, the exercise of normative power is an aspect of the politics among actors, which involves bargaining and compromise driven by interests. In addition, the two case studies show that leaders, driven by their interests in obtaining support from others, need to adopt the norms of other actors.

The third section of the chapter compares the outcomes of the norm diffusion of the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA. It shows the incorporation of the norms of both actors in these two institutions. Such an outcome, which is brought about by their compromises, fulfils the interests of both the EU and China since they were both able to shape the policy framework of the AIIB and the regulatory framework of the PA with

their norms. The chapter argues that international norms, as a deal that fulfils the interests of all actors, are therefore not static, but will keep changing because of the evolving interests of actors. In addition, the exercise of normative power can produce positive pay-offs for all actors in terms of the fulfilment of interests. The chapter suggests that this positive pay-off could lead to the collaboration between the EU and China, as well as among other actors in global governance.

7.1 Interests and Norm Divergence

In Chapter 2, this thesis suggested that there are two aspects of norm divergence: first, different actors could have different interpretations of the same norm; and second, different actors could promote different hierarchies of norms in the same area of global governance. The comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China, as well as the two case studies of the AIIB and the PA, demonstrates that the distinctive interests the EU and China seek to fulfil through norm diffusion are at the centre of both aspects of norm divergence between these two actors. This shows that the first aspect of the centrality of interests in normative power is the essential role interests play in terms of shaping an actor's conceptualisation of its norms.

This chapter suggests that the different interpretations of sovereignty and human rights of the EU and China are to a large extent due to the diverging interests they aim to fulfil through the diffusion of these norms in global governance. When asked about the EU's and China's approaches to sovereignty, one European scholar pointed out that "China prefers sovereignty, but the EU shares sovereignty" (Interview Respondent 10, 14 March 2019). Chapter 4 demonstrated that sovereignty protection, which refers to the non-interference principle and territorial integrity, constitutes the "paramount norm" in Beijing's external relations (Pan, 2012, p. 11). Since the 1950s, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which define mutual respect and non-interference as the

fundamental principles of international relations, constitute the guiding norms of Chinese foreign policy (Holland, 2012; Pan, 2010). The EU's interpretation of sovereignty is considerably different from that of China. The EU interprets sovereignty as transferrable (Bartelson, 2006). The idea of sharing sovereignty is regarded by the EU leaders as the foundation for the EU to "export Europe's high standards for food safety, workers' rights, the environment and consumer rights far beyond our borders" (Junker, 2018, p. 3). The EU's emphasis on transferrable sovereignty is demonstrated by the establishment of a number of supranational governance bodies, including the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the Common Agricultural Policy in 1962, and the European Commission (Gottwald & Duggan, 2012). The continuous process of European integration, in which EU members pool their sovereignty, leads to the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty in the EU's context to the extent that the connection between sovereignty and indivisibility becomes blurred (Bartelson, 2006).

In summary, whereas China emphasises the "protection" of sovereign integrity of itself as well as of other states, the EU promulgates sovereignty as transferrable. This chapter asserts that these diverging interpretations are driven by their significantly different interests, which they intend to fulfil through the diffusion of sovereignty. As this thesis suggests in Chapter 4, China's interpretation of sovereignty is essentially driven by three interests. First, learning from the "century of humiliation", China perceives the protection of its territorial integrity as a key interest (Qin, 2006). Second, China is also driven by its interest in consolidating its relationship with other developing states to obtain political support, ensure energy security and expand foreign investment (Shepard, 3 Oct 2019; Strauss, 2009). Third, Beijing interprets sovereignty as the precondition for human rights development so as to protect itself from external criticisms of its human rights conditions (Kinzelbach, 2016). The EU also learns from its history in interpreting sovereignty, but it draws on very different historical experiences and therefore comes

up with different interpretations of sovereignty. In particular, learning from the experience of the First and Second World War, the EU suggests that sovereignty interpreted as “absolute immunity from external intervention in a state’s domestic governance” (Pan, 2010, p. 234) is an essential reason that “[s]trategic rivalry between great powers often produced wars in Europe” (Barroso, 2010). Therefore, the EU’s distinctive interpretation of sovereignty is to a large extent driven by its distinctive interest in ensuring that war among European states “becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” through European integration (The Schumann Declaration, 1950, quoted in Manners, 2008, p. 48). In addition, the EU has been placing increasing emphasis on shared sovereignty in the late 2010s to increase unity among the Member States in championing multilateralism, enhancing the EU’s role in global governance and the EU’s defence policy (Junker, 2018, p. 5). This approach to sovereignty is to a large extent driven by the EU’s growing interest in defending its values and interests from the disruption of Brexit and Trump (Leonard & Shapiro, 2019).

The analysis illustrates that because of their essentially different historical experiences and political settings, the EU and China have considerably different interests to fulfil through norm diffusion. The differences in interests indicate that the EU and China have considerable norm divergence in many aspects of global governance. As this chapter shows, sovereignty is one of these aspects. The different interpretations of sovereignty between the EU and China demonstrate that the diverging interests actors seek to fulfil constitute the essential factor that drives “diverse, and, at times, competing ethical practices and concept of rights” in global governance (Aggestam, 2009, p. 35).

Another norm the EU and China interpret differently is human rights. As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, since the 1990s, China focused on the rights to subsistence and development as priorities in human rights development (Information Office of the State

Council, 2000; Sceats & Breslin, 2012), whereas the EU emphasised civil and political rights in its human rights dialogues with developing states (Council of the EU, 2012). In Chinese white papers on human rights, the rights to subsistence and development have always been placed in the first chapter, followed by civil and political rights (Information Office of the State Council, 1991; 2012). In contrast, the Union's Strategic Framework on Human rights and Democracy and its Action Plan (Council of the EU, 2012) privilege civil and political rights such as freedom of expression, opinion, assembly and association, freedom of religion or belief, and fighting discrimination. As stated in Chapter 3, issues raised by the EU in its human rights dialogues with China—including the labour re-education program, rights of ethnic minorities and civil and political freedoms—have centred on civil and political rights (EEAS, 2019). The thesis suggests that this emphasis on civil and political rights since the 1990s is consistent with the structure of the ECHR (Council of Europe, 1953), which mainly lists civil and political rights.

The comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China shows that their diverging interpretations of human rights are significantly driven by the distinctive interests they seek to realise through their norm diffusion in human rights governance. For the EU, as suggested in Chapter 3, the emphasis on civil and political rights in human rights diffusion is essentially driven by its interests in undermining autocratic regimes to establish a democratic regime that accords with the EU's standards in other states (Sjursen, 2006, p. 239). The EU focuses on civil and political rights because they are closely connected with regime change and democratisation. However, for China, which is itself an autocratic regime, the central interests in human rights issues are to foster economic development while maintaining the dominant role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese political system. Whereas China's interest in developing domestic economy explains Beijing's emphasis on development rights, the

thesis argues that it is Beijing's interest in preventing political reform that could undermine the CCP's rule that drives China to prioritise development rights over civil and political rights. Hence, the analysis shows that whereas the EU has an interest in promoting democratisation, China has an interest in preventing democratisation internally. The diverging interests they aim to fulfil through the diffusion of human rights norms are central to their diverging interpretations of human rights.

In their studies of China's normative power, both Kavalski (2013) and Womack (2008) emphasise that China has a distinctive type of normative power due to Beijing's distinctive norms, such as the adherence to the non-interference principle and its focus on establishing relationships with other actors based on mutual benefit and mutual respect. This thesis adopts a more nuanced position than these studies by arguing that China's interpretations of norms such as sovereignty and human rights are also considerably driven by the distinctive interests Beijing seeks to fulfil, such as protecting the CCP's rule and obtaining political support from other developing countries. Therefore, the suggestion that the EU's norms involve "self-rationalisation" of political and economic interests (Langan, 2012, p. 244) can also be applied to China, since Beijing's conceptualisation of its norms is also considerably driven by its political and economic interests. Hence, this thesis provides a nuanced understanding of the distinctiveness of Chinese norms by hypothesising that central to China's "alternative model of governance" (Khanna, 2012, pp. 66–67) that does not converge with democratic standards is its distinctive interests.

In addition to their different interpretations of sovereignty and human rights, the thesis has also argued that the diverging hierarchies of norms in financial governance and climate change governance between the EU and China are also essentially driven by the different interests they seek to fulfil through the diffusion of their norms in these

two areas of governance. As demonstrated in the case of the AIIB, China mainly promotes three financial governance norms. First, socioeconomic growth through infrastructure development is the predominant norm of China's development programs (Brautigam, 2009). Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated that over 40% of Chinese aid is devoted to developing economic infrastructure and another 26% is used for social and public infrastructure (State Council, 2014). Second, China's external assistance policy is also underpinned by the norm of "no strings attached"; namely, that China does not attach conditions to its investment programs to change the political structure of recipient states. Chapter 4 illustrated that China focuses on maintaining the status quo of the recipient state, be it democratic or authoritarian. Third, China also aims to increase the voting rights of developing states in global financial institutions to establish a "fair governance structure".

A key interest that drove China's promotion of these financial governance norms in the AIIB is reforming the global financial governance structure with its norms ("The AIIB: What happens", 2015). This interest has driven China to actively promote the reform of the IMF since the mid-2000s, with a focus on increasing the voting rights of developing states and emerging economies to fit the new structure of the global economy (Lu, 2011). However, the US Congress' refusal to approve the IMF reform plan that aimed to increase China's voting rights by 3% by the December 2014 deadline prompted China to establish an alternative institution to change the existing financial governance structure ("The AIIB: What happens", 2015). Such an impetus drove Beijing to establish the AIIB as a platform to promote its financial governance norms.

Conversely, the EU Member States were driven by the interest in shaping the governance structure of the AIIB in accordance with the EU's standard of financial governance. They emphasised the objective to ensure that the AIIB "follows the best

standards and practices in terms of governance, safeguards, debt and procurement policies” (Higgins & Sanger, 2015). This is consistent with the EU’s position that the AIIB should follow “the economic prescriptions and economic and social standards” of other multilateral development banks (EPSC, 2015, p. 5). Therefore, EU Member States promoted the norms that underpin the EU’s financial governance institutions, including transparency, social security and environmental protection, to fulfil this interest (Wilson, 2017). As illustrated in Chapters 3 and 5, these norms are incorporated as important principles of the EU’s Treaty as well as its development policies (EU, 2017a; EU, 2007b). They are also implemented as norms of the EU’s financial institutions, such as the EIB (2015, 2018). Hence, for the EU Member States, the diffusion of the EU’s transparency, social security and environmental protection norms in the AIIB is driven by their interest in ensuring that new institutions follow the existing financial governance norms the Union supports.

The diverging hierarchies of norms between the EU and China are further demonstrated by the case of the PA. EU officials, climate change scholars interviewed, and the official statements of the EU and China, have all emphasised that the issue of differentiation constituted the central point of divergence between the norms of the EU and China during the Paris Conference (EU, 2015; Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019; Interview Respondent 7, 1 March 2019; Interview Respondent 9, 13 March 2019; Interview Respondent 10, 14 March 2019; Zhang, 2015). An interviewed scholar noted that “whereas China perceived the binary differentiation between developed and developing states as ‘the red line’ in its climate change policy, the EU regarded the removal of this binary differentiation as the red line” (Interview Respondent 9, 13 March 2019).

In addition, China referred to the UNFCCC, which “takes into account historical

responsibility and national circumstances”, as the basis of China’s position (Zhang, 2015). Therefore, China supported a rigid binary differentiation in which industrialised states “take the lead” in mitigation actions and provide financial and technological support to developing countries (Zhang, 2015). Conversely, the EU (2015) promoted a legally binding agreement that establishes progressive and quantifiable mitigation targets for “all parties”. In addition, the EU (2015) stated that such a responsibility should be quantitative as well as progressive to achieve the target of controlling global warming within 2°C. The EU (2015) also aimed to introduce a regime in which all parties are required to increase their commitments every five years. Therefore, while China promoted a differentiated and asymmetric mitigation framework, the EU sought to advance a progressive and equal mitigation arrangement that covers all parties.

This thesis hypothesises that a major driver of the norm divergence between the EU and China in the AIIB is their distinctive interests in climate change governance. For the EU, there are considerable economic interests in pushing for a progressive climate change agreement in which the Union could take advantage of its advanced green technology to build a low-carbon economy in a more cost-effective way than in other regions (European Commission, 2018). Such a comparative advantage would create more than one million jobs for the EU and double the value of environmental goods and services before 2020. To fulfil these interests, it is important for the EU to ensure a “level playfield” with other economies through the establishment of a robust climate change governance structure that applies to all parties (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019). However, the central interest China seeks to fulfil in climate change governance is to ensure the economic development of developing states, including China, are not be restricted by a mandatory agreement without a binary differentiation between developing and developed countries (Peng, Zhou, & Ni, 2012). This interest drove China to oppose any mandatory or quantitative carbon emissions reduction

targets being placed on developing countries in the PA (Zhang, 2013; Zhang, 2015).

Many scholars have pointed out the variety of interpretations and hierarchies of norms. Tocci (2008, p. 6) suggests that norms “can be interpreted in a myriad different ways by different actors at different points in time”, while Aggestam (2009, p. 35) contends that norms can be “diverse, and, at times, competing”. However, few studies have investigated what brings about the norm divergence among actors. Through the examination of the different interpretations of sovereignty and human rights of the EU and China, as well as their different hierarchies of norms in financial governance and climate change governance, this thesis hypothesises that the distinctive interests actors seek to fulfil through norm diffusion are central to their norm divergence. While Lucarelli and Manners (2006, p. 202) suggest that in the EU’s norm diffusion, “each broad principle is given a European reading before being channelled into relations with third parties”, this thesis has illustrated that norms promoted by Beijing are also given a Chinese reading based on Chinese contexts. It emphasises that the different readings of norms among actors are essentially driven by their distinctive interests incorporated in these norms. This indicates that the norms promoted by actors are often a result of their selective adoption and interpretation of international norms based on their specific interests, rather than encompassing the full context of these norms. Therefore, whereas a number of scholars place increasing emphasis on how norms constitute an essential factor that defines the interests of an actor (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), this thesis has demonstrated that actors tend to conceptualise norms in a way that is consistent with their interests. The centrality of interest in an actor’s interpretations and hierarchies of norms shows that the foundation of an actor’s normative power is its interests that can be fulfilled by reforming the status quo or creating new institutions in accordance to its norms. Without these interests, actors would not seek to diffuse their norms through external relations in the first place

(Wunderlich, 2013). Hence, actors diffuse norms because it is in their interest to do so. As Jacobsen notes, “entrepreneurs do not descend from Mount Olympus; they are usually interested actors who benefit when their ideas are adopted” (as cited in Wunderlich, 2013, p. 23). Thus, it is essential for the normative power literature to examine not only the divergence of norms among actors, but also the different interests behind such norm divergence, since after all, as Carmen Wunderlich (2013) suggests, norms are institutionalised interests in individual actors.

7.2 Interests and Norm Diffusion

The second aspect of the centrality of interests in normative power is that interests constitute the predominant driver of the exercise of normative power. The comparative analysis of the EU’s and China’s approaches to their diffusion mechanisms demonstrates that both the EU and China tend to adjust their approaches to norm diffusion to fulfil their political, economic, and security interests. For instance, Chapter 3 suggested that driven by the growing trade interests of France and Germany with China, the EU adopted the human rights dialogue to replace the sponsorship of a UN resolution against China since 1995 (Balducci, 2010). In addition, as the value of trade with China has continued to rise since the mid-1990s, the EU has placed more emphasis on the EU-China economic relationship than shaping China’s human rights norms in its China policies (European Commission, 1995b, 2016). Therefore, the EU’s diminishing assertiveness in its human rights diffusion towards China is to a large extent driven by the economic interests of the Union and its Member States.

The Darfur issue, as suggested in Chapter 4, demonstrates that China also adjusted its approach to norm diffusion to fulfil its interests. China’s non-interference policy in Darfur attracted intense criticism from Western states and non-governmental organisations in the mid-2000s, some of which labelled the 2008 Beijing Olympic

Games the “Genocide Olympics” (Shinn, 2009, p. 86). These criticisms undermined China’s interest in fulfilling its role as a responsible actor. To fulfil this interest, China proactively supported the UN peacekeeping missions in Darfur (Large, 2008). Beijing also actively persuaded the Sudanese government to accept the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force (Carlson, 2008). The Darfur case indicates that China is willing to adopt a less rigid position in terms of sovereignty and non-interference when its interests in acting as a responsible actor are at stake.

These two examples demonstrate the centrality of interests in norm diffusion since interests constitute the factor that orients the EU’s and China’s approach to norm diffusion. Essentially, the exercise of normative power is to shape international norms in a way that does not undermine the interests of an actor. Hence, actors tend to fall back from their normative positions when they have newly emerged interests that are in tension with their norms. This sheds light on how norms and interests intertwine in an actor’s foreign policy (Aggestam, 2008; Brown, 2001).

In addition, the comparative analysis of the AIIB and the PA shows that the overlapping interests of the EU and China drove these two actors to address their norm divergence through compromise in these two institutions. This is another demonstration of the centrality of interests in actors’ exercise of normative power, since overlapping interests, rather than norm divergence, constitute the predominant factor that determines how the EU and China interact with each other in multilateral settings. This provides an answer to the question of how two actors with diverging norms interact with each other in an institution. This question is important not only for normative power scholarship, but also for international relations research, since global governance is increasingly characterised by the creation and expansion of multilateral institutions in which multiple actors seek to shape the institution with their norms. This denotes that the

process of “norm building”, to borrow the words of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 895), could be one in which multiple actors that exercise normative power interact with each other to set out the norms of an institution. However, to date, this aspect of norm building, which significantly contributes to our understanding of the structure of global governance, has largely remained understudied in the normative power scholarship. The majority of the studies are implicitly or explicitly based on the assumption that in any case, there can only be one norm promoter that diffuses its norms unilaterally, with no competition or the need to compromise with other norm promoters (Björkdahl, 2005; Björkdahl et al., 2015; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Even if there are contestations in norm building, they occur between “new norms” and “prior norms”, rather than between one “new norm” and another “new norm”, or between one norm promoter and another norm promoter (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895).

The different hierarchies of norms between the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA have demonstrated that the exercise of norm diffusion in multilateral settings is not a unilateral process, as there can be multiple actors with considerable norm divergence among them. Based on the comparative analysis of these two cases, the thesis hypothesises that norm promoters can address their norm divergence through compromise. This is demonstrated by both the AIIB and the PA, in which the EU and China managed to address their norm divergence through reaching compromises. In the AIIB, China made the compromise by adopting the transparency, social security and environmental protection norms of the EU. The EU Member States also made a compromise by accepting the exclusion of the EU’s human rights norms in the AIIB’s policy framework. As Chapter 6 demonstrated, the EU and China announced the EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change in June 2015, which established their consensus on the frameworks of the PA. In the joint statement, the EU made a compromise by endorsing the CBDR principle as the central norm of the PA, which

was the central claim of China before COP 21. China also made a compromise as Beijing supported the EU's proposal to formulate an agreement that provides progressive mitigation targets to all parties (EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, 2015).

The thesis argues that in both the AIIB and the PA, the EU and China were driven by their overlapping interests in reaching compromises regarding the norms of these two institutions. In the AIIB, the EU Member States and China had an overlapping interest in enhancing the global profile of the Bank. For China, an AIIB with considerable international clout would contribute to expanding China's norms of "no strings attached", infrastructure development, and a "fair" governance structure in other countries and regions through the Bank's projects (Bustillo & Andoni, 2018). The EU Member States have economic interests in enhancing the global influence of the AIIB. For instance, the UK has an interest in expanding the Bank as this will contribute to "the desire to ensure that London remains a global centre of finance" (Domínguez, 2015). Similarly, increasing the role of the AIIB in Asian infrastructure construction also suits the interests of Germany and France, which aim to take advantage of the business opportunities offered by AIIB projects (Bustillo & Andoni, 2018). The thesis suggests that such overlapping interests drove China to adopt the norms of the EU to obtain the endorsement of European countries, and the EU Member States to set aside the EU's human rights protection norm in their negotiations of the AIIB to ensure they can enjoy the advantages of being a member of this newly established bank with a growing international profile.

In the PA, both the EU and China had an interest in building new coalitions because they cannot play a leadership role in climate change negotiations without collaborating with other actors. When asked about the EU's key interests regarding the PA, a

European scholar suggested that the EU realised that it needed to keep “a low profile” and “leave more space” for other parties to advance their norms in climate change negotiations (Interview Respondent 10, 14 March 2019). An EU negotiator also emphasised the EU’s “deliberate effort in forging coalitions such as the High Ambition Coalition” before the Paris Conference (Interview Respondent 7, 1 March 2019). Such an interest in forging new coalitions was also evident in China’s climate change diplomacy before the Paris Conference. As Chapter 6 illustrated, the coalition between the EU and small island states, as well as South Africa’s and Brazil’s increasing support for an enhanced global mitigation framework, decreased the support for China’s norm of binary differentiation among the G77 group and the BASIC countries (Qi, 2011, Hallding et al., 2011). The difficulty in maintaining the existing coalitions with G77 and BASIC countries suggests that just like the EU, China needs to collaborate with other actors to obtain broad support for the diffusion of its norms in climate change governance. Therefore, despite their norm divergence in climate change governance, the EU and China had overlapping interests in establishing new coalitions before COP 21. This shared interest drove the EU and China to make a compromise in their joint statement on climate change to obtain support from each other regarding the norms they sought to promote at COP 21.

Therefore, one implication of this thesis is that in multilateral institutions, the interests of actors with diverging norms can overlap, leading to a compromise between these two actors. The role of overlapping interests as a predominant factor that shapes the interactions among these actors in their exercise of normative power has not been examined in the existing studies of normative power. As suggested in Chapter 2, it is argued by a number of studies that norm divergence between actors will lead to a conflictual relationship (Pan, 2010; Tocci & Manners, 2008). However, this thesis demonstrates that it is overlapping interests, rather than norm divergence, that have a

greater say in the relationship between norm promoters: If actors could find overlapping interests, they can overcome their norm divergence and reach compromises regarding the norms of the institution. This not only adds to the argument of this chapter that interests constitute the centrality of normative power, but also shows that the exercise of normative power is an aspect of the politics among actors, which involves bargaining and compromise driven by interests.

The finding that the EU and China addressed their norm divergence through compromise also indicates that the exercise of normative power is not a form of power politics; that is, the more powerful actor (in terms of economy, resource, or other types of material capacity) fully dominate the less powerful actors by setting every norm of the institution. Contrastingly, in both the AIIB and the PA, the thesis demonstrates that it is a key interest of the leader of the institution to obtain support from others. This shows another aspect of the centrality of interests in the exercise of normative power: the interest in obtaining support drives the leaders' adoption of the norms of other actors. This accords with Nye's (2008, pp. 140–141) suggestion that leaders "have to pay more attention to how they adjust to flatter hierarchies and find ways to empower their followers. Instead of just shaping others to their will, leaders have to attract support by also shaping themselves to their followers".

The leadership structures of the AIIB and the PA are different. In the AIIB, China is the leader of the Bank. As Chapter 5 illustrated, the AIIB was initiated by Chinese leaders in 2013 and China was in the driver's seat during the negotiations with other members of the Bank. Further, after the Bank was established, China became the largest shareholder with more than 25% of voting rights and *de facto* veto power (Wilson, 2017). The EU Member States are the participants since they did not apply for membership until March 2015, just before the deadline to apply to become a founding

member of the Bank. In addition, as non-regional members of the Bank, the EU Member States together have around 20% of voting rights, about 5% less than China's share.

In the PA, the EU and China are both leading actors. On the one hand, EU negotiators suggested that the EU continued to practise its "leadership by example" strategy at COP 21 (Interview Respondent 6, 5 February 2019; Interview Respondent 7, 1 March 2019). Scholars such as Bäckstrand and Elgström (2013) and Oberthür and Groen (2017) suggest that the EU re-established its leadership in climate change after Copenhagen by placing more emphasis on building coalitions with other actors. China, on the other hand, has earned itself leadership status in many discussions on climate change politics because of its expanding influence on climate change negotiations since 2009 (Engels, 2018). For example, *The Guardian* wrote that "China is leading the way" in tackling climate change by submitting its progressive mitigation plan before COP 21 (Duggan, 2015). In addition, Laurence Tubiana, Special Representative for the 2015 Paris Conference, stated that "China has a critical leadership role to play in Katowice (COP 24)" (as cited in Hook & Hornby, 2018).

The two case studies show that a shared interest of the leaders (China in the AIIB and the EU and China in the PA) is to gather support from other actors regarding their norms. Chapter 5 demonstrates that in the AIIB, China sought to obtain the endorsement of the EU Member States regarding its financial governance norms. In the PA, both the EU and China were seeking to establish new coalitions with other actors so as to broaden the support of their climate change norms among actors. The two cases demonstrate that norm adoption can occur both between the leader and the participant, and between two leaders. In the AIIB, China, as the leader of the Bank, adopted the EU's financial norms. In the PA, the EU and China adopted each other's climate change norms. This

shows that driven by the interest in obtaining support from other actors, leaders need to consider not only the interests of others, but also the norms of other actors.

7.3 Interests and Outcomes of Norm Diffusion

What will be the outcome of the interactions between actors with diverging norms? Are different norms mutually exclusive, or can they end up with a “joint pursuit of norms”, as suggested by Tocci and Manners (2008, p. 326)? The comparative analysis of the AIIB and the PA shows that the norms of the EU and of China are both incorporated in these two institutions. As already noted, such an outcome is largely brought about by the compromises they reached during the negotiations. This demonstrates that interests also constitute the centrality of the outcomes of norm diffusion, since international norms represent a deal that, to a certain extent, fulfils the interests of all parties.

In the case of the AIIB, China’s norms of “no strings attached” and infrastructure construction underpin the AOA of the bank. The codification of “no strings attached” is demonstrated by the fact that the AOA does not impose any political requirement on the recipient country. Instead, the AOA explicitly states that “[t]he Bank shall ensure that each of its operations complies with the Bank’s operational and financial policies, including without limitation” (AIIB 2015a, Article 13). In addition, the AOA codifies China’s focus on developing infrastructure by regulating that “[t]he purpose of the Bank shall be to foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors” (AIIB, 2015a).

While the norms of China underpin the AOA, the EU’s norms of transparency and social and environmental protection are also incorporated as the guiding norms of the AIIB’s investment programs. Specifically, the ESF of the AIIB (2016) implements the EU’s norms of ensuring social and environmental safeguards by requiring every AIIB project

assess its potential environmental and social risks, and, when adverse effects are identified, “facilitate resolution of the concerns of people who believe they have been adversely affected by the Project’s environmental and social impacts” (AIIB, 2016, p. 30). In addition to the ESF, the draft Policy on Public Information of the AIIB, which aims to “promote transparency in Bank operations” (AIIB, 2018a, 1.2), codifies the EU’s principle of transparency. Therefore, the AIIB’s policy framework incorporates both the norms of the EU and those of China. As posited in Chapter 5, such an outcome was essentially based on the compromise between the EU and China. Hence, the norms that underpin the AIIB’s policy framework represent a deal that fulfils the essential interest of the EU and China in shaping the governance structure of the AIIB with their norms.

The PA also incorporates both the norms of the EU and China, particularly in its mitigation regulations. As illustrated in Chapter 6, the PA requires each country to formulate and submit their NDCs (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 30). In addition, every five years, all parties need to submit new mitigation targets that “represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution, and reflect its highest possible ambition” (Article 4-3). While this arrangement accords with the EU’s proposal for a progressive and dynamic mechanism covering all parties, the PA also regulates that the developed states need to “take the lead” in terms of mitigation, and developing countries are only “encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances” (Article 4-4). This binary differentiation between developed and developing states, of which China was a major promoter, is consistent with the CBDR principle established in the Kyoto Protocol. Such an outcome accords with the compromise reached between the EU and China in the EU-China joint statement on climate change. Therefore, similar to the case of the AIIB, the incorporation of the climate change norms of the EU and

China in the PA constitutes a deal that fulfils both actors' interest in shaping climate change governance structure with their norms.

Many scholars have examined the numerous ways international norms function after they are set, such as how norms could constrain actors' behaviour by providing standards of "appropriateness" or creating the sense of "oughtness" (Wunderlich, 2013, p. 17). Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) examined the process of norm compliance, in which norm diffusion processes initiated by non-state transnational networks put pressure on norm-violating governments to make concessions leading to the internalisation of the norms. However, these studies take norms as given and do not pay adequate attention to how international norms exist in their current form. As suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896), norms "do not appear out of thin air". Before they can function as standards of behaviour for actors, norms firstly need to be accepted or institutionalised in institutions. The incorporation of both the norms of the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA shows that international norms are a product of the bargaining and compromise among actors in the first place. Such an understanding of how international norms come to its current form also indicates how they will evolve in the future: international norms are fluid, constantly shaped by the evolving interests of actors and the deals that they reach. How climate change norms have evolved from the Kyoto Protocol to the PA sheds light on this nature of international norms: the deal made in the Kyoto Protocol regarding climate change norms became incompatible to the changing interests of the EU, China, and other actors. These actors renegotiated a deal in the PA to ensure that the revised climate change norms fulfil their new interests. This indicates that international norms are not static, but will keep changing because of the evolving interests of actors.

The finding that international norms could exist as a deal that fulfils the interests of

multiple actors also suggests that the exercise of normative power does not necessarily lead to an actor setting all the norms of an institution. Rather, the outcome tends to be the co-existence of the norms of all actors, based on their compromise. The exercise of normative power of multiple actors is therefore not a zero-sum game, but can produce positive pay-offs for all actors since their interests in shaping the global governance structure in their likeness are, at least partly, fulfilled. This contrasts with the suggestion made by Morse and Keohane (2014, p. 386) that multilateralism in global governance is becoming less cooperative, characterised by “competing coalitions and shifting institutional arrangements”. Whereas Morse and Keohane (2014) emphasise the emergence of “contested multilateralism”—that is, newly established institutions underpinned by norms that are in conflict with the norms of status quo institutions—both the AIIB and the PA show the incorporation of alternative norms and existing norms. In the AIIB, China’s alternative financial norms, such as “no strings attached” and infrastructure development, co-exist with existing norms such as transparency, social security and environmental protection. In the PA, the EU’s alternative climate change norms, such as a progressive mitigation arrangement, co-exist with the CBDR principle that underpins the status quo. Therefore, the thesis makes the case that “collaborative multilateralism” constitutes an alternative structure of global governance to the “contested multilateralism” suggested by Morse and Keohane (2014).

The incorporation of the norms of the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA also provides important implications for policymakers in the EU and China by suggesting that on the condition that they have overlapping interests, these two actors can collaborate in international institutions despite their norm divergence. Norm divergence between the EU and China is suggested by a number of studies as a source of conflict between these two actors (Pan, 2010; Tocci & Manners, 2008). The official document of the EU explicitly identifies China as a “strategic rival” because of China’s promotion

of “alternative models of governance” (European Commission, 2019a). This thesis demonstrates that the relationship between the EU and China in multilateral settings is more likely to be determined by whether or not they have overlapping interests rather than whether or not they have norm divergence. The case studies of the AIIB and the PA in this thesis demonstrate that in the cases in which the EU and China have overlapping interests, they can collaborate with each other despite their norm divergence. This indicates that the EU and China, rather than being strategic rivals, can forge a collaborative relationship in global governance. The collaboration between these two actors after Trump’s decision to withdraw from the PA in June 2017 (“Trump on Paris accord”, 2017) provides further evidence of this suggestion. When asked about the influence of the US’s withdrawal from the PA, a European scholar suggested that “the US is the ‘common enemy’ of the EU and China” (Interview Respondent 10, 14 March 2019). Therefore, the EU and China had overlapping interests in tackling Trump’s disruption and consolidating the PA. Driven by these overlapping interests, both the EU and China criticised Trump’s decision. The EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, Miguel Arias Cañete, stated that the EU “deeply regrets this unilateral decision” made by Trump, while Premier Li Keqiang responded to Trump’s suggestion that global warming was “created by China” by asserting that “[f]ighting climate change is a global consensus, not invented by China” (“Trump on Paris accord”, 2017). In addition, in the EU-China Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy (2018), the EU and China agreed to intensify their cooperation and “underline their highest political commitment to the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement in all its aspects”. The consolidation of EU-China collaboration in the implementation of the PA further shows that interests, rather than norms, are at the centre of the EU-China relationship in their exercise of normative power.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the centrality of interests in three components of normative power—norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of norm diffusion—based on a comparative analysis of the findings in Chapters 3 and 4, and the two case studies, namely the AIIB and the PA. First, it demonstrated that the different interests that can be fulfilled through norm diffusion are central to the EU's and China's diverging interpretations of sovereignty and human rights, as well as their diverging hierarchies of financial governance norms and climate change norms. This indicates that China's distinctive norms regarding global governance are essentially due to its distinctive interests. In addition, the chapter suggests that whereas norm divergence between actors has been pointed out by a number of studies, the central role interests play in shaping such divergence has not received adequate attention. This finding indicates that an actor's normative power is driven by the interests that can be fulfilled if their norms are adopted by other actors or international institutions.

Second, this chapter showed that interests are also at the centre of an actor's norm diffusion practices. It demonstrates that when the EU and China have interests that are in tension with their norms, both actors tend to adjust their approaches to norm diffusion to fulfil these interests. Therefore, interests constitute the predominant driver of norm diffusion. In addition, the two case studies show that the overlapping interests the EU and China had in the AIIB and the PA were essential for them to address their norm divergence through reaching compromises. This chapter argues that this finding broadens the scope of research on norm diffusion by demonstrating that the exercise of normative power is an aspect of the politics among actors, which involve bargaining and compromise. It also shows that the interest in obtaining support from other actors could drive the leader of the institution to adopt the norms of other actors.

Third, this chapter provided insight into the central role of interests in the outcomes of norm diffusion. It suggests that the incorporation of the norms of the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA shows that international norms represent a deal that fulfils the interests of all actors in terms of shaping global governance structures with their norms. Hence, norm diffusion of multiple actors is not a zero-sum game, but can produce positive pay-offs for all actors. This indicates the emergence of collaborative multilateralism in global governance. The chapter further argues that the EU and China are not necessarily strategic rivals because of their norm divergence, since they can forge collaboration in global governance on the condition that they have overlapping interests.

Chapter 8—Conclusion

Introduction

Since Manners (2002, p. 251) conceptualised normative power as “the ability to change the concept of ‘normal’” in international affairs in 2002, there have been extensive scholarly discussions on whether or not the EU is an actor that possesses normative power in international affairs (Whitman, 2011). However, to date, only a handful of scholars, such as Womack (2008) and Kavalski (2013), have examined whether or not China has normative power. Even fewer studies have compared the normative power of the EU and that of China, or investigated the interactions between these two actors in their exercise of normative power in multilateral institutions. This thesis suggests that since the beginning of the 21st century, China has had an increasing interest in shaping and influencing global governance with its distinctive norms (Callahan, 2016; Pu, 2012). It is therefore imperative to assess whether China possesses normative power in global governance, and if so, to compare China’s normative power with that of the EU.

The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate how the normative power of China compares with that of the EU. It identified three core components of normative power: norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes. It then examined these three core components in the EU’s and China’s foreign policy to assess the normative power of these two actors. It further examined how the EU and China exercise their normative power in two multilateral institutions: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Paris Agreement (PA). It compared the norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion of the EU and China. In the examination and comparison of the normative power of the EU and China, this thesis focused on the role interests

play in driving and shaping the two actors' approaches to norms and norm diffusion.

This concluding chapter starts with a reiteration of the research problem and the research questions of the thesis. It then synthesises and integrates the key findings of the thesis. Next, the chapter will demonstrate the significance and contribution of the thesis, and finally, it will discuss future research agendas regarding normative power.

8.1 Revisiting the Research Question and Hypothesis

This thesis examines and compares the normative power of the EU and China in terms of their norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion. The main question this thesis seeks to answer is: *How does the normative power of China compare with that of the EU?*

This thesis argues that both the EU and China possess normative power in global governance. It further argues that interests constitute the predominant driver of the normative power of the EU and China. The individual state/union interests contribute to the norm divergence between the EU and China. In addition, when interests are in conflict with the norms the EU and China promote, both actors tend to fall back to fulfilling their respective interests. Moreover, when they have overlapping interests, the EU and China addressed their norm divergence through compromise.

To exhibit the validity of the hypothesis, this thesis examines five sub-questions:

1. How should we conceptualise the normative power of an actor in global governance?
2. Do the EU and China possess normative power in global governance?
3. How do the EU and China exercise their normative power in multilateral

institutions?

4. How do the EU and China address their norm divergence and why?

5. What theoretical and empirical implications can be drawn from the comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China?

In the next section, this thesis discusses the main findings of this research and evaluates how they respond to the stated sub-questions and research hypothesis.

8.2 Findings of the Thesis

The research in this thesis is structured through the exploration of the above five sub-questions. To answer the first sub-question, *How should we conceptualise the normative power of an actor in global governance?*, Chapter 2 defines normative power as the power to shape global governance structure through the diffusion of the norms of an actor. It suggests that the analysis of normative power needs to focus on the deliberate actions of norm diffusion, the goal achievement of norm diffusion, and the connection between norm diffusion and the impacts on international institutions. Drawing on the analytical frameworks of normative power proposed by Manners (2008) and Tocci (2008), the chapter identifies three core components of normative power: norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion. The first core component is norms. Norms are the constitutive principles that guide an actor's foreign policy. Norms constitute the subject of the actor's norm promotion in global governance. The thesis identifies the different interpretations of the same norm and the different hierarchies of norms in the same area of governance as two aspects of norm divergence between actors.

The second core component is diffusion mechanisms, namely the policy tools utilised by actors to promote their norms. Because of its focus on intentional attempts to

exercise normative power, the thesis has emphasised direct diffusion mechanisms, including persuasion, coalition building, inducement and coercion, in its analysis of norm diffusion. It suggests that such an approach contributes to establishing a clear connection between norm diffusion and positive outcomes. The thesis does not incorporate indirect means of norm diffusion, such as emulation, lesson-drawing, and competition, as it is difficult to empirically verify whether there is a clear causal connection between indirect norm diffusion and the alleged impacts it creates on other actors. The thesis also suggests that coalition building constitutes an important diffusion mechanism in multilateral institutions, since actors need to establish a broad platform with other actors to jointly shape the norms of multilateral bodies when there are multiple norm promoters.

The third core component is the outcomes of norm diffusion. This thesis identifies two types of positive outcomes: policy changes in the target states in accordance with the norms of the norm promoter and the codification of an actor's norms in the policy frameworks and regulatory frameworks of international institutions. These positive outcomes brought about by the deliberate norm diffusion of the EU and China verify the normative power of these two actors in certain areas of global governance.

Chapters 3 and 4 answer the second sub-question: *Do the EU and China possess normative power in global governance?*. Chapter 3 applies the analytical framework set out in Chapter 2 on the EU. The findings demonstrate that the EU's normative power can be assessed through an examination of three components: norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of norm diffusion. It also demonstrates that interests constitute a predominant driver of the EU's exercise of normative power. In terms of norms, the chapter examines the EU's interpretations of human rights, democracy and good governance, resilience, and climate change norms. It suggests that the Union's

interpretations of its norms are essentially driven by the interests the EU seeks to fulfil through the promotion of these norms. The EU prioritises civil and political rights, mainly because of its interest in triggering democratisation in developing states. The Union's interpretation of democracy and good governance is essentially driven by its interest in promoting its standard of governance and the economic interests it can obtain through market liberalisation. Moreover, the EU's adoption of resilience as a norm of its foreign policy and its interpretation of this norm is based on its interest in protecting its own security, tackling regional fragility, and addressing the migration problems. The EU's interpretation of climate change norms is significantly driven by its interest in shaping international climate change in accordance with its internal climate change governance structure.

In terms of norm diffusion mechanisms, Chapter 3 examines the EU's development assistance policy and EU-China human rights dialogues. It demonstrates that the EU's development assistance programs serve as a platform for the EU to diffuse its liberal democratic norms and financial governance norms. The EU's practices of this diffusion mechanism, especially the practices of sanctions triggered by violations of the human rights clause, are highly selective because of the political, security, and economic interests of the EU and its Member States. The chapter demonstrates that the EU seeks to promote its standard of human rights protection to China through the human rights dialogues. It identifies the diminishing assertiveness in the EU's approach to this diffusion mechanism driven by the increasing economic interests of the EU and its Member States in China. Based on these analyses the chapter makes the case that interests constitute the predominant driver of the EU's approaches to these two diffusion mechanisms.

Moreover, the thesis examines the outcomes of the EU's norm diffusion through the

analysis of the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with Macedonia and the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. It demonstrates that through the EU's norm diffusion, its human rights, democracy and good governance norms are codified in these agreements. In addition, through the SAA, the EU's norms of democracy and good neighbourly relations underpin the internal and external policies of Macedonia. These positive outcomes of the EU's norm diffusion verify the EU's normative power in terms of shaping its relationships with Macedonia as well as with the ACP states.

Chapter 4 examines China's normative power in global governance through an analysis of China's norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes of norm diffusion. The findings of this chapter demonstrate that China is an actor that possesses normative power, which brings to the fore an alternative structure of global governance to the one promoted by the EU. It also reveals that China's distinctive interests significantly drive its exercise of normative power. The chapter firstly examines China's interpretation of sovereignty, human rights, peaceful development and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR). It demonstrates that China's emphasis on territorial integrity and non-interference in its interpretation of sovereignty is mainly driven by its interest in protecting its own territorial integrity and consolidating the relationship with other developing states. It also demonstrates that, as in the Darfur issue, China is willing to adjust its rigid position regarding non-interference so as to fulfil its interest in establishing a responsible image in global governance. In addition, China's emphasis on state autonomy in formulating the hierarchy of human rights is driven by its interest in legitimising its domestic approach to human rights. The chapter also suggests that Beijing's prioritisation of the rights to development over civil and political rights is essentially due to its interest in developing China's economy while maintaining the dominant role of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese political system.

Moreover, China's adoption of peaceful development was driven by its interest in tackling the "China threat theory". In terms of climate change norms, China promotes CBDR because it is in Beijing's interest to ensure the economic development of developing states, including China, would not be restricted by climate change agreements. The chapter further demonstrates that China's interest in protecting its territorial integrity leads to a hierarchy of norms in which sovereignty outranks other norms. Therefore, China's different interpretations of sovereignty, human rights and CBDR, when compared to the EU, are essentially due to its distinctive interests in these areas of governance.

The chapter examines the peripheral diplomacy and external assistance programs as two mechanisms of China's norm diffusion. It suggests that the adoption of peripheral diplomacy illustrates the growing proactiveness in China's norm diffusion driven by its increasing interest in shaping global governance in its likeness. In addition, the chapter demonstrates that China's external assistance programs are characterised by its selective use of conditionality in accordance with China's political and economic interests. To consolidate the relationship with developing states, China excludes political conditionality that would transform the political regime of the recipient states. At the same time, China strictly applies the One-China Principle in its development aid programs to protect its territorial integrity. Therefore, interests constitute the predominant factor that drives China's approach to its norm diffusion mechanisms.

Chapter 4 further examines the outcomes of Chinese norm diffusion through the analysis of the Beijing Declaration (2017) and the Copenhagen Accord (2009). The Beijing Declaration codifies China's human rights norms, including the emphasis on state autonomy in terms of human rights protection and the priority of development rights. The Copenhagen Accord codifies China's climate change norms since it contains

no mandatory targets for developing states while providing developed countries with considerably more responsibility in terms of mitigation. The codification of Chinese norms in these institutions demonstrates China's normative power in human rights governance and climate change governance. These positive outcomes also illustrate that China's exercise of normative power leads to the emergence of new institutions that are underpinned by Chinese norms rather than those of the EU.

The third sub-question, namely *How do the EU and China exercise their normative power in multilateral institutions?*, is answered by Chapters 5 and 6. The findings in Chapter 5 demonstrate the diverging hierarchies of norms promoted by the EU and China in the AIIB. China aimed to promote “no strings attached”, infrastructure development, and a “fair” governance structure in the Bank, whereas the EU Member States sought to advance the EU's norms of transparency, social security, and environmental protection. The chapter also illustrates that the EU and China promoted their norms in different ways in the AIIB. As the leading actor in the negotiation of the AIIB, China diffused its norms through setting the agenda of the negotiation. As the participants of the Bank, the EU Member States utilised their membership to diffuse their financial governance norms. The examination of the policy frameworks of the AIIB revealed the codification of the norms of the EU and China in the institution. While China's “no strings attached” and infrastructure development norms are codified in the Articles of Agreement, the EU's transparency norms are codified in the AIIB's public information policies. In addition, the Environmental and Social Framework of the AIIB incorporates both the EU's norms of social security and environmental protection and China's preference for the exclusion of human rights conditions in external assistance programs.

Chapter 6 demonstrates the exercise of normative power of the EU and China in the PA.

It demonstrates that the EU and China promote different hierarchies of climate change norms. First, the EU sought to remove the binary differentiation between developed and developing states, whereas China aimed to preserve such binary differentiation in the PA. Second, the EU promoted a progressive and quantifiable mitigation arrangement that applies to all parties, whereas China emphasised that developed states should take the lead in curbing greenhouse gas emission and developing states should keep their autonomy in terms of setting mitigation targets. Third, the EU promoted an enhanced transparency framework that applies to all actors, whereas China suggested that developing states should have more flexibility than developed states in terms of transparency. The chapter also demonstrates that the EU and China utilised similar diffusion mechanisms in the PA. They both adopted enhanced mitigation targets to advance the influence of their norms in the upcoming agreement. Further, both the EU and China emphasised coalition building as an essential mechanism to diffuse their climate change norms. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that the norms of the EU and China are codified in the regulatory frameworks of the PA. The PA adopts the 2°C objective, of which the EU was an important promoter. The mitigation and transparency arrangements of the PA incorporate both the norms of the EU and those of China. The PA enhances the responsibility of all parties in mitigation and transparency, while at the same time maintains the principle of CBDR and the differentiation between developing and developed countries by providing developing states with more flexibility than developed states. Therefore, Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that the exercise of normative power of the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA produced positive pay-offs of both actors, as they both incorporated their norms in these two institutions. They are both norm-makers and at the same time norm-takers in these two institutions.

Chapters 5 and 6 also answer the fourth sub-question: *How do the EU and China address their norm divergence and why?*. These two chapters find that the EU and

China addressed their norm divergence in the AIIB and the PA through reaching compromises on the norms of these two institutions. These compromises were driven by the overlapping interests of the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA. Chapter 5 demonstrates that driven by their overlapping interests in enhancing the global profile of the Bank, the EU and China made compromises on the norms of the Bank. Specifically, China sought to enhance the global influence of the AIIB to establish a broad platform for the diffusion of its financial governance norms. To obtain the endorsement of the EU Member States, Beijing adopted the EU's financial governance norms, including transparency, social security and environmental protection. The EU Member States sought to fulfil their economic interests through the expansion of the AIIB. Driven by this interest, the EU Member States agreed to exclude the EU's human rights norms from the policy frameworks of the AIIB.

Chapter 6 demonstrates that the PA constitutes another case in which the EU and China, based on their overlapping interests, addressed their norm divergence through compromise. Before COP 21, both the EU and China had an interest in establishing new coalitions in climate change negotiations to obtain broader support for their climate change norms. Driven by this overlapping interest, the EU and China reached a compromise on the norms of the PA in the *EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change* in 2015. In this joint statement, the EU made a compromise by endorsing the principle of CBDR as the guiding norm of the PA, despite its objective to remove the binary differentiation between developed and developing states established in the Kyoto Protocol. China also made a compromise by supporting the objective to control global warming within 2°C, which contrasts with China's objection regarding a quantifiable mitigation arrangement in climate change agreements. The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that it is overlapping interests, rather than norm divergence, that have a greater say in the relationship between the EU and China in

their exercise of normative power.

Chapter 7 answers the fifth research question, *What theoretical and empirical implications can be drawn from the comparative analysis of the normative power of the EU and China?* through a comparative analysis of the findings in Chapters 3 and 4, as well as of the two case studies. It demonstrates the centrality of interests in all three core components of normative power: norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion. In terms of norms, the chapter argues that the different interests the EU and China seek to fulfil through norm diffusion are essential for their diverging interpretations of sovereignty and human rights, as well as their diverging hierarchies of financial governance norms and climate change norms. The centrality of interests in China's conceptualisation of its norms suggests that the distinctiveness of China's norms regarding global governance is essentially due to its distinctive interests. In addition, the finding that the diverging interests of the EU and China are essential to their norm divergence indicates that the norms promoted by actors are often a result of their selective adoption and interpretation of international norms based on their specific interests. Norms, therefore, are institutionalised interests of individual actors.

In terms of diffusion mechanism, this chapter shows that interests constitute the predominant driver of an actor's norm diffusion practices. On the one hand, the EU's diminishing assertiveness in the EU-China human rights dialogues and China's support for UN peacekeeping missions in Darfur demonstrate that when there are tensions between their interests and the norms each promotes, both actors tend to fall back on their norm diffusion to fulfil their interests. On the other hand, the two case studies show that when the EU and China have overlapping interests in the AIIB and the PA, they addressed their norm divergence by reaching compromises with each other. The finding that norm diffusion is essentially driven by the interests of norm promoters

demonstrates that the exercise of normative power is an aspect of the politics among actors, which involve bargaining and compromise. The compromises made by the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA illustrate that leaders, driven by the interest in obtaining support from other actors, could actively adopt the norms of other actors.

Regarding the role of interests in the outcomes of norm diffusion, both the AIIB and the PA are characterised by the incorporation of the norms of the EU and China. This indicates that the exercise of normative power of multiple actors is not a zero-sum game, but can produce positive pay-offs for all actors. This thesis argues that such an outcome denotes that international norms constitute a deal that fulfils the interests of all actors in shaping global governance structures with their norms. This finding has both theoretical and empirical implications. Theoretically, it suggests that multilateralism could be collaborative rather than contested because of the collaboration among actors with diverging norms in international institutions. Empirically, the compromises reached between the EU and China in the AIIB and the PA demonstrate that these two actors are not necessarily strategic rivals because of their norm divergence, but can establish collaboration based on their overlapping interests in global governance.

8.3 Significance of the Thesis

The significance of the thesis lies in its systematic analysis of how the interests of the EU and China shape a more nuanced structure of their interpretations of norms and approaches to norm diffusion than the policy statements of the EU and China illustrate. Specifically, the thesis demonstrates that the political, economic, and security interests the EU and China seek to fulfil through norm diffusion drive their interpretations and hierarchies of norms in their foreign policies. In addition, the thesis suggests both the EU and China adjusted their approach to norm diffusion so as to fulfil their interests. Moreover, the thesis demonstrates that the overlapping interests of the EU and China

in international institutions drive them to address their norm divergence through compromise. Thus, this thesis demonstrates that interests constitute the predominant driver of the exercise of normative power of these two actors.

The significance of this thesis also lies in its systematic analysis of China's norms, diffusion mechanisms, and outcomes of norm diffusion. It broadens the normative power literature through an assessment of China's normative power, particularly in financial governance, climate change governance and human rights. The verification of China's normative power in this thesis demonstrates that normative power is not exclusive to the EU. It also sheds light on how China's interests shape the nuances in China's normative power. The thesis emphasises that the distinctiveness of China's normative power is not only due to its distinctive norms and approaches to norm diffusion, but also its distinctive interests in global governance. It complements the existing studies on China's normative power by demonstrating the predominant role interests play in China's exercise of normative power.

Furthermore, the significance of this thesis lies in its two case studies, namely the AIIB and the PA, in which both the EU and China attempt to exercise its normative power through the diffusion of its distinctive norms. It bridges a gap in the normative power literature, which primarily focuses on the exercise of normative power of a single actor in a bilateral relationship or an international institution. It demonstrates that the exercise of normative power constitutes an important aspect of the politics of norm-setting in global governance. This means that international norms could be a product of the politics among international actors, which include bargaining and compromise.

The two case studies also add to the knowledge of how the EU and China address their norm divergence in multilateral settings. It illustrates that the EU can compromise with China to establish a collaborative relationship in global governance when they have

overlapping interests. This provides important implications for policymakers in the EU and China by demonstrating that these two actors could collaborate in global governance in cases in which they have overlapping interests. This indicates that the EU and China are likely to continue their collaboration in climate change negotiations because of their shared interest in consolidating the PA arrangements, especially after Trump's decision to withdraw the US from the PA. They would also keep their cooperation in the AIIB because of their overlapping interests in expanding this institution. The findings of the thesis indicate that despite their norm divergence, there is potential for the EU and China to expand their collaboration in multilateral institutions on the condition that they can identify overlapping interests. Hence, it is likely that the two actors would forge collaboration in other areas of global governance, such as the Middle East, based on their shared interest in maintaining regional stability, despite the EU's democratisation agenda in the region, which is not shared by China. However, in other issues such as the South China Sea issue, it is unlikely that the EU and China would collaborate since the EU does not share China's interest in protecting its sovereignty claims in this area.

8.4 Future Research

This thesis has the potential to serve as a starting point for future studies on normative power. Firstly, this thesis has provided a rigorous framework to assess an actor's normative power in a certain area of global governance. The analytical framework of this thesis examines the normative power of an actor based on the study of the norms that it seeks to diffuse in global governance; the diffusion mechanisms adopted by the actor to promote its norms externally; and the outcomes of norm diffusion, with a focus on the policy change of the recipient states and the codification of the norms of the actor in international institutions. The three core components of norms, diffusion mechanisms and outcomes, contribute to illustrating the normative power of an actor in

global governance. The analytical framework employed in this thesis may prove useful in informing future research by providing a mechanism for exploring the normative power of other actors, such as the US, Russia and ASEAN, in global governance. As the thesis has demonstrated, actors establish their specific hierarchies of norms and approaches to norm diffusion based on both their standards of global governance as well as their interests. The analysis of the normative power of other actors can further explore how norms are interpreted and diffused differently in international affairs. These studies would contribute to expanding the scholarly understanding of the plurality of norms and norm diffusion mechanisms in global governance.

Secondly, this thesis has examined the interactions between the EU and China in their exercises of normative power in two specific institutions: the AIIB and the PA. It argues that the EU and China, driven by their overlapping interests in the AIIB and the PA, addressed their norm divergence through reaching compromises regarding the norms of these two institutions. It identifies these two multilateral settings as significant areas of global governance in which the EU and China seek to exercise their normative power with distinctive national/EU interests. However, there is still the opportunity to analyse the normative power of the EU and China in international institutions that are not covered in this thesis. For example, as already suggested, the EU and China promote considerably different standards of human rights protection in their external relations. Therefore, there is potential to examine whether or not the EU and China have normative power in the Human Rights Council; the similarities and differences between the norms and diffusion mechanisms of the EU and China in the institution; and how the EU and China interact with each other in their practices of norm diffusion in the institution. Similarly, the study of other international organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation and the G20, could also contribute to an understanding of the relationship between the EU and China in their exercise of normative power in global

governance bodies.

Thirdly, one subject of this thesis has been to study how the EU and China, as two actors with diverging norms regarding financial governance and climate change governance, compromised with each other and established collaboration in the negotiations of the AIIB and the PA. To broaden the research agenda on normative power, the literature in this field could also begin to explore the relationships between the EU, China and other actors such as the US, Russia, and India, in their exercises of normative power in international institutions. Such research agendas would then make it possible to assess whether the finding that the overlapping interests drive the EU and China to reach compromises despite their norm divergence is specific to the relationship between the EU and China or consistent among different actors that seek to exercise normative power in global governance bodies.

The contributions this thesis has made to the normative power scholarship, as well as the abovementioned potential for future research drawing on this thesis, reveal that the exercise of normative power constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of an actor's international behaviour. The analysis of the objective, action, and outcome of an actor's norm diffusion is essential for the scholarly understanding of the role the actor plays in international institutions. Hence, this thesis demonstrates that the concept of normative power is one with long term conceptual use since the power to shape international norms is one of the most important types of power in global governance.

Appendix A—Interview Questions

Questions for European academics studying EU-China relations

1. What are the main areas of research that you are currently working on?
2. What issues relating to normative diffusion are currently the most important in your opinion?
3. What are the main forces driving the EU's normative foreign policy?
4. What are the main challenges to the EU's normative foreign policy?
5. Do you agree that China is also diffusing a series of norms in its foreign policy?
6. If so, do you think China can be labelled as a normative power in international relations?
7. If so, what do you think is the major difference between China's normative diffusion and the EU's?
8. What do you think will be the relationship between the EU's and China's normative policy?

Questions for Chinese academics studying EU-China relations

1. What are the main areas of research that you are currently working on?
2. Which past research projects have you been particularly interested in or proud of?
3. What future research plans do you have?
4. Do you think China is holding a series of norms as the guideline of its foreign policy?
5. If so, do you think that China is promoting these norms in international society?
6. Do you agree that China can be labelled as a 'normative power' in international relations?
7. What are the differences and similarities between China's normative policy and that of the EU?

8. Do you think China's norms will become a challenge to the EU's foreign policy?
9. If not, what will be the relationship between China's normative policy and that of the EU?

Interview Questions for AIIB staff⁹

1. What were the AIIB's key interests in obtaining EU Member States as prospective members?
2. The EU Member States did not apply for AIIB membership until March 2015, how would you characterise the major reasons for their change of attitudes during the negotiation?
3. The EU and China have different norms regarding development policy and financial governance, do you think this normative diversity constitutes an issue in AIIB negotiation? If so, how is this diversity addressed by the two parties?
4. What are the other key issues in negotiating the membership of European Countries? What are the respective arguments of the two parties regarding these issues?
5. No EU institution joins the AIIB and European countries made their decisions separately. How would you describe the impact of the lack of a common EU strategy on the roles of the EU Member States in the bank?
6. In the formulation of the AIIB, China is the leading country and the European States are the participants. How would you describe the influence of these different roles of these two parties on their actions and approaches to the AIIB?
7. There are concerns that the AIIB serves as a tool for China's own interests in its operation. Do you agree with this argument? How would you describe the AIIB's role in Asian development policy?
8. The accession of EU states significantly increased the influence of the AIIB. In addition to this, what are the other impacts the entrance of European members has caused on the AIIB?

⁹ Due to the refusal of AIIB staff to take one-on-one interviews, these questions were submitted to the AIIB through its official website. The AIIB provided a response to these questions based on the collection of answers from its staff.

9. How would you characterise the influence of China's norms in the AIIB? What are the key areas you think China has exerted its influence?
10. How would you characterise the influence of the norms of the EU Member States on the AIIB? What are the key areas you think European states have exerted their influence?
11. How would you characterise the AIIB's importance to the broader political relationship between the EU and China?

Interview Questions for participants of the Paris Conference

1. What would you think are the key interests of the EU with regard to the Paris Agreement before the Paris Conference in 2015?
2. The EU and China have different norms regarding climate change governance, do you think this normative diversity emerged during the Paris Conference? If so, how do the EU and China address this diversity?
3. The EU adopts a 'leadership by example' strategy in its climate change policy. In your opinion, how was this strategy implemented during the negotiation of the Paris Agreement? What are the other strategies the EU adopted during the conference?
4. The EU and China forged a joint statement on climate change several months before the Paris Conference. How would you describe the impact of this joint statement on the EU's position for the Paris Conference?
5. The EU led the High Ambitious Coalition during the Paris Conference. What are the key movements made by the EU to forge this coalition? How important is this coalition to the EU's climate change diplomacy during the conference?
6. Brazil, as a member of the BRICS group, joined the High Ambitious Coalition during the conference. What do you think are the impacts of this incident on the negotiation strategies of the EU and China?
7. Both the EU and China sought to shape the Paris Agreement based on their principles. How would you characterise the influence of the norms of the EU and China in the Paris Agreement? What are the key areas in which the two Parties have established

their influence?

8. Some scholars suggest that the Paris Agreement is a compromise among Parties. Do you agree with this suggestion? If so, on what issues do you think that the EU and China compromised with each other?
9. Comparing to the Copenhagen Accord, the EU's influence in the Paris Agreement is much more significant. What would you think are the key reasons for the different outcomes in the Copenhagen Conference and the Paris Conference?
10. After President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, how would you characterise the roles of the EU and China in the implementation of this agreement?

Interview list

Institutions	Date	Interview code
Fudan University, China	29/12/2015	Interview Respondent 1
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, China	08/01/2016	Interview Respondent 2
Renmin University, China	11/01/2016	Interview Respondent 3
Beijing Foreign Studies University, China	12/01/2016	Interview Respondent 4
Fudan University, China	16/01/2016	Interview Respondent 5
EU DG Climate	05/02/2019	Interview Respondent 6
EU DG Climate	01/03/2019	Interview Respondent 7
Clingendael Institute, Netherlands	05/03/2019	Interview Respondent 8
Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi	13/03/2019	Interview Respondent 9
Clingendael Institute, Netherlands	14/03/2019	Interview Respondent 10
University of Nevada, the US	04/07/2019	Interview Respondent 11

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