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A Quarrel with the German People? The Totalising Logic of Enmity, Narratives of Enmity and the “German Question” on the Australian Home Front During the Second World War

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A Quarrel with the German People?

The Totalising Logic of Enmity, Narratives of Enmity and the
“German Question” on the Australian Home Front During the
Second World War.

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Abstract:

A significant aspect of wartime discourse is the construction, definition and redefinition of in-group and out-group identities which justify, rationalise and strengthen the support and unity behind a war effort. The totalising “logic” of contemporary visions of twentieth century peoples’ wars, and the horrific realities of such conflicts, facilitated the systematic demonisation, dehumanisation and condemnation of entire peoples and nations. Recent scholarship, however, has emphasised the need to account for unique contexts and political, cultural and moral choice when analysing enmity during the Second World War. Such factors rendered the totalisation of enmity during the conflict, and its concurrent “communitarianisation” of identities, contextually contingent, conditional, and far from inevitable, notwithstanding the irrevocable momentum of the enmity process in totalising peoples’ wars.

This thesis explores the logic of totalising enmity during the Second World War. It analyses Australian public discourse and contemporary framing of the German enemy between 1939 and 1945. It focuses on the dynamic of this logic by exploring the structures, forms and *contested* nature of various “narratives of enmity” relating to the “German Question” in the Australian context. Reduced to its core, the German Question summarises the polarising debates on the Allied home fronts as to whether the German nation and people, through their national character, history, culture and aims, expressed bellicose intent and complicity with the objectives, ideology and horrors of National Socialism and the Nazi regime. These questions, this thesis posits, heavily influenced wartime enmification and problematised Australian conceptions of the enemy, despite the unanimity of Australian support for a perceived just, defensive, “good” war against Nazism. Qualitative analysis, largely focusing on Australian print media – editorials, foreign correspondence cables, reports, the correspondence columns, published speeches, cartoons and images across a variety of newspapers, magazines, journals – and other published materials, reveals several ambiguous, contested and often contradictory enmity narratives relating to the German people and nation.

This thesis demonstrates Australia’s complex response to the totalising logic of enmity. This thesis proposes that totalising narratives of enmity encompassing the German people were far more pronounced in Australian wartime discourse than previously accounted for in the historiography, and grew exponentially as the war progressed. Widely held distinctions between the German people and Nazism professed in the first months of the war evaporated as the war progressed in light of changing wartime contexts. This process, however, remained *contested* between 1939 and 1945, even though there was a widespread receptiveness to, and expression of, totalising enmity narratives by the end of the conflict.

This thesis investigates the intersecting relationship between three major themes in Australian war discourse – totalising enmity, narratives of enmity and the German Question – to further historical understanding of Australian experiences and attitudes under the pressures of a totalising peoples' war and situate these findings within the broader historiography of such conflicts.

Declaration:

I, Trent Duan, declare that the work presented within this thesis is an original contribution towards the fulfilment of the Doctor of Philosophy. Due acknowledgment has been made in the text to all other works, sources and materials used. I also declare that this thesis is below the maximum word limit allowed for a Doctoral thesis (99, 946 words), excluding tables, bibliography, appendices, abstract, acknowledgements and list of illustrations.

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Abbreviations:

General:

AIF – Australian Imperial Force
AAP – Australian Associated Press
ABC – Australian Broadcasting Commission
ADB – Australian Dictionary of Biography
APOP – Australian Public Opinion Polls
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BOB – (Eric) Baume’s Overseas Budget
CMF – Citizens Military Force (Militia)
FPCA – Federal Pacifist Council of Australia
HOC – House of Commons (British)
HOL – House of Lords (British)
HOR – House of Representatives (Australia)
HWT – Herald Weekly Times
LNU – Australian League of Nations
MHR – Member of the House of Representatives (Australia)
NAA – National Archives of Australia
NSA – National Security Act (1939)
NHWPM – “No Hate War Pledge Movement”
NUAUS – National Union of Australian University Students
POW – Prisoner of War
RSSILA – Returned Sailor’s and Soldier’s Imperial League of Australia (Pre-1940)
RSSAILA – Returned Sailor’s, Soldier’s and Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia (Post 1940)
VE – Victory in Europe
WEA – Worker’s Educational Association
WPA – War Precautions Act (1914)

Newspapers and Journals:

AWW – Australian Women’s Weekly
CE – Cessnock Eagle
DT – The Daily Telegraph
NMH – Newcastle Morning Herald
SMH – The Sydney Morning Herald
SW – Smith’s Weekly

Academic Journals:

ANR – The Australian National Review
AQ – The Australian Quarterly

Departments:

DOI – Department of Information
MOI – Ministry of Information (British)
OWI – Office of War Information (USA)

Political Parties and Organisations:

ACTU – Australian Council of Trade Unions
ALP – Australian Labor Party
BLP – British Labour Party
CP – Country Party
CPA – Communist Party of Australia
NSDAP – National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nazi Party)
UAP – United Australian Party
TUC – British Trade Union Congress

Military:

ARP – Air Raid Precautions
CIC Commander in Chief
CBO – Combined Bomber Offensive
RAAF – Royal Australian Air Force
SS – *Schutzstaffel*
USAAF – United States of America Air Force

Introduction: The Totalising Logic of Enmity, Narratives of Enmity and the “German Question” in Australian War Discourse

Reading these plain narratives, I found myself becoming a sheer savage; I, a normally mild and reasonable being, saw red....I forgot all the decent and kindly Germans I have known; I forgot the millions of such persons in Germany to-day....I forgot that we had no quarrel with the German people, but only with the vile gang in whose grip they held...I forgot all the great things they have given to our common life...I hated Germany and all things German with an intensity which would have done credit to a good Nazi thinking of England.

Professor Walter Murdoch in his essay, “A Nightmare,” published in his wartime memoir *Steadfast*.¹

The precepts of total war demand that the enemy, each individual enemy, must be hated. It is hard to hate men who look so wistful.

Citizen’s Forces’ Reserve T. Harold in “Prisoners’ Interlude,” *Australian Women’s Mirror*, 4 May 1943, 13.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the totalising logic of contemporary visions of a peoples’ war facilitated the systematic demonisation, dehumanisation and condemnation of entire populations and nations. The Second World War was governed by the exigencies of industrialised warfare. Australia’s wartime leaders attempted to encapsulate the national experience, expectations, and devastating potential of a peoples’ war through various terminologies and definitions. The catch cries of “all-in” and “unlimited war” under Prime Minister Robert Menzies, and evolving framework of “total war” necessitating “total mobilisation” and a “total war effort” that became the slogan of his successor, John Curtin, were all attempts to define, comprehend and harness the energy and power of a peoples’ war.² Embedded in the totalising war efforts of their respective nations, every man, woman and child was rendered a potential legitimate target of military violence. Mass mobilisation dominated national experience of every belligerent involved in the conflict to varying extents and degrees.

¹ Walter Murdoch, *Steadfast: A Commentary* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1941), 126-31.

² Exploring the contemporary visions of “total war” in Australia was the subject of the author’s Honours Thesis. This thesis employed “ideal type” methodology to examine how “total war”, in its various guises, was articulated, understood and implemented in Australia throughout the war. Trent Jay Duan, “This Is Total War: Re-Exploring Australia’s Second World War through the Lens of Total War” (Honours thesis, University of Melbourne, 2014).

The context of a totalising peoples' war invariably shaped Australian attitudes towards its enemies. Walter Murdoch's frank admission of succumbing temporarily to totalising enmity – the extension of enmity to those “decent and kindly Germans” with which he had “no quarrel” – through the everyday narratives he engaged with despite his well-known moral abhorrence for unadulterated enmity and hate propaganda is evidence of a broader struggle within Australian public discourse. T. Harold's astute observations following a positive encounter with enemy Prisoners of War (POWs) raises similarly interesting questions around how essentialising images of a culturally alien, dangerous, anti-social enemy *Other* framed by enmity narratives could be severely questioned by countervailing narratives – evidence, directly or indirectly, of the humanity of the ‘Other’. Reflecting on the idea of hatred as a central precept of “total war”, Harold's positive encounter appeared incompatible with common conceptions of the totalising logic of a peoples' war. This stipulated, in the Reservist's own words, that “each individual enemy” – every man, woman and child – were worthy of unadulterated enmity.³

To engage with these important ideas, this thesis focuses on the intersection and relationship between three major themes in Australian war discourse – totalising enmity, narratives of enmity and the “German Question” – to further develop our historical understanding of Australian experiences and attitudes under the pressures of a totalising peoples' war.

A Totalising Peoples' War and Totalising Enmity:

The Second World War engendered enmity on an arguably unprecedented scale, albeit far from monolithic and universal between all belligerent societies. Several historians have treated this enmity as an inevitable teleology of increasing hatred and callousness towards the enemy in the so-called “age of total war” ending in the ideological and racial enmities of the Second World War.⁴ However, recent scholarship has placed emphasis on viewing enmity as a process or “logic” – the analysis of the form, evolution and dynamism alongside the constraints and limitations on enmity in individual belligerent nations.⁵ While John Horne introduced the idea “totalising logic” as a means of analysing

³ T. Harold, “Prisoners' Interlude”, *Australian Woman's Mirror*, 4 May 1943, 13.

⁴ Hugh Bicheno, “Total War,” in *The Oxford Companion to Military History*, ed. Christopher Bellamy, et al. (New York: OUP, 2001); Jeremy Black, *The Age of Total War, 1860-1945* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006); Roger Chickering, “Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept,” in *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914* ed. Manfred F. Boemeke, Stig Förster, and Roger Chickering (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, and Bernd Greiner, *A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).; Talbot Imlay, “Total War,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 3 (2007).

⁵ John Horne, *State, Society, and Mobilization in Europe During the First World War*, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); “A Total War? The French Experience of the First World War,” (Trinity College, Dublin: Society for French Historical Studies, 2014).; “Civilian Populations and Wartime Violence: Towards an Historical Analysis,” *International Social Science Journal* 54, no. 174 (2002).

the First World War, scholars such as Pierre Purseigle have successfully applied this concept to the Second World War. The totalising logic of the latter war, Purseigle argues, blurred lines between combatant and non-combatant, home front and military front, and facilitated a climate where national enemies could rightly be considered to threaten national “culture, identity and way of life.”⁶ The era of mass industrial, totalising warfare resulted in a reconstitution of normative framings of the enemy.

The ascendancy of this approach in the historiography is evident in the third volume of the *Cambridge History of the Second World War: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture*, published in 2015. This multifaceted analysis of the Second World War examined the “totalising” nature of a “peoples’ war” – a conflict it usefully described as “with, for and against peoples”.⁷ Three totalising dimensions of the war were investigated: firstly, the all-encompassing mobilisation of society, economy and culture; secondly, the overarching socialisation of death and violence; and thirdly, the subject of this thesis, the *totalising nature of enmity*. Enmity, an historically contingent process and act of constructing the enemy as an object, entity or Other,⁸ acquired the potential to extend beyond the immediacy of the battlefield in ways unseen in previous conflicts. Novel strategies aimed at the complete destruction of the enemy’s social, economic and cultural forces driving national war efforts (which had been theorised, developed and tentatively employed throughout the inter-war period) encouraged the totalising enmification of entire peoples irrespective of individual and group actions, circumstances, experience, and objectives.⁹ However, this scholarship stresses that the totalisation of enmity and its concurrent “communitarisation of identities” remained contextually contingent, conditional, and far from inevitable notwithstanding the rapid momentum and “logic” of the enmity process.¹⁰ The volume’s findings promoted more research to account for the unique circumstantial contexts and political, cultural and moral choice of individual belligerents regarding enmification in correlation with broader alliance networks and transnational dialogues. Michael Geyer and Adam Tooze, the volume’s

⁶ Pierre Purseigle, “Home Fronts: The Mobilization of Resources for Total War,” in *The Cambridge History of War*, ed. Roger Chickering, Dennis Showalter, and Hans van de Ven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 258-60, 62.

⁷ Michael Geyer and Adam Tooze, *Total War: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol. 3, *The Cambridge History of the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4. This thesis employs the term **peoples’ war** over the more commonly used **people’s war** in the historiography because it more aptly captures Geyer and Tooze’s notion of war “with, for and against peoples”. Select usage of the latter term either correlates to the contemporary use of the term, or its employment by another scholar.

⁸ Horne, “A Total War? The French Experience of the First World War.”

⁹ Geyer and Tooze, 3, 9.

¹⁰ Ibid., 9-10. Although the term used within this thesis, the somewhat clunky “communitarisation of identities” utilised by Geyer and Tooze is perhaps better explained through terms such as the “homogenisation” or “essentialisation” of identities. Rieber and Kelly’s use of “particularisation”, a focus on ideology or actions to mobilise societies for war in which they use the example of “Fascism”, while useful, does not capture the process of embroiling entire peoples, nations and cultures into enmity narratives. R. W. Rieber and Robert J. Kelly, “Substance and Shadow: Images of the Enemy,” in *The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy*, ed. R. W. Rieber (New York: Plenum Press, 1991), 7, 14, 29.

editors, summarised that the various aspects of totalisation must be sensitive to the “moral economies” of belligerent nations – those institutional, political, cultural, social and moral formations within a society which provoke debate of the moral efficacy of wartime actions.¹¹ The editors called for more research that not only looks at why and how totalising enmity flourished but equally examines the limitations on this process.

A significant aspect of wartime discourse is the construction, definition and redefinition of in-group and out-group identities which justify, rationalise, and strengthen support and unity for a war effort.¹² This thesis rests on the premise, summarised perfectly by the Cambridge study, that the:

*totalitarian impetus [of the Second World War] was in need of justification, and nowhere was this production of rationalisations more evident than in the treatment of...mortal enemies...Existential enemies did not simply exist...they were actively produced.*¹³

For a democratic nation like Australia, eroding peacetime inhibitions regarding appropriate, moral and just actions and attitudes during periods of conflict necessitated the construction of demonised enemies to engender the will to fight, accept war aims and persuade citizens to bear the sacrifices demanded by a peoples’ war. Enmity was simultaneously mobilizational, motivational and justificatory. Linking to what Hobsbawm labelled the “Barbarisation” of the world wars,¹⁴ narratives of enmity were constructed to garner consent and support of the wartime communities and justify transgressions of previously accepted moral, political and ideological norms. Presenting and maintaining a simplified “good” war narrative was a key strategy for the Allied nations. Scholars such as Richard Overy have shown that the capacity of Allied leaders of public opinion to formulate and sell a “good” war narrative, despite neither side possessing an entirely unblemished war record, gave their populations a moral edge over the Axis powers.¹⁵

¹¹ Geyer and Tooze, 3, 417.

¹² See Adam Hodges, “War Discourse”, in “The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction,” Wiley Online, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781118611463>; Sam Keen, *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination* (San Francisco: Harper, 1991), 16-18.; Rodney Barker, *Making Enemies* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1, 13-15.

¹³ Geyer and Tooze, 3, 418.; Barker, IX, 161.

¹⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, “Barbarism: A User’s Guide,” *New Left Review*, no. 206 (1994).

¹⁵ Richard James Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (London: Pimlico, 2006), 352-57.; James J Weingartner, “Americans, Germans, and War Crimes: Converging Narratives from ‘the Good War’,” *The Journal of American History* (March, 2008). Here I am referring to the contemporary narrative capacity and potential of a “good” war narrative, a retrospective term applied here to capture the nuances of this Allied narrative outlined by Overy. For recent analysis of these issues, the moral, ethical and legal aspects of the conflict, and the necessary qualifications regarding the historical pitfalls of moral relevancy in terms of wartime actions and culpability, see: Michael Bess, *Choices under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008); Michael Bess et al., “Moral Dimensions of World War II: A Forum,” *Historically Speaking* (March/April, 2008); A. C. Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities: Is the Targeting of Civilians in War Ever Justified?* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007).

As the populations of belligerent nations in the Second World War were rhetorically and physically converted into resources of the wartime state, entire societies were increasingly rendered complicit in the actions of their leaders and military forces. Consequently, home front populations acquired an increased stake and investment in public discussion.¹⁶ As Lynette Finch proposes, it was the specific environment of “people’s wars and total civilian enlistment” that provided the key social, cultural, ideological and political conditions of popular involvement in the national project of war. Notwithstanding the expectations and responsibilities of citizenship, Australians had to be convinced of the worthiness and stakes of renewed conflict to instil sacrifice and ideological commitment to another war.¹⁷ Wartime leaders recognised that the attitudes and perceptions of civilian populations were an essential aspect of modern warfare, captured under the vague but contemporarily significant term “morale”.¹⁸ The Australian wartime population, Finch argues, “knew the codes, understood the civil contract [and] accepted that national warfare was their business” after being conditioned by increasingly sophisticated propaganda and the modern mass media who played a significant role in fostering a paradigm shift in democratic nations where citizens accepted “ownership of warfare”.¹⁹ Concurrently, as civilian populations were conditioned to directly and indirectly participate in totalising violence as both *subjects* and *objects*, suffer the devastation and sacrifices imposed by twentieth century warfare, and accept and condone an equivalent direction of military violence against their civilian counterparts on the opposing side, a suitably coherent set of images, stories and narratives was needed.²⁰ As Rieber and Kelly aptly note, “defining an image of the ‘enemy’ on a mass scale [was] a psychological prerequisite” of the immediate pre-nuclear era of “total” warfare.²¹

Building on the framework of a totalising “peoples’ war”, the extension of enmity to entire populations, and the prerequisites of a “good” war, this thesis is a response to the recent appeal for analysis of totalising enmity beyond the major powers to those relegated to the footnotes of dominant international histories of “peoples’ wars”. It focuses on this dynamic by exploring the contested narratives of enmity relating to the German people in Australian public discourse. It tasks itself with analysing the extent to which Australian home front narratives of enmity regarding Germany,

¹⁶ Michael Howard, “Total War in the Twentieth Century: Participation and Consensus in the Second World War,” ed. Brian Bond and Ian Roy, *War and Society Volume 1: A Yearbook of Military History* (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2015).

¹⁷ Lynette Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare* (Melbourne: Melbourne Publishing Group, 2006), 63; Kate Darian-Smith, “War and Australian Society,” in *Australia’s War, 1939-45*, ed. Joan Beaumont (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 55.; Susan L. Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 7.

¹⁸ Finch, 112-13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, XII, 36, 69, 73, 76, 118, 94-5.

²⁰ Geyer and Tooze, 3, 7.

²¹ Rieber and Kelly, 4.

perpetuated through various sources in public discourse, as well as the discourse surrounding those narratives, reflect the logic of totalising enmity on the Australian home front.

Beyond Official Propaganda and the “Yellow Peril”: Why Germany?

The decision to focus on Germany facilitates a more complex discussion of the contested nature of totalising enmity. A more definitionally challenging enemy than Japan – a comparatively straightforward, coherent and widely accepted racialized Oriental “Other”²² – and the often-dismissive, ridiculing tone facing Fascist Italy,²³ the question of Nazi Germany was far more problematic and challenging for Australian propagandists and commentators and varied in popular perception.²⁴ The positive imagery of a past Germany, deriving in part from Germany’s technological, scientific, intellectual and cultural heritage and a shared racial, ethnic, historical and religious background particular to Anglo-American identity, has been well noted by scholars.²⁵ In exploring the relationship between narratives of enmity and the totalising logic of a peoples’ war in the Australian context, this thesis necessarily analyses the content, nature and shape of home front narratives of enmity relating to Germany, as well as the themes, tropes, archetypes, stereotypes and typecasts that perpetuated them. What were the sources and contexts of wartime enmity, domestically and from overseas, and how were these presented to Australian audiences? While the transnational, multifaceted nature of enmity in a global war in which Australia was a junior partner needs to be taken into account, analysis of enmity in a totalising peoples’ war must remain sensitive to Australia’s own unique experience of war rooted in factors such as Australian cultural, political and societal norms, history and physical, geographical and psychological distance from the war.

Although there is a sound comparative literature on Second World War propaganda,²⁶ Finch’s excellent research on the operation of propaganda in modern warfare, *Dark Angel*, is perhaps the

²² John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); Finch; David Walker, *Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 1850-1939*, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: SSS Publications, 2009).

²³ Margaret Kertesz, “The Enemy: British Images of the German People During the Second World War” (PhD thesis, University of Sussex, 1992), 5.

²⁴ Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War* (Oxford: OUP, 1989), 120.; Jürgen Tampke, *The Germans in Australia: The Story of the Continent’s German Speaking Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 136.; Michaela Hoenicke Moore, *Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945*, Publications of the German Historical Institute (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 344.

²⁵ Finch, 377; Fussell, 120-21; Hoenicke Moore, 5, 146-7; Kertesz, 5, 222.

²⁶ Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organizations, Policies and Public in Britain and Germany* (London: Routledge, 1979); Lynette Finch, “Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century,” *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 3 (Spring, 2000); Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (London: Sage, 1999); Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1992); Peter Stanley, *What Did You Do in the War Daddy?: A Visual History of Propaganda Posters* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983); Marja Vuorinen, *Enemy Images in War Propaganda* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2012); David Welch, *Know Your Enemy:*

closest attempt to touch on the relationship between the totalising logic of the war (employing the more standardised framework of “total war”) and the enmity narratives (an overt focus on “propaganda”) within the Australian context.²⁷ However, like many Australian-centric studies of propaganda in the Second World War,²⁸ Finch’s work privileges official Australian and Allied propaganda campaigns and the particular function of opinion management and censorship.²⁹ Such an approach fails to capture the nuances of enemy representation and the perpetuation of enmity through other meaningful avenues of public discourse running in parallel to officially sanctioned campaigns. Advances in the wider study of wartime propaganda are also important here. As Emily Robertson aptly summarises, the contextualisation of propaganda with broader historical events and belief systems has been an essential step forward in the field, allowing scholars to see past the manipulative aspects of propaganda to see it “as an extension of various values and moral convictions” regarding wartime conduct.³⁰ This is particularly important in analysing belief systems surrounding the permissibility of totalising violence, a matter discussed later in this thesis. Moreover, Kay Saunders’ article on Australian propaganda, public policy and the media aptly covers official anti-German propaganda activities and argues that this form of anti-German propaganda “never totally dehumanised” the German enemy.³¹ While true for the Australian Department of Information’s (DOI) propaganda efforts, Saunders’ work requires further clarification regarding the broader enmity narratives, particularly in the Australian media. This thesis is thus a necessary corrective to the privileged position given to official propaganda in Australian historiography.

Deriving from scholarly focus on official campaigns, disproportionate, albeit understandable, emphasis has also been placed on Australian representations of Japan. The largely negative response to the DOI’s controversial and multifaceted “Know Your Enemy” campaign between March-April 1942

Images of the Enemy in Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, podcast audio, Why War, accessed 06/06/2017, 2014, <http://podcast.freud.org.uk/e/know-your-enemy-images-of-the-enemy-in-propaganda-in-the-twentieth-century-david-welch/>; Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era*, 3rd. ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Donald W. Shriver, *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

²⁷ Lynette Finch, “Knowing the Enemy: Australian Psychological Warfare and the Business of Influencing Minds in the Second World War,” *War & Society* 16, no. 2 (1998); “Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century.”; *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*. For an in-depth analysis of propaganda, see Jowett and O’Donnell.

²⁸ Kay Saunders, “An Instrument of Strategy”: Propaganda, Public Policy and the Media in Australia During the Second World War,” *War & Society* 15, no. 2 (1997).

²⁹ Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*; Jowett and O’Donnell; Pratkanis and Aronson; Stanley; David Welch, *Propaganda, Power and Persuasion: From World War I to Wikileaks* (London: IB Tauris, 2014); *Know Your Enemy: Images of the Enemy in Propaganda in the Twentieth Century*.

³⁰ Emily Robertson, “Propaganda and ‘Manufactured Hatred’: A Reappraisal of the Ethics of First World War British and Australian Atrocity Propaganda,” *Public Relations Inquiry* 3, no. 2 (2014): 262.

³¹ Saunders, 81-2.

has dominated understanding of enmity within the Australian historiography.³² The heavy criticism of the DOI from within the press and the vast letters to the editor and Labor Senator William Ashley's office have been conceptualised by historians as a strong unreceptiveness to hate propaganda, racialism and essentialising narratives of enmity which threatened Australia's moral superiority and principles of civilisation, liberty and pluralism (however narrowly understood in the context of "White Australia") – in other words, Australia's "good" war narrative.³³ The common usage of limited public polling results demonstrating that 54 per cent of respondents questioned the logic, rationale and results of the hate broadcasts to argue a widespread aversion to hatred in Australia generally fails to emphasise the remaining 46 per cent who supported or were ambivalent, non-committal or indifferent about the totalising nature of the campaign.³⁴ Such evidence certainly supports the theory of the *contested* nature of totalising enmity in Australian wartime society posited within this thesis, yet more research into Australian responses to the other belligerent powers is needed to capture the nuances in enmity formation within Australian society.

In terms of temporality, a disproportionate focus on Japan and the DOI's propaganda campaign has also narrowed scholarly analysis to Australia's crisis year, 1942, at the expense of the equally important preceding years before Japan was in open hostility with Australia and the final stages of the conflict. Saunders' emphasis on the DOI's tendency to recycle British Ministry of Information (MOI) materials preceding an "Australianisation" of propaganda after 1942 does seem to unintentionally decrease the significance of Australian representations of the enemy before the Pacific War.³⁵ Admittedly, Australian vulnerability to racial panics, geographical isolation and invasion scares rendered Japanese expansionism – the "Yellow Peril" – an ever-present threat, even in the absence of a declared state of war.³⁶ But to claim that Japan was the central enemy during this period would be misleading. The focus of several chapters within this thesis on the period 1939 to 1941, when Nazi Germany remained Australia's most threatening enemy, attempts to remedy a generally narrow focus – both in terms of *temporality* and *type* of enemy – on enmification in the Pacific War context.

The "German Question"

Analysis of how contemporary debates – popular, intellectual, elite and official – on the so-called "German Question" coalesced in public wartime discourse through the media, is a useful point of

³² Lynette Finch, "Knowing the Enemy: Australian Psychological Warfare and the Business of Influencing Minds in the Second World War," *ibid.* 16 (1998); "Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century.," *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*; Saunders.

³³ Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 165-7, 78.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 167.

³⁵ Saunders, 81-2, 89.

³⁶ David Walker, *Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939* (New Dehli: SSS Publications, 2009).

departure for this study. The German Question incorporates the historically, politically, economically, culturally and morally contested ideas regarding the supposed innate aggressiveness and bellicosity of German people; the German mentality and national character; the use of German history and historical thought to present Nazism as an “outcome” or “aberration”; and, importantly, German complicity and relationship with Nazism in discussions of an “Other” Germany, both within Germany, the exile/émigré community and established migrant communities.³⁷ Put simply, the German Question, both as a term of contemporary significance and a conceptual framework, encompasses the key frames of reference through which Australian commentators attempted to explain Nazi Germany.

Regarding this thesis’ objectives in analysing totalising enmity, a key research question asks to what extent wartime hatred extended from Germany’s national leaders and ideology to the German population itself – the extension of enmity to peoples, culture and ways of life. Richard Overy epitomizes scholarly consensus that a general and fluctuating distinction between Hitler/Nazism and the German people remained to varying extents throughout the war in Allied discourse and, importantly, was constructed differently across the various belligerent states.³⁸ The German Question and the problem of “with whom are we at war” was clearly influential and potent enough for wily contemporary observers such as the Melbourne *Advocate*’s Francis Davitt to produce this humorous hypothetical exchange between Mrs. Bloggs and Moggs in January 1940 [Image 1].³⁹

WAR TIME
Mrs. Bloggs: “I’m not agen the Ger-
man people.”
Mrs. Moggs: “No; well, who are you
agen?”
Mrs. Bloggs: “I’m agen the Nasty
Party.”

Image 1.

³⁷ Hoenicke Moore; Kertesz.

³⁸ Overy, 353.

³⁹ Francis Davitt, “Passing Shots: War Time,” *Advocate*, 4 January 1940, 10.

Australian Scholarship and the "German Question"

Despite the existence of several excellent works, the scope of research relating to Australian attitudes towards Germany during the Second World War has been far more limited in comparison to the in-depth studies of popular and official anti-Germanism during the First World War.⁴⁰ The Australian historiography regarding the former has tended towards reductionism and requires greater qualification. Johannes H. Voigt's sustained analysis of the breakdown of the hitherto amicable Anglo-German relationship in Australia (a disjuncture contingent on Australia's distance and the context of distrust and suspicion engendered by a climate of war which destroyed former distinctions between various "types" of Germans) and its consequences, both during the war and throughout the inter-war period (the normalisation of relations, the developments of *Deutschumpolitik* and the Nazi-era), are matched by a seeming disregard for attitudes during the Second World War.⁴¹

The most widely-utilised justification for this is the relative lack of anti-German actions against the German community on the home front – that "not every person speaking German or German-Australian was an object of suspicion" as they had been between 1914 and 1918.⁴² This can be attributed to the narrow focus on attitudes towards and the treatment of the Australian-German community as a means of evaluating anti-German sentiment more broadly. While this thesis certainly supports and aligns with the contention that specifically *anti-German* policies and actions were far more measured and less widespread in the Second World War than its predecessor, this framework has somewhat clouded analysis of shifting, complex attitudes towards the German people *ut totum*. Scholars such as Jürgen Tampke argue that the re-emergence of indiscriminate internment and pressures on the German community in the Second World War did not equate to a similar scale of severity and hardship. The Australian-German community, he posits, was "hardly affected" by wartime policies because of the level of integration in Australian society.⁴³ Tampke and Voigt both conceptualise a lack of enmity resulting from Australia's Pacific orientation, the immediacy of the Japanese threat, and prompt normalisation of Australian-German relations through Cold War power

⁴⁰ See: Gerhard Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1989); "Immigration, Integration, Disintegration," *Griffith Review*, no. 48 (April, 2015). <https://www.griffithreview.com/articles/immigration-integration-disintegration/> (Accessed 19/04/2018).

⁴¹ Johannes Voigt, *Australia-German Relations: Two Hundred Years of Contacts, Relations, and Connections* (Bonn: Inter Nationes Bonn, 1987), 82, 102, 08.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 121.

⁴³ Jürgen Tampke and Colin Doxford, *Australia, Willkommen: A History of the Germans in Australia* (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1990), 236-9.

politics, adding that Australian military engagement against Germany in the “gentleman’s theatre” (the Mediterranean and North Africa) also decreased the potential for totalising enmity.⁴⁴

Ian Harmstorf provides a similar evaluation focused on the experiences of Australia’s most active and developed bastion of the Australian-German community, South Australia.⁴⁵ In his overall excellent analysis of the wartime experiences of the Australian-German community, Harmstorf argues along the lines of Voigt and Tampke that the Second World War did not produce a corresponding level of hatred nor the scale of injustices and collective trauma of the previous war. More importantly, Harmstorf significantly asserts that a **“definite distinction was made between Germans and Nazis”** throughout the war.⁴⁶ Such a distinction, he argues, was evident in the media and other platforms of public discourse. As a major aspect of the German Question and the process of totalising enmity, this thesis contends that the commonly proffered assumptions reflected in Harmstorf’s statement require more qualification. It is likewise necessary to research beyond the confines of South Australian context and the overt focus on a single, albeit representative, media source (the *Adelaide Advertiser*). The idea of a “definitive” distinction between Germans and Nazis, and the assumption that enmity was not extended to the German people in any meaningful way, is untenable in light of the multiple sources analysed within this thesis. Paradoxically, in light of the capacity for “enemy aliens” to foment fifth column hysteria, the empirical evidence of “good” Germans on the home front was something which needed to be reconciled with narratives of enmity for those attempting to promote totalising enmity and undermine the popular distinction.⁴⁷ Mirroring a greater problem in the historiography, Harmstorf does not seriously account for or analyse the often acrimonious debates that occurred over such a distinction and its consequences in Australian war discourse.

⁴⁴ Tampke, 136. Similar findings are also supported in Mark Johnston’s excellent book on Australian servicemen’s views of their German, Italian and Japanese enemies. Mark Johnston, *Fighting the Enemy: Australian Soldiers and Their Adversaries in World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3-6. This latter argument, while important, does not account for the Australian involvement outside of this theatre, notably in the strategic bombing campaigns (see Chapter Six).

⁴⁵ Ian Harmstorf and Michael J Cigler, *The Germans in Australia* (Melbourne: AE Press, 1985).

⁴⁶ Ian Harmstorf, ‘World War II: South Australia’s Germans’; ‘1838—1990: The Issue Of Loyalty – South Australian Germans’ (accessed 16/07/2018). Emphasis mine. These articles are drawn from a collection compiled on the website of the German Club and the South Australian German Association. Unfortunately, after a recent restructuring of this website, these resources have subsequently been removed in the process of writing this thesis. Analysis has been undertaken from a copy within the author’s possession. The former is drawn from Harmstorf’s 1988 article on the same theme: Ian Harmstorf, “South Australia’s Germans in World War,” *Historical Society of South Australia*, no. 16 (1988). The latter is derived from a conference paper. “The Trouble with Patriotism. The Issue of Loyalty: South Australian Germans 1838—1900,” in *The Third Biennial Conference of the Australian Association of von Humboldt Fellows* (Flinders University, Adelaide 1980). An archived version of the collection with article titles has recently been republished at: Harmstorf, “Germany History in South Australia,” The German Club, (accessed 20/02/2021), <https://thegermanclub.com.au/about/german-history-sa/>

⁴⁷ Hoenicke Moore, for instance, notes that the position of American-Germans acted to temper enmity and reinforce the distinction. Hoenicke Moore, 148.

The issues of indiscriminate internment on the Australian-German community and the function and consequences of anti-Alien legislation resulting from National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations will not be discussed here given the excellent coverage by Australian scholars.⁴⁸ David Henderson importantly takes issue with the collective “homogenising myths” and historical meta-narratives deriving from the ideological and moral dichotomy between “good” democracy and evil, tyrannous fascism in which the thorny issues of internment and treatment of enemy aliens does not fit.⁴⁹ This is evidence of a growing sensitivity in Australian scholarship to the fact that the “moral culture of war [did] not end with the totalitarian states”, a theme central to Geyer and Tooze’s framings of a peoples’ war. The need to analyse the less flattering aspects of the Australian war effort is slowly emerging in Australian historiography. The current study, in part, aims to further this objective.

Anglo-American Scholarship on the “German Question”:

The current exploration of totalising enmity, narratives of enmity and the German Question in the Australian context borrows from a strong international body of work studying Anglo-American attitudes towards Germany during the Second World War.⁵⁰ One key example is the overarching influence of the “Vansittartism” controversy, which had produced its own niche historiography.⁵¹ Contextually, these works also are useful in designating similar points of contention and developments to analyse in the Australian context. They also point to important contextual differences between Allied partners and vindicate a focus on Australia.⁵² Despite the focus of this thesis on Australian views

⁴⁸ David Henderson, *Nazis in Our Midst: German Australians, Internment and the Second World War* (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2016). For scholarship on this issue, see: Paul Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, Australia in the War of 1939-1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1956). See Appendix 4: The Wartime Treatment of Aliens. Hasluck briefly covers the details of National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations, but more detailed analysis has emerged in recent years. Joan Beaumont, Ilma Martinuzzi O'Brien, and Mathew Trinca, *Under Suspicion: Citizenship and Internment in Australia During the Second World War* (Canberra: National Museum of Australia Press, 2008); Margaret Bevege, *Behind Barbed Wire: Internment in Australia During World War Two* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993); Kay Saunders, "Down on the Farm: Italian POWs in Australia 1941-47," *Journal of Australian Studies*, no. 46 (1995); Klaus Neumann, *In the Interest of National Security: Civilian Internment in Australia During World War II* (Canberra: National Archives of Australia, 2006); Ilma Martinuzzi O'Brien, "Citizenship, Rights and Emergency Powers in Second World War Australia," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, no. 2 (2007); Barbara Winter, "The Impact of National Socialism on German Nationals in Australia and New Guinea 1932-1947" (PhD Thesis, The University of Queensland, 2006).

⁴⁹ Henderson, XIV.

⁵⁰ Jan Rüger, "Revisiting the Anglo-German Antagonism," *The Journal of Modern History* 83, no. 3 (September, 2011): 588.

⁵¹ See Chapter Nine of Hoenicke Moore.; Hans Rudolf Vaet, "Vansittartism Revisited: Thomas Mann, Bertolt Brecht, and the Threat of World War (the Ida Herz Lecture)," *Publications of the English Goethe Society* 82, no. 1 (March, 2013): 29.; John Ramsden, *Don't Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890* (London: Abacus, 2006), 184-200.

⁵² For instance, Hoenicke Moore’s emphasis on American isolationist/interventionist debates are less relevant in Australia where almost unanimous support for Australian involvement was displayed through an absence of effective and organised anti-war/isolationist voices after war was declared. John Robertson, *Australia at War 1939-1945* (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1981), 9. Australian representations of Germany were not impeded by

of Germany, analysis remains sensitive to the transnational nature of enmity narratives and the powerful influence of British and American narratives on local ideas and content given Australian junior coalition role. This work also affords the opportunity for comparison where applicable.

Although a broad range of works have influenced this study, two major contributions to the historiography are worthy of note here. Firstly, this thesis has borrowed from the theoretically driven discussion of American “explanatory models” and narratives of enmity regarding National Socialist Germany by American historian of international relations Michaela Hoenicke Moore.⁵³ Despite her overt focus on the political and intellectual context in which attitudes were formed, Hoenicke Moore’s approach to the “genesis, transmission, appropriation and political relevance of American views of Nazi Germany” has clear ramifications for research into public discourse and enmity.⁵⁴ Hoenicke Moore provides an apt summary of the “unresolved ambiguity” delineating American opinion on the German question across three layers of analysis: popular culture and opinion, elite discourse and governmental debates. Her analysis of a fundamental lack of unanimity on both the “nature of the enemy” and “what to do with Germany” reflects a similar lack of clarity, coherence and focus that defines the Australian enmity narratives discussed within this thesis. Equally, her research reinforces the inefficaciousness of outdated and reductive conventional dichotomies such as “hard” and “soft” peace and absolute definitions of the enemy population that ignore the more porous spectrum of broad-ranging attitudes.⁵⁵

Secondly, and perhaps more prominently given Australia’s position within the British Empire, Margaret Kertesz’s doctoral thesis has been invaluable for its keen insights into the British “redefinition of the enemy” over the course of the war – the shift from a more limited and coherent focus on Nazism to a far less definable image encompassing the German populace in its entirety, placed outside the realms of Christianity, culture, civilisation and humanity.⁵⁶ Stressing the importance on the Self/Other binary in enemy narratives (what will be discussed in this thesis as “in-groups” and “out-groups”), Kertesz argued through analysis of various narrative “slices” (key points in the British war effort) that public opinion became increasingly hostile to the German people as the war continued yet remained privately contested despite high levels of public conformity. Importantly, Kertesz also alludes to the importance of recognising that the extreme conditions of the Second World War, a context which promoted deindividuation and produced conditions where the “instinctive reaction

ambiguity about its involvement in the war being fought, but rather what that war was against and Australia’s war aims.

⁵³ Hoenicke Moore.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 12.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 12, 179, 91-92.

⁵⁶ Kertesz, summary, 6.

[was] total enmity”.⁵⁷ Kertesz’s conceptualisation of “contestation” and “challenge” to dominant enmity narratives, and her conclusions about indefinability and “shifting range of images” throughout wartime Britain, form important reference points for a study of Australian enmity narratives given the close wartime relationship, influence and transference of ideas between Motherland and Dominion.⁵⁸

The “German Question”: The Key Points of Analysis and Contention

A close examination of the Australian and Anglo-American historiography reveals several key central points of contention which, as will be posited, influenced the construction of wartime enmity narratives and understanding of Nazi Germany in Australia.⁵⁹ These include:

- 1) Whether a definite distinction could or should be made between the German people on one hand, and Hitler and the National Socialist regime on the other, in the context of a totalising peoples’ war.⁶⁰
- 2) The historical framing of “two Germanys” predicated on the existence of an “other” or “good” Germany.⁶¹ Contemporary definitions of a “good” Germany differed depending on the individual or group utilizing it and, just like the expression of enmity, often served specific political or ideological agendas.
- 3) The continued impact of a positive pre-war image of Germany engendering *Deutschenschwärmes* (an “enthusiasm for Germany”),⁶² personified by long standing individual and collective historical memory of German *Gemutlichkeit* (cheer, warmth and friendliness). This was also evident in related disagreement regarding the contemporary relevance, influence, and role of Germany’s cultural, scientific and artistic contributions to shared European heritage and legacy.⁶³
- 4) The idea of innate or contingent German national character, mentality and *Deutschtum* (“Germanness”), generally reflected in stereotypical traits of

⁵⁷ Ibid., 3.; J. G Gray, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

⁵⁸ Kertesz, 216.

⁵⁹ Most studies point to several, if not all, of these facets in their research of Anglo-German relations and wartime enmity. Kertesz and Hoenicke Moore exemplify this, touching on every point in some way. Footnotes on each reference suggest an indicative source or two.

⁶⁰ Kertesz.; Hoenicke Moore.

⁶¹ Magnus Brechtken, “Personality, Image and Perception: Patterns and Problems of Anglo-German Relations in the 19th and 20th Centuries,” in *An Anglo-German Dialogue: The Munich Lectures on the History of International Relations*, ed. Adolf M. Birke, Magnus Brechtken, and Alaric Searle, Prinz-Albert-Studien (München: K. G. Saur, 2000), 28.

⁶² David S. Bird, *Nazi Dreamtime: Australian Enthusiasts for Hitler’s Germany* (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2012), 23.

⁶³ Brechtken, 28, 167.; Samantha Owens, “‘Won’t Sing in German’: Responses to German Music in War-Time New Zealand,” *Crescendo*, no. 95 (2014).; Voigt, 59-60.

bellicosity, aggressiveness, envy, self-pity, cruelty, sentimentality and lust for global domination and power.⁶⁴

- 5) Disagreement over the German people's collective complicity with, and responsibility for, Nazism and its crimes.⁶⁵ This was most evident in varying conceptions of German "victimhood" – whether the German population were victims, passive adherents, benefactors of, or active participants in National Socialism. Inter-war discourse surrounding German "grievances" – generally emerging amongst Liberals and the Leftists concerned by Germany's treatment after the First World War, was a clear example of these debates.⁶⁶
- 6) Whether Hitler and Nazism were "aberrations" or "outcomes" of Germany's political development, history and culture. This rested on varying and conflicting interpretations about the thesis of historical continuity and the mobilization of historical exemplars to postulate German particularism in European history. This popular application of the *Sonderweg* thesis (a term designating a particularistic reading of German historical and political development rooted in Germany's own self-professed exceptionalism) competed with a more "universalist" lens which invariably invited greater self-reflection and recognition of the universal implications of Fascism, Nazism, militarism, and totalitarianism.⁶⁷
- 7) Whether the German people were permissible, even worthy targets of totalizing violence in the context of previously immutable boundaries between the combatant and non-combatant realms.⁶⁸
- 8) Discussions of the post-war treatment of Germany and its reintegration into post-war Europe and the world. Debate over the extent of German redeemability was matched by diverging opinions on how to balance the dual imperatives of rehabilitation, re-education and reintegration on one hand, and international security against future aggression, justice and (for some) punishment on the other

⁶⁴ Overy, 355-6.; Ramsden, 180.

⁶⁵ Hoenicke Moore; Kertesz.

⁶⁶ Overy, 355-6.

⁶⁷ Hoenicke Moore, 37.

⁶⁸ Alex J. Bellamy, "Terror Bombing in the Second World War," *Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Morality* (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013); Grayling; Richard James Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2013).

through disarmament, control and occupation. This related to fears of German re-emergence and instigation of a Third World War.⁶⁹

For the purposes of this thesis, these key facets of the German Question form a solid point of departure from which to analyse the comprehensive Australian commentary on Nazi Germany during the war. Such points of contention were most likely to engender discussion of the German people *ut totum* (as a whole) and reveal potential sites for the propagation or contestation of totalising enmity. These themes are also essential in understanding and contextualising the stereotypes that continued to reinforce the various characteristics, traits and values ascribed to the German people by Australian commentators. Biased, reductive, exaggerated, emotional and homogenising, stereotypes form simplified and purpose-oriented messages that convey a specific interpretation of these questions relating to the German people. Like the narratives of enmity they feed, stereotypes evolve and fluctuate according to shifting wartime contexts and the needs and purposes of the narrators.⁷⁰

Narratives of Enmity

Increasing historical awareness of the paradoxes, contradictions, and complexities of defining enmity narratives is indebted to developments in social scientific conceptualisations of enmification.⁷¹ “Enmification” derives from terminology used by Robert Rieber and Robert J. Kelly to denote and encapsulate the “psychological and social factors and their concomitants that go into the process of enemy-making.” It is utilised throughout this thesis as a practical means of summarising the key processes and factors relating to the formation and propagation of enmity, enmity-making, and the related narrative and descriptive functions.⁷²

A central premise of this study is to highlight the *contested*, unstable, fluctuating, paradoxical and ambiguous nature of enmity narratives in Australian representations of Germany. Scholarship pertaining to collective enmity reminds us that discussion of national enemies must be tempered by the caveat that *nations* do not hate. Collective enmity can only describe a process occurring at multiple levels in belligerent societies expressed by individuals or groups of citizens encompassing that society or people.⁷³ Equally important is how Australia’s enemies were discussed outside dominant narratives.

⁶⁹ Hoenicke Moore. See Chapters 10 and 11.

⁷⁰ Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, Culture, Media and Identities (London: Sage, 1997), 258; Vuorinen, 5; Ofer Zur, “The Love of Hating: The Psychology of Enmity,” *History of European Ideas* 13, no. 4 (1991): 7.; Robert J. Sternberg and Karin Sternberg, *The Nature of Hate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 61, 69.; Keen, 13.

⁷¹ Hoenicke Moore.; Niza Yanay, “Understanding Collective Hatred,” *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, no. 1 (2002): 55.

⁷² Barker, 9; Rieber and Kelly, 6, 38; Zur, 2.

⁷³ Rieber and Kelly, 6-7.

Did counter-narratives exist in parallel? How did various narratives meet and converge across a wide variety of media? In other words, this thesis also accounts for the wide variety of Australians framing the enemy in public war discourse, and what they were trying to accomplish in doing so.

Enmity manifested itself in contingent ways across Second World War societies. It took on several forms in terms of severity, extent, level of engagement, durability, and reciprocity (symmetricity or asymmetricity).⁷⁴ The employment of Rod Barker's framework of "*narratives of enmity*" (a reflection of other similar terminologies encompassing "stories" and "plots"⁷⁵ or "discourse"⁷⁶) over more static concepts like "enemy images" (used by both Kertesz and Hoenicke Moore), more aptly captures the mutability, dynamism and fluidity of wartime perceptions; the multidimensionality of sources and voices, the prominence of exchange, dialogue and debate; and the role of contingency and choice inherent in discussions of the German enemy on the Australian home front.⁷⁷ Robert and Karen Sternberg touch on similar issues in their framework of "stories of hate", scripts that are consistently "revised and rewritten" and whose narrative structure portrays an "anticipated set of events" with a beginning, middle and end.⁷⁸ Similarly, Marja Vuorinen's discussion of "discourses of enmity" reinforces that enmity is not inherent but rather "created, negotiated and modified" within wartime communities.⁷⁹ These frameworks share a concern with highlighting contestation and contingency. Narratives of enmity are "functional narratives", used to incite, manipulate and consolidate support, justify and give meaning to, or exist parallel to, wartime actions and policies.⁸⁰

This thesis also explores how narratives of enmity were utilised in the justification and rationalisation of wartime practices, proposals and behaviour: namely totalising violence and the treatment of the enemy in the final years of the conflict. The relationship between enmity narratives and the rationalisation of violence and coercive acts – occupation, reparations, applications of post-war justice – has been emphasised in research of enmity, alterity and Otherness.⁸¹ This thesis also utilises Susan Opatow's framework of "moral exclusion" and discusses its role in defining the boundaries of the

⁷⁴ Susan Opatow, *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, ed. Linda R. Tropp, *The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 75-6. Sternberg conceptualises a useful "Taxonomy of Types of Hate". Sternberg and Sternberg, 12-13, 73.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁷⁶ Vuorinen.

⁷⁷ Barker; Keen; Robert J. Sternberg, "Understanding and Combating Hate," in *The Psychology of Hate*, ed. Robert J. Sternberg (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2005); Vuorinen; Zur.

⁷⁸ Sternberg and Sternberg, 96-99.

⁷⁹ Vuorinen, 5.

⁸⁰ Barker, 55, 69-70; Hoenicke Moore, 6-7.

⁸¹ Barker, 9-11.; Geyer and Tooze, 3, 415; Sternberg and Sternberg, 7. Sternberg, for instance, theorises about the bidirectionality between violence and hatred.

“scope of justice” in Australian wartime society.⁸² The contingent, adaptable and unstable and essentialising narratives fostering moral exclusion across various layers of societal discourse (an important conceptual link reinforcing the connection to narratives of enmity)⁸³ construct boundaries around the application of justice and qualification for moral concern. Such boundaries separate the *morally included* – those within an in-group who promote a sense of “moral obligation, responsibility and duty” – and the *morally excluded* – those “non-entities” rendered “psychologically distant” from the in-group; unconnected, expendable, and undeserving of restraint and mercy. It is against the morally excluded that acts of violence, resource denial and exploitation are normalised, justified, ignored or, most perversely, celebrated as an achievement of the in-group.⁸⁴

Retaining the essence of Opatow’s framework of moral exclusion, Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr.’s formulation of “delegitimization” further elucidates and conceptualises the proscription, authorisation, moral licence or “psychological permit” to harm and the rhetorical and discursive formulation of out-groups as “worthy targets of violence”. Wartime violence is one of the more extreme consequences of moral exclusion theorised by Opatow.⁸⁵ Moral exclusion is most likely to be prevalent in comprehensive, prolonged and violent intergroup conflicts, entered into as a response to unjustified aggression against the in-group and where the life and worldview of the in-group is perceived to be threatened. Such conditions correlate to the exaggerated environments in a totalising peoples’ war where Australia’s existential survival and way of life were deemed, rightly or wrongly, to be imperilled.⁸⁶ Within this thesis, moral exclusion facilitates discussions of, and theorises the conceptual links between, narratives of enmity and the justification of totalising violence (such as the bombing of non-combatants) and other punitive actions (post-war reparations and/or punishment) against an out-group. These subjects are discussed in the final chapters of this thesis.

⁸² Susan Opatow, "Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction," *Journal of Social Issues* 46, no. 1 (Spring, 1990); "Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion," in *The Psychology of Hate*, ed. Robert J. Sternberg (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2005); *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*. "Moral Exclusion" shares many similarities to "delegitimization", espoused by: Daniel Bar-Tal and Phillip L Hammack Jr., *Conflict, Delegitimization, and Violence*, ed. Linda R Tropp., The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁸³ Barker, 30-32.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 30; Opatow, "Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion," 127; *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 73-4.

⁸⁵ Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr., 31-2; Opatow, *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 75, 129.

⁸⁶ Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr., 34.

Sources and Methodology

As noted, my central focus remains on public discourse. This thesis is not a study of official Australian propaganda apparatuses and operations of psychological warfare, of which several excellent works exist.⁸⁷ Whilst remaining sensitive to issues of representation, distribution and accessibility amongst other factors, the media has been treated as a close approximation of the “public sphere” in Western democracies throughout the twentieth century. Marshall and Atherton highlight the Australian media’s historical role in the construction of a “working, recognisable and exchangeable public sphere as it works to ‘represent’ a nation and culture.”⁸⁸ Building from this, the qualitative analysis of the various mediums of public discourse within this thesis concentrates on the Australian mass media.⁸⁹ It particularly focuses on print media which facilitates research into a wide spectrum of opinion and readership.

Despite strong advancements in long and short-wave radio and newsreel technology and a widening reach of broadcast journalism in Australia throughout the inter-war period,⁹⁰ newspapers remained the most accessible public communication form throughout the Second World War.⁹¹ Print media likewise suffered far less overt censorship, control and interference than radio or newsreels, a trend carried over from inter-war policy under the Lyons and Menzies’ administrations fearing radio’s influence of the masses.⁹² Broadcast scripts, for instance, were required to be submitted in advance for approval by the DOI in a form of “precensorship” that was not applied to print media.⁹³ Thus, while the overt focus on censorship of radio and news reel technology reflected governmental fears about the Government’s capacity to shape public opinion, it renders such media forms far less useful in analysing *contested* narratives. While political leaders, governments and officials ultimately hold agenda setting power in symmetrical enmity narrative formation, other layers certainly exist. A functional wartime media maintained an important *agenda setting* role in Australian wartime discourse as “gatekeepers” of information. The press did not necessarily enforce what to think about

⁸⁷ Finch, "Knowing the Enemy: Australian Psychological Warfare and the Business of Influencing Minds in the Second World War."; "Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century."; *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*; Robertson; Saunders, "An Instrument of Strategy": Propaganda, Public Policy and the Media in Australia During the Second World War."; Stanley.

⁸⁸ P. David Marshall and Cassandra Atherton, "Situating Public Intellectuals," *Media International Australia* 156, no. 1 (Aug, 2015): 72.

⁸⁹ Bridget Griffen-Foley, *A Companion to the Australian Media*, ed. Bridget Griffen-Foley (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2014).

⁹⁰ *Changing Stations: The Story of Australian Commercial Radio* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2009).

⁹¹ Carruthers, 3-4; Jowett and O'Donnell, 110, 29, 32.; Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 113.

⁹² E. M. Andrews, *Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crisis, 1935-1939* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), 199.

⁹³ Carruthers, 78-80; K. S. Inglis and Jan Brazier, *This Is the ABC: The Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1932-1983* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1983), 78.

the Germans but influenced the public on *what to think about* (in this case, the issues relating to the German Question) through the selection, interpretation and (in many cases) distortion of information.⁹⁴

Australia's appetite for war news was typical of belligerent states fighting in a peoples' war.⁹⁵ The twentieth century mass media qualifiedly democratised enmity formation, allowing input from a variety of sources.⁹⁶ Any discussion of enmity within this context must remain sensitive to the multiplicity of voices within a democratic society involved in cultivating enmity narratives. Enmity cultivation in a wartime democracy such as Australia remained a "dialogue", often popularly articulated beyond the prerogatives of Australia's political and military leaders in forums such as the correspondence columns.⁹⁷ Put simply, this thesis recognises the voice of the concerned munitions worker writing to their local paper, as well as the politician, military leader and the public intellectual, in their public, most-often published, form. While the beliefs, understanding and "intentionality" of various individuals forms important context, what is most critical to the objectives of this thesis is that which is stated in public wartime discourse, the "public function" of enmity narratives. For the researcher, this function is far less impeded by questions of "sincerity" or privately held attitudes.⁹⁸ Narratives of enmity are more telling of the unique societies producing them than their targets. Australia's contingent cultural, social and political factors limited the various potentialities of interpretation of German character, behaviour and intent.

The current study attempts to trace the process of totalising enmity through Australian wartime enmity narratives across a wide variety of *texts*. While studies of the totalising aspects of the Second World War must remain sensitive to the conflict's "pretextual materiality" (the material consequences and structures of the war), this thesis is more concerned with the "textuality" through which violent conflict and the consequences and burdens of war were intercepted and took on shared meaning in war discourses.⁹⁹ The construction and representation of enemies was only one part, albeit a significant one, of this broader interpretative process in wartime societies and cultures. *Intertextuality*, the "accumulation of meanings across different texts" (written words, visual representations, photographs), reinforces the importance of reading individual texts in context where

⁹⁴ Jowett and O'Donnell, 192; Sternberg and Sternberg, 159.

⁹⁵ Carruthers, 82.

⁹⁶ Barker, 12, 222.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 33.

⁹⁸ "Sincerity", in this sense, refers to the speaker's belief in specific statements. Barker argues that difficulties surrounding this question have far less effect on "published description". Ibid., 7, 62. Jowett and O'Donnell also rightly note the disjuncture between an individual's public support of ideas and private acceptance and belief. Jowett and O'Donnell, 2, 201.

⁹⁹ Roger Chickering, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9.

they gain meaning when read in conjunction with others.¹⁰⁰ Methodologically, then, this thesis rests on the qualitative analysis of popular Australian newspapers, journals and treatises informing Australian public war discourse. Sources of opinion, editorials and letters to the editor, are equally revealing of Australian attitudes towards the German people as news reports and foreign correspondent cables.

Australian pictorials such as *Pix* exemplified an emerging “visual culture”, an explosion of popular periodicals devoted to images contextualised by short textual captions and articles to create picture stories, essays and articles.¹⁰¹ Barbie Zelizer formulates a “turn to the visual” which, in light of the violence of totalising warfare, allowed the audience to see images of the enemy and its actions with an immediacy unheard of in previous generations.¹⁰² This invariably influenced the way in which the mainstream press presented news and commentary. Susan Sontag concurs that the developing art of photojournalism truly came into its own during the Second World War.¹⁰³ Kathryn Evans reinforces Australia’s involvement in the 1930s phenomenon of capturing the world through the visual: “picture essays and picture stories were on the increase: movement, narrative, progression, headline and caption were all intertwining.”¹⁰⁴

Recognising the power of visuals in the formation and expression of enmity narratives, this thesis has incorporated analysis of visual sources – cartoons, illustrations, photographs, posters – in conjunction and relation to written text.¹⁰⁵ In democratic war societies, George Roeder notes a resistance against the compulsive attempts to suppress ambiguity in wartime narrative: “...journalists, entertainers, artists and public officials...used visual means to open up honest dialogue on war’s nature and meaning.”¹⁰⁶ The close relationship between editorial opinion and cartoonists is particularly highlighted within this thesis as strong evidence of contemporary attitudes. Visual artists such as Norman Lindsay (*Bulletin*), Harold Armstrong (*Argus*), George Finey and W.F. “Bill” Mahony (*Daily Telegraph*) and Jack Quayle (*News*) powerfully summarised, synthesised, simplified (and in more

¹⁰⁰ Hall, 232-33, 19; Kertesz.

¹⁰¹ Fussell, 127.; Susan Sontag, “Looking at War: Photography’s View of Devastation and Death,” *The New Yorker* (December, 2002). <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/12/09/looking-at-war> (Accessed, 01/10/17).; *Regarding the Pain of Others* (New York: Picador, 2003), 27-8.

¹⁰² Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer, *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2004), 117-18.

¹⁰³ Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 28.

¹⁰⁴ Kathryn Evans, “‘The Shadow of the Photographer’: Images on Paper,” in *Journalism: Print, Politics and Popular Culture*, ed. Ann Curthoys, Julianne Schultz, and Richard Nile (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1999), 137.

¹⁰⁵ Hall; Jowett and O'Donnell, 289.; Barker, 77-82.

¹⁰⁶ George H Roeder, *The Censored War: American Visual Experience During World War Two* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 91.

limited cases, criticised) dominant enmity narratives perpetuated in editorials, interpretive columns, and news reports.

The role of the Department of Information (DOI), the government department responsible for Australia's propaganda, informational and censorship activities, raises other important questions around the extension of governmental wartime "machineries of control" over communication and information.¹⁰⁷ Considering the diversity of opinion regarding the German Question, Edward Vickery notes that "no thorough attempt to measure and regiment Australian opinion" was made by the Australian authorities. Wartime opinion management was limited by dominant Australian conceptions of the function of a wartime democratic government and the continuation of partisan party political disagreement over the function of censorship.¹⁰⁸ The DOI, however, remained a central intermediary between official governmental opinion and the media in a relationship defined on the whole by "cooperation" and "persuasion".¹⁰⁹ The loose delineation between "fact" and "opinion" ostensibly exerted far less interference in editorial and opinion pieces, allowing a number of different narratives concerning Germany to co-exist and compete.¹¹⁰ The *decentralised* nature of enmity cultivation in Australia allowed the public to engage with a variety of sources whilst a widespread "liberalisation" permitted greater space for contestation and competing narratives than that available in the Axis states.¹¹¹ Thus, despite censorship, a "blend of discretion and direction" which placed the onus on the media itself to self-regulate, helped to ensure the functions of an accountable wartime democracy that facilitated the liberal proliferation of competing Australian viewpoints about the enemy discussed within this thesis.¹¹²

Finally, the level of analysis available to Kertesz and Hoenicke Moore in their respective investigations exposes challenging limitations in an Australian study regarding evidence and the potential scope of

¹⁰⁷ Carruthers, 13; Jowett and O'Donnell, 42; Saunders, "An Instrument of Strategy": Propaganda, Public Policy and the Media in Australia During the Second World War."; Paul Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1965); *The Government and the People, 1942-1945* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1970).; John Hilvert, *Blue Pencil Warriors: Censorship and Propaganda in World War II* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984); Edward Louis Vickery, "Telling Australia's Story to the World: The Department of Information 1939-1950" (PhD thesis, Australian National University, 2003).

¹⁰⁸ Vickery, 6, 13-14.

¹⁰⁹ Saunders, "An Instrument of Strategy": Propaganda, Public Policy and the Media in Australia During the Second World War," 76; Vickery.

¹¹⁰ Carruthers, 78-80.

¹¹¹ Barker, 161; Carruthers, 77, 92-5; Jowett and O'Donnell, 375; Saunders, "An Instrument of Strategy": Propaganda, Public Policy and the Media in Australia During the Second World War," 80. The function of wartime democracy has also been emphasized in the American context. Hoenicke Moore, 10-11.

¹¹² John E. Owens, "The Resilience of Democratic Institutions in Britain, Australia and the United States under Conditions of Total War," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 66, no. 3 (2012): 339, 41.; Hilvert; Vickery. Comparisons in this sense can be made with the British and American censorship systems. Carruthers, 78-80.; Roeder, 2.

research. Kertesz refers to the vast “public opinion” polling and Ministry of Information Diaries that provide a useful counterpoint to her analysis of published opinion.¹¹³ As Vickery’s excellent thesis on the DOI suggests, Australia failed in comparison to the MOI’s “Mass Observation” and similar efforts of the American Office of War Information (OWI) to systematically engage in the collection and collation of information regarding public attitudes towards the enemy and assess the state of public morale, despite acquiring the imperfect methods of doing so and pressure from leading social scientists to do so.¹¹⁴ While limited public opinion polls on Australian attitudes towards Germany are available for the final years of the war (utilised in analysis in the final chapter), the absence of even the most rudimentary and primitive opinion polling on attitudes towards the Axis populations available to scholars of British and American opinion necessarily limits analysis in this thesis to *published* opinion. It is consequently essential to qualify tentative statements on *public* opinion herein on the basis of narratives of enmity perpetuated, constructed and deconstructed through largely published media sources and reports.¹¹⁵

Chapter Structure

This thesis begins with a brief contextualisation of the diverging, often contradictory, impressions of the German people and their relationship with National Socialist objectives and ideology throughout the early twentieth century. The following four chapters aim to analyse the intersections of totalising enmity, narratives of enmity and the German Question between 1939-1941. Chapter Two focuses on discussions of the German Question by Australian politicians in the House of Representatives, particularly important contextually given their narrative setting capacity. Chapter Three moves on to the mainstream press, examining editorials, news cables, letters to the editor, reports on meetings, rallies, published radio reports and cartoons in Sydney and Melbourne newspapers. This chapter then turns to an examination of nationalist and tabloid journals such as *Truth*, *Smith’s Weekly* and the *Bulletin*.

Chapter Four explores the influence of Australian public intellectuals and their scholarly framing of the German Question in terms of historical, political and cultural context. Although examining arguments of several key intellectuals, my analysis will focus on a close reading of regular newspaper columns by two of Australia’s leading public intellectuals, Alan R. Chisholm and Walter Murdoch. A

¹¹³ Limited attempts to systematically gauge public opinion, such as “Group Committees”, did exist from 1939 though were halted in 1941. Vickery, 44-45.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 28-9, 243

¹¹⁵ Unfortunately, the scope of this doctoral thesis, and the absence of a clearly defined set of an easily comparable and accessible collection of diaries, such as the excellent collection of MOIDs utilised by Kertesz, renders any comprehensive comparison between published and private opinion beyond the current scope of the current work. Kertesz, 19.

study of the journals which correspond with the main sources of “anti-Vansittartism” in Anglo-American debates – the widely encompassing periodicals of the Socialist Left and the Australian Churches – will follow in Chapter Five.

The penultimate Chapter Six examines how the logic of totalising enmity was harnessed to justify and normalise acts and consequences of violence and weaken peacetime limitations of the permissibility of violence in line with the process of moral exclusion.¹¹⁶ It looks at a particularly problematic feature of the Australian “good” war narrative: the discussion and presentation of German civilians under Allied bombing, and the means, arguments and problems raised by the totalising process which rendered them acceptable and even worthy targets of military violence. It particularly focuses on the transformative years of the Allied strategic bombing offensive, 1940-1943.

Questions of guilt, complicity, reprisal and punishment coalesced with contemporary understanding of the breakdown of non-combatant immunity in Australia. Chapter Seven looks at the variety of attitudes towards the post-war treatment of the German populace. This chapter asks whether the longevity of brutal war, belated awareness of the Holocaust and other German atrocities, and a “never again” mentality translated into a deep-seated enmity towards Germany and the German people in Australia in the final years of the conflict. To what extent was the totalising logic of enmity evident in Australian discourse regarding the fate of the vanquished? Focusing on the final stages of the conflict brings us closer to an understanding on the shifting nature of totalising narratives of enmity and their forms and constraints in a totalising peoples’ war, an expansive conflict “with, for and against peoples”.

¹¹⁶ Opatow, “Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction.”; “Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion.”; *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*.

Chapter One: Ambiguous Impressions of the German in Early Twentieth Century Australia

Narratives of enmity do not emerge in a vacuum. While dependent on shifting wartime contexts, narratives are also the product of longstanding ideological preconceptions, prejudices, racial stereotypes, and historical memory which rapidly resurface in the lead up to, and during, conflict. The historical contextualisation of enmity narratives is key to understanding their formation and function and how they impact on war discourse.¹¹⁷ By analysing the vast historiography on Anglo-German and Australian-German relations, it is evident that key structures, frameworks and models for representing and comprehending a belligerent National Socialist Germany were already entrenched in Australian and other Anglo-American societies before the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939.¹¹⁸ Regarding Australia, some brief points of contextualisation through secondary material are necessary to explain the ambiguity of Australian perceptions of Germany on the eve of war.

Current research into late nineteenth and pre-war twentieth century Anglo-German relations concerning social, cultural, political and military interaction and dialogue can be aptly summarised by the titular reference of Richard Scully's in-depth analysis of the complex, multifaceted and non-linear nature of British images from 1860-1914 – "Admiration, Antagonism and Ambivalence".¹¹⁹ This scholarship describes a more "varied, changeable and open-ended" relationship that has largely destabilised and questioned a limited focus on "antagonism".¹²⁰ Australian scholars have largely adopted this approach in their respective analyses of Australian-German relations.

The First World War: A Precedent for Totalising Enmity

The dominance of the First World War as a reference point in the formation of enmity narratives between 1939 and 1945 cannot be overstated. Historians such as Gerhard Fischer, Jürgen Tampke and Ian Harmstorf have engaged in a systematic analysis of the rampant anti-Germanism of the First World War. Emphasis has largely been placed on the devastating effects of totalising enmity for the

¹¹⁷ Jowett and O'Donnell, 206.

¹¹⁸ Hoenicke Moore, 3.

¹¹⁹ Richard Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism & Ambivalence, 1860-1914*, ed. British Scholar Society, Britain and the World (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). For examples of this wide ranging historiography, see: Adolf M. Birke, Magnus Brechtken, and Alaric Searle, *An Anglo-German Dialogue: The Munich Lectures on the History of International Relations*, ed. Franz Bosbach, vol. 17, Prinz-Albert-Studien (München: K. G. Saur, 2000).; David Dilks, "Britain and Germany, 1937-1939: A Context for British Reactions to the German Resistance," in *An Anglo-German Dialogue: The Munich Lectures on the History of International Relations*, ed. Adolf M. Birke, Magnus Brechtken, and Alaric Searle, Prinz-Albert-Studien (München: K. G. Saur, 2000); Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London: Ashfield Press, 1980).

¹²⁰ Rüger, 585-9; Kennedy; Kertesz, 27; Patrick Major, "Britain and Germany: A Love-Hate Relationship?," *German History* 26, no. 4 (2008): 457.

Australian-German community.¹²¹ While there is little room here to detail nineteenth century relations in the burgeoning colonies, a sizeable community of German-speaking migrants had developed in Australia by the fin de siècle. The on the whole positive status of this migrant community was severely damaged by wartime enmity between 1914 and 1918.¹²² Warnings of the dangers of “*Pauschalverurteilung*” – Tampke’s reference to a collective condemnation of Australian society and their leaders as rampant hate-mongers – and defence of acts committed under national security considerations evidences some scholarly disagreement over the justifiability of policies and scale of anti-German sentiment and suffering imposed on the German community.¹²³ From an overview of the literature, however, most analyses of First World War anti-German activity and rhetoric conceptualise a form of enmity which, with varying limits and constraints, was totalising in its extent and indiscrimination.

Recognition of the ambiguity of enmity narratives is evident within Australian and international studies of the First World War. Limited attempts to constrain totalising enmity and rehumanise the German have been noted within the historiography.¹²⁴ It is undeniable, however, that the breakdown of former distinctions between Germans, Australian-Germans and Australians of German heritage, let alone between the German people and their leaders, evidenced a homogenisation of identities promoted by the totalising logic of the First World War. Fischer aptly demonstrates the role of the conflict in perpetuating extant socio-cultural fears and anxieties and an intentional mobilisation of enmity concurrent with political ambitions of a nascent and developing Australian nation sensitive to its colonial past, political expressions of British identity and geographical isolation (a fear most prominently expressed against its Asian and Pacific neighbours).¹²⁵

Expressions of anti-Germanism in the Second World War were not unprecedented. As signposted in the introduction, this thesis endorses the widely held contention that specifically *anti-German* policies

¹²¹ Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920*; Harmstorf and Cigler; Tampke; Tampke and Doxford. For a more localised study, see: Bruce Pennay, “An Australian Berlin and Hotbed of Disloyalty: Shaming Germans in a Country District During Two World Wars,” *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society* 92, no. 1 (June, 2006).

¹²² Fischer places the pre-war German-Australian community at approximately 100,000 or two per cent of the Australian population. Fischer, “Immigration, Integration, Disintegration.”; Harmstorf, *The German Experience in South Australia*; Tampke and Doxford, X-XIII.;

¹²³ Tampke, 119-21. This is perhaps evidence of the need to explore the totalising logic of enmity in First World War Australia as a means of understanding form and evolution, as well as limitations and constraints, on the process. However, I would argue that Tampke perhaps goes too far in undermining the extent of anti-German sentiment in claiming the “life went on as usual” for most in the Australian-German Community. Tampke, 125.; Tampke and Doxford, XIII, 179.

¹²⁴ Kertesz, 34.

¹²⁵ Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920*, 5-6, 124; Walker, *Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 1850-1939*. See also Michael McKernan, *The Australian People and the Great War* (West Melbourne: Nelson, 1980).

and actions were far more measured and less indiscriminate in the Second World War than its predecessor. Internment is indicative of this. For instance, the internment of Germans in the Second World War has been shown by historians to have been far less indiscriminate and better targeted than the First World War, even if creeping arbitrariness, superficial selectivity and coarsening public sentiment and grassroots social pressures were reinforced by broadening definitions of potential fifth columnists after mid-1940.¹²⁶ Shifts in the framing of loyalty and subversion facilitated homogenised and simplistic narratives. The legacy of essentialism and indiscrimination in the internment policies of 1914-18 importantly influenced totalising enmity narratives in the Second World War, even if internment was undertaken in a far more targeted manner.

German enemy aliens were deprived of civil and constitutional rights and liberties, suffered threats to their employment and livelihood, had property confiscated and vandalised, suffered economic boycotts, had educational and religious organisations curbed, and suffered outward persecution evident in all layers of wartime discourse – in the streets, in workplaces, through the media and via organised official propaganda campaigns and policy.¹²⁷ The repression and destruction of the Australian-German community's autonomous identity, cultural heritage, language and traditions was also evident in the closing of Lutheran Churches, German Clubs and schools.¹²⁸ The renaming of German placenames (a total of 69 enforced by the Nomenclature Act of 1917) and other public sites also demonstrates the extension of enmity to German language.¹²⁹ The linguistic curtailment of the language of the "Hun" was patriotically enforced. This was another example of anti-Germanism which was far less severe in the Second World War. It was even treated with spurious contempt by some ardent opponents of the Nazi/German distinction as a problematic distraction.¹³⁰

Totalising enmity was mobilised through official channels, within civic society, intellectuals, churches, media, and political elites, and was disseminated widely through the media. Parallel expressions of enmity converged in a national wartime discourse where domestic discord over policies such as conscription was refocused on recognisable and simplified external and internal enemies.¹³¹

¹²⁶ Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920*; Henderson, 74, 76-77; Tampke, 103; Winter; Robert Loeffel, *The Fifth Column in World War II: Suspected Subversives in the Pacific War and Australia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

¹²⁷ Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920*; "Immigration, Integration, Disintegration."; Tampke and Doxford.

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ Harmstorf, 1917 Nomenclature Act – 69 Place Names of German Origin.; World War II. Grassroots moves to change German placenames and sporadic movements against street names fell flat in the Second World War.

¹³⁰ See reference to Baume, p. 92 This theme can also be seen in some limited analyses of Australian responses to German music. Owens. A publication is currently being prepared by the author that explores this theme through the lens of music (building on Owens' work), entertainment, sport (vastly differing responses to a football team's colours in 1914 and 1939), material products and language.

¹³¹ Horne, "A Total War? The French Experience of the First World War."

Narratives of enmity were thus far more complex than an inevitable and spontaneous result of “wartime hysteria”, even though, as this thesis will posit, the context of totalising war can powerfully influence their development. The anti-German sentiment and overt “hate campaigns” – sponsored through Governmental legislation and official propaganda campaigns and provoked by the Australian media – had standardised a vast repertoire of crude images, stereotypes and tropes across Australia’s shared wartime vocabularies which became entrenched in popular post-war memory.

The lingering effects of anti-German sentiment throughout the inter-war period were perpetuated by popular post-war references to war guilt, the legacy of German *Weltpolitik* (the foreign policy under Kaiser Wilhelm II often truncated in the more loaded term “Kaiserism”),¹³² reparations and atrocities. These themes were captured in popular collective memory of the Treaty of Versailles, the post-war agreement reached during the Paris Peace Conference which established and formalised the various conditions of peace to be imposed on Germany.¹³³ Australia’s controversial wartime Prime Minister W.H. “Billy” Hughes’ wartime anti-German credentials were further entrenched in his representation of Australia during the peace process. Hughes aligned Australia with French (personified by President of the Paris Peace Conference, Georges Clemenceau) demands for a “Carthaginian” and retributive peace governed by unrealistic expectations of reparation and compensation to be imposed on the German people.¹³⁴

Several aspects of the Versailles Treaty: disarmament, large reparations, the establishment of demilitarisation zones and territorial changes, formed a key point of reference in discussions of Germany throughout the Second World War. This was a product of its continued manifestation in the inter-war public consciousness and official policy regarding trade, immigration and international relations with both Weimar and Nazi Germany.¹³⁵ However, a process of normalisation of Australian-German relations, a cautious softening of post-war enmity and the emergence of “grievance” rhetoric (varying interpretations of German mistreatment under the Versailles Treaty most commonly emanating from Liberal commentators and the political Left)¹³⁶ had already begun in the 1920s and

¹³² David Welch, “Images of the Hun: The Portrayal of the German Enemy in British Propaganda in World War I,” in *Propaganda, Power and Persuasion: From World War I to Wikileaks*, ed. David Welch (London: IB Tauris, 2014), 93-5.

¹³³ Jürgen Tampke, *A Perfidious Distortion of History: The Versailles Peace Treaty and Success of the Nazis* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2017).

¹³⁴ *The Germans in Australia: The Story of the Continent's German Speaking Communities*, 126; Tampke and Doxford, 200-3.; W. M. Hughes, *Australia and War to-Day: The Price of Peace* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1935).

¹³⁵ Voigt, 105-7.

¹³⁶ Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, 355.

continued throughout the latter half of the decade (the “Golden Twenties” of pre-Depression Weimar Berlin) and early 1930s.¹³⁷

Inter-war Normalisation of Relations and the Rise of National Socialism

The inter-war normalisation of Australian-German relations did produce some haphazard, restrained attempts to reinvigorate *Deutschtum* (Germanness) and *Deutschtumpolitik* (Political Germanness) domestically in the Australian-German community. However, scholars have noted an aversion to militaristic, and later National Socialist, manifestations of *Deutschtum* in Australia.¹³⁸ Despite the continued existence of a separate Australian-German identity, the cultural and linguistic assimilation, conformism and Anglicisation and “Australianisation” of the Australian-German community which was already evident before 1914, accelerated throughout the war and increased with intensity during the inter-war years.¹³⁹ Importantly, historical consensus, led by David Bird’s excellent work, proposes that National Socialist ideology, racialism and political theory had limited influence and persuasive power in Australia’s German community let alone more broadly in Australian society where, to co-opt the phraseology of Inga Clendinnen, Nazism “did not travel well” beyond isolated fringes, “fellow-travellers” and nationalist dreamers in Australian society.¹⁴⁰

The images of idyllic hiking and youth organisations, films star Thea Fischer and modern fashion trends published by the *Adelaide News* a month after Hitler’s aggressive annexation of Czechoslovakia evidences the type of image held by the majority of Australians of life in the Third Reich on the eve of war [Image 2].¹⁴¹ A period of comparatively peaceable relations between Australia and Nazi Germany spanning from the *Machtergreifung* (Nazi seizure of power in 1933) and the immediate process of *Gleichschaltung* (process of aggressive “coordination” of German social, cultural and political life) to the end of the so-called ‘Olympic Pause’ in 1937 – did not automatically promote the re-emergence of enmity against everything German.¹⁴² Even the more cynical, shrewd and observant Australian observers of the late 1930s, such as Challis Professor and historian Stephen Roberts, failed to properly interpret certain aspects of the regime and the German political climate despite recognising (albeit for the “wrong reason[s]”) that Nazism would engender renewed global conflict and rejecting

¹³⁷ Tampke, *The Germans in Australia: The Story of the Continent's German Speaking Communities*; Voigt.; Kertesz, 37.

¹³⁸ Tampke, *The Germans in Australia: The Story of the Continent's German Speaking Communities*, 128; Tampke and Doxford, 204, 11-13.

¹³⁹ Harmstorf, ‘The Issue of Loyalty’. This was an idea promoted by Augustine Lodewyckx. Henderson, 45.

¹⁴⁰ Cited in Henderson, 16, 49.

¹⁴¹ “People in the Germany of Today,” *News*, 15 April 1939, 8.

Christopher Waters, “Understanding and Misunderstanding Nazi Germany: Four Australian Visitors to Germany in 1938,” *Australian Historical Studies* 41, no. 1 (2010): 369.

¹⁴² Henderson, 35.

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THE NEWS
 DELAWARE SATURDAY, APRIL 16, 1938
People in the Germany of Today

DEPOTIVE ORIGINAL

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TUNNEY'S

LATEST PICTURES from Germany. No. 1—Women farm workers help to make hay. 2—German youths in the compulsory training scheme. 3—Thea Fischer, a film star. 4—What modern German girls are wearing. 5—A home for Hitler youths to use when hiking through the country.

A TREAT FOR MUSIC LOVERS
 at
GLENELG THEATRES
 ★ **STRAND** ★
 TONIGHT 11:15 FRIDAY
Rear Gladys Swarthout and Johnnie Walker
 "Rose of the Rancho"
 Play "Rose of the Rancho" in 11:15 at 11:15
 "THE GAME THAT KILLS"
 All Color "The Game That Kills" and "The Game That Kills"
 ★ **SEAVIEW** ★
 TONIGHT 11:15 FRIDAY
HOPALONG CASSIDY
 "TRAIL DUST"
 "The 10th Man"
 Block Now for Tonight!

Australia's geographical and psychological distance from Europe ensured that most Australians failed to seriously contemplate the repercussions of the growth of fascist, militarily aggressive states during the late 1930s. Christopher Waters had successfully argued that, with limited exceptions, Australian foreign policy throughout the 1930s under the administrations of Joseph Lyons and Robert Menzies conformed to British appeasement policy vis-à-vis Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.¹⁴⁵ Appeasement in the context of international diplomacy refers to the concessionary policies towards belligerent states,

¹⁴⁴ Harmstorf, "The Issue of Loyalty."; M.S. Regan's thesis, 'Australian Perceptions of Nazism 1933 – 1939', has reinforced the tendency of Australian newspapers to differentiate between the Nazi regime and the German people. Mary Stephanie Regan, "Australian Perceptions of Nazism: A Study of Some Press and Parliamentary Reactions to Hitler and His Policies, 1933-1939" (Honours Thesis, Flinders University of South Australia, 1971), 13.; Henderson. 17-18.

30

political, economic or otherwise, in an attempt to limit or pacify conflict. These were actions undertaken by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to placate and aggressively expansionist German *Führer*. E.M. Andrews' seminal study on inter-war appeasement has also posited that an internally focused Australian society was far more concerned by domestic internal politics and post-depression economic and social concerns to care greatly about the implications of international developments. This mentality was perpetuated by successive Australian governments' unwillingness to facilitate open discussion on Australia's subscription to appeasement in public discourse.¹⁴⁶ Widespread isolationism, indifference and misunderstanding towards foreign affairs (evident in the haphazard and patchy media coverage of the era) only slowly began to dissipate through a series of crises – ranging from the Abyssinian Crisis, the Spanish Civil War, the ongoing Sino-Japanese conflict and finally Nazi Germany's aggressive expansionism. Australia was not unique in the Anglo-American sphere in experiencing a "delay" in recognising the dangers of National Socialism, its ideology and its aggressive foreign policy.¹⁴⁷

While analysis of international relations remained largely the prerogative of some astute Australian politicians, academics and foreign affairs journalists and correspondents until the last months of the inter-war period, an almost apolitical popular interest in life under Nazi rule was clearly evident in the Australian media as Image 2 suggests.¹⁴⁸ Despite the relatively lacklustre role of the Australian newspapers in increasing public knowledge and apprehension of international affairs in the late inter-war period, Australian newspapers did play a role in perpetuating inconsistent and ambiguous pre-war narratives through a shared imperative to "understand", rather than merely attack, developments in Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, despite limited exceptions such as the *Sydney Morning Herald*, scholars such as Andrews and Paul Bartrop have shown that the Australian press circulated biased, piecemeal reporting on Nazi Germany that lacked contextual information and analysis.¹⁴⁹

Notwithstanding the increasing hostility towards the Nazi regime and its ideology and aggressive foreign policy throughout 1938 and 1939, the tendency towards positive and even sympathetic images of the German people on the eve of war, brought back by Australian travellers for instance, influenced wartime discussions of the German Question and laid the foundations for a "good" Germany.¹⁵⁰ Travel

¹⁴⁶ Andrews, 175, 93, 209, 21.

¹⁴⁷ Brechtken, 19, 32; Hoenicke Moore, 8; Kertesz, 38-40. Siân Nicholas also notes the absence of understanding of Nazi Germany in the British public beyond vague stereotypes. Siân Nicholas, *The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-45* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 179.

¹⁴⁸ Waters, "Understanding and Misunderstanding Nazi Germany: Four Australian Visitors to Germany in 1938."

¹⁴⁹ Andrews, 197-200.; Paul Bartrop, *Australia and the Holocaust 1933-45* (Kew: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1994), 193.

¹⁵⁰ Julia Boyd, *Travellers in the Third Reich: The Rise of Fascism Seen through the Eyes of Everyday People* (London: Elliott & Thompson, 2017).

commentaries from wide ranging “tours” by academics, politicians, farmers, students, sportsmen and businessmen all provided descriptive accounts of German everyday life, customs and attitudes. Many focused on presenting the views of a “range of people in Germany”, what Stephen Roberts aptly conceptualised as insight into the mindset of “the tinker and worker, professor and farmer”.¹⁵¹ While their success in this was limited by accessibility (see below) and language barriers, these far more accessible analyses of life in the Third Reich were increasingly read alongside the more sophisticated analysis of political developments and Nazi foreign policy objectives.¹⁵²

Overall, these impressions acted to humanise the German people who were often subsumed in the event-by-event commentary of international cable summaries and an increasingly negative image of National Socialism. For instance, Sir Hudson Fysh, the managing director of Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., shared his views on Nazi Germany in a speech to the Millions Club, subsequently published in March 1939.¹⁵³ This largely perpetuated misunderstandings of National Socialism propagated by many Anglo-American commentators and experts in the late inter-war period. Many shared in the popular delusions fostered by what Melbourne based foreign correspondent Geoffrey Rawson had aptly identified as the “tourist’s delight” – the National Socialist façade of organised, superficial sympathy manufactured through the Party’s Foreign Press Department.¹⁵⁴ Notwithstanding this, Fysh’s own empirical, moral-inclusionary analysis of the German people engendered ethnic self-identification and positive attributes. The German was, in essence, like “us”:

I went to Germany in an intensely enquiring frame of mind. I came away with the confirmation – which should not have been needed – that **the average German is a person just like ourselves with the same hopes and fears** [emphasis mine]. As an illustration, they feed the starving birds in the snow just as people do in England.¹⁵⁵

Although travellers such as Fysh provided some astute observations of life in the Reich, superficiality, naivety and ignorance characterised many impressions of the “New Germany”. This often acted to

¹⁵¹ Bonnell, “Stephen H. Roberts’ the House That Hitler Built as a Source on Nazi Germany,” 5; Stephen H. Roberts, *The House That Hitler Built* (London: Methuen, 1937), vi.

¹⁵² For some examples, see: “Many Still loyal to Kaiser: Ex-Cricketer Tells of German Tour,” *Daily News*, 16 August 1939, 3.; Alec H Chisholm, *The Incredible Year: An Australian Sees Europe in “Adolf Hitler Weather”* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1944).

¹⁵³ Hudson Fysh, “Impressions of a Trip Abroad: An Address Delivered to the Millions Club, Sydney, Australia.” Delivered 9 March 1939. University of Melbourne, UniM Bail SpC/MCL: AVIA. FYSH.

¹⁵⁴ Geoffrey Rawson, “Germany A Vast Whispering Gallery: Who Is Able to Say What People Think,” *Advertiser*, 19 October 1939, 14.; “Inside Hitler’s Germany: Where People Dare Not Talk,” *West Australian*, 21 October 1939, 5.

¹⁵⁵ Fysh, “Impressions of a Trip Abroad,” 9.

present a more favourable image of the German people to the Australian people. The views of Edna Burke, a pianist on the teaching staff of the Sydney Conservatorium of Music who had visited Berlin in 1938, were summarised by the equally reductionist and shallow title given by the *Sydney Morning Herald* – “Good Manners, Good Babies, And Good Beer” [Image 3]. Published in the *SMH*’s women’s supplement, her extensive analysis of the German *Hausfrau* (housewife) proffered an extremely positive view of German politeness, enthusiasm, hospitality and charm alongside a solitary dismissive reference to the “Jewish Problem” which she distanced from “every decent German.”¹⁵⁶ Such narratives emphasised German *Gemütlichkeit* (warmth, friendliness and good cheer) and separated the issues relating to the regime – *realpolitik*, appeasement, racialism and foreign policy objectives – from the image of the everyday, ordinary German.



Image 3.

¹⁵⁶ Edna Burke, "A Music Student in Germany: Good Manners, Good babies, And Good Beer," *SMH*, 13 March 1939, 4.

The potential for xenophobia, ethnocentricity and crude reductionism which formed the basis of First World War enmity narratives certainly pervaded the Australian inter-war consciousness as the following chapters will evidence. However, while the Australian people perhaps held a quiescent popular animosity from collective memories of the First World War, a collective and unyielding predisposition towards anti-Germanism, hatred and totalising enmity towards the German people was not evident on the eve of war and cannot explain wartime enmities in isolation. This chapter has established the context for the duality between increasingly critical analyses of Nazi Germany and its ideological and foreign policy ambitions and unreflective, neutral, and positive images of the German people, rooted in personal experience or through popular reference to a pre-war, historical “good” Germany. This ambiguity in Australian representations on the eve of war would influence the framing of the enemy in the first stages of the conflict.

Chapter Two: “No Quarrel”: The German Question and the Political Framing of the Enemy

The first section of this thesis establishes several definitions of the German as an enemy across the various layers of Australian public war discourse in the first three years of the war, 1939-1941. Moving towards this objective, this chapter examines public manifestations of political discourse emanating from key Australian politicians in the Australian House of Representatives (HOR). It analyses the variety of political responses to Australia’s official subscription to the British Government’s overt differentiation between the German people and their rulers to reveal an initial resistance to totalising enmity narratives by Australia’s political leaders. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s assurance to the British Empire, the onlooking world, and the German nation that it had, with caveats, “no quarrel” with the German people, was a catchphrase utilised extensively by Australia’s wartime Prime Minister between 1939-41, Robert Menzies. In Australia, the slogan ostensibly summarised the British assurances of just and limited war aims – that Australia’s involvement in military intervention was exclusively for the purposes of removing the ideological and racial stain of Nazism as a force in international affairs. The German people, notwithstanding their guilt in allowing Nazism to flourish, were not the enemy.

Why look at political discourse given the focus on the Australian media? As Judith Brett has suggested in notable reference to Menzies, political language is in essence “public language” – “conventional, clichéd and redundant, using images and arguments that are quickly recognisable to its audience and able to be deployed” with ease.¹⁵⁷ During the early stages of the Second World War, political language, and the public statements of Menzies in particular, aided to frame enmity narratives in their earliest forms and helped to set the tone of wider public discussions. In the fraught process of “opinion management”, the agenda setting power held by political leaders and capacity to organise, sustain and supply enmity narratives naturally applies to the inverse capacity to moderate narratives of enmity and promote moral inclusion, tolerance and reflection in limiting the totalising logic of enmity.¹⁵⁸ While political leaders do not necessarily monopolise the formation and dissemination of enmity narratives, the input, resources or, at the very least, consent and acquiescence of governments and the political elite is required to maintain enmity over an extended period of time.¹⁵⁹

The current analysis of political discourse will focus on the first months of the conflict – a period when official statements on the German Question were intimately connected to the publicly expressed war

¹⁵⁷ Judith Brett, *Robert Menzies' Forgotten People* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2007), 35-6.

¹⁵⁸ Carruthers, 7.

¹⁵⁹ Barker, 92, 160.

aims and objectives for which Australians were expected to sacrifice their standard of living and, ultimately, their lives. While a wide selection of statements have been examined from the Australian HOR between 1939 and 1941, analysis will focus on key examples from the two parliamentary sitting periods of the Phoney War period: 6 September – 22 September and 15 November – 8 December 1939 respectively. Parliament did not sit again until 17 April 1940, when the situation in Europe was rapidly deteriorating (context) and the shape of enmity narratives (form) had shifted dramatically. Ministerial statements from the opening days of both sitting periods in particular reveal a deep concern about the framing of the enemy as a representation and extension of why Australia was fighting; alongside the key organisational problems noted by Paul Hasluck: the organisation of Australia's military forces, the maintenance of the liberties and functions of Australian democracy at war and financing the war effort.¹⁶⁰

Contextually, the authority of Australia's wartime Prime Minister, who had held the title for a mere five months, rested on an unstable coalition of his United Australia Party (UAP), the Country Party (CP) and independents. This remained the case until October 1941 when John Curtin's Labor Government took power.¹⁶¹ In addition, Australian politics continued on a partisan basis throughout the war, lacking the symbolic unity of a "national government" enjoyed by Britain.¹⁶² Notwithstanding the potential for partisanship on the issue of the German Question, this chapter posits that the majority of sitting members of the three major Federal political parties – the UAP, CP and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) – supported the distinction espoused by the Prime Minister in the opening stages of the war. However, a small, albeit vocal minority of Conservative outliers questioned the validity and usefulness of such comments, actively claiming that a distinction between Nazism and the German People weakened the developing Australian war effort and war aims. This chapter reveals the diverging political motives, ideological frameworks and understandings of totalising warfare governed the various responses to "no quarrel" and the inclusion of the German people in enmity narratives – totalising enmity.

¹⁶⁰ Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 158-60.

¹⁶¹ Brett; David Lee, "Politics and Government," in *Australia's War, 1939-45*, ed. Joan Beaumont (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 85-88; A. W. Martin and Patsy Hardy, *Robert Menzies: A Life* (Carlton: MUP, 1996); Robertson, 13.; Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 160, 564-5.

¹⁶² *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 161, 419-20.; Lee, 90.

The Official Narrative: “No Quarrel” with the German People?

Australia entered the Second World War on a melancholy, anxious and sombre note. The national mood was a far cry from the flag waving, hyper-patriotic energy displayed one quarter-century previously. The Australian press exhibited the qualified, unanimous consent of Australian society for unified action against Nazi aggression by all but the most ardent anti-war forces of the extreme fringes of Australia’s political spectrum.¹⁶³ The righteousness of action after exhausting all other means of appeasement and negotiation, the notion of a defensive war in support of small powers, and the courage and unity of purpose required to check the unrivalled treachery and ruthless ambition of expansionist National Socialist Germany were all highlighted in early wartime discourse to rationalise and legitimise Australian involvement. An editorial from the Brisbane *Courier-Mail* summarised the subdued tone and absence of enmity-provoking rhetoric in the transcript of Prime Minister Robert Menzies’ broadcast to the nation at 9.15 pm on 3 September 1939 which dominated the front pages of the national press:

We do not enter this contest with cheering or flag waving or the singing of hymns of hate, but with a stern resolve to preserve and deserve our own freedom by regaining freedom for others from the oppression or the menace of a military dictator who began his career by first destroying freedom in Germany.¹⁶⁴

Reflecting the Dominion’s place within the British Empire and the tenets of Imperial Defence,¹⁶⁵ Australia’s foreign policy approach to Nazi Germany in September 1939 continued to take its lead from Whitehall. Menzies’ government unquestioningly, albeit unenthusiastically, pledged Australia to another world war. The Australian political response in the first year of the conflict reflected the uncertainty, lack of cohesion and ambiguity of the so-called “Phoney War”, a term encapsulating the lack of major operations and inactivity between German and Allied forces during the first six months of the war co-opted in Australian wartime vocabulary from Allied commentators.¹⁶⁶

Neville Chamberlain’s direct appeals to the German people in his wartime speeches and broadcasts, referenced widely and summarised and reinforced in a global broadcast by British Secretary to the Dominions, Anthony Eden, had been received with great enthusiasm in Australia in the first months of the war as a guiding principle for a war free of unnecessary hate mongering and unrestrained

¹⁶³ Andrews, 185; Robertson, 9.; Joan Beaumont, "Australia's War: Europe and the Middle East," in *Australia's War, 1939-45*, ed. Joan Beaumont (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 1-2.; Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 154-5, 93.

¹⁶⁴ “We Believe in Our Hearts We Will Win”: Mr. Menzies Stirring Address to Nation, *Courier-Mail*, 4 September 1939, 4.; “We Are at War,” Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Beaumont, 3-5; Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁶⁶ “Another War Breeds Another Crop of Wartime Slang,” *Argus*, 28 May 1940, 4.

enmity.¹⁶⁷ Chamberlain had promoted the idea of “no quarrel” in a speech to the House of Commons on 1 September 1939. “Punctuated by cheers” and echoed by responses of several leading Liberals, Labour Party politicians and Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, in the House of Lords (HOL),¹⁶⁸ Australian media cables services such as the Australian Associated Press (AAP) had faithfully reproduced Britain’s official standpoint vis-à-vis the German people:

We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they have allowed themselves to be governed by the Nazi government.¹⁶⁹

Historians of Anglo-German relations have consistently argued that “no quarrel” symbolised the Chamberlain administration’s desires to maintain a distinction between the German people and the Nazi regime and speak to an “other” Germany.¹⁷⁰

From his first detailed wartime statement in the House of Representatives on 6 September 1939, read out to all sitting members with the galleries at full capacity, Menzies was cautious to differentiate the German people from Nazism.¹⁷¹ This statement introduced a White Paper consisting of documents detailing the diplomatic exchanges and correspondence between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Germany in the weeks leading up to the war.¹⁷² Reinforcing the justifications for Australian involvement laid out in the White Paper, Menzies framed the conflict as a war against the evils of “the Man” (the German *Führer*), Hitlerism, National Socialist ideology and racialism, and the Nazi “system”. Such terminology semantically reinforced an active distinction from the German people of whom “millions” were “liberal” and anti-war in outlook.¹⁷³ Hoenicke Moore’s discussion of the “central liberal tenet” of differentiation in responses to Nazi Germany by leading American Liberal commentators shows several parallels with leading Australian Liberals like Menzies.¹⁷⁴ Liberalism’s differentiation between people and governments, rooted in the belief that the individual would

¹⁶⁷ “War to End Nazism: Hope of New World: Mr. Eden’s Broadcast,” *SMH*, 13 September 1939, 14.; “Issue Faced with Clear Conscience”: Mr. Chamberlain Cheered as He Defines British Policy in Crisis: Nazi Methods Must End, *Herald*, 2 September 1939, 2.; “Chamberlain’s Direct Appeal to Germans,” *Telegraph*, 5 September 1939, 1.

¹⁶⁸ Klemens Von Klemperer, *German Resistance against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938-1945*, (Oxford Scholarship Online, October, 2011), <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/unimelb.edu.au?url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1093%2Facprof:oso/9780198205517.001.0001>. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205517.001.0001. 154.

¹⁶⁹ “Issue Faced With Clear Conscience”: Mr Chamberlain Cheered As He Defines British Policy in Crisis: Nazi Methods Must End.

¹⁷⁰ Brechtken, 34.; Anthony J. Nicholls, “The German ‘National Character’ in British Perspective,” in *Conditions of Surrender: Britons and Germans Witness the End of the War*, ed. Ulrike Jordan (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1997).; Von Klemperer. 154.

¹⁷¹ “Canberra Debate: Australia Determined: No Bitterness to Germans,” *Daily Mercury*, 7 September 1939, 7.

¹⁷² *House of Representatives Official Hansard*, No. 36, 6 September 1939, 28-36. Henceforth, these volumes of the House of Representatives Hansard will be referred to as *HROH*.

¹⁷³ *HOHR*, No. 36, 6 September 1939, 30.

¹⁷⁴ Hoenicke Moore, 9, 110.

innately strive for peace and liberty, was completely in consonance with the ideological imperatives underpinning Menzies' governance and political outlook. Moreover, Menzies' well documented subscription to appeasement and lingering hopes for negotiation and compromise were matched by an equally dangerous misunderstanding of the causes and manifestation of National Socialism, the regime's exaggerated domestic successes and national unity, its foreign policy objectives and the brutal efficiency with which it was willing to follow those ambitions.¹⁷⁵ This invariably influenced the pro-German slant to his public statements that continued well into the occupation of Poland.

The proliferation of totalising enmity itself was also of concern to the Prime Minister. Menzies' first statement to the HOR on 6 September had concluded with idealistic optimism that Australian could fight the war without engaging in the indiscriminate hatred of the previous war:

...we have no bitterness against the plain and private citizens of Germany and I hope we will not be called upon, at any stage, to disfigure...a noble cause by any hymns of hate...My prayer is that [the war] may be won quickly as to permit a just peace...not a peace which will sow the dragon's teeth of bitterness and hatred and distrust.¹⁷⁶

This recognition of the potential of totalising enmity was further captured beyond the halls of parliament in countless speeches at rallies, luncheons and Clubs ranging from the Legacy and Millions Clubs to the Royal Melbourne Show.¹⁷⁷ A speech to the Legacy Club in Melbourne on 17 October 1939 on the issue of "War Objectives" was dutifully captured by the national press. Adelaide's popular evening paper, the *News*, had praised Menzies' "shrewd" remarks across the various mediums of public discourse as a "public service" in wartime. The Prime Minister was quoted thus:

Our experience of the past has indicated, however fine our motives may be in the early stages of war, by the time that war is finished bitterness exists in almost every heart, and the instinct for punishment and revenge comes to the top.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Waters, "Understanding and Misunderstanding Nazi Germany: Four Australian Visitors to Germany in 1938."; *Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy and the Origins of World War II*, 3. After his 1938 tour of Germany, Menzies had also alluded to the positive unselfish manner in which Germans devoted their services to the State, even if the State professed a flawed ideology. Andrews, 210-11; Bird, 43, 47-50.

¹⁷⁶ *HOHR*, No. 36, 6 September 1939, 36.

¹⁷⁷ "Australia's War Aims: Fighting For Peace, Not to Dictate to the German People – Mr. Menzies," *Herald*, 4 October 1939, 3.; "War Aims: Australia's Task" Prime Minister's Review," *SMH*, 25 September 1939, 13.; "No Retreat": Hitler's Peace Move: Mr. Menzies' View, *SMH*, 4 October 1939, 13.; "British Aims: Just Peace for All: Mr. Menzies Speech," *SMH*, 5 October 1939, 9.

¹⁷⁸ "Tide of Hate Must Not Rise," *News*, 18 October 1939, 6. The speech gave voice to an editorial from four days prior which had criticised the cultivation of hatred against the enemy as a poison engulfing national life. "Hate is a Noxious Weed," *News*, 14 October 1939, 4.

Belligerent states rarely, if ever, enter a conflict announcing exploitative, expansionistic, or punitive war aims.¹⁷⁹ In the case of Australia, Menzies framed the war as an unavoidable, just and defensive act to maintain international law and the integrity of small states. The idea of “no quarrel” with the German people served to reductively reinforce Australia’s involvement in a “good” war whilst avoiding the problematic enunciation of concrete war objectives. The initial hesitancy on the part of the Government in explicating Australian and Allied war aims was exacerbated by several factors shaping the wartime political debate: the lingering shadow of appeasement; the legacy of anti-war sentiment; geographical (and indeed psychological) distance from the conflict; and disagreement over the shape and extent of post-war reconstruction. Australia’s conservative wartime administration, taking its lead from Britain, had reduced the conflict to its bare, ideological minimum, a vague binary pitting the free world against Nazism. As Country Party leader, Sir Earle Page, noted on behalf of the Party, the war was a “fundamental quarrel” over key principles: “the elements of right and wrong, between the law of force and the law of reason, between might and right...”¹⁸⁰ Liberty, freedom and the rights of small nations were also highlighted.

Menzies had also publicly affirmed the importance of quickly defining wartime objectives “when passions were not running so high as they undoubtedly would” so they would “not be forgotten by us or by our enemies.”¹⁸¹ Following the lead of Chamberlain, the Prime Minister had stressed reasons of mutual comprehension and potential cooperative settlement as reasons for limiting enmity.¹⁸² A central aspect of Menzies’ equivocal statement of war aims was to guarantee the freedom of the German people and respect their rights and territorial integrity. Menzies was far more concerned by the message these aims conveyed, rather than their practical application. Menzies reinforced this theme during the Legacy Club address:

There must be no attempt to suppress the ordinary German people. We are not in this war to convert the Germans into vassals...If there is one thing we look forward to in a newer and better world, it is that the German people shall have some conception of the same rights and liberty as we claim for ourselves.¹⁸³

This was reaffirmed in a second important Ministerial Statement on 15 November after a sizeable recess of Parliament. This summary of Australian war aims espoused throughout October also received wide recognition and praise in the national media as an important statement of Australian

¹⁷⁹ Carruthers, 16-17.

¹⁸⁰ *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 44.

¹⁸¹ “Australia’s War Aims: Fighting For Peace, Not to Dictate to the German People – Mr. Menzies.”

¹⁸² Von Klemperer. 154.

¹⁸³ Transcript of Menzies’ speech delivered at a Melbourne Legacy Club luncheon 17 October 1939. Reproduced in: “Allies Fighting to Free German People,” *Courier-Mail*, 18 October 1939, 1.

attitudes towards the war.¹⁸⁴ Before detailing the Government's preparations over the previous two and a half months, the Prime Minister began by stressing two vague aims governing the Australian war effort and fulfilling bipartisan concerns about upholding "international morality".¹⁸⁵ In emphasising both aims, securing "victory" and the establishment of a loosely defined "better world", all mention of a "vassal" or "slave" state and "humiliation of the German people" which had emerged in some corners of the Australian media was actively rebuffed. Similarly, any references to "spoils" which could be construed by the Australian Left as a renewed Imperialistic venture and acquiescence to Great Power *realpolitik* were avoided. Menzies emphasised mutual "freedom and equity", "prosperity" and "security" independent of race in which Australians should "want Germany to share as a great nation."¹⁸⁶

The concern with hate had expressed itself through governmental organisations that had attempted to enact Menzies' message of tolerance and moderation. It was not only through the War Cabinet's informational arm, the DOI, that the message of non-condemnation was reinforced.¹⁸⁷ Divisions of the public broadcaster, Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC), for instance took steps to limit the process of totalising enmity throughout its program organisation. Aside from anti-hate broadcasts,¹⁸⁸ this was reflected in the ABC's policy vis-à-vis German music summarised by general manager of the Commission, Charles Moses. Moses reproached a vocal minority of Australians calling for the banning of "enemy" music on the national broadcaster. He argued that Australians were "not at the war with the German culture or German people". Attempting to align the Commission's broadcasting guidelines to the "no quarrel" stance enunciated by Chamberlain and Menzies, Moses argued that the ABC did not view the cultural works of the German masters through the lens of nationalism or race.¹⁸⁹ The Menzies' administration's rejection of totalising enmity thus pervaded governmental departments from September 1939 onwards.

Opposing "No Quarrel": Australian Conservatives, Anti-Germanism and "Total War"

Notwithstanding their personal views on the matter, the majority of Government Ministers supported the Menzian line with little public commentary.¹⁹⁰ Vocal opposition, though limited, ironically

¹⁸⁴ *Commonwealth of Australia: Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 162, 15 November 1939, 1129-34. Henceforth, this volume will be referred to as *CPD*. Menzies' address to the Millions Club luncheon on 4 October 1939. "Australia's War Aims: Fighting For Peace."; "Peace for Weak": *Empire War Aims*, *Argus*, 5 October 1939, 6.

¹⁸⁵ Beaumont, 3.

¹⁸⁶ *CPD*, Vol. 162, 15 November 1939, 1130-31.; "Mr. Menzies Defines War Aims: Nazis' Task Impossible," *Age*, 16 November 1939, 12.

¹⁸⁷ Hilvert.; Vickery.

¹⁸⁸ "Broadcast to Schools: 'Keep Hate from Your Hearts'," *West Australian*, 5 September 1939, 10.

¹⁸⁹ "A.B.C. To Play German Music," *Daily Telegraph*, 16 September 1939, 6.; "German Music: Only Copyright Works Excluded," *SMH*, 16 September 1939, 17.; "German Music Retained," *Argus*, 16 September 1939, 5.

¹⁹⁰ *Herald*, 26 September 1939, 8.

emerged from UAP and CP colleagues at both the Federal and State level. Many were marginal, with little influence in Menzies' War Cabinet. Within the UAP, for example, conservative Thomas White had questioned the notion of a democratically oriented anti-Nazi Germany waiting to revolt against its masters. Authority derived from his direct experience of Nazi Germany in 1938 which had reinforced White's longstanding impression of an aggressive, Prussian Germany as a pilot in the Australian Flying Corps during the First World War.¹⁹¹ White rejected the idea of a German internal "Revolution", particularly the framework popular among commentators on the Left (see Chapter Five).¹⁹² He had consistently attacked the "tolerance" personified by Menzies in the HOR, in spite of (and perhaps perpetuating) the marginalisation he faced outside of Cabinet influence.¹⁹³ Lawrence "Larry" Anthony, White's colleague and Federal CP member for Richmond, also agreed that apologia regarding the Versailles Treaty and German "grievances" fundamentally misrepresented German guilt and responsibility, exaggerated any injustices inflicted, and ignored harshness of the settlement planned by German officials for the defeated Entente between 1914-18.¹⁹⁴ Despite the Prime Minister's assurances against a "patched-up peace" and the Allied rejection of Hitler's "peace offensive" in early October, tentative exploration for a peaceful settlement throughout September, October and November led some within the Government to openly express concerns that narratives emphasising "good" Germany perpetuated lingering hopes for some form of negotiated peace within the administration and in the general public.¹⁹⁵

Others possessed more power and influence within the wartime administration. The most common issue with Menzies' distinction between Nazis and the German people was illustrated by Archibald "Archie" Cameron in his dogmatic pursuit of an all-in, "total" war effort. One of Cameron's key "matters of urgency" in pushing against Menzies' "business as usual" approach was the consistent assertion by Australian political leaders that national enmities were not to be mobilised against "the German people". Such an argument, professed by "leading men of various political parties" including his own soon to be deposed Party leader, Sir Earle Page, was mere "eye wash" and "self-deception".¹⁹⁶ Despite the tenuous relationship between the CP and the Menzies-led government, and personal

¹⁹¹ Thomas Walter White, *Guests of the Unspeakable: The Odyssey of an Australian Airman – Being a Record of Captivity and Escape in Turkey* (London: John Hamilton, 1928).

¹⁹² *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 47-48. The influence of his first-hand experience of Nazi Germany during the late 1930s, where White visited the Reich as an official delegate on his way to attend an Evian conference on refugees and as a trade delegate, is well covered in Waters, "Understanding and Misunderstanding Nazi Germany: Four Australian Visitors to Germany in 1938," 383. The difference between the views of an accompanying Menzies and White is palpable, given their shared political background.

¹⁹³ *CPD*, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1198-99.

¹⁹⁴ *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 69-71.

¹⁹⁵ *CPD*, Vol. 162, 15 November 1939, 1129-30.; Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 193-5.

¹⁹⁶ *CPD*, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1207-08.; "War Aims Talk Criticised: 'Eyewash' Says C.P. Leader," *Courier-Mail*, 17 November 1939, 3.

attacks on the Prime Minister's capability as a wartime leader, Page had publicly subscribed his Party to Menzies' framing of the enemy during his last days as leader.¹⁹⁷ Page argued that war was not being waged against the "hapless German people" but their "maniacal leaders" and "Hitlerism" which had rendered the former "victims" of greed and bloodlust.¹⁹⁸

Mere months before the war, Cameron, the then Postmaster-General, had denoted the Germans as excellent potential European migrants – an answer to Australia's racially-provoked population panic and the encroaching threat of Communism which had encouraged Australian Conservative sympathies with Nazi Germany throughout the inter-war period.¹⁹⁹ In a broadcast address to the nation in February 1940 on the war aims of the CP – a period when totalising enmity narratives were gaining traction in the Australian media – the now Party leader had reinforced that Australia was not fighting to covet German territory or resources. He even pointed to the pre-war "record of Germany in science, literature, art".²⁰⁰

Cameron's consistent rejection of the distinction, then, was not a product of inherent Germanophilia nor crude national stereotypes. Rather, Cameron framed enmity as the inevitable product of the mobilisation of entire populations to wage a "total war" or "totalitarian war".²⁰¹ These were terms he frequently employed in political statements, particularly after the Fall of France in June 1940, to capture the unavoidable erosion of the distinctions between the combatant and non-combatant sphere. War, he had argued from the outset, was a "doctrine of force. We kill and blockade. We impose our will by any means recognised by international law."²⁰² Through the "ruthless" application of the methodologies of totalising violence (blockade and strategic bombing), he argued that the peoples of the enemy nation could not be separated from the military machine and governments which they served.²⁰³ Cameron viewed the Nazi/German distinction as irresponsible for its failures to mentally prepare the Australian people for the inevitable and necessary outbursts of totalising violence against the German people. Cameron's November 1939 Ministerial Statement captured this frustration:

¹⁹⁷ Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 204-5, 64-5.

¹⁹⁸ *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 42-43.; Lee, 85-86.

¹⁹⁹ "Bring German People Here, Says P.M.G.," *News*, 3 February 1939, 7. Cameron himself had noted in the HOR that he had been accused of being "pro-German" while enacting his role of Postmaster General. *CPD*, Vol. 167., 18 June 1941, 138.

²⁰⁰ "Mr. Cameron Speaks to Germans in Australia: Country Party Viewpoint on War Explained," *Recorder*, 15 February 1940, 1.

²⁰¹ "Cameron Speaks Out: "Only One End in View"," *The Sunday Times*, 26 May 1940, 2.; "Winning the War is All That Matters: Mr. Cameron," *Mail*, 25 May 1940, 2.; "Win the War: All That Matters: Mr Cameron's Comment: Must Take All Measures," *The Daily Examiner*, 27 May 1940, 6.

²⁰² *CPD*, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1207-08.

²⁰³ *CPD*, Vol. 161, 14 September 1939, 568.

we are at war, not only with the German government, **but also with the German people.**

We are at war with the armed forces of Germany...and we are at war with the economic power behind those forces [of] the **country we have selected as an enemy.**²⁰⁴

Beyond the waging of war, Cameron shared Anthony's and White's concern that the Nazi/German distinction was a symptom of misplaced hopes for negotiated peace, diplomatic solutions, and reconciliation with a "good" Germany evident in both Governmental ranks and the ALP Opposition.²⁰⁵ While the problem of negotiated peace and the last vestiges of appeasement had dissipated after April 1940 in light of events in Europe,²⁰⁶ the notion of a "good" German, in his view, remained one key factor undermining Australia's preparation for total war. He continued to argue these key points in mid-1941 (now a sitting member of the UAP) in response to continued tolerance within Menzies' "Prospectus for an Unlimited War Effort".²⁰⁷ Cameron went so far as to invoke his November 1939 speech to suggest that little had changed in his criticism of his own Party's policy:

My answer [to the statements by Menzies between September and November 1939] was that we were at war, not only with the Nazi Government [but also] the German people and everything that was German, and that stands for to-day.²⁰⁸

Cameron's status as a returned soldier, a station he shared with other advocates of total war such as Anthony and White, rendered him more attuned to the strategic implications of German expansionism. Federal Attorney-General Billy Hughes' apocalyptic visions in *Australia and War To-day* (1935) had similarly presented war as a natural, even regenerative, component of an international system rooted in perpetual enmity, conflict and struggle between nations.²⁰⁹ Hughes' anti-Germanism during the First World War and the inter-war period was rooted in conceptions of race (a narrow interpretation of white Australia framed by Anglo-Saxon Britishness), trade (the nascent views of perpetual economic warfare) and ensuring the integrity of the British Empire. These heavily influenced his policies vis-à-vis Germany.²¹⁰ Throughout the 1930s, Hughes had aligned himself with slowly growing sentiment of anti-appeasement British diplomats concerned by the widespread myth of German suffering under the Versailles Treaty – that Germany would have been developed as a "simple, friendly industrious, liberty loving people" had it not been for the injustice of the post-war

²⁰⁴ CPD, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1207-08. Emphasis mine.

²⁰⁵ CPD, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1207-08. Cameron accused both Curtin and Menzies of this latter point. "Cameron Speaks Out: 'Only One End in View'."

²⁰⁶ Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 195.

²⁰⁷ CPD, Vol. 167., 4 June 1941, 138.

²⁰⁸ CPD, Vol. 167., 18 June 1941, 138.

²⁰⁹ Hughes.

²¹⁰ Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920*, 42-50.

settlement. Germany, he argued, remained a “militarist nation”, driven by imperialistic ambition, tacitly aggressive through its national deification of force and “will to war”.²¹¹

As a member of Menzies’ War Cabinet, Hughes had begrudgingly feigned support for the Prime Minister’s “no quarrel with the mass of the German people” claims with some reservations.²¹² The irony and ominous portent of Hughes’ re-reading of his own inaugural wartime speech twenty-five years previously as then Attorney-General of Andrew Fisher’s wartime Labor Government would not have been lost on Menzies, nor Hughes’ former political colleagues on the Left.²¹³

I quite agree that we have no quarrel with the masses of the German nation; but we have a quarrel, and a quarrel to the death, with that intolerable Prussian military autocracy which, by this war, and by deliberate preparation during the last twenty years, has hoped to dominate the world and trample under foot liberty and democratic government. In order to meet the machinations of this blood and iron policy, the power given in this paragraph is obviously necessary. We are face to face with the most terrible realities. It is for us a struggle of life and death. We must not forget this fact. Sentiment is idle; mere talk will not avail.

If one were to replace Hughes’ reference to “Prussian military autocracy” in 1914 with “the intolerable spirit of dictatorship” inherent in Nazism and Hitlerism he referenced in early September 1939, Hughes’ statements were almost carbon copies of each other. He was quoted thus:²¹⁴

²¹¹ Hughes, 2, 90.

²¹² *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 40-42.; “All Parties Support Ministry: Remarkable Unity Shown: Debate in Federal Parliament,” *SMH*, 7 September 1939, 9.; “Atmosphere is Tense at First Wartime Session of Parliament: Packed Galleries Hear Prime Minister’s Statement: All Parties Promise Support,” *Examiner*, 7 September 1939, 7.

²¹³ *HROH*, No. 36, 6 September 1939, 40.

²¹⁴ “Atmosphere is Tense at First Wartime Session of Parliament.”; Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920*.

"I agree with the Prime Minister when he says that we have no quarrel with the mass of the German people," said Mr. Hughes. "But we have a quarrel to the death with the intolerable spirit of dictatorship."

In order to gratify his insatiable ambition, Herr Hitler was prepared to send millions of men, women and children, not only of other nations but of

his own nation, to their death. The people of Australia must realise that this was a struggle to the death, and the issues involved were so vital that they might shake to their foundations the structure of our economic and social life.

Astute observers cautioned about the potential hollowness of governmental rhetoric given the symbolic and legislated anti-Germanism spearheaded by Hughes between 1914 and 1918 against those Germans with whom he had "no quarrel". True to form, the Attorney General was soon demanding that the Allies "beat Germany to her knees", a statement made in an address to the Sydney Lyceum Club in early November which was quickly jumped upon by the Sydney Press.²¹⁵ Hughes' strong rhetoric drew praise from magazine's such as *Smith's Weekly* who viewed the isolated but "long-sighted" Hughes as an important corrective to political "mumbling Minnie's" such as Menzies and "pamphlets from heaven", a reference to the British "leaflet raids" which will be discussed in the following chapter.²¹⁶ Some astute Labor politicians, such as Eddie Ward in response to the Sydney *Sun's* report on the matter, argued that Hughes' public rhetoric was in "marked contrast" to assurances by the Government that it "had no desire to humiliate or destroy the German nation [and] interfere in any way with the livelihood of the German people."²¹⁷

²¹⁵ "'Beat Germany to Her Knees'," *DT*, 6 November 1939, 7.; "National Anthem Objection: Hit Back at Cleric," *Newcastle Sun*, 7 November 1939, 2.; "Aid From Heaven in Just War: Bible Basis for Royal Anthem," *Sun*, 12 November 1939, 11.

²¹⁶ "Half In and Half Out: How Some Australians Look at the War: Leadership Lags Behind the Beat of the Nation's Pulse," *SW*, 30 September 1939, 3.; This War is Different, *SW*, 28 October 1939, 20.

²¹⁷ *CPD*, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1221.; "Aid From Heaven in Just War: Bible Basis for Royal Anthem."

“Blame Hitler, Not the German People”: The Australian Labor Party and Support for “No Quarrel”

Despite concerns regarding sincerity, differing ideological impetuses and concerns over other elements of Australian war aims and war effort, the Labor opposition publicly commended Menzies for his ideological, rather than national or racial, framing of the enemy. The ALP’s subscription to the “no quarrel” framework reflected bipartisan support across the political spectrum, even if a large divide remained regarding the derivation of the threat from an ideological perspective. It was likewise uncontroversial considering underlying divisions that remained within the Australian Labor Movement. Ideologically, politically, and morally, the vagueness of Menzies’ stance allowed various meanings to be attached to it. In the ALP’s case, “no quarrel” could be reconciled with both the vague mainstream consensus within the Party for war based on collective security and a last resort to conflict, and the slowly converted minority clinging to the inter-war isolationism and pacifism who would naturally have supported any assurances of constraint, moderation and tolerance.²¹⁸ Although expressing a determination to win the war, the ALP maintained the possibility of negotiated peace with an “other” Germany.²¹⁹

The ALP’s continued support for the “no quarrel” stance throughout the Phoney War and well into 1941 was vocalised by Federal Opposition Leader, John Curtin.²²⁰ Curtin had applauded the essence behind the Prime Minister’s November statement of war aims but had expressed his colleagues’ concerns about their “genuineness” and abstract form which gave little assurance to how “all peoples” would benefit from the peace envisioned by Menzies. Evidence that this focus on universal social and economic benefits extended beyond the ALP was tabled by Curtin in the form of a manifesto printed in the *West Australian*. It contained signatories from across the West Australian political spectrum, alongside key representatives from the education sector, judiciary, commerce, and local government, who utilised a similar emphasis on “all peoples”.²²¹

It was also the framing of *peoples*, rather than specific nations, as the victims of war that Curtin urged the Government to expand upon and reinforce in Australian war aims. In a November 1939 statement on “culpability”, Curtin had noted that the Prime Minister’s speeches to date had rightly:

...drawn a clear distinction between the government of Germany and the people of Germany...Because the peoples of the world have not had the making of this war, it is

²¹⁸ Waters, *Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy and the Origins of World War II*, 260.

²¹⁹ CPD, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1192-93.; Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 195.

²²⁰ HROH, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 36-7.

²²¹ Ibid. It is little surprise that F. Alexander, the Professor of History responsible for ABC broadcasts warning against the proliferation of national enmities, was a signatory. “Broadcast to Schools: ‘Keep Hate from Your Hearts’.”

right that the issues [principles of liberty, freedom and justice for the 'people'] should be kept clearly in the forefront of every national statement.²²²

Joe Gander, the Langite member for Reid, put ALP policy more bluntly in an injunction against a perceived "condemnation" of the German people *en masse* in Menzies' 6 September statement: "Blame Hitler, not the German people".²²³

The ALP clearly supported a conflict against a "political system" and ideology. Thinly veiled references to "bad governments" could clearly be read as Curtin's warning that the policies of consecutive Conservative governments were part of the problem. The ALP was concerned that focus on an "external enemy" could be used to excuse Capitalist exploitation on the home front.²²⁴ Reinforcing the politicised narrative of international working-class solidarity, Curtin noted in early 1940 that "the workers in Australia have no quarrel with the workers of any other country."²²⁵ Curtin's framing of the ALP's stance clearly aligned with that of British Labour. In the House of Commons (HOC), Party leader Clement Attlee and deputy A. Greenwood had likewise proclaimed no "ill will" towards the German people. Curtin reinforced Attlee's references to German "responsibility" to attack and undermine Hitlerism from within, albeit as part of a universal struggle against global Fascism.²²⁶ The German working class was seen as an inevitable ally in the ideological conflict against National Socialism, and an internal source of revolution from within.

Leading Labor politicians such as John Beasley, Eddie Ward, Joe Gander, Dr. William Maloney, James Scullin and Maurice Blackburn weighed in to hold the Menzies Government to its claims. John "Jack" Beasley asked how the German people – renowned for intellectual, industrial and cultural ability no less than the British people – could support a regime responsible for the calamities noted in the White Paper.²²⁷ In response to White, Anthony and CP MHR, John Prowse,²²⁸ Beasley sympathised with German "grievances", blaming the deprivations and suffering imposed on the German people through the Versailles Treaty for the rise of National Socialism.²²⁹ The economic context and insecurity of the inter-war period and the diplomatic alienation and lack of tolerance displayed by Hughes and his contemporaries had perpetuated that "deep resentment" which had exacerbated the perpetual

²²² CPD, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1190-92. Curtin advocated that the war against "Hitlerism" be promoted where possible in national statements to the public.

²²³ HROH, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 36.

²²⁴ Ibid, 16 November 1939, 1192.

²²⁵ "Labour and War: 'Inflexibility for Allies': Mr. Curtin's Broadcast: Conference Appeal," SMH, 1 January 1940, 8.

²²⁶ "Mr. Attlee's Appeal" German People: Ending Aggression," SMH, 10 November 1939, 12.; "Ending Torture of Nations: Why Britain Fights," Argus, 7 November 1939, 3.

²²⁷ HROH, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 58.

²²⁸ Ibid. See Prowse's interjection.

²²⁹ Ibid.

“antagonism” between Germany and the Allies.²³⁰ In promoting the ALP’s view that the war was, in part, a matter of assisting the German people to overthrow Hitlerism, Beasley reflected the attempt to universalise the issue along the line of Labor ideology and “economic security”, engendering empathy for the German plight:

We must remember that the German people, like ourselves, have traditions and ideals...we cannot crush a whole people like this out of existence, and therefore, the Prime Minister’s reference to the German people as such [like ourselves] is worthy of particular note.²³¹

James Scullin, the former Depression-era Prime Minister who endorsed Labor’s support for the war, had qualified the Party’s support by emphasising a commonly utilised argument that framed “war”, rather than any specific nation, as the true enemy. Framing national enmity as a “hatred of war”, rather than peoples, had been undertaken by many politicians, including both Curtin and Menzies.²³² Scullin attempted to remove “nationality” as a framework and reinforce humane wartime conduct “irrespective of nationality or of race”.²³³

Others were far more overtly political in their discussions. The maverick political “bomb-thrower” and isolationist ex-Langite, Eddie Ward, was much more forthright in openly criticising “British Imperialism” and trade competition through Labor’s class narrative.²³⁴ Aside from his open attacks on Billy Hughes discussed above, Ward also challenged Larry Anthony’s framing of the inter-war settlement and his inflammatorily reductionist claims about the mass support of the “90,000,000 enemies” in Germany who, wholeheartedly “imbued with the Nazi spirit”, were Nazis for the purpose of war.²³⁵ Ward counterposed that:

Many of the unfortunate people in Germany who have had their civil liberties destroyed, have been dragooned into going to war because they have not the power to resist. According to the honourable member [Anthony], we must regard every one of those Germans as enemies.²³⁶

²³⁰ Ibid, 60.

²³¹ Ibid., 59.

²³² *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 36.; *CPD*, Vol. 162, 15 November 1939, 1130-31.

²³³ Ibid, 46-7.

²³⁴ *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 69-73.; Ross McMullin, 'Ward, Edward John (Eddie) (1899–1963)', ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ward-edward-john-eddie-11959/text21435>, published first in hardcopy 2002, (accessed 10/03/2018).

²³⁶ Ibid, 72-3.

Ward argued that not only were these views not shared by Anthony's own UAP colleagues (an astute and accurate observation given our discussion above), British Bomber Command would not idly waste precious wartime resources on an extensive pamphlet drop to directly speak to the German people, counter Nazi propaganda and educate the German populace about Allied war aims. Ward also politicised the issue further by attacking Anthony's selective and politically opportunistic interpretation of *Mein Kampf* for failing to reference Hitler's attacks on the German working class whilst drawing an unfavourable analogy between Nazism and the Conservative's own "anti-Labor" agenda.²³⁷ Ward was still criticising repeated claims by Conservatives that the German people would not revolt against Hitler in a separate debate on the 1939-40 Budgetary papers and war economy more than a week later. He highlighted the Government's anti-worker policies and attempts to undermine international working-class solidarity.²³⁸ Any attempt to shift blame to the German people symbolised Ward's broader concern and suspicion about the Conservatives' expanding definition of "threat" and "enemy" in both Australia and in Britain.²³⁹

Suspicion remained within the ALP regarding the cogency, robustness and sincerity of the Government's apparent tolerance. Dr. William Maloney, an international socialist and fervent anti-militarist,²⁴⁰ and Norman Makin, the Methodist lay preacher and sitting Labor member for Hindmarsh, personified ALP concerns about "racial" injustices once again being perpetrated against law-abiding Australian-Germans.²⁴¹ They had failed to be convinced by injunctions of Conservatives such as Arthur "Artie" Fadden, the soon to be CP leader and short-lived future Prime Minister who provided an impassioned plea for tolerance on behalf of the Australian-German community in his electorate.²⁴² The spectre of Andrew Fisher's Labor Government's enactment of the War Precautions Act (WPA) in October 1914 clearly prompted political advocacy for a more tolerant, subdued approach in the formation of the contemporary National Security Act (NSA). Like the NSA, the WPA saw an overarching conferral and centralisation of national security powers to the Executive and military bodies over information dissemination, communications networks and economic and social life. This institutionalised the legal framework for the suppression of personal rights and liberties and justified anti-German policies throughout the war.²⁴³ Political discourse surrounding the German people's rights and freedoms exemplified the ALP's consistent warnings about the use and abuse of wartime

²³⁷ *HROH*, No. 46., 16 November 1939, 1228.

²³⁸ *CPD*, Vol. 161, 14 September 1939, 613. It was also used elsewhere, such as against key anti-Alien clauses of the National Security Bill 1939. *National Security Bill 1939*, *CPD*, Vol. 161, 7-8 September 1939, 173, 198, 220.

²³⁹ *CPD*, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1221.

²⁴⁰ *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 65.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 76-77.

²⁴² *CPD*, Vol. 161, 22 September 1939, 1096.

²⁴³ Fischer, "Immigration, Integration, Disintegration." Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 175-6.

powers under National Security regulations on the domestic front to not only suppress minority groups (including enemy aliens), but also to restrict individual rights of Australian citizens.²⁴⁴

Some staunch anti-hate advocates also recognised that totalising enmity narratives were inevitable. Maurice Blackburn, a staunch defender of civil liberties in wartime, questioned the superficial “popular attempt to distinguish between German people and the German Government”.²⁴⁵ While actively calling out anti-German sentiment, Blackburn expressed little belief in the popular Leftist notion of internal revolution against Hitlerism in the Reich itself given the historical role of hyper-nationalism in totalising war. His concerns were not allayed by the guarantees of senior Cabinet figures such as Minister for External Affairs and Information, Henry Gullett, regarding the “treatment” of Australian Germans, nor hypotheses that they would not be “interfered with by Australian citizens.”²⁴⁶ Suspicion on this front was valid given the rhetoric surrounding so-called “enemy aliens” by men such as Cameron who actively designated foreign-born residents the status of “enemy” regardless of the absence of guilt, professions of loyalty or naturalisation.²⁴⁷ Blackburn highlighted the capacity of total mobilisation to raise wartime emotions and the powerful role of nationalism.

Conclusion

Analysis of the political discourse emanating from Menzies’ appropriation of Chamberlain’s dictum reveals a noticeable lack of hatred and vitriol against the German people in official statements, even less so than in the initially moderate response in British Parliament. As the following chapters will show, Menzies’ appropriation of “no quarrel” with the German people became a key reference point in the formation of Australian enmity narratives throughout the first months of the conflict. The Nazi/German distinction reinforced the Australian Government’s rejection of hatred and anti-German jingoism and attempts to focus national enmity on Nazism and the ideological, racial and political threat it posed to Australian national security, values and way of life.

The ideological framing of the war against Fascism, Nazism and Hitlerism was accepted with little opposition, even accounting for Australia’s partisan political context. Hasluck’s findings vis-à-vis cooperation and bipartisanship in the face of vocal fringe minorities on several key wartime issues appears to equally apply to the German Question.²⁴⁸ Limited attempts to undermine the idea of “no quarrel” in the first months of the conflict emanated from a small, yet vocal section of the UAP/CP Coalition Government who tended to refute the distinction due to the logic of total war. Although

²⁴⁴ Lee, 87.

²⁴⁵ *CPD*, Vol. 161, 6 September 1939, 56-57.; Andrews, 167-8; Henderson, 74.

²⁴⁶ *HROH*, No. 36., 6 September 1939, 63.

²⁴⁷ *CPD*, Vol. 166, 2 April 1941, 554-55.

²⁴⁸ Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 156, 243, 562.; Robertson, 9.

varying levels of anti-German sentiment were evident in the responses of Hughes, Anthony and others, existing anti-Germanism did not appear to be necessary for politicians such as Cameron to promote a narrative of totalising enmity in the context of the strategic implications of total war. Although Cameron advocated totalising narratives, his focus appeared to be on mentally preparing Australians to realise that fighting a totalising peoples' war required simple dichotomies between peoples, rather than to instigate indiscriminate hatred and anti-Germanism.

The ALP opposition clearly supported the logic of a distinction between the German people and Nazism because it suited the Labour Movement's ideological and political objectives. Concerns about feasibility, suspicions of the Government's sincerity, and cynical realism were reflected in the responses of Labor politicians such as Ward, Makin, Maloney and Blackburn. Limiting the war to Hitler, the Nazi Party and its ideology served a clear political goal.

Despite the sincere concern expressed by politicians on both sides of the political spectrum, apprehension over the well-being of German "enemy aliens" and avoiding the mistakes of the previous war seemed less of a prerogative for mobilising "no quarrel" sentiment than justifying the declaration of war and framing the type of conflict that would service a burgeoning "good" war narrative. It normalised and legitimised the conflict as an ideological and moral struggle, rather than a renewed global conflict for national or imperialistic interests. The Brisbane *Telegraph's* Canberra correspondent recognised that the Government's references to "not fighting to suppress the German people but to prevent the[ir] suppression" by Hitler, provisions for "freedom and equity for the Germans as well as ourselves", and the "absence of any expressions of bitterness towards the enemy" had in no small part secured Labor cooperation during the war.²⁴⁹ Although reductive in its analysis, the *Telegraph* captures the bipartisan rejection of totalising enmity highlighted by other mainstream dailies.²⁵⁰ The rejection of the exploitation of the German people and promotion of shared "equity" and "prosperity" spoke positively of the Government's war aims, even if there were doubts about its authenticity and application in practice.

Finally, a brief survey of the Government Hansard reveals that these parliamentary exchanges did not continue after the initial months of debate discussed within this chapter aside from sporadic injunctions by individual MHRs. Importantly, no systematic debate occurred vis-à-vis Japan in December 1941 where racialized assumptions about innate Japanese character underwrote enmity

²⁴⁹ "Australia Not Fighting To Suppress German People But to Prevent Suppression of German People By Hitler," *Telegraph*, 16 November 1939, 3.

²⁵⁰ "Momentous Sitting at Canberra: Leaders Pledge Help in Fighting Nazism: 'Unity and Determination'," *Argus*, 7 September 1939, 9.

narratives. Put simply, there were no official attempts to argue that Australians had “no quarrel” with the Japanese people.

Chapter Three: “Whom Are We Fighting?”: The Media Narrative, 1939-41

The truism that war sells reflected the voracious demand for war news and images in Australia that was particularly acute in the opening stages of the conflict.²⁵¹ The Australian press maintained a thriving discourse relating to the enemy German population throughout the first years of the conflict. As noted in the introduction, historians such as Ian Harmstorf have argued that the mainstream Australian press largely upheld the Nazi/German distinction.²⁵² Harmstorf, however, does not provide extensive analysis of this issue, drawing broad assumptions from a solitary newspaper, the *Advertiser*.²⁵³ This is problematic given the lack of a unanimous collective viewpoint in the major dailies of wartime Australia, who largely maintained editorial independence and presented diverging interpretations of key wartime issues.²⁵⁴ Notwithstanding the Australian press’ common reliance on various international cable services such as the AAP and British United Press (BUP), variations in local editorial decisions – how, where and if a story was presented, the choice of headline, accompanying commentary and images (photographs and cartoons) – governed how Australians on the home front saw and experienced the war in Europe.

The following chapter argues that whilst Harmstorf’s findings regarding a Nazi/German distinction within the mainstream press largely hold true in the first months of the conflict, the framing of the wider “Germany” enemy was far more nuanced, disjointed, problematic and, in some cases, divisive within the Australian public discourse than existing scholarship reveals. By the end of the Phoney War and throughout the remainder of 1940 and 1941, a significant portion of the mainstream Australian press were publishing totalising enmity narratives that questioned key assumptions supporting the distinction between Nazism and the German people. Differences in interpretation lay not only between newspapers, but also within individual newspapers struggling to answer the important wartime question: “Whom are we fighting?”

The Australian press largely followed British norms and assumptions of its role in national life as a shaper of public opinion, a source of information and education to the reading public.²⁵⁵ Kertesz rightly notes that the press in the British tradition both “leads and reflects” public opinion.²⁵⁶ Australia’s

²⁵¹ Carruthers, 5.

²⁵² See pp. 10-11.

²⁵³ Harmstorf, “World War II.”

²⁵⁴ Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 150.

²⁵⁵ Griffen-Foley, *A Companion to the Australian Media*.

²⁵⁶ Kertesz, 21.

mass-circulation newspapers shared a “sense of mission” and a self-professed social role in line with their commercial interests and needs, with a focus on informing and promoting ideas of national wartime relevance.²⁵⁷ Carruthers’ seminal work on media and war successfully argues that according to liberal theory, the media in democratic nations at war often functions to offset confusion induced by the fog of war, inform citizens, and perform a watchdog role over increasingly overarching Executive wartime powers. In executing its self-professed role as a “fourth estate” alongside the Executive, Judiciary and Legislature, the press informs public opinion in democratic societies on key events, situations and people in terms of its *informative* as well as *explanative* and *interpretative* functions. In line with the politics of wartime nationalism, this role often clashed with the expectations and realities of the wartime state which often framed expressions of media objectivity, impartiality and balance as inappropriate and borderline treasonous in the context of totalising war.²⁵⁸ Notwithstanding the Western media’s hesitancy to challenge the nation’s resort to armed conflict, Carruthers’ broad survey of twentieth century conflicts demonstrates that it has repeatedly failed to contest or has actively perpetuated nationalistic jingoism and racist stereotypes of “foreign antagonists”. It has consistently encouraged narratives of enmity in patriotic service of national war efforts.²⁵⁹

Exploring another facet of the public discourse on the German Question, the following chapter argues that popular, mass-circulation Australian dailies such as the *Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)*, the *Argus*, and the *Daily Telegraph* displayed an initial qualified acceptance of the Government’s distinction between Nazism and the German people. This rejection of totalising enmity, professed by newspaper editors, journalists, and commentators alike, was increasingly tested throughout the first year of the war, particularly during and after the reverses of mid-1940. Newspapers such as the *Sydney Sun* reveal an inner turmoil in the media’s attempts to balance public expectations regarding “no quarrel” and the rejection of hate propaganda and fears that a Nazi/German distinction undermined the national war effort. A divisive set of correspondence exchanges in the *SMH* and representatives from the Melbourne press between September and October is then discussed to ascertain reader responses to shifting media narratives surrounding Germany. This forms an important, albeit limited, lens into public opinion in the absence of sustained public opinion polling. The findings herein also highlight increasing polarisation on the German problem throughout the Phoney War. A discussion of the re-emergence of some of the main essentialising stereotypes in the media follows that further evidences the Australia’s press’ shift towards totalising enmity. Finally, a discussion of popular weekly journals

²⁵⁷ Bartrop, 193.

²⁵⁸ Carruthers, 9; Craig Murray, “Intellectuals in the Australian Press” (PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2005), 92-3.

²⁵⁹ Carruthers, 9.

advocating against the Nazi/German distinction will follow. The totalising narratives opposing a Nazi/German distinction discussed within this chapter form a useful counterpart to the discussion of the religious and Leftist press that follow in Chapter Five.

The German Question and Narratives of Enmity in the Press

The political bipartisanship regarding Menzies' framing of the German enemy prompted a temporary, qualified media consensus in the opening months of the war. Most Australian metropolitan dailies displayed qualified support for, or at the very least general indifference to, the official "no quarrel" stance, the absence of hate-engendering rhetoric and the absence of punitive and expansionist war aims against the German people.²⁶⁰ In this, the Australian press largely mirrored British newspapers.²⁶¹

The *SMH* was representative in its framing of the conflict as "The War Against Hitlerism".²⁶² The longstanding and quality Sydney broadsheet of the entrepreneurial Fairfax family boasted a daily circulation of 225,000 in 1941 with competition emanating from New South Wales tabloids such as the *Daily Telegraph*, *Sun*, and *Daily Mirror* (from 1941).²⁶³ Paul Bartrop describes the *SMH* as the voice of Sydney middle-class and conservatives, a paper read and respected by "leaders of society".²⁶⁴ The *SMH*'s editorials emphasised Menzies' "distinction", employing the language of British and Australian official statements and expert opinion to posit that "our quarrel lies...with the rulers of Germany, not the German people".²⁶⁵ Prefacing the expected enunciation of moderate war aims by Menzies, the *SMH* reflected an influential branch of the national media who framed the German Question as a crucial factor in defining Allied war aims beyond the loose principles enunciated from the beginning of the war.²⁶⁶ These newspapers stressed the importance of "no quarrel" as a guiding principle by which the war should be fought.²⁶⁷

Frank Packer's popular Sydney morning tabloid, the *Daily Telegraph* (*DT*), further exemplified popular narratives whose rhetoric aligned closely with British newspapers reinforcing potential alliance,

²⁶⁰ "Allies Fighting to Free German People," *Courier-Mail*, 18 October 1939, 1. The Australian media's common response to Chamberlain's definition of the enemy can be seen in AAP reports: "'Issue Faced With Clear Conscience': Mr. Chamberlain Cheered as He defines British Policy in Crisis: Nazi Methods Must End."

²⁶¹ Kertesz, 50, 213.

²⁶² "The War Against Hitlerism," *SMH*, 6 September 1939, 12.; "War of 'Frightfulness' Begun," *SMH*, 5 September 1939, 8.

²⁶³ Robin Berwick Walker, *Yesterday's News: A History of the Newspaper Press in New South Wales from 1920 to 1945* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980).

²⁶⁴ Bartrop, 193.

²⁶⁵ "Australia and the War: The Ultimate Goal," *SMH*, 16 September 1939, 14.

²⁶⁶ "War Aims: Definition Urged: Basis of Peace Terms," *SMH*, 14 September 1939, 9.; Australia and the War: The Ultimate Goal."; "Empire Aims: lasting Peace: Mr. Menzies' View: Great Britain's Stand Supported," *SMH*, 16 November 1939, 9.

²⁶⁷ "Tide of Hate Must Not Rise."

tolerance and restraint, and a war of “liberation”.²⁶⁸ The *DT* had achieved a daily readership of 276,000 that had almost rivalled the popular *SMH* by the end of the war, evidence of its wartime influence.²⁶⁹ The *DT*’s editorial stance was shaped by editors Sydney Deamer, C. S. McNulty, and (news-editor turned editor in 1941) Brian Penton. Under Penton in particular, the *DT* had emerged through the late inter-war period as an impertinent, progressive and individualistic Sydney daily with a serious commitment to strengthening awareness on issues of public interest.²⁷⁰

Penton’s tacit support for Chamberlain’s “no quarrel” sentiment was clear in an editorial prepared a day before the declaration of war and was repeated throughout the first days of the conflict.²⁷¹ The implicit blame on Hitlerism was established in black and white terms and an overt satirical focus on the National Socialist leadership.²⁷² Reasserting official clarifications of the justice of the recourse to war, the *DT* stated under the bold heading “No Quarrel With German People” that war was the fault of Hitler and his unrepresentative minority who were the latest grotesque expression of the same vices of Prussianism of Kaiser Wilhelm II who had lead Germany into disaster two decades earlier:

The German people suffered unforgettably for their ruler’s wild ambitions 25 years ago. They are destined, it seems, to suffer again today. **They are as much the victims of Nazi despotism as the small states...** Many Germans are already in revolt against their leaders. Germany marches into Poland, not as a united nation, but as a nation truncheoned into an outward show of unity.²⁷³

This latter point was reinforced by an accompanying article from a special London correspondent explaining the personification of German resistance – freedom radio of “The Voice” – undermining Nazism from within.²⁷⁴ The *DT* was not alone in this promotion. For instance, Max Lamshed, a senior editor at the *Advertiser*, summarised many of the key arguments circulating in Australian public discourse surrounding the various resistance movements in Germany.²⁷⁵ Although popular with the Australian Left, German resistance and the potential for internal revolution was considered important

²⁶⁸ Kertesz, 53.

²⁶⁹ Walker, 194.

²⁷⁰ Patrick Buckridge, *The Scandalous Penton: A Biography of Brian Penton* (St. Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1994).

²⁷¹ “If We Have to Fight We Will Know Why,” *DT*, 2 September 1939, 4.; “This is Why Britain is at War,” *DT*, 4 September 1939, 6.

²⁷² George Finey, “His Choice,” *DT*, 2 September 1939, 4.

²⁷³ “If We Have to Fight We Will Know Why.” Emphasis mine.

²⁷⁴ “‘The Voice’ Tells Germans the Truth,” *DT*, 2 September 1939, 4.

²⁷⁵ Maxwell Lamshed, “The Underground War Against Germany: Factors Which May Destroy Nazism From Within,” *Advertiser*, 27 September 1939, 18.; “They Listen to Forbidden Voices – And Wonder Why They Are Fighting,” *ABC Weekly*, 13 April 1940, 5.

enough during the opening stages of the conflict for staff cartoonists W.E. Pidgeon [Image 4] and George Finey [Image 5] to present a collection of humorous cartoons to reinforce the theme.²⁷⁶

The *DT* had further clarified its editorial position through its response to the publication of the British White Paper on Nazi persecutions in Germany. The document, which covered the history of Nazi Terror from 1933, was seen as clear evidence in support of the “liberation” of German “victims” as a fundamental war aim and precursor to any humanitarian post-war new order:

It is incredible that this record of sadism should relate to a country which produced Goethe, Beethoven, Schiller, and in more recent times, Thomas Mann. **But Nazism is not symbolic of the German people as a whole.** It is systematic terror imposed upon the Germans by that sinister element, which, for a century, has worshipped force and glorified crude doctrine that might is right.²⁷⁷

The *DT* was not alone in highlighting German victimhood in the first months of the conflict. “Three Wise Monkeys – German Version” [Image 6] from the *Newcastle Morning Herald (NMH)* depicted the oblivious and docile “German people” blinded, censored and gagged against their will by the three monkeys – Hitler, Hermann Goering and Joseph Goebbels.²⁷⁸ The cartoonist’s intent here was far less ambiguous in suggesting German victimhood at the hands of the regime supported in *NMH* editorial opinion. The *NMH* noted in late November 1939 that one of the most important wartime conundrums was the “sentiment of the German people” and their relationship and support of the regime. The paper was particularly interested in the potential for internal revolt in the Reich of which there was “substantial evidence”. Yet the *NMH* warned of the dangers of “wishful thinking”, noting that the potential for revolt and negotiated peace were hampered by Germans’ “notorious...lack of political capacity” which had allowed the rise of Nazism despite never being chosen in “free elections”. Nevertheless, the *NMH* narrative promoted the idea that the German people, through no fault but their own political inaction, were the victims of a totalitarian dictatorship – a distinct entity from the regime for the purposes of wartime narratives.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁶ Finey, “Somewhere in Germany,” *DT*, 23 September 1939, 4.; *War Cartoons by Finey, WEP and Mahoney: Daily and Sunday Telegraph*, (Sydney: Consolidated Press, 1940), 10.

²⁷⁷ “A People’s Fate Under Nazi Terror,” *DT*, 1 November 1939, 6.; “He Can’t Fool the German Workers,” *DT*, 16 November 1939, 6.

²⁷⁸ “Three Wise Monkeys – German Version,” *NMH*, 19 April 1940, 10.

²⁷⁹ “Will the Germans Change Regime?,” *NMH*, 29 October 1939, 8.



THEY CAME THROUGH THE WINDOW—Wep.

SATURDAY DAILY TELEGRAPH SEPTEMBER 23, 1939



SOMEWHERE IN GERMANY

By FINEY

Above: Image 4. Below: Image 5.



Image 6.

Representatives of the Australian media such as the *NMH* grappled with the various contradictions posed by a totalising peoples' war and German complicity with Nazism. While the *NMH* qualified their concerns with support for the distinction, other newspapers reached different conclusions. The *Sydney Sun*, a popular Associated Newspaper's afternoon newspaper edited by L.V. Armati and boasting a circulation of 229,102 in March 1941,²⁸⁰ reflected a section of the media that had rapidly begun to caution readers on the consequences of acquitting the German people after several weeks of fighting.

The *Sun* had reflected the initial unanimity of support for the official distinction. The *Sun*'s opening editorial after the declaration of war did tend to push its energy against "the forces of Hitlerism". Whilst being far less overt than other mainstays of the Sydney media such as the *Daily Telegraph* and *SMH* in promoting the distinction, it had insinuated that Hitlerism was the second "curse inflicted on the German people" after militant Prussianism and Kaiserism.²⁸¹ Another editorial from the 23

²⁸⁰ The creation of Ezra Norton's *Daily Mirror* cut the *Sun*'s sales down to 189,874 the following year, shaking its monopoly status. Walker, 198.

²⁸¹ "Hitler's Guilt," *Sunday Sun and Guardian*, 3 September 1939, 4.

September, entitled "Music and War", had reproached the "small and uninformed minority" of Australians demanding the ABC instigate a German music ban as an expression of wartime enmity.²⁸² The *Sun* personified the continued influence of positive pre-war images reinforced through the inter-war period that framed initial enmity narratives:

Still, we must believe that in Germany there are kindly and intelligent people...who feel that there is more urgency in such a song as Bach's '*Bist du bei mir*' or Schubert's '*Du bist die ruh*', than in a 10-inch howitzer of a bombing plane...

...Those of us who believe, in spite of these present outbursts of cruelty and hate, in the essential brotherhood of man, do not hate the Germans, though we may pity them for the pass into which they have been led by a bad government...²⁸³

Yet other articles seem to contradict this editorial message, evidencing apparent confusion as the *Sun* attempted to frame the issue. In the first week of war, the *Sun*'s staff cartoonist encapsulated the relationship of Germany's "tragic trio" (or as an accompanying article by X.M. proposed, a "triple curse", of Hermann Goering, Joseph Goebbels and Hitler) and the militaristic "German people" simultaneously marching off a cliff into "oblivion" [Image 7].²⁸⁴ X.M.'s article warned against the incursion of "British sympathy" in Australian public discourse.²⁸⁵ Perhaps the most damning intervention was an accompanying editorial on the sinking of the *Athenia* by German submarine U-30 with its evocation of the earlier sinking of the *Lusitania* in May 1915.²⁸⁶ This also compared German contraventions of international naval codes with legal, norm-bound British war conduct – "Hitler bombs babies...Britain bombs battleships".²⁸⁷ Read alongside the Editor's reference to the "triumvirate lead[ing the] Germans into moral shame, and thence military disaster" and "within the bully who makes war upon defenceless, a coward always lurks", the cartoon associated the German people and the atrocities symbolised by the *Athenia* sinking in the mind of the reader.²⁸⁸

²⁸² "Music and War," *Sun*, 23 September 1939, 4. The editorial piece was also printed in the affiliated *Newcastle Sun*: "Music and War," *Newcastle Sun*, 23 September 1939, 6.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ "Over the Top," *Sun*, 10 September 1939, 4.

²⁸⁵ X. M., "Private lives," *Sun*, 10 September 1939, 4.

²⁸⁶ See example on p. 161.

²⁸⁷ "Women and Children First," *Sun*, 10 September 1939, 4.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. This was commonly argued by those attempting to invoke historical precedent. Baume, for instance asked: "WHAT DIFFERENCE IS THERE BETWEEN THE LUSITANIA AND THE ATHENIA?" Do We Fully Realise What the Empire is Fighting?, *Truth*, 3 March 1940, 20.

Germany's Tragic Trio—



Over The Top

Image 7.

The newspaper's Foreign Editor, E.C.S. Marshall, reflected widespread concerns within the *Sun* that the mass movement against hate propaganda, while commendable regarding the German people, was so neutered by fear of repeating mistakes of the previous war that it failed to adequately target the Nazi regime. Marshall argued that timidity and hesitancy on the part of the Allies' "psychological" war, in part through Menzies' attempt to exculpate the German people, was largely to blame for popular misunderstandings about the so-called Phoney War.²⁸⁹ Reflecting the paper's growing unease with the distinction, Marshall argued that a wholly "unemotional" war would fail to mobilise the Australian population for total war:

Blind, unreasoning hate – hatred for instance, of all Germans; hatred for the innocent victims of a system – certainly that should be repressed. But what can be wrong with hate when it is directed against some object repugnant to every decent instinct...²⁹⁰

While he agreed in principle with focusing enmity on the Nazi leadership, Marshall criticised the Australian media's promotion of the official Nazi/German distinction and the self-censorship emanating from exaggerated concerns about the Australian public's aversion to "hate" propaganda as hampering the honest application of hate as a mobilizational device.

²⁸⁹ E.C.S. Marshall, "People Cannot 'Stick' Unemotional War: Room For Hate in Our Civil Armoury," *Sun*, 1 October 1939, 3.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Other writers for the *Sun* saw the Nazi/German distinction as a far more dangerous process that misunderstood the underlying problems of German national character. In November 1939, an unnamed *Sun* military correspondent prepared an article that foreshadowed the paper's hardening stance towards post-war treatment, permanent disarmament, and military occupation.²⁹¹ The article was also evidence that the counter-narrative to the consensus of the mainstream press in the first months of the war applauding an absence of totalising enmity was not solely relegated to periodicals such as *Smith's Weekly*, the *Bulletin* and *Truth* (discussed below). The writer explicitly extended enmity towards the Germans *ut totum*: "To say that the Allies are fighting Hitlerism and not the German people is not correct."²⁹² The tendency in the *Sun's* contemporaries to attribute blame to specific leaders failed to recognise that the "cunning, instinctive ruthlessness and brute force" of historical and contemporary German leaders was "admired" by the German people:

Hitler did not create the German spirit and German ambitions. They have been ingrained in the German character for many generations. The eradication of this warlike side of the German character does not depend on the destruction of the Nazi regime only. It can be brought about only by drawing the teeth and clipping the claws of Germany so that no new Fuehrer can rise...²⁹³

A particularistic, unique "system" of rampant militarism, expansionism, aggression and world-domination, he continued, was implanted "in the bones of the German people" through its education, political and cultural development throughout the nation's chequered post-unification history. The power of essentialising narratives and projection of seemingly natural, permanent, or innate characteristics was already evident in Australia. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the writer was concerned that wartime conduct and complete military defeat be one undertaken in accordance with "Christian principles, without any vindictiveness, or cruelty or harshness".²⁹⁴ In breaking apart the assumptions governing "no quarrel", the writer was careful to conform to current norms and expectations in wartime discourse against the propagation of hate. Australians' sensitivity and low tolerance for expressions of totalising enmity in the first months of the conflict was reinforced by several retorts from other periodicals and newspapers accusing the *Sun* of hate mongering.²⁹⁵

* * *

²⁹¹ "Fighting German Ambitions: Need for Disarmament," *Sun*, 1 November 1939, 4.

²⁹² *Ibid.*

²⁹³ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ "Hatred or Tolerance?," *West Wyalong Advocate*, 6 October 1939, 2.

The Australians press's attentiveness to the German Question manifested enough public interest to enter the national opinion columns. The correspondence columns of the major dailies served as open forums of debate in a wartime democracy. The diverging attitudes within were not only evidence of disagreement within the wider readership of each newspaper regardless of individual editorial stances. It also reinforced to those readers themselves that the German Question, fraught with inconsistencies, needed answers that were not always provided in the commentary by those newspapers. An examination of major Sydney and Melbourne correspondence columns show that Australian readers and correspondents set the German Question as an important theme of contemporary war discourse by their engagement with enmity narratives. Although such exchanges are evident across the metropolitan, regional and local newspapers across the nation,²⁹⁶ the letters columns of these major daily newspapers reflected a far greater variance of opinion and interrogation of editorial content.

Several astute observers had noted totalising rhetoric within Australian forums of public debate in the months before the conflict.²⁹⁷ Hazel Lingard's published address in the *NMH* to the Newcastle Business and Professional Women's Club exemplified growing anxiety that a pre-war "re-learning of hate" was occurring in Australia. Lingard noted a worrying trend of hatred in national correspondence columns, perpetuated by irresponsible reporting. The public's perception of the German people, she argued, was being negatively influenced by the regime's actions domestically and abroad, rather than the realities she and her three travel partners witnessed in a recent tour of the Reich. "The present development is very worrying", she summarised. Australians are "learning to hate the Germans and judge them by their leaders. It was sad to think of this because the German people were very hospitable and very kind."²⁹⁸

Lingard's fears seemed justified. Totalising rhetoric was already evident in the readership of the *SMH* and *Argus* throughout September and October 1939. Many early examples repeated claims, popularised by Hughes, that the distinction between Hitlerism and German people was compounding Germany's historic organisation of sympathy.²⁹⁹ Despite its aforementioned opposition to totalising enmity, the *SMH* had opened its pages to opposing viewpoints. The *SMH*'s support for Menzies'

²⁹⁶ See for instance the debate in the *Advertiser*. Leonard Holman, "War Guilt: Nazi Chiefs or Germany?," *Advertiser*, 14 September 1939, 20.; Rev. L.A. Tepper, "War Guilt," *Advertiser*, 15 September 1939, 24.

²⁹⁷ "Australian Looks at Germany," *Mail*, 25 March 1939, 11.; "'Hang the Kaiser' and All That," *Bulletin*, 29 March 1939, 50; "ABC Hate Propaganda," *Bulletin*, 10 May 1939, 13.; "Must it Happen Again," *Bulletin*, 28 June 1939, 48.

²⁹⁸ "German People Desire Peace: Miss Lingard's Impressions," *NMH*, 23 March 1939, 4.

²⁹⁹ A.H. Spencer, "Let Us Be Ruthless," *Argus*, 23 September 1939, 2.; *Argus*, 16 September 1939, 2.

proclamation again was a strong conduit for debate on several occasions.³⁰⁰ T.J. Butler had chastised the *SMH* for its advancement of Menzies' distinction and failure to recognise the inherent relationship between the German military complex and the people who profited and benefitted from German "criminal thoroughness". Because the Germans were as "brutal, arrogant, and insolent" in victory as they were fawning in defeat, Butler was adamant that the distinction was based in flawed logic:

The majority of Germans are Nazis. Every Nazi is a potential despot or dictator. Despotism is the only form of government that Germans understand, and it is the form most suitable to their character.³⁰¹

Dissatisfied that Menzies' limited statement to the HOR on 15 September did not go far enough, representatives of the Sydney branch of the Australian League of Nations Union (LNU) envisioned the definition of the enemy as a key component of the organisation's objectives in promoting international peace, justice, cooperation, responsibility, and collective security. With LNU branches forming in all Australia capital cities between 1921 and 1945, the Union in Australia was patronised by leading public figures embedded in the establishment and bolstered by grassroots participation. The LNU's lobbying swayed various inter-war and wartime governments.³⁰² A joint letter signed by leading LNU figures – including President Francis Anderson, leading practitioner F.E. Barraclough, and respected Official Historian of the First World War C.E.W. Bean – reinforced the *SMH*'s "satisfaction" with the declarations of Menzies, Chamberlain, Eden and Lord Halifax. However, the LNU mirrored concerns of key Labor ministers over the failures of inter-war reconstruction, the lip-service paid to the ideals espoused by the League Covenant, failure to recognise the root causes of the conflict and an apparent "reversion to power politics". The letter argued that peace rested on a concrete, universal understanding of "not only **what we are fighting against**, but also what we are fighting for, and what we shall do when we win."³⁰³

University of Sydney academic and statistician, Dansie Sawkins, had also supported the LNU's reinforcement of negotiated peace with the "German nation" separate from the Nazi regime.³⁰⁴ George Embleth added that the "enlistment" of German democrats and anti-Hitler forces necessitated clear enunciation of what they could expect economically and politically from Allied governments after

³⁰⁰ "'No Retreat': Hitler's Peace Move: Mr. Menzies' View," *SMH*, 4 October 1939, 13.; Wilfred I. Wenborn, *SMH*, 7 October 1939, 9.; "British Aims: Just Peace for All: Mr. Menzies Speech," *SMH*, 5 October 1939, 9.

³⁰¹ T.J. Butler, "The German Character," *SMH*, 8 September 1939, 4.; "Hitler's War," *SMH*, 5 October 1939, 3.

³⁰² Hilary Summy, "From Hope ... To Hope: Story of the Australian League of Nations Union, Featuring the Victorian Branch, 1921-1945" (PhD Thesis, The University of Queensland, 2007).

³⁰³ Francis Anderson, C.E.W. Bean, Arthur H. Garnssy, F.E. Barraclough, Raymond G. Watt, "Allied War Aims: Need for Definition," *SMH*, 16 September 1939, 14.

³⁰⁴ D.T. Sawkins, "Allied War Aims," *SMH*, 27 September 1939, 6.

the overthrow of Hitlerism. The LNU, Sawkins and Embleth reflected concerns that whilst “no grudge” rhetoric was admirable, it was useless without providing potential internal anti-Hitler coalitions with assurances for their cooperation “as an ally in the re-establishment of liberalism in Europe.”³⁰⁵ They exemplified a common call for a more concrete official statement on Australia’s war aims vis-à-vis the German people which had been expressed by the *SMH*. Concerned by a continuous rise in “outbursts of jingoism and hate” in the media in December 1939 and capitalising on continued debate within the *SMH*’s correspondence column, the LNU noted its intention to facilitate several private and public dialogues on these key issues.³⁰⁶

Expressing similar attitudes to interventionist Australian politicians, many *SMH* readers viewed authoritative intellectual interjections as representative of a dangerous tendency towards unwarranted tolerance and sentimentality.³⁰⁷ Francis G. Clarke criticised the popular aversion to totalising enmity championed by authoritative “well-known commentators” such as Bean in “reputable journals”.³⁰⁸ Bean had personally reaffirmed the key points of the LNU in a separate letter to the *SMH*, mirroring other readers who recognised the hypocrisy of correspondent references to the guilt of the “majority” when countless Germans were languishing in the concentration camps and “nameless graves”.³⁰⁹ Clarke mirrored the *Sun*’s narrative which professed an aversion to outright hate propaganda whilst promoting enmity-engendering stereotypes about “natural proclivities and the national spirit of the [German] race.” The reply captured the intertwining of the German question and totalising enmity; a correlation that Clarke, like the *Sun*, unsuccessfully attempted to deny:

We are told we have no quarrel with the German people. This statement is false. We are warned to beware of hate. We do not hate them. It is feared we are out to crush them. We are not. We are assured by one commentator that Germany has a soul. Let ravaged Poland be heard in reply. We are advised to define our war aims. Our aims are to win the war and the peace, but we will not win if some ideas now being inculcated regarding the German people are left unquestioned.³¹⁰

³⁰⁵ George Embleth, “Allies’ War Aims,” *SMH*, 9 September 1939, 8.

³⁰⁶ P.J. Holdsworth, *SMH*, 20 November 1939, 7.; T.M.C. Towle, “The Real Enemy,” *SMH*, 6 December 1939, 6. Towle exemplified the earlier arguments of Embleth. “No Jingoism or Hate: League’s Formula for Peace,” *Daily News*, 11 December 1939, 2.

³⁰⁷ J. W. Martin, “Hitler’s Peace Move,” *SMH*, 10 October 1939, 7.; A Spencer Watts, “Hitler’s Peace Move,” *SMH*, 10 October 1939, 7.

³⁰⁸ Francis G. Clarke, “War Aims,” *SMH*, 2 October 1939, 2.; Clarke, “Allied War Aims,” *SMH*, 4 October 1939, 3.

³⁰⁹ C.E.W. Bean, “Hitler’s War,” *SMH*, 28 September 1939, 7.; A. Herborn, “War Aims,” *SMH*, 3 October 1939, 3.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Read alongside letters by W.M.S., N. Bede Nairn, Mary Lisle, Thos. Ranken and others, Clarke symbolised a backlash against the *SMH*'s narrative; against the "futility" of "not making war on the German people" and the "ethical hair-splitting" and "self-deception" contained therein.³¹¹

An analysis of editorials and the correspondence columns in the major dailies in Melbourne – the *Herald*, *Argus* and *Age* – reveals similar attitudes as expressed in the Sydney press. The *Herald*, an evening broadsheet with a readership of over 200,000, had continued to argue for negotiated peace with Germany months into the conflict. The Allies' only "quarrel" with the German people, it argued in early November, was that "they allowe[d] themselves to be instruments of Nazi aggression."³¹² The *Argus*, widely regarded as the local "voice of middle-class conservatism" with a readership of 108,370 in 1941 and a reputation as a "cause" paper, argued similarly.³¹³ For the first months of the war at least, the *Argus* had invariably supported the disassociation of the German people from the German Government in Allied war aims and methods, including the logic behind the leaflet raids and the potential for internal revolt.³¹⁴ Like the *SMH*, the *Argus*' editorial response to the September HOR debates reinforced Menzies' framework of a war against "Hitlerism", applauded the lack of "bitter feelings" and enmity against the "real German people", and endorsed the "freeing of the German nation".³¹⁵ Its support for the Nazi/German distinction throughout October attributed German support for Hitlerism to "ignorance" and "deception" by the regime, rather than "perverted nationalism".³¹⁶

The Melbourne *Age*, on the other hand, had referred to German complicity with the regime far more quickly than its contemporaries, notwithstanding a shared eleventh-hour conversion from appeasement. The generally liberal *Age* was owned by the Syme family and was edited by the reputable Harold Campbell. Its readership of 99,400 (1941) largely consisted of Victoria's business leaders and the educated elite.³¹⁷ Preceding other early critics such as the Sydney *Sun*, the *Age*

³¹¹ W.M.S., "Hitler's War," *SMH*, 26 September 1939, 7.; N. Bede Nairn, "Hitler's War," *SMH*, 29 September 1939, 3.; Mary Lisle, "Hitler's War," *SMH*, 30 September 1939, 9.; Thos. Ranken, "Hitler's War," *SMH*, 11 October 1939, 6.

³¹² "The Appeal Must Be to the German People," *Herald*, 8 November 1939, 6. The *Herald* had a readership of 232, 131 in 1941.

³¹³ Bartrop, 191.

³¹⁴ The *Argus*' support for the leaflet raid was also expressed. Wayfarer, "Bloodless Strength," *Argus*, 20 October 1939, 2.

³¹⁵ "One Foe Alone," *Argus*, 6 September 1939, 8.; "No Peace on Nazi Terms," *Argus*, 11 September 1939, 4.

³¹⁶ "Illusory Peace Hopes," *Argus*, 13 October 1939, 4.; "The Objective," *Argus*, 16 October 1939, 4.; "They Clutch at Straws," *Argus*, 17 October 1939, 6.; "In Desperate Mood," *Argus*, 23 October 1939, 4.; "Not a 'Funny' War for Nazis," *Argus*, 24 October 1939, 6.

³¹⁷ Bartrop, 191. Despite strong competition from the *Sun News Pictorial* (258,959) and the *Argus*, and far lower circulation numbers than the evening *Herald*, the *Age* retained a strong level of influence given its readership. Sybil Nolan, "Age," in *A Companion to the Australian Media*, ed. Bridget Griffen-Foley (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2014).

published a scathing editorial two days after the declaration of war that devoted considerable column-space to the historical continuity of German aggression and the dangers of Chamberlain and Menzies' "no quarrel" speech. It proposed that Nazism was the German peoples' "free choice", a product of informed acquiescence rather than ignorance and deception underlined by the *Argus*. The unity between the German people and the charismatic *Führer* was even stronger than that of the *Herrenvolk* and Kaiser Wilhelm II between 1914-18. For the democracies, the war was one against the "deep and ugly instincts of the German people" of which Nazism was a manifestation. German national character was

...responsible for defenceless women and innocent children finding a grave in the sea or being battered to death from the air. Have the democracies, indeed, no quarrel with the German people whose guilt this ultimately is? Hitler is the apostle of brute force as a national philosophy. That the German people approve of it is indicated by the sheep-like meekness with which they have always submitted to it.³¹⁸

In its forthright rejection of the Nazi/German distinction, the *Age* represented a minority view in a climate where its commercial competitors appeared cautious not to openly transgress anti-hate norms. Yet resonance with the *Age's* rhetoric, like in the Sydney newspapers, was widespread throughout Melbourne correspondence columns in the first weeks of the war.³¹⁹

Reports on the formation of anti-hate groups in the city were a revealing conduit for discussions about totalising enmity. One notable example was a student-led anti-hate movement at the University of Melbourne.³²⁰ A collective of university students had formulated a pledge which was to be submitted to universities across Australia, Britain, France, and America to facilitate transnational dialogue. The pledge contained three major principles which reflected other peace organisations such as LNU who reinforced the centrality of defining the enemy to the chances of lasting peace. Principles two and three centred around appropriately defining the "enemy", avoiding totalising enmity narratives and the just treatment of the German people as "victims" of Nazism:³²¹

Lurline Stuart, "Argus Newspaper," University of Melbourne, <http://www.emelbourne.net.au/biogs/EM00085b.htm>. (accessed, 22/05/2017).

³¹⁸ "Each May Help," *Age*, 5 September 1939, 8.

³¹⁹ R.T.M., "The German People," *Age*, 7 September 1939, 8.

³²⁰ "Students Ask 'No Hate' War Pledge, *Herald*," 6 September 1938, 11.; "Movement Opposed to Hate Begins At University," *Weekly Times*, 7 October 1939, 24. Its inaugural meeting was held on the 7 September 1939.

This was just one of many peace-oriented groups deriving from the University engaging with a broad, yet diverging network of bodies incorporating church groups, the LNU and Communist sponsored organisations. Andrews, 21.; "A Peace Pledge," *Age*, 8 September 1939, 11.

³²¹ "A Peace Pledge."

ing:—(1) To give every support to the efforts now being made toward the successful termination of the war. (2) Not to subscribe to any hate propaganda directed against the German people—but to remember that these people are merely the victims of the Nazi despotism. (3) To do all in their power to ensure the formulation of a just peace treaty at the end of hostilities and that no revenge is taken against the German people.

By late September, the movement was affiliated and endorsed by the National Union of Australian University Students (NUAUS). The principles resonated with “all shades of University opinion”, including some academic staff.³²² The *Herald* reported on the “large number of students” who had signed the pledge.³²³ The general secretary of NUAUS, R.W.W. Wilmott, elaborated on the aims of student body to a *Herald* correspondent during one of the movement’s meetings. Wilmott noted that whilst pacifism in the face of Nazism and Fascist domination of Europe was inappropriate, Australians:

...must keep a reasoned balanced outlook and fight without hate...If the democracies set out with a determination to impose harsh terms on the German people, it would result in losing the peace...**Germans and Nazis [are] not synonymous.**³²⁴

Wilmott’s speech reinforced the central premise of the movement, which had now rebranded itself the “No Hate War Pledge Movement” (NHWPM).³²⁵ In short, denouncing totalising enmity and acknowledging German victimhood at the hand of the regime was not unpatriotic and did not, and should not, bar oneself from pledging wholeheartedly to the national fight against “Hitlerism”. The NHWPM was not pacifistic in the anti-war sense shared by other active groups at the University.³²⁶ The emphasis rested on balancing security and a moral basis for the war that properly channelled enmity at the root causes of conflict rather than nations or peoples.

The absence of editorial criticism in the Melbourne *Argus* and *Herald* reflected the initial support of those newspapers for the themes within the NHWPM pledge in September 1939. The correspondent column was far less uniform. Writing to the *Argus*, readers such as R.E. Henderson were adamant that Nazism rested on the support and “willingness” of the German people whose religiosity of racial and national superiority could only be stamped out by a long war and recognition that Australians were

³²² The *Herald*, for example, reported on a speech delivered at a Movement meeting by noted Professor of Jurisprudence and eventual Vice-Chancellor, G.W. Paton. “Mankind and Peace,” *Herald*, 20 October 1939, 7.

³²³ “Students Sign ‘No Hate’ Pledge,” *Herald*, 22 September 1939, 3.

³²⁴ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

³²⁵ “A “No-Hate” League,” *Age*, 30 September 1939, 22.

³²⁶ “Pacifist Meeting At University,” *Herald*, 12 September 1939, 3.

“fighting the German people.”³²⁷ Another correspondent, C.P.R., agreed with Henderson’s assessment of the “culpability” of the German people and echoed the latter’s sentiments regarding the “dismemberment” of Germany into pre-unification states and destruction of its existing ruling classes.³²⁸ O.K., another letter writer, argued against the “ridiculous display of sentimentality” under the conditions of a totalising war which failed to account for the inherent and perpetual barbarism at the heart of German culture and, he insinuated, its racial composition.³²⁹ Paul G. Dane also applauded Henderson’s claims about the “ridiculousness” of public sentiment, the *Argus*’ misplaced tolerance and the political limitations imposed on enmity (ie. Menzies’ Nazi/German distinction). Attempting to revive the “standard” typical anti-German sentiment which had been officially sanctioned under Billy Hughes’ leadership during the First World War, Dane reinforced Henderson’s, O.K.’s and C.P.R.’s explicit rejection of the “No-Hate” premise symbolised by the NHPM pledge:

Only a violent, unrelenting hate can urge us onward to their [the Germans’] complete destruction as a nation. This war should be fought with all the ruthlessness and ferocity that men are capable of; the old law is the only law the German people understand – an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.³³⁰

It is perhaps no coincidence that V.I. Rice, Secretary of the NHPM, had submitted various letters to the *Argus* throughout October reaffirming the organisation’s objectives.³³¹ Others reflected a more practical-oriented view of the enemy rooted in the exigencies of war and dependent on the conduct of the Germans rather than preconceived biases – positive or negative. K.A. noted how a recent historical aberration had rendered Germany’s previously highly cultured and educated people to submit meekly to its political leadership.³³² Yet unlike the bull-headed “hard” peace advocates, K.A. suggested that any positive anti-Nazi activity in Germany – symbolised by the actions of the “German Freedom Party” whose anti-Nazi admonitions to the German people via publications and broadcasts had received widespread coverage in the Australia press – should be matched by leniency and support on the Allied part towards a reform-ready Germany.³³³ Notably, A. Herborn had also reinforced the

³²⁷ R.E. Henderson, “War Aims,” *Argus*, 29 September 1939, 5.; “Think Deeper, They Help the Foe,” *Argus*, 21 September 1939, 6.

³²⁸ C.P.R., “War Aims,” *Argus*, 30 September 1939, 8.

³²⁹ O.K., “Germany Must Learn,” *Argus*, 18 October 1939, 2.

³³⁰ Paul G. Dane, “Not Only Nazism,” *Argus*, 2 October 1939, 6.

³³¹ V.I. Rice, “For Just Peace,” *Argus*, 2 October 1939, 2.; “Anti-Hitler Germans,” *Argus*, 19 October 1939, 2.

³³² K.A. “For Just Peace,” *Argus*, 2 October 1939, 2.

³³³ *Ibid.* For example of coverage of the “German Freedom Party”, see: “Death Threat to Hitler: ‘Ultimatum’ From Freedom Party,” *Argus*, 13 December 1939, 1. “Germany Hears The Voice of Freedom,” *Herald*, 22 September 1939, 6. See also H.S., “They still defy the Gestapo,” *DT*, 31 October 1939, 4.; “No German Wants War,” *DT*, 4 November 1939, 3. The *Age* also noted its importance, whilst warning readers not to “overestimate” opposition in Germany. O.M.A., “Liberty Station Calling: Secret Voice That Defies Hitler,” *Age*, 14 October 1939, 9.

role of the Freedom Party in refuting W.M.S.'s "superficial and ill-advised generalisations" about the complicity of the Germans with the crimes of Hitlerism in the *SMH* debate two weeks prior.³³⁴

Discourse relating to the German Question was reinvigorated in October when the *Argus* published an article by correspondent John D. Keating covering his impressions of Germany during two short trips in the months prior to the war.³³⁵ Keating was concerned by the negative and essentialising misrepresentations of the German people inherent in public hunger for first-hand "impressions" fulfilled by an obliging wartime press. He had criticised unfounded emphasis on popular support for Hitlerism, overt anti-British sentiment and "veiled hostility", "officiousness", and political meekness of the ordinary people which had filled the *Argus* correspondence column.³³⁶ The potential of narratives of enmity to essentialise characteristics of an out-group and negate heterogeneity, temporality and conditionality was already apparent to the observant Keating, who saw warning signs in the *Argus*.

Keating's reference to "stumbling" upon these Germans was intended to show, in a tongue-in-cheek manner, that anti-Nazi sentiment existed across the German community. What Keating found most surprising, given his preconceptions derived from inter-war travel literature, was his discussion with a SA (*Sturmabteilung*) officer who openly denounced Nazism for its broken promises. Whereas many other popular Australian "encounters" with German officials tended to reinforce negative tropes, Keating noted how his preconceived ideas about the officer had been thrown into question by the encounter.³³⁷ Keating argued that the experience validated the officer's claim that "80 per cent" of Germans, including Germany's youth and the armed forces, opposed National Socialism and only feigned support because there were no opportunities for active opposition.

Keating reflected on the dangerous logic and wartime pressure to conform to essentialising, homogenising and suppositious enmity narratives which undermined the positive images of Germany based on the assessment of individual Germans:

I didn't relish the idea of having to regard these people as enemies – family parties back from the country, girls on bicycles, sunburnt youths in Tyrolese costume – people who seemed of rather more than ordinary kindness. Even the uniformed men seemed friendly and unwarlike.³³⁸

³³⁴ Herborn, "War Aims."

³³⁵ John D. Keating, "I Stumbled Across Those Anti-Hitler Germans," *Argus*, 18 October 1939, 4.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Keating, "I Stumbled Across Those Anti-Hitler Germans."; Keen, 26.

In this sense, Keating hoped that the empirically positive images of Germany would shield him from what he saw as an inevitable process of totalising enmity. Other readers, he feared, did not possess a similar shield against totalising enmity and the inflammatory statements by those such as Henderson, O.K. and Dane.



Image 8.

Keating's argument seemed to contradict the message in Harold Armstrong's "Reich Custard" [Image 8], a cartoon published next to the article which embodied Keating's concerns. The German people, designated by the small writing above their heads, press their greedy faces to the window, sticky hands pressed up against the glass, peering at a caricatured Hitler the baker coating an unappetising slab of "hard facts" with exaggerated claims of German successes.³³⁹ Armstrong's Germans insinuated that

³³⁹ Armstrong, "Reich Custard," *Argus*, 18 October 1939, 4.

Germany would remain behind the objectives and military incursions as long as Hitler could convince the German people that the conflict benefitted them.

The *Argus* had acknowledged such internal contradictions in its editorial treatment of the German Question. Alongside a special article prepared by Austrian refugee Friedrich Czerwenka emphasising German heterogeneity, the *Argus'* accompanying commentary revealed an enlightening self-awareness of the contradictions within the newspaper's own narrative – including the deviating opinions by local and international experts that it published daily.³⁴⁰

Has Hitler the support of the German nation or has he not. A few days ago we published in this column the opinion of Mr. J.D. Keating that many Germans are 'anti-Hitler'." At various times in our own open column correspondents have supported this as well as the diametrically opposite view. [Czerwenka's article] offers an explanation of these contradictions.³⁴¹

This was further evidence that the Australian press struggled to settle on a concrete position vis-à-vis the German Question and helps to explain the *Argus'* changing attitudes towards the Nazi/German distinction.

The correspondence column throughout the following week was again filled by ardent defences and rebuttals of each stance. G.F.H.R., for example, noted how Keating's habitually apt observations in the *Argus* were, in this case, the product of an inconclusive analysis during a fleeting, superficial tour that failed to capture the realism of other accounts.³⁴² The appropriately titled "ANTI-BOSCH" and J.W.C. noted how Keating represented the dangerous "persistence" of a Nazi/German distinction and "suicidal self-deception" in the *Argus* which clouded Allied war aims.³⁴³ Many also were explicitly horrified by the evidence of growing anti-Germanism in the *Argus* and worried about the newspaper's shifting tone.³⁴⁴ Gertrude Peake agreed that "prejudice, hatred and selfishness" were inadequate pillars for engaging in meaningful dialogue with anti-Hitlerite Germany.³⁴⁵ Citing her own personal experiences of the kindness and hospitality professed by individual Germans, she argued that Australian national ignorance (an apt observation given Australia's inter-war ignorance of foreign

³⁴⁰ Thomas Mann, "Despoilers of Germany," *Argus*, 7 September 1939, 8.

³⁴¹ Friedrich Czerwenka: "News from Vienna: Analysis of 'The Reich'," *Argus*, 24 October 1939, 6.

³⁴² G.F.H.R., "Anti-Hitler Germans," *Argus*, 20 October 1939, 2.

³⁴³ ANTI-BOSCH, "Not Hitlerite Germany," *Argus*, 20 October 1939, 2.; JWC, "Hitler and Germany," *Argus*, 21 October 1939, 5.

³⁴⁴ John Fisher, "Anti-Hitler Germans," *Argus*, 19 October 1939, 2.; Farmer, "Hitler is 'Wanted'," *Argus*, 21 October 1939, 5.; Victor Spinks, "The German People," *Argus*, 23 October 1939, 2.; Demos, "The German People," *Argus*, 25 October 1939, 2.

³⁴⁵ Gertrude Peake, "The German People," *Argus*, 21 October 1939, 5. Peake echoed sentiments of Queen's College teacher Arthur Livingstone. "Anti-Hitler Germans," *Argus*, 19 October 1939, 2.

affairs) was the central driving force behind the tendency to “condemn a whole nation because of the wrongs committed by a section of its people.” Germany was suffering from the same dangerous and, importantly, universal illnesses plaguing the modern world – inward looking hyper-nationalism, greed, hatred and ignorant misunderstanding.³⁴⁶ The economic, political and diplomatic causes for hostility thus required looking reflexively inward, as much as looking outward.

An article by G.H. Morison, the paper’s former Berlin correspondent who had been forced to flee with the onset of war, summarised the paradox of the Australian conceptualisation of the war:

From the point of view of the Western Powers this war is not being waged against the whole German people but is wholly and solely a crusade against Hitlerism. There has been no confiscation of German property or any attempt to interfere with peaceful aliens carrying on their usual businesses. Chamberlain has even been at pains to declare that even if Germany resorts to aerial war on civil populations, England will not allow herself to be provoked into doing so.³⁴⁷

Australian commentators were beginning to form their own interpretations about what “no quarrel” meant in practice in the context of a totalising peoples’ war. Despite supporting the distinction in terms of limiting enmity, Morison argued, in contravention of Menzies, for compulsory democracy, emphasised German “psychology”, and complete military defeat. He also theorised that retaliation through economic warfare and civilian bombing would also be necessary to incite hopelessness and instigate revolution from within Germany. The *Argus*, attempting a more balanced approach in framing the German Question, had found Morison’s “wide knowledge of German psychology and German heterogeneity” influential. It added that Germans should now be aware of the role the Allies had designated them in the struggle and that they would soon have to prove their loyalties if the Nazi/German distinction was to remain valid and intact.³⁴⁸

By mid-1940, Germany’s aggression in Western Europe had resulted in what Hasluck has labelled a “popular clamour for action” in Australia.³⁴⁹ Menzies’ proclamation of an “All-In” war effort signalled an emerging subset of over-compensatory “parallax enmity” between April and July of 1940. This form of enmity describes the scapegoating and over-compensatory policies levelled against specific out-

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ G.H. Morison, “An Authority on Germany Says: Hitlerism Can Be Destroyed But Germans Must Do It,” *Argus*, 30 October 1939, 4.

³⁴⁸ “German People Decide, *Argus*,” 30 October 1939, 4.

³⁴⁹ Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 213-14.

groups in wartime society to offset perceived weakness, belated action or to shift focus away from other domestic problems.³⁵⁰ “All-In” was a rejection of the problematic Phoney War “business as usual” increasingly criticised by the national press as symbolic of the Government’s inactivity and softness towards the Axis powers. A concurrent push towards a similar antithesis of the Prime Minister’s “no quarrel” was equally gaining traction within the Australian media, mirroring shifting wartime contexts and the reconceptualization of the national effort towards a “total war footing” and “total war effort”.³⁵¹ Significant reverses in Western Europe, the Fall of France and the beginning of the London Blitz coincided with increased anxiety surrounding the “Fifth Column” on Anglo-American home fronts.³⁵² Speaking to the dialogical aspects of enmity formation, governmental action against tangible enemies on the home front appeared to be reactive to popular unrest, fears and suspicion channelled through public discourse.³⁵³ This influenced views of the German people more broadly.

The Australian media was becoming far more receptive to totalising enmity narratives in 1940. The *SMH* had begun to publish anti-distinction articles such as that of regular contributor Vera Wellings with greater frequency.³⁵⁴ The persistence of the *Age*’s attacks on the “German Soul”, “German *Kultur*” and characteristic “will to power” throughout 1940 and into 1941 increasingly became normalised within the Australian press.³⁵⁵ Increased reference to war against the “whole German people” as a necessary corollary of a totalising peoples’ war in the *Argus* reflected a general hardening of attitudes in the Melbourne press by the end of 1939.³⁵⁶ By mid-1940, *Argus* editorials had abandoned restraint and were frequently inferencing “hate”, “loathing” and “contempt” for the name German and the wreaking of “civilisation’s vengeance” on “Hunnish bestiality” alongside its reports on “good” Germany which were now given far less weight.³⁵⁷ The *Australasian*, The *Argus* and *Australasian Limited*’s weekly sixpence journal, also evidenced the Melbourne press’ changing attitudes. Regular book reviewer, Erle Cox, increasingly questioned the key tenets of the German

³⁵⁰ Barker, 61, 68.

³⁵¹ The *Argus* evidenced the dominating presence of this theme in contemporary media discourse. “What is Total War? Sacrifice By All,” *Argus*, 18 June 1940, 2.; “Australians Demand It,” *Argus*, 25 May 1940, 4.; “Can We Ignore This Appeal,” *Argus*, 27 May 1940, 6.; “War Brings New Era,” *Argus*, 28 May 1940, 4.; “Sympathy is Not Enough,” *Argus*, 5 June 1940, 4.; “Our Duty Clear,” *Argus*, 6 June 1940, 4.

³⁵² Barker, 97-98.

³⁵³ Robert Loeffel provides an excellent summary of the Fifth Column scare and subversion in Australia. Loeffel.

³⁵⁴ Vera Wellings, “Same Old Spots: German Leopard is Unchanged,” *SMH*, 6 July 1940, 9.; “Germany’s War Guilt: Whole People to Blame: Mr. Duff Cooper’s Speech,” *SMH*, 24 April 1940, 14.

³⁵⁵ “The German Soul,” *Age*, 17 May 1941, 20. Letters supporting the *Age*’s negative framing of German national character also continued. Multum in Parvo, Letters to the Editor: “The German Character,” *Age*, 20 January 1941, 6.

³⁵⁶ “That Way Lies Madness,” *Argus*, 11 November 1939, 4.

³⁵⁷ “Their Cause and Ours,” *Argus*, 1 June 1940, 4.; “The Gambler’s Throw,” *Argus*, 11 May 1940, 4.; George Bernhard, “What Will Follow Nazism: Peace Has True and False Friends,” *Argus*, 3 May 1940, 12.

Question throughout the war, reflecting strong commentary by local and international commentators.³⁵⁸

To suggest a complete turnaround would be misleading as the legacy of “no quarrel” continued to assert itself in the media. One confused *Argus* reader noted that a single May edition of the *Argus* contained two contrasting articles by J.S. MacDonald and G.H. Morison on German character and their enthusiasm for militarism.³⁵⁹ However, notwithstanding the continued contradictions and ambiguity that the *Argus* increasingly shared with other leading Australian newspapers, it is hard to reconcile the tolerance of its initial editorials with examples such as “The Gambler’s Throw” from May 1940. This editorial acknowledged the totalising logic of enmity in the “chaos of totalitarian warfare” and violation of the norms and rules of international conduct in the Nazi invasion of the Low Countries:

From now on he [Hitler] **and his people** must be treated without mercy or consideration. Germany has lost all claim to be regarded as anything but a nation of animals...content to see the disappearance of every shred of humanity, justice and restraint... Henceforth the ‘good German people’ must have their leaflets delivered to them covered in trinitrotoluene [TNT].³⁶⁰

The multiple cynical references to the “good German people” professed by Keating and others reflected the frustrations and despair universally expressed in the Australian press as the promises of internal revolt, negotiation and a swift end of the war which dominated public discourse in 1939 dissipated forever after May-June 1940. Such frustrations appeared to manifest themselves in uncontrolled bursts of enmity in previously tolerant newspapers.

The hardening of attitudes in the Melbourne papers was evident in a *Weekly Times* editorial from January 1941 which had asked readers to forget the Chamberlain distinction as a purely “academic” relic of the idealism it had shared with the *Argus* and *Herald* in the first months of war.³⁶¹ The *Weekly Times*’ policy regarding the German Question under editor Frank Murphy had also been established in the mid-1940 crisis when it had argued clearly against the “generous” defence of the distinction which was “calculated to confuse the minds of the people.”³⁶² By 1941, the editorials of newspapers under the *Herald* and *Weekly Times* (HWT) banner reflected the widespread employment of racist stereotypes (“square heads”) and utilisation of terms such as the “Hun” in reference to the German people. “Fritz, Hans, Karl and August” were fighting with the German “character” and “spirit” of

³⁵⁸ Cox, “Books of the Day: Causes of War,” *Australasian*, 13 September 1941, 2.

³⁵⁹ G.J., “War Guilt,” *Argus*, 10 May 1940, 11.

³⁶⁰ “The Gambler’s Throw,” *Argus*, 11 May 1940, 4.; “Churchill,” *Argus*, 13 May 1940, 4.

³⁶¹ “German People Are Our Enemies,” *Weekly Times*, 25 January 1941, 26.

³⁶² “We are Fighting the German People,” *Weekly Times*, 1 June 1940, 34.

foulness and brutality. Nazism and Hitler, the *Weekly Times* added, were an expression of the soul of the German nation rather than an isolated freak occurrence in German history. It concluded: "We are fighting the German nation, because the German nation bred, fostered, and now worships Hitlerism."³⁶³ This rhetoric seemed to resonate with readers. "Interested reader" congratulated the paper on its rebuttal of the "casual minded" within Australian society who could not realise that the "ruthlessness" and "brutality" of the "Nazi People" could only be countered by much of the same.³⁶⁴ This attitude was also evident in exemplars of Melbourne's suburban press. Editorials in the western suburbs of Melbourne from the *Sunshine Advocate* and *Williamstown Chronicle*, for instance, rejected the Nazi/German distinction, opposed sentimentalism in the war and promoted the views of Britain's prolific anti-German, Sir Robert Vansittart.³⁶⁵

In answering "Do We Hate the Germans?", a Sydney *Sun* editorial from September 1940 argued that the advice by Menzies to fight but not hate the Germans had been "met with some opposition" after a year of fighting.³⁶⁶ Analysis of the Sydney and Melbourne press reveals that this might have been an understatement. However, the *Sun's* attempt to employ contemporary psychology in its differentiation of "hatred, "hostility" and "anger" in the pursuit of war suggested that Australian newspapers were still concerned about Australia's popular reticence towards totalising enmity after mid-1940. The latter two, it argued, were acceptable responses to total war, whilst the former reflected the unbridled "passions" inculcated by the enemy through its propaganda systems – an "organised hate" incompatible with the British mind and character. This semantic differentiation had allowed Australians on the whole to reconcile their previous "friendly feelings" with German acquaintances (the *Sun* implicitly revealing its belief that "aliens" were enemies for this purpose). It advocated a "national hostility" that avoided the impractical and sentimentalist professions of Christian love for the enemy whilst rejecting furious enmity that would "affect our judgment". On the matter of morality, and in reference to recent events in Western Europe, the *Sun* implied that totalising enmity might be inevitable and justifiable if the war continued on its trajectory of totalising violence:

...there are some people of strong feelings who will regard it as their personal duty to hate the Germans. Ethically, it is a matter for the individual conscience, and, as hate is

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Interested reader, "Hit the Nazis Hard," *Weekly Times*, 1 February 1941, 5.

³⁶⁵ "Every German Worships War," *Sunshine Advocate*, 26 September 1941, 6; "The Democracies Should Get Tough," *Sunshine Advocate*, 24 April 1942, 3.

³⁶⁶ "Do We Hate the Germans?," *Sun*, 7 September 1940, 4.

apt to beget hate, there is some excuse for it in indignation which naturally follows the exhibition of German spite and brutality.³⁶⁷

The *Sun's* editors remained hesitant to promote outright hatred of the enemy which it continued to assume was not in line with the public mood. It reflected a key theme of many press narratives between 1939 and 1941 – growing receptiveness to totalising narratives of enmity matched by a resistance, in light of contemporary norms in Australian discourse, to avoid the outright proliferation of hatred against the German people. Australian commentators attempted to create a distinction between the German Question and “hatred/enmity” which mirrored both Governmental (Chapter Two) and intellectual (Chapter Four) discourse. This duality of enmity representation, however, became increasingly difficult to maintain.

The Re-emergence of the “Hun” and First World War Stereotypes

It is perhaps prudent to briefly discuss the Australian employment of stereotypes which underpinned various enmity narratives. Perhaps the most popular and resilient monosyllabic stereotype sustaining totalising enmity narratives in Australian discourse was that of the “Hun”. The “Hun” contained explicit and reductive inferences to German history, *Kultur* and character rooted contextually in the First World War.³⁶⁸ Alongside related stereotypes such as the German ogre, “Fritz” and the “Bosche”, the “Hun” connotatively resurfaced a dormant master narrative about German militarism, barbarism, the anti-Civilisation of German *Kultur*, and the aggressive lust for world domination which had been pushed by Australian intellectuals, propagandists and the media throughout the First World War.³⁶⁹ It rested on observations, assumptions and criticism that transcended Nazism to target Germany – its people, their character, and national norms.

The “Hun” quickly re-emerged in the wartime lexicon for those attempting to remobilise the totalising anti-Germanism of the previous war. In line with its concerns about totalising enmity, the *Daily Telegraph* had noted that after the first week of war, such derogatory terms were already creeping back into Australian wartime vocabularies. It attempted to provide etymologies for each term.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Fussell; Welch, “Images of the Hun: The Portrayal of the German Enemy in British Propaganda in World War I.”; Zur, 19.

³⁶⁹ David Welch, “Depicting the Enemy”, British Library. <https://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/depicting-the-enemy> (Accessed, 08/05/2017).; Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 150-55; Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920*, 123-4; Robertson; “Norman Lindsay and the ‘Asianisation’ of the German Soldier in Australia During the First World War,” *Round Table* 103, no. 2 (2014); “A Much Misunderstood Monster: The German Ogre and Australia’s Final and Forgotten Recruiting Campaign of the Great War,” *History Australia* 13, no. 3 (July, 2016); Stanley.

³⁷⁰ “A Boche is a Cabbage Head,” *DT*, 12 September 1939, 6. See also consistent references between 1939-1941. C.T., “Huns Are Huns Again,” *Herald*, 22 April 1940, 6.; Jeremy North, “The Eternal Hun,” *Sunday Sun and*

These historically contextual terms more easily encapsulated the German nation, people, and culture as a whole than terms such as “Nazis” which, in light of popular Nazi/German distinctions, were seen to connote the regime itself. The historical context of such terms in promoting totalising enmity perhaps explains the temporary hesitancy of more moderate Australian newspapers to sanction their usage in solidarity with British papers such as the *London Times*.³⁷¹

Nonetheless, by mid-1940 the “Hun” was again normalised in the everyday reporting of the Australian press.³⁷² Expressing its shifting editorial viewpoint, the *Argus* was consistently employing terms such as “Hunnish savagery”, “beastliness”, “Teutonic failing” by the beginning of the Pacific War to indict a “criminal nation”. The use of such language would frequent *Argus* editorials until the end of the war.³⁷³ Armstrong also sought to mobilise the trope to reinforce the *Argus*’ correlation between atrocity and the German people through his illustration of Hitler’s release of a flying “Hun” symbolising their role in the collective “atrocities of ’14 – ’18” [Image 9].³⁷⁴



Image 9.

Guardian Magazine, 29 September 1941, 4.; Lane Marshall, “Why We Call Them ‘Huns’,” *World’s News*, 18 October 1941, 7.

³⁷¹ C.T., “Huns are Huns Again.”; Kertesz, 71.

³⁷² Ordnance, “Let Us Not Use True Perspective on War News: Hun Has Something Coming to Him,” *SW*, 25 January 1941, 4.; “Every Hun Invader Should be Annihilated: Misplaced Mercy Only Aids His Missions,” *SW*, 11 January 1941, 4. “Ordnance” consistently utilised terms such as “Hun” and “Bosche” within normal war commentary. “Bombers Gave the Hun ‘The Works’,” *SW*, 5 May 1945, 10.

³⁷³ “Freedom and Discipline,” *Argus*, 10 January 1942, 2.

³⁷⁴ Harold Armstrong, “It is Dangerous to Awake the Dead!”, *Argus*, 28 November 1941. Reprinted in Harold Armstrong, *Army Stoo: A Fourth Volume of War Cartoons by Armstrong of the Argus*, vol. 4 (Melbourne: The Argus and Australasian Limited, 1942), 44.

The efforts of the largely conservative and heavily anti-Communist Sydney *Bulletin* magazine to engender wartime enmity in the early months of the war reflected typical sensationalist representations. This was personified through the anti-German jingoism of cartoonist Norman Lindsay's resurrection and conceptualisations of the "Hun". Lindsay personified Australian anti-German jingoism during the First World War, symbolised most prominently by the cartoonist's notorious recruitment poster of the "German Ogre".³⁷⁵ Lindsay personified a school of visual artists tending towards the "apocalyptic rather than amusing" in wartime representation; the presentation of reductive, essentialising dichotomies that framed the "eternal forces of evil against the eternal forces of good".³⁷⁶ "The Sower" [Image 10] and "The Issue" [Image 14], for instance, resurfaced the destructive "Hun" in *pickelhaube* as representative of *Kultur*, the latter in contradistinction to British "Civilisation". The barbarism of German thought and action in the binary between Civilisation and *Kultur* was commonly depicted by Lindsay as a reversal of Western democratic and liberal values espoused in the French Revolution. "Back to the Bastille!" [Image 13] depicted a gargantuan and deformed "Hun" figure brandishing a whip and forcing crawling French civilians back into the gates of the Bastille – the Revolutionary symbol of Bourbon oppression.³⁷⁷ Lindsay also presented the "Hun", complete with axe and horned helmet, slaughtering innocent nations personified by terrified women [Image 12].³⁷⁸ The trope of innocence was further commentary on the way in which previously immune non-combatants were now the target of Germany's military policies and tactics. Lindsay's remobilisation of the image of *Schrecklichkeit*, terroristic warfare against civilians, would foreshadow the *Bulletin's* criticism of Germanic indiscriminate violence in the air and justification of the Allies' own renunciation of non-combatant immunity.³⁷⁹

The rapid extent to which the "Hun" was re-embedded in Australian popular memory is further evidenced in the pictorial *Pix's* coverage of railway-worker-cum-amateur-modeller S.W. Campbell and his sand sculpture displays in Coolangatta, Queensland.³⁸⁰ Campbell's sculptures, covered by *Pix* in both 1940 and 1941, exhibited the instilling recreational activity (sand sculpting, leisurely swimming, walking or sunbathing for local beachgoers) with enmity via local interpretations of well-worn enemy

³⁷⁵ Stanley, 37.

³⁷⁶ Bernard Smith, Lindsay, Norman Alfred (1879-1969), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/lindsay-norman-alfred-7757> (accessed, 22/08/2016).

³⁷⁷ "Back to the Bastille!" The *Bulletin*, 17 July 1940,

³⁷⁸ "But These Fellows Always Come to a Sticky Finish," The *Bulletin*, 17 April 1940, 7.

³⁷⁹ "Return to the Primitive," *Bulletin*, 30 October 1940.; "The New order in Europe," *Bulletin*, 27 November 1940.; Greek Tragedy, *Bulletin*, 30 April 1941.

³⁸⁰ Under editor, Lionel B. Foster, *Pix* boasted a sizeable national readership, reaching 200,000 by early 1942. "Pix Newspapers" Photographer collecting War Effort Pictures on Australia. NAA: SP112/1, 429/1/13.

images.³⁸¹ Campbell's enlistment of his eleven and eight year old daughters, Zena and Inez, in his projects, and the huge crowds of visiting tourists (including children) evidenced the extent to which negative stereotypes relating to Germany had again been normalised in everyday Australian life.

Campbell's protest against the execution of Polish boy scouts in 1940 [Image 15] employed the German "Hun", leering over the corpse of one of the scouts who was spread out like a Swastika.³⁸² Campbell's representation of Germany rested on visually emphasising the symbolic connection between the totalising imagery of the "Hun" – the archetypal Prussian, militaristic and uncivilised nature of German national character – and Nazism (the Swastika). Campbell confided to *Pix* the following year that his experience in Europe during the First World War had given him "first-hand knowledge of German *Kultur*", implying that his "hatred of Nazism" and Prussian Militarism was clearly linked to his authoritative status as a veteran.

These connotative themes were further highlighted by the photojournalist's own contextualisation of the symbolic meanings of Campbell's artwork. "Stepping Stones to *Kultur*" [Image 16], Campbell's "version of Germany" from 1941, depicted a dehumanised and decivilized simian form symbolic of the "Hun" dragging a young girl by the hair. The gorilla, labelled so in the accompanying text based on the reporter's discussions with Campbell, boasted a Nazi armband and brandished a club – a further symbol of barbarity.³⁸³ The very term "stepping stones", popular in the First World War and revived in the current conflict, suggested that Campbell's "version" was one of a collection in the broad re-imagining of a familiar trope, drawing the worst aspects and stereotypes of German *Kultur* and dragging the German nation into a new narrative targeting Nazi Germany.³⁸⁴

³⁸¹ "Gone with The Tide: Civil Servants Hobby: Amazing Models in Sand," *Pix*, 24 August 1940, 6-7.; "Holiday Hobby: War Themes in Digger's Modelling," *Pix*, 12 July 1941, 38-39.

³⁸² "Gone with The Tide: Civil Servants Hobby."

³⁸³ "Holiday Hobby: War Themes in Digger's Modelling."

³⁸⁴ See for example the cartoons of Will Dyson between 1915-16. "Stepping Stones to Higher Things", part of a broader caricature collection "Kultur Cartoon", reflected the prevailing mood of anti-German sentiment. The links between Campbell's work and these efforts are telling. AWM: ART02265. <https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C175491> (Accessed 28/08/17).




Clockwise from top left: Image 10.; Image 12.; Image 13.; Image 14.





Above: Image 15.; Below: Image 16.



Allen and Zelizer have proposed three ways in which images of current wars are linked to the past which are evident in the employment of the “Hun” by Lindsay and Campbell. Firstly, through the words – headlines, captions and bodies of text – which accompany images. Secondly, through parallel images recycling well-established, recognisable and associated portrayals. Finally, through the employment of “substitutional depictions” – those images which establish a “definitive visual corollary between the war of then and now” and lessen the distance between old conflicts and new by complementing or replacing contemporary images.³⁸⁵ The “Hun” and “Kultur” in both cases connotatively and symbolically referenced the First World War, recovering and repurposing older associations with Prussianism, militarism and Kaiserism and linking the current conflict to “familiar” actors (Nazi Germany), experiences, emotions, ideas and values.³⁸⁶ Lindsay’s wartime cartoons and Campbell’s sculptures were easily repurposed to serve totalising enmity narratives in the media attempting to assert a connection between Germanness (*Deutschtum*), the German nation and National Socialism.

“What this country needs is more hate, more hate for the Hun”: Popular Magazines and the German Question

Magazines were an important facet of Second World War Australian public discourse. As Jowett and O'Donnell note, magazines constitute a personal medium that fosters strong association and identification between readership and editorial attitudes. They argue that it was in magazines that “most of the political and social muckraking took place.”³⁸⁷ Naturally then, Australian magazines were a strong source of totalising enmity in the first years of the conflict. Ironically, the inter-war period for *Truth*, *Smith's Weekly*, *Current Problems* and the *Bulletin* can be summarised as a blend of hyper-nationalism, isolationism, pro-Appeasement and even varying levels of overt pro-Germanism.³⁸⁸ The oft-exaggerated, over compensatory and uncompromising anti-Germanism that will be discussed below can be interpreted, in part at least, as an attempt to reconcile previously open support for Hitler’s regime and appeasement and cover up the embarrassingly belated *volte face* most committed.

Under the wartime editorship of Claude McKay and George Goddard, the jingoistic *Smith's Weekly* was a representative hard-line critic of a Nazi/German distinction throughout the war.³⁸⁹ However, mirroring others within the mainstream press, its position on the German Question was rather sketchy in the first weeks of the conflict. Throughout September 1939, *Smith's* swayed between two almost contradictory positions in its attempts to capture the public mood in line with its longstanding

³⁸⁵ Allan and Zelizer, 125-9.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., 125.

³⁸⁷ Jowett and O'Donnell, 109.

³⁸⁸ Andrews, 198.; Walker, 81-2.

³⁸⁹ Despite suffering sales throughout the 1930s, a rationalised *Smith's* saw a boost in wartime sales from 97,219 in March 1940 (its lowest circulation) to 228,579 by the end of the war. This suggested a resonance of its wartime message with readers. Numbers quoted in Walker, 76.

tendency of partiality, inconsistency and sensational shifts on issues resonating with its readership.³⁹⁰ This serves as a reminder of the role of commercial interests in media narratives and the attempts to align content with perceived public interest in war discourse that influenced editorial responses to the German Question.³⁹¹ In its “Why We Publish” section, *Smith’s* discussion of why Australia was fighting shifted between negative stereotypes and essentialising character traits and support for Menzian war aims:

Australia with Britain is at war against Hitler on behalf of the German people.... Fritz, who faced the Diggers from his trenches, has deeper roots than Adolf. According to his history and heredity, the German falls readily into goose-step [yet neither] Britain nor Australia wants Germany destroyed. They want but to free a great people from the tyranny of Hitler and his Nazi gunmen.³⁹²

The German people were victims of this regime of terror which stifled “liberty, democracy, religion and humanity” and the fate of the Jewish community, Catholics, religious leaders and liberal intellectuals, persecuted, interned or forced into exile, particular evidence of the brutality of Nazism.

Menzies’ allusions to freeing German “victims” from their leaders was considered appropriate during the final weeks of Kenneth Slessor’s editorship. By October, however, evidence of *Smith’s* criticism of the Menzies administration’s self-proclaimed “business as usual” approach to Germany was clear. The periodical cynically asked in direct reference to the German Question, “*Are We At War....Or Aren’t We*”.³⁹³ The article reproached red-tape undermining an effective, all-in, and “total” effort.³⁹⁴ *Smith’s* argued that the war was against “Fritz” – a derogatory characterisation of German soldiers synonymous with the “German” of the last war in Australian collective memory.³⁹⁵ In attacking Menzies’ soft-peddalling towards the “Hun”, *Smith’s* contemptuously labelled Menzies a

...complex philosopher who sees a number of Fritzes flitting about, and...fears to hit the wrong Fritz. Actually Fritz is doing the same for Hitler just the same as he did for Kaiser William [Wilhelm II]...³⁹⁶

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 73, 76. “Aliens’ Dependents in Distress: Most People Sympathetic, Wife Declares,” *SW*, 23 September 1939, 19.

³⁹¹ Carruthers, 9.

³⁹² “Why We Publish: The Empire Set Out to Free Germany: How It Began: Germany Under the Heel of a Tyranny,” *SW*, 16 September 1939, 12.

³⁹³ “Are We at War, Mr. Menzies, Or Aren’t We?,” *SW*, 14 October 1939, 10. Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 198-99.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ “Don’t Believe German Propaganda!: The Hun as He really Is,” *SW*, 11 May 1940, 1.

³⁹⁶ “Are We at War, Mr. Menzies, Or Aren’t We?”



Image 17.

This idea was further emphasised by an accompanying cartoon by Stanley (Stan) George Cross in one of his final submissions to the magazine [Image 17].³⁹⁷ Cross, in emphasising the ridiculousness of the Australian and British official stance, depicted an outraged German, an “AVERAGE GERMAN”, taking offence to Menzies’ public statements reinforcing the distinction between the German people and the *Führer*.³⁹⁸ Menzies’ sentimentality, the cartoon insinuated, was wasted on the “all Bosche” average German. Cross further highlighted the ridiculousness of such attitudes under conditions of totalising warfare by the explosions in the background. The “misconception” of German character and relationship with Nazism was further highlighted by Chamberlain, the British architect of Appeasement, and his equally wasted attempts to draw distinctions between Germans and Nazis – symbolised by the divisive “leaflet” drop over German cities consistently criticised and ridiculed by

³⁹⁷ Stan Cross, “A Slight Misconception,” *Smith’s Weekly*, 14 October 1939, 10. Cross worked as a cartoonist for *Smith’s* until moving to the *Melbourne Herald* in 1940. Vane Lindesay, “Stan Cross in Smith’s Weekly,” *The LaTrobe Journal*, no. 65 (Autumn, 2000); Walker, 74.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 74.

Smith's.³⁹⁹ Menzies' rejection of totalising enmity was a far cry from *Smith's* yearning for the strong, anti-German leadership personified by Billy Hughes and Clemenceau published by its artists one month later.⁴⁰⁰

Smith's promotion of essentialising, totalising narratives and indictments of Germany served to bolster vehement and vitriolic anti "Alien" campaigns during the Blitzkrieg of Western Europe.⁴⁰¹ It had directly blamed the persistence of Menzies' Nazi/German distinction for national apathy in the face of the Fifth Column threat in mid-1940.⁴⁰² The anti-Alien agenda also was professed in *Current Problems*, an international affairs periodical aimed at the average reader and under the editorial control of influential "anti-Alien" advocate, A.M. Pooley.⁴⁰³ Pooley envisioned the magazine fulfilling an essential wartime role – namely to hold the Government to account for its failures in preparing the nation for war and filling in the gaps of its confusing and often contradictory war narrative. This meant, most of all, providing a clear definition and knowledge of the German enemy. Several articles republished Pooley's popular talks on 2GB Sydney and 3AW in Melbourne on that very subject, clarifying the "confusion", "vagueness" and "misunderstanding" which reader correspondents had expressed to Pooley and the magazine about what Australians were actually fighting.⁴⁰⁴

Pooley reflected *Smith's* concerns that the Australian media was perpetuating a dangerous vision of "good" Germany:

There are still illusions about Germany, about Hitler, about the Nazis...People still say, 'the Germans are nice people...they treated me splendidly, when I was in Berlin...of course they did...It was part of the game...I think that it is silly to say that we are not fighting the German people...'⁴⁰⁵

Incredulous that the message had failed to sink in by the end of 1939, and certain that misunderstanding of the Nazi/German distinction was responsible for the widespread "appalling

³⁹⁹ Cross, "A Slight Misconception." The 'leaflet war' was a strong conduit for debate on the German Question in Australian and Britain given the inherent logic behind it. Kertesz notes similar divisiveness in Britain. Kertesz, 64.

⁴⁰⁰ "This War is Different," *SW*, 28 October 1939, 20.

⁴⁰¹ Loeffel, 60, 70, 116. *Truth* magazine served as an equally potent platform for anti-German sentiment, fulfilling what it saw as a public demand for an intern-them-all policy. "Intern All Enemy Aliens!," *Truth*, 14 July 1940, 18.; "Intern All Enemy Aliens is Demand," *Truth*, 25 January 1942, 21.

⁴⁰² "Take No Chances With Fake Friendship of Enemy Aliens: Better to Be Sure Than Sorry," *SW*, 22 June 1940, 10.

⁴⁰³ Pooley was described by *Smith's* as one of Australia's "most expert journalists, commentators and publicists" with a large following. "Japan Must Be Put in Her Place – As a Second-Class Nation," *SW*, 13 December 1941, 1.

⁴⁰⁴ "What the War Means to Us," *Current Problems*, 6 October 1939, 290-92; "For What Do We Fight," *Current Problems*, 6 November 1939, ii-iii.

⁴⁰⁵ Pooley, "For What Do We Fight."

apathy” and sluggishness in the wartime community, *Current Problems* republished one of Pooley’s popular radio broadcasts under the revealing title, “GERMAN OR NAZI: WHOM DO WE FIGHT?”.⁴⁰⁶ He reasoned that it was wrong to attribute the aggressive foreign policies, atrocities and outright responsibility for the war to Nazism alone. These actions were confluent with “German character” and were “authorised by the German people as a whole.”⁴⁰⁷ The failure of Lyons and Menzies to implement an effective National Aliens’ Register, and the Government’s “futile” internment policy and attitudes towards Australia’s national enemies bordering on “tenderness”, had resulted in “genuine doubts” in Australian public discourse “as to whether we are really at war with Germany or not”.⁴⁰⁸ Pooley also criticised dangerous talk about the oft-cited “Revolt in Germany” – not only the Leftist variant but a popular idea in the “foolish” mainstream Australian Press.⁴⁰⁹ Pooley noted, in light of these mistruths, that it was “not surprising that plenty of people are wondering whether Germany is our enemy or not. We must consider this matter of very great importance.”⁴¹⁰

Perhaps the vehement critic of distinction rhetoric was the publications of Ezra Norton’s controversial Truth and Sportsman Ltd. –the weekly *Truth* and the *Daily Mirror* (from May 1941). *Truth* was edited by Norton’s newspaper executive, Mark Gallard. Gallard had facilitated the scandalous weekly’s growth throughout the inter-war period and articulated Norton’s “wayward” and fluctuating editorial policies – a reflection of the paper’s shifting political disposition and chameleonic attitude towards Nazi Germany.⁴¹¹ *Truth*’s anti-Germanism was heavily shaped by Norton’s European Editor-in-Chief, Frederich Ehrenfried (Eric) Baume, who had left for Europe mere weeks after the declaration of war as a last-minute replacement for the fourth accredited correspondent.⁴¹² A New Zealand born journalist of German-Jewish parentage, Baume was a persuasive voice in Australian public discourse and a dominating print and radio presence over the previous decade.⁴¹³ Through his weekly London cable service for *Truth*, “Baume’s Overseas Budget” (“BOB”), and his regular correspondence for the *Daily Mirror*, Baume critiqued perceived weakness in the Allied war effort which largely stemmed from widespread misunderstandings of the enemy.

⁴⁰⁶ “GERMAN OR NAZI: WHOM DO WE FIGHT,” *Current Problems*, 6 December 1939, ii-iii.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ “Home Front: Enemy Aliens,” *Current Problems*, 21 December 1939, 369-70.

⁴⁰⁹ “September Newsletter: Revolt in Germany,” *Current Problems*, 6 October 1939, 282-3.

⁴¹⁰ “Home Front: Enemy Aliens.”

⁴¹¹ Walker, 82. By 1938, *Truth* sales had reached 248,000, yet publication had weakened during the war due to Packer’s *Sunday Telegraph*. Stuart Inder, Gallard, Mark Edward (1899-1971), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/gallard-mark-edward-10269> (accessed, 17/10/2017).

⁴¹² Fay Anderson and Richard Trembath, *Witness to War: The History of Australian Conflict Reporting* (Melbourne: MUP, 2011), 111.

⁴¹³ Arthur Manning, *Larger Than Life: The Story of Eric Baume* (Sydney: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1967), 80-81.

Baume's first memoir, *I Lived These Years* (1941), summarised the relationship between his anti-German sentiment and "total war".⁴¹⁴ The opening chapter aptly summarised the views Baume professed in cables to Australia over the previous two years:

You may note throughout frank and unadulterated hatred for the German aims and the German system. Hatred, some people say, is wrong and futile and hopeless. Yet you cannot fight an enemy if you love him. And if you do not hate him for what he represents to you and to your country you might as well not fight a war at all. That is not what high officials of the ethical tradition said in this country when the war had been months in progress. They had no objections to the Germans as such. They met many delightful Germans. The Germans were gentlemen – God save the word! They were charming, they were excellent dancers and good sportsmen.

Baume was concerned about the continued influence of positive inter-war images of the "Good German", particularly since his anti-appeasement warnings about the German "menace" had been "pilloried" in Australia.⁴¹⁵ The bitterness of Baume's self-declared martyrdom was a sore point that only inflamed his anti-German rhetoric.⁴¹⁶ In this, he shared a great deal with his unofficial mentor, Sir Robert Vansittart, who was similarly booted from the British foreign office for his outspoken anti-German polemics.⁴¹⁷

Truth, *Smith's* and the *Current Problems* shared a mutual admiration for Vansittart.⁴¹⁸ Pro-Vansittartist articles frequently reinforced editorial commentary and were even mailed to respective magazines by interested readers demanding that they be published.⁴¹⁹ Given the sizeable influence "Vansittartism" asserted in Australian debates and on Baume's ideas in particular, it is worthwhile that we digress to introduce this key British symbol of anti-Germanism.

Freed from the limitations of public service as the former Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office (1930-38) and Chief Diplomatic Advisor (positions which had reinforced and guided his attitude vis-à-vis Germany), Vansittart devoted his wartime activity to inoculating the Anglo-American societies

⁴¹⁴ Frederick Ehrenfried (Eric) Baume, *I Lived These Years* (Sydney: George G. Harrap & Co., 1941). Baume produced a sequel the following year. *I've Lived Another Year: A Journalist's Diary of the Year 1941* (Sydney: George G. Harrap & Co., 1942). Both memoirs sold well and contributed to Baume's public standing, despite their self-proclaimed brashness and vulgarity. Manning, 106.

⁴¹⁵ Baume, *I Lived These Years*, 14.; *I Lived These Years*, 14.; "British Public Wants Gloves Off: No More Tit-For-Tat: Churchill Told To Hit Harder," *Truth*, 12 May 1940, 22.

⁴¹⁶ "Do We Fully Realise What the Empire is Fighting?," *Truth*, 3 March 1940, 20.

⁴¹⁷ Robert G. Vansittart, *Lessons of My Life* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1943), 9-10, 16, 215.

⁴¹⁸ "How Vansittart Would Deal With Germany," *SW*, 13 June 1942, 8.

⁴¹⁹ *Smith's* had received such letters from F. Baxter and E. Aeschliman. "Will Germany Escape as In 1914-18?," *SW*, 27 August 1942, 8.

against rampant misunderstandings of the German Question. He deconstructed the myth of the “Good” German through the employment of stereotypes and tropes, colourful and polemical representational strategies in lieu of his political opponents,⁴²⁰ and celebrated “plain speaking” highly effective in the context of war.⁴²¹ Vansittart brought together and articulated common ideas related to the German Question: Germany’s deeply rooted national character, historically evident expansionism, militarism, aggression and urge for global domination, and the continuity of manifestations of *Weltpolitik* through Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Hitler.⁴²² Vansittart’s influential “Black Record” broadcasts in Britain between November and December 1940 were a concerted effort to raise awareness of the German Question and present these problems in a simplified format for the average Briton engaged in contemporary debates on wartime enmity.⁴²³

Despite limited references to the broadcasts in Australia throughout early 1941, Vansittart’s presence only truly started to be felt in the wake of the Australian publication of the talks under the same title.⁴²⁴ While raising some concerns about its polemical tone, Australian book reviewers set the largely positive response to *Black Record* before editorials reinforced individual newspaper responses.⁴²⁵ This is further evidence of the totalisation of enmity narratives in the mainstream press by 1941. Despite some sophisticated and intellectual engagement with the ideas in *Black Record*,⁴²⁶ Vansittartism featured heavily in media debates as an often inflammatory and contentious shorthand for anti-Germanism, reductive analyses of German “national character” or “hard” peace. Between mid-1941 and 1945, Vansittartism was popularized within Australian wartime vocabulary. For instance, A.L.B., a columnist for the *Argus*, could speak freely of “Vansittartisms” as a shorthand for anti-German rhetoric in 1944 assuming reader knowledge of the term.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁰ Kertesz, 193.

⁴²¹ Robert G. Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present*, Australian ed. (Melbourne: Hamish Hamilton, 1941).

⁴²² Aaron Goldman, “Germans and Nazis: The Controversy over ‘Vansittartism’ in Britain During the Second World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 1 (1979).

⁴²³ Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present*. See blurb for Australian edition.

⁴²⁴ Ibid. *Black Record* ran through fourteen editions with contemporary estimations of over 3,000,000 readers by the end of 1941 through various published material. Kirk Graham, “A Good Germany?,” *History Today* 67, no. 7 (2017): 10; Ramsden, 184; Valet, 28. *Black Record* was followed by Robert G. Vansittart, *Roots of the Trouble* (Melbourne: Hutchinson & Co., 1941).; the pseudo-autobiography, *Lessons of My Life*.; and *Bones of Contention* (Melbourne: Hutchinson & Co., 1945). While popularly discussed in Australia, these did not cause the same level of debate as *Black Record* within Australian public discourse.

⁴²⁵ Notwithstanding the *DT*’s relatively tolerant tone, its reviewer described *Black Record* as a “magnificent, myth-slashing campaign” of indicting the German nation. He acknowledged that while there are some good Germans, they were powerless to sway the majority. Mr. Montaigne’s Bookshelf, “Nazism is Logical Outcome of German History,” *DT*, 24 May 1941, 4.; “Books of the Week: Should Germany Be the Object of revenge and Hate? – Analysis of “Vansittartism”,” *SMH*, 6 June 1942, 6.

⁴²⁶ See p. 110.

⁴²⁷ *Argus*, 8 March 1944, 8.

Almost every Australian journal expressed some sort of attitude towards Vansittartism, even though their commentary varied in the space devoted to it.⁴²⁸ While achieving supporters on both sides of the political and ideological spectrum in Australia,⁴²⁹ Vansittartism most often resonated with conservatives and journals associated with the political right with a tendency towards anti-‘soft’ peace and anti-appeasement credentials. As an import of popular British and American debates, the manifestations of Vansittartism in Australian narratives were poorly defined, generally employed to reductively and often falsely denote any form of condemnatory, essentializing and negative interpretation of German history and character.⁴³⁰ Narratives that connected the actions and ideology of National Socialism with the popular ambitions of the German people, employed racialism in the style of National Socialism, or proposed the annihilation of the German people (in spite of Vansittart’s consistent rejection of this) were often criticized as being “Vansittartist”.⁴³¹ Notwithstanding the complexity of Vansittart’s ideas, it is these popular manifestations of Vansittartism that are most valuable to this study, given their capacity to incite and inflame wartime enmities.

A self-identifying “Vansittartite”, Baume was clearly transfixed by the “Black Record” broadcasts in December 1940 which he saw as giving authoritative credibility to arguments he had been raising for over a year regarding the “German mentality”.⁴³² Baume devoted his correspondence to the defence of Vansittart from the British press (swerving from the extremes of the Conservative Tory press to the Leftist periodicals) and correcting misrepresentations of Vansittartism held by Australian readers. He criticised a climate of censorship and political interference disallowing “the public to give free expression to the loathsome contempt and utter hatred they feel for the German swine.”⁴³³ In Vansittart, Baume found an individual who gave public, authoritative expression to his pre-existing ideas developed throughout the late inter-war period – a vocal and powerful corrective to the soft-peddling of British and Australian leaders and authorities restrained by political considerations or misplaced moral hang-ups about unleashing violence on the German people.⁴³⁴

⁴²⁸ “German Manners,” *Age*, 20 June 1942, 6. The *Age*, in referencing the debate, summarised that “since the publication of Sir Robert Vansittart’s ‘Black Record’, it has been hotly debated whether we should regard the whole German people as the makers of war or the deluded victims of a political party.”

⁴²⁹ Graham, 10; Ramsden, 199.

⁴³⁰ Hoenicke Moore, 241, 46, 66.; Goldman, 168-9, 75-6.

⁴³¹ *Lessons of My Life* contained a sizeable chapter on the phenomenon/doctrine of “Vansittartism” which summarised Vansittart’s consistent attempts to amend these popular misconceptions about his arguments. Vansittart, *Lessons of My Life*, 30-4.

⁴³² Baume, *I Lived These Years*, 273.; *I’ve Lived Another Year: A Journalist’s Diary of the Year 1941*, 149.

⁴³³ Baume, “Baume’s Overseas Budget (henceforth, BOB),” *Truth*, 1 December 1940, 18.; “BOB: Attack,” *Truth*, 1 March 1942, 18.

⁴³⁴ *Truth*, 3 August 1941, 22.

Ignoring Australian media norms surrounding the outward promotion of hatred propaganda expressed by the *Sun* and others, instilling enmity towards the German people was an explicit aim of Baume's editorials and speeches. Baume had controversially told a representative for the *Daily Telegraph* before boarding a London-bound ship on 15 September 1939 that "what this country needs is more hate, more hate for the Hun".⁴³⁵ Syndication of the report ensured that readers as far away as Perth read of Baume's call to hate, leading to criticism in the correspondence column of the Perth press.⁴³⁶ Upon arriving in pre-Blitz London, Baume reflected on a similar lack of hate for the Germans the British shared with Australia in contrast to the "Hate Everything" policy of 1914.⁴³⁷ Baume noted that the absence of hate for these "inconsequential things" – words, music and football colours – was a positive step. However, he noted that this vacuum was not being filled by a realistic hatred of the Germans, their national character and conduct: "...war without any hate...is absurd and maudlin...the natural antipathy to an enemy determined to strangle them has been dispelled by too friendly expressions from those...higher up."⁴³⁸

The obvious implication here was that the war effort had been retarded in its early years by an absence of hate. Despite the journalistic bombast of Baume's writing and broadcasts, he agreed, on the surface, with Vansittart's principle of avoiding vindictiveness for vindictiveness' sake. Enmity was rather a matter of realism in wartime, as it was in peacetime conduct in foreign affairs. Attitudes should be, as Baume wrote after an unplanned interview with Vansittart at Chesterfield House in 1941, "cold, informed hatred", unemotional and driven by rational arguments and empirical evidence.⁴³⁹ It was to be, in other words, a purposeful hate serving wartime interests and aims. Baume explained that the "tall, smiling German hater" did not "hate crudely", nor believe that all Germans were inherently evil.⁴⁴⁰ Baume's journalistic attacks on Germany, however, rarely stopped to explain such theoretical considerations. He uncritically and indiscriminately incited wartime hatred of Germany and indicting its people "coldly and mercilessly" as worthy targets of violence.⁴⁴¹

Vansittart was not the only anti-German to frequent Baume's cables. Baume jumped on any opportunity to add snippets of influential figures who supported his claims that the war was against the Germans.⁴⁴² Baume's analysis was biased towards and promoted views of the "numerically small

⁴³⁵ "'More Hate', Writer's Theory," *DT*, 16 September 1939, 6.

⁴³⁶ "'Just Ordinary', No Time for Hate," *Daily News*, 9 October 1939, 4.

⁴³⁷ "BOB: This War Without Hate!," *Truth*, 28 April 1940, 18.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁹ Baume, *I've Lived Another Year: A Journalist's Diary of the Year 1941*, 85-6.

⁴⁴⁰ "BOB: Post-War German Warning," *Truth*, 24 May 1942, 16.

⁴⁴¹ "Do We Fully Realise What the Empire is Fighting?," *Truth*, 3 March 1940, 20.

⁴⁴² For example, see Conway Evans on the privileged position of German *emigres* (*Truth*, 3 August 1941, 22); a young cadet officer's claims of hatred and war against the "German Race" (*Truth*, 8 September 1940, 22); a reprint of a letter by Viscount Elibank on his frustration and official attempts to differentiate between "the Nazis

section" of British society, led by Field Marshall Lord Milne, A. Duff Cooper, Gilbert Murray, Lord Beaverbrook and others popularly quoted in *Truth*, who criticised the "differentiation of Nazis and Germans as enemies".⁴⁴³ Baume was not alone in mobilising leading British opinion.⁴⁴⁴ *Smith's* London correspondent, F.L. McIlraith, emphasised a split along "political" line between the Left-Liberal Press and "more realist journals" to which *Smith's* aligned. The latter, he argued rallying the same language as Baume, formed a vanguard against "kid-glove" appeasers. McIlraith's interpretations and support for hard-line British opinion was often presented by the editor as symbolic of *Smith's* editorial viewpoint on the German Question.⁴⁴⁵

Any remaining vestige of restraint in *Truth's* criticism of the weakness of British and Dominion leaders had dissipated by early 1940. Baume launched a full-throttle attack on the "mealy-mouthed speeches" and "restraint" of politicians, Anglo-American "pro-Germans", "emotional optimists" and the disingenuous "ministries of information" (the MOI and DOI) for lacking the realism of their beleaguered continental Allies. Baume alluded to a sinister conspiracy by leading officials across the British Empire:

In actual fact, we [in Britain] feel the war no more than you do in Australia or New Zealand. Sometimes I feel an Invisible Government doesn't want us to see the Germans, men and women alike, as the foul beasts that they are, beasts who today give slavering allegiance to a German Government or murderous perverts...Every living German is to blame for this war, just as in 1914. Barbarism – a coordinated barbarism – is marching against the scattered forces of civilisation...⁴⁴⁶

Norton's sensational headline of the leading article, "1940 Germans are the Germans of 1914", captured Baume's historical platitudes, references to the "Hun", and employment of the language and themes of the previous conflict – Germanic barbarism, the Civilisation/*Kultur* binary, anti-Christianism and atrocity.⁴⁴⁷

and so-called 'good' Germans" ("Can't Soothe a Tiger By Stroking Him," *Truth*, 12 October 1941, 23); and the statements of D.G. MacKenzie which Baume considered necessary to combat "painstakingly" produced publications aimed to "point out the German people have nothing to do with this war." (*Truth*, 10 May 1942, 16.). See also, "Give Huns Hate", *Truth*, 26 January 1941, 13.

⁴⁴³ "Split German Nation – Range Nazis Against Anti-Hitlerites," *Truth*, 3 December 1939, 3.

⁴⁴⁴ For instance, the *Cessnock Eagle* had utilised Lord Milne's statement in the House of Lords to attack local manifestations of the 'good' German argument. "Hitlerism and the German Nation," *CE*, 1 December 1939, 7.

⁴⁴⁵ F.L. McIlraith, "Realities of War Examined by F.L. McIlraith: Leaflet War Won't Do It: Put Yourself in Their Place, *Smith's Weekly*," 14 October 1939, 12.; "Symposium of British Publicists on War Aims: Realism Expressed by a Frenchman," *SW*, 18 November 1939, 6.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ "1940 Germans Are Germans of 1914," *Truth*, 3 March 1940, 20.; "Do We Fully Realise What the Empire is Fighting?"



Image 18.

Churchill’s tenure from May 1940 saw improvements in Baume’s eyes and a personal admiration of the new Prime Minister’s longstanding lack of reservations in public utterances of “frank hatred” for Germany.⁴⁴⁸ Baume’s criticism of Government inaction and lack of policy regarding Germany, however, continued unabated throughout the remainder of the war. This was not only concerning the weakness of the reprisal campaign but also regarding the War Cabinet’s reluctance to prepare a “truculent forthright statement about the growing enmity of the British people to Germany.”⁴⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Baume noted with pride that his paper, *Truth*, was “one of the first newspapers to say straight out that the Empire was fighting the whole of Germany and that Hitler and Germany could not be separated.” [Image 18].⁴⁵⁰

Totalising enmity narratives did not always appear where one might expect. The editors of the *Australian Women’s Weekly* (AWW) – the most widely read magazine in Australian publishing history,

⁴⁴⁸ “BOB: “Hyena Hitler,”” *Truth*, 5 May 1940, 10. Papers such as the *Argus* had shared Baume’s enthusiasm. “Churchill,” *Argus*, 13 May 1940, 4. However, Baume’s tendency towards outbursts of anger had led to direct conflict and censure by Churchill himself. Manning, 101-2. Baume’s anger was perhaps exacerbated when he realised that, notwithstanding his crude rhetoric against the ‘Huns’, Churchill maintained a practical distinction between the German people and Hitler. Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, 353-4.

⁴⁴⁹ “Let Us Be Truculent!,” *Truth*, 19 January 1941, 14; “Russia’s Plan for Revenge: Whitehall Shows Amazing Apathy,” *Truth*, 11 January 1942, 21; Baume, *I’ve Lived Another Year: A Journalist’s Diary of the Year 1941*, 78.

⁴⁵⁰ ““Truth’ Lead in War Policy,”” *Truth*, 29 September 1940, 15.

with a weekly readership of 700,000 by the end of the conflict⁴⁵¹ – rejected wholeheartedly the “no quarrel” sentiment. This was despite the magazine’s tendency of putting a positive spin on most of its war commentary and diverting reader attention away from disquieting news commentary on foreign affairs. An exemplary editorial, probably written by long-time editor Alice Jackson, entitled “The Hun at His Worst”, heavily implicated the German people and presented the argument that the bullying, terroristic and brutal form of Nazi warfare was actually a product of a “flaw in the German character”.⁴⁵² Jackson’s editorials seemed to reinforce the AWW’s longstanding argument that the “German doesn’t change much”.⁴⁵³

Other popular magazines had actually supported Menzies’ distinction between the Germans and Nazis and rejected totalising enmity. Kenneth G. Murray’s *Man* magazine – a popular men’s magazine with a readership of between 60,000 and 70,000 in the early years of the war – epitomised the popular narrative of German victimhood.⁴⁵⁴ Alongside a number of supportive articles applauding the lack of “bitter propaganda against the millions of good people in Germany” in official propaganda, the media and the ABC, *Man*’s November 1939 edition provided vivid artistic representations of German life under the police state and the camp system.⁴⁵⁵ The image of Frau Schmidt, a grieving German widow receiving the contents of her deceased husband in a cigar box, was exemplary. It appropriated a humanising anecdote popularised in Australia in a number of variations through reviews of American Quaker Nora Waln’s *Reaching for the Stars*.⁴⁵⁶ Accompanying illustrations emphasised the plight of anti-Nazi Germans in the camps and under aerial bombardment, as well as sickening descriptions of “Nazi Kultur” and “Nazi” propaganda and contained inert references to the German people being “not to blame” and “no hate from the Allies” attempting to free Germany from Nazism.⁴⁵⁷

Agreement with “no quarrel” rhetoric and a focus on “Hitlerism” was reinforced by the magazine’s discussion of the Allied leaflet drops so ridiculed in *Smith’s Weekly*, *Truth* and *Current Problems*. The utility of the raids was captured in another illustration by staff-artist Barnes accompanied by the translated message [Image 19]: **“We have no quarrel with the German people. Our fight is against Hitlerism and we are at war to re-establish peaceful relationship between the world’s peoples”**. The accompanying text also stressed the message of the inter-war travel impressions about German

⁴⁵¹ Figures taken from 1946. The Australian Women’s Weekly. The Australian Women’s Register, www.womenaustralia.info/biogs/AWE3520b.htm (accessed, 04/05/2017).

⁴⁵² “An Editorial: The Hun At His Worst!,” AWW, 1 June 1940, 20.

⁴⁵³ “An Editorial: Blitzkrieg on the Cradle,” AWW, 15 June 1940, 12.

⁴⁵⁴ Greg Ray, “MAN Magazine: The Australian Publishing Icon,” Collecting Books and Magazines, Blue Mountains, NSW, Australia, <http://www.collectingbooksandmagazines.com/man.html> (accessed, 11/09/2018).

⁴⁵⁵ “The Bore War”, *Man*, November 1939, 11.; A.R., “What of the German Language,” *Man*, Nov 1939, 28.

⁴⁵⁶ Nora Waln, *Reaching for the Stars* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1939).; Freda Barrymore, “Books Received,” *Townsville Daily Bulletin*, 30 May 1939, 11.; “A Quaker in Nazi Germany, *Sunday Mail*,” 28 May 1939, 12.

⁴⁵⁷ “Official Nazi Propaganda Takes Hate to Point of Ridicule,” *Man*, No 1939, 90-1, 93-4.

hospitality and *Gemütlichkeit*.⁴⁵⁸ *Man* envisioned a return to normalised relations and natural friendship between Britain and Germany, and the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between Germans and Nazis to promote internal German resistance. This was despite the magazine's recognition that modern warfare was indiscriminate in nature and had effectively eroded combatant/non-combatant distinctions, a fact stressed by *Truth*, *Smith's Weekly* and *Current Problems* in their attempts to mobilise totalising enmity narratives.⁴⁵⁹



Image 19.

⁴⁵⁸ *Man*, Nov 1939, 46-7.

⁴⁵⁹ Finch, "Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century."; *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 29-30, 44.

Conclusion

Summarising the first months of the conflict, A.G. Darby had written to the *Adelaide Advertiser* applauding the pleasing restraint by Australian authorities and the press against facilitating “racial hatreds towards the German peoples.”⁴⁶⁰ Superficially, such accounts appear to vindicate Ian Harmstorf’s analysis of Australian public discourse. However, analysis of the broad range of media sources discussed within this chapter have shown that while a precondition of totalising hatred was not evident in the Australian press from the outset, a tentative and isolated minority who were critical of the Nazi/German distinction in September 1939 had grown throughout the first year of the conflict to increasingly normalise totalising enmity in Australian public discourse.

This chapter has focused on the response of Australia’s leading newspapers to the proliferation of totalising enmity and the German Question between 1939 and 1941. Analysis of the first months of the war in particular has demonstrated that many Sydney and Melbourne newspapers initially supported the distinction posed by Menzies, despite wide ranging disagreement already being expressed in the national correspondence columns. While some papers, such as the *Age* and *Sun* expressed doubts from the beginning, many other newspapers slowly shifted their views throughout the Phoney War to present an often disjointed, confusing and even contradictory view of the German people. The uncertainty existing within the *Argus*’ narrative was far from unique, reflecting a characteristic ambiguity in the Australian press on key facets of the German Question that often bordered on self-contradiction as the narrative developed between 1939 and 1941.

Many newspapers appeared cautious to not sway too far towards the outright hate propaganda of the previous war, nor open themselves to accusations of hyper-patriotic fervour and warmongering on one hand, or pacifist sentimentality and disloyalty to Australian objectives and war effort on the other. Attempts to avoid “hate” reflected public attitudes towards enmity, at least insofar as newspaper and journal editors read the public mood. However, by mid-1940, a significant voice within Australian public discourse promoted enmity engendering narratives that reflected the totalising logic of the war. Analysis of *Smith’s Weekly*, *Truth*, *The Bulletin* and *Current Problems* evidences a vocal minority in the wartime media who, from the first weeks of the war, attempted to mobilise a realistic enmity that connected the German people with the objectives and actions of their government.

⁴⁶⁰ A. G. Darby: “Nazism and Racial Hatred: Chivalrous Australian Spirit,” *Advertiser*, 21 October 1939, 20.

Chapter Four: *Sine ira et studio?* Australian Intellectual Framing of the German Question

In light of the politics of wartime loyalty, hyper-patriotism and propaganda, the precise role and contribution of intellectuals during the two world wars was in no way clear cut.⁴⁶¹ Historical analysis of Australian intellectual engagement in public war discourse *qua intellectuals* has highlighted the difficulty experienced by intellectuals in balancing between competing aims: firstly, maintaining self-professed academic *objectivity* and, secondly, the unavoidable conscription into morale-boosting activities of the Australian and Allied war efforts. The influence of Australian intellectuals on local enmity narratives is not only evident in their own individual attempts to influence wartime discourse. Their arguments were also source material to be exploited, distorted and mobilised by the media, politicians and other interest groups.

Australian intellectual attempts to reinforce a distinction between the German people and their leaders and put wartime enmities under the microscope did not necessitate nor indicate pacifism and anti-war sentiment. Intellectuals who actively opposed Australian involvement in the Second World War were in the minority.⁴⁶² Conversely, to engage in a thorough discussion of German national character and relationship of the German people with National Socialism and the conflict as a scholarly exercise did not necessitate the propagation of enmity narratives in the minds of many intellectuals. British Historian George Peabody Gooch perhaps best summarised this point in opening a collection of essays discussing the “German Mind” by the Institute of Sociology. He proposed that in analysing

...the problem of two Germanies [one must] resist the temptation – particularly strong in time of war – to oversimplification... [Intellectuals must] analyse the various elements in the life of the nation *sine ira et studio* [without anger or passion].⁴⁶³

The following Chapter explores the contribution and influence of Australian public intellectuals in the framing of the German Question and accompanying enmity narratives in public war discourse.

The definition of the “public intellectual” in Australia is heavily contested and contextually dependent given the absence of comprehensive studies on their role and influence.⁴⁶⁴ Without becoming mired in this ongoing debate, several common characteristics are important to my analysis of intellectual contributions to public debate on the German Question and totalising enmity. Firstly, Marshall and

⁴⁶¹ David Drake and Debra Kelly, “Intellectuals and War,” *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 2, no. 1 (2009): 7.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁶³ G. P. Gooch et al., *The German Mind and Outlook* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1945).

⁴⁶⁴ Marshall and Atherton, 69-70, 75-6.; Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, *The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy and Politics* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).; Murray.

Atherton emphasise that the specific form of knowledge produced by the public intellectual is of “contested value” across various layers of discourse.⁴⁶⁵ Criticism remains an important characteristic of the public intellectual. Secondly, while the intellectual remains an expert in their fields, adept at explanation and analysis, the public intellectual “proffers opinion” on matters of “public concern”.⁴⁶⁶

For the purposes of this analysis, by public intellectual I am referring to those educated, publicly authoritative and “socially recognised” thinkers who broadly engage with and influence public discourse on a variety of topics relevant to wartime experience and meaning making beyond their area of expertise. Through engagement with available communicative technologies, Australian public intellectuals spoke to a general audience and rendered a substantial contribution to the social, economic and cultural life of the Australian body politic at war.⁴⁶⁷ It was those who, put simply, were defined by their concern and contribution to the various problems affecting Australian wartime society through the various mediums of public discourse beyond the ivory tower of academia.

Notwithstanding the expansive scope given by some scholars to qualifications of the public intellectual, for the purposes of this chapter I am largely focusing on academic public intellectual output. Despite Australia’s historical tendency towards anti-intellectualism and distrust of the academic intellectual,⁴⁶⁸ popular Australian academics remained a key source of wartime commentary on foreign affairs. They dominated the public discussion of the international situation whilst being challenged by non-academic “experts” with a strong media presence.

This chapter demonstrates how public intellectuals translated complex social scientific, historical, political and psychological theories regarding Germany into comprehensible, accessible language for the average Australian to consume and make informed judgments about the German people.⁴⁶⁹ It begins with a brief overview of intellectual analyses of Nazi Germany in the late inter-war period before moving to an examination of key public intellectuals’ interpretations of the German Question. Although incorporating arguments of several key intellectuals, my analysis will focus on a close reading of popular personal newspaper columns by two of Australia’s leading public intellectuals, Professor Alan R. Chisholm and Professor Walter Murdoch. These erudite public intellectuals professed vastly differing interpretations of the German Question and totalising enmity, even though both professed

⁴⁶⁵ Marshall and Atherton, 69.

⁴⁶⁶ Murray, 44-45.

⁴⁶⁷ Marshall and Atherton; Murray, 42-45.

⁴⁶⁸ Murray, 47-50.

⁴⁶⁹ For example, see Professor of Economics, E.R. Walker’s “The World Your Neighbour”. Walker’s talks often touched on Germany and attempted to explain the “German mentality” through analysis of its political and social history. “Spotlight on Germany,” *ABC Weekly*, 25 May 1940, 21. This was an expansion of Walker’s interwar analysis of modern Germany. “Tragedy of Germany,” *Mercury*, 9 May 1939, 11.

to subscribe to the dictum *sine ira et studio*. Given our definition of the public intellectual, these individuals form useful case studies given the wide reach of their personal newspaper columns which were widely syndicated across the national metropolitan press. They conveyed personal opinions on the German Question, speaking directly to the reader and advocating a specific form of action and desirable response to it.

Inter-War Analysis of the German Question

Inter-war developments in Nazi Germany were duly followed by Australian academics in journals such as the *Australian Quarterly* (AQ, the journal of the Australian Institute of Political Science covering a broad range of social, political and economic issues), *The Australian National Review* (ANR, a topical inter-war monthly edited by political freelancer journalist William Farmer Whyte),⁴⁷⁰ and *The Round Table*. The latter periodical of The Round Table organisation advocated close Anglo-American co-operation and had consistently dealt with the "Anglo-German rivalry" from its earliest issues in 1910 well into the 1930s.⁴⁷¹ The deviations in its editorial attitudes towards Nazi Germany was reflected in equal appearance of articles supporting and criticising the policy of appeasement.⁴⁷²

Similarly, a wide range of interpretations were printed in the AQ and ANR. These journals covered the ideological, economic, and foreign affairs developments within the context of a supposed decay of Liberalism in the face of Fascism and Communism.⁴⁷³ Early articles divulged scholarly interest in the experiment of National Socialism, rather than overt concern with its consequences for Australia. The threat posed by the Nazi Germany to Australia was largely dismissed by scholars such as A. G. Colley. In his 1937 appraisal of "Australia's Enemies", Colley questioned what he saw as a growing tendency towards war mongering.⁴⁷⁴ The correlation of domestic and international politics and intellectual endeavour was evident, with Colley reflecting a belief that intellectuals could serve the cause of peace, negotiation and diplomacy by tempering the political rhetoric of unwieldy statesmen and thinly disguised targets such as Hughes, White and Cameron.⁴⁷⁵

Colley personified the widespread appeasement mentality finding expression in Australian intellectual thought. A sizeable portion of the Australian intellectual community could be characterised by varying levels of support for economic or so-called "colonial" appeasement, suspicion of several provisions of

⁴⁷⁰ Gavin Souter, Whyte, William Farmer (1877-1958), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/whyte-william-farmer-9090> (accessed 03/03/2020).

⁴⁷¹ "The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs: History," The Round Table Ltd., <https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/journal/history/#>. (accessed, 04/03/2020).

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ A. H. Charteris, "Germany and the Disarmament Conference," *Australian Quarterly* 5, no. 18 (Jun, 1933); Stephen H. Roberts, "The Rise of Hitlerism," *ibid.* (June, 1933).

⁴⁷⁴ A. G. Colley, "Australia's Enemies," *ibid.* 9, no. 4 (Dec, 1937).

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., 89. See also. Arthur C. Morgan, "International Horizons", *ANR*, 1 July 1937, 18-19.

the Versailles Treaty, and opposition of the employment of armed force which permeated the University sector and adult education organisations such as the Workers' Educational Association (WEA) and the organisation specific Adult Education Boards.⁴⁷⁶ Alongside prolific academics, respected adult educators such as W.G.K Duncan, Charles Currey and Colin R. Badger engaged heavily in the discussions formulating in these popular journals through their own articles or analyses of local and international literature.⁴⁷⁷

Condemnation of the Nazi regime in the Australian intellectual community, let alone the German people, was haphazard during the inter-war period. E.M. Andrews has highlighted an academic tendency towards indecision and neutrality – a notable “vagueness”, inconclusiveness and safeguarding of public image that pervaded Australian intellectual public commentary on international affairs throughout the 1930s.⁴⁷⁸ This tendency acted to reinforce the ambiguity of official narratives regarding Germany.

This was personified by Stephen Roberts, whose seminal October 1937 treatise, *The House that Hitler Built*, and regular contributions in Australian print and broadcast media, helped shape inter-war views of Nazi Germany.⁴⁷⁹ The intricacies, insights and misconceptions of Roberts' contribution to Australian discourse on Nazi Germany has been well covered by Andrew Bonnell.⁴⁸⁰ However, some aspects are worthy of note here because they are demonstrative of how essentialising views of the German people could inadvertently be spread by leading intellectuals. Bonnell highlights how Roberts' “ethical-political rejection of Nazism” and self-professed “objectivity” in analysing the Jewish question, anti-Semitism, the “regimentation of individual”, education, administration and economy amongst other facets of National Socialism carried undercurrents of an essentialising view of German national character.⁴⁸¹ Bonnell's outline of popular British tendencies to equate Hitler and Nazism with a “fundamental, virtually transhistorical German national character” can equally be applied to other Australian intellectual commentators, particularly the varying views as to whether such essentialising traits were entirely negative.⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁶ Andrews, 176, 96-7. Macmahon Ball, for instance, had supported German grievance rhetoric as late as June 1939 before shifting to support for action.

⁴⁷⁷ See p. 110. Colin R. Badger, “The Book World (Review of G. Reimann's *Germany, World Empire or World Revolution*),” *ANR*, 1 January 1939, 86-88.

⁴⁷⁸ Andrews, 104.

⁴⁷⁹ Roberts, *The House That Hitler Built*; “The Rise of Hitlerism.”

⁴⁸⁰ Bonnell, “Stephen H. Roberts' the House That Hitler Built as a Source on Nazi Germany.”; “Stephen Roberts as a Commentator on Fascism and the Road to War in Europe.”

⁴⁸¹ “Stephen H. Roberts' the House That Hitler Built as a Source on Nazi Germany,” 15-18.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, 10.

House's lack of account for the heterogeneity of the German electorate (the failure of the NSDAP to achieve a democratic majority) and internal German opposition to Nazism foreshadowed common patterns in the Australian debate. Roberts' work implicitly promoted an "illusion of national unity" and a "complete identity" between the German people and regime.⁴⁸³ This failure of inter-war Anglo-American intellectuals (even self-professed critics of Nazism) to account for internal German opposition fed wartime totalising enmity narratives.

The dominating theme of inter-war intellectual analysis of the German Question was former German territories and resources given the significance and strategic relevance of former German colonies under Australian mandated control. So-called German "grievances", a contemporary framework linked to Liberal/Leftist concerns that Germany had been short-changed by inter-war policy and the stipulations of Versailles, perpetuated an image of victimhood that foreshadowed wartime distinctions and continued to be held by many high-ranking Australian officials until the eve of war.⁴⁸⁴ Taking the *AQ* as an example, opinions varied between sympathy with German claims and actions in righting the wrongs of the post-war settlement and concern about the legitimacy, security and the consequences of Germany's aggressive foreign policy.⁴⁸⁵ By the end of 1938, however, an almost unanimous consensus towards this latter argument emerged. The undesirability of returning mandated territory to a militarily aggressive and expansionist Nazi Germany, particularly given the tenuous isolation of Australia under Imperial Defence strategies, was evident as intellectual and official viewpoints slowly caught up to public opinion on the matter.⁴⁸⁶

However, the logic behind German "grievances" would continue to influence the debate.⁴⁸⁷ The degrading situation in Europe ran parallel to a widespread optimism in some intellectual corners that the German people shared in Pan-European anti-war sentiment. Firsthand accounts of the New Germany by globetrotting local academics often perpetuated this idea.⁴⁸⁸ William MacMahon Ball's article in the *AQ*, "Thoughts on the Conflict With Germany", was premised on the political philosopher and historian's tour of the Third Reich and its territories between May 1938 and early 1939.⁴⁸⁹ Despite

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

⁴⁸⁴ Waters, *Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy and the Origins of World War II*, 262.; Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, 355-6.

⁴⁸⁵ Louis Reese, "The German Colonies: Should They Be Returned?," *ANR*, June 1937, 27, 28.; L. S. Amery, "Germany's Colonial Claim," *ANR*, August 1937, 13-22.; Charles W. Marr, "The Australian Mandate," *ANR*, August 1937, 23-4.

⁴⁸⁶ Andrews, 157.

⁴⁸⁷ For example, A.T. Shakespeare, "Is Australia Safe?," *ANR*, 1 November 1938, 4-11.

⁴⁸⁸ J. Griffyth Fairfax, "The Crisis and After," *ANR*, 1 February 1939, 24-30.

⁴⁸⁹ William Macmahon Ball, "Thought on the Conflict with Germany," *Australian Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (June, 1939). Ball approached the issue through the theoretical lens of nationalism, imperialism and "Nazi ethics" respectively, rooted in historical contingency and economic factors.

warnings about the political developments within the Reich and complaints about Australian apathy regarding Nazism, Ball roundly rejected the hypocritical allusions to German particularism and historical reductionism that framed dictatorship as a “natural German vice”.⁴⁹⁰ Individually, Ball was adamant that the “ordinary German” expressed as strong a compunction to “act justly and avoid war as the ordinary Britisher”. Thwarted national pride, for instance, morally justified German rearmament.⁴⁹¹ Ball promoted these points in a number of public speeches and articles printed in the national press. The *Argus*, the then unconverted arch appeaser of the Melbourne press, had covered one representative speech delivered at a University of Melbourne Union luncheon. Its representative had been impressed by Ball’s allusions to the non-homogenous “individual” German’s desire for world peace, social justice and “tolerance” despite the support of the “majority of the German people” for Hitler as a force of national regeneration.⁴⁹²

However, the tone of post-Munich optimism specifically regarding the anti-war credentials of the German people was clearly not shared by all Australian intellectuals.⁴⁹³ The state of modern mass politics, philosopher John McKellar emphasised, rendered it impossible for dictatorial regimes such as the NSDAP to maintain themselves without the support of the German people. The deep-seated suppression of free thought and expression was inadequate to deny the backing of Nazism by “if not [a] majority, at least... a great proportion of the German people...”.⁴⁹⁴ The widely held and “deep seated bitterness of the resentment” towards the Versailles settlement and international pariahdom had rendered Hitler a persuasive saviour, one who promised the regeneration of national self-respect, power and prestige.⁴⁹⁵ Unlike Macmahon Ball, McKellar argued that the Germans would follow their charismatic *Führer* into another global conflict with little hesitation.

“Dangerous talk” of the “Good” German: Alan Rowland Chisholm

Alan Rowland Chisholm, a Professor of French at the University of Melbourne, was a key Australian observer actively engaged in the synthesis and interpretation of burgeoning Anglo-American literature related to the German Question through the media.⁴⁹⁶ Like many self-proclaimed experts

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., 14-15.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., 9-10.

⁴⁹² “German People: Desire for Tolerance,” *Argus*, 5 May 1939, 13.

⁴⁹³ J. McKellar, “Can We Avoid War?,” *ANR*, June 1939, 4-11.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid, 5. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid, 5, 9.

⁴⁹⁶ Stanley John Scott, *Chis: The Life and Work of Alan Rowland Chisholm (1888-1981)* (Melbourne: Ancora Press, 2019).; “Chisholm, Alan Rowland” (1888-1981), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/chisholm-alan-rowland-12315> (Accessed 02/03/2017).

See also: Gregory Melleuish, “Randolph Hughes and Alan Chisholm: Romanticism, Classicism and Fascism,” *Australian Studies* 16, no. 2 (2001); “The Master and the Disciples: A.R. Chisholm, Randolph Hughes and Carl Kaeppel on Christopher Brennan,” *Journal of Australian Studies* 32, no. 1 (2008).

on the German character, politics and history, Chisholm boasted a powerful academic knowledge of the German people, language and culture. He was educated in both French and German, which he drew on extensively in his discussions.⁴⁹⁷ His passionate love of the former, and notable political attempts to restore faith in the defeated French people, was likewise matched by systemic theorising, warning and, at times, crude generalising about the “German Mind” and the nation’s historical and political development.⁴⁹⁸ Chisholm’s empirical observations of German history, philosophy and political development often lapsed into pseudo-psychological analysis.



Image 20. Professor Alan Rowland Chisholm, University of Melbourne, circa 1950-1960., University of Melbourne Archives. Published 27/08/2015. <https://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/archives/professor-alan-rowland-chisholm-university-of-melbourne-circa-1950-1960/> (Accessed 07/09/2017).

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Alan Rowland Chisholm, “From Cuckoo To Eagle: The Evolution of Pan-Germanism,” *Argus*, 10 September 1940, 4. In this he was aided by other Australian representatives of the Free French Movement. Writing from a position on the Sydney French Chamber of Commerce after eight months of relative wartime inaction, the French expatriate, E.P. Rémond, presented a damning indictment against the historical fallacy of separating the German people from their leaders. E. P. Rémond, “Sed Delenda Est ... 'Prussia',” *Australian Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (Mar, 1940): 5.

The conservative Melbourne *Argus* and the *Australasian* were a natural home for Chisholm. Chisholm's conversion away from the distinction framework between 1939 and 1941 is further evidence of the shift in editorial stance of both papers.⁴⁹⁹ David Bird describes Chisholm as a fierce authoritarian professing an anti-democratic, anti-liberal, anti-Semitic and anti-Communist *Weltanschauung* (world-view). His conservative disillusionment with inter-war Australian society and political landscape aligned with key international right-wing intellectuals and fellow Australian contrarians flirting with Nazi ideology and acting as apologists for the regime.⁵⁰⁰ This included his Germanophilic colleague at the University of Melbourne, Augustin Lodewyckx, with whom he had shared more than a mere cultural affection of the German masters.⁵⁰¹ Chisholm had also regularly sparred with Australian critics of Nazi Germany such as Stephen Roberts. In the divisive review literature of *The House That Hitler Built*, Chisholm aligned with pro-Nazi sympathisers who had levelled critiques ranging from charges of an unacademically predisposed cynicism and misrepresentation of the New Germany and accusations of war mongering, to the reductive and crude criticism of P.R. "Inky" Stephenson that the treatise was an expression of Robert's "hatred of the Germans".⁵⁰²

David Bird's analysis aptly suggests that members of the Australian intellectual community acted as apologists for the regime or reserved judgment until well into the first months of the conflict before cautiously distancing themselves from their previous views on the Nazi experiment.⁵⁰³ Respect for German *kultur* and a *Deutschesschwärmes* (an "enthusiasm for Germany") remained strong within sectors of the intellectual community, even as apologia for Nazism became increasingly tenuous in Australian discourse.⁵⁰⁴ Those holding such views certainly perpetuated "grievance" rhetoric and opposed the purportedly war-mongering press.

Mirroring other cynics about the restraint in wartime enmity against the German people, Chisholm's changing attitudes correlated with his analysis of the nature of the conflict and wartime realism. "Total war", a term he frequently employed, engendered a number of paradoxes in Australia's "national and

⁴⁹⁹ "How Can the War End?," *Australasian*, 6 December 1941, 10-14. This four-part series was published in December 1941 and reinforced many of Chisholm's columns for *Australasian* readers.; T. H. Laby, "Unquenchable Freedom: The Fight Can be Won," *Argus*, 18 June 1940, 4.

⁵⁰⁰ Bird, X-XI.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 178, 85, 93. Lodewyckx's promotion of the image of a well-fed, prosperous Germany behind Hitler suggested that intellectuals were also drawn in by the façade posed by the Nazi state discussed earlier in Chapter One.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, 178; Bonnell, "Stephen H. Roberts' the House That Hitler Built as a Source on Nazi Germany," 18-19.

⁵⁰³ Bird, 221-2.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 212-13, 62.; Brechtken, 167.

civil life.”⁵⁰⁵ Chisholm’s views reflected the teleology of Hughes’ *Australia and the War*, viewing history as the progressive struggle of civilisation against barbarity. To preserve high-minded principles of civilisation, human decency, and an ecumenical “Christian Ethic”, Chisholm demanded that “nice distinctions”, of which the Nazi/German form was exemplary, be abandoned for the duration of the conflict.⁵⁰⁶ The nature of the war required clear demarcations and a “communitarianisation” of identities central to the framing of the totalising logic of a peoples’ war.⁵⁰⁷ Abandoning his usual academic rigour in August 1941, Chisholm bluntly contended with faint echoes of the Germanophobic Rudyard Kipling’s crude segregation of “human beings” (Chisholm’s “common humanity” and British civilisation) and the “Germans”: “The only line of demarcation that still shows strongly is the blazing hem of hatred and destruction that marks the meeting point of humanity and the Hun.”⁵⁰⁸ This reflected the culmination of the professor’s increasing proliferation of totalising enmity narratives between 1939 and 1941.

An attempt to demarcate “German particularism”, inherent in its political philosophical development which differed from the “universalism” of the British and French, was published in the *Australian Quarterly* in the first month of the war.⁵⁰⁹ Despite these earlier interventions, Chisholm’s first systematic engagement with the German question in his regular wartime columns in the Melbourne *Argus* occurred during the early months of the Blitz when the discourse had reached the height of contention in the Australian press. Chisholm’s initial academic attempts to define the continuity of German “national spirit” as the ideological root of Nazism and introduce importance of the “German mind” and “diseased” national mentality into Australian public discourse quickly gave way to systematic attempts to ingratiate such themes into the *Argus*’ enmity narratives.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁵ Chisholm, “Two Years of War Have Brought Us Bitter Lessons: Ideas, Ideals and Beliefs Have Swept Into Oblivion Between September 1, 1939, and August 30 1941,” *Argus*, 30 August 1941, 1.

⁵⁰⁶ “Killing a Gorged Python,” *Argus*, 3 July 1940, 4.; “The Defence of Man: A War of Values,” *Argus*, 3 December 1940, 4.; “The Christian Ethic: War in Defence,” *Argus*, 29 April 1941, 7. The latter article, a dictation of Chisholm’s speech delivered to the Congregational Union of Victoria, noted a lack of this “Christian Ethic” in Germany because of its alternate development over the past century. Despite this, Chisholm noted his hesitancy to label “every German an anti-Christian savage”.

⁵⁰⁷ Geyer and Tooze, 3, 9.

⁵⁰⁸ “The Planet of Hate 1: Germany and the World,” *Argus*, 13 August 1941, 4.; Welch, “Images of the Hun: The Portrayal of the German Enemy in British Propaganda in World War I,” 96-8.

⁵⁰⁹ Alan Rowland Chisholm, “God, Man and the Reich,” *Australian Quarterly* 11, no. 3 (Sep, 1939).

⁵¹⁰ “German Pattern Makers: Will Democracy Crash,” *Argus*, 20 August 1940, 4.; “The Background of War: From Philosophy to Frightfulness,” *Argus*, 15 October 1940, 4. A similar view was expressed in 1944 in Chisholm’s *Argus* column on “The German Mind – And Ours”. This somewhat crudely construed a “disease” of the German mind. *Argus*, 11 November 1944, 6.

Chisholm was struck by specific arguments by Sebastian Haffner (the pen name of self-imposed German exile lawyer journalist and author Raimund Pretzel) in *Germany Jekyll and Hyde* (1940).⁵¹¹ Chisholm noted Haffner's popularity amongst like-minded conservative anti-appeasers and scholars of Nazism in the British debate who denounced crude assessments of German innocence. Chisholm noted the anti-appeasement politician, Vernon Bartlett, and journalist/historian Wickham Steed as positive reviewers of the work.⁵¹² Although selectivity underplaying Haffner's key arguments about mobilising external anti-Nazi Germany against Hitlerism and criticism of overtly Vansittartist interpretations of German development, Chisholm's views resonated with Haffner's politico-scientific rejection of the arguments popular in Leftist and Liberal works that pushed for the "liberation" of the innocent German population from Nazism, his lack of faith in internal resistance movements (particularly German Communists) and attempts to explain German national character and absence of "political sense".⁵¹³

Chisholm built upon Haffner's claims that Nazism was a "psychology", personified in Hitler and reflecting the collective worst aspects of the "German Mind". Chisholm's interest in the German mind was not without precedent in Australia, given the rapid development of Anglo-American scholarship in the fields of political science, anthropology, education, sociology and psychology taking the "German Mind" as its central focus.⁵¹⁴ Australia's contribution to this transnational discourse should also not be underestimated, given the contributions by works such as Melbourne psychiatrist Reginald (Reg) Ellery's *Psychiatric Aspects of Modern Warfare*. The sometime Communist sympathiser had devoted chapters to applying current psychoanalytic theory and historical analysis to diagnosis and treatment of a "psychotic", "paranoid" and delusional mentality affecting the German people. To implement "re-culturalisation," Ellery had advocated mass internment or resettlement, deprivation of "all political power" and that Germany be "shorn of all cultural influences".⁵¹⁵ Ellery's work placed him in the popular school of international psychology and behavioural sciences framing their research around the German *Sonderweg*.⁵¹⁶

In asking "Who are our enemies?", Chisholm saw it as his intellectual duty to introduce his readers to the growing body of conservative and anti-Marxist international literature which rightly dispelled any

⁵¹¹ "From a Poisonous Tree: Hitler and the Third Reich," *Argus*, 22 October 1940, 4. Sebastian Haffner, *Jekyll and Hyde: An Eyewitness Analysis of Nazi Germany* (Plunkett Lake Press, 2008). See introduction by Neal Ascherson for a good summary of Haffner's central ideas vis-à-vis the German Question.

⁵¹² Ibid.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Hoenicke Moore.

⁵¹⁵ Reginald Spencer Ellery, *Psychiatric Aspects of Modern Warfare* (Melbourne: Wilkie & Co., 1945). See Chapter "Aftermath", 158-69.

⁵¹⁶ Hoenicke Moore, 218-19.

simplistic notions of a simple dichotomy between the German people and Nazism or any other ideological/economic system:

All the dangerous talk about our war not being with the German people, but only with Hitler, is therefore quite specious, and is based on a purely theoretical knowledge of Germany over the gravening chasm of geographical and linguistic remoteness...⁵¹⁷

The disturbing lack of knowledge in Australia on the historical, political and social forces governing German thought and its relationship with Nazism led Chisholm to write a follow-up article a month later. Suitably titled “The German Question: Hitler or the Reich”, the article aimed to translate these inaccessible scholarly perspectives into a consumable form.⁵¹⁸ Aware of the popular discourse forming around the German Question, most notably the accountability of the German nation for its military’s appalling wartime conduct, Chisholm presented the article as an answer to critics of his previous article of which, he professed, there were many. A stream of letters had charged the professor with emotional thinking and succumbing to the passionate prejudice and crude hate-mongering inherent in a totalising war.⁵¹⁹ Public intellectuals were particularly held to account for displays of emotional wartime partiality. Chisholm nominally accepted that “pure intellectual detachment” and pure reason in approaching the German Question was impossible due to the emotional stakes of the conflict and the concurrent enmity it produced. However, Chisholm reaffirmed that a “long study of the German mind”, albeit not wholly disinterested of wartime passions, was possible in a relatively objective, scientific and rational manner. Emotion, he added, was inherent in the pursuit of all knowledge. The mawkishness displayed by his critics, he concluded, was far more dangerous than his intellectual pursuit of Australian wartime “self-preservation” through “intellect and instinct”.⁵²⁰

Methodologically, Chisholm argued that the erroneous focus on a single source or theme had derailed many inter-war analyses of the German Question. Cultural products such as literature, art and music epitomised the problematic issue of Germany’s contribution to shared European civilisation, an argument often raised by supporters of the “good” German thesis. Admiration and respect for those excellent elements of German culture that Chisholm himself admired, including its scholarship, music and “*Gemuetlichkeit*’ [sic] (that untranslatable word connoting a combination of heartiness and good-humoured sentimentality) ...” did not allay German guilt and responsibility in the context of war.⁵²¹ Moreover, an overt focus on “anti-militarist” inter-war literature, popularised in Australia by Erich

⁵¹⁷ “From a Poisonous Tree: Hitler and the Third Reich.”

⁵¹⁸ “The German Question: Hitler or the Reich,” *Argus*, 5 November 1940, 4.

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*

Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* and perpetuated by Macmahon Ball and others, had led to an equal downplaying of the opposing, untranslated works of German hyper-militarists less accessible to the average Australian. This neo-militarist literature, intrinsically connected to the "pan-German" nationalist literature of Erich Ludendorff, Heinrich von Treitschke and Oswald Spengler, needed to be accounted for in any empirical study of the German Question.⁵²² Chisholm concluded that while Hitlerism was the "violently warped and specialised form of the worst things in the German mind, it [was] still not without roots in German history, German literature, German philosophy."⁵²³

John Maynard Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919) was an influential publication which emphasised economic and material factors over, and not in parallel with, the psychological.⁵²⁴ Chisholm's criticism of Keynesian ideas reflected his wider dismissal of "economic" and "grievance" arguments, largely espoused on the Left yet normalised in mainstream media and some intellectual journals throughout the inter-war period.⁵²⁵ In a review of vocal Leftist and anti-Vansittartist Victor Gollancz's *"Little Man – This Now"* (published under the pseudonym "XYZ"), Chisholm noted how the plight of the "small man" (a Socialistic euphemism designating the German worker) had become a key theme in the debate about the ordinary Germans' relationship with Nazism. Such arguments sought to vindicate German complicity with Nazism by focusing on the coercive aspects of the police state.⁵²⁶ Chisholm summarised the experience of Gollancz's protagonist "Walter" who joins the *Sturmabteilung* (SA) in the early stages of the *Machtergreifung* (seizure of power) to safeguard his family. Acquiescing to the Nazi system, Walter watches as his wife and son are coercively indoctrinated by the regime. His own principles and conscience are subsequently shattered after informing on Anna, a young Jewish girl sheltering under his protection. Although acknowledging Gollancz's attempts to highlight the brutality of the regime against the German working class, Chisholm cautioned against "sentimental pity that condones without reflection" vis-à-vis the average German stimulated by the Leftist typology of victimhood. He contended that the ordinary German personified by Walter was not capable or willing to revolt *en masse* and had bound themselves to the fate and ambitions of the regime.⁵²⁷ The German people were actively functioning, if sometimes coerced, cogs in the Nazi military machine.

Although expressing similarities of thought in spite of their wildly varying inter-war analyses of National Socialism, Chisholm did not mention Vansittart until May of 1941, when Australian editions

⁵²² For instance see, Erich Ludendorff, *Der totale Krieg* (München: Ludendorffs Verlag, 1935).

⁵²³ "The German Question: Hitler or the Reich."

⁵²⁴ Ibid.; John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1919). See Ramsden, 134-8. for British responses to Keynes.

⁵²⁵ "The German Question: Hitler or the Reich."; "From a Poisonous Tree: Hitler and the Third Reich,."; H. D. Brash, "Is Germany a Hopeless Case?," *Australian Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (Mar, 1942): 57.

⁵²⁶ "Where Conscience Dies: The Hell of Nazism," *Argus*, 2 January 1941, 4.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

of *Black Record* were under review by the Australian press.⁵²⁸ Vansittartism had infiltrated Australian intellectual discourse by late 1941 to the extent that Chisholm's colleague, the lecturer in Engineering H.D. Brash, could reference "Black Record writers" in the *AQ*. Brash emphasised the fluctuating responses of Australian academics and public discourse between 1939 and 1942.⁵²⁹ Australian academic interest in the German Question was not confined to admirers of *Deutsche Geschichte* and literature. Nor was it the sole property of historians, political scientists and philologists who dominated the field.

Vansittartism formed a powerful intermediary between purely academic scholarship and arguments playing out in the correspondence columns of the daily press. Charles Currey, a respected senior lecturer in history and political affairs at the Sydney Teachers' College and member of the Sydney Round Table, instigated a public spat in the *SMH* after publishing a letter lending intellectual authority to *Black Record* in June 1941.⁵³⁰ Currey's praise of *Black Record* was not well received by left-leaning liberal, W.G.K. Duncan, a political philosopher and educator at University of Sydney.⁵³¹ Duncan criticised Currey for his "irresponsible" promotion of Vansittartism and misrepresentation of European historical and political context, particularly by one of such influence in the Teachers' College. Duncan had already intervened on the separate issue of what he saw as political interference in the cultural sector and the fostering of anti-German sentiment in discussions about banning German language broadcasts and German music. Duncan had already stressed that public institutions such as the ABC and Australian universities had a responsibility to promote educated, informed discussion on the German Question under the pressures of totalising war by specifically following the "example of Mr. Chamberlain and [draw] a distinction between the Nazi regime and the German people...".⁵³² He further highlighted Currey's failure to reference notable texts by anti-Vansittartist authors such as Harold Laski, Rudolf Olden, Haffner, and Heinrich Fraenkel that uncovered the "shallowness and mischief of Vansittart's arguments."⁵³³ This issue reflected Duncan's fears that the more rational, intellectually sound and academically objective appraisals of Germany were being subsumed by emotional hate propaganda serving a morale-boosting function under the guise of scholarship. Currey

⁵²⁸ See p. 89-90.

⁵²⁹ Brash, 54-5.

⁵³⁰ C.H. Curry, "Black Record", *SMH*, 11 June 1941, 7.; J. M. Bennett "Currey, Charles (1870-1970), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/currey-charles-herbert-9883> (accessed 28/02/2018).

⁵³¹ W.G.K. Duncan, "Black Record", *SMH*, 19 June 1941, 4.; Hugh Stretton, Duncan, Walter George Keith (1903-1987), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/duncan-walter-george-keith-12443> (accessed 28/02/2018).

⁵³² "Opposes Ending German Talks," *DT*, 15 September 1939, 5.; "Mainland Notes: Effects of War on Culture: View Taken That Interference is Foolish," *Mercury*, 16 September 1939, 3.

⁵³³ Duncan, "Black Record."; Heinrich Fraenkel, *Vansittart's Gift for Goebbels: A German Exile's Answer to Black Record* (London: Fabian Society, 1941).

had naturally responded by targeting Duncan's "left-wing" bias in promoting anti-Vansittartist texts from the Left Book Club.⁵³⁴

Chisholm's review of *Black Record* coincided with his appraisal of the London Blitz. The *Luftwaffe's* actions reflected evidence of "another Germany" – the Vansittartist Germany of the "Hun" which had emerged "under the cover of scholarship and music, literature and art...a secret Germany".⁵³⁵ Chisholm condoned Vansittart's historical indictment of the "Hun" from the stone-age to the twentieth century, seeing Nazism as an outcome, rather than an aberration, of German history.⁵³⁶ It was the collective "Germans in plural" that mattered as far as foreign affairs was concerned.⁵³⁷ Chisholm sympathised with Vansittart's attempt to explain that while "25 per cent" of Germans were "good", the remaining 75 per cent, the "Germans in plural", were so representative as to make the "good" minority irrelevant.⁵³⁸ Attuned to public attitudes that still largely rejected outright hate propaganda, as well as the *Argus'* editorial tone, Chisholm was careful to suggest that a lack of sentimental pity did not necessitate explicit anger and hate. The German Question was, rather, a matter of detached, "cold-calculation" and empirical evidence, something which, he argued in a similar fashion to Eric Baume, gave Vansittart credibility in the discussion.⁵³⁹

Chisholm channelled Vansittart's personal, empirical assessment of German national character, recounting a personal anecdote to typify continuity with Wilhelmine society. He wrote of an encounter with a habitually calm and composed Berliner in 1913 who, being "curiously proud of his duelling scars", had exploded with rage about the comeuppance Britain would receive when their conversation had briefly shifted to Anglo-German affairs.⁵⁴⁰ This duellist evidenced how "quiet Germans" could "become Huns" with such ease.⁵⁴¹ It was perhaps no coincidence that Vansittart had spoken of his own similar experiences of German duelling and the system of warped "honour" it symbolised.⁵⁴² Varying in his interpretation, Chisholm interpreted the story as a representation of "national dualism" between the nineteenth century image of the *biergarten*, poets and scholars, and the German who "bombed open cities" and placed themselves behind the will of a charismatic psychopath.⁵⁴³ While

⁵³⁴ Currey, "Black Record." See Chapter Five.

⁵³⁵ "London and the Hun: The Secret Continent," *Argus*, 13 May 1941, 4.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁷ Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present*, 14-20.

⁵³⁸ *Lessons of My Life*, 32-3.

⁵³⁹ "London and the Hun."

⁵⁴⁰ "Problem of Germany: Moral Laziness," *Argus*, 5 August 1941, 4.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴² Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present*, 41-3.

⁵⁴³ "Problem of Germany: Moral Laziness."

Vansittart and other key figures clearly reinforced his ideas, Chisholm reflected many Australian commentators who were informed by their own experiences and observations of Germany.

Another text making rounds in Australia – *The German Mentality* (1941) by Verrina (the pseudonym for an unknown German lawyer and landowner) – reinforced Chisholm’s political-scientific arguments about German political “placidity” and “inertia” – popular themes in Australian editorials. It supported Chisholm’s earlier contention that the German “moral composition” was particularly susceptible to the strong man type, suffering a stunted political development in contrast to the Western democracies.⁵⁴⁴ Aside from being unprepared for democracy, as the failed Weimar experiment had shown, Chisholm suggested that the German people had allowed the regimentation of the state towards militarist and racial goals because of this trait: “Their energies are misdirected because their moral makeup is defective.” The regimented, rationalised and mechanical society of the Nazi system – along with its spurious racial doctrines, callousness and brutality – was actually the product of Germany’s lackadaisical acquiescence to novel “moralities”, however fallacious.⁵⁴⁵

Germany’s post-war re-education was thus largely “psychological” – a particularistic German problem of mind and mental make-up. Chisholm begrudgingly accepted a small role for “good” Germans in the re-education process.⁵⁴⁶ However, he evidenced fears within the Melbourne academic community that exaggeration of a German role by uneducated sentimentalists and the ignorant would whitewash the complicity of Vansittart’s “Germans in plural” who – in the realpolitik of totalising war – were the only Germans who counted in defining the enemy.

Chisholm appeared to recognise and reflect on the role of intellectual analyses in promoting and justifying popular totalising enmity narratives. Even though he noted that his self-professed “wildest anti-German moments” were always tempered by “intellectual detachment”, Chisholm admitted that a sizeable portion of his *Argus* columns were “anti-German” in many respects.⁵⁴⁷ Multiple allusions to the “Hun” demonstrated his multiple failings in upholding the principle of *sine ira et studio* under the “logic” and realities of a totalising peoples’ war. An article for the *Australasian* in October 1943 reinforced his views on the “German psychology” and the problematic re-emergence of “grievance” rhetoric in Australia. Chisholm warned against a settlement which swayed too far to either extremes of “sentimentality” or “unthinking anger”. Truth, objectivity and realism were far more prudent in the “evaluation of national and international guilt, than personal feelings, vengeance, ideology of political profit” that had swayed the Versailles settlement and its unrealistically punitive economic sanctions.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁷ “That German Problem: On More Solution,” *Argus*, 25 March 1944, 8.

Yet Chisholm expressed caution of being labelled a soft peace advocate in calling for a “reasonable peace”:

There is certainly a place for anger in the present war, in which both Germany and Japan have consistently outraged all human traditions, and punishment of the guilty is a duty imposed by human decency upon to Allies. **But there can be reasoned anger and unthinking anger... we cannot afford to indulge in this second type of anger, which is apt to be as dangerous to one adversary as the other.**⁵⁴⁸

“Preaching Hatred in Trumpet Tones”: Walter Murdoch

Having established that leading Australian public intellectuals actively questioned the Nazi/German divide in the public sphere through our discussion of Alan Chisholm, this chapter will now identify counter currents with a particular focus on Professor Walter Murdoch. Murdoch personified a vocal body of the Australian intellectual community who were quick to criticise the propagation of enmity in the first month of war. He was one of the nation’s most popular academics, essayists, newspaper columnists and radio presenters. John La Nauze has underlined the professor’s attempt to foster a closer engagement between academia and the community. His “simple language, challenging titles, erudite literary allusion, subtle or open criticisms of popularly accepted practices and beliefs” attracted a variety of readers from various backgrounds.⁵⁴⁹ Murdoch was unafraid to question the status quo, even if it was unpopular or “unpatriotic” to do so. This attribute defined Murdoch’s engagement in public debates – his intellectually complex defence of “good” Germany and anti-enmity agenda. Murdoch spearheaded Australian intellectual efforts to temper hardening public attitudes towards the German people in the first years of the war.

Murdoch invariably fulfilled the active role of a public intellectual in attempting to mobilise Australian wartime society behind a tolerant approach to the enemy.⁵⁵⁰ Murdoch’s columns appeared simultaneously in various journals and affiliated newspapers in Melbourne (*Herald*), Brisbane (*Courier-Mail*), Adelaide (*Advertiser*) and Perth (*West Australian*).⁵⁵¹ His articles for the HWT network were also published in book form. The most relevant was *Steadfast: A Commentary* (1941) which presented a

⁵⁴⁸ “Revenge and Anger Have Held Sway, And Peace Settlements of Other World Wars Have Proved Dangerous,” *Australasian*, 23 October 1943, 10. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁴⁹ John La Nauze, *Walter Murdoch: A Biographical Memoir* (Melbourne: MUP, 1977).

⁵⁵⁰ Murdoch, “We Should All Sign This Pledge,” *Sunday Telegraph*, 2 January 1941, 2.

⁵⁵¹ La Nauze, 127-8. Fred Alexander, “Murdoch, Sir Walter Logie (1874-1970), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/murdoch-sir-walter-logie-7698> (accessed, 19/12/2016).

clear overall picture of Murdoch's mentality and concerns in the inaugural years of war.⁵⁵² Countless letters of "more or less violent disagreement" with his analysis of the German Question attested to Murdoch's powerful voice in the debate.⁵⁵³ Murdoch himself noted that his unwavering defence of the Nazi/German distinction, despite his own private struggles with the logic of totalising enmity, had led to countless "abusive letters denouncing [him] as pro-German" and public criticism by notable commentators such as E.A Mann.⁵⁵⁴



Image 21. Walter Murdoch, 1949., NAA: A1200: L 12287. Republished in Fred Alexander, "Murdoch, Sir Walter Logie (1874-1970), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/murdoch-sir-walter-logie-7698> (accessed, 19/12/2016).

⁵⁵² Murdoch.

⁵⁵³ For example, see the debate on Murdoch's framing of the "German paradox". W.J. Denny, "Hitler and Germans Jointly Responsible," *Advertiser*, 15 August 1940, 12.; P.H. Williamson, "Hitler and Germany," *Advertiser*, 16 August 1940, 20.

⁵⁵⁴ Murdoch. "Gloating", 156. Also see preface.

Murdoch applauded Menzies' parliamentary response to the British White Paper in September 1939 for its lack of "cheap and tawdry rhetoric" and the absence of a "single word of hatred", despite criticism of its vagueness and generality.⁵⁵⁵ Resembling other public intellectuals such as P.F. Irvine and W.E. Reid, Murdoch looked to the expression of the Australian Government's war aims with great interest.⁵⁵⁶ These scholars recognised Menzies' narrative setting agenda vis-à-vis enmity images. Despite applauding Menzies' November statement, Irvine observed the disquiet in public attitudes regarding Australian war aims and intentions in his December 1939 article "The Implications of Australia's War Aims".⁵⁵⁷ Irvine shared Murdoch's call to the "individual citizen" to look beyond the tendency towards hatred and recognise that the justness of Australian war aims needed to be matched by a just appraisal of the enemy. Vague applications to the defence of democracy and freedom were not enough to reinforce the Nazi/German distinction and "drive a wedge" between Nazism and the German people called for by Reid.⁵⁵⁸

The war needed a narrative beyond the immediacy of self-preservation, one that explained the "vital interests" in which the war was being fought. It was a war in defence of the principles of civilisation, part of a broader teleology, the march of history and the age-old struggle between the forces of civilisation and barbarism.⁵⁵⁹ In expressing these war aims, Murdoch differed little to Chisholm. Difference rested in their different responses to the proliferation of enmity. Murdoch shared with Irvine a belief that a "policy of moderation", rather than the normalised proliferation of enmity that naturally accompanied war, was what required justification in the climate of totalising enmity. Murdoch was concerned by the hate propaganda emerging in print and on the airwaves "preaching hatred in trumpet tones". This form of hate mongering, reminiscent of the vituperative Nazi styling and "Hate Hymns" of the previous war, was personified in the broadcasts of local Western Australian commentator Boanerges, who he styled as the "Australian Herr Goebbels".⁵⁶⁰ For Murdoch, Boanerges' calls for hatred against the whole of the German people reflected a worrying trend on a national scale.⁵⁶¹

Other writers agreed. William Macmahon Ball remained heavily invested in engaging in public wartime discourse to the dangers of enmity through his regular writing, broadcasting and roles in the DOI and

⁵⁵⁵ "Hatred: The Satanic Gospel," *West Australian*, 30 September 1939, 5.

⁵⁵⁶ "German Part After War," *DT*, 15 January 1940, 6.

⁵⁵⁷ P. F. Irvine, "The Implications of Australian War Aims," *Australian Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (Dec, 1939).

⁵⁵⁸ W. E. Reid, "The Religious Conflict in Germany" *ibid.*, no. 1 (Mar, 1939).

⁵⁵⁹ Murdoch. "For Dark Days", 19.; "Unessential Christianity", 83-88; "The Foundations", 89-94.; "Walter Murdoch Writes a Parable on Hell," *Courier-Mail*, 22 March 1941, 6.

⁵⁶⁰ "Hatred: The Satanic Gospel."

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*

the ABC.⁵⁶² Ball enacted the Commissions' early avoidance of crude hate and disinformation in this latter role. He remained a voice of "calm and reason" in a climate of "fear, moral indignation and hatred" which, as Ball himself suggested, "wrecks all normal and constructive purposes".⁵⁶³ As an academic, Ball's contested ideas did reach a diverse wartime audience, fulfilling the role of public intellectual. For instance, a discussion between Ball and Kenneth H. Bailey of key themes of the conflict, published by the Victorian Branch of the LNU on 19 October 1939, was called upon by Curtin in canvassing the ALP's commitment that "all peoples" were victims of the current war. Bailey, a Professor of Law at the University of Melbourne, had also reinforced Ball's argument that a definitive distinction remained between peoples and their government during war.⁵⁶⁴

Given their wide reach, attacks by pro-enmity media figures against the public intellectual cautioned against the commanding influence of the latter as "news commentators". Before it placed its sights on its outspoken anti-enmity local Reverend Alan Walker, the regional *Cessnock Eagle* had taken Ball to task for his "sickening advice" that "we should not hate the Germans, or talk in hateful terms about them" in contravention to the logic of total war.⁵⁶⁵ Macmahon Ball had reinforced the relationship between enmity, the German question and war aims in a series of lectures for the ABC in early January 1940 which had received some attention in papers such as the *Daily Telegraph*, a newspaper already noted for its relative tolerance.⁵⁶⁶

Murdoch's public spat with maverick ABC commentator, Edward A. Mann, better known as "The Watchman", is perhaps a more influential example. Reports of audiences crowding on footpaths to enrapture themselves in Mann's radio broadcasts "At Home and Abroad" (daily bulletins) and Sunday "News Behind the News" are telling of his authority in the sphere of international affairs. This bellwether's longstanding opposition to the appeasement of Nazi Germany during the inter-war years translated into a formidable wartime anti-Germanism. It reflected a longstanding belief that the war was merely a resumption of longstanding conflict between Civilisation and barbarous *Kultur* adjourned twenty years prior.⁵⁶⁷ Mann's outspoken remarks on foreign affairs encountered heavy wartime

⁵⁶² Hilvert, 38-39.; Inglis and Brazier, 79.

⁵⁶³ Macmahon Ball, 9.; Peter Ryan, "Ball, William Macmahon (1901-1986)", ADB. <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ball-william-macmahon-12166> (Accessed, 13/03/2018).; Ai Kobayashi, *W. Macmahon Ball: Politics for the People* (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2013).

⁵⁶⁴ Kenneth. H Bailey and William Macmahon Ball, "Why Did We Go to War, What Do We Hope to Achieve? What Sort of Peace Do We Want? A Discussion of These Pertinent Questions," ed. Victorian Branch of the League of Nations (Melbourne: Victorian Branch of the League of Nations, 1939).

⁵⁶⁵ "Do Not Hate the German: What Utter Nonsense," *CE*, 23 January 1940, 2. The *CE*'s editorial stance was summarised in December 1939: "...we are fighting the German nation as surely as we fought them in 1914." "Hitlerism and the German Nation," *CE*, 1 December 1939, 7.

⁵⁶⁶ "German Part After War."

⁵⁶⁷ Andrews, 20-21; Inglis and Brazier, 83.

censorship.⁵⁶⁸ While Ken Inglis notes that the authorities were more concerned about Mann's attacks on wartime policy than his vitriolic "hymns of hate", Murdoch had attacked "The Watchman" for similar reasons as Boarnerges:

I think he is poisoning the public mind...all that super-heated eloquence – all his daily hymns of hate – must hurt all who wish Australia to go into this war with dignity and understanding of the issues at stake.⁵⁶⁹

Little remains of Mann's broadcast scripts for the ABC.⁵⁷⁰ However, his short-lived contributions to the Commission's periodical, the *ABC Weekly*, provide some insight, reasoning and justification for Murdoch's criticism. Mann had been persuaded by editor, S. H. Deamer, in February 1940 to provide transcripts and articles on foreign affairs to the *Weekly* under his radio alias. This was in light of the amount of public interest in "Watchman" broadcasts in submissions to the magazine, but also Deamer's own interest in promoting debate on the issue in the *Weekly*.⁵⁷¹ Mann's "Carthage Must Be Destroyed", a transcript of a 19 March 1940 broadcast published on the grounds of mass reader request, was an exemplary injunction against negotiated peace terms and purported fifth column activity of pro-German forces in Australia. Mann's account started with the totalising affirmation that total war was a struggle between irreconcilable forces – "good and evil, truth and falsehood, peace and violence" and, more importantly, Pan-Germanism and Western Civilisation.⁵⁷² These were:

...fundamentally antagonistic [and] actively hostile and mutually destructive, and Western civilisation is at last faced with the situation that it must destroy Pan-Germanism (note-not Germany or the Germans, but Pan-Germanism) or perish itself...[it is] ...not true to separate the German Government and people – we are fighting both.⁵⁷³

Perhaps given the criticism of men such as Murdoch and further evidence of public uneasiness regarding hate propaganda in early 1940, Mann had clarified that while he was not advocating the

⁵⁶⁸ Mann had targeted this in his print submissions to the *ABC Weekly*. The Watchman (E.A. Mann), "Free Speech is Valuable," *ABC Weekly*, 23 March 1940, 7.

⁵⁶⁹ Quoted in Inglis and Brazier, 83.

⁵⁷⁰ Andrews, 21.

⁵⁷¹ "Introductions: The Watchman," *ABC Weekly*, 2 March 1940, 3. Mann's publications alongside those of Murdoch and Duncan evidences the wide scope of views on the German Question within the magazine. An article by Theo Mathew on Vansittartism, for instance, had caused a great stir. Theo Mathew, "Vansittartism – And All That," *ABC Weekly*, 19 December 1942, 9-10.; Dr. K. Posener, "Other People's Letters: Vansittartism," *ABC Weekly*, 13 February 1943, 2.; Q.X., "Other People's Letters: Vansittartism," *ABC Weekly*, 24 April 1943, 4.; Eleanor G. Atkinson, "Other People's Letters: Vansittartism," *ABC Weekly*, 10 April 1943, 4.; A. R., "Other People's Letters: Hating Huns," *ABC Weekly*, 18 July 1942, 2.; Jean Brown, "Other People's Letters: Racial Prejudices," *ABC Weekly*, 31 October 1942, 4.; D. Garland, "Other People's Letters: Vansittartism," *ABC Weekly*, 9 January 1943, 2.

⁵⁷² The Watchman, "Carthage Must Be Destroyed", *ABC Weekly*, 13 April 1940, 13.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

“destruction of the German people” (a fact he reaffirmed later in the article), that nation and its citizens were clearly the propagator of Pan-Germanism in its modern form and worthy of enmification. For Mann, the war was not only for the destruction of National Socialism and Hitler, but the spirit innately connected to the German people – that “evil thing represented by that almost untranslatable word, ‘*Deutschum*’...”⁵⁷⁴

The fundamental antagonism, literally a “duel to the death” between the vastly opposing systems and ways of life, was evidence of the process of totalising enmity that mirrored Chisholm’s views. The professor himself had consistently alluded to the total stakes of the conflict and the insidious development of a “national aberration” – the “anti-Western” and “anti-Christian” Pan-Germanism of the “Blond Beast”.⁵⁷⁵ Mann also promoted a small shilling pamphlet “We Must Kill Pan-Germanism” which had clearly influenced his broadcast.⁵⁷⁶ The pamphlet, authored by Charles Troiset, had been translated from the original French by Chisholm himself and was in such great demand after receiving Mann’s approval that it rapidly sold out in national book stores leading to a new edition.⁵⁷⁷ It was also the subject of discussions of various tutorial classes and discussion groups.⁵⁷⁸ Beyond the influence Mann commanded, this also evidences the increasing appetite for literature on the key questions relating to the enemy nation and mentality. As the reviewer of the Melbourne *Herald* suggested, the pamphlet not only advocated the destruction of German political unity, disarmament and perpetual military observation (particularly of Prussia). It was also the Frenchman’s empirical study of the German “people and their outlook” who consistently confided their destiny to aggressive leaders.⁵⁷⁹ Cato’s rallying cry “*Delenda est Carthago*” – delivered to an apathetic Roman population unwilling or unable to see the danger posed by resurgent Carthage – was sadly missing in the Australian political leadership and intellectual community according to Mann. He promoted anti-distinction public intellectuals such as Chisholm and Troiset as a counter to the popular arguments of Murdoch.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid, 14.

⁵⁷⁵ Chisholm, “From Cuckoo To Eagle: The Evolution of Pan-Germanism,” *Argus*, 10 September 1940, 4.

⁵⁷⁶ The Watchman, “Carthage Must Be Destroyed”, 13. Charles Troiset, *We Must Kill Pan-Germanism*, trans. Alan Rowland Chisholm (Melbourne: Robertson and Mullens, 1939).

⁵⁷⁷ “Pan-Germanism,” *Age*, 25 May 1940, 9.

⁵⁷⁸ “What is Pan-Germanism?,” *Murrumbidgee Irrigator*, 23 April 1940, 1. This front-page advertisement of a tutorial class in the NSW Riverina on the issue appeared a week after the Watchman’s broadcast, suggesting its appeal beyond the confines of the metropole.

⁵⁷⁹ “‘We Must Kill Pan-Germanism’: Frenchman Sums Up,” *Herald*, 20 April 1940, 7.

Murdoch displayed an empathetic interest in the attitudes and experiences of the ordinary German people. In his *Daily Telegraph* column, he noted:

What is happening in the minds of the ordinary German people – the people who (like you and me) are inconspicuous, the silent people, the inarticulate who for the mass of the nation? We should very much like to know; but we can only guess, and our guesses are likely to be coloured by our wishes.⁵⁸⁰

The application to national character was not confined to public intellectuals, or indeed any other commentator, who were critical of distinctions between Nazis and Germans. Murdoch shared Chisholm's concern that superficial and "external" elements were often mistakenly focused upon in popular representations at the expense of a deep objective study of the "mental make-up of each nation" and "psychology" rooted in national history.⁵⁸¹

An August 1940 column proposed that the German people were waging war, and had submitted themselves to Nazism, from a longing for peace and tranquillity rooted in the "German psychology".⁵⁸² Poverty and unending warfare had made the Germans susceptible and capitulatory to authoritarian regimes and strong leaders. He thus shared Chisholm's beliefs regarding the apathy of Germany in the political sphere. The differences, however, lay in causal factors. Whereas the school of thought represented by Chisholm advocated an innate and purposeful "moral laziness" resulting from German "national dualism", Murdoch proposed a more understandable pursuit of peace through misguided means – what he labelled the "German Paradox".⁵⁸³ The incomprehension, apathy and acquiescence of the German majority had allowed Nazism, rather than an innate brutality and aggressiveness personified by Chisholm's duelling partner. As Murdoch stressed in a further article, a certain infantile "childishness in [the German] mentality" had led Germany to unthinkingly support the Nazi war machine while unhypocritically also claiming victimhood.⁵⁸⁴ While Murdoch encouraged liberating the German people from Nazism, he also recognised the difficult post-war task of reconditioning of the "German Mind".⁵⁸⁵

German émigrés maintained a strong presence in Australian intellectual debates and professed a strong first-hand authority to confirm stories of resistance and opposition emanating from Nazi

⁵⁸⁰ Murdoch, "It Seems to Me, The German Civilian is Tiring," *DT*, 16 June 1940, 14.

⁵⁸¹ "The German Paradox: Peace With Slavery," *Advertiser*, 10 August 1940, 11.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁴ "Comic Relief: The Clown of Tragedy," *West Australian*, 1 February 1941, 6.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Germany.⁵⁸⁶ While clearly promoting the loyalty of German refugee and émigré intelligentsia in light of concerns over their influence,⁵⁸⁷ Murdoch cautioned that “wishful thinking” on the part of democratic observers was leading to a misplaced faith in decreasing morale in the Reich, exaggeration of internal resistance and the possibility of revolution from within. He was not alone in this. Recognising his own Germanophilia, Macmahon Ball noted how wartime enmities presented a cruel yet unavoidable paradox. No matter how one admired Germany or advocated the:

friendliness and hospitality of individual Germans, there is still an awful fact rooted in the middle of your mind. It is the fact that the sort of man you admire most – the man who tries to think independently, who speaks courageously, who shows tolerance and humanity to those of different race and creed – under such a modern dictatorship such a man can only be found in prison. No effort to understand Germany’s present temper in terms of her past history can alter that. No humility on our own part, no confession of Britain’s own failings and crimes can alter that.⁵⁸⁸

On his return from the tour on the Monterey to Sydney in February 1939, Ball had explained to Sydney reporters that whilst “individual Germans” he had met throughout the tour were generally “charming and hospitable”, the nation “collectively” was “terrifying”.⁵⁸⁹ “As a nation”, he continued, Germany was behind Hitler. They had little opportunity to organise in the climate of persecution against Jews, Socialists and Liberals alike, noting in an almost Vansittartist manner that, politically, these “good” Germans “[did] not count”.⁵⁹⁰

These intellectuals shared a concern with the *uncritical* acceptance of the “good” German narrative that failed to accept the new realities of Nazi Germany as much as they criticised the use of the German Question to promote enmity. The existence of an anti-Nazi “other” Germany was abundantly clear to Murdoch and Macmahon Ball. Differing from Chisholm, both argued against seeing the silent, acquiescent majority as innately “bad”, complicit and, consequently, open to the full weight of Allied wartime and post-war retribution. Murdoch’s central thesis was that Germany’s mind had been poisoned by an evil minority, seemingly collating the professor’s complex analysis into the simple idea that “there are good Germans...but no good Nazis.”⁵⁹¹ The apathetic majority, duped by Nazism were

⁵⁸⁶ Andrews, 153-5.; George M. Berger, “A Study of Danubian Destiny: Will Western Culture Continue?,” *Australian Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (Dec, 1940): 23, 26, 28.

⁵⁸⁷ “One of Them”, “Voice of the Refugee”, *ANR*, July 1939, 17-23.

⁵⁸⁸ Macmahon Ball, 16.

⁵⁸⁹ “Atmosphere in Germany: Visitor Finds it ‘Terrifying’: Illusions Shattered,” *SMH*, 21 February 1939, 13.; “Changed From Pacifist: Visitor to Germany,” *Argus*, 21 February 1939, 9.; “Atmosphere in Germany is ‘Terrifying’,” *The Maitland Daily Mercury*, 21 February 1939, 5.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹¹ Nazism, The Thing We Fight: Butcher Heydrich Becomes Its Symbol, *Advertiser*, 12 September 1941.

complicit with the Nazi system, not through innate aggression or brutality, but rather a characteristic complacency and misguided capitulation to a brutal minority. This allowed Murdoch to unhyprocritically decry, as one headline read, “Not Hitler the Sadist, But German People”.⁵⁹²

The complete Nazification of German life under totalitarian rule, evident in the shift in political, linguistic and cultural meaning in Germany, was noted by Murdoch as a key reason for the dangerous breakdown in communications and mutual understanding with the liberal and democratic world. In the new Germany, religion had become a racial matter, sport now served the state, common morality and the rule of law had been subverted to ideology and racialism, and even art, music and literature had been thoroughly Nazified to a point that old and new Germany were incongruous in many respects.⁵⁹³ Nazification rendered actions that sought to speak directly to the German people (such as the leaflet raids) imperceptible in their effect.⁵⁹⁴ Recognition of this process was not a “diatribe against the Germans” – the tone of many anti-leaflet reports in the press – but a matter recognising the problems of speaking directly to the German people.⁵⁹⁵ Murdoch personified the argument of Brash and others recognising that whilst the supposed peculiarities of German character problematised the issue, the German Question was actually of wider, universal significance given the creeping hand of totalitarianism in Australian society.

Murdoch’s passage from *Steadfast* which opened this thesis evidenced an extraordinary process of self-reflection on the emotional toll of hatred, not only on scholarly analysis, but also on perceptions of the conflict. The professor’s concessions to totalising enmity mirrored Chisholm’s recognition of the effect of wartime emotions on the intellectuals’ objectivity in writing about the enemy. In a “spontaneous” article from early 1940, Murdoch deliberated on apprehensions raised by British social commentator J. B. Priestley and writer John Masfield that the British people were regressing to savagery from engaging a barbaric enemy.⁵⁹⁶ Murdoch theorised, with little optimism, that Australians had been largely restrained vis-à-vis totalising enmity in the first months of war – free of unbridled passion, “savagery” and “violent hatred” towards Germany. He was unsure whether this attitude was the result of healthy philosophical detachment, good nature, or collective ignorance of the nature and stakes of a largely distant war with little tangible impact on the lives of Australians. Suspecting the latter, the professor hypothesised that it was only a matter of time before Australians began to “see red” as a natural emotive response to the horrors of totalising warfare.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹² “Germany’s Real Evil genius: Not Hitler the Sadist, But German People,” *Advertiser*, 13 September 1941, 6.

⁵⁹³ “The New Language: Some Recent Changes,” *West Australian*, 11 May 1940, 6.

⁵⁹⁴ “It Seems to Me: German Words Are Hard to Translate Now,” *Sunday Telegraph*, 12 May 1940, 15.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*; “Steadfastness: Sermon in Stones,” *West Australian*, 13 July 1940, 10.

⁵⁹⁶ “A Nightmare”, 126-131.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

Murdoch rejected the logical course to hate mongering as a mobilising force by the civil and military leadership.⁵⁹⁸ The Australian media's presentation of events in Europe carried a large portion of the blame. Media narratives convincingly homogenised the atrocities of the German military serving in occupied Poland with the German nation *ut totum*. Murdoch's own prided philosophical detachment had been shaken by seemingly "plain narratives" – those not intentionally or explicitly inciting enmity. Murdoch admitted to his readers that he had found himself questioning the nature of the German "people" linked to such atrocity and brutality:

I, a normally mild and reasonable being, saw red....I forgot all the decent and kindly Germans I have known; I forgot the millions of such persons in Germany to-day....I forgot that we had no quarrel with the German people...I hated Germany and all things German....⁵⁹⁹

He clearly recognised the potency and dangerous potential of the totalising logic of enmity in the proliferation of hatred and retribution increasingly evident in the Australian media.

Murdoch recognised more quickly than likeminded critics in the religious press that recognition of totalising warfare was necessary to avoid accusations of sentimentalism from the metropolitan dailies. Murdoch countered charges of "rank sentimentalism", pacifism and pro-Germanism in an article "Gloating" some months later.⁶⁰⁰ Theorising about "cruel-mindedness" – a term signifying the complete callousness to human suffering and removal of the German population from the "scope of justice" that would come to frequent religious narratives – Murdoch highlighted the essential difference between "sentimentalism" and "realism". The latter necessitated a recognition of Germans as victims of the Nazi regime; the former was an emotional, dogmatic and resentful refusal to do so rooted in racial and ideological prejudice. Realism was essential to ensure that such unavoidable wartime emotions such as anger and indignation were directed at the proper target – Fascism and the war it had instigated.⁶⁰¹

Despite the professor's own allusions to more than once falling prey to the totalising logic of enmity, Murdoch generally presented the German people as victims– albeit not entirely blameless ones – of the Nazi regime. Murdoch himself admitted that only so much could be done to maintain the distinction between Nazism and the German people. He continued to be concerned about the "slimy

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid. Australian General Thomas Blamey's call for a "killer instinct" was evidence of a worrying trend. Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 157.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid, 128-9.

⁶⁰⁰ Murdoch, "Gloating", 155-160.

⁶⁰¹ "The Decent Bloke", 188.

trail of loathing” well into the decisive final years of the war.⁶⁰² Murdoch symbolised a widespread fatalism in the intellectual community regarding the inevitability of totalising enmity in a prolonged and brutal conflict. While defending the collateral damage of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, Murdoch was uneasy about the “intensity of the hatred [such a war] would leave behind.” Although all nations, including Germany, were generally slow to hate and quick to forgive, the totalising nature of the conflict inspired pessimism. The negation of a “good” Germany through wartime hatred facilitated and sanctioned totalising violence and hampered effective cooperation central to Murdoch’s theories about the post-war settlement.⁶⁰³ Macmahon Ball had shared these frustrations.⁶⁰⁴ As Murdoch concluded, “the only war that will really end war is a war against hatred.”⁶⁰⁵

Conclusion

Inter-war intellectual and political discourse added to the confusion, uncertainty and disagreement regarding Nazi Germany and the German people on the eve of war. Public intellectual concern over the extension of enmity to the German nation during the first years of the conflict largely related to its robustness, effectiveness, utility, purpose and merit during war, as well as its long-term consequences in achieving a lasting, permanent, and cooperative post-war settlement. Australian intellectuals attempted to reduce an immense transnational literature and complex theories into comprehensible, accessible language for the average Australian to digest in the enmity producing climate of heightened anxiety, suspicion and shared fear accompanying a peoples’ war.

All of Alan Chisholm’s knowledge of German literature, philosophy and culture was put towards one war time goal regarding Germany – to show that the distinction of two Germanys was, for the duration of the war, purely academic. Despite several minor deviations from Vansittartism, by the end of 1941 Chisholm was actively promoting several facets of that narrative which was feeding totalising enmity narratives in Australia. Concurrently, Walter Murdoch continued to defend the increasingly unpopular Menzian idea that the war was being fought to free the waylaid “good” Germany from the clutches of Nazism and necessarily remove the ingrained disease of Nazism plaguing the population to usher in a just and prosperous post-war peace. The totalising logic of enmity was antithetical to this aim, and Murdoch devoted a vast swathe of his intellectual capacity towards limiting such a process.

How Australian public intellectuals dealt with the German question and totalising enmity reveals their difficulty in traversing the mutually exclusive imperatives of wartime patriotism and intellectual

⁶⁰² “In the Wake of World War: Problem of the Trail of Loathing,” *Advertiser*, 17 July 1943, 4.

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁴ William Macmahon Ball, *Japan, Enemy or Ally?* (Melbourne: Cassell, 1949). See Ball’s introduction.

⁶⁰⁵ “In the Wake of World War: Problem of the Trail of Loathing.”

integrity. Both Chisholm and Murdoch recognised the limits of their own academic “objectivity” and the role of wartime emotions in scholarly discourse of the enemy. Both actively took on a self-professed “corrective” role in public war discourse to various “non-experts” within the media. These included specific commentators, editorial stances, and correspondence from the public as well as other authoritative public figures such as politicians. Through asserting varying interpretations of the German Question, both publicly argued against entrenched ideas they considered to be “dangerous” and detrimental to the war effort and peace process. Notwithstanding the stark differences in their interpretations of the German Question, Murdoch and Chisholm demonstrate that the imperative to “understand” the enemy, rather than merely denounce, was at the heart of Australian intellectual analyses of the German. However, intellectual discourse could act to reinforce enmity provoking arguments regarding “German National character” or a “German Mind” in the Australian media, even if it was not the intention of their authors. The multiple failures of Australian intellectuals to uphold the principle of *sine ira et studio* discussed within this chapter also speaks volumes of the potency of the logic of totalising enmity on the Australian home front.

Chapter Five: Defending “Good” Germany: The Australian Left and The Australian Churches

In focusing so far on the period 1939 to 1941, this thesis has shed light on a variety of responses to the German Question and a Nazi/German distinction in Australian public discourse, including representatives of the mainstream media, popular magazines, politicians, and public intellectuals. It has conceptualised how these various voices have utilised the key questions related to the German Question in their contributions to Australian narratives of enmity. A general trend towards totalising enmity between 1939 and 1941 has been evidenced. Considering this research, the claim that a “definite distinction” between the German people and Nazism in Australian wartime discourse is untenable.

However, in line with scholarly emphasis on political, cultural and moral choice and contestation in enmity formation during a peoples’ war, totalising enmity remained a contested and challenged process in Australia. The nation’s “moral economy”, public expectations surrounding indiscriminate enmity narratives, and concerns about maintaining a “good” war narrative limited and constrained its application and development. This chapter aims to further emphasise the contested nature of totalising enmity narratives in Australia by analysing counter-narratives emanating from the Australian Left, the churches and religious organisations. These sections of wartime society challenged dominant totalising enmity narratives between 1939 and 1941 and sought to account for good Germany on the basis of socialism and class and Christian morality respectively.

Australia’s most vocal defenders of a Nazi/German distinction were generally affiliated with the Australian Left, the clergy, religious and pacifist groups, and organizations of German émigré community.⁶⁰⁶ Scholarly analysis of British and American discourse relating to the German Question has revealed that anti-Vansittartist dialogue tended to coalesce towards the Left of the political spectrum or emerge from religious circles.⁶⁰⁷ This chapter reinforces several findings from previous chapters; firstly, that definitions of “good” Germany vary across the different layers of Australian public wartime discourse and, secondly; that such attempts to assert a particular definition of the “good” German served the partisan, political and ideological interests and objectives of groups and individuals contending them. These sections of Australian society form a useful means of analysing the constraints and limitations on the process of totalising enmity in Australian war discourse and the counter narratives they produced.

⁶⁰⁶ Goldman, 156.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.; Hoenicke Moore; Ramsden.

Firstly, this chapter contends that the Australian Left was largely unanimous in contesting totalising enmity narratives throughout the first two years of the conflict. Reflecting the loose principles defining the Australian Left in this thesis – varying interpretations of Socialism and defence of the interests of the working class – the German Question was framed around the imperatives of a restructured post-war world founded in Socialist principles and international working-class solidarity. Despite key doctrinal differences and political and ideological agendas, the various factions of the Australian Left shared deep concerns that the “real” ideological enemy, Fascism and Nazism, was being clouded by totalising enmity narratives that shifted culpability away from class enemies, traditional elites, and uncontrolled Capitalism. This chapter will begin with analysis of a collection of individual union journals, the Communist Press (most notably *Tribune*) and Labour periodicals such as the Sydney based *Australian Worker*, the Brisbane *Worker*, Melbourne’s *Labor Call* and the Perth’s *Westralian Worker*.⁶⁰⁸ Read in line with the unanimity of ALP politicians discussed in Chapter Two, this chapter presents strong evidence of the Australian Left’s anti-totalising enmity agenda during the first years of the war.

Secondly, this chapter then analyses discussion of the German Question by the Australian Churches, religious organisations and popular religious individuals who engaged in the debate through their own periodicals, sermons, and pamphlets as well as secular channels of public discourse. A general discussion of religious narratives professed by leading ecclesiasts is followed by an in depth look at the Melbourne Catholic periodical, the *Advocate*, and Catholic intellectual D.G.M. Jackson. These sources demonstrate unanimous concern within Australian religious circles about the propagation of totalising enmity narratives – what was framed as a secular, anti-Christian propagation of collective hate.

Accounting for Socialist Germany: Solidarity with the German Working Class and its Revolutionary Potential

The Australian Left’s support for a Nazi/German distinction arose within a transnational discourse of anti-Vansittartism led by prominent British Leftists such as H.N. Brailsford, Douglas Brown, Richard Stokes, Harold Laski and Victor Gollancz.⁶⁰⁹ Publications from the latter’s “Left Book Club” and the related *Left News* displayed considerable influence on shaping the political and ideological ideas on the Left in Australia from the 1930s onwards.⁶¹⁰ Countless individual analyses of the wide structural

⁶⁰⁸ For a general overview of the Australian Labour press, see: Victor Isaacs, “Labour Dailies”, The Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, <https://labourhistorycanberra.org/2015/05/labour-dailies/> (accessed 23-03-19).

⁶⁰⁹ Victor Gollancz, *Shall Our Children Live or Die? A Reply to Lord Vansittart on the German Problem* (London: V. Gollancz, 1942).

⁶¹⁰ John Arnold, “The Left Book Club in Australia: Achieving Reform and Change through Reading and Its Attempted Suppression,” *Journal of Australian Studies* 25, no. 69 (2001).

and ideological problems underlying the German Question – ranging from Communists and Labour figures to Liberals – were republished for Australian domestic audiences through Australian publication networks.⁶¹¹ Although the organisation's publication efforts had been undermined by the UAP's anti-Communist measures and Conservative fears it was a Communist Party front, the Left Book Club maintained a role in providing "left and left leaning" Australians with cheap and accessible materials and educational sources that guided Leftist discussions of the German Question.⁶¹² One of the Left Book Club's stated wartime aims was to defend tolerance and democracy in wartime actions and post-war planning. This, in no small part, required challenging the framing and proposed treatment of the enemy by international Vansittartism.⁶¹³ The Australian Left aligned itself with a loose international coalition of anti-Vansittartists. It criticised the foundational ideas of Vansittartism which, it argued, undermined internal and external German resistance, the potential for "revolution" by the German Left, and promoted punitive post-war settlements that would disproportionately affect the German working class.

The ALP and wider Australian Labour Movement was active in the popular definitional framing of Australia's wartime enemy. A dominant narrative of enmity framed the conflict against an *ideological* enemy, reflected in a preference for terminology such as "Nazism", "Hitlerism" and "Fascism" rather than more ambiguous references to Germany. According to popular Leftist explanatory models, National Socialism emerged from warped capitalism and a failed economic system. Attempts were made by Labor-affiliated journals to separate the "average German" – thoroughly anti-war and victims of rampant capitalism – from the regime.⁶¹⁴ Australian unions also championed international working-class solidarity.⁶¹⁵ The ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions) resolution passed on 20 September 1939 directly blamed "German Fascism" for the war and institutionalised concerns shared by ALP politicians for worker's rights and Trade Union authority under Australian National Security Regulations. The resolution was published in the major papers alongside the actions of individual organisations such as the motion raised by Australian Railways Union under its secretary Lloyd Ross.⁶¹⁶ The solidarity of opinion in the Left demanded clear war aims to be presented to the German people as a sign of just, constructive and reasonable peace terms in the war against "Hitlerism".⁶¹⁷

⁶¹¹ Gordon B Neavill, "Victor Gollancz and the Left Book Club," *Library Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (July, 1971).; Arnold.

⁶¹² Arnold, 110-11.

⁶¹³ Neavill, 213.

⁶¹⁴ "Inside Germany," *Voice*, 22 October 1938, 5.

⁶¹⁵ "N.Z. Federation of Labour: Appeal to Fight Against Nazism," *SMH*, 9 September 1939, 14.

⁶¹⁶ "War Guilt on Fascists: Crush Nazis, Says ACTU," *Courier-Mail*, 20 September 1939, 1. T. Wright, Vice President of the Labour Council of NSW, argued that the German masses would overthrow Hitler. T. Wright, "Securing Peace," *Telegraph*, 8 November 1939, 12.

⁶¹⁷ "Should Tell German People: Peace Terms Should Be Clearly Stated," *Australian Worker*, 27 December 1939, 12.; "Demands War Aims Outline," *Daily News*, 1 December 1939, 5.

Divisions remained over the proper response towards Australia's involvement in a European conflict, reflected in the bitter divisions on the eve of war between the left-wing controlled periodicals.⁶¹⁸ Perhaps the biggest outlier to the tenuous Leftist support for action were the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). Communists were an active, albeit marginal political force in war discourse until the CPA, with its membership of 4-5000, was banned under National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations on 15 June 1940.⁶¹⁹ Ideologically bent on uniting the global network of anti-Fascists in Europe against the common ideological enemy, Fascism, the Australian Communists took their lead from the Communist International (Comintern).⁶²⁰ The CPA's brief "War Policy" against "Hitlerism" was clearly stated throughout its periodicals such as *Tribune* before the CPA reversed its short-lived support for the war in line with Soviet policy.⁶²¹ Comintern policy governed Australian Communists' opposition to the war throughout the first two years of the conflict. Although lacking representation in Parliament, the CPA consistently attempted to disrupt the Australian war effort through various avenues such as the Trade Union movement, and continually criticised what it saw as a new "Imperialist War".⁶²²

This had changed only after the Soviets joined the Allies in June 1941 following Hitler's invasion of the USSR. Despite the ban not being formally lifted until December 1942, the CPA became one of the strongest supporters of a "total war effort", not for furthering Australian national interest, but in support of "democratic peoples against Fascist imperialist aggression."⁶²³ Terminologically speaking, the focus on both a "People's Peace", and then a "people's war" against Fascism,⁶²⁴ reinforced the international proletariat against the forces of war – profiteering, capitalist monopoly, and imperialism – resting on the Marxist framework of "class enemy" rather than national animosities. In terms of the totalising enmity discussed within this thesis, the CPA supported Stalin's consistent public pronouncements which separated the Hitlerite regime from the German people.⁶²⁵

The CPA, alongside the Ironworkers' Union, Waterside Workers' Federation and Miners' Federation, represented a minority section of the Australian Left who forcefully advocated negotiated peace

⁶¹⁸ Andrews, 176-7, 206.

⁶¹⁹ Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 182-83. See Appendix 3: Banning of the Communist Party, 583-92.

⁶²⁰ Andrews, 203-5.

⁶²¹ "Communist Policy on the War: For the Defeat of Hitler: War Profiteering Must be Prevented By the Government," *Tribune*, 5 September 1939, 1-3. "Communist Policy on the War to Defeat Hitler: Freedom Menaced by Menzies," *Workers' Star*, 8 September 1939, 1.

⁶²² Lee, 95-6.; Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 586.

⁶²³ Lee, 94-5. CPA's position quoted in Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 590.

⁶²⁴ Quoted in *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 586.

⁶²⁵ "Character of the War," *Tribune*, 17 October 1941, 3.

during the peace discussions of October and November 1939.⁶²⁶ In advocating a peace conference to halt the so-called “orgy of hate and destruction”, *Tribune* printed various resolutions of the CPA Executive and supporting editorials to emphasise cooperation with the German people and Communist revolution:

The peace front would have yet another powerful supporter; the people of Germany. The German people, who no more want war than we do, were blindfolded to the disaster looming...The eyes of the German people have now been opened...[They themselves] can and will finally deal with Hitler’s dictatorship.⁶²⁷

A common emphasis on German self-liberation, resistance and revolution seemed to resonate with *Tribune’s* readership.⁶²⁸ Of course, the Communist call for an armistice was shared by pacifist and isolationist dissident elements and organisations within the broader Labour Movement. Expressions of solidarity with leading Federal ALP members such as Brennan, Holloway, Ward and Maloney and the “many sections of the Labor movement in all states” advocating a peace conference, were common and act as a reminder of crossovers between various sects of the disparate Australian Left.⁶²⁹ Despite disagreements about the justification for Australian involvement in the conflict, the Australian Left unanimously blamed the war on economic factors and the capitalist system. This facilitated consensus insofar as the construction of enmity narratives and support for the Nazi/German distinction was concerned.

A telling letter from 11 September 1939 to the Sydney *Daily News*, a Leftist periodical which positioned itself as the official organ of Australian Labor until its demise in 1941, summarised the widely discussed concerns within Leftist periodicals.⁶³⁰ In terms of the Left’s support for Australia’s involvement in the war, the writer argued along the lines of a Nazi/German distinction that a war against Nazism must be fought to “save the people of Germany”, the line popularised by Menzies to which ALP politicians had attempted to hold him to account. A second concern was the propagation of hate against “the Other Germans” – “to return hate for hate weakens our cause. We can hasten [victory] by showing our

⁶²⁶ Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*, 194.

⁶²⁷ “Peace Conference or Powers an Urgent Need,” *Tribune*, 13 October 1939, 1, 3.; “Peace Does Not Mean Retreat Before Hitler,” *Tribune*, 17 October 1939, 2.; “Who is Responsible for the War,” *Tribune*, 31 October 1939, 2.; “More War! Imperialist Peace or Revolution?,” *Tribune*, 14 May 1941, 1-2, 7-8.

⁶²⁸ “Reader, What Do You Think: Soviet Policy,” *Tribune*, 22 September 1939, 2.

⁶²⁹ John Fisher, “Defeat Hitler By Peace: World Parley Move By Labor: May Lead to Menzies’ Fall,” *Tribune*, 13 October 1939, 1.; “No Peace With Fascism, But – Mrs. A. Fisher,” *Tribune*, 6 October 1939, 1. References to various Left leaning peace organisations were also common. “Peace Body Seeks War Aims,” *Tribune*, 14 November 1939, 3.; “Stop War, Public Demands,” *Tribune*, 10 November 1939, 1. See also the letter from Secretary of ALP stationed in King’s cross, F. Lamb, who promoted the awakening of German people through negotiated peace. “Labor for Peace,” *Tribune*, 31 October 1939, 2.

⁶³⁰ Walker, 102-3.

sympathy with peace-loving German citizens.”⁶³¹ This message was reinforced in the Brisbane *Worker*, a pioneering periodical of the Queensland Labor Party and Australian Workers’ Union. The paper’s “pertinent paragraphs” section repeated the sentiment of the Australian, British and French governments which had been widely publicised in the mainstream press that they had “no quarrel with the German people” but rather with Hitlerism, “distinct from the people.”⁶³² Defending the role of Australia’s production in aiding the motherland (as opposed to the mobilisation of an expeditionary force), the article reminded Australian wage earners about the dangers of wartime enmity and the fostering of hatred on the basis of “nationality” rather than class. The *Worker* noted that most Germans “of our acquaintance are bitterly opposed to Hitler” (notably “socialist” Germans), and that the German “wage earner” neither endorsed, nor was responsible for a regime emerging from the instability of the Weimar system. Ruthless and brutal suppression – symbolised by the concentration camp – ensured Nazism’s political survival, not the “good will” of its people.⁶³³

Collective memory of the rampant Germanophobia of the First World War reinforced the current conflict in ideological and class-structural, rather than national or racial, terms. The Left’s defence of the German working class proved a stark contrast to the First World War when the traditional framework of working-class solidarity within a global labour movement defined by class struggle became one of the first “fatalities” of the war to which some representative leftist organisations and individuals succumbed, alongside liberal politicians and intellectuals.⁶³⁴ The dominating climate of hatred, fear and suspicion manifested itself in working-class discourse – when the expressions of loyalty were forcefully displayed through anti-German sentiment in Union action and the workplace.⁶³⁵

The *Westralian Worker* blamed dominant Australian narratives of enmity in the Australian media which had shifted the focus of enmity from a narrow target of Prussian militarist Junkers and industrialists, to nations. The editors found the tale of veteran “Old Scotty” to be illuminating. Speaking in the trenches to his men in February 1917 (or so the apocryphal tale went), Old Scotty suggested that he

...would rather feed a German than shoot him...and I am sure that the average German feels the same way about us. Yet we are being told that we have got to hate the German

⁶³¹ “Proud to Be English, The Other Germans,” *Daily News*, 11 September 1939, 4.

⁶³² “Pertinent Paragraphs: The Nations Are Fighting Hitlerism,” *The Worker* (Brisbane), 12 September 1939, 15.

⁶³³ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁴ Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920*, 155.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, 173.

people, and the Germans are being told that they must hate us...the only ones I hate are those who tell us that war must be fought....⁶³⁶

The editors claimed that there was a need to resist the incipient totalising logic of hatred in the current war rising from similar sources to the last one. In an editorial from December 1939, vocal Labor advocate and editor of the *Australian Worker*, Henry Boote, had noted that while soldiers were conditioned to slaughter and kill each other by those with “interests high up”, the average “Fritz Schmitt [held] no hatred for Tommy Atkins” and vice versa. That the masses of the people of both countries were “at enmity” yet had “no quarrel with each other” was one of the horrible ironies of total war.⁶³⁷

The Labor Party and Movement’s “logical” assent to war was predicated on the official restraint in framing the enemy.⁶³⁸ Fascism, he argued, posed a threat to all workers and thus justified Leftist support for the war with the careful reservations of a focus on home defence and industrial effort. Boote added that despite vested interests at play, Socialist principles called for the defeat of Nazism for all workers – including the Germans who, represented by the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD, Germany’s Socialist Party), had begged the British Labor Party to not forget its active resistance to and suffering from Nazism “in the midst of death and destruction”.⁶³⁹ Allied military force was justified, in part, to facilitate and aid a German “revolution” that had been launched and then betrayed in Germany’s 1918-19 “*Novemberrevolution*”:

THAT DEFEAT WOULD GIVE THE GERMAN REVOLUTIONARIES THE OPPORTUNITY THEY ARE LOOKING FOR...we envisage another and a greater German Revolution [than 1918-19] as the outcome of the conflict. We see the German masses shaking off the chains of slavery...such an uprising would be an inspiration to the whole of Europe.⁶⁴⁰

⁶³⁶ “The Folly of War,” *The Westralian Worker*, 1 March 1940, 1.

⁶³⁷ Henry Boote, “Do Soldiers Hate?,” *Australian Worker*, 6 December 1939, 16.

⁶³⁸ Andrews noted the support of the Leftist consent to war given by Boote and the *Australian Worker*. Andrews, 188.

⁶³⁹ Boote, “Labor and the War: Why the Movement Has Assented to It,” *Australian Worker*, 29 November 1939, 1.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid. Other writers for the *Australian Worker*, such as W.D. Heher, warned against placing too much faith in resistance by the non-mercurial, “solid, phlegmatic” German people without some use of force. W.D. Heher, “Weekly Comments on the War,” *Australian Worker*, 22 November 1939, 10. Such a focus was well in line with developments on the British Left. Jörg Thunecke, “‘Fight for Freedom’: A Vansittartist Network of Rightwing German Socialists in Great Britain (1941-1945),” in *Networks of Refugees from Nazi Germany* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 63.




Image 22.

These revolutionary forces were flanked by the millions of anti-Nazi Catholics, Trade Unionists and Democrats which Leftists such as John Fischer, *Tribune's* Canberra political correspondent,⁶⁴¹ had liaised with in an extensive tour of Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne and Essen between 1935 and 1936 as a representative of a Melbourne broadsheet. It was a group which, he added, could only have "grown since then".⁶⁴² He had reinforced such ideas in several injunctions in the correspondence columns of the *Argus*.⁶⁴³

The Australian Left reflected a longstanding tradition emphasising the victimhood, exploitation and suppression of the German working class entrenched in the ideological framework of Labor discourse. Rupert Lockwood enacted the *Daily News's* representation of the German workers as "victims of war"

⁶⁴¹ Amirah Inglis, Fischer, John (1910-1960), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/fisher-john-10189> (accessed 03/03/2017).

⁶⁴² Fischer, "Not a Funny War, But a Phoney One," *Tribune*, 20 October 1939, 3.; "Austrians, Czechs Fight Hitler From Within," *Tribune*, 29 September 1939, 2.

⁶⁴³ "Anti-Hitler Germans," *Argus*, 19 October 1939, 2.

in his analysis of the “underground allies” within Germany in July 1940.⁶⁴⁴ Having undertaken an extensive tour of the Reich in 1937, Lockwood felt well-equipped to write on the topic. Lockwood spoke of the dangers facing members of the underground – a collective of disenfranchised anti-Nazi Socialists, Communists, Catholic and Protestants.⁶⁴⁵ This reinforced the periodical’s discussion of the *Deutsche Blick* (The “German Look”) which it interpreted as the “haunted, despairing look of the German worker” under Nazi terror noted by many European travellers.⁶⁴⁶ Aside from reaffirming the Nazi/German distinction, the serious undertones of Will Dandle’s humorous depiction of the “bad egg” of “Hitlerism” and “Nazism” [Image 22] reinforced the concerns of Lockwood and others about declining living standards of the German working class in pursuit of Hitler’s aggressive expansionism.⁶⁴⁷

Mirroring concerns within the ALP Party room, other leading figures of the Labour Movement attacked right-wing interventions from the UAP/CP coalition which downplayed the role of capitalism in fomenting Nazism and international conflict.⁶⁴⁸ Boote remained sceptical of Menzies’ repeated statements in Parliament and from the pulpit that war was not against the German people but against the flawed systems igniting conflict.⁶⁴⁹ Notwithstanding the anti-German utterances of leading figures in Menzies’ Cabinet, Boote alluded to the potential dangers of the semantic posturing of war against “Hitlerism” because it failed to designate Western Capitalism as a root cause of conflict. The *Daily News* and *Westralian Worker* mirrored these concerns about the platitudinous war aims espoused by conservative British and Australian leaders of the “Versailles tradition” and politically self-serving framings of the enemy, alongside the typical concerns over workers’ rights, profiteering and equality of sacrifice on the home front.⁶⁵⁰ In March 1940, the *Daily News* summarised the dangerous language of total war, noting the Menzies’ reframing of “All-In” war pitted nations against nations.⁶⁵¹ The outright rejection of Vansittartism was personified in consistent critiques by its prominent anti-Vansittartist book reviewer and columnist, “The Nipper”, in his review of the Australian publication of *Black Record*.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁴ “Labor & The War,” *Daily News*, 23 March 1940, 4.

⁶⁴⁵ Rupert Lockwood, “Underground Allies in Nazi Germany,” *Daily News*, 2 July 1940, 6.

⁶⁴⁶ “The ‘German look’,” *Daily News*, 17 May 1940, 4.

⁶⁴⁷ Will Dandle, “Germany’s Bad Egg,” *Australian Worker*, 25 October 1939, 15.

⁶⁴⁸ Archie Cameron again was a major target. Frank Cotton, “The Mysterious Fifth Column as Visualised by Mr. Cameron,” *Australian Worker*, 29 May 1940, 6.

⁶⁴⁹ Boote, “The Logic of Menzies’ Word,” *Australian Worker*, 29 November 1939, 12.

⁶⁵⁰ “Demands War Aims Outline,” *Daily News*, 1 December 1939, 5.; “Fighting the Gestapo,” *Daily News*, 9 May 1940, 4.; W.A. Wood, “World Comment,” *Daily News*, 23 March 1940, 4.; “Woe to the Vanquished,” *Westralian Worker*, 17 November 1939, 1.; “The Folly of War.” Labour periodicals frequently pointed out that prominent Australians of this class, as well as in Britain, were active in pro-Fascist Anglo-German networks. “The Spirit of Brotherhood,” *Westralian Worker*, 20 December 1940, 3.

⁶⁵¹ “Labor & The War.”

⁶⁵² “Winning the Peace,” *Westralian Worker*, 21 March 1941, 2.; The Nipper, “Crib Time: Topics Toilers Talk of: In Germany To-day,” *Westralian Worker*, 21 April 1939, 2.; “Crib Time: Topics Toilers Talk of,” *Westralian Worker*,




Image 23.

The Communist journals shared concerns with the outpourings of hate, noting that Churchill's "Hymns of Hate" reflected the true objectives of British Conservatives [Image 23].⁶⁵³ Letters to the editor also provide a small glimpse into widespread disillusionment and distrust of the war aims espoused by Chamberlain and Menzies. A letter received from an unnamed soldier enlisted in the 2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) who was preparing to be mobilised to the Mediterranean theatre argued that volunteers had been misled into a conflict with their German working-class counterparts through vague rhetoric and an unwillingness to define war aims. In a direct message to Chamberlain, the soldier argued that when

...you persuaded us to enlist in your army you said we would not be asked to fight the German people, just Hitler. We were ready to do that...but it turns out that we are not fighting him at all. On the contrary, your soldiers are herded into barracks and frozen trenches while your navy is starving those same German people with whom you have no quarrel...

...Now Mr. Chamberlain it is becoming increasingly evident that we are not going the right way about defeating Hitler. To get to him it appears we must starve and kill the German people. We are doing the very opposite of what we set out to do! And frankly, we don't like this business of starving women and children and sick people to death in order to force our way into the German chancellery.⁶⁵⁴

15 September 1939, 2.; "Crib Time, Topics Toilers Talk of," 10 April 1942, 2.; "Crib Time: Topics Toilers Talk of," *Westralian Worker*, 25 July 1941, 2.; "Crib Time: Topics Toilers Talk of," *Westralian Worker*, 25 July 1941, "Crib Time: Topics Toilers Talk of," *Westralian Worker*, 14 November 1941, 2.

⁶⁵³ "Dislike of Churchill," *Tribune*, 26 January 1940, 1.; "Impressions," *Tribune*, 10 September 1940, 3.

⁶⁵⁴ "A Soldier's Letter to Chamberlin," *Tribune*, 14 November 1939, 2.

The stinging rebuke would have resonated with readers embroiled in the narrative of service for Imperialistic aims and objectives that harkened back to the previous war. Indeed, the totalising logic of economic blockade exaggerated the factor of class conflict and class struggle.

Commentators servicing the Capitalist news organisations were also liable to sharp retort. For instance, *Tribune* had attacked *Truth's* maverick European correspondent, Eric Baume, for his anti-German “new low in jingo gutter journalism”. Baume, the paper noted, had attempted to “lump all Germans together as Nazi barbarians” in a vitriolic article which reeked of the “pro-fascist provocation” that *Truth* personified.⁶⁵⁵ Baume was importantly singled out as exemplary of a broader trend in the Capitalist press:

The technique of the press [Baume] serves was in the first place to lure the Australian working class into a war “Against Hitler but not the German people.” Now the object is to persuade us that it is ‘Hitler and the German people,’ so later, perhaps, it can be ‘with Hitler against the German people’ (not of course put so bluntly).⁶⁵⁶

Noted communist writer and CPA member Ralph Gibson also noted the prevalence of “fascist propaganda” in the Right-wing or nationalist Australian journals discussed in Chapter Three. Gibson feared the “stirring up of hatred against other nations”, particularly the power of totalising enmity narratives to feed anti-Enemy “Alien” campaigns on the home front.⁶⁵⁷ Concerns about domestic hate campaigns were shared by the Labor affiliated journals. The *Daily News* had attacked the “misguided patriotic fervour and plain hooliganism” of outward expressions of anti-alien sentiment on Sydney streets in the height of an anti-alien crisis largely stimulated by such journals.⁶⁵⁸

At the end of 1939, Boote optimistically commented that “virulent vindictiveness and malevolence which get into the press, and into the oratorical outpourings on both sides” did not reflect the common attitude of the Australian working class.⁶⁵⁹ By the end of 1941, however, it was clear that the Left was losing its struggle against totalising enmity. F.E. Chamberlain, a prominent figure in the West Australian Labor Party, echoed the *Westralian Worker* in framing the issue around post-war reconstruction. The establishment of the principles and programmes of socialist thought and international reconstruction was premature because the “other” Germany was being excluded from that process with increasing ferocity:

⁶⁵⁵ “New Low in Jingo Journalism,” *Tribune*, 12 January 1940, 3.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ Ralph Gibson, *Stop This Fascist Propaganda*, Richmond: Richmond Chronicle Print, 1941. <https://viewer.slv.vic.gov.au/?entity=IE2531222&mode=browse> (accessed, 18/03/2018), 4-5.

⁶⁵⁸ “Innocent People Victims of Hate,” *Daily News*, 5 June 1940, 2.

⁶⁵⁹ Boote, “Do Soldiers Hate?,” *Australian Worker*, 6 December 1939, 16.

It is the greatest tragedy of war that barriers of hate are built up between people that last for centuries. The only way the majority of people view the German to-day is an in-human monster. They know nothing of the German away from war. How shall we break down the barriers of hate to reach the German worker – The German socialist? In spite of Hitler they still exist.⁶⁶⁰

The Labour Movement's early concerns about totalising hatred appeared to be driven by mistrust of the governing conservative UAP/CP coalition. Yet by January 1942, after Federal Labor had taken office and fears of an "Imperialist war" were long shattered by deeply ideological and racial conflict in Eastern Europe and the Pacific, representative periodicals of the Left continued to criticise a widespread "Hate Policy" towards German people evident in discussions of wartime conduct.⁶⁶¹ Journals such as the *Westralian Worker* were clearly unafraid to question the approach of Curtin's administration in facilitating enmity narratives, even if the more spurious examples were being perpetuated through the mainstream media. Noting the emotional response to the shape and nature of the present war, the *Worker* declared that prolonged conflict and "advocates of the policy of hatred" had "broken down all mental reservations" about the futility and dangers of unrestrained wartime enmity evident in the first years of the conflict.⁶⁶² The *Westralian Worker* consistently attacked reciprocal and totalising hatred for its futility and capacity to undermine lasting peace between 1943 and 1945. It also hinted at a degradation of tolerance in sectors of the Australian Left, despite the optimism proffered by Boote.⁶⁶³ The continued advocacy and frustrations of Leftist periodicals is further evidence of the breakdown of Nazi/German distinctions and the increasing trend towards totalising enmity in Australian public discourse.

["Have You Read the Story of Pastor Niemoller?": The Australian Churches and the Defence of Anti-Nazi Christian Germany](#)

As many Australian religious leaders warned, the basic tenets of Christian doctrine are antithetical to the process of totalising enmity. Menzies' non-sectarian Protestant values and faith were clearly a guiding principle in his framing of the German people and wartime enmity. His broadcast declaration of war was celebrated across the periodicals of the Australian Churches for its deliberate absence of belligerent terminology.⁶⁶⁴ Menzies had also appealed to Christian theology during his public rejection of wartime "enmity against the people of another country" when promoting the Commonwealth-

⁶⁶⁰ F. E. Chamberlain, "Looking Over the Barrier," *Westralian Worker*, 10 October 1941, 3.

⁶⁶¹ "The Hate Policy," *The Westralian Worker*, 23 January 1942, 1.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶⁶³ "Economics and War," *Westralian Worker*, 15 January 1943, 2.; "The Policy of Revenge," *Westralian Worker*, 5 February 1943, 1.; "Hate and Greed," *The Westralian Worker*, 17 September 1943, 1.; "The Foolishness of Hate," *The Westralian Worker*, 31 December 1943, 1.

⁶⁶⁴ "The War and the Christian," *Advocate*, 7 September 1939, 6.

backed day of prayer organised at the behest of several church leaders.⁶⁶⁵ The *Argus* quoted the Prime Minister after being prompted on the issue of wartime enmity during the laying of a foundational stone at the Hartwell Presbyterian Church: “I have no use for the gospel of hatred... [urging Australians] to hate evil things in the world without descending to the childish hate of peoples.”⁶⁶⁶ Respect for Menzies’ emphasis on Christian tolerance, understanding and the rights of defeated peoples stance was matched by an equal share of derision and criticism. Menzies recognised the public pressure on “every Prime Minister in war time [to] stir up hatred”.⁶⁶⁷

Perhaps referencing his outspoken First World War contemporary, Billy Hughes, Menzies concluded that in comparison he would be the most “offending” wartime leader if the role were tested on a proclivity to promote hatred.⁶⁶⁸ On such a character assessment, it is no surprise that Hughes had found himself at loggerheads with Rector of Darling Point’s St. Mark’s Church of England, Canon H.W. Barder, over the issue of the proliferation of enmity via patriotic verse. In a sermon, Barder had taken issue with particular a verse in the British national anthem, God Save Our Queen, which asked God to “scatter his enemies”.⁶⁶⁹

Hughes’ criticism of Barder’s religiosity symbolised the uphill struggle Australian Churches faced, as the moral voice of the nation, in their vocal attempts to foster tolerance and maintain the distinction between the German people and Nazism. Unsurprisingly, applications to the Christian doctrine of loving thine enemy filled the sermon halls across Australia throughout the duration of the conflict, drawing on key references within biblical scripture to criticise the emotional proliferation of hatred in wartime discourse. These were faithfully reproduced, not only in religious journals, but also in the secular media. The reference to Matthew 5:44, “love your enemies” – as utilised by Rev. W. Deane in a sermon that graced the front page the NSW organ, *Methodist* – reflected the general push of the Australian Churches between 1939 and 1941 to establish ecclesiastical authority against totalising enmity from a doctrinal, ethical and moral perspective.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁵ “A Day of Prayer: ‘Australians Cherish No Enmity’,” *West Australian*, 8 September 1939, 17.; “In the Churches: Prayers For Peace,” *Age*, 11 September 1939, 13.

⁶⁶⁶ “‘No Time for Hatred’: Lessons of War,” *Argus*, 2 September 1940, 2.; “Fight, But Don’t Hate: Menzies,” *Sun*, 1 September 1940, 2.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid. One *Argus* reader, A.G. Lester, derided the Prime Minister’s anxiety “lest the electors descend to a ‘childish’ exhibition of hatred”. A. G. Lester, “Hate!,” *Argus*, 3 September 1940, 7.

⁶⁶⁸ “No Time for Hatred”: Lessons of War.”

⁶⁶⁹ “Beat Germany to Her Knees,” *DT*, 6 November 1939, 7.; “National Anthem Objection: Hit Back at Cleric,” *Newcastle Sun*, 7 November 1939, 2.; “Aid From Heaven in Just War: Bible Basis for Royal Anthem,” *Sun*, 12 November 1939, 11.

⁶⁷⁰ Rev. W. Deane, “Love Your Enemies”: A Sermon by Rev. Wallace Dean, M.A., B.D. (Text, Mth. 5:44), *Methodist*, 10 October 1942, No. 41. – Vol. 51., 1. For examples in 1939, see also: Rev. J. Harold King on the Three Fundamentals at Brown street Congregational Church, Newcastle. “Love Must Overcome Hate,” *NMH*, 2 October 1939, 3.

For instance, Archdeacon Hewett had urged his congregation at St. Paul's, Melbourne in September 1939 to "have no bitterness or hate in our hearts towards the German people".⁶⁷¹ Bishop of Sandhurst, J.J. McCarthy, also criticised the "race hatred and exaggerated nationalism" present in wartime Australia in July 1941 whilst defending the role of Catholic education in combating totalising enmity.⁶⁷² The Bishop of Ely, Rev. B.O.F. Heywood had also noted in the diocesan gazette his criticism of "hymns of hate" and argued that many Germans must "hate the war as we hate it" and were "kindly, good-living folk" deserving of Australian "pity" and prayer.⁶⁷³ Rev. E.J. Davidson often spoke to his congregation at St. James on King St about the process of totalising enmity when passions were aroused in civilians and soldiers alike and hate transgressed from the realm of "personal ethics" to become a central facet and expression of national morale.⁶⁷⁴ A unanimous, ecumenical aversion to unchecked hatred and enmity for nations and peoples, and an understanding of its probable mobilisation in totalising warfare, was evident in religious periodicals such as the Melbourne *Advocate*, *Catholic Weekly* and *Methodist*, as well as sermons and catechisms of the Australian and international clergy published in the secular press.

Australian church groups were keen to promote a transnational consensus with resolutions of international clerical and organisational opinion. In a similar fashion to key commentators on the Australian Left, they attempted to utilise authoritative individuals and groups to bolster their arguments. The Melbourne *Herald* noted that the Victorian branch of the "World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches" – encompassing members from the Church of England, Baptists, Congregational Methodists, Presbyterian, Salvation Army and others – had expressed their solidarity with the appeal raised by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Lang, that Christians should avoid hatred and revenge however great the provocation by the enemy power.⁶⁷⁵

Given the consistent references and weight given to opinions of leading international intellectuals, statesman, politicians, and journalists in the framing of the German Question in the Australian media established above, it was no surprise that religious ministers attempted to counter excerpts of enmity inducing speeches that carried such great weight in Australian public opinion. Eric Baume's Vansittartist apostles – Lord Beaverbrook, Duff-Cooper, and Vansittart himself – were consistently scrutinised by Australian religious commentators. The Presbyterian Minister in Mackay, R. Bardon, for

⁶⁷¹ "No Bitterness: 'Pray for all Men'," *Argus*, 18 September 1939, 2.

⁶⁷² "Catholic Education in Sandhurst: Bishop, in Trenchant Address, Condemns Gospels of Hatred and Racial Animosities," *Advocate*, 31 July 1941, 27.

⁶⁷³ "No Hymns of Hate," *Maryborough Chronicle*, 1 February 1940, 10.

⁶⁷⁴ "From the Pulpit: Christian Ideals Challenged: The German Tragedy," *SMH*, 22 April 1940, 8.; "The Pulpit: Danger of Hate to Morale," *SMH*, 8 December 1941, 8. This also contained speeches by Rev. Monsignor Eris O'Brien and Rev. C. Bernard Cockett on similar issues.

⁶⁷⁵ "'No hate' Appeal Supported by Alliance," *Herald*, 8 September 1939, 7.

instance delivered what the *Daily Mercury* labelled a “stirring denunciation” of Lord Beaverbrook’s call for a “stern righteous hatred of the Germans” in the HOL which had been plastered over the pages of dailies around the country.⁶⁷⁶ Bardon was probably referencing the *Daily Mercury’s* cables which had provided no retort and had even utilised a sensational sub-heading “All Germans are Bad” that implied agreement.⁶⁷⁷ Bardon had denounced what some papers had labelled a “new Hymn of Hate”⁶⁷⁸ as thoroughly “un-British”: “We have the reputation of being stupid, slow and selfish, but never the reputation of a people who retain hatred.”⁶⁷⁹ Bardon was obviously correct in his concern over local support for the sentiments of the British newspaper publisher and politician, evidenced by correspondents such as W. Soper who expressed concern at growing enmity in the local community in spite of Bardon’s congregational call for tolerance.⁶⁸⁰

The impressions of religious ministers influenced perceptions of “good” Germany in the late inter-war period. The Tasmanian *Examiner’s* interview with recently returned Reverend and former journalist R. C. Mathias expressed clearly the “generous and kindly treatment” he received while in Germany and noted the positive advances made by the regime.⁶⁸¹ Others, such as Reverend Father P. Davoren of Cessnock, stressed to representatives of the Sydney daily press a palpable anti-war sentiment he witnessed in Germany, reinforcing Mathias’ claims that the “average citizen of Germany” was peaceable and had greeted him “amiably” in his travels.⁶⁸²

Similar findings were also presented a month into the conflict by Dr. Irving Benson, the superintendent minister of the Central Methodist Mission in Melbourne (Wesley Church) who had witnessed inner Germany in the previous July as part of a global tour.⁶⁸³ Benson was well known for his forthright and controversial commentary on 3LO’s “Questions and Answers” program, regular articles for the Melbourne *Herald*, leading the popular Pleasant Sunday Afternoon (PSA) gatherings, and holding a large congregational audience.⁶⁸⁴ In a lay-over in West Australia, Benson told journalists that one

⁶⁷⁶ “Allies Must Retain Hate For Germans,” *Daily Mercury*, 23 June 1942, 3. For example, see: “Beaverbrook Urges 2nd Front at Once,” *Telegraph*, 22 June 1942, 1.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸ “Beaverbrook’s Hymn of Hate,” *Daily News*, 22 June 1942, 11. Bardon had questioned Beaverbrook’s assertions regarding Soviet “hatred” for the Germans and referenced the negative connotations of the “Hymn of Hate”. In a small insertion, the writer or editor had added that Stalin had always been careful to distinguish between the German Government and the masses. They quoted Stalin: “...it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler’s clique with the German people and the German state”. They continued that the Soviets had deemed statement that the Soviet people hated the Germans “because they were Germans” as “stupid lies”.

⁶⁷⁹ “Policy of Hate Denounced,” *Daily Mercury*, 29 June 1942, 2.

⁶⁸⁰ W. Soper, “Our Enemies,” *Daily Mercury*, 8 July 1942, 2.

⁶⁸¹ “Nazism in Germany: Has Some Positive Achievements,” *Examiner*, 22 November 1938, 6.

⁶⁸² “Found No War Spirit in German People: Cessnock Priests Impressions,” *Newcastle Sun*, 4 April 1939, 11.

⁶⁸³ “The Ultimate Tragedy”: German View of War With Britain, *West Australian*, 30 September 1939, 18.

⁶⁸⁴ Renate Howe, Benson, Sir Clarence Irving (1897-1980), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/benson-sir-clarence-irving-9493> (accessed, 05/05/18).

“ultimate tragedy” of the war was that German people did not want conflict with Britain and that anti-British feeling did not exist beyond official Nazi propaganda. Benson insinuated that the German people would not tolerate an extended and brutal conflict against the British Empire.⁶⁸⁵ In the first year of the conflict, Benson had noted that the “Christian Soldier”, one who expressed an abhorrence of war and acted on “constructive goodwill”, would also “not surrender his love of the German people” in the righteous struggle against Hitlerism.⁶⁸⁶

The employment of these reductive and simplistic inter-war images of the “good” German further removed the German people from enmity narratives. Unperturbed by the heightened climate of war of mid-1940, Rev. E.H. Vines suggested in a sermon at Dubbo’s St. Andrews Presbyterian Church that Australians could learn from a “wonderful people” whose industry in preparation for war and devotion to the Nazi system, though misplaced, should be idolised.⁶⁸⁷ Reverend G.R. van Eerde was assertive in his view that Hitler did not represent the “heart of the German people”:

A nation which produces Beethoven, Bach, Wagner, Handel, Schweizer, Einstein, Niemoller [sic] is not going to follow Hitler permanently. The German people, like any other people, want peace, a steady job, and a quiet home. They have been criminally sinned against by their own leaders and treaty makers [i.e. Allied statesmen], but the heart of the common man and woman in Germany is not vile.⁶⁸⁸

Some religious commentators could reinforce Nazi/German distinctions while avoiding the outwardly reductive and superficial analysis of Nazi Germany expressed by their contemporaries. The erudite Cessnock minister, Reverend Alan Walker, vocally opposed totalising enmity in all its forms from the pulpit, the radio, and by the pen in the national press and as a regular contributor to Australian pacifist periodical the *Peacemaker*.⁶⁸⁹ Walker was a popular theologian, evangelist, activist and vocal social commentator concerned with the moral life of the nation at war. The popular moniker “Conscience of the Nation” was bestowed by biographer, Don Wright, due to Walker’s strong involvement in social justice issues.⁶⁹⁰ Walker’s impressions of Germany, originally published in July 1939 in the *Newcastle Morning Herald* and syndicated to the local press, received prominent media attention. The articles

⁶⁸⁵ “‘The Ultimate Tragedy’: German View of War with Britain.”

⁶⁸⁶ Benson, “Church and People: The Christian as Soldier,” *Herald*, 20 January 1940, 30.

⁶⁸⁷ “Germany Has Her Good and Her Bad: Much We Should Copy: Nazis Without Christianity, So Have No Liberty,” *Dubbo Liberal*, 4 July 1940, 5.

⁶⁸⁸ “National Repentance: A Religious Revival Needed,” *Maryborough Chronicle*, 27 January 1940, 6.

⁶⁸⁹ Walker’s preoccupation with Australian discussion of the German Question continued until the end of the war. In line with Commentator, the pseudonym of another prominent pacifist, Walker released a pertinent pamphlet through the Federal Pacifist Council of Australia (FPCA) entitled “What Shall We Do with the Germans?”, (also published in the *Peacemaker*) in 1944. Alan Walker and Commentator, *What Shall We Do With the Germans?*, (Melbourne: Essendon Gazette, 1944).

⁶⁹⁰ Don Wright, *Alan Walker: Conscience of the Nation* (Adelaide: Openbook Publishers, 1997).

were followed up with a number of local lectures on the same theme which continued into the war period.⁶⁹¹

Walker was adamant that Nazi indoctrination through the media, schools, and even some churches through the *Positives Christentum* (the Nazified Positive Christianity movement which blended Christianity with aspects of Nazi ideology such as German racial purity), had resulted in a mass “numbing” effect on the German mind. Erudite commentators distinguished between Germans subscribing to *Positives Christentum* and those persecuted Christians refusing to conform to Nazified doctrines. Rev. George Calvert Barber, Professor of Theology at Queen’s College, Melbourne, had been careful to highlight this distinction in a DOI talk on Christian persecution in Germany.⁶⁹² Walker and Calvert Barber realistically acknowledged that there were some German Christians who had benefitted from Nazism and enthusiastically supported Hitler’s quest for national rebirth. The enigmatic *Führer* commanded “blind allegiance and worship” and a “hypnotised fanaticism unparalleled in civilised people”.⁶⁹³ Walker had witnessed this disturbing trend first-hand while attending Hitler’s infamous 1938 Nuremburg rally. The venomous anti-Semitism Walker encountered was further evidence of a widespread abasement not captured in the more superficial accounts of Mathias and others. Walker’s emphasis on the heterogeneity of German society was qualified by more sophisticated gradations of victimhood and benefactors in Nazi Germany.

While many secular commentators would utilise the empirical evidence of German fanaticism to perpetuate totalising enmity, the “degradation” or paganization of German society did not negate the existence of “good” Germans in Walker’s view. The very nature of the indirect means in which the regime was attacking religion – through politicised entrance exams for clerics and the organisation of political rallies during church times – potentialized Christian resistance. Christian Germany was thus symbolic of the “good” Germany Walker witnessed, forming the archetypal revolutionary force that Australian Leftists had separately defined as German Socialists and Communists: “there is a favourable Germany and it is in this favourable Germany that the hope of the future lies. They are a kind-hearted people.”⁶⁹⁴ Notwithstanding Germany’s sickness, something universal and not particular to the race, this “favourable” Germany was a reminder of the convalescent potential of the people.

⁶⁹¹ Alan Walker, “Germany To-day: ‘Story of Deterioration of Human Values’,” *NMH*, 29 July 1939, 7. The *NMH* saw Walker’s interpretation as a useful Australian corollary to Nora Waln’s *Reaching for the Stars*. “The New Germany,” *NMH*, 29 July 1939, 10.

⁶⁹² “The Church in Germany: Grim Persecution: ‘German’ Christians Protected and Favoured,” *Recorder*, 11 April 1940, 6.; “The Church in Germany: Grim Persecution,” *Daily Mercury*, 12 April 1940, 4.

⁶⁹³ *Kyogle Examiner*, 5 September 1939, 2.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Australian commentators also highlighted the actions of the German Churches in resisting Hitlerism.⁶⁹⁵ Stephen Roberts had noted in a short-wave broadcast for the DOI in April 1940 that internal resistance to National Socialism would “spread like a cancerous growth” under conditions of total war. He argued that of the “vast potential opposition” within the Reich, the most prospective were the oppressed Christian community.⁶⁹⁶ This popular theme in anti-enmity rhetoric was symbolised by the actions of the archetypal “good” German, Pastor Martin Niemöller, whose resistance to Nazism had captured the imagination of the Australian community.⁶⁹⁷ Niemöller’s charismatic opposition to the Nazification, paganisation and racialisation of Christianity through the often ambiguous Confessing Church (created in 1934 and presenting itself as the true organisation of Lutheran Christianity in Germany) led to the Pastor becoming fully acquainted with the camp system. Throughout the 1930s and the war years, he was placed under protective custody (*Schutzhaft*).⁶⁹⁸ Niemöller’s internment and solitary confinement in Sachsenhausen personified Christian resistance against Nazism.

The use of Niemöller in this capacity is interesting given the complexity of the Pastor’s own convictions – a strong opposition to National Socialism mixed with German nationalism, conservatism anti-democratic and anti-liberal sentiment and expansionism; denunciation of Jewish persecution but only for reformed Christians of Jewish descent given his anti-Semitism.⁶⁹⁹ Most Australian commentators failed to recognise this ambiguity of character, particularly Niemöller’s largely theological, rather than political, opposition to Nazism.⁷⁰⁰ Nonetheless, Niemöller served a particular and often reductionist function in Australian enmity narratives: to highlight the resistance of the uncorrupted elements of German Christianity to Nazism.⁷⁰¹ In this, he transcended religious discourse like no other German ecclesiast, functioning as a popular archetype for secular writers, intellectuals and journalists. Walter Murdoch, whose ardent defence of the distinction between Germans and their leaders has already been established, saw Niemöller as an exemplar of the outstanding German individuals heroically standing up against Nazism and acting as voices of the unheroic, albeit inherently “good”, silent German majority. He asked: “Have you read the story of Pastor Niemoller [sic]? It is one of the heroic pages of history.”⁷⁰² N. Bartlett’s heroic anthology of the life of the “Christian martyr” in the *West*

⁶⁹⁵ Rev. A. E. Cowley, “The Christian Faith in Germany,” *The Australian Christian Commonwealth*, 18 August 1939, 1.

⁶⁹⁶ “German Threat to Nazism,” *DT*, 16 April 1940, 3.

⁶⁹⁷ Walker, “Germany-To-day.”

⁶⁹⁸ Nicholas Stargardt, *The German War: A Nation under Arms, 1939-1945* (London: Penguin Random House, 2015), 13-14.

⁶⁹⁹ Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2001), 720-21; Stargardt, 13-14.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰¹ “Philo’s Letter: Nazi Tactics,” *Kadina and Wallaroo Times* 8 November 1941, 1.; “Religion and Politics in Germany,” *Pix*, 25 February 1939, 42-3.; “Hitler’s Hypocrisy: “What Religion Means to Nazis,” *Pix*, 15 July 1944, 18-19.; “Swastika Versus the Cross: Pagan revival in Germany,” *Pix*, 17 April 1940, 26.

⁷⁰² Murdoch, “The German Paradox: Peace With Slavery.” See also Reid, 17, 21.

Australian was representative of common portrayals of the Pastor's resistance in the Australian media.⁷⁰³ It is no surprise that anti-German polemicists such as Vansittart attacked the Niemöller myth as dangerously misleading.⁷⁰⁴ Only a minority of Australian commentators such as Eric Baume, however, warned of the propagandistic dangers of overemphasising Niemöller or attempted to correct his symbolic personification of "good" Germany in the early stages of the conflict.⁷⁰⁵

The *Advocate*, the official Catholic periodical published by the Archdiocese of Melbourne dominated by Irish-born Archbishop Daniel Mannix, did not repudiate the influence of the Lutheran Niemöller as an international symbol of Christian resistance to Nazism.⁷⁰⁶ Catholic periodicals such as *Advocate*, *Southern Cross*, *Catholic Weekly* and *Catholic Press* maintained a plethora of German Catholic martyrs that served a similar function to the Lutheran minister. German Catholic victimhood at the hands of the regime was inextricably linked to the pleas of leading Catholic figures in Germany and had influenced shifting attitudes towards the regime within the Catholic community.⁷⁰⁷ The Bishop of Münster Clemens August Graf von Galen⁷⁰⁸, the Archbishop of Freiburg Conrad Gröber,⁷⁰⁹ and the Archbishop of Breslau Adolf Bertram⁷¹⁰ became household names in Australian Catholic discourse. Moreover, their pastoral letters and speeches constantly alluded to the victimhood and persecution of Germans, usually Christians, under the Godless regime. While many Catholic commentators criticised the secular press for their failure to promote acts of resistance, emphasis on the increase of Catholic activity and opposition to Nazi racialism, hyper-nationalism, neo-paganism and anti-Christian conceptions of *Blut und Boden* (Blood and Soil),⁷¹¹ whilst most prominent in religious periodicals, appeared haphazardly in widely read cables.⁷¹²

Australian Catholic opinion was heavily influenced by clerical opinion, pushed through its official organs and periodicals, sermons from the pulpit and broadcasts which were in turn published through the secular press. The *Advocate* was a key source of Catholic opinion in Melbourne. It was far more

⁷⁰³ N. Bartlett, "Man v. State: The Case of Pastor Niemoller," *West Australian*, 10 May 1941, 7.

⁷⁰⁴ Vansittart, *Lessons of My Life*, 158.

⁷⁰⁵ Baume, "Hitler Seeks to Save Skin," *Truth*, 15 November 1942, 16.

⁷⁰⁶ "The Story of Pastor Niemoller," *Advocate*, 14 November 1940, 20.; "Heroic Protestant, Noted Jesuit, Cell Mates in Nazi Prison," *Advocate*, 19 September 1940, 6.

⁷⁰⁷ Andrews, 125.

⁷⁰⁸ "German Bishop Challenges Gestapo," *Advocate*, 27 November 1941, 19.; "This Man is a German Hero," *Catholic Weekly*, 21 March 1942, 3.;

⁷⁰⁹ "Fearless Bishop lifts up the Cross for Germans," *The Southern Cross*, 7 June 1940, 1.; "Vatican Daily Runs Anti-Nazi Pastoral: Was Suppressed in Germany," *Catholic Freeman's Journal*, 22 May 1941, 3.; "Suppressed Pastoral of German Bishop Published in Vatican Paper," *Southern Cross*, 30 May 1941, 13.; "German Bishop Calls on People to Resist Pagan Influences," *Advocate*, 10 July 1941, 10.

⁷¹⁰ "German Bishops Protest to Government: Bitterness and Enmity Around Germany," *Advocate*, 1 July 1943, 5.

⁷¹¹ "Church Progresses Despite Nazism," *Advocate*, 25 April 1940, 18.; "Hooked Cross Versus Cross of Christ," *Advocate*, 22 August 1940, 5.

⁷¹² "The German Horde," *Advocate*, 23 March 1939, 6.

interested in foreign affairs, though far less liberal than its contemporaries in Sydney – the *Catholic Freeman's Journal* and *Catholic Press*.⁷¹³ Its attempts to moralise the war were supported by the publication of key local and international Catholic intellectuals, the transcripts of broadcasts, publications of pastoral letters emanating from German clerical resistance, and translations from the Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*.⁷¹⁴ Publications of the Pope's statements and Vatican Radio discussions also evidenced the external influence on Australian Catholic discourse.⁷¹⁵

Australia's Catholic community expressed a similar shame as the Labour press for their betrayal of principles during the First World War.⁷¹⁶ The *Advocate* referenced a number of Christians who had "succumbed to propaganda, indulged in hatred and vilification of the enemy, obscured issues in a miasma of religiosity, and degraded God as an instrument of partisan policy."⁷¹⁷ The mobilisation of religious resources for temporal conflict – invoking God in the interests of nationalism – and the spewing forth of enmity from the pulpit in the service of national, secular aims, was antithetical to Christian doctrine. The *Advocate* was not convinced that Australians would heed widespread appeals for tolerance and restraint. It predicted

a fiercer outbreak of the familiar propaganda of fear, hatred and lies. The old catch-cries are screamed more fiercely than ever to pervert men's minds and nerve them for the work of destruction. The Germans, Italians and Japanese are proclaimed as 'enemies of humanity' – while the bloodstained tyrant of Moscow...[is] eagerly invoked as allies against them in the salvation of 'peace', and even – God help us! – of Christian civilisation.⁷¹⁸

One page length editorial on 7 September 1939 on "The War and the Christian" mentioned the propagation of hatred and enmity no less than four times in analysing the paradoxical stance of the Christian in a totalising war:

⁷¹³ Andrews, 12-13.

⁷¹⁴ Fulton Sheen, Think of War in Terms of Justice, *Advocate*, 27 February 1941, 19.

⁷¹⁵ Hate, 'Public Enemy No. 1,' Says Vatican Radio, *Advocate*, 30 July 1942, 10.

⁷¹⁶ Tampke, *The Germans in Australia: The Story of the Continent's German Speaking Communities*, 179.

⁷¹⁷ The War and the Christian, *Advocate*, 7 September 1939, 6.

⁷¹⁸ The Tragic Memory of 1914, *Advocate*, 10 August 1939, 6.

of patriotism, but the present
diseased and apostate world. The great
danger of the Christian in the coming
months, possibly years, is that, under the
influence of emotions, whipped up by pro-
paganda and hymns of hate, which, unfor-
tunately, have already begun, he should
conceive his own allies as guileless crusaders
bent upon the extermination of a diabolic
enemy. But, as a Christian, he is bound
to love the enemy and practise the cardinal
virtue of charity. However strongly he may
be convinced of the justice of his cause, he
is bound to recall that the masses of the
men and women against whom he is aligned,
millions of them his own brothers in Christ,
are neither more nor less sinful nor desirous
of war than he is. In time of war, com-
placency towards oneself and hatred of the
enemy are, from the Christian standpoint,
the worst of vices, and their practice by
Christians would be the occasion of serious
scandal. For we are bound to love them
that hate us and bless them that curse us.

Australian religious intellectuals had attempted to engage with these paradoxes from the outset. One series of pamphlets on “The Christian and the War” set out Christian ethical principles of the just war for the Australian laymen. Edited by Archdeacon C.E. Storrs, a collection of six essays by leading thinkers such as Kenneth Henderson, Archbishop Wand and Professor Kenneth Bailey of the University of Melbourne explored key moral and religious quandaries presented by total war. A.E.S., a columnist for the Brisbane *Telegraph*, was particularly taken by Henderson’s contention that “we can pray for our enemies [and] can think most kindly of the individuals we are opposed to, and yet believe that they are serving a corporate will that [is] evil.”⁷¹⁹

Perhaps the most influential of these scholars was Catholic intellectual, D.G.M. Jackson. He encapsulated the attempts of the Catholic Church in Australia to promote its doctrine as an antidote to hate propaganda. Jackson also reflected the reactive role that religious narratives played against what many viewed as a propagation of hatred by the secular media. A leading figure of Victorian Catholic opinion and keen student of international affairs, Jackson’s work appeared in many sources of religious opinion under a raft of pseudonyms including “Sulla” (*Advocate*) and the “Onlooker” during his regular Sunday evening “Catholic Hour” broadcast for radio 3AW. As his biographer noted, Jackson’s prolific commentary across various media platforms resulted in many Catholic listeners and readers equating his frank views on contentious issues (such as bombing) with established, official ecclesiastical opinion.⁷²⁰

⁷¹⁹ “The Ethics of War: Pointers for Christians,” *Telegraph*, 25 January 1941, 6.

⁷²⁰ Michael Costigan, Jackson, Denys Gabriel Maurice, ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/jackson-denys-gabriel-maurice-12688> (accessed 20/08/17).; Andrews, 4, 12.

Jackson consistently attempted to grapple with the serious theological and ethical questions of waging a just war when total war had noticeably degraded the key distinction between belligerent and non-belligerent – the guilty and innocent.⁷²¹ He noted that Christian principles were:

incompatible with the demands for a peace of vengeance and the humiliation of the German people which are made by many in our own ranks [i.e. Catholics]. Severe measures may be needed for the sake of future security, but the infliction of hate-breeding indignities, the imposition of heavy burdens, must be avoided at all costs...⁷²²

Jackson's allusions to the source of totalising enmity reflected the ongoing relationship of the *Advocate* with the secular Melbourne Press – in particular the *Argus*, from which the multiple confrontations discussed in this thesis are largely drawn. Criticism of the Melbourne press for fostering hate was already evident in the correspondence column of the *Advocate* in the pre-war climate. "The 'psychological mobilisation' of British opinion", one correspondent noted in a chain of letters on the hate mongering in the Australian press published in July 1939, "has been going on for years, until today 80 per cent. of the Australian people believe that it is our duty which we owe to civilisation to fight the despised 'wops' and the hated 'Huns'."⁷²³ Like many of the Leftist journals, the religious periodicals saw the mainstream press as the chief promoter of narratives of enmity which incited hatred of peoples rather than systems. This was especially acute considering the recognised restraint of official propaganda emerging from the DOI and pronouncements by leading political leaders:

Unscrupulous war propaganda, which misrepresents the enemy systematically, as a means of arousing hatred and contempt against him, must be reckoned as among the chief obstacles to the spirit of justice and sanity on whose prevalence the future civilisation depends. Here too, while our enemy is guiltier than ourselves, we certainly cannot claim to be innocent of evil-doing.⁷²⁴

Australian Catholics stressed the dangers of the Church narrative in a "charged" atmosphere promoting "ferocious intolerance" in which the "refusal to hate [was] regarded almost as a symptom of disloyalty!"⁷²⁵ This pointed to the dangerous position of opposing totalising enmity narratives in the context of wartime nationalism. In the shifting climate of mid-1940, the *Advocate* expressed shock at the proliferation of enmity it witnessed in clippings collected by its staff and concerned readers from

⁷²¹ Sulla, (D.G.M. Jackson), "War and Christianity, Part IV – The Conduct of Modern War," *Advocate*, 4 July 1935, 27.

⁷²² "As The Earth Turns: Commentary on World Affairs," *Advocate*, 9 January 1941, 3.

⁷²³ "Alter Christianus", "Fostering International Hatred," *Advocate*, 13 July 1939, 27. The *Advocate* admitted that the bulk of letters received meant that many could not be published on the important theme.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

⁷²⁵ "War and Hate," *Advocate*, 4 July 1940, 8.

the correspondence column of the *Argus*.⁷²⁶ The narratives within the *Argus* substantiated the Catholic Churches' initial concerns about the "inevitable progress" of totalising enmity in spite of the lip-service paid by Australian political leaders. Jackson professed a similar sense of betrayal and cynicism to those representatives on the Left who criticised the false promises of Menzies' "no quarrel":

How confident, then, our leaders are that [The Pope] was wrong; how eloquently they explained that our war was with 'Hitlerism', from which the real, good German people, were to be delivered...

...Thank heaven, there are still those who retain moderation and decency in language and sanity in their thought; but with the growth of fear and insecurity and horror, their voices are gradually being drowned out with enraged cries of 'reprisals', with exhortations to 'root out appeasers' and to pursue alien suspects with all the fervour of the Gestapo.⁷²⁷

The increased presence of Australian "sixth column" organisations and patriotic "societies" by mid-1940 was evident in a controversy in the *Argus*' correspondence column during the Blitzkrieg crisis.⁷²⁸ A report on the 29 May 1940 on the annual meeting of the Melbourne Scots, a society designed to promote and celebrate Scottish cultural identity, had become embroiled in anti-alien hysteria.⁷²⁹ President C.N. MacKenzie had called for the inculcation of a "first-class hatred" that rejected the euphemistic distinction rhetoric propagated by the churches:

we are not doing enough in this country toward stirring up hate...We want no euphemisms. It is not the Nazis we are out after; it is the Germans. We must cultivate hate.⁷³⁰

Reflecting the shifting climate of attitudes within the paper, the *Argus* passed the comment without criticism. *Argus* readers were also split by the allusions to totalising enmity therein.⁷³¹ Summarising the *Advocate's* view, Francis Davitt penned a patronising verse that invoked the hyperbole of *Gott strafe England*: "Our 'strafing' must grow really great// Foaming in frenzy, brutal bold – // We gravely

⁷²⁶ Ibid. It noted a particular example by Paul G. Dane which implored "savagery" as a response to the enemy. Paul G. Dane, War Psychology, *Argus*, 1 July 1940, 2. Dane had been heavily involved in the *Argus* correspondence debate discussed in Chapter Three. See p. 70.

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

⁷²⁸ Loeffel, 52-4. The term "Sixth Column" had acquired various meanings by mid-1940. It reflected the mobilisation of various RSL branches and the formation of the Australian National Service League.

⁷²⁹ "'Not Enough Hate' Says Scots President," *Argus*, 29 May 1940, 9.

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

⁷³¹ I.N. Cameron, "Hate," *Argus*, 31 May 1940, 5.; Bruce Laing and M. Meade, "Hate," *Argus*, 1 June 1940, 7.

need a ‘first-class hate...’.⁷³² The growing distaste for distinctions between Nazism and the German people in the secular press discussed in Chapter Three was accompanied by the Australian Churches’ increasing feeling of exclusion and isolation in Australian war discourse. One unnamed Catholic intellectual, writing under the alias P.I. O’L, had attempted to align the churches’ anti-enmity agenda with secular articles, directly referencing articles by Walter Murdoch and eminent Professor of Natural History at the University of Melbourne, Professor T.H. Laby. He noted, pessimistically, how even “hitherto dignified leading articles columns [now contained] verbal fire and brimstone and the molten lava of language” despite the ineffectiveness and futility of invective on the air, in the press or behind the camera.⁷³³ Given the *Advocate*’s close criticism of the *Argus*, it would not be much of a stretch to suggest that P.I. O’L was referring to Alan Chisholm’s columns.

Australia’s Churches continued to mobilise against totalising enmity despite the dawning recognition that such enmity narratives would invariably accompany a “total war”.⁷³⁴ The *Advocate* continued to reject the “doctrine that ‘total war’ implies total hatred”.⁷³⁵ By 1942, the *Advocate* was still condemning a more pronounced, more widespread tendency to “think and speak of the Germans and Japanese only as monsters and vermin”, the cynicism of correspondents who viewed “chivalry” as a weakness, and the growing tendency to “rejoice in the type of action which tends...to give personal expression to hatred, and to obliterate the distinctions generally observed among civilised peoples – the distinction between civilian and soldier, between armed violence and mere animal savagery.”⁷³⁶ The *Advocate*, too, recognised that, in public discussions of the German Question and the connected narratives enmity, it was fighting a losing battle.

Conclusion

Through a close analysis of representative voices in the Australian Churches and the Australian Left, this chapter has highlighted the existence of systematic, challenging, counter-narratives to totalising enmity narratives in Australian war discourse. While they shared a common fear of repeating their respective engagements with anti-Germanism during the First World War, each differed in their responses and definitions of “good” Germans according to varying partisan, political or ideological agendas. By 1941, the churches and the Left both pessimistically noted that they were losing their struggle against the proliferation of totalising enmity in Australia, feeling that the promises of

⁷³² Francis Davitt, “Passing-Shots: ‘A First-Class Hate’,” *Advocate*, 13 June 1940, 16. Articles within the *Argus* were a regular target of Davitt’s satire.

⁷³³ P.I. O’L, “Sound and Fury of Ineffective Words,” *Advocate*, 23 May 1940, 11.

⁷³⁴ “Total War,” *Advocate*, 16 May 1940, 6.; “Totalitarianism Without Tears,” *Advocate*, 30 May 1940, 8., “Total War Footing,” *Advocate*, 20 June 1940, 6.; “The Christian Way of Justice,” *Advocate*, 1 May 1941, 8.; “War and Hate,” *Advocate*, 4 July 1940, 8.

⁷³⁵ “The Soldier’s Code of Chivalry,” *Advocate*, 25 June 1942, 8.

⁷³⁶ Ibid. “Christian Courage or Pagan Hatred?,” *Advocate*, 13 August 1942, 8.

tolerance and moderation symbolised in Menzies' "no quarrel" had been shattered under conditions of totalising war.

Representatives of Australia's religious communities were ecumenical in attempting not only to limit hate, but also undermine the very logic underpinning totalising enmity narratives. They were early to recognise the novel threat posed by "total war" to Christian tenets of just war, tolerance and restraint. Christian narratives tended to reinforce the "good" German through specific references to the collective victimhood of Germany's Christian communities under a Godless regime. Limited references to German moral "degradation" by ecclesiasts such as Walker were tempered by widely held views of the redeemability of the German people. The Melbourne *Advocate's* criticism of newspapers such as the *Argus* reflected the self-professed reactive role of multi-denominational religious periodicals across the nation to what was framed largely as immoral, *secular* hate propaganda. The combative relationship between the Melbourne Catholic organ and the Melbourne press, one which would continue throughout the war, was interactive. The religious narrative was increasingly criticised as an expression of misplaced sentimentality, lingering unreality and platitudinous biblical prattling in the Australian community that drew the ire of commentators with increasing vehemence.⁷³⁷

By clearly positioning the war as one against an ideological system (the grotesque child of Capitalism and Fascism) rather than the enslaved and coerced German people, the Australian Left questioned the logic of totalising enmity and the hatred it invoked throughout the first stages of the war. Between 1939 and 1941, the various factions of the Australian Labour Movement – affiliations with the ALP, union journals and the CPA – were largely unanimous in their support for the distinction between Nazism and the German people, the revolutionary potential of the German working class and opposition to totalising enmity therein. The Australian Left commonly framed totalising enmity as servicing the interests of Capitalism and Imperialism in Australia by alienating the German working class. Factionalism, and wide disagreements between Australian Communists calling for negotiated peace and forces within the Labour Movement that supported qualified military action, did not appear to divide the Australian Left concerning views of the German people throughout the early stages of the conflict.

Both sections of Australian society tended to highlight the actions of "good" Germans that aligned with that group's ideological, spiritual or factional standpoint whilst positive images of other "good" Germans were ignored, underplayed or outwardly countered. Church narratives tended to foster

⁷³⁷ "Remarks at School Anzac Service," *Singleton Argus*, 29 April 1940, 4.; "Justice the Aim in War," *Singleton Argus*, 3 May 1940, 8.; "An Enemy Who Has No Loving Intentions", *Singleton Argus*, 29 April 1940, 4.; "An Explanation," *Singleton Argus*, 6 May 1940, 4.; "Momentous Topic of the Day", *Singleton Argus*, 8 May 1940, 3.; "Reply to Patriotic Christian," *Singleton Argus*, 31 May 1940, 6.

ecumenicity and a tacit recognition of a collective German “Christian” victimhood, yet invariably promoted the martyrs most identifiable with their own denominations. Between 1939 and 1941, there appeared to be little evidence of the divisiveness in British Left and Labour Movement captured by scholars such as Jörg Thunecke and Isabella Tombs.⁷³⁸ As these works have shown, the anti-Vansittartism personified by Gollancz’ organisation, was not universally accepted by the British Left and would cause acute disagreement in the later years of the conflict.⁷³⁹ Although not fully brought out here, the Australian Left, in spite of the common emphasis on international working-class solidarity, would come to demonise each other’s role in the creation of National Socialism in the latter years of the war. Social Democrats, Socialists and Communists targeted one another based on their continental peers’ role in acquiescing in or supporting the rise of National Socialism. Communist attacks on German “Labor” leaders and exiled remnants of the SPD were extended to the anti-Communist elements of the Australian Labour Movement.⁷⁴⁰ This, of course, was reciprocated in the Labor press.⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁸ Thunecke.; Isabelle Tombs, "The Victory of Socialist 'Vansittartism': Labour and the German Question, 1941-5.," *Twentieth Century British History* 7, no. 3 (1996).

⁷³⁹ Ramsden, 189-90; 95-6.; Thunecke.

⁷⁴⁰ “Anti-Communist Sold Out German Workers,” *Tribune*, 24 June 1943, 4.; “No Soft Peace for German ‘Socialists’,” *Tribune*, 27 July 1944, 2.; Sharkey, “Big Three Decide.”; Rupert Lockwood, “They’ll Cheat You, Those Junkers!”, *Tribune*, 10 August 1944, 2.

⁷⁴¹ See: The Nipper, “Crib-Time: German Coms,” *WW*, 13 July 1945, 6.; “Crib Time: Nazis and Communists,” *WW*, 28 July 1944, 2.

Chapter Six: “Are We Becoming Brutal?”: Moral Exclusion and the Representation of German Civilians in Australian Discussions of the Allied Strategic Bombing Campaigns

...we are at war with Germany, and that means for me that we are at war with Otto and Ruth who walked in Cornwall and Saxony with us; Fritz and Willi, who canoed with us on the Danube, and Johann, who skied with us in the Sudeten mountains. It is not easy to agree with Mr. H.G. Wells’ contention that we should bomb German towns.

T. C. Reisling, exchange teacher on the staff of Albury High School, in a speech entitled “Human Understanding: The Conflict of War and Education”.⁷⁴²

As the Second World War reached its denouement with the painful establishment of Allied military and economic supremacy, Australian wartime discourse relating to the German Question refocused on the treatment of the enemy. As previous chapters have established, Australian narratives of enmity throughout 1939-1941 were characterised by inconsistencies, paradoxes and contradictions despite a powerful rise in enmity aimed at the German people throughout that period of the conflict. However, as T. Riesling’s concern about the status of his pre-war German acquaintances in shifting enmity narratives evidenced, the maintenance of a distinction between the Nazi regime and German people became increasingly problematic in the articulation and expression of totalising violence.⁷⁴³ Acceptance and recognition of the enemy’s humanity – a “good” Germany – conflicted with increasingly indiscriminate methods of warfare against German civilians. Totalising violence necessitated a strong enemy/Other to avoid collective cognitive dissonance between behaviour and attitudes.⁷⁴⁴

The success of the contemporary master narrative of a “good” war demanded rectification of the “deep contradictions” imposed by the dynamic of totalising violence. This is what Geyer and Tooze attempt to capture under the term “moral economy”, a conscious contemporary recognition that the means, ends and ramifications of totalising violence required justification in a totalising peoples’ war.⁷⁴⁵ Answering their collective call for the examination of individual “moral cultures” and character of wartime societies, the connection between narratives of enmity, the permissibility of indiscriminate

⁷⁴² Speech given at the Albury Rotarian meeting, republished in Australian *Digest of World Reading*, 1 June 1940, 21.

⁷⁴³ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁴ Sternberg and Sternberg, 7.

⁷⁴⁵ Geyer and Tooze, 3, 415, 18, 20.

violence, and justification of transgressive acts against non-combatant immunity requires further analysis in the Australian context.⁷⁴⁶

The following chapter examines the various intersections and processes of “moral exclusion” in Australian enmity narratives throughout the key developmental stages of the Anglo-American strategic bombing campaign.⁷⁴⁷ Moral exclusion occurs in several, often overlapping forms regarding its intensity/severity, extent and level of engagement (ranging from passive to active).⁷⁴⁸ In terms of its public war discourse, the Australian media facilitated the passive ignorance, facilitation and allowance of strategic bombing; a form of blatant totalising violence which violated legal/ethical norms to a wide extent of people – the “German” non-combatant.

Margaret Kertesz has rightly observed that the bombing war formed a key signifier of hostility in wartime representation in British enmity narratives.⁷⁴⁹ Concerning Australian views on Germany, it took on a particular importance considering the waning focus on the German enemy between December 1941 and 1944 in line with Australia’s strategic repositioning to the Pacific War. The narratives connected to Australia’s complicity and understanding of the bombing war against German civilians were inextricably tied to interpretations and reports on the actions of British Bomber Command and the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). Despite Australia’s strategic reorientation to the Pacific Theatre from December 1941, the RAAF’s major role remained with the air offensive over Europe. It was here that eight out of a total of seventeen RAAF squadrons, took part in the strategic bombing offensive across various stages of the campaign. This is not to mention the thousands of others (10,532 by April 1945) who were embedded into separate RAF units. The RAAF’s contribution of approximately ten per cent of aircrew to Bomber Command campaigns against the Reich should not be underestimated. 78 per cent (5100 of its 6500) of Australian combat deaths occurred over the skies of Europe, making it the “most costly single campaign of the war” for Australia despite the overt focus on the Pacific Theatre.⁷⁵⁰

This chapter looks at a particularly vital feature of the Australia’s moral exclusionary narratives: firstly, the discussion and presentation of German civilians under Allied bombing, and secondly, the means, arguments and problems raised by the totalising process which rendered Germans acceptable,

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid., 418; Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, 48.

⁷⁴⁷ See pp. 17-18 for a discussion of moral exclusion.

⁷⁴⁸ Opatow, *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 74.; “Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion,” 128.; Sternberg and Sternberg, 29.

⁷⁴⁹ Kertesz, 124.

⁷⁵⁰ John Malcolm McCarthy, *A Last Call of Empire: Australian Aircrew, Britain and the Empire Air Training Scheme* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1988). quoted in Peter Dennis et al., *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History* (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press 1995), 226-7, 508-9.; Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, 121-3; Robertson, 52-7.

normalised and even worthy targets of totalising violence. Focusing on the years 1940-1943, when the greatest changes in bombing policy, attitudes and context occurred, this chapter conveys two competing narratives within the Australian debate. The first encompasses a loose yet widespread coalition of pro-bombing forces which encompassed the bulk of the Australian metropolitan, provincial and rural press and many popular journals. This dominant narrative, to varying extents, promoted and applied the logic of totalising violence to justify and proliferate the moral exclusion of the German people from the scope of justice. This, however, can be split between outright *advocates* of totalising violence against the German people, and those who merely rested on the moral exclusionary narrative to *justify* actions foreign to the sensibilities and self-professed institutional, legal and moral constraints professed by liberal states – Australia’s “moral economy”. This latter form, it will be argued, was far more commonly applied to, although outright advocacy of the punitive function of bombing was increasingly evident as the bombing war progressed.

A second force also existed. Marginalised Australian actors and groups form a useful point of departure to analyse resistance to the logic of totalising enmity in the later stages of the war.⁷⁵¹ An isolated coalition of individuals and organisations attempted to oppose this process by reinforcing ethics and morality, liberalism and international norms governing wartime conduct. They engaged in an opposing process of “moral inclusion”. An overview of the religious press, pacifist organisations and anomalous media coverage demonstrates attempts to facilitate moral inclusion in Australia war discourse. Such forces were engaged in resisting and limiting the inherent logic of totalising war that promoted violence against an enemy population and rendered them worthy targets of violence. That their actions largely fell on deaf ears, and had little impact on Australian public opinion, was testament to the power of that logic. Here, scholarship on the logic of total war and its focus on forms and constraints ala John Horne, Geyer and Tooze, and Pierre Purseigle coincides with calls of social scientists like Opatow for more research on “within-group dissent” and its influence on the processes of enmity and moral exclusion.⁷⁵²

This chapter also lends to a broader understanding of the bombing war through a reconstruction of the paradoxical and often incohesive framework in which the moral imperatives of the war were contemporarily perceived – when a widespread acceptance that the norms governing military conduct were shifting in line with the “relative ethics of survival and defeat” connected to the totalising warfare.⁷⁵³ Such considerations are captured under the concept of the “logic of totalising violence”.

⁷⁵¹ Geyer and Tooze, 3, 418.

⁷⁵² Opatow, *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 83.

⁷⁵³ Richard James Overy, “Allied Bombing and the Destruction of German Cities,” in *A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945*, ed. Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, and Bernd Greiner (New

The possibility, willingness and even conspicuous acclamation in targeting the enemy home front population, and the concurrent lack of opposition this provoked, can only be understood through sensitivity to contemporary framing and concessions to totalising logic it permitted – the narratives of enmity and moral exclusion which accompanied this.⁷⁵⁴

Popular Australian narratives of the bombing war, replicating official sources from Britain and America, rarely deviated from the established claim that Allied bombers, including Australian aircrews, limited their operations to military targets.⁷⁵⁵ The Australian media perpetuated various “cognitive defences”, translated from transnational governmental and military discourses, to reconcile the human cost and degradation of previously immutable principles of non-combatant immunity with a commitment to the intensification of the war effort in the pursuit of unconditional surrender.⁷⁵⁶ This was rooted in a widespread official belief that large portions of the domestic population in liberal democratic states would not support an outright terror bombing campaign that openly contravened peacetime norms. Contemporary Anglo-American analysts of public opinion consistently highlighted that the normative concept of “civilian immunity” retained a strong hold in their communities.⁷⁵⁷ Notwithstanding an overarching belief in the justice of the war in Allied populations, shapers of public opinion also achieved consensus through misleading rhetoric and staunch control of the presentation and structuring of the campaigns through communication and information networks and the willingness of those at home to believe such “convenient fiction[s] in order to resolve their own cognitive dissonance”.⁷⁵⁸

York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 295; *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945*, 31.

⁷⁵⁴ My aim here is not to apply or analyse current moral, legal and historical considerations involved in anachronistic post-war, retrospective assessment which has defined recent scholarship. Bellamy; Bess, 279, 92; Geyer and Tooze, 3; Grayling.; Bess et al.; Donald Bloxham, “Dresden as a War Crime,” in *Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945*, ed. Paul Addison and Jeremy A Crang (London: Pimlico, 2006), 181-208.

⁷⁵⁵ Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945*, 49.

⁷⁵⁶ Tami Davis Biddle, “Wartime Reactions,” in *Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945*, ed. Paul Addison and Jeremy A Crang (London: Pimlico, 2006), 218; “Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory,” *The Journal of Military History* 72, no. 2 (April, 2008): 438. See also *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁷⁵⁷ Kertesz, 153.

⁷⁵⁸ Bellamy, 158.; Mark Connelly, “The British Debate,” in *Terror from the Sky: The Bombing of German Cities in World War II*, ed. Igor Primoratz (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).

Bomb-Consciousness and the Potential for Empathy

The human element of the Allied strategic bombing campaign became easily lost within the gargantuan scope of the destructive capacity of the bombing war. Combined statistics for Germany and Japan vary between 500,000-800,000 and Germany between 250,000-600,000 deaths.⁷⁵⁹ Of those killed within the Reich, Richard Overy estimates 353,000 based on a careful correlation of archival evidence, of which upwards of 80 per cent were German civilians.⁷⁶⁰ Not accounted for here are the millions injured and displaced, nor the destruction of urban landscapes and historical and cultural monuments.

The Australian experience (or relative lack thereof) of mass area bombing is an important contextual matter in analysing attitudes to the German victims of Allied strategic bombing campaigns. Susan Sontag provides some useful commentary on the mediated experience of war through images and a resulting inability to empathise with the suffering of others that can be applied to Australia. As a composite part of enmity narratives, images can only act to bring home a “portion of the reality” of violent conflict rather than the full experience of its horror. Through such mediation, she argues, an individual cannot fully imagine or understand wartime violence beyond their own self-experience.⁷⁶¹

For most Australian civilians, wartime violence and suffering was “constructed” through images and language rather than the direct experience of bombing. The closest many came to a bombing raid was the local ARP demonstrations held in metropolitan and regional centres. The “grim reality” of a mock raid in Melbourne’s Bourke St. and destructive blend of high explosives and incendiaries shown in a multi-page *Australasian* picture story was exemplary in reminding readers that “THIS COULD HAPPEN HERE”.⁷⁶² The vivid imagining of bombing of Australian shores in media, art and literature, however, struggled to bring home some sense of reality to the bombing. In the *Meanjin Papers*, the Australian poet Brian Vrepon’s attempted to “anchor” the complex interplay between the mundane, everyday life under bombing in Darwin with the constant possibility of violent death. The obscene “meaninglessness”, indiscrimination and dehumanisation of bombing captured in Vrepon’s short story, “Your Last Few Hours”, exemplified attempts to foster resonance with far removed readers in the South-Eastern Australian states.⁷⁶³

⁷⁵⁹ Richard Bessel, “Death and Survival in the Second World War,” in *The Cambridge History of the Second World War: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture*, ed. Michael Geyer and Adam Tooze (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 259; Anthony Cooper, *RAAF Bombers over Germany, 1941-42* (Sydney: Rosenberg Press, 2016), 19; Grayling, 5; Mark A Stoler, *Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers 1940-1945* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2007), 90.

⁷⁶⁰ Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945*, 307.

⁷⁶¹ Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 11, 126; Rieber and Kelly, 7.

⁷⁶² *Australasian*, 10 May 1941, 5, 26-7.; *Australasian*, 18 January 1941, 6.

⁷⁶³ Brian Vrepon, “Your Last Few Hours,” *Meanjin Papers*, Vol. 1, No 8., March 1942, 27-28.

Despite the systematic attempts of the media to incite public moral outrage through an “appeal to fear”, contemporary reports revealed a collective distance from Europe’s victims.⁷⁶⁴ Summarised under the cliché “It Can Happen Here!”, Aria’s (former *Smith’s Weekly* cartoonist George Aubrey) cartoon accompanied a *Sunday Sun* editorial which called for drastic realisation of the “catalogue[s] of horror” – the multi-page picture stories dominating the centrefolds and frontpages of the national papers – and a response beyond mere “pity for the wretched victims”.⁷⁶⁵ The ambiguity of Aria’s target city, which could have equally been a rural town, reflected an attempt to universalise the threat of bombing beyond the more susceptible Northern Australian coastal towns and expose the consequences of the breakdown of combatant/non-combatant norms. In this, it reflected trends in the First World War that universalised the experience and potential fate of distant European victims.⁷⁶⁶ Far from mobilising Australian readers, however, the editor’s exasperated plea inferred Australians’ lack of ability to empathise with distant victims within their own scope of justice and associate their potential victimhood in totalising warfare to the prototypical Australian civilian-soldier in Aria’s cartoon.⁷⁶⁷

Australian remoteness and false sense of security disengaged the average Australian reader from the reality of the consequences of the bombing war. Seeing war from a distance eliminated the human aspect. The overarching destructiveness suppressed human and individual identification, exaggerating an already innate inability of many to comprehend the suffering of those around them. This compounded extant Australian racial and ethnic disaffiliation with Asian and Eastern European victims, yet also impacted empathy within easily identifiable in-groups.⁷⁶⁸ In mid-October 1940, the *SMH* felt it prudent to run a special story by one of its London correspondents that not only uncovered the “anger” and “bitterness” shared by civilians and stationed Australian soldiers at the *Luftwaffe*’s night time raids but also reinforced the “human side” and consequences of the air raids in an attempt to remove said distance.⁷⁶⁹ Even the experiences of those morally included in Australian public consciousness – those Londoners within the scope of justice maintaining varying levels of responsibility and moral obligation on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, culture – could fail to engender human empathy in home front narratives.

⁷⁶⁴ “Sympathy is Not Enough,” *Argus*, 5 June 1940, 4. The *Argus* argued that the Germans had bombed Melbourne and London “in spirit”. Sternberg and Sternberg, 132.

⁷⁶⁵ “It Can Happen Here! This Other Man Could Be You, Too!,” *Sunday Sun and Guardian*, 2 June 1940, 3.; Walker, 74.

⁷⁶⁶ Stanley, 9-10.,

⁷⁶⁷ “It Can Happen Here! This Other Man Could Be You, Too!”

⁷⁶⁸ Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 49, 78.

⁷⁶⁹ A Londoner, “The Human Side of the London Air Raids: ‘We Hate and Fear’ Them,” *SMH*, 19 October 1940, 9.

In their distance from the war, Australians shared much more with their transpacific ally America than Blitzed-Britain. The former's attitudes to bombing have been described by one historian as "ambivalent" at best.⁷⁷⁰ Contemporary Australian observers certainly detected an indifference to the effects of bombing emanating from various quarters of Australian public discourse. The Brisbane *Courier-Mail* noted as much a week after the devastating Dresden raids of February 1945 – the exemplar *par excellence* of Allied air might which saw 25,000-30,000 German residents and refugees fleeing the Red advance embroiled in a roaring inferno and firestorm.⁷⁷¹ The *Courier-Mail's* correspondent, Trevor Smith, noted a distinct dulling of sensibilities between the sensationalised responses to the first 1000 bomber raids in 1942 to the raid on the Saxon "Florence of the Elbe" given its cultural, artistic and architectural significance that presented the delusion of invincibility.⁷⁷² Moreover, M. McRae, in the *West Australian*, personified an almost callous indifference to the countless dead and injured in Dresden by focusing almost exclusively on the cultural loss of the "beauties of civilisation".⁷⁷³

European correspondent Roy Simmonds further evidenced the dissonance between Australian comprehension of aerial warfare with the suffering of German men, women and children and the limited potential for empathy and understanding despite the "millions of words" and images provided in media reports:

it is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to bring home realities through observers eyes....It is hard to convince sceptics that there is an undreamed of destructive potential [of] bigger, brighter methods of mass killing.⁷⁷⁴

The overarching totalising logic of maximising military gains, competitive and increasingly brutal methodologies and the breakdown of mutual communication stimulates a callous disregard for the "Other" and acts as an essential force in the "reproduction" of conflict.⁷⁷⁵ In Australian bombing discourse, the quantity of bomb tonnage, the destruction of dwellings, and the statistics of dead, homeless and injured were entwined in with the teleological story of Allied military success in the final

⁷⁷⁰ Bellamy, 147.

⁷⁷¹ Trevor Smith, "Only Nazis Know What Raids Mean," *Courier-Mail*, 24 February 1945, 2. For an overview of the Dresden raids, see Biddle, "Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory," 324-5, 415.

⁷⁷² Ibid.

⁷⁷³ M. McRae, "Dresden – The German Florence," *West Australian*, 3 March 1945, 3.

⁷⁷⁴ Roy Simmonds, "Awesome Pattern of Future War: Troglodyte Peoples Digging Deeper and Deeper," *Advertiser*, 30 July 1945, 8.

⁷⁷⁵ Opatow, *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 82.; Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr., 38; Geyer and Tooze, 3, 7.

years of the war. The accompanying statistics to Smith's report on Dresden, "This Hit Nazis" [Image 24], exemplified the callousness and dehumanising manner in which figures came to be treated in the war of statistics.⁷⁷⁶ Moreover, the *Argus* reported that March 1945 bombing statistics were the most impressive of the war as Bomber Command and the American Air Force dropped a stated combined total of 133,125 tons on Germany. A boastful rate of 179 tons an hour for the month did little to empathise with those on the receiving end with the emphasis of Allied gains provoking moral exclusion.⁷⁷⁷



This Hit Nazis	
HERE is the tally of a week's bombing by Allied air forces on Germany since February 13:	
TUESDAY:	Night, Dresden, 1400.
WEDNESDAY:	Day, Dresden, 1350; night, Chemnitz, 1300.
THURSDAY:	Day, Dresden, 1100.
FRIDAY:	Day, oil plants, 1000.
SATURDAY:	Day, Frankfurt, 350.
MONDAY:	Day, rail centres, 1100.
TUESDAY:	Day, Nuremberg, 900; night, Dortmund, 1200.
WEDNESDAY:	Day, Nuremberg, 1200.

Image 24.

Notwithstanding the growing capacity of Australians on the home front to view data as a signifier of progress (war supplies, casualty lists, manpower statistics), Smith argued the bombing statistics were rendered "almost meaningless" through repetition.⁷⁷⁸ The very nature of dry, operational cabled reports likewise did little to induce empathy for the suffering of Allied populations, let alone for German victims.⁷⁷⁹ The nature of the "hard news" favoured by the AAP – statistics of square-miles of damage, bomb loads, and impersonal casualty lists – was central to the deindividualization of German victims.⁷⁸⁰ This "moral disengagement" suppressed empathetic reactions and relieved the collective

⁷⁷⁶ Smith, "Only Nazis Know What Raids Mean."

⁷⁷⁷ "March Was Best Flying Month: 133,125 Tons of Bombs Dropped on Germany," *Argus*, 4 April 1945, 16.

⁷⁷⁸ Smith, "Only Nazis Know What Raids Mean."

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁰ Walker, 108-9.

guilt and remorse often caused by immoral in-group actions.⁷⁸¹ The seemingly unrelenting totalising logic of the violent bombing campaign was matched with gargantuan scope of suffering which reports encapsulated, stifling already unbalanced compassion by rendering the enormity of the suffering irrevocable.⁷⁸² Statistics and procedural, impersonal and purposefully amorphous reports removed the human element and emotion altogether. This increasingly typified the popular cabled reports prepared by the Australian correspondents and foreign offices during the 1942-45 campaigns. Repetition, scale and the prolonged exposure to statistics and images normalised shocking acts of violence from the air in what Sontag labels the “habituation” of horror.⁷⁸³ It is no coincidence that Walter Murdoch pleaded to Australians to think “of our enemies, not as targets, but as human beings”.⁷⁸⁴

Moral exclusion can be passive in nature. It can coalesce with more active forms contributing to the dehumanisation and removal of the morally excluded from the scope of justice.⁷⁸⁵ Whilst empathy with German victims was not forthcoming, justification for Allied actions was still necessary. What could be described as a *bomb-consciousness* clearly existed in Australia; a merging of aerial language and imagery forming one of the earliest additions to Australia’s popular wartime lexicon.⁷⁸⁶ No Australian could plead ignorance to the most rudimentary knowledge of the destructive capacity of aerial bombardment. Abyssinia, Spain and China had provided a glimpse into the apocalyptic potentialities of aerial warfare.⁷⁸⁷ The *bomb-consciousness* of early wartime Australia contained elementary understandings of the consequences of area bombing for civilian populations; namely its indiscriminate nature and its potential as a “terror” weapon. Australians were reminded that even its own most scrupulous pilots – attempting to uphold normative, legal and moral codes of combat – would invariably kill non-combatants.⁷⁸⁸ Justificatory narratives were thus key, and the main facilitator in the case of Australia was the mainstream media.

⁷⁸¹ Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr., 41.

⁷⁸² Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 62, 79.

⁷⁸³ Ibid., 64-5. Sam Keen discusses the creation of the “A-human”. Keen, 84-5.

⁷⁸⁴ “What an Idea!,” *Advertiser*, 3 February 1940, 11.; Murdoch, *Steadfast*, “A Nightmare”, 126-131.; “A Footnote to History: The Non-Combatant,” *Courier-Mail*, 2 March 1940, 11.; “Life and Letters: The Swordsmith: Old Wars and New,” *West Australian*, 22 February 1941, 6.

⁷⁸⁵ Opatow, “Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion,” 142.

⁷⁸⁶ Some examples include: John Digby, “The Time Bomb Terror,” *Sunday Times*, 29 September 1940, 2.; “How ARP Deals With Bombs: Timely Lecture to Sodality,” *Advocate*, 20 February 1941, 26.; “Fire Bombs in Modern Warfare,” *Northern Star*, 24 April 1941, 6.; “Wings of War,” *Sunday Sun*, 22 June 1941, 8-9.; “Bomb Types: What to Expect in an Air Raid,” *Lithgow Mercury*, 26 November 1942, 4.; E.S., “Demonstration at Uncompleted School,” *SMH*, 30 August 1943, 6.

⁷⁸⁷ Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 31-3, 44, 54. Finch discusses the normalisation of bombing civilians, its roots in inter-war developments, and the role of propaganda in educating civilians of their new role.

⁷⁸⁸ “Bomber is War’s Most Terrible Weapon: Thousands of Planes Able to Fight,” *News*, 14 September 1939, 6.

The Context for Moral Exclusion and the Normalisation of Totalising Violence: 1939-41

Subscription to non-combatant immunity was popularly upheld in public discourse throughout the Phoney War period. Australian political leaders were largely content to regurgitate, with little deviation, the British official line that civilian collateral damage would be avoided at all costs to maintain non-combatant immunity. The Menzies' administration generally abstained from overt expressions of hate propaganda in response to the London Blitz. Following the lead of the MOI, the DOI engaged in the mobilisation of "moral outrage" in promoting enmity against the militaristic and barbaric actions of the aggressor nation.⁷⁸⁹ Notwithstanding some exceptions, the popular media narrative largely reflected discussions of bombing in public discourse – an aversion to vindictive reprisals correlating with an implicit preparation of Australian public opinion for what appeared to be an inevitable escalation of military violence in response to German transgressions. Editorial opinion during the Phoney War continued to stress and congratulate Allied resolve to maintain non-combatant/combatant distinctions and refrain from reprisals whilst consistently criticising German "undisguised aerial terrorism".⁷⁹⁰

However, a framework of reprisal was already being formulated in correspondence reports during the German Blitzkrieg against Western Europe. The framework of removing Germans from the scope of justice had emerged early in the war with the policy of naval blockade, rooted in the ingrained logic of total economic warfare of the previous war.⁷⁹¹ Gary Sheffield defines this in his discussion of the "total war mentalities" that eroded peacetime inhibitions about transgressing non-combatant immunity.⁷⁹² Anger at Germany's purportedly indiscriminate naval conduct during the first months of the conflict seamlessly transposed to the bombing war. Australian cartoonists remobilised propaganda tropes of *Schrecklichkeit* – a term describing the German policy of "terror" or frightfulness perpetrated under the banner of *Deutsche Kultur* against Belgian civilian resistance rooted in popular First World War vernacular and memory of German atrocity [Image 25].⁷⁹³

⁷⁸⁹ Jochen Hellbeck, "Battle for Morale: An Entangled History of Total War in Europe, 1939-1945," in *Total War: Economy, Society and Culture*, ed. Michael Geyer and Adam Tooze, The Cambridge History of the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 338. Opatow also speaks of "moral condemnation" which displaces normative moral codes governing in-group and out-group interaction. Opatow, "Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion," 142.

⁷⁹⁰ "Nazi Savagery," *Advertiser*, 1 July 1940, 12.

⁷⁹¹ For a good summary of arguments over the first year of the war in the Australian press, see: "The Blockade: Its Purpose & Effects," *Age*, 22 October 1940, 6.; "No Sentiment in a Blockade," *Argus*, 16 July 1940, 4.; "Plea For Germany," *Mercury*, 19 January 1940, 3.

⁷⁹² Gary Sheffield, in J. M. Winter, *The Legacy of the Great War: Ninety Years On* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 80-1.

⁷⁹³ "Kultur – 1915, 1939!," *Newcastle Sun*, 6 September 1939, 4.; "Making War on Civilians," *Newcastle Sun*, 2 October 1939, 6. This theme continued well into 1941. "Kultur," *Telegraph*, 2 January 1941, 8. See: John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Ian




Image 25.

The destruction of what will henceforth be designated “victim cities” in Australian war discourse – Guernica, Chungking, Warsaw, Rotterdam, Belgrade and others – illustrated the devastating and ruthless potential of German bombing. The experience of “victim cities” became key orientational guides in the future moral and strategic defence of Allied bombing against civilian nerve centres. Consistent references to German transgressions in Australian media ensured that if reprisals needed to be defended, the wartime discourse would contain a vast array of examples already inseeded into the Australian national consciousness. Ruthless bombing, and the disturbing reports of *Luftwaffe* pilots strafing fleeing refugee columns in Western Europe, brought the image of German *Terrorangriff* (terror attack) home and highlighted rising Continental indignation and demand of reprisal.⁷⁹⁴ If unrestricted, lawless aerial “total” war against civilian women and children was to become the norm, the Australian press ensured that Germany had the obloquy of instigating it. This provided moral sanction for reciprocation.

The shifting focus in Australian press coverage and commentary after the fall of Western Europe resulted in a more overt focus on the effects of totalising violence on civilians. This intensified with the onset of the London Blitz. From the perceptible beginning of the systematic bombing of mainland

Stewart and Susan L. Carruthers, *War, Culture, and the Media: Representations of the Military in 20th Century Britain* (New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996), 57.

⁷⁹⁴ “And This is Total War,” *Northern Star*, 8 June 1940, 6.; “This is the Havoc of Total War,” *The Courier-Mail*, 22 June 1940, 6.

Britain on 7 September 1940 until May 1941, between 40-50,000 Britons were killed and over one million homes destroyed.⁷⁹⁵ News of what was being touted as a “total air offensive” against London reached Australian shores through the international cable services, and commentary began in earnest in the Australian press.⁷⁹⁶ Although initially feigning objectivity, reports from Australian foreign correspondents on the first mass air raids did little to hide their authors’ moral outrage. These reports stressed, and often exaggerated, the nefarious motives and intent of the German *Luftwaffe* beyond military necessity.⁷⁹⁷

The *SMH*’s coverage of the first weeks of the Blitz summarised the common themes and tone of overseas cables. Its initial coverage, consisting of AAP, BUP, and special correspondent analysis, mirrored common themes in the Empire Press that stressed positive British values, calm defiance and stoicism and refusal to be pushed into a cycle of indiscriminate bombing.⁷⁹⁸ Yet by the attack on Coventry in November 1940, a novel and prominent narrative was emerging. Headlined “Coventry Raid Avenged”, a report from the *SMH*’s staff correspondent, attempted to translate the feelings of vengeance, hatred and anger in the British media and the psychological effect in mobilising public opinion against the “merciless indiscriminate bombing” described in an accompanying AAP cable. The correspondent informed Australian readers that “never before in the war has there been such an upsurge of public hatred for an enemy who could perpetrate such wanton destruction” – a fact evident in the various leading headlines of the major London dailies stressing the “feeling, and the desire for revenge.”⁷⁹⁹ Such reports reflected the *SMH* editorial tone developed from the earliest raids. The newspaper described the ruthlessness and terrorism of Hitler’s “total war” and added that “anger and indignation” at recent examples of atrocity would leave a “penalty to be paid”.⁸⁰⁰ The implicit call for reprisal here was aimed at the “spiritual descendants” of Attila the Hun for whom war against civilians was a “hereditary instinct” covered up by the veneer image of a “cultured nation.”⁸⁰¹

Between September 1940 and mid-1941, references to Hitler and *Reichsmarschall* Hermann Göring were replaced by a more open-ended perpetrator. Totalising stereotypes began to frequent reports, correlating with the re-normalisation of archetypes such as the “Hun” discussed in Chapter Three. Ian Gall, cartoonist for the *Courier-Mail*, had professed the “return of the Hun”, replete with Imperial *Pickelhaube* and *Eisernes Kreuz*, carrying the corpses of young girls and foregrounding the smouldering

⁷⁹⁵ Cooper, 20-1.

⁷⁹⁶ “Summary: Overseas News: Total Air Offensive,” *SMH*, 11 September 1940, 1.

⁷⁹⁷ “London Civilians Feel Hitler’s Hate,” *Telegraph*, 9 September 1940, 1.

⁷⁹⁸ “Total Air Raid Begun on London: Bomb Inferno in City Areas,” *SMH*, 11 September 1940, 11.; Kertesz, 98.

⁷⁹⁹ “Coventry Raid Avenged: Two Smashing Attacks on Hamburg: King in Ruined City: People Demand Reprisals,” *SMH*, 18 November 1940, 9.

⁸⁰⁰ “Hitler’s War of Terror,” *SMH*, 3 September 1940, 8.

⁸⁰¹ *Ibid.*

ruins of European victim cities [Image 26].⁸⁰² The *Herald's* "The Way of a Hun" had similarly rendered atrocity an innate characteristic of the war-waging German. It presented a lumbering ape-like figure popularised by cartoonists in the previous war indiscriminately dropping bombs on London below [Image 27]. Pictorial spreads from the *Weekly Times* clearly attempted to connect the civilian casualties and destruction of indiscriminate bombing to totalising stereotypes of the "Hun" and "Kultur" [Images 28 and 29]. These images embodied the discursive attempts by the Australian press to revive emotions of the First World War before the Nazi bombing campaigns attained their own destructive image.

The logic of total war, most newspapers noted, had rendered civilian bombing almost inevitable. Progressive havoc would ensue as each side intensified its attacks against non-combatants.⁸⁰³ The expectation that reprisals could not go "unrequited" when Germany reneged on its commitments to non-combatant immunity was also evident in the foreign correspondent reports of Geoffrey Tebbutt, Ronald Monson, Kenneth Slessor and Gavin Long who gave a powerful resonance to the early narrative and personalised accounts of Allied collective self-victimhood.⁸⁰⁴ Coverage of the London Blitz succinctly amalgamated the horrors of the German aerial offensive against Europe's civilian populations into a reductive narrative which facilitated moral exclusion. Whilst some explicitly promoted reprisals through mass bombing against the German people as deserving targets of military violence, most commentators implicitly supported the measure through the language of military necessity and collective self-victimhood.

⁸⁰² Ian Gall, "Return of the Hun", *Courier-Mail*, 11 May 1940, 4.; "This is War For All", *Courier-Mail*, 11 May 1940, 4.


⁸⁰³ "Man Under Bomb," *Sun*, 31 August 1940, 4.; "Total War," *Examiner*, 27 August 1940, 4.; "The Bombing of Civilians," *Examiner*, 25 March 1941, 4.; "Plea for Germany," *Mercury*, 19 January 1940, 3.; "Reprisals Urged: Total War on Germany," *Mercury*, 25 September 1940, 1.

⁸⁰⁴ Kenneth Slessor, "'Diggers in London': Air Raid Experiences: A Graphic Description: Helping Rescue Parties," *Kalgoorlie Miner*, 14 September 1940, 7.; Geoffrey Tebbutt, "The English Learn to Hate," *Sunday Mail*, 5 January 1941, 4.; Tebbutt, "Bombing Horror: Fiery Pits In Town," *Sun*, 18 May 1940, 2.

Return of The Hun



THE WAY OF A HUN



Above: Image 26; Below: Image 27.

Right: [Image 28] A Little German Kultur, *Weekly Times*, 5 October 1940, 6.

Below: [Image 29] Handiwork of the Hun, *The Weekly Times*, 18 January 1941, 6.



On the more extreme end of the former category sat self-proclaimed anti-German commentator, Eric Baume. As Chapter Three has shown, Baume personified a particularly vocal section of Australian opinion on the German Question during the London Blitz – evident in *Truth*, the *Bulletin* and *Smith's Weekly* – forcefully critiquing German character and complicity in Nazi aggression. These papers attempted to reconceptualise the scope of justice through narratives of enmity.⁸⁰⁵ Baume considered morale bombing and reprisals against German civilian centres to be wholly justified and necessary under conditions of total war.⁸⁰⁶

Given his popularity and influence as an Empire journalist,⁸⁰⁷ Baume and *Truth's* London-based editorial team were highly active in constructing the Allied narrative of strategic bombing in the British and Dominion Press.⁸⁰⁸ Baume gave voice to *Truth's* (and later the *Daily Mirror's*) editorial stance on German civilian bombing, captured by cartoons such as “German Kultur: 1939 Version” which personified the *Luftwaffe's* bombing through the Grim-Reaper wearing a *Pickelhaube* and scything a

⁸⁰⁵ “Germany’s Advantages,” *Bulletin*, 13 March 1940, 8.; “War on Civilians,” *Bulletin*, 27 November 1940, 8.; “British Style Warfare,” *Bulletin*, 15 January 1941, 8.; “Nazis Waive the Rules,” *Bulletin*, 12 March 1941, 8.

⁸⁰⁶ Baume, *I’ve Lived Another Year: A Journalist’s Diary of the Year 1941*, 149.; “BOB: Not Wicked To Bomb Germans!, ‘Let’s See How They Take It’ Says M.P.,” *Truth*, 30 November 1941, 22.

⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 120-21.; Manning, 76-77.; “BOB: Action! Now! Short War Wanted,” *Truth*, 2 February 1941, 14.

⁸⁰⁸ “Realism Stalks in Britain,” *Truth*, 11 May 1941, 16.

defenceless village in an allusion to German atrocities in Belgium during 1914-15 [Image 30].⁸⁰⁹ Baume's often sensational, fallacious and, more often than not, inflammatory interpretation of the bombing campaign and other aspects of the war led to several conflicts with the British and Australian censors, commentators and political leaders.⁸¹⁰




Image 30.

During the period preceding the sustained bombing of London from early September 1940, when the *Luftwaffe's* strategic focus remained on establishing conventional daylight air superiority over Britain, the framework of Baume's narrative was beginning to emerge. "Sidelights on Bombings", published in mid-August, established a mass call for reprisal in its first paragraph: "'We only hope they'll bomb Berlin now.' That was the general expression in a south-western district after bombs were dropped last evening....".⁸¹¹ Describing another "deliberate and brutal" raid on Eastbourne, a resort town and professed "safe zone" containing 4000 children, Baume noted how German pilots were vindictively

⁸⁰⁹ "German 'Kultur', 1939 Version," *Truth*, 10 September 1939, 18.

⁸¹⁰ Manning, 14-15; Vickery, 244; Walker, 204-5, 07.

⁸¹¹ "Sidelights on Bombs," *Truth*, 18 August 1940, 14.

and purposefully going beyond their brief, taking out their frustrations by machine gunning innocent bystanders.⁸¹² The consistency with which Baume reported these “weekly stories of German terror-bombing” – combining common tropes, stereotypes and examples of the *Luftwaffe*’s barbarity – lead him to suggest that they had become “part of our national life”.⁸¹³ Alongside accounts of stable morale and stoic calm, descriptive observations of the bomb damage and civilian casualties were a staple of Baume’s authoritatively personal reports between September 1940 and July 1941. After his initial fears had dissipated, Baume frequently toured bombed London boroughs, sleeping bag in hand, to experience the devastation of the bombing.⁸¹⁴

Baume also actively promoted authoritative British opinion that supported his thesis of Germany’s indiscriminate, diabolical intent in the air, utilising the same authorities discussed in Chapter Three.⁸¹⁵ Former appeasement advocates, church leaders and politicians across the political spectrum including Lord Halifax, Sir Samuel Hoare, Viscount John Simon and Sir Ernest Benn were critiqued in the column for their opposition to reprisal bombing.⁸¹⁶ The harshness of Baume’s anti-German rhetoric and propagation of “hate” in *pro-bono* lectures for MOI rallies and popular broadcasts for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) also put him at odds with leading individuals in both organisations.⁸¹⁷ Baume noted his continual frustration that community perceptions were still being governed by ethical considerations, a “gentlemanly kindness” and British “politeness” extending from the “High officials”, “Ethics Boys” and London clubs to the man in the street.⁸¹⁸ Reports that British women were placing flowers on the military grave sites of German airmen, or farmers offering pints of beer to downed pilots, reflected the “piggish traditions” of British sentimentalism marring what Baume saw to be a mass movement towards a true knowledge of the enemy and recognition that reprisals demanded the Germans to suffer “man for man, woman for woman, child for child.”⁸¹⁹ Baume likewise

⁸¹² Ibid.

⁸¹³ “Reprisals Demanded: Bombs on Germans,” *Truth*, 29 September 1940, 16.

⁸¹⁴ Manning, 82.

⁸¹⁵ “Non-Stop-Bombing Continues: Hospital Carnage,” *Truth*, 13 October 1940, 15.

⁸¹⁶ “Nazis’ Incredible Brutality: Bomb Destruction is Appalling,” *Truth*, 8 December 1940, 16.; “Churchill of Trial: Give Nation Action, or Get Out,” *Truth*, 10 November 1940, 1.; “The Horror of Simon,” *Truth*, 18 May 1941, 14.; “Reprisals Must Come,” *Truth*, 16 March 1941, 14.

⁸¹⁷ Baume, *I Lived These Years*, 270-71.; *I’ve Lived Another Year: A Journalist’s Diary of the Year 1941*, 9, 14, 78, 127.; Manning, 103. Sir Alexander MacEwen, a member of the MOI Committee, had openly accused Baume of “stirring race hatred against the Germans”. Baume noted on one lecture to a crowd of 3000 civilians in Pendlebury: “They rose from their seats when I called German baby-killing airmen ‘swine’, and they demanded that the Germans should be bombed...”. Ezra Norton had sent Baume a telegram explaining how MacEwen’s criticism of yet another “swine” reference had resulted in attacks in the priggish Australian press. “Scot Defends German Race,” *Sun*, 2 November 1940, 1.

⁸¹⁸ “Let Us Be Truculent!,” *Truth*, 19 January 1941, 14; “Russia’s Plan for Revenge: Whitehall Shows Amazing Apathy.”; “Dilly Dally Tests the British People: Time for Lolly-Pops Has Passed: The Fight Must be Merciless,” *Truth*, 5 May 1940, 20.; *Truth*, 29 December 1940, 10; “British Wants Gloves Off; Are We Wasting Time? 10,000 Civilian Casualties,” *Truth*, 22 September 1940, 17.; *I Lived These Years*, 269, 72.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid., 268-69.; “BOB, Ethics That Delay Our Victory,” *Truth*, 8 September 1940, 18.; Overy, 310.; Grayling, 285.

shared common views on the dangers of so-called “good” Germans engaging in bombing discourse in the era-old game of “organising sympathy.”⁸²⁰ *Truth* readers were bombarded with evidence of British pro-German forces hampering the Allied war effort through criticism of the strategic bombing campaign in an attempt by Baume to displace them from the scope of justice.

Despite his fears of widespread sentimentality, Baume sought to exaggerate to his Australian readers any evidence of disconnect between a “public sick to death of this cant [inaction against Germany]”, and the Government and RAF command’s emphasis on the limited bombing of “military objectives” and “industrial centres” .⁸²¹ By March and April 1941, Baume’s suggestion that “public opinion [was] hardening on the need for more RAF raids on Germany” was as much an expression of Baume’s desires as an accurate representation of growing public anger.⁸²² Mobilizing “public resentment” in the service of “brutal and uncompromising reprisals” against the German civilian population had almost become Baume’s obsessive contribution to the Allied war effort.⁸²³ The message to Australian readers being bombarded by news of the Blitz in the daily press was that, as citizens of the British Empire, Australians should conform to a common baying for blood. Baume’s rhetoric was established beyond the confines of *Truth*. His cables were authoritatively reproduced in papers such as the Mackay *Daily Mercury* who quoted Baume at length to explain the shift in bombing paradigm to its readership. Mirroring Baume, the *Mercury*’s discussion of “hate-crazed Germans” and “the Huns” was based on a recognition of the German interpretation of “total war” and its transgressions of international norms.⁸²⁴

Baume aligned himself with a loose coalition of Britons demanding a more realist approach to Germany in the context of total war. His anti-German rhetoric continued to be linked to his frank advocacy of the bombing of German cities as reprisal and retaliation for the Blitz.⁸²⁵ Baume’s cables for *Truth* and published memoirs are not only revealing in terms of *how* he represented the German people – clearly embroiling them in narratives of enmity – but also his reflections on *why* the German people were necessarily and unavoidably enemies in totalising warfare.

⁸²⁰ “BOB,” *Truth*, 3 August 1941, 22.

⁸²¹ “Reprisals Demanded: Bombs on Germans,” *Truth*, 29 September 1940, 16.; “BOB, Growing Demand for ‘Total War’,” *Truth*, 10 November 1940, 12.; Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945*, 48-49.

⁸²² “Take War to Germany,” *Truth*, 6 April 1941, 21.

⁸²³ “What About This Bombing? England is Angered: Cry For Brutal War,” *Truth*, 23 March 1941, 15.

⁸²⁴ “Fighting Civilians,” *Daily Mercury*, 8 May 1943, 2.; “‘Total’ War,” *Daily Mercury*, 19 May 1943, 2.

⁸²⁵ Baume, *I’ve Lived Another Year: A Journalist’s Diary of the Year 1941*, 37, 49. See also: “BOB,” *Truth*, 20 May 1943, 14; “BOB,” *Truth*, 5 September 1943, 14.

From Bombed to Bomber: Moral Exclusion in Australian Reporting, 1942-43

By the onset of the Pacific War, the Australian media's framing of the London Blitz had clearly shifted Australian perceptions of the efficacy of bombing the German homeland. These narratives had seriously eroded, albeit not completely, self-imposed moral limitations on totalising violence. Alan Chisholm summarised the insurmountable "paradoxes" of the first two years of "total war" in a special article for the *Argus*. He noted how the very logic of the war had fundamentally shifted previously immutable ideas, ideals and beliefs held by the self-professed "liberal" states in a perpetually increasing "mental tempo". The demand for realism Chisholm had pushed for throughout 1940 and 1941 had come to the forefront after "crying in the wilderness for so long".⁸²⁶ Public discourse was necessarily shifting in favour of a morally excluded, delegitimised "German" enemy as strategic bombing became a viable and acceptable strategy. The gradual recognition in Australia that war could no longer be fought in a "refined" and "civilised" manner given Germany's transgressions of military norms, had rendered the bombing of German towns in some popular commentary as not only "inevitable", but "desirable".⁸²⁷ While Chisholm remained sceptical of official justifications, he maintained that the resort of bombing German civilians was not symbolic of reduced civilisation. Rather, civilisation was to rise again like a phoenix out of the literal ashes of German cities, no matter how "tragic and paradoxical" the methods and consequences might have been. Chisholm's explanation of bombing through the very lofty ideals of rebirth and reconstruction for which the war was being fought was evidence of the mobilisation of intellectual influence in the service of moral exclusionary narratives.

Despite the expression of private concerns and opinions, Australian politicians did not discuss the morality, ethics, legality and victims of the sustained bombing campaign waged against German cities in any great detail. Contrarian positions on the bombing campaign expressed by Australian political leaders were ignored by their parliamentary colleagues and the mainstream press to an even greater extent than their contemporaries in Britain who at least warranted some brief mention in cables from London.⁸²⁸ Even the popular Bishop of Chichester, George Bell, who was given a greater platform to question bombing policy and Vansittartism in the British HOL, was largely dismissed in officialdom as "our Good German Bishop."⁸²⁹ Limited criticism and expressions of moral abhorrence to the bombing

⁸²⁶ Chisholm, "Two Years of War Have Brought Us Bitter Lessons: Ideas, Ideals and Beliefs Have Swept Into Oblivion Between September 1, 1939, and August 30 1941," *Argus*, 30 August 1941, 1.

⁸²⁷ Ibid.

⁸²⁸ Grayling, 195-99; Kertesz, 152-3, 72.

⁸²⁹ Von Klemperer. 11.

campaigns by Labor members such as Francis “Frank” Brennan did not carry much political weight in the public discussion.

Brennan, a labour activist, pacifist, and Catholic moralist with close links to Archbishop Mannix, had shared the latter’s criticism of the conceptual foundations, assumptions, and implications of the term “total war” from the beginning of the conflict. This had led to several heated exchanges in the Australian HOR with Archie Cameron, a leading conservative who, as Chapter Two has shown, was one of Australia’s chief progenitors of “total war”.⁸³⁰ Cameron’s statement on 16 November 1939, which had urged indiscriminate violence against the German population through naval blockade, provoked many of Brennan’s regular criticisms of “total war” and highlighted the disjuncture between the advocacy of totalising violence and the Government’s assurances that the war was not against the German people.⁸³¹ Despite the relative calm and restraint of the Phoney War, Brennan was concerned by Cameron’s advocacy of “total war” as it was

...intended to be waged, upon men, women and children....[through] the starvation of non-combatants [and] the tightening of the belts of those people in Germany, who, according to my friends opposite [Menzies], are entirely out of sympathy, are entirely out of sympathy with the Kaiser [Hitler].⁸³²

Although his concerns had been shared by many others within the Labor Party at the time, Brennan’s outcry was comparatively isolated by the end of 1942. Brennan was concerned by the moral relativism structuring the raids on Coventry and Cologne respectively, the “emotionalism” of public discourse, and application to totalising logic of intensification expressed in Australian responses to the 1000 bomber raids. Bombing, he argued, reflected a philosophical and pacifist facet of the instability of belligerency in modern industrialised warfare: the problem of “total war and reprisals”.⁸³³ In his attempts to shift Australian political focus back to the “moral economy” of the war, Brennan argued on behalf of the “non-consenting” in Germany (women, children, the aged and invalid) who he attempted to retain within the scope of justice even though the boundaries between civilian and military spheres had eroded:

Indeed, in a war of the dimensions of the present war, in which almost the whole population is in some way or another engaged, that [military intensification and threats

⁸³⁰ See pp. 42-44.

⁸³¹ *CPD*, Vol. 162, 16 November 1939, 1207.

⁸³² *Ibid*, 1212-14.

⁸³³ *CPD*, Vol. 172, 9 September 1942, 121-5.

to the integrity of the combatant/non-combatant distinction] is easily understood, but it does not diminish the importance of deciding who are belligerents, and who are not.⁸³⁴

Despite applications to international law, mutual restraint and norm-bound combat, Brennan's Catholicism and moral discourse clearly framed his response, with references to "Christian morality", "conscience and ethics" and "moral courage" opening him up to similar political criticism experienced by leading religious figures (see below).⁸³⁵ Robert Menzies, now in opposition, also attempted to approach the issue from a moral standpoint in his public engagement. Menzies' aversion to instrumentalising hatred was evident during his popular 1942 *Forgotten People* broadcasts, most notably in a broad discussion of "Hatred as an Instrument of War".⁸³⁶ This reflected the former Prime Minister's longstanding views on the topic, despite some public slips during his tour of Blitzed Britain in 1941 where the disjuncture between his private anger from his first-hand experience of the consequences of German bombing and his public, official stance of moderation and restraint became apparent.⁸³⁷

While both accepted the totalising logic of the conflict, Brennan and Menzies reflected concern that moral exclusion was occurring beyond reasonable limits. However, calls for dramatic intensification, open praise for the morale effects of terror bombing and the vindictive tone emanating from certain quarters of the British HOL were absent in Australian parliamentary discourse relative to their British counterparts. Comparatively little was said in parliament beyond isolated interjections by conservatives and air-power enthusiasts such as Cameron, Hughes, Hutchinson and White who continued to criticise the "unreality" of Australian understanding of the bombing war and "totalitarian warfare".⁸³⁸ The official narrative of Australia's involvement in the bombing war was largely framed as proportionate and necessary in light of the justice of the war, the dictates of military strategy and the notion of justified retaliation. Prime Minister John Curtin effectively summarised what his administration had been spruiking to the Australian public throughout the 1942 and 1943 campaigns in a speech to the Australian Club in May 1944:

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ CPD, Vol. 172, 9 September 1942, 123-4.

⁸³⁶ Menzies, "Hatred as an Instrument of War Policy" (Chapter 10), *Forgotten People*, 12 April 1942. <https://menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/the-forgotten-people/68-chapter-10-hatred-as-an-instrument-of-war-policy/> (accessed 02/05/2016).

⁸³⁷ "Pith of the Leaders: The Bombing of Civilians," *Examiner*, 25 March 1941, 4.; "Mr. Menzies in Blitz: Experience at Plymouth: The People's Reaction," *Townsville Daily Bulletin*, 24 March 1941, 5.; "'Our Enemy': Mr Menzies' Address to Women," *Daily Advertiser*, 5 May 1941, 4.; Baume, "BOB: Menzies Gives a 'Shock'," *Truth*, 11 May 1941, 16.; Jowett and O'Donnell, 201.

⁸³⁸ *HROH*, No. 6, 10 February 1944, 114-19.; *HROH*, No. 29, 19 July 1944, 213-18.; Waters, "Understanding and Misunderstanding Nazi Germany: Four Australian Visitors to Germany in 1938," 371.

We are not engaged in the wanton killing of civilians in our bombing operations over Europe or any other part of the world. Every act of war carried out by the Allies is an act of war, dictated by military strategy and military necessity. The United Nations entered the war because they were attacked. They entered it unprepared [and] engaged in war in self-defence against those who waged war as the only and primary principle of human existence.⁸³⁹

Moral exclusion of the German civilian to justify violence largely followed this line in the official public narrative. The logic of total war rendered the German civilian as “combatant”, rather than overt dehumanisation or calls for punitive reprisal. Australia’s official narrative did little to deviate from Allied strategists who presented the bombing of civilians as an unavoidable consequence of norm-bound attacks on legitimate military and industrial targets. This was despite prevailing strategical thinking, operational realities and the widening, almost arbitrary, scope of “military objectives” which rendered “precision” bombing in any real sense a fantasy.⁸⁴⁰ Deliberate and indiscriminate bombing beyond conventional military targets was not something that the Australian Government or its military advisers were willing to openly admit, despite both the RAF and USAAF forces subscribing to it to varying levels and the abundance of evidence of such a policy available to the observant reader.

Contextually, political, military, diplomatic, strategic and industrial forces of “inertia” worked in favour of the bombing in 1942, despite the poor exchange of results for the heavy losses sustained, technological and logistical limitations and the competitive inter-service claims over scant military resources.⁸⁴¹ The British Air Ministry’s 14 February 1942 directive, which had in effect formalised the targeting of “morale” and the increasing tendency towards area bombing over precision forms, was not met by official pronouncements on the matter, in Australia or elsewhere.⁸⁴² The major test for the newly appointed CIC of Bomber Command, Arthur “Bomber” Harris, not only for the strategic power of the raids but also public opinion and political legitimacy, was Operation Millennium – the so-called “1000 Bomber Raids” in 1942 against Cologne (30 May), Essen (1-2 June) and Bremen (25-26 June).⁸⁴³

Cabled reports in Sydney and Melbourne dailies such as *SMH*, the *Sun*, *Herald* and *Argus* presented a standardised narrative of the Millennium raids. They drew on largely similar sources available through

⁸³⁹ Curtin, “Speech to the Australian Club, 18 May 1944,” *Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister*, (Canberra: Commonwealth Government, 1944), No. 81, 70-73.

⁸⁴⁰ Bellamy, 158.

⁸⁴¹ Cooper, 106, 55.

⁸⁴² Bellamy, 139-40.

⁸⁴³ Overly, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945*, 90. Harris maintained that bombing resources were best employed against German urban centres and morale regardless of ethical objections, and an equally “exceptional hostility” and “complete indifference” to the suffering of the German people.

the AAP and presented a universally positive image of the success of the raids. The raid on Cologne on 30 May was a particularly destructive campaign involving an artificial force of 1,047 bombers who, through a potent blend of high explosives and incendiaries, killed 486 and injured over 5000. In the destruction of 3,300 buildings and the damaging of 7,908 more, 59,100 were rendered homeless.⁸⁴⁴ The *SMH*'s coverage was representative of the callous indifference for the victims in light of these reports. It focused on the strategic value, level of damage to essential war industries, and the operational and organisational scale of the raid. It reported that the raid had killed 474 and injured 5027.⁸⁴⁵

Media reports were accompanied by detailed maps containing references to key military and industrial targets – munitions factories, shipping yards and oil refineries. Cartographical depictions and aerial images from thousands of feet in the air further removed the human element, illustrating widespread destruction but purposefully failing to capture the consequential human suffering for the German population below.⁸⁴⁶ Euphemism was also expertly employed by Australian cartoonists through an established tradition of thoroughly removing references to the human ramifications of Allied raids. Examples from this period of the war such as the *Telegraph* [Image 31] could show the strength and capacity of bombing raids against the euphemistic "Nazi Machine" (German production and industrial capacity) without explicitly inferencing German workers.⁸⁴⁷ This was despite a recognition by others such as the *News*' Jack Quayle that German workers (a notably male personification reinforcing gender norms) were a composite component of the Nazi military machine, equally deindividualized and depersonalised collateral damage justified under Harris' broadening scope of Axis war-making potential [Image 32].⁸⁴⁸ This was a common form in enmity narratives called *instrumentalization*,⁸⁴⁹ the rendering of humans as mere "agents of ideologies" or objects which not only justified violence against German people servicing the enemy war effort (Quayle's "German War Worker"), but could also semantically and visually deny the German non-combatant's anthropoidic status by rendering them literal cogs of the Nazi military-industrial complex.

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid., 97.

⁸⁴⁵ "1,000 Bomber Raids of the Ruhr: Mighty RAF Offensive: City By City From Now On," *SMH*, 1 June 1942, 5.; "Weather Stops New Big Raid: Devastation in Cologne: Reprisal Raid by Luftwaffe," *SMH*, 2 June 1942, 2.

⁸⁴⁶ "The World's Fourth Largest City is About One-Fifth Destroyed," *Fact (Sun)*, 28 November 1943, 1.; Godfrey Blunden, "Bombers' Trail of Destruction: What Photographs Reveal (Part XI)," *Argus*, 6 December 1942, 2.; "Effects of Bombing: Immense Devastation (Part One)," *Argus*, 9 November 1943, 2.

⁸⁴⁷ "The Time to Bomb, Bomb and Bomb!," *Telegraph*, 24 June 1941, 8.

⁸⁴⁸ Jack Quayle, "Always Coming Back," *News*, 30 July 1942, 2.

⁸⁴⁹ Barker, 115-16.; Zur, 22.

The Time to BOMB, **BOMB AND BOMB!**



ALWAYS COMING BACK

Above: Image 31.; Below: Image 32.

Reports commonly emphasised the role of Australian squadrons, often including a named list of select local Australian personnel engaged in major bombing campaigns. Many included interviews with Australian pilots and their experiences bombing German cities. This simultaneously reinforced positive self-image whilst deindividualizing German victims.⁸⁵⁰ Focus on the exhilaration felt by pilots and acts of heroism, bravery and excitement attempted to present a bomber archetype in the tradition of the Battle of Britain. Concurrently, the effects of raids in this form were most often presented in vague, impersonal and even callously distant terms. Interviews contained little reference to the “Bomber Boys’” attitudes to those below.⁸⁵¹ The anonymity of killing was perhaps natural from a height of 15,000 feet plus, and expressions of sympathy for Germans was rare amongst pilots – let alone those quoted in the press.⁸⁵²

Foreign correspondents on the ground, including Baume, Geoffrey Tebbutt, Trevor Smith, Ronald Monson and A.W.V. King, remained active in rationalising the British bombing policy from 1942 and translating increasing British desires for proportionate retaliation to Australian readers.⁸⁵³ Notwithstanding euphemistic and vague language, a sanitised realism and comprehension began to pervade many correspondent cables with increased pictorial evidence of the destruction of Germany’s urban sprawl.⁸⁵⁴ The stereoscopic images made available to Dominion journalists in August 1942 – images which another journalist for the *Sun* proposed had descriptively proven claims via the neutral press that Cologne was a “dead city” – had reinforced horrific cable descriptions. King could not help but admit to readers that destruction represented by the images “could not be inflicted without terrorising millions of people.”⁸⁵⁵ Control of the presentation of the raids became far less dependent on controlling knowledge and evidence of the *consequences* of the raids. While “visual sanitation” was still clearly evident through censorship,⁸⁵⁶ the carefully constructed presentation of *intent* was far more important, and this was where Australian editorial interpretation thrived in rendering the violence against German civilians as normal, acceptable and inevitable.

⁸⁵⁰ The *Argus* discussed the role of local aircrews in the raid on Cologne: “Victorian Airmen Over Germany: Parts in Raids,” *Argus*, 4 June 1942, 3.; “Big Raid on Cologne Was ‘Dead Easy’: Stories of Crews,” *Argus*, 3 June 1942, 3. Similar stories could be found in other Australian dailies. “Bombing ‘Tour’ of 12 German Cities,” *SMH*, 10 October 1942, 10.

⁸⁵¹ A.R. McElwain, “Bomber Boys Tell How It Feels to Bomb Berlin,” *Herald*, 26 November 1943, 4.; Lloyd Dumas, “Editor Abroad Meets Britain’s Hard Hitting Leaders,” *Herald*, 21 September 1943, 4.

⁸⁵² Cooper, 126; Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 49-51.

⁸⁵³ Tebbutt, “Beating at the Back Door,” *Herald*, 21 May 1942, 4; “Bombs and Breaking Point,” *Herald*, 4 June 1942, 4.; “Weather Stops New Big Raid.”; Trevor Smith, “Not Only Second Front – But Annihilation,” *Herald*, 3 June 1942, 1.

⁸⁵⁴ A.W.V. King, “RAF Bomb Campaign: Raid Effects,” *SMH*, 7 August 1942, 8. Roeder notes similar processes in the American Press. Roeder, 85.

⁸⁵⁵ “Cologne, City of Death,” *Sun*, 15 June 1942, 2.; King, “RAF Bomb Campaign: Raid Effects.”

⁸⁵⁶ Roeder, 86.

Editorials from the *Age*, *Argus* and *SMH* evidence the types of arguments raised in support of the bombing campaign throughout 1942 and 1943. The Melbourne *Age*'s editorial commentary on the Cologne and Essen raids, entitled "The Ethics of Air Raids", focused heavily on the bravery and courage of Allied pilots but was clearly concerned by the ethical outcry against the bombings explored later in this chapter.⁸⁵⁷ News of the raids, it noted, had resulted in a curious blend of rejoicing, satisfaction, emotion, elation and "pity" for its countless victims which, according to inflated premature numbers, were as high as 20,000 deaths. This understandable "mental emotional conflict" – a form of collective cognitive dissonance – required that the bombing war be put into its proper context for Australians on the home front.

The editor rejected the moral and legal validity of the *Tu Quoque* ("Appeal to Hypocrisy") argument resting on German transgressions of convention-dependent norms despite its extensive employment in Australian editorial opinion.⁸⁵⁸ A key facet of moral exclusion is the normalisation of simplistic cause and effect narrative between actions and outcomes that replaces extant moral codes.⁸⁵⁹ Prevailing logic, espoused through the media sources, suggested that hypocritical Germans who had started war and instigated aerial bombing through deference to or inaction against the Nazi leadership were now justifiably experiencing bombing in turn. Yet for the *Age*, a just war to remove the "moral political stain" of Nazism rendered the moral dissonance of the bombing war a necessary cost. The editor noted to those readers who would "shirk" this responsibility that an "emotional balance" and corrective to the cognitive dissonance engendered by the Cologne and Essen raids could be reached by remembering the broader "total" stakes of a national struggle for survival.⁸⁶⁰

In the process of claim and counter-claim evident in reciprocal or "complementary" narratives of enmity, both sides often reflect the same charges and allege similar vices and virtues.⁸⁶¹ Accusations of indiscriminate bombing occurred on both sides and contained elements of objectively and empirically viable evidence distorted to various degrees by creators. The common script of RAF bombing, with its "incidental" civilian casualties in pursuit of pure military objectives, was juxtaposed with the "gloating", "vindictive", and "contemptible" terroristic and "cultural" raids typical of the German character. These were evident in the so-called "Baedeker" raids against Norwich, Bath, Exeter and York between April and May 1942.⁸⁶² Narratives of enmity emphasised the contradistinction

⁸⁵⁷ "The Ethics of Air Raids," *Age*, 4 June 1942, 2.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid.; "His Own Weapons," *Argus*, 2 May 1942, 2.; "Total War in the Air?," *Canberra Times*, 16 July 1942, 2.; "The Bombing Offensive," *West Australian*, 30 July 1942, 4.

⁸⁵⁹ Opatow, "Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion," 140-42.

⁸⁶⁰ "The Ethics of Air Raids."

⁸⁶¹ Barker, 40-41, 72-74; Kertesz, 73; Sternberg and Sternberg, 132; Zur, 15.

⁸⁶² "The Ethics of Air Raids.," Cooper, 52.

between Anglo-German methods from the earliest sustained reciprocal raids in September and October 1940, captured by examples from *Daily Telegraph* and *Sunday Telegraph* cartoonist Bill Mahony. The blend of visual and accompanying text highlighted the major differences in methodology and intent.⁸⁶³ “Target Number One” [Image 33] visualised Germany’s “unrestricted” air campaign centring on a terrified British mother and three children surrounded by the ruins of their former domicile. The indiscriminate nature was reinforced by captioned references to civilian casualty lists in London’s socially downcast and “thickly populated” East End, but also reference to the cultural destruction of the open ended “famous streets and buildings”.⁸⁶⁴ Mahony’s contemporary cartoon, “A Taste of His Medicine” [Image 34], reflected a commonly employed idiom in Australian discourse – the reactivity of Allied bombing. Depicting a smiling RAF pilot forcefully providing Hitler (an individual leader rather than German civilians) with a measured dose of medicine (a euphemism for bomb loads that reinforced narratives of disease, diagnosis and cure),⁸⁶⁵ Mahony removed all inference to the incidental civilian casualties during the Berlin raids. The accompanying text reinforced the focus on German war making capacity – “German seaports, industrial centres, military objectives and invasion bases”.⁸⁶⁶

The projection of negative traits onto the latter’s bombing clearly had some basis in the reality of *Luftwaffe’s* conduct, but equally could be applied to British, and by extension, Australian conduct in the bombing war. The *Age* mirrored the *SMH* and *Argus* in a continued focus on *intent* as well as operational methodology in projecting a positive self-image of the raids, concluding that “...Britain’s mass bombings are at once essential and ethical...she never descends to those levels of callousness which are typically German...”⁸⁶⁷ The *Argus* went so far as to perversely suggest that the imperative to destroy Nazism through bombing “invite[d] retaliation” and could actually be construed, beyond the common focus on saving Allied lives, as an honourable “service to the German people”.⁸⁶⁸ It is no coincidence that the *Argus* produced a comparable justification for the “great loss of civil life among the civil population of Germany” a year later by suggesting that bombing of urban areas was the quickest, and ultimately most “humanitarian”, method of removing the “totalitarian cancer” from Germany.⁸⁶⁹ The Self/Other dynamic of enmity and what Paul Fussell labels the “accentuation of the positive” had clearly developed from earlier preconceptions focusing on self-imposed restraint to a

⁸⁶³ The supplementary text effectively summarised the editorials which accompanied the cartoons in their original published form.

⁸⁶⁴ Mahony, “Target Number One,” *War Cartoons by Finey, WEP and Mahoney: Daily and Sunday Telegraph*, 40.

⁸⁶⁵ Hoenicke Moore, 177.

⁸⁶⁶ “A Taste of His Own Medicine,” *War Cartoons by Finey, WEP and Mahoney: Daily and Sunday Telegraph*, 41.

⁸⁶⁷ “The Ethics of Air Raids.”; “His Own Weapons.”; “The Changing Shape of War,” *SMH*, 2 June 1942, 4.

⁸⁶⁸ “His Own Weapons.”

⁸⁶⁹ “They Asked For It,” *Argus*, 5 June 1943, 2.

focus on Allied bombing as necessary, ethical, legitimate and even virtuous.⁸⁷⁰ The exaggerated claims against German area bombing had clearly fostered equally exaggerated claims of righteousness of the Allied campaign. What Ofer Zur labels a “double standard bias” is clearly evident in analyses and assessments of the motivations and objectives of analogous bombing campaigns of the Axis and Allied forces.⁸⁷¹

Whilst “wartime realism” was a major supporting factor in defending the 1942 raids, the “justifiable satisfaction” and “exultation” of Melbournians described by the *Argus* upon hearing the hypocritical cries against reprisal in Germany after the Cologne and Essen raids reflected the increasing superficiality of Australian newspapers’ discussion of moral concerns over the campaigns.⁸⁷² The language within the *SMH*’s editorial “Vengeance from the Skies” promoted retribution and the positive “psychological effect” of bombing.⁸⁷³ Opatow has theorised that the obsession with “moral condemnation” related to moral exclusion can replace the normal moral code of the in-group.⁸⁷⁴ With increasing frequency, Australian newspapers were quoting simple revenge – with all its implications about the retributive justice imposed on an entire people and didactical functions – as an important function of strategic bombing raids.

⁸⁷⁰ Fussell.; Vuorinen, 4.

⁸⁷¹ Barker, 118; Zur, 12.

⁸⁷² “Cologne is a Token,” *Argus*, 2 June 1942, 2.; “With Interest,” *Argus*, 4 June 1942, 2.; Armstrong, “Garnishee,” *Argus*, 4 June 1942, 2.

⁸⁷³ “Vengeance in the Skies,” *SMH*, 12 June 1942, 4.


⁸⁷⁴ Opatow, “Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion,” 142.



TARGET NUMBER ONE—Mahony.

SEPTEMBER, 1940

A year after the outbreak of war London became the target for unrestricted Nazi air fury. Night bombing blotted out famous streets and buildings. Into the thickly populated East End the Nazis rained death and destruction. During September, 6,954 people were killed and 10,615 injured in raids on Britain. But the British spirit was unbroken.



A TASTE OF HIS OWN MEDICINE —Mahony.

Night after night British long-range bombers attacked German seaports, industrial centres, military objectives and invasion bases in German-occupied territory. The number of raids on Berlin grew. Hitler winced under the rain of British bombs.

Above: Image 33.; Below: Image 34.

After four years of conflict, reversals in the bombing war were beginning to become clear. In reviewing the capacity of Allied bombing in December 1943 and the successful campaigns against the Ruhr, Hamburg and Berlin campaigns throughout that year, one headlining AAP report satisfactorily concluded that nearly one quarter of built-up areas had been devastated in targeted German cities. It added that large scale bombing of urban areas within Cologne, Hamburg and Dusseldorf had rendered each incapable of holding “civilian life...as the British knew it.”⁸⁷⁵ The sheer scope of the bombing during 1943, in which the Australian media narrative captured the delicate balance between sustainable civil and urban life in Germany and the reduction to a troglodytic existence, saw a transformation in opinion regarding bombing and a far greater openness in discussing its consequences.⁸⁷⁶ Geoffrey Tebbutt aptly summed up the hardening attitudes within RAAF Bomber Command for Australian readers in his description of Harris after a press briefing: “His tongue is rough, and he utters no claim to be able to put bombs down factory chimneys while leaving women, children and cultural monuments unharmed...”⁸⁷⁷

Lloyd Dumas, the HWT’s overseas editor, himself not shy of freely utilising terms such as “Hun” and “hordes of Hitler”, noted his first “tinges of sympathy” for the German people after hearing Harris’ plans for Germany’s urban centres.⁸⁷⁸ By the end of 1943, correspondent reports occasionally highlighted German suffering.⁸⁷⁹ Recognition of the horrors brought to the German home front by Allied bombing was not met by any overarching or correlating sense of apology for it in the Australian media. Apologia maybe; but little regret. However, many Australian commentators appeared to fear the emergence of an Australian version of what Kertesz has denoted a “community of suffering” in Britain – a temporary increase in “pity” (not “sympathy” which implied similarity between in-group and out-group) stemming from the perceived passivity of the German population.⁸⁸⁰ Moral exclusion importantly facilitated “moral disengagement” to such an extent that even with the recognition of German victimhood, the cognitive dissonance experienced by Australian home front populations in immoral or contradictory policy was alleviated and the former remaining acceptable targets of totalising violence.⁸⁸¹ Although fears of a backlash against bombing policy resulting from an increase in “pity” were misplaced in Australia given the key differential of experience and the incapacity of

⁸⁷⁵ “Bombed Nazi Cities Facing Extinction,” *Herald*, 9 December 1943, 1.

⁸⁷⁶ H.L., “These are the Bombed Cities of the Ruhr: They Are Close Together, Vary in Appearance, and Are Mostly Cramped and Crowded,” *Argus*, 24 July 1943, 3.

⁸⁷⁷ Tebbutt, “How Long Can Germany Endure Blitz,” *Herald*, 30 November 1943, 4.

⁸⁷⁸ Dumas, “Editor Abroad Meets Britain’s Hard-Hitting Leaders.”

⁸⁷⁹ See, for example, Godfrey Blunden’s syndicated series in the *Argus*. “Effects of Bombing: Immense Devastation (Part One).”

⁸⁸⁰ Kertesz, 172-6, 79. Temporary given the power of the atrocity revelations of 1945 to limit the capacity for pity. See Chapter Seven.

⁸⁸¹ Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr., 41.

most Australians to relate to the mutual experience of area bombing compared to their British kin (Australia's *bomb consciousness*), Australian narratives of enmity throughout 1943 contained renewed attempts to negate German victimhood through moral exclusion.

One common editorial response to cabled reports of the 1943 Rhineland-Ruhr bombings was to underline the cant of the German to hypocritically complain about their treatment. Australian commentary emphasised themes of German "whining", "whinging", "wailing", "screaming" with increased frequency. Even the Prime Minister referred to the German "squealer" in defending Allied actions during the "Battle of the Ruhr", a series of raids between March and June 1943 against various Rhineland-Ruhr industrial cities and the first serious widespread destruction to the German urban landscape.⁸⁸² Sontag's reference to the Aristotelian dictum that the moral judgement implicit in pity was reserved for those enduring "underserved misfortune" is important here.⁸⁸³ Emphasis on the alleged support of the German people for the Nazi war effort negated the limited pity in certain sectors of public discourse by painting the Germans as undeserving non-entities morally excluded from the ever-tightening scope of justice.

The *Age*, *SMH* and *Argus* continued to exemplify key facets of the editorial framing of the Casablanca Offensive which was largely a continuation of arguments developed in response to the 1000 Bomber Raids. Growing anxieties about German victimhood and "pity" had, however, led to some changes in focus. Shedding the paper's former aversion to *Tu Quoque* arguments, the *Age*'s "The Bully Begins to Whine" and "Nemesis in Air Warfare" encapsulated the hypocrisy of Germany's "whimpering pleas", "mawkish enemy recantations" and "sentimental pleadings" against area bombing by placing the campaigns into their proper historical context.⁸⁸⁴ This involved rekindling images of German bombing between 1940 and 1941.

Although acknowledging the "great loss of life among the civil population in Germany", the *Argus*' contempt for German "whining" and its "eleventh hour conversion" against civilian bombing was underlined in one of its editorial by-lines – "They Asked For It".⁸⁸⁵ The *Argus* had expressed similar concerns over what it labelled "*Ersatz* indignation" ("Synthetic" indignation) from the 1000 Bomber Raids – a feigned horror over the destruction of culture, property and life and self-misrepresentation

⁸⁸² Curtin, "Policy – Prime Minister's Speech, 6 June 1943," *Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister*, (Canberra: Commonwealth Government, 1942-43), No. 59, 22.; "State of the War – Prime Minister's Statement, 4 June 1942," *Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister*, (Canberra: Commonwealth Government, 1942), No. 31, 18-20.

⁸⁸³ Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 59-60.

⁸⁸⁴ "The Bully Begins to Whine," *Age*, 12 March 1943, 2.; "Nemesis in Air Warfare," *Age*, 28 May 1943, 2.

⁸⁸⁵ "They Asked For It."

of Germans as the “apostles of culture”.⁸⁸⁶ These newspapers feared that undeserved pity would instigate a public backlash against the campaign and a cessation of an offensive so essential in crushing German war potential. The mobilisation of enmity against the German people was highlighted by the *Age*, who argued that that pity for the reversal of fortunes in Germany was being checked by growing public hate, anger and resentment.⁸⁸⁷

Editorials also justified violence against the German population using the well-established argument that the “pattern of total war set by our enemies” had been utilised with such ruthlessness, callousness and lack of solicitude for its victims. The German people, the *Age* posited, had sycophantically applauded the triumphs of their air weapon.⁸⁸⁸ This reinforced official “instrumentalising” narratives promoted by Curtin which argued that bombing could end with capitulation under the conditions of unconditional surrender set months prior at the inter-Allied Casablanca Conference.⁸⁸⁹ This was not a novel idea. It rested on earlier projected hopes of German capacity and desires for resistance which had failed to materialise.⁸⁹⁰ Consequently, the German people were framed as victims by choice. Their affiliation and complicity with the ideological and racial evils of Nazism reinforced their worthiness as subjects of violence:

...until they are prepared to [surrender unconditionally], the German people who hailed Hitler as the new Messiah must ‘take it’ from adversaries whose power to strike back is clearly being shown.⁸⁹¹

Such examples evidence the capacity of moral exclusion to normalise simplistic relationships between *cause* and *effect*, narrative and outcome.⁸⁹² The German people were more clearly rendered as deserving targets of military violence and outside of the scope of justice for their role in facilitating and supporting Nazi war potential utilised to engage in the indiscriminate bombing of Allied cities. Moreover, the consequences of the raid were deemed unproblematic so long as the *intent* of the act was justified.

Commentary on the bombing war increasingly utilised terms such as vengeance, retaliation and reprisal, tempered by the caveat that Allied peoples were not “gloating” over the suffering of the enemy. The application to victim cities fulfilled a standard narrative reflected in the Brisbane *Courier-*

⁸⁸⁶ “Ersatz Indignation,” *Argus*, 1 May 1942, 2.

⁸⁸⁷ “The Bully Begins to Whine.”

⁸⁸⁸ “Nemesis in Air Warfare.”

⁸⁸⁹ The decision to exacerbate strategic bombing campaigns was also agreed upon here. Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945*, 107.

⁸⁹⁰ “Germany’s Advantages,” *Bulletin*, 13 March 1940, 8.

⁸⁹¹ “Nemesis in Air Warfare.”; Opatow, *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 31.

⁸⁹² “Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion,” 140.

Mail's sensationalised "Do They Remember Rotterdam". This editorial was both a rebuke of the German people's hypocritical griping and a criticism of so-called Australian humanitarians on the home front attempting to "arouse compassion" for German victims.⁸⁹³ Perhaps less measured than the *Courier-Mail* and *Age* who had at least superficially distanced Allied raids from terms such as "gloating", "satisfaction", "rage" and "revenge", the *SMH's* editorials in May 1943 struggled to hide a belief that the "retaliatory" attacks of Hamburg were in the pursuit of just "vengeance" and "retributive justice" against German aerial terrorism.⁸⁹⁴ The bombing of the Reich capital, Berlin, in August was seen as a continuation of "special retribution" for German attempts to destroy London, something which "the whole British people had long looked forward to."⁸⁹⁵ Little had changed during editorial analysis of the more sustained "Battle of Berlin" between November 1943 and March 1944, which was seen by the *SMH* as fulfilling Bomber Harris' claims about the efficacy of bombing against the enemy's means and will to war: "At last the German nation, which has made all its wars abroad, is learning on its own soil, in terms of blood, anguish, and desolation, what war really means."⁸⁹⁶

Although many Australian newspapers self-professedly avoided "gloating" in at least a superficial sense, the language within the *SMH* became far more common throughout 1943-44. The *Bulletin's* editorials throughout 1943 reflected the viewpoint of its hard-line tabloid contemporaries *Smith's Weekly* and *Truth* who did little to hide their exultation over the success of the Ruhr campaigns in curbing German morale.⁸⁹⁷ Reducing the international cables on the bombing war to a "serial thriller", one editorial noted that while some in Australia might "prefer to deny" the raids, a widespread "savouring of revenge" was also evident in Australian public discourse.⁸⁹⁸

The editors made no compunction that German suffering was a matter of just retribution and repayment on a collectively guilty party. It also aimed to present meaningful statistics to a nation at a safe distance from, and without the "experience" of, mass bombing raids.⁸⁹⁹ Rather than attempting to downplay the destructive effects "in terms of human beings", Malcolm Ellis' (Ek-Dum) "The Service Man" and other columns had consistently compiled reports of human terror, misery and suffering in an attempt to reconstruct the Allied raids for Australian readers incapable of imagining its horrors. The *coup-de-grace* was the description of the Hamburg "firestorm" which had reached the Australian

⁸⁹³ "Do They Remember Rotterdam?," *Courier-Mail*, 28 May 1943, 2.

⁸⁹⁴ "The Axis Cannot 'Take It'," *SMH*, 28 May 1943, 4.; "The Air Conquest of Europe," *SMH*, 4 August 1943, 6.; "Do They Remember Rotterdam?."; "Nemesis in Air Warfare."

⁸⁹⁵ "Berlin in Flames," *SMH*, 26 August 1943, 4.

⁸⁹⁶ "The Air Battle of Germany," *SMH*, 25 November 1943, 4.

⁸⁹⁷ Pooley, "Simplifying the Bombing of Germany," *SW*, 30 January 1943, 6.; "Door of Hell Opens On the Huns," *SW*, 31 March 1945, 8.

⁸⁹⁸ "Backfire Blitz," *Bulletin*, 28 April 1943, 6.

⁸⁹⁹ "They Called the Tune," *Bulletin*, 26 May 1943, 6.; "Bombing Season," *Bulletin*, 17 November 1943, 6.

home front via neutral observations: "People caught in such 'storms' are stripped of their clothing and left dying in the streets, twisted and naked. The living wandered about seeing nothing, half demented with terror."⁹⁰⁰

Reminding readers about the horrors suffered by the victim cities, the *Bulletin* shared bemusement with its contemporaries at continued protests against morale bombing. The "British Style of Warfare" noted the "peculiarity" of British disagreements about reprisal bombing in the major British newspapers on the grounds of ethical concern for the enemy.⁹⁰¹ The editor noted that protests on broad humanitarian and idealistic grounds (published in the British and Dominion press) were not only ignorant of realism, but unrepresentative of broad public attitudes in their "illogical and out of tune appeals".⁹⁰² Despite a recognition of a shift in attitudes, the *Bulletin* shared Baume's frustrations which were summarised by typical article headlines attached to the latter's reports in *Truth*: "Tearful Halfwits Seek Mercy for Huns and Wops" and "Don't Be Soft With the Hun".⁹⁰³ Such journals exemplified, perhaps in an exaggerated form, the extent of moral disengagement rendered by the moral exclusion. Their continued frustrations, however, also evidenced constraints and limitations on the permissibility and sanctioning of totalising violence in Australian public discourse.

The Ethical Outcry: Moral Inclusion and the Scope of Justice

Historical analysis of the public discourse in Britain and the United States has suggested that the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive met virtually no tangible, widespread and organised public opposition in the Allied nations despite persistent resistance within wartime discourse into the final campaigns of 1945.⁹⁰⁴ The moral sensibilities of these belligerent states, however, did not totally erode in the face of the totalising logic of the war. Such findings are equally applicable in an analysis of the Australian moral economy. Australian religious opinion was one of the few deviations from the established normative process of moral exclusion in public wartime discourse.

Australian religious actors exemplified the inverse of moral exclusion in their attempts to oppose the overarching totalising logic of enmity upon which Australian public support for civilian bombing largely rested. This is what Opatow has usefully designated as "moral inclusion" – a process of deterring, resisting and reducing hatred dependent on retaining "communication" with enemies, the ability to recognise and face one's own and collective hatred and, importantly, avoiding "lowering standards of

⁹⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁰¹ "British Style Warfare."

⁹⁰² "Backfire Blitz."

⁹⁰³ "BOB," *Truth*, 12 April 1942, 16; *Truth*, 21 June 1942, 18; "Ghastly Axis Atrocities," *Truth*, 20 September 1942, 9.; "BOB," *Truth*, 20 May 1943, 14; "BOB," *Truth*, 5 September 1943, 14.

⁹⁰⁴ Bellamy, 147; Connelly; Cooper, 104; Kertesz, 152; Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, 363; Ramsden, 206.

justice".⁹⁰⁵ Bar-Tal and Hammack Jnr. add that other interventions at the collective level can include the acceptance of the other as worthy of moral treatment ("legitimisation"); the recognition of the equal status of the out-group ("equalisation"), recognition of the diversity and heterogeneity of the out-group ("differentiation") and opposing depersonalisation through recognition of the individuality of members of the out-group and their experiences, fears, needs and desires ("personalisation").⁹⁰⁶ Those who are morally included are retained within the shifting scope of justice and protected by accepted frameworks, rules, norms and codes of justice and fairness. They are subject to a collective sense of "moral obligation, responsibility and duty" denied to the morally excluded.⁹⁰⁷ Moral inclusion shares similarities with complex processes raised by Keen ("Metanoia"), Zur ("Rehumanisation" and "realistic empathy") and others that necessitate introspective self-awareness of the enmity process.⁹⁰⁸

Religious discourse – exemplified again on the pages of periodicals such as the *Advocate*, *Methodist* and *Catholic Freeman's Journal* – was one of several, albeit increasingly isolated, sites moving against the popular grain to retain established ethical, legal and norm-based codes in relation to the bombing of German civilians. Church leaders and the religious periodicals condemned the suppression of moral thinking, proportionality and distinction regarding violence. This was despite the churches' recognition in the first months of the war, discussed in Chapter Five, that the war would not be fought on "Christian" grounds given the dangerous potential of the totalising logic of violence and the forms of reprisals already evident in naval blockade and combat.⁹⁰⁹

The universality of religious appeals against the shrinking scope of justice for all non-combatants before the 1942 campaigns was a key factor less prominent in the secular media tending to focus on collective self-victimhood. Whilst sharing the moral outrage of the secular press, religious periodicals were far more focused on promoting organised church resistance to civilian bombing – the local and international; sectarian and cross-denominational/ecumenical. Editorials by leading intellectuals and ministers busily stressed the doctrinal, legal, temporal ethical problems with German war methods that, ironically, it would soon be employing against the actions of Australia's own airmen.

The *Catholic Freeman's Journal*, in its fearful predictions for retaliatory aerial bombardment, warned against the essentialist narrative by reminding readers that the hateful rhetoric emanating from the

⁹⁰⁵ Opatow, "Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion," 145-9. Opatow notes that in-group dissent is a factor of morale exclusion requiring more focus in the scholarship, as well as a recognition of intermediate positions on a broad spectrum. *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 83.

⁹⁰⁶ Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr., 41.

⁹⁰⁷ Opatow, *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 73.

⁹⁰⁸ Keen, 92-3; Zur, 24.

⁹⁰⁹ "The War on Civilians," *Catholic Freeman's Journal*, 30 November 1939, 20.

state German press was not indicative of wider German sentiment.⁹¹⁰ Differentiation – recognition of the diversity and heterogeneity of the enemy population – was evident here.⁹¹¹ Its sister paper in Sydney before amalgamation in 1942, the *Catholic Press*, also expressed concern about the breakdown of the many “uncodified” and “largely unwritten” rules of law which, open to interpretation, was a dangerous precedent for unrestrained bombing.⁹¹² Correspondent disagreement also frequently emanated from religious quarters. This was reflected in the varied responses to a *Telegraph* leading article warning of talk of reciprocation in the British HOL should Germany transgress the principle of mutual restraint.⁹¹³ One joint letter from representatives of the Legion of Christian Youth (Robert Jay, W.A. Hardie and T.N. Neller) related the bombing war to growing anti-German rhetoric in Brisbane, as several other correspondents criticised restraint as indicative of the dangers of the distinction between Germans and Nazism.⁹¹⁴

Despite Australia’s distance from bombing, by 1943 some religious ministers had recognised a correlation between the underlying narratives of moral exclusion in the media and the brutalisation and callousness of wartime societies through the totalising logic of the war. Rev. Alan Walker’s wartime rhetoric regarding the bombing offensive reflected broader ethical and moral concerns within the Methodist community and a desire to “rehumanise” an enemy excluded from the scope of justice. Walker penned an exemplary and controversial response to objectionable examples of “moral exclusion” in the Australian media which captured the main points of arguments emanating from religious circles.⁹¹⁵ Walker’s disdain extended to the utterances of leaders of Australian public opinion –politicians, intellectuals and journalists – which, he argued, would have been unacceptable at the beginning of the war. Australian politicians during this period of the war felt little compunction or need to justify the targeting of German civilians during air raids.⁹¹⁶ More concerning for Walker was that this process had extended beyond the utterances of these leaders to the man in the street. A moral callousness and the dulling of empathy, pity and compassion towards the enemy was part of a

⁹¹⁰ Ibid.; “Is it ‘Frightfulness’?,” *Catholic Freeman’s Journal*, 12 September 1940, 16.; “Methods of Warfare: Many Uncodified Rules: Moral Principles Involved,” *Catholic Press*, 11 January 1940, 17.

⁹¹¹ Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr., 41.

⁹¹² “Horrors of War: Civilisation Degraded,” *Catholic Press*, 13 June 1940, 20.

⁹¹³ “Civil Bombing: British Reprisals,” *Telegraph*, 14 September 1939, 1.

⁹¹⁴ “War Attitudes,” *Telegraph*, 18 September 1939, 8.

⁹¹⁵ Walker, “Weekly Feature: ‘Are We Becoming Brutal?’,” *Cessnock Eagle and South Maitland Recorder*, 4 June 1943, 5.; George H. Johnston, “Vital Turn in Pacific: Battle of the Bismarck Sea was War’s Most Sensational and Complete Air Victory,” *Australasian*, 13 March 1943, 10-11.

⁹¹⁶ “No Sympathy for Germany: Dr Evatt Says Air Raids Justified,” *Singleton Argus*, 7 July 1943, 1.; “Bomb Japanese Cities,” *SMH*, 9 June 1943, 11.

broader process which the Methodist minister noted was most aptly symbolised by public reactions and attitudes towards the bombing of European cities:

The chief peril of a long war is that people become callous and brutal. In time much suffering and rising hatred for the enemy kills natural feelings of pity and compassion. The very immensity of the tragedy of modern war deadens sensitiveness. As this war is now almost four years old, is it time perhaps we asked the question 'Are We Becoming Brutal?'⁹¹⁷

Walker established that Australian attitudes towards the German people evidenced a societal-wide moral disengagement, with the logic of total war acting as a justifying narrative:

Now, it may be argued that under conditions of total war such methods are necessary. I disagree, but that is not my concern at the moment. But I am concerned at the way we are receiving these developments and whether we are being brutalised by them.⁹¹⁸

Walker attempted to frame his ideas in line with the British debate. He noted the former Bishop of Coventry (and then current Bishop of Winchester), Mervyn Haigh's, reference to the "growing tendency" of British "gloating" over the raids on German cities and a callousness and brutality in his diocese for those who had suffered under similar raids. Hatred was symbolic of the "moral deterioration" engendered by the war.⁹¹⁹ Walker called for an active aversion to the moral exclusion process – to stop bleating outward hatred; halt the hypocritical placing of enemy civilians outside the scope of justice by framing Rotterdam and Dortmund (a German city) through the same moral aperture; engendering empathy for real and shared "human suffering" by rehumanising the enemy and asking readers to imagine that victims were their own loved ones; and recognising that all shared responsibility for the poisonous inter-war climate that made war inevitable, albeit to varying degrees.⁹²⁰ Walker's arguments correlate strongly with the framework of moral inclusion.

Walker's public criticism of the Allied bombing campaign led to several exchanges with members of his parish who took issue with his faith based anti-bombing argumentation and the Churches' hypocritical moral authority on the pages of the *Cessnock Eagle*.⁹²¹ Some, however, were receptive to Walker's moral inclusionary discourse. Noting that the indiscriminate destruction of human life had

⁹¹⁷ "'Are We Becoming Brutal?'"

⁹¹⁸ Ibid.

⁹¹⁹ Ibid.

⁹²⁰ Ibid.

⁹²¹ "An Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth", *CE*, 8 June 1943, 2.; "Nazi Barbarians Are Running True to Form," *CE*, 27 September 1940, 4.; "Condemns Bombing Policy," *NMH*, 29 May 1943, 2.; E. Worthington, "Bombing Policy," *NMH*, 5 June 1943, 6.; H.M. May, "More Criticism of Rev. Walker," *CE*, 11 June 1943, 4.; "One of the Old Veterans," Rev. Alan Walker Criticised, *CE*, 8 June 1943, 1.

engendered totalising enmity, Fay Curtis attempted to reclaim the term universalist “we” as a designation for all mankind. She reminded her peers that Churchmen in the Axis nations had raised similar concerns about the *Luftwaffe* campaigns.⁹²² This reflected equalisation, a process whereby the in-group and out-group are defined and recognised as coequal.⁹²³ Walker’s recognition that in times of conflict it was “so easy for intolerance to blind us” resonated with Curtis as a means of safeguarding moral life and humanitarian values of the nation at war. Perhaps ironically, Curtis fatalistically admitted that Walker’s rhetoric in such a climate was “too high an intellectual concept” for most Australians to comprehend – that the totalising logic of enmity had become too powerful for most to resist by purely theoretical or doctrinal considerations.⁹²⁴

Concerns about the “deterioration of moral outlook fostered by the propaganda of ‘total war’” and the adoption of “Pagan hate” took on a new sense of urgency for Australia’s Catholic community during the strategic bombing offensive.⁹²⁵ The *Advocate* argued that the Allied pursuit of victory, unconditional surrender and appropriation of Soviet “total vengeance” had engendered a degraded “moral outlook”.⁹²⁶ Editorials observed that a “ruthless spirit of vendetta” had emerged in the Australian press, symbolised by the indulgence and “savage rejoicings at the vengeance now being wreaked upon the Axis powers for the horrors of 1940 and 1941.”⁹²⁷ Media narratives surrounding the bombing of Hamburg and Berlin in late 1943 reinforced the standard argument linking hatred with morale, the subjugation of “sanctities and humanities” for “military exigencies”, and hypocritical disregard for “inconvenient legalities” while applying to the rule of law for those within the scope of justice.⁹²⁸ The previously discussed *Argus* editorial “They Asked For It” was quoted at length as symbolising this mainstream press narrative – “a systematic press propaganda of hatred and revenge” in which writers and political leaders did little to hide their disdain for German protests and suffering.⁹²⁹ Common arguments expressed by Australian leaders of public opinion and correspondents such as Baume, Tebbutt and Blunden that legitimised retaliation– references to common maxims, victim cities, hypocrisy, whining, non-recognition of common humanity and suppression of anti-bombing voices discussed throughout this chapter – were criticised by the *Advocate*.

⁹²² Fay Curtis, “Reply to Mr. May,” *CE*, 15 June 1943, 4.

⁹²³ Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr., 41.

⁹²⁴ Curtis, “Reply to Mr. May.”

⁹²⁵ “Christian Courage or Pagan Hate?,” *Advocate*, 13 August 1942, 8.; “Drowned Mercy,” *Southern Cross*, 21 May 1943, 6.; “Pertinent Questions on Total War and Christianity,” *Southern Cross*, 28 January 1944, 1.

⁹²⁶ “Vengeance or Justice?,” *Advocate*, 15 January 1942, 8. A notable example was Baume’s attitude reflected in *Truth*: “Russia’s Plan For Revenge: Whitehall Shows Amazing Apathy.”

⁹²⁷ The Fifth Column of the Merciful, *Advocate*, 10 June 1943, 8.

⁹²⁸ The Need of Peace, *Advocate*, 2 December 1943, 2.

⁹²⁹ The Fifth Column of the Merciful.; They Asked For It, *Argus*, 5 June 1943, 2.

The more restrictive expressions of Christian empathy were consistently attacked in the secular press for hampering the military effort and as signs of weakness and disloyalty. Like Australia's public intellectuals' struggles to maintain some vestige of "objectivity", the Australian Churches' moral preaching had to operate within the politics and confines of Australian wartime patriotism. Concessions to totalising logic were inevitable and necessary if the religious narrative was to retain any currency in the coarsening war discourse of 1942-45. While conceding to the need for some levels of "totalitarian" methods in war, emergency and temporary regulations required a composite purging of hate and systematic recognition of the "humanity" of the enemy in religious conceptualisations of "Just War Theory".⁹³⁰

"It may be **right and essential** that we should inflict on the enemy populations the frightful mass-suffering of air-bombing which we and our allies endured so recently. Nothing, however, **can justify sneers at the expense of those who suffer, whether they are innocent or guilty, or chuckles of satisfaction at the thought of vengeance.** The Christian is permitted to kill in a just war: but he may not rejoice in the avenging of blood."⁹³¹

Catholic lay commentator D. G. M. Jackson and the *Advocate's* radio commentator P.F.M. exemplified such religious arguments. While the Pope provided the Catholic doctrinal interpretation of the bombing ethics, P.F.M. applauded Jackson's contextualisation of the Australian debate. Jackson had referenced an unnamed, yet well-known secular Australian broadcaster (most likely the controversial "Watchman", E.A. Mann) who had warned his listeners of an insidious "campaign of mug-wumps entitled 'pity the poor Hun'" in complete ignorance of the horrors perpetrated against civilians and the "vandal destruction" of cultural, religious and artistic heritage."⁹³² Such callous media framing of the agony of German women and children as a "just 'reprisal'", according to Jackson, was as "irrational" as it was un-Christian. Admissions to realism about the inevitability of "incidental" and "unintentional" bombing of German civilians in the pursuit of military targets did not condone the "rejoicing" Jackson had witnessed in the Melbourne press during the aptly named Operation Chastise – the Dam-busters campaign.⁹³³

⁹³⁰ Anthony J. Coates, *The Ethics of War*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016); Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 5th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

⁹³¹ "The Fifth Column of the Merciful." Emphasis mine.

⁹³² P.F.M., "Pope's Protest Against Inhumanity, 'Onlooker' Comments on Air Horror War," *Advocate*, 17 June 1943, 13.

⁹³³ *Ibid.* The semantic undertones of Operation "Chastise" would not have been lost on Jackson.

Jackson reflected the Australian Churches' reluctant and qualified acceptance about the unlikelihood of mutual restrictions in the bombing war. Yet religious periodicals continued to attack rampant political realism and moral relativism in Australia which attempted to bypass the moral inconsistencies of the bombing campaign. This was captured by the *Advocate's* contemporary in Sydney, the newly amalgamated *Catholic Weekly*. In a discussion of "Total War and Unjust Warfare" in early May 1944, the *Weekly* argued that a widespread coarsening of objective and just thinking was pervading Australian society from the politician and statesmen to the "men-in-the-street". Holding Germans responsible for the war and concurrent atrocities, the powerful moral exclusionary narratives employed by the media acted to dull moral concern about the German civilian through its emphasis on "total war".⁹³⁴

Various pacifist groups likewise organised against the callousness of the bombing campaign. Another close colleague of Walker was "Commentator" – regular contributor to the Melbourne based-periodical of the Federal Pacifist Council of Australia (FPCA), "*The Peacemaker*".⁹³⁵ The FPCA was an amalgamation of inter-war pacifist groups expounding various philosophical, religious, and political viewpoints. It actively argued against the grain of popular wartime sentiment for negotiated peace and, importantly, advocated for the end of the Allied strategic bombing offensive against enemy cities in the pursuit of unconditional surrender.⁹³⁶ *The Peacemaker* was founded in September 1939 and combined locally created content with international works to commentate on key issues relating to the war.⁹³⁷ It was not in itself an anti-war magazine, but rather sought to provide enlightened commentary of issues through the lens of pacifism and check excesses of various kinds evident in a totalising war. The FPCA and *Peacemaker* were strong critics of totalising violence, starting from criticism of economic warfare and the policy of economic blockade.⁹³⁸

Commentator had consistently noted the back-footed struggle in Australia against the "paroxysms of hate against the enemy" in his weekly feature for the magazine, "A Pacifist Looks at a World at War", from October 1942 onwards.⁹³⁹ Originally written for the *Peacemaker* for its September 1943 issue,

⁹³⁴ "Total War and Unjust Warfare," *Catholic Weekly*, 4 May 1944, 4.

⁹³⁵ The *Peacemaker* was edited by Frank W. Coaldrake, Anglican reverend, missionary and President of the FPCA from 1943-46. Coaldrake espoused non-violent resistance for the pacifist cause. Laurie O'Brien, Coaldrake, Frank William (1912-1970), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/coaldrake-frank-william-9771> (accessed 23/05/2018).

⁹³⁶ "Invulnerable Values," *Peacemaker*, February 1942, 4.; "'Unconditional Surrender' – What it Really Means," *Peacemaker*, 15 March 1943, 3.; "Unconditional Surrender", *Peacemaker*, 1 June 1943, 1.; "Allied Bombing – Vera Brittain Questions Policy," *Peacemaker*, 1 June 1944, 1.

⁹³⁷ See *Peacemaker*, 29 September 1939, 2, for the magazine's central aims and policies.

⁹³⁸ "Civilians Attack Civilians," *Peacemaker*, May 1940, 8. Based on a talk by professor H.D. Black.

"What Are We To Do Now," *Peacemaker*, August 1940, 2.; "Humane War an Illusion," *Peacemaker*, December 1941, 3.

⁹³⁹ Commentator, "A Pacifist Looks at a World at War," *Peacemaker*, 1 October 1942, 2.

Commentator's "The Ethics of Bombing" was reformulated into booklet format a year later as a FPCA publication with editorial additions to account for the phenomenon of the robot bombs or *Vergeltungswaffen* (Vengeance/Retaliatio n Weapons) [Image 35].⁹⁴⁰ The V1 (June 1944) and more destructive V2 (September 1944) were presented as a typically German, purely terroristic, indiscriminate and literally inhuman bastardisation of technology (a fact that usefully fed into stereotypes of the German automaton, thoroughness and perverse intelligence); reaffirming emerging atrocity revelations and usefully juxtaposing the justified, limited military objectives of conventional Allied air campaigns.⁹⁴¹



Image 35.

The indiscriminate robot bomb, Commentator argued, removed the final vestiges of Australian public moral concern that area bombing had initiated between the so-called Battle of Hamburg in mid-1943 until the first V1 attacks a year later. In light of the narrative being presented, Commentator argued that a policy of "revenge" had swept through the British Empire despite contrary assurances from

⁹⁴⁰ Commentator, "A Pacifist Looks at a World at War: The Ethics of Bombing," *Peacemaker*, 15 September 1943, 3. The original article was wrongly listed as being printed in the April 1943 edition. All text remained unchanged, with the exception of small, albeit important, additions regarding the V1 offensive. *The Ethics of Bombing*, (Melbourne: Essendon Gazette, 1944). Published in unison with the FPCA.

⁹⁴¹ Anne Matheson, "How London Lives in Shadow of Flying Bombs," *AWW*, 29 July 1944, 9.; "Flying Bomb Ordeal," *Sun*, 6 July 1944, 4.; "London Has Suffered Badly from Flying Bombs," *Argus*, 13 September 1944, 9.

British Minister of Air, Archibald Sinclair.⁹⁴² Emanating from universally held conceptions of “total war” that assumed A) Civilians were essential to national war efforts in a “total war and total war effort [where] none can contract himself out of it”; B) the impossibility of operational discrimination between *non-military* and *military* targets, empirically evident in indiscriminate bombing by both the *Luftwaffe* and the Allied air forces and; C) that former non-military targets could be deemed legitimate according to contemporary thinking and a rational appraisal of bombing strategy – Commentator rightly argued that area bombing was becoming normalised through the logic of totalising violence.⁹⁴³ This had resulted in the confusing array of often irreconcilable defences and lines of thought discussed within this Chapter. Reporting on the Allied strategic bombing offensive engendered cognitive dissonance, requiring greater “tangents, reservations, and qualifications” designed to shift action perception and decrease dissonance in public perceptions.⁹⁴⁴

In these broader strategic, political and moral considerations of “obliteration” bombing, Commentator viewed the definition of targets, “human reactions” and “states of mind” behind those reactions as key points of interest to facilitate moral inclusion. Commentator recognised that views on the Allied bombing campaign varied widely as the bishops, statesmen, military leaders, journalists and “plain common men” discussed in this chapter presented their responses. The inherent difficulty, he noted, was separating informed opinion from rhetoric rooted in wartime “passion” and prejudice promoted by the totalising logic of enmity. Avoiding value judgements of culpability on either side, Commentator noted a universal pattern of hypocrisy in Australian media responses to bombing solidified in narratives of the campaigns:

The people of each [nation] have one reaction to the bombing of the people in enemy countries, and quite another when **they** are being bombed. Each sees its own raids as a necessity of war, and that of its enemy as sheer brutality...**FOR THIS IS TOTAL WAR.**⁹⁴⁵

Commentator recognised that mutual enmity had been matched by an increased callousness to the suffering of others outside the defined scope of justice. That a pacifist magazine such as the *Peacemaker* and its contributors were continuing, less successfully, to counteract the same arguments in the final years of the war reinforces the general uphill battle faced by isolated forces in Australian wartime discourse in their attempts to rescript a now dominant master narrative by promoting self-reflection, moral inclusion and legitimising discourse.

⁹⁴² Commentator, *The Ethics of Bombing*, 1.

⁹⁴³ Ibid, 8.

⁹⁴⁴ Ibid, 4.

⁹⁴⁵ Ibid, 3.

Conclusion

As the final bombs fell on Europe in April 1945, the standard plot of the Allied air war against Germany in the Australian public consciousness remained one of the innocent, trusting underdog, wronged by a powerful and ruthless enemy who, through sheer grit, determination and stamina, overcame the enemy to bring justice against him.⁹⁴⁶ As part of a broad coalition, Australian bombers dropped 59,419 tons on enemy targets during the Second World War.⁹⁴⁷ Many landed on legitimate industrial or military objectives – railroads, armaments and munitions factories, submarine bases. Many, however, did not. Australian commentators increasingly perceived the targeting of German civilians and their fate (blown to smithereens, burnt alive or asphyxiated) as axiomatic. The evident decrease in the prevalence of “debate” on strategic bombing in the latter years of the conflict can be construed as evidence of hardening attitudes and the dominance of such narratives. A self-righteous, even celebratory tone existed in Australian media coverage of the Allied strategic bombing campaign throughout the final years of the war that only really started to shift with immediate post-war discussions of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki between August and September 1945. Indeed, Michael McKernan and Prue Torney-Parlicki have characterised the Australian media greeting of the Atomic Age as subdued, tentative, anxious, and introspective in comparison.⁹⁴⁸

The success of moral exclusion was evident in the uncontroversial callousness of language and imagery. Statements reminiscent of one *Argus* editor’s allusion to “blast[ing] the Hunnishness out of the Huns”; or the impunity by which recently-arrived *Herald* European correspondent Osmar White could discuss the problem of “Bomb-Happy Huns” [Image 36], reflected the general tone of reporting as the final bombs fell on the Third Reich.⁹⁴⁹ Mirroring Anglo-American media discourse, unsavoury applications of totalising violence against non-combatants – reconciled with the self-professed Western moral superiority of the Allied forces – were “loudly articulated, proudly defended and timidly challenged” by Australian commentators.⁹⁵⁰

In the Australian media, the almost dogmatic subscriptions to British justice, Christian ethics, and concern for neutral opinion which had initially tempered the permissibility of bombing German civilians in the first months of the war gave way to a new dominant counter-narrative after 1942.

⁹⁴⁶ “How Germany Was Beaten From the Air,” *Argus Week-End*, 21 July 1945, 16-17.

⁹⁴⁷ *Australian Year Book*, No. 37, 1946-47, 1031.

⁹⁴⁸ Michael McKernan, *All In! Fighting the War at Home* (Melbourne: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 266; Prue Torney-Parlicki, “‘Whatever the Thing May Be Called’: The Australian News Media and the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” *Australian Historical Studies* 31, no. 114 (2000): 49, 66.

⁹⁴⁹ Osmar White, “Problem of ‘Bomb-Happy’ Huns,” *Herald*, 16 March 1945, 4.; “Reform By Force,” *Argus*, 16 April 1945, 2. The editor had also made similar remarks about the unrepentant and bestial “Hun” and the “Hunnishness” in an editorial three months earlier. “Impertinent Germany,” *Argus*, 4 January 1945, 2.

⁹⁵⁰ Geyer and Tooze, 3, 418.

Distance, while important, cannot alone account for this given the importance of a robust “moral economy” in a totalising people’s war and Australia’s *bomb-consciousness*. Support on the home front, or at the very least a lack of organised opposition and outrage at Australian complicity in strategic bombing, can be attributed to the narratives of enmity professed in the media that morally excluded German civilians. Symptoms of moral exclusion were clearly evident in media representations of increasingly unworthy, expendable, psychologically distant enemies rendered worthy targets of violence: “dehumanisation, derogation, biased evaluation of groups, and the glorification and normalisation of violence.”⁹⁵¹

Standardised narratives that emerged in the Australian media became a hegemonic prism through which most Australians viewed the Allied bombing war. The narratives emphasised the dangers of empathy and “sentimentalism”; the righteousness, in light of the cause at hand, to employ any method necessary for victory; the justness of retaliation and reprisal in light of Germany’s instigation or contravention of proscribed military, ethical and legal norms; and explicitly linking the German people to the crimes, suffering and violent massacre instigated by the Nazi regime. While many superficially claimed to avoid the explicit language of reprisal and even expressed an undertone of pity for German victims, the Australian media *en bloc* were unwilling to criticise reciprocal attacks on the enemy that deviated from increasingly blurred norms of combat. By the end of 1943, discussion of the horrific fate awaiting German civilians in the coming years could occur with relative impunity and acted to suppress and negate empathy for victims. In the broader context of the Allied struggle for moral supremacy, the Australian wartime media necessarily resorted to moral exclusion to exonerate the Self and render bombing a normative, justifiable and inevitable wartime act. This was reinforced by the shifting parameters of the conflict itself – the totalising logic of violence – which had engendered changes to what the scope of justice encompassed. Previous respect for non-combatant immunity, a claimed legacy of Western Civilisation seen as largely immutable in Australian discourse earlier in the war, had eroded dramatically throughout the bombing campaigns of 1940-1945.

Forces of “moral inclusion” were increasingly sidelined in Australian war discourse as their initial resonance with mainstream media opinion began to contradict the newly emergent hegemonic narrative professed by the latter. This reflected a breakdown, albeit not a total one, in Australia’s “moral economy”. Mirroring Britain, their influence on public opinion waned throughout the strategic bombing offensive.⁹⁵² Recognising the untenable position placed on the Christian that a just and moral war could be fought by some innately “unjust means”, representative voices of the Australian

⁹⁵¹ Opatow, *The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace*, 74-5.

⁹⁵² Kertesz, 154.

Churches pleaded for Australians not to throw their “ethics in the cupboard” when engaging in unavoidable concessions to the logic of totalising violence and enmity. They pleaded for the incidental not to be rendered deliberate, nor the arguably necessary a source of morbid pleasure. Although concessions to totalising enmity did occur, Australian religious opinion could not be said to suffer a schism on the issue of bombing to the same extent as in Britain where any utterance deemed to threaten Anglo-American moral superiority in the bombing war caused considerable tension.⁹⁵³ Leading church opinion, on the whole, aligned towards the Walkers, Mannix and Jacksons of the debate engaged in an open process of moral inclusion. Despite the unanimity of attitudes towards the Allied bombing war, narratives of moral inclusion, mirroring their counterparts in Britain and America, largely failed to influence public attitudes on the bombing of German civilians.⁹⁵⁴



Image 36.

⁹⁵³ "Methods of Warfare," *North Eastern Advertiser*, 2 July 1943, 2.; Clarence Irving Benson, "Church and People: Eau De Cologne," *Herald*, 13 June 1942, 11.

⁹⁵⁴ Kertesz, 152, 72; Ramsden, 206.

Chapter Seven: “What Are We Going to Do With Germany?”: Totalising Enmity and Australian Debates on the Treatment of Germany, 1944-45.

As VE Day in Europe approached in 1945, Australian public war discourse surrounding Nazi Germany shifted to a more explicit focus on the major strategic problems of transnational post-war reconstruction.⁹⁵⁵ One of the foremost challenges was “What are we going to do with Germany?”, a question intrinsically connected to shifting Australian attitudes towards the German people and changing wartime contexts. Australians were told by foreign correspondents such as Geoffrey Hutton that the “last and greatest of the mysteries of the war is the German people”. On the ground analysis of their “temper”, character and attitudes towards the war, Nazism and unconditional surrender would determine Allied policy.⁹⁵⁶ Hutton’s analysis seems to be supported by reflections of war correspondent Douglas Wilkie. In a 1976 interview, Wilkie reminisced that the Australian public’s Pacific-oriented focus resulted in less concern with the final “military story” in Europe. The focus of the Australian foreign correspondent in the final stages of the war was on the study of “the German people in defeat.”⁹⁵⁷

Anglo-American scholarship has clearly drawn a correlation between wide ranging war-time assessments of “German character” and Allied post-war planning and policy concerning occupation and reconstruction. Brechtken has convincingly demonstrated that the intensification of negative wartime imagery and stereotypes related to the “Hun” – particularly acute in the final months of the war – was a strong driving force in the demand for “harsh” peace in British public debates.⁹⁵⁸ This chapter explores how the longevity of totalising war, belated awareness of German atrocities, and a widespread “never again” mentality translated into increasing enmity towards the German people in Australian public discourse in the final years of the war, 1944 and 1945. Towards this end, this chapter examines editorial opinion and the role of the foreign correspondent before moving to Australian responses to published atrocity documentation, films and images. The continued “search for the good German” in Anglo-American discourse was intrinsically linked to the apportioning of blame and guilt for the war and the violence and deprivation it engendered.⁹⁵⁹

⁹⁵⁵ Anderson and Trembath, 158.

⁹⁵⁶ Geoffrey Hutton, “German Behaviour as Allies Advance: ‘Cold, Silent Hostility’,” *Argus*, 30 September 1944, 4.

⁹⁵⁷ Douglas Wilkie, interview by Mel Pratt, December 10, 1976, 1976. See time section 35.00-40.00.

⁹⁵⁸ Brechtken, 35-6.; Nicholls.

⁹⁵⁹ Kertesz, 141.

This final chapter argues that the relatively mild, tolerant and sometimes empathetic attitude towards the German people that defined attitudes in Australia during the first months of the conflict was most threatened by the pressures of totalising enmity during the last stages of the conflict. It is during this period that the “logic” of totalising enmity, the frictions between totalisation and constraints noted by Horne, Purseigle, and the Cambridge scholars, is most palpable and contested. This chapter extrapolates an escalating totalisation of enmity in Australian public discourse during the war’s denouement, building during the Allied advance through the German homeland between 1944 and early 1945 and becoming particularly acute in light of the atrocity revelations of April and May 1945. However, as the analyses of foreign correspondents in particular shows, evidence of the “good” German continued to constrain and limit enmity so that the image of the good, kindly German was never wholly subsumed by an increasingly dominant narrative of the Hun. This analysis of totalising enmity aids to explain the generally *tough, though measured* post-war policy framework called for by the majority of Australians revealed in the rudimentary opinion polling available to researchers.

Tough, though Measured: Australian Gallup Polls and A Brief Contextualisation of Australian Attitudes, 1944-45

Researchers of Australian public opinion management have convincingly argued that “no thorough attempt to measure and regiment Australian opinion” was made by the Australian authorities during the Second World War.⁹⁶⁰ Nevertheless, limited public opinion polls of attitudes towards Germany, undertaken by Australian Public Opinion Polls (APOP), are available for the final years of the war. These Gallup polls provide tentative contextual evidence to enmity narratives not available earlier in the war.⁹⁶¹ An examination of several key opinion polls provides further evidence of hardening attitudes in Australia towards the German people between 1944 and 1945, and a breakdown of the distinction between the Nazi leadership and the German people reflected in proposed post-war treatment. This trend aligns with research into the Anglo-American states where more systematic and sophisticated polling was undertaken throughout the duration of the conflict.⁹⁶²

⁹⁶⁰ Vickery, 6, 13-14.

⁹⁶¹ Murray Goot, “A Worse Importation Than Chewing Gum’: American Influences on the Australian Press and Their Limits – the Australian Gallup Poll, 1941-1973,” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 30, no. 3 (September, 2010): 274-5. Gallup polling was exported to Australia from the USA in 1940 through Keith Murdoch’s Herald and Weekly Times group (HWT). This organisation maintained a strong influence over its activities in Australia. Analysis was undertaken by the Gallup-affiliated Australian polling company headed by Murdoch affiliate Roy Morgan, Australian Public Opinion Polls (APOP), which, despite the existence of more limited polling, was the most sustained attempt to gauge wartime public opinion in wartime Australia. Simon King, “Australia Speaks’: Reactions to Political Opinion Polls in Australia 1941-1943,” *Flinders Journal of History & Politics* 28 (2012).

⁹⁶² Kertesz.; Hoenicke Moore, 206, 11-13. See discussion on pp. 22-3.

Three separate Gallup polls between late 1943 and early 1945 found that 85 per cent of Australians demanded unconditional surrender and rejected any form of negotiated peace, 72 per cent advocated control and supervision for an extended period, whilst seventy per cent had advocated some form of policing, occupation and/or crippling German war-making potential to avoid further conflict.⁹⁶³ A February 1945 poll moved from the broader question of control to the particular “severity” of the peace terms to be inflicted on Germany. The sample group was given the option between “severe” and “moderate” peace terms. A substantial majority (67 per cent) favoured the former, rather loaded, classification with little differentiation in age, gender or economic background.⁹⁶⁴ This rather ambiguous, reductionist and arbitrary terminology was developed further in May 1945 to include two further classifications – “harshly” and “leniently”. This survey was conducted after the German surrender and revelations of German atrocities in occupied Europe to ascertain attitudes “specifically to[wards] the German people.” Respondents were prompted: *“In your opinion; how should the German people be treated after the war?”*⁹⁶⁵ This was an important, if subtle, semantic distinction that reflected the pollsters’ focus on the German *people*, encapsulated in totalising narratives of enmity, rather than the more abstract nation and “country” of the February poll.⁹⁶⁶

The May polling results give some insight into Australian views of the German people during and immediately after the unconditional surrender of Germany. Those bracketed in the “severely” (37 per cent) and “harshly” (twenty per cent) categories far outweighed advocates of “moderately” and “leniently” categories with a total of 57 per cent.⁹⁶⁷ Unlike the February poll, the May survey also included analysis of the reasoning behind the results (provided by the respondent) which were utilised to explain continuity with previous polls. The majority “severe” category included splitting the nation into separate areas under the control of the major powers (the eventual policy applied to post-war Germany), the reduction of Germany to an agrarian, primary producing and pre-industrial state, the destruction of the German armaments industry, and the forceful imposition of reparations and the rational enlistment of the German people to rebuild Europe.⁹⁶⁸ The issue of severity reflected concerns that the supposed leniency of the Versailles Treaty not be repeated. Another survey taken one year after the surrender of German forces found that when given an option between a “more” or “less” severe post-war treaty than two decades prior, 72 per cent continued to elect the former with

⁹⁶³ Public Wants Germany Controlled After War (AGP, No. 170-9), Published December 1943 – January 1944.; Australia Wants Allies to Govern Germany (AGP, No. 232-240), Published November 1944.; Unconditional Surrender by Germany Demanded (AGP, No. 241-248), Published December 1944 – January 1945.

⁹⁶⁴ Severe Peace Terms for Germany Are Favored, (AGP, No. 249-254), February- March 1945.

⁹⁶⁵ Severe Treatment Favored for German People, (AGP, No. 246-271), May 1945. Emphasis mine.

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁸ Severe Treatment Favored for German People.

only 11 per cent expressing qualms about the punitive aspects of collective punishment imposed on the German people.⁹⁶⁹ Another immediate post-war poll revealed consensus in support for tough reparations, with a majority of eighty per cent supporting compensation via the supply of labour, goods and requisition of all profits from Germany's heavy industry.⁹⁷⁰ These policies were fairly uncontroversial in Australian wartime discourse throughout 1944 and 1945.

While contemporary Gallup polls reveal an overall shift towards totalising enmity, constraints still existed. These were tied to Australia's "moral economy". The May 1945 poll revealed that just over one third of respondents (39 per cent) promoted a "moderate" (31 per cent) or "lenient" (eight per cent) approach. The pollsters noted that the main differential separating these classifications from the severe and harsh categories, observed in the clarifications of respondents, was the idea that the "common" German people could not be held collectively responsible for the excesses of the criminal Nazi regime and military and political leadership – i.e., the maintenance of the Nazi/German distinction. Importantly, many specifically feared that overt harshness would "breed hatred and cause another conflict".⁹⁷¹ This reinforced the findings in a poll a month prior which reinforced that many Australians still took issue with collective guilt. For instance, a "considerable number" of the 42 per cent Australians who rejected the creation of an indentured labour force of the German people to be employed outside of Germany were "unwilling to see the ordinary German citizen punished for something that had been ordered by the German leaders".⁹⁷²

Overall, however, the APOP polls evidence an overall reticence in Australia towards an overtly "lenient" or "harsh" approach to Germany. Although the former category suggested that common German people should be given a chance to "build a new life", most Australians asserted that some form of collective re-education was necessary to reform the enemy population. More popular was the "harsh" category, with a sizeable section of the twenty per cent advocating "shoot the lot – all the goodness has been bred out of them" and "wipe them out – a degenerate people".⁹⁷³ Such evidence is a strong reminder of the powerfully expressed enmity in the final months of the war and its continued presence in the immediate post-war period despite the normalisation of Australian-German relations.

By 1945, resistance to the totalising logic of enmity and support for a Nazi-German distinction was undoubtedly in a minority position, with over half of respondents arguing for strong action specifically

⁹⁶⁹ Lesson of 1914-18: More Severe Terms For Germans (AGP, No. 355-364), July 1946.

⁹⁷⁰ Make The Germans Pay, (AGP, No. 284-293), August 1945.

⁹⁷¹ Severe Treatment Favored for German People.

⁹⁷² Should Germans Be Made to Help Rebuild Europe: Public Opinion Divided Here (AGP, No. 255-263), April 1945. 44 per cent supported the idea, 42 per cent opposed, and 12 per cent remained undecided.

⁹⁷³ Severe Treatment Favored for German People.

against the “German people”. Gallup polls suggest that the majority of Australians promoted a resolute approach to Germany, measured in direct punitiveness and retribution yet severe enough to re-educate and reform, extract reasonable reparations and avoid a resurgence of German militarism. This is where one could place the “severe” and “moderate” camps (68 per cent in total) in the May 1945 poll in generalised terms. Despite a worrying portion of the harsh category advocating mass genocide (evidence on the rhetorical power of totalising enmity narratives at the end of the war), discursive limits clearly remained in the expression of enmity in Australian wartime discourse by the end of the war. To explain this, we now turn to enmity narrative in the final years of the conflict.

The German Question, Totalising Enmity and Narratives of Enmity in the Press:

Indecision, disunity and the fluidity of inter-Allied politics effectively encapsulates the competing ideological imperatives, coalition interests and strategic/security considerations that framed Anglo-American post-war planning vis-à-vis post-Nazi Germany.⁹⁷⁴ This international context invariably influenced Australian public discourse. Australia’s “moral economy” remained in a state of flux between self-professed liberal and democratic tenets of freedom, liberty, pluralism, self-determination, and fairness in dealing with the defeated enshrined in Australia’s subscription to the Atlantic Charter (facets limiting totalising enmity on one hand); and the precepts of “unconditional surrender”, punishment (restorative or retributive) and effective control and safeguarding of international security on the other. There was general agreement in Australia that some form of “re-education” and external control would have to be imposed on Germany. Public discourse and media narratives focused, to various degrees, on the key aspects of *denazification*, *decentralisation*, *deindustrialisation*, *demilitarisation* and *democratisation* – those aspects encapsulating so-called “four” or “five Ds” haphazardly formalised throughout proceeding inter-Allied conferences (particularly Yalta) and eventually codified at the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945.⁹⁷⁵ These ideas shaped discussion of the German Question in the final years of the war.

Publicly, the Labor Government’s subscription to unconditional surrender demonstrated a belief that the longevity of the war depended on the *choice* of the German people to continue to support the regime.⁹⁷⁶ Curtin maintained that an overtly punitive post-war settlement rooted in punishment of the enemy nation and retribution undermined universal issues of international post-war reconstruction, the ALP’s implementation of its Socialist agenda, and eradication of the evils of

⁹⁷⁴ Goldman, 182; Hoenicke Moore, 271-3.

⁹⁷⁵ Burleigh, 795-7.

⁹⁷⁶ Curtin, “Surrender by Italy,” 9 September 1943, *Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister*, (Canberra: Commonwealth Government, 1943-44).; Herbert Vere Evatt, “Australian Policy – Minister’s Statement 1943,” 14 October 1943. *Ibid.*, No. 66, 3-8.

Fascism. Broadly speaking, Australia's federal government urged *tough, yet measured* action concerning post-Nazi Germany.

Public debate on the treatment of Germany by Australian politicians was limited to small exchanges. This can, in part, be attributed to greater political momentum in British and American political discourse in comparison to the Australian Houses of Parliament. Pacific oriented concerns were given far more weight, where Australia hoped to exert greater political influence over reconstruction commensurate to its small power status. However, isolated cases still evidenced divisiveness at the highest levels of Australian society. The Conservative state leader Alexander Mair, for instance, would notably clash with Menzies on several occasions during the conflict.⁹⁷⁷ Menzies, the now Opposition backbencher yet soon to be leader of the reformed Liberal Party, had publicly argued in January 1944 in favour of making post-war Germany "prosperous", a stance which still had some support from Anglo-American commentators.⁹⁷⁸ Mair vocally disagreed. He called for a punitive and retributive post-war plan for the "Hun" which had gained increasing popularity in a war-weary Australia – a fifty-year occupation, severe material reparations, and economic sanctions.⁹⁷⁹

The Australian media remained the most contested site of debate. Australian public discourse regarding the post-war treatment of Germany did not occur in a vacuum. Detailed theses and analyses by Anglo-American intellectuals, politicians, and religious leaders were aptly summarised, recontextualised and condensed into mass-produced packages for Australian domestic consumption. Examples such as the *Daily Telegraph's* "What Shall We Do with the Germans After the War?" and "As the Artists see the German" were exemplary in their wide-ranging mobilisation of international "experts".⁹⁸⁰ Media syntheses of often theoretically and methodologically complex proposals emanated principally from American and British journalists, academics and politicians and were contingent on political, economic and security factors.

The weight given to authoritative international writers is also evidence of the hardening editorial lines of Australian newspapers. The overarching prerequisites of Vansittart's "Twelve Points for Germany" rested on themes that were almost universally accepted in the Australian press by 1945 – the complete and unconditional defeat of German militarism, unilateral disarmament and demilitarization, and a sophisticated and prolonged program of re-education under the auspices and

⁹⁷⁷ Mair's response republished in: "Mr. Mair Assails Mr. Menzies: 'Help Axis Morale'," *NMH*, 1 February 1944, 2.; "N.S.W. Premier Would Intern All Germans," *Herald*, 16 May 1940, 16.; Henderson, 92-5.; Pennay, 22.

⁹⁷⁸ Kertesz, 208.

⁹⁷⁹ "Mr. Mair Assails Mr. Menzies: 'Help Axis Morale'."

⁹⁸⁰ "What are we going to do with the Germans?," *DT*, 26 February 1943, 6. Originally published in the New York evening daily, *PM*, Vol. III, No. 172. "As the Artists see the German," *DT*, 28 April 1945, 11.

supervision of Allied occupation.⁹⁸¹ Editorials in the daily press evidenced a shift from tentative, qualified support for Vansittart's interpretations of the root *causes* of the German problem (the comments on German character, history and culture that guided his policy formulations) from 1942 onwards, to an overt support for Vansittartism previously limited to journals such as *Smith's Weekly*, *Truth* and the *Bulletin*.⁹⁸² The *Launceston Examiner* and *Hobart Mercury's* increasing intolerance for the Nazi/German distinction, for instance, mirrored their growing editorial support for Vansittartism.⁹⁸³

Packer's *Daily Telegraph* – now under editorial guidance of the controversy-seeking Brian Penton (who had witnessed firsthand the devastation of Europe in 1944) and associate editor Sydney Deamer – generally maintained moderation in its framing of the German Question as an essential facet of post-war reconstruction.⁹⁸⁴ It promoted “wisdom, realism, sacrifice and compromise” and importantly cooperation in dealing with Germany to combat the “legacy of hatred, suffering, starvation, death, destruction and suspicion” engendered by totalising war.⁹⁸⁵ The *DT* noted that proposals to reduce Germany to an agrarian state or “emasculate or kill every German [and] sow salt in the ruins of her broken cities” (a Carthaginian Peace) failed to promote a practical settlement and slowly reintegrate the German people into the comity of nations. The *DT* generally exemplified the *tough, yet measured* school of thought:

The German people must make reparation for the destruction and suffering which their fighting machine wrought...But subject to, and over and above all this, the German people must be encouraged to work their way back into the society of nations and the brotherhood of man, to unite their great talents and industry with the common labours of all nations for the common good.⁹⁸⁶

However, even those papers who qualifiedly maintained aspects of earlier distinctions between Germans and their leaders succumbed to the totalising logic of the war. Given its emphasis on responsibility and reparations, the *DT* avoided referring to the German people as “victims” of Nazism as it had done in September 1939. Enmity-promoting images were clearly utilised to justify any policy

⁹⁸¹ Vansittart, *Lessons of My Life*, 13-14.

⁹⁸² “How Vansittart Would Deal With Germany,” *SW*, 13 June 1942, 8.; “Will Germany Escape as In 1914-18?,” *SW*, 27 August 1942, 8.

⁹⁸³ “The Problem of Germany,” *Examiner*, 20 November 1942, 4. By 1944, the *Examiner* was devoting significant editorial space to correcting misrepresentations of the former Chief Diplomat's post-war policy. “What to Do With Germany,” *Examiner*, 3 August 1944, 4.; “Not Nazis, But Germans,” *Mercury*, 15 April 1943, 3.; “Nazis or Germans?,” *Mercury*, 27 April 1943, 3.; “The Problem of Germany,” *Mercury*, 25 September 1944, 3.

⁹⁸⁴ “Germany Beaten – But We Still Have to Win the Peace,” *DT*, 8 May 1945, 7.

⁹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

deemed necessary to enforce unconditional surrender. George Finey's "Inside Germany" reflected initial assessments emanating through AAP cables covering the fall of Aachen, the first major city in the Reich proper to fall to American forces [Image 38].⁹⁸⁷ Finey's German – the elderly man weeping in the streets – symbolised the pitiful image of the German citizenry. The trope of the hypocritical whiner, used extensively in bombing discourse, suppressed empathy and a sense of victimhood. Perceptive satirical cartoons by George Molnar (György Molnár), the Hungarian born sponsored migrant who had begun providing cartoons to the *DT* in 1945, also caricatured reports from *Today's* London office (the *Telegraph's* weekend news magazine) that National Socialists were preparing their anti-Nazi alibis. Molnar's Sieg-Heiling naked German, rendered in his signature caricatured style with a Swastika plastered on his cheek, mocked spurious attempts to disown Nazism in the eleventh hour which had been consistently referenced to by its correspondents [Image 37].⁹⁸⁸ Compared to earlier sympathetic images of the German as "victim" discussed in Chapter Three, Finey and Molnar's cartoons reinforced the general hardening of the *DT's* editorial tone after years of conflict and the increased ambiguity in its enmity narratives through the diverse domestic and international analyses it was publishing.




Image 37.

⁹⁸⁷ Finey, "Inside Germany," *DT*, 16 September 1944, 8.; "Allies Enter German City: Big Advance," *DT*, 16 September 1944, 1.

⁹⁸⁸ "The Germans had no coffins for those of lowly station," *Today* (Sunday Telegraph), 18 March 1945, 15. Attila Urmenyhazi, Molnar, George (1910-1998), Obituaries Australia, National Centre of Biography, ANU, <http://oa.anu.edu.au/obituary/molnar-george-14136> (accessed, 04/04/2019).



Image 38.

Australian newspapers who had expressed an early concern about the Nazi/German distinction became even more “suspicious” of attempts to distance the German people from the consequences of defeat.⁹⁸⁹ The increasing reference to the “organisation of sympathy” in the Australian press reinforced fears of the spectre of Versailles and inter-war “grievance” arguments.⁹⁹⁰ The *Argus* and the *Australasian* had displayed increasing scepticism and scathing editorial attacks on the German people from 1942 onwards. The latter periodical’s criticism was personified by regular book reviewer and commentator Erle Cox who consistently promoted Vansittartist literature throughout the conflict.⁹⁹¹ The international framework for a workable, cooperative and peace oriented post-war

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁰ F. C. Folkard, “What Shall We Do With the Germans?,” *News*, 25 April 1945, 2.; Godfrey Blunden, “What Allies May Find Inside Reich: Occupied Area Provides Clues,” *Argus*, 29 January 1945, 2.

⁹⁹¹ Erle Cox, “Vengeance, Punishment, or Pardon? How Should Germany Be Treated After The War?,” *Australasian*, 17 October 1942, 12.; “Books of the Day: ‘Among the Huns’,” *Australasian*, 2 May 1942, 2. “Books of the Day,” *Australasian*, 15 August 1942, 2.; “Books of the Day: ‘German Women’,” *Australasian*, 11 December 1943, 2.; “Books of the Day: Causes of War,” *Australasian*, 13 September 1941, 2.

settlement was of particular concern for Errol G. Knox, managing director and editor in chief who exhibited a strong influence on the editorial directions of *The Argus* and Australasian Ltd.⁹⁹²

Knox argued along Vansittartist lines that Nazism was an outcome of German history. It was a reincarnation of the Wilhelmine “spirit and methods of barbarism”, Teutonic ruthlessness in war, politics and economic expansionism, and the “violent, predatory, and anti-democratic” character of the Prussian state.⁹⁹³ Knox summarised the paper’s viewpoint through a series of articles in early 1944, the most revealing being the polemically entitled “The Myth of the Good German People” which was, in large part, an explicit attack on Leftist conceptualisations of the “good” German.⁹⁹⁴ The totalizing rhetoric was highlighted by Knox’s promotion of a “national war, a people’s war”, rather than a conflict against an ideology. The absence of active resistance to the regime by the “good, decent German”, a fact highlighted by *Argus* foreign correspondent Geoffrey Hutton on several occasions from the Rhineland,⁹⁹⁵ was taken as irrefutable evidence of German mass support Nazism. Knox’s dualistic concerns about the excessive influence of Socialist German emigres and refugees on post-war policy, and the widespread belief in the absence of internal revolt and resistance in Germany, were commonly expressed amongst the international network of Vansittartists.⁹⁹⁶

The *Argus* had also published a response by Socialist writer and lecturer of politics at the University of Melbourne, Ian Milner. Milner expressed a minority view within *Argus*’ correspondence column supporting the actions of a “good” German Left. He criticized the two central ideas represented in the article which were gaining traction in Australian discourse and encapsulated the conflation of the German Question, narratives of enmity, and totalizing enmity: 1) The non-existence and misplaced hope in a “democratic peace movement” in Germany as a product of a “people’s war”; and 2) A mistrust of the German people’s ability to foster and develop a working democracy resulting from a “fundamental interpretation of German history” which rendered Germans predisposed to aggressiveness and violence.⁹⁹⁷ Regarding the second point, Milner resorted to the oft quoted rebuttal that arguments about innate and unchangeable national character could only result in calls for “national annihilation through dismemberment and indefinite military subjection”. This was an

⁹⁹² Sally O’Neill, Knox, Sir Errol Galbraith (1889-1949), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/knox-sir-errol-galbraith-6991> (accessed 17/04/18).

⁹⁹³ Errol G. Knox, “Today: The Myth of the Good German People,” *Argus*, 1 February 1944, 2.; “Today: Isn’t Revolution the Only Way!,” *Argus*, 17 January 1944 2.

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁵ Hutton, “German Behaviour as Allies Advance: ‘Cold, Silent Hostility’.”

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid. Vansittart’s last wartime treatise, *Bones of Contention*, for instance, was predicated on this. Vansittart, *Bones of Contention*.; Goldman, 171-3; Kertesz, 171; Valet, 29.

⁹⁹⁷ Ian Milner, “Militarism and the People of Germany: Many Staunch Democrats Still,” *Argus*, 11 February 1944, 2.

untenable position for self-professed liberal democracies to promote.⁹⁹⁸ Milner, alongside leading Socialist commentators such as John Fisher, personified trends in Communist discourse in conformity to the Comintern's anti-Vansittartist line. Yet even here, key personalities, such as Australian Communist Party president, L.L. Sharkey, reflected a hardening of attitude regarding post-war settlements and allusions to restrained and conditional collective guilt and punishment.⁹⁹⁹

The *Argus* received many correspondence letters at its Elizabeth Street office over the following week. These were generally supportive of Knox's interpretation. This demonstrated that the German Question had returned as one of public interest and controversy and that *Argus* readers were far more open to denial of the distinction than earlier examples discussed in Chapter Three. E.L. Jones noted that the article was a timely and pertinent intervention in a debate being derailed by influential "soft" peace advocates like the politically-resuscitated Opposition Leader, Robert Menzies.¹⁰⁰⁰ Elinor Coy of Gardenvale similarly viewed the article as a necessary intervention in reconstruction discourse against the "maudlin sentimentality" of domestic and international politicians who were burdened by misplaced concerns with the "great" German people. Emily Scott of Vermont demanded that the article should be published in pamphlet form.¹⁰⁰¹ Jones, Coy and Scott are evidence to the growing fears of ordinary Australians about resurgent "good" German rhetoric. Knox's ideas were resonating with readers to such an extent that one isolated correspondent, Lucy Gibson, complained of a widespread and deleterious "Myth of the Bad German" being proliferated in the Melbourne press.¹⁰⁰² Such arguments continued to play out in the correspondence columns of the national press with greater ferocity than in 1939-41.¹⁰⁰³

Foreign Correspondents and Media Narratives

The cabled reports of Australian foreign correspondents gave the Australian home front a taste of the real Germany leading up until its unconditional surrender in May 1945 when, as HWT correspondent Trevor Smith noted, it "ceased to be a nation, militarily and politically."¹⁰⁰⁴ An assembly of at least

⁹⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁹ "Victory Over Fascist Thugs Is Victory over Monopolists," *Tribune*, 10 May 1945, 7.; "Fascism, Not 'Race'," *Tribune*, 26 April 1945, 1.; Fisher, "A New Dawning for Germany," *Tribune*, 5 October 1944.; L.L. Sharkey, "Punishment for the Germans," *Tribune*, 20 July 1944, 5.; "Big Three Decide," *Tribune*, 22 February 1945, 5.

¹⁰⁰⁰ E.L. Jones, "'Good German' Myth," *Argus*, 3 February 1944, 9.

¹⁰⁰¹ Emily Scott, "'Mythical Good Germans'," *Argus*, 4 February 1944, 5.

¹⁰⁰² Lucy Gibson, "'Good' and 'Bad' Germans," *Argus*, 8 February 1944, 9.

¹⁰⁰³ One set of exchanges in the *Mercury* continued between late April and June 1945: "Letters to the Editor: Post-War Treatment of Germany By Allies," *Mercury*, 28 April 1945, 3.; "Prison Camp Pictures," *Mercury*, 30 April 1945, 3.; "Letters to the Editor: Post-War Treatment of Germany By Allies," *Mercury*, 2 May 1945, 14.; "Letters to the Editor: Treatment of Germany," *Mercury*, 4 May 1945, 8.; "Letters to the Editor: Germany's Future," *Mercury*, 9 June 1945, 3.; "Letters to the Editor: Treatment of Germans," *Mercury*, 8 June 1945, 13.; "Letters to the Editor: Treatment of Germans," *Mercury*, 12 June 1945, 3.; "Letters to the Editor: Treatment of Germans," *Mercury*, 13 June 1945, 3.; "Letters to the Editor: Treatment of Germans," *Mercury*, 19 June 1945, 13.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Trevor Smith, "Germany Loses Everything: Allies to Wipe Out Militarism," *Herald*, 10 May 1945, 1.

thirty Australian correspondents accompanied various advancing battalions into mainland Europe and the German home front. Supposedly “objective” on-the-ground analysis and anecdotal evidence increasingly supplanted the limited sources available to the media in the early stages of the war – official German sources (newspapers, radio and communiques), statements by POWs, neutral travellers, diplomats, escaped Allied prisoners and photo reconnaissance.¹⁰⁰⁵

Syndicated cables and weekly columns such as Godfrey Blunden’s “The Germany We Are About To Conquer” (a regular contribution to the *Argus* and *DT*) shaped discussions of justice, treatment and the increasingly complex representations of the typical German.¹⁰⁰⁶ As one Australian foreign correspondent, Douglas Wilkie, surmised: “We have plenty of opportunity to get to know the ordinary German women and children in their homes...[journalists] are assailed by the German emotional response to the invasion.”¹⁰⁰⁷ The claim of deep knowledge was the product of the style of reportage developed in the first years of the conflict which rendered the journalist’s personal interpretation of events and the subjective lens as credible and influential sources of information. As Anderson and Trembath appropriately note, the foreign correspondent rapidly became an “authentic” observer to war with a wide capacity to influence Australian war discourse.¹⁰⁰⁸ J.D. Corbett of the *Australasian* reflected in July 1944 that photographers, journalists, broadcasters and artists were an intrinsic force in “total war”. They were “history makers” whose task was not only to instil national pride and influence neutral opinion but build historical archives and capture “visual and verbal evidence of a resurgent dominant Germany” in all its forms and consequences to contextualise and shape discussions of post-war policy.¹⁰⁰⁹

Consequently, Australian correspondents were viewed by readers as authoritative experts on the German Question. In a correspondence chain devoted to the logistics of peace, *Argus* reader Iris De Luca specifically captured the common theme of war correspondent reports: the “intense hatred the Germans have aroused for themselves” in Europe.¹⁰¹⁰ Cabled reports formed a powerful, albeit imperfect, corrective to the disjuncture between Australian public incomprehension and the lived experience of occupied Europe. This facilitated totalising enmity to an extent not yet seen in Australia. De Luca argued that it was “perhaps natural [for Australians] to try to ignore these things, yet in doing

¹⁰⁰⁵ Blunden, “What Allies May Find Inside Reich: Occupied Area Provides Clues,” *Argus*, 29 January 1945, 2. Carruthers discusses the lens of “second hand account” and the importance of press-handouts, briefings and meetings. Carruthers, 11.

¹⁰⁰⁶ See for example: Blunden, “What Allies May Find Inside Reich: Occupied Area Provides Clues.”

¹⁰⁰⁷ Douglas Wilkie, “A Bad Dream Comes True in the Reich,” *Herald*, 17 April 1945, 4.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Anderson and Trembath, 114.

¹⁰⁰⁹ J. D. Corbett, “How They Report “Total War” Battles,” *Australian*, 22 July 1944, 4-5.

¹⁰¹⁰ Iris de Luca, “Letters to the Editor: The German Mentality,” *Argus*, 13 April 1945, 2.

so we shall never solve ‘the German problem’.”¹⁰¹¹ Foreign correspondent reports gave a distant Australian population, one still keen to seek comprehension and understanding of the enemy, a lens into the supposed inner workings of the German mind.¹⁰¹² They also provided a realist cure to what another *Argus* reader, W. Buchanan, labelled excessive philosophising by Australian armchair strategists, politicians, academics and ecclesiasts in the media over the issue of German guilt and treatment by bringing the issue “down to earth” with empirical evidence.¹⁰¹³ It was these supposedly objective, first-hand narratives that resonated with readers and influenced their attitudes in the final push into Nazi Germany.

The unpredictability of the German masses, emotionally and physically worn down by twelve years under National Socialism, provoked an almost academic endeavour by correspondents to understand the enemy. Geoffrey Hutton, for instance, had undertaken his own “Gallup Poll” into what German POWs thought of Hitler, their relationship with Nazism, and belief in victory.¹⁰¹⁴ Having only limited opportunity to assess German character in the British sector after the fall of Aachen in October 1944, Hutton recognised the continued difficulty in gauging the temperament of the German people from a small snapshot of peasants and townspeople. Access to diverging official reports, on which many correspondents continued to rely, continued to colour the ambiguous representation of German attitudes across the coming months:

The first reactions of the German peasants [in the American sector] were confusing. I have heard reports of ecstatic welcomes by whole villages, but in the [British] sector I’ve seen there was nothing but cold, silent hostility from most people.¹⁰¹⁵

Douglas Wilkie recognised from during the first stages of the advance into the Reich that the result of this problem was that there was “not a vestige of unanimity” in the popular, intellectual nor official discourse surrounding Germany. The “confused reports” originating from the German home front were confounding readers at home.¹⁰¹⁶ Like Hutton, Wilkie noted the “full range of sentiments [from] sullen resentment to welcoming smiles.” Recognising his potential role in shaping Australian post-war discourse, Wilkie’s cables contained self-reflection on the German question:

¹⁰¹¹ Ibid.

¹⁰¹² Ibid.

¹⁰¹³ W. Buchanan, “Germany’s War Mentality,” *Argus*, 9 September 1944, 7.

¹⁰¹⁴ Hutton, “German Prisoners’ Views on Hitler: 300 Questioned,” *Argus*, 19 September 1944, 2.

¹⁰¹⁵ “German Behaviour as Allies Advance: ‘Cold, Silent Hostility’.

¹⁰¹⁶ Wilkie, “Have the German People the Will to Fight? Goebbels’s Hot Air and Heroics as The Allies Close In,” *Advertiser*, 22 September 1944, 6.; “Days of Doom,” *Advertiser*, 22 September 1944, 6.

...how much – even outside the bounds of military necessity – of a distinction can be made between Nazis and the German people? That question everyone is asking today. It is an old question, but one never so urgently linked up with imminent events.¹⁰¹⁷

Reviewing the initial reports of his colleagues alongside his own findings, Wilkie had argued from that pure anti-Germanism, Vansittartism in its reductive popular sense, would be temporary:

For a variety of reasons, good or bad, one doubts whether the thesis that the Germans are intrinsically Huns who must remain suspect for generations will be valid for the British people for long after the war.¹⁰¹⁸

While many correspondents essentialised certain traits of specific castes of German society, others displayed a complex resistance to the totalising logic of enmity deriving from their often-paradoxical observations in occupied Germany. Reports emphasising German heterogeneity and positive encounters, however, were almost always tempered by qualifications and counter images regarding exploitation, guilt, responsibility and complicity. These were themes which featured in foreign correspondent cables with greater frequency from late 1944 onwards.¹⁰¹⁹ While connected to the correspondents' own emotional response to events, they also shared concerns that an overtly positive image of the German civilian and positive fraternisation with Anglo-American forces could undermine the role of occupation forces and post-war policy.¹⁰²⁰

Wilkie had failed to be taken in by what he saw as a façade of cooperation and docility. Siân Nicholas notes that this theme of docility and helpfulness had been repeated consistently in the news outlets such as the BBC, which inevitably filtered into Australian reports.¹⁰²¹ Whilst recognising the scale of destruction in Cologne,¹⁰²² Wilkie continued:

Under white flags a cringing population disowns the Nazi creed with what seems like a well-learned formula of friendship towards democracy. Some observers report that the undercurrent of hatred for the Allies is still there. Uniforms have been hidden.¹⁰²³

¹⁰¹⁷ Wilkie, "Have the German People the Will to Fight?"

¹⁰¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁹ Hutton, "German Behaviour as Allies Advance: 'Cold, Silent Hostility'."; Blunden, What Allies May Find Inside Reich: Occupied Area Provides Clues.

¹⁰²⁰ White, Problem of 'Bomb-Happy' Huns.

¹⁰²¹ Nicholas, 162-3.

¹⁰²² Wilkie, "'Master-Race' – Timid, Cowed," *Herald*, 10 March 1945, 2.

¹⁰²³ "Germany in Defeat," *Herald*, 10 March 1945, 4.

Blunden similarly witnessed the façade of “friendship and servility” covering up a lack of conscience in the Germans he encountered.¹⁰²⁴ Anne Matheson, an accredited correspondent for the *DT* and *Argus* and London based representatives for the *Australian Women’s Weekly*,¹⁰²⁵ was also one of the first female correspondents to report on conditions in occupied Cologne. Despite strict anti-fraternisation policies, Matheson’s interactions with the local German populace also revealed that many “want[ed] to be friendly to convince us that they are not Nazis”. Her allusions to an undefinable blend of “sentiment and brutality” in the Germans she liaised with reinforces the blend of suspicion and confusion that defined foreign correspondent reports.¹⁰²⁶

The ambiguous spectrum between *benefactors* and *victims* of Nazism was also noted. Wilkie provided the anecdote of an elderly German with whom he had billeted in troglodyte Cologne. Having given up his room to the occupation forces, the elderly *Hausfrau* had taken filthy straw bedding which had once bedded the host of Eastern-European slave workers in the city. These constant reminders of German transgressions tempered Wilkie’s own pity and empathy for the Germans he encountered, particularly victims of strategic bombing: “One shudders at the fate of Germany. Then one remembers the bales of filthy straw”.¹⁰²⁷ The fact that billeted houses also contained “loot” from conquered Europe also reminded Wilkie that many Germans were benefactors of Hitler’s aggressive expansionism.¹⁰²⁸ Matheson had written of an almost identical experience in her billeted house previously belonging to a wealthy Nazi official in Cologne.¹⁰²⁹

As their detachments moved further into occupied Germany, Australian correspondents continued to conceptualise heterogeneous typologies based on the Germans they encountered. Wilkie qualified this, carefully noting that he was not attempting to exonerate the German people:

I have two stories to tell. In neither am I attempting to exonerate any section of the German people...But the further one goes into Germany, the more one recognises the **gradations of evil**. There are Germans who will be our enemy as long as most other Germans are...There are others who [were it not] for the disgrace of Hitler might be our friends...¹⁰³⁰

¹⁰²⁴ Blunden, “What Allies May Find Inside Reich: Occupied Area Provides Clues.”

¹⁰²⁵ Jeannine Baker, “Marginal Creatures: Australian Women War Reporters During World War II,” *History Compass* 13, no. 2 (2015).

¹⁰²⁶ Matheson, “Allies Restoring Order Among Demoralised Civilians,” *AWW*, 14 April 1945, 9.

¹⁰²⁷ Wilkie, “‘Master-Race’ – Timid, Cowed.”

¹⁰²⁸ Ibid.; Blunden, “German people have fared well on loot of Europe,” *DT*, 29 January 1945, 6.

¹⁰²⁹ Matheson, “Allies Restoring Order Among Demoralised Civilians.”

¹⁰³⁰ Wilkie, “Two Tales That Show There Are Different Kinds of Germans,” *Herald*, 10 April 1945, 4. Emphasis mine.

Class was one useful, albeit imperfect, framework for classifying these “gradations”. In Aachen, Blunden had compared the farmers and local workers (the active resistance of coalminers against storm troopers attempting to sabotage a mine being “true of any working class people”) and the ambiguous class of pre-Nazi Germans (lawyers, ecclesiasts, doctors aiding occupation forces) with the other “class” of German – the “sinister” mine managers and executives attempting to beguile Allied forces into protecting their assets, and low-ranking Nazis who reflected the “old characteristics of arrogance and fanaticism.”¹⁰³¹ Blunden and Wilkie cynically argued that the German middle-class had been shown undue, politically-motivated, leniency relative to their guilt. Both noted with disgust that many saw the Allies as saviours and protectors of their interests and material possessions. These Germans distanced themselves from Nazism not because of “guilt” or professed “victimhood” but merely because the regime had failed them in a good-war-lost and a collective fear of Soviet vengeance.¹⁰³²

Some commentators had their expectations of hatred and resentment entirely subverted. *SMH* correspondent Harold Austin’s expected encounter with the “Hun” was shattered following direct liaison with civilians in Cologne and their respectful treatment of fallen Allied airmen.¹⁰³³ Austin had visited a British Empire war cemetery which contained 416 airmen who had been awarded full military burials. The regret felt by the local caretakers that some graves had been marked as “enemy airmen” (a semantic change from “airmen” ordered by local Nazi officials) and the lack of damage beyond unavoidable effects of air raids led Austin to praise the actions of the local population. Austin expressed none of the suspicion levelled at the Cologne citizenry by Wilkie, Blunden and Matheson. He seemed to capture the overall scarcity of “popular hatred” in the German population noted by scholars such as Richard Overy. Notwithstanding regional variations, “spontaneous” acts of reciprocal violence against downed Allied airmen (often instigated by Party affiliates) and attempts of the Nazi regime to insemminate the term *vergeltung* (a just “vengeance”) into the popular wartime vocabulary, Austin’s findings would corroborate Overy’s conclusions.¹⁰³⁴

Wilkie’s experience of lodging with a music professor in Loccum, Herr Hellsbrecht, was also at odds with the lack of conscience and guilt he had previously witnessed in the German bourgeoisie of Diepholz, Bremen and Celle.¹⁰³⁵ Wilkie’s host family in Celle, that of prominent Lawyer “Dokter”

¹⁰³¹ Blunden, “German people have fared well on loot of Europe.”

¹⁰³² Ibid.; “War Comes to Town of Pied Piper,” *News*, 21 April 1945, 2.; “The German: He Is The Same As Ever”, *DT*, 28 April 1945, 10-11.; Wilkie, “Exasperation At German Civilian Attitude: ‘Feel They Are being Liberated From the Russians’,” *Advertiser*, 19 April 1945, 4.

¹⁰³³ Harold Austin, “German Tended Australian Graves in Cologne,” *SMH*, 22 March 1945, 3.

¹⁰³⁴ Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945*, 310.

¹⁰³⁵ Wilkie, Interview by Mel Pratt, time section 35.00-40.00.

Schmidt, reflected Wilkie's common story of "petty" self-interest and self-proclaimed victimhood by "smirking, simpering accomplices in plain clothes".¹⁰³⁶ The Hellbrechts, in comparison, "were obviously simple kindly folk and it was easy to believe that they were the sort of Germans of whom Hitler would not approve."¹⁰³⁷ The Hellbrechts' apparent openness revealed a complex interplay between war guilt, trauma and victimhood in Wilkie's representation that humanised the German. The loss of their young daughter to British raids only a fortnight prior (trauma); Frau Hellbrecht's admonition about her own sister being placed in a concentration camp after admitting her Jewish ancestry (evidence of victimhood); and her veiled recognition that her own brother-in-law had engaged in a wrongful "compromise with evil" by attaining membership in the Nazi Party in a vain attempt to save his wife, all acted to temper and somewhat humanise Wilkie's assessment of the Hellsbrechts.¹⁰³⁸

Although he remained wary of the Hellbrechts' intentions and effusiveness, such experiences fed Wilkie's optimism that the insight of the foreign correspondent could reinforce the potential and capacity of the German masses to engage in "self-liberation" from Nazism and participate fruitfully in the process of post-war democratisation. It was from encounters such as that with the Hellbrechts that Wilkie advocated a "middle" ground policy that balanced the competing imperatives of post-war reconstruction: "It is not in their [the democracies'] character to keep a beaten enemy pressed down in humiliation, even though it is now their will to avoid a dangerous leniency. They must find a middle way..."¹⁰³⁹ Wilkie's middle-ground approach demonstrated the tensions and competing imperatives brought home to Australian audiences.

The claims by some scholars about the routine failure of correspondents to expose the "complexities" of the Allied advance and the suffering of Germany's civilian population in their reports to the home front require some clarification given such encounters.¹⁰⁴⁰ Analysis of the reports of Wilkie, Matheson and Blunden evidence limited and qualified counter-narratives to totalising enmity emanating Australians in occupied Europe, aspects of the German character and mien which could not easily be reconciled with the callousness, brutality and duplicity focused on by other correspondents and espoused in editorial opinion. While of course bound by censorship sensitive to references of Allied transgressions (particularly the diverging inter-Allied treatment of enemies on the Western and Eastern fronts), discussion of German suffering and the actions of "good" Germans certainly emerged in reports. They were always qualified in their presentation – not only a matter of the correspondents'

¹⁰³⁶ Wilkie, "Exasperation At German Civilian Attitude."

¹⁰³⁷ "A Bad Dream Comes True in the Reich."

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁹ "Germany in Defeat."; Osmar White, *Conqueror's Road* (Sydney: Harper Perennial, 1996), IX.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Anderson and Trembath, 159.

own experience of anger and frustration at what they witnessed, but also, if Wilkie's qualification of not "exonerating" the German people is accounted for, recognition of growing anger at the German people on the Australian home front.

Totalising enmity narratives were certainly feeding this anger. The complexity of foreign correspondent analyses should not be seen as overpowering the overarching narrative of guilt, collective responsibility and conformity to type consistently appearing within other cables. A sizeable portion of Australian correspondents, including Eric Baume, F.C. Folkhard (a correspondent for the HWT and News Limited) and Ronald (Ron) Monson (a widely regarded colleague of Blunden's at the *DT*), merely chose to turn a blind eye to such nuances.¹⁰⁴¹ The product of anti-Germanism forged in the First World War, Monson's studies of the "mien of the few Huns" he had encountered reflected cables that were far more loaded and far less empathetic in its portrayal of the German civilian in defeat.¹⁰⁴² They expressed little interest in the potential of their reports to contextualise, rationalise or temper Australian attitudes about post-war Germany.

Beyond the foreign correspondents' own actions, reports were also distorted by Australian editors prone to "totalising" views through an implicit downplaying of positive images, complex motivations and heterogeneous behaviours therein.¹⁰⁴³ Complexity could often be lost in the editorial presentation of reports, headlines and accompanying images and captions.¹⁰⁴⁴ Austin's analysis, for instance, seemed incongruous with the tone and focus of the *SMH*'s contemporary editorial responses that had stressed retribution and a negative image of German victims as worthy targets of totalising violence and punitive justice.¹⁰⁴⁵ *AWW* editorial discussions on the "solution of the German civilian problem" between March and May 1945 displayed little of the nuances of Matheson's cables. The *AWW* attributed any positive imagery to the "organization of sympathy" and questioned whether "millions of German...sadistic brutes" could be re-educated, even via the harsh "punishment, control and discipline" it advocated.¹⁰⁴⁶ Blunden's widely syndicated article focusing on the complexities of the German middle class noted earlier had been simplistically entitled by the *DT*: "The German: He Is The

¹⁰⁴¹ F. C. Folkard, "What Shall We Do With the Germans?"

¹⁰⁴² Ronald Monson, "Farmer Fritz's Good Times Ended Suddenly," *DT*, 29 January 1945, 6. Bridget Griffen-Foley, Monson, Ronald Austin (Ron) (1905-1973), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/monson-ronald-austin-ron-11149> (accessed, 05/06/2019).

¹⁰⁴³ This was reflected in British newspapers such as the *Daily Express*. Kertesz, 148.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Blunden, "What Allies May Find Inside Reich: Occupied Area Provides Clues."

¹⁰⁴⁵ "Nemesis in Germany," *SMH*, 19 February 1945, 2.; "How Long?," *SMH*, 3 March 1945, 2.; "Berlin Paid In Full," *SMH*, 23 April 1945, 6.

¹⁰⁴⁶ "Problem of Germany," *AWW*, 17 March 1945, 10.; "Crimes of Germany," *AWW*, 5 May 1945, 18. The presentation of Matheson's cables for the *Argus* similarly reduced the complexities of the German people. Matheson, "German People and Unrepentant: No Sense of War Guilt, *Argus*," 11 April 1945, 16.

Same As Ever".¹⁰⁴⁷ Accompanying illustrations by the *DT* staff cartoonist [Image 39] depicted representative sections of German society (not only Party members but also civilians and even a child) "heiling" the *Führer*. Subtracting Hitler from the equation did little to quell the fanaticism of the now headless collective, a figurative allusion to the absence of self-thought and fanaticism of the homogenous German masses which was not contextually dependent on Hitler or the Nazi movement.¹⁰⁴⁸




Image 39.

The treatment of Wilkie's cables for the *Sydney Sun* in early April is perhaps the most telling evidence of such editorial influence. For instance, the trademark nuances of Wilkie's analysis were completely lost in the sensationally entitled "Stupid Germans Won't Admit Guilt". Increasingly prone to anti-German sentiment, the *Sun's* editorial team chose to highlight the hollowness of German "*schaden*" (a mistaken mistranslation of the term *Scham* by Wilkie for "shame") in another unnamed village. Here, the women had openly displayed their ignorance and scepticism regarding German war methods and atrocities:

...more and more, one gains the impression that the vast mass of these politically ignorant Germans have only a sub-conscious feeling of guilt...**One wishes we could have already begun the task of re-educating these silly, thick-headed Germans with something as well as bombs and bullets.**¹⁰⁴⁹

The *Sun's* ardent anti-Germanism under editor H.R. "Frank" Ashton had intensified from its earliest manifestations discussed in Chapter Three to an outright promotion of collective guilt and habitual criminality in late 1944 and 1945 editorials. Based on articles such as Wilkie's widely published cable from Diepholz (the same cable as the above discussion in the *Herald* although interestingly edited

¹⁰⁴⁷ Blunden, "The German: He Is The Same As Ever".

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Wilkie, "Stupid Germans Won't Accept War Guilt," *Sun*, 7 April 1945, 2. A contemporary editorial touched on similar themes. "German Everyman and His War Guilt," *Sun*, 28 March 1945, 4.

without reference to the Hellbrechts) and Folkard's reports from the Mulheim area,¹⁰⁵⁰ Ashton portrayed

the Germans as a race beyond the pale of human consideration; the old 'cruel and intractable tribe' of Caesar's commentaries, killing in cold blood for the sheer pleasure of killing, torturing for the perverted joy of seeing human suffering...In this loathsome festival of mass murder the whole nation is involved, from the paranoiac Hitler...to the German civilians who bought their ghastly spoils of clothes and boots in the bargain sales of the German cities.¹⁰⁵¹

The *Sun* reflected a growing collective of Australian newspapers summarising a common mien of the German – susceptible to regimentation, benighted in their acceptance of Germany's horrific record, and as hysterical in their fear of retributive Bolshevism and ex-slave labour and demands for protection as they were disillusioned and hypocritical in their demands for assurances of the continuity of their post-war industry and wealth.

Despite the shifting focus of the war to the Pacific Theatre after the German surrender, foreign correspondents continued to assess the German people in the first months of the Allied occupation. The continued ambiguity of the narrative of enmity is evident in the analysis of two *DT* accredited journalists. Their cables were synthesised with another by former British Aircraft Production Minister Lord Brabazon to present "Three Ways of Looking at a German".¹⁰⁵² The image of the German at a Berlin orchestra performance by Leo Borchard provided by Ron McKie made scant references to German degeneracy besides the unsympathetic allusion to small infringement by a German woman he witnessed stealing a carrot from a garden. The relative normalisation of relations in McKie's cable juxtaposed greatly to the warning tone of Packer loyalist David "Dapper Dave" McNicoll's report on his experiences as *DT* foreign correspondent from 1944.¹⁰⁵³ McNicoll was particularly concerned by questions emerging in Australian discourse relating to the Allied non-fraternisation policy.¹⁰⁵⁴ McNicoll noted a broadcast by Vansittart on the dangers of removing the fraternisation ban. The popular image of the post-war German female in Australian media, perpetrated by its foreign correspondents, reflected the danger for McNicoll from a gendered perspective:

¹⁰⁵⁰ "Inside Germany: Nazism has taught Germans to like pushing around," *Sunday Sun*, 15 April 1945, 3.

¹⁰⁵¹ "The Sodom of Today," *Sun*, 31 August 1944, 4.; Dust and Ashes for Germany, *Sun*, 2 October 1944, 4.

¹⁰⁵² "Three Ways of Looking at a German," *DT*, 29 July 1945, 6.

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid.; John Farquharson, McNicoll, David Ramsay (1914-2000), Obituaries Australia, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, <http://oa.anu.edu.au/obituary/mcnicoll-david-ramsay-712> (accessed 07/06/2019).

¹⁰⁵⁴ See: "Problem of Germany," *AWW*, 17 March 1945, 10.

Are German women dangerous? Are they human? Have they been infected by the virus of Nazi ideologies? Are they Germany's most powerful 'underground'?...The German Fraulein is now being presented to Allied peoples as a pleasant, 'good' person. There is no reason to believe that German women were any less imbued with Nazi ideas than were men.¹⁰⁵⁵

The "feminisation" of the enemy and gendered perceptions emerging from encounters in occupied Germany that painted Germany in a less threatening light have been noted by scholars.¹⁰⁵⁶ McNicoll argued that systematic focus on demobilisation of the typical enemy – the male combatant – and the re-education of German youth had been accompanied by a dangerous leniency and underestimation of Germany's adult female population as a potential fifth column. Just like the other classes of Germans, McNicoll argued along Vansittartist lines that the female population not only contained a minority of "good" candidates but a large portion of former Nazis and "fanatics". These were symbolised by the female Belsen guards – those "Amazonian sadists" – and the female masses who displayed "sullen faced, pitiless pathological interest [when] shown the corpses of people killed in Buchenwald...".¹⁰⁵⁷ Discussion around the relaxation of non-fraternisation orders reflected the realisation of fears raised by "thinking people" – the select group personified by the Vansittartists to which McNicoll identified – who understood the dangers of even a defeated Germany and remained cautiously vigilant for re-emerging "symptoms" of Germany's collective degeneracy.¹⁰⁵⁸

Reflections on Vansittartism: *Pix* and the Post-War German Question

An exemplary demonstration of the coarsening of the Australian media's presentation of the German people in the final years of the conflict can be seen in the pictorial *Pix*. In the first years of the conflict, *Pix* exhibited some restraint in engaging in an outright hate campaign against the German people that might have lent to its sensationalistic, tabloid genre. Early picture stories on Nazi Germany tended to focus on the regime and its ideology, racialism and threat to Western norms. *Pix* occasionally published attacks on the German people by proxy through picture stories such as Campbell's sand sculptures.¹⁰⁵⁹ However, essentialising, totalising narratives began to be published with increased frequency from 1942 onwards. Titles such as "Huns Slaughter Innocent Civilians: *Kultur*" and textual references to the "Hun's unspeakable brutality and sadism" blurred the line between the actions of the German military and the German people by linking historically totalising terminology and

¹⁰⁵⁵ "Three Ways of Looking at a German."

¹⁰⁵⁶ Hoenicke Moore, 338.

¹⁰⁵⁷ "Three Ways of Looking at a German."; Helen Seager, "Grim Truth of Nazi Horrors," *Argus*, 24 May 1945, 2.

¹⁰⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵⁹ See pp. 81, 83.

stereotypes to shocking images of mass graves and executed civilians.¹⁰⁶⁰ *Pix* also began to explicitly associate the German people with the crimes, barbarity, sadism and cruelty of the regime. Alongside one step-by-step atrocity montage in 1942 of the hanging of Russian civilians near Smolensk, *Pix* added:

If only a tenth of these reports were true, they would form the grimmest indictment brought against any nation in history...The Germans themselves have given all the necessary confirmation. And this confirmation of the maniacal arrogance and sadism which exists in the German people is not a new thing, brought by Nazism. It is as old as Prussian militarism.¹⁰⁶¹

From 1944 onwards, *Pix* directly posed the post-war questions associated with Vansittartism through the distinctive binary lens of the German question: "Is Fascism a symptom or a disease? This is a problem troubling thousands of thoughtful people throughout the world...Are we fighting Germans or Nazis?"¹⁰⁶² *Pix* had supported an increasingly limited role for "good" Germans in the reconstruction process well up until the first half of 1944. Across various articles, it had defended "Christian" Germans, Social Democrats, Communists, Working Class, German Nationalists, and the Jewish community. In a departure from Vansittartism, *Pix* represented the unofficial Free Germany Movement as a favourable reservoir of liberal thought and anti-Nazism sharing a "common hatred for Nazism" and militarism. The double page spread was devoted to various images of "good" Germans, including prominent anti-Vansittartist Heinrich Fraenkel (author of *Vansittart's Gift to Goebbels*),¹⁰⁶³ and prominent female anti-Nazis Emmy Damerius and Elsbeth Bruch (a long-time opponent of Prussian militarism).¹⁰⁶⁴ Another picture story in May 1944 covering Soviet re-education programs reinforced that not all anti-Nazi resistance had been crushed during the seizure of power: "not every German soldier is a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi." One image, "Amendable", differentiated between "good" Germans – those open to re-education to be enlisted in post-war reconstruction – and the troublesome German who would seek to re-establish militarism in some post-Nazi form.¹⁰⁶⁵ This seemed to actually move against the grain of popular Vansittartism in Australia that sought to undermine and exclude "good" Germans from leading roles in re-education.

¹⁰⁶⁰ "Huns Slaughter Innocent Civilians: *Kultur*," *Pix* 2 January 1943, 30.; "Murderers – Nazi Guilt," *Pix*, 21 October 1944, 14-15.

¹⁰⁶¹ "Millions Await Revenge: Under Hitler's Heel – What It Means," *Pix*, 30 May 1942, 26-29.

¹⁰⁶² "Programme For Peace?: Vansittart Indicts German Militarists," *Pix*, 8 January 1944, 20.

¹⁰⁶³ Fraenkel.

¹⁰⁶⁴ "Refugees Band Against Nazis: Free Germany Movement in Britain," *Pix*, 29 January 1944, 20-21.

¹⁰⁶⁵ "Russia Re-Educates P.O.W.: German Prisoners Renounce Nazism," *Pix*, 20 May 1944, 18-19.

By late 1944, however, *Pix*'s tone had shifted. One highly reductionist article from November 1944 attempted to historicise the tentative discussions between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin regarding the post-war treatment of Germany by framing the "intractable German" as "Europe's bad boy for more than 2000 years". It suggested that the Allies were the most recent manifestation of a succession of external leaders from the time of Augustus Caesar attempting to "compel" German cooperation. Just as Vansittartists relished citing Tacitus' *Germania*, *Pix* quoted Edward Gibbon's seminal treatise *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* on the characteristics of the Germanic tribes – the "constant spirit....thirst for rapine, and disregard" for diplomatic niceties.¹⁰⁶⁶

By March 1945, any remaining confusion in *Pix*'s narrative appeared to have dissipated in favour of a Vansittartist view. Picture stories consistently stressed the relationship between historical criminality, collective guilt and "German national character" to promote a punitive, unconditional, and heavily regulated peace settlement:

Can any punishment be too severe for the people who plunged the world into history's most catastrophic war? Practically the whole German people supported and condoned Hitler and the Nazi Party in their efforts to conquer the globe....¹⁰⁶⁷

The magazine's souvenir edition booklet celebrating V.E. Day opened with the scathing attack on the "The Hun". It displayed ethnologically and racially rooted analyses, subscription to the historical continuity thesis, the belief in collective German guilt and punishment and fear that "emotion" would undermine the proper punishment of the German people:

The Hun – the **unspeakable** Hun – has savaged the world on two occasions within a quarter of a century. His plans, his hopes and his inherent character have been absolutely bestial. All the scheming of this brilliantly clever race has been destructive. The hands of the Germans, no less than those of their Hitler, are stained with the blood of millions of innocent men, women and children.¹⁰⁶⁸

Pix saw the Germans as deserving of any hardships they faced resulting from Allied post-war policies. The magazine expressed the poetic justice of the suffering of the *Herrenvolk*: "For the common people, disease, poverty and chaos are the only reward for their stupidity in following...Hitler into an

¹⁰⁶⁶ "Allies Face 2000 Year Old Problem," *Pix*, 4 November 1944, 8.; Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London: Book Club Associates, 1972).

¹⁰⁶⁷ "Will It Be Peace – Or Merely Pause?," *Pix*, 12 May 1945, 2.; "Lesson of Yesterday: Will Germany Try to Fight Again?," *Pix*, 17 March 1945, 8-9.

¹⁰⁶⁸ "Will It Be Peace – Or Merely Pause?"

unsuccessful war.”¹⁰⁶⁹ Earlier representation of German women as victims of Nazi suppression was long-forgotten as readers were reminded that pictured destitute women “share[d] in their nation’s guilt” and “shame and humiliation”.¹⁰⁷⁰ Text accompanying a set of images published in December 1945 showing a German youth triumphantly raising a mouldy piece of bread scavenged from refuse [Image 40 and Image 41] reflected *Pix*’s consistent presentation of similar picture-stories throughout 1945. It boldly proclaimed the prize a “fitting reward for a people who gave birth to Nazism...”¹⁰⁷¹



Image 40 and Image 41.

¹⁰⁶⁹ “‘Berlin Today’: Allies Wage War on the Black Market and Disease,” *Pix*, 27 October 1945, 12-15.

¹⁰⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷¹ “Starving Europe: Millions Will Die in Coming Winter,” *Pix*, 1 December 1945, 3-5. For example, see the image “Garbage” in “Grim Prospect for Hitler’s Former Slaves,” *Pix*, 9 February 1946, 4-5.

Pix's concerns about German youth exemplified widespread anxieties in Australian public discourse about the re-education, de-Nazification and instilling of “democratic feeling” and free-thinking in post-Nazi Germany. The totalitarian indoctrination of children by a warped *Weltanschauung*, based on racial superiority, glorification of war and Social Darwinism, had consistently been utilised in *Pix's* enmity narratives as a means of highlighting the relationship between German society and the National Socialist regime.¹⁰⁷² By early 1944, articles bearing sensational titles such as “Remoulding Little Fascist Pagans” reinforced these themes with a parallel coarsening of wartime representation and language. The caption “Human?” accompanying an image of an emotionless, automaton German youth [Image 43] went so far as to question the humanity of the indoctrinated child as the future citizen of a corrupted, Nazified Germany.¹⁰⁷³ “From Cradle” [Image 42], an image accompanying *Pix's* picture story on Vansittartism, symbolised Vansittart’s central concern with the re-education of German youth as a test for the broader application to German society.¹⁰⁷⁴



Left: Image 42.; Right: Image 43.

¹⁰⁷² “Nazi Hate School: He’s Making Future Fuehrers!,” *Pix*, 30 March 1940, 4-6.; “Making Young Barbarians, Product of Hitler’s War Machine,” *PIX Magazine*, 12 October 1940, 20-21. See also: “Mind Moulding Machine: Education of Nazi Youth for Death,” *Pix*, 10 July 1943, 10-11.

¹⁰⁷³ “Post-War Youth: Remoulding Little Fascist Pagans,” *Pix*, 4 March 1944, 12-13.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Post-war picture stories reinforced Allied responsibility in “bringing Germany up”, through prevention of starvation and death by cold, housing displaced persons, and keeping check on the spread of disease. *Pix*’s presentation of the German war orphan “Guenther” [Image 44] – a malnourished, “potential lawbreaker”, loitterer and “menace to the tottering community” who was captured by photographers attempting to sell his father’s iron cross for 10 cigarettes – personified the German nation in defeat. Günther was emblematic of “Europe’s problem children who, in the tomorrow of international affairs, may develop into problem citizens once more threatening world’s security.”¹⁰⁷⁵ This paternalism reflected broader concerns in Australia of a re-emergent, re-militarised post-Nazi Germany if re-education failed. Such concerns help to explain the *tough, but measured* approach to post-war Germany promoted by *Pix*.

Tropes such as the “problem child” also served a more sinister purpose linked to “moral exclusion” and the removal of Germans from the scope of justice. They negated the cognitive dissonance caused by images of suffering and innocent German “victims”. Several examples showing malnourished and destitute children explained that the suffering caused by Allied policies to eradicate militarism and Nazism was permissible and necessary because, with “a victorious German to educate them, [German *kinder*] would be the guilty, belligerent Nazi tyrants of tomorrow.”¹⁰⁷⁶ Despite Australia’s qualified acceptance and desire to see Germany returned to the comity of nations through mass re-education and de-Nazification, the magazine’s narrative in the fraught months bookending Nazi Germany’s surrender exemplified popular notions of national guilt and punishment and propositions that the German people deserved any misfortune received for starting the war and supporting Hitlerism. Totalising narratives of enmity continued to influence discourse after Germany’s unconditional surrender.

¹⁰⁷⁵ “German Problem Child is Allies’ New Worry,” *Pix*, 25 May 1946, 5.

¹⁰⁷⁶ “‘Berlin Today’: Allies Wage War on the Black Market and Disease.”; “Last” and “Acts” in “A Nazi Spy Faces the Firing Squad,” *Pix*, 7 July 1945, 12-13.

PIX

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German Problem Child Is Allies' New Worry



Mr. John Hynd

PICTURED above is a German war orphan named Guenther. When the camera caught him he was trying to sell his father's Iron Cross for 10 cigarettes. His face is clay-colored for want of nourishment. He goes to school only rarely, is a potential lawbreaker, a menace to the ordering community which is responsible for the emergence of thousands of street arabs like him. He is, in fact, one of Europe's problem children who, in the tomorrow of international

affairs, may develop into problem citizens once more threatening the world's security. Control Commission handling civil administration of the British zone in Germany is scratching its collective head over what to do with youngsters like Guenther. Task is so important that a Minister of Cabinet rank, Mr. John Hynd, has been placed in charge. Assisting him as Permanent Secretary is Sir Arthur Street, a man of wide administrative skill, experience.



Sir Arthur Street

Image 44.

Atrocity Camp Revelations and Totalising Enmity

Shocking revelations of German atrocities in the early months of 1945 provoked a dramatic coarsening of Australian attitudes towards the German people. The previously widespread, though often implicit, use of the Nazi concentration camps by the Australian media to imply shared suffering and victimhood by both German and non-German prisoners was now scarcely employed outside the Leftist and religious periodicals. Narratives regarding the camps had been inverted in the Australian public consciousness to now symbolise a collective German degradation and evidence of the need for mass re-education. Mirroring discussions of the bombing campaigns, continued emphasis was placed on rising public anger in the Allied nations regarding the atrocity camps as an attempt to set the tone of the findings and shape public attitudes in Australia.¹⁰⁷⁷

The discussion of German atrocities was nothing new in Australian war discourse. Atrocity reporting was a key means of attacking the enemy and remained a central feature of Australian enmity narratives that was exemplified by the Japanese entry into the war. However, its position in enmity narratives was shadowed by the complicated legacy of First World War atrocity propaganda which had triggered widespread public scepticism and reluctance on the part of Anglo-American administrations to publish atrocity stories and utilise the Holocaust for propagandistic purposes.¹⁰⁷⁸ The fragmented reporting on Nazi atrocities during the inter-war years had slowly given way to an accretion of reports in the daily press proliferated in the first years of the conflict. While atrocity stories were a mainstay of these early wartime narratives between 1939 and 1941,¹⁰⁷⁹ the specific blend of racialism, hyper-nationalism and systematic nature of the industrial-scale Nazi program of extermination was only tentatively understood in the Australian press. Detailed evidence had only begun to haphazardly emerge in Australia from 1942 onwards as systematic reports filtered through Allied channels and editorial space was devoted to the theme. Although atrocity discourse was far less resonant with Australians on the home front in its initial framing on the basis of “piecemeal” cables, it did facilitate an increasing presence within enmity narratives as commentators began to be mobilise atrocity as a symbol of “German”, rather than “Nazi”, inhumanity.¹⁰⁸⁰ Despite often severe delays in the Australian media’s reporting of sporadic second-hand information, the Australian public was able to piece together a suitably broad picture of the “Jewish situation” and other examples of atrocity in Europe by 1942-43.¹⁰⁸¹

¹⁰⁷⁷ “Grim Public Told of More Atrocities: British Soldiers ‘Sick With Horror’,” *Advertiser*, 23 April 1945, 1. “Public Anger Rises Over Atrocities: ‘Unbelievably Terrible’, Says Parliamentarians,” *Advertiser*, 24 April 1945, 1.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Bartrop; Balfour.; Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 177-78.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Bartrop, 199-201.

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 208-9.; “Not Nazis, But Germans.”; Give Us the Whole Film, *Argus*, 2 March 1943, 2.

¹⁰⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 204-7.; “The Nature of Our Enemy.”; Give Us the Whole Film.

Paul Bartrop's excellent research into Australian responses to the Holocaust discusses a period of "revelations" beginning in January 1944. This was a process by which the largely sporadic, piecemeal nature of reporting was slowly replaced by more methodical accounts, particularly driven by the shocking revelations of the Red Army in its rapid advance westward.¹⁰⁸² However, mirroring other Western Allied nations, public anger regarding the camps only emerged in Australia with the liberation of a series of processing facilities, ghettos and transit and concentration camps during the Allied pincer advance in April 1945 – Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Dachau, Theresienstadt and Ravensbrück. Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald in particular shaped Australian narratives of enmity. Bartrop's analysis touches on the importance of the camp revelations exacerbating anti-German sentiment in Australian public attitudes and its role in formulating attitudes towards the post-war treatment. He notes that the responses of the major newspapers (Bartrop's analysis had sampled the *SMH*, *Argus*, *Age* and *Advertiser*) largely fell into two camps – "revelation or retribution".¹⁰⁸³

Atrocity revelations and responses to the Holocaust, however, need to be positioned within a broader narrative regarding Germany. Belated evidence of the camps exacerbated extant enmity already proliferated through the narratives of these representative papers.¹⁰⁸⁴ The *SMH*'s editorial response to the Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald camps actively endeavoured to connect the moral debasement of the regime to a "national degeneracy" of modern Germany and undermined the Nazi-German distinction. Bartrop notes a key example from the 21 April 1945.¹⁰⁸⁵ Yet a far more significant example was published two days later. "Hitler in Extremis" argued that the "immolation" of National Socialism was equally telling of the "guilt of the whole German nation" with "retribution" continually inflicted on them.¹⁰⁸⁶ This message was reinforced by an accompanying cartoon, "The Everlasting Hun" [Image 45], which highlighted the façade of servility, docility and guilt and collective distancing from Nazism frequently underlined by Australian correspondents. The cartoonist depicted "the German public" – caricatured in the simplistic form of the stocky, balding German male – being herded in front of a pit of bodies surrounded by barbed wire of the camps. One leader, importantly not a Nazi official or military officer but an ordinary German, warns his comrades of the stern Allied gaze of an American military officer and asks them to feign horror at the sight of the victims' corpses.¹⁰⁸⁷ A further editorial from June 1945 evidenced the *SMH*'s conversion and support for now uncontroversial "Vansittartist"

¹⁰⁸² Ibid., 208-9.

¹⁰⁸³ Ibid., 213.

¹⁰⁸⁴ The *SMH* had already pushed for the use of documents and images to instil a lacking sense of collective guilt in the German people weeks before the main revelations appeared. "Germans Feel No Guilt," *SMH*, 28 March 1943, 3.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Bartrop, 211.

¹⁰⁸⁶ "Hitler in Extremis," *SMH*, 23 April 1945, 2.

¹⁰⁸⁷ "The Everlasting Hun," *SMH*, 23 April 1945, 2.

ideas: the failures of Versailles, the multi-generational process of re-education, the importance of control and supervision, the confiscation of German wealth and resources to be put at the disposal of Allied occupation forces, and the temporary suppression of certain “rights”.¹⁰⁸⁸ The latter point in particular was a far cry from the *SMH*’s support for Menzies’ proclamation in defence of German rights and privileges in late 1939.¹⁰⁸⁹ The *SMH*’s representation of Germany by mid-1945 was now framed by the “deep-rooted” militarism entrenched in the German character, the support of the German people for the regime, suspicion of the motives of the masses and the lack of German self-awareness of the complicity, guilt and responsibility “ordinary citizens” shared in Nazi crimes and aggression.¹⁰⁹⁰



Image 45.

¹⁰⁸⁸ "Germany's Penalty," *SMH*, 7 June 1945, 2.

¹⁰⁸⁹ See p. 56.

¹⁰⁹⁰ "Germany's Penalty."

Revelations of 'Nazi brutality and almost incredible, soullessness in "liquidating" "unwanted" persons shocked the civilised world, and Belsen, Auschwitz, and Buchenwald became by-words. A long, laborious, and stern curriculum in the re-education of war-minded Germany was indicated.



—"WITH A LOOK THAT HELL MIGHT BE ASHAMED OF!"

Image 46.

The *Argus* heavily employed dehumanising stereotypes indiscriminately aimed at the German nation – references to Satan, beasts, monsters, devils and sadists.¹⁰⁹¹ Armstrong's reference to demonic, uncivilised "Hunnishness" of the Buchenwald revelations [Image 46] was a favoured term of the *Argus*.¹⁰⁹² This correlated with other examples such as the *Adelaide News*, *Brisbane Telegraph*, the *Canberra Times*,¹⁰⁹³ *Hobart Mercury* and *Launceston Examiner*. The monopoly of the latter two in the Tasmanian media landscape indicated a widespread emphasis on "retribution", penalty and punishment that had naturally developed from their post-Phoney war enmity narratives.¹⁰⁹⁴

¹⁰⁹¹ Quoted in Bartrop, 212-13.

¹⁰⁹² Armstrong, "—With a Look That Hell Might Be Ashamed Of!", *Argus*, 21 April 1945, 3. Reprinted in Harold Armstrong, *Stag at Bay: A 7th Volume of War Cartoons by Armstrong of the Argus, November 1944 to September 1945*, vol. 7 (Melbourne: The Argus and Australasian Limited, 1945), 25. The cartoon had accompanied a special report by Ron Monson for the *Argus* in which he had discussed, in vivid detail, the "ultimate in frightfulness" he had witnessed personally in the camps. Monson had noted: "Come to Belsen and you will believe anything". Monson, "Ghastliness of Nazi Prison Camp: How Able-Bodied SS Brutes Wreaked the Fuhrer's Will," *Argus*, 21 April 1945, 3.

¹⁰⁹³ "The Kultur of Belsen: Indictment of the German People," *Canberra Times*, 14 May 1945, 2.

¹⁰⁹⁴ "Not Nazis, But Germans.," *Control of Germany*, *Mercury*, 29 May 1945, 3.; "War of the Future," *Mercury*, 13 November 1944, 3.; "What Terms For Germany?," *Mercury*, 15 September 1944, 3.; "The Problem of Germany," *Mercury*, 25 September 1944, 3. "Treatment of Germany," *Mercury*, 27 April 1945, 3.; Indictment of German People: Belsen Horrors, *Mercury*, 21 May 1945, 3.

Alongside Bartop's existing analysis which provides an excellent summary of the development of the Australian media's response to the Holocaust between 1939 and 1945, the unanimity of the mainstream Press opinion in April and May 1945 requires little further elucidation.

The role of foreign correspondents, not greatly covered by Bartrop, reinforces these findings. As during the liberation of Western Europe and the occupation of the Rhineland, the presentation of atrocity by foreign correspondents set the tone of debate in Australia. While most struggled to hide their emotions and control sporadic outbursts of hatred, a growing number sought to exacerbate totalising enmity narratives on the basis of collective guilt. An exemplary case of the mobilisation of enmity through the Australian cabled coverage of the first visual evidence of the liberated atrocity camps again came, unsurprisingly, from *Truth* correspondent Eric Baume.¹⁰⁹⁵ The expatriate journalist attempted to mobilise atrocity revelations to support a tough post-war policy through the same methods and rhetoric he employed to garner support for reprisal bombing.¹⁰⁹⁶ In June 1942, Baume aptly summarised that publication of enemy atrocity images "isn't hate, its reporting – objective and factual reporting for the camera does not lie."¹⁰⁹⁷ *Truth*, and its afternoon equivalent the *Daily Mirror*, utilised atrocity revelations to further promote its Vansittartist agenda, symbolised by staff cartoonist "Tac's" colourful ode to Vansittartism and the final pages of Germany's "Black Record" [Image 47].¹⁰⁹⁸ *Truth* was at pains to stress through emotive language and imagery that the atrocities were nothing more than the hyper-inflated modern expression of German *Kultur*, perpetrated by the "THE GERMANS [who were the same] sadistic beasts in the last war."¹⁰⁹⁹ [Image 48].



Left: Image 47.; Right: Image 48.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Baume, "BOB," *Truth*, 22 April 1945, 15.

¹⁰⁹⁶ "Nazi Atrocities Should Be Realised: Won't believe War Photos," *Truth*, 21 June 1942, 18.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Baume, "BOB," *Truth*, 21 June 1942, 15.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Tac, "The Last Page," *Truth*, 6 May 1945, 7. Originally published in the Sydney *Daily Mirror*. See also: "Contrast this With Hun Murder Camps," *Truth*, 27 May 1945, 1.

¹⁰⁹⁹ "Nazis Were Sadists in the Last War, Too," *Truth*, 29 April 1945, 19.

Evaluating shifting Anglo-American attitudes, Baume posited a hardening of opinion unmatched by earlier revelations: “Nothing else is discussed, and this is no exaggeration. No one talks about the advance of the armies.” For once, Baume’s hyperbolic assertions were largely supported by reports appearing in other British and Dominion press and reinforced by the particularly compelling visual evidence of multi-page pictorial articles.¹¹⁰⁰ The pictorial *Pix*, which in December 1944 had alluded to “sadistic tendencies” of the German mind in relation to the “inhuman mass slaughters” shown at Klooga Labor Camp, unapologetically announced only months later that images from Le Struthof camp in France was evidence of “sadistic savagery” which had “earned the German undying hatred and loathing in the civilised world”.¹¹⁰¹

Baume captured an emerging popular discourse on the Allied home fronts, one in which ordinary civilians carried around newspaper clippings to show neighbours, friends and relatives to present a common theme on “what these Germans are” and the “depraved race of Germans”. Baume noted that the main reasoning behind his exposé on the camps was to combat the now minority coalition of “pink Left Wing [that] want[ed] friendship with the Germans” evident during his previous cables.¹¹⁰²

Baume rightly noted that he was not alone in his anger, incomprehension and disgust at the revelations, noting his network of Australian expatriates such as Colin Wills (BBC correspondent and co-writer of the mid-1945 MOI documentary *German Concentration Camps Factual Survey*) and Noel Monks (a renowned Australian correspondent who had helped shape the early narratives of atrocity following the bombing of Guernica).¹¹⁰³ The mien of Australian foreign correspondents was captured by a widely published article by an unnamed Australian London correspondent synthesised various camp reports, including that of Australia’s own Osmar White, Sam White (the *Argus*), and Monson. It summarised that all Australian

correspondents agree on the German fiendishness and the public finds it hard to know what to do with a nation which perpetrated or condoned almost unbelievable crimes. **No longer is anything heard about good or bad Germans. The few who even tepidly pleaded leniency as now as silent as tortured. These Huns...profess ignorance....Nobody any longer doubts the severity of treatment due to the Germans.** The only doubt is

¹¹⁰⁰ “All Germans Blamed for Atrocities, *Courier-mail*,” 23 April 1945, 2. Associated Press did its best to convey the public outcry and anger regarding the atrocities. “Public Anger Rises Over Atrocities, ‘Unbelievably Terrible,’ Say Parliamentarians,” *Advertiser*, 24 April 1945, 1.

¹¹⁰¹ “Camera Angles on War: Germans Incinerate 3000 Prisoners,” *Pix*, 9 December 1944, 4.; “Nazi Slaughterhouse: Death Behind Barbed Wire: Prisoners Cremated After Gassing,” *Pix*, 10 February 1945, 3-5.

¹¹⁰² “Nazi Atrocities Should Be Realised: Won’t Believe War Photos.”

¹¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

whether the criminal trial machinery will be enough to deal with the **whole problem of German barbarity and fanaticism...**¹¹⁰⁴

Ronald Monson concern with the “very smug” German civilians who had been allowed to “go free” and rejected all suggestion of their collective complicity symbolised the response of foreign correspondents. The documented fact that a furious Monson had punched the first random German he encountered in the camp is indicative of the explicit rage and emotion that coloured most cables reports between April and May 1945.¹¹⁰⁵

Not all correspondents abandoned a nuanced perspective of the German people. There were exceptions to the new norm of unrestrained hostility and emotion. The almost unanimous emphasis on the collective guilt and complicity of the German people converged with calls for restraint, even in the face of these crimes. Godfrey Blunden probably had the most longstanding empirical relationship with German atrocities of all Australian correspondents from his experience as an attaché with advancing Soviet forces. Blunden’s punctilious reports of atrocities committed on the Eastern Front during 1942-43 were largely relegated to secondary news, reinforcing the relative absence of editorial outrage regarding the accounts of atrocity during that period of the war.¹¹⁰⁶ However, Blunden noted in a cable to the *Adelaide News* in April 1945 that the Gardelegen atrocity represented a new stage of “malice and vindictiveness” in systematic atrocities. Although overseen by SS guards, this mass burning of over one thousand prisoners – force-marched from Bergen-Belsen, Sachsenhausen and Neuengamme – in a large barn in the town of Gardelegen, was perpetrated by members of the local community.¹¹⁰⁷ Through this massacre, Blunden noted how his own objective interpretations of events were being slowly eroded to reductionist levels in the Australian media in the service of enmity:

After seeing a thing like the Gardelegen massacre one easily becomes a German-hater, and I am sure, personally, I shall never again have any feeling of liking or appreciation for any German thing. **The German people are now identified with the Nazi Party. That is how one feels, but for the benefit of Europe it will be better if we can separate the issue and not fall too easily into an attitude of racial hostility.**¹¹⁰⁸

Blunden’s anger at the local people was understandable in the context of the treatment of the local population by American occupation forces which largely framed the community as complicit. Blunden

¹¹⁰⁴ “Photos Confirm Horror of German Prison Camps,” *Newcastle Sun*, 19 April 1945, 2.; “British Public Left Gasping By Atrocities,” *Advertiser*, 19 April 1945, 4.; “The Kultur of Belsen: Indictment of the German People,” *Canberra Times*, 14 May 1945, 2. Emphasis mine.

¹¹⁰⁵ Monson, “I Saw the Horrors of Belsen Camp,” *News*, 24 April 1945, 2.

¹¹⁰⁶ Anderson and Trembath, 160-61.

¹¹⁰⁷ Blunden, “With the End Near, Frenzy Has Seized the Nazis,” *News*, 28 April 1945, 2.

¹¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

noted that over fifty German civilians had been taken to witness the horrific actions of their countrymen, and indeed over the following days between 200 and 300 civilians from the town engaged in the burial of 430 burned prisoners along with the exhumation and re-burial of a further 586.¹¹⁰⁹ Reflecting his longstanding suspicions about a lack of collective “conscience”, Blunden cynically wondered: “how genuine were those Germans’ expressions of horror?”.¹¹¹⁰ However, despite his insistence on his growing hatred for the German people, it was clear that Blunden, who had witnessed the horrors first hand, was cautioning Australians against outright “racial hostility” in the formation of post-war policy based on his reports.¹¹¹¹

Osmar White presented a similar call for restraint in the face of his experiences at the camps. A HWT correspondent connected to Patton’s Third Army, White reflected similar attempts to wrestle with the various contradictions he witnessed during the liberation.¹¹¹² The horrors of Buchenwald heavily coloured White’s post-war observations and severely shattered the objectivity that was a matter of self-pride in his reporting. White’s burning anger did not prevent him presenting, in his own words, increasingly self-reflective and “nonconformist” views on German war guilt and the war crimes tribunals:

the crime of the great mass of the German people was blind support of a Government of hyper-gangsters rather than direct and personal participation in the cruelties and villainies of the Gestapo and SS ...This is not a plea for a soft [peace]; it is merely an observation that it is not wise to plan to make gravy with blood wrung from stone.¹¹¹³

Differentiating from the tones of unabated vengeance professed by Baume, Monson and Folkhard (the latter had utilised atrocities to hyperbolically call for “vengeance” and ask, in terms of post-war reconstruction, “are we going to feed...Hitler’s Germans?”),¹¹¹⁴ an underlying caution against totalising enmity and its effects on post-war relations, occupation policy and re-education continued to shape some reports from the camps. This reflected a strange interplay between the themes and tone of atrocity reports and the resistance against unbridled hatred that reflected the totalising logic of enmity – an interplay between totalisation and constraint in the most hate-engendering period of the

¹¹⁰⁹ “Gardelegen”, Holocaust Encyclopedia, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/gardelegen> (accessed 30/03/19). Blunden also cabled the speech given by American Colonel, George Lynch, to the local population. It highlighted the “responsibility of the German people” for atrocities which symbolised the “crime, cruelty and sadism” of the “master race”.

¹¹¹⁰ Blunden, “With the End Near, Frenzy Has Seized the Nazis.”

¹¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹¹² Fay Anderson, “White, Osmar Egmont Dorkin (1909-91),” in *A Companion to the Australian Media*, ed. Bridget Griffen-Foley (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2014).

¹¹¹³ White, “Problem of ‘Bomb-Happy’ Huns.”; “What is Going On in Minds of Defeated Germans? Absence of Any Signs of a Sense of Guilt For Nazism’s Crimes,” *Advertiser*, 6 April 1945, 6.; White, IX-XV.

¹¹¹⁴ Folkard, “What Shall We Do With the Germans?”

conflict that perhaps helps to explain the *tough, yet measured* attitudes expressed in Australian opinion polls.

“This is the German”: Australian Responses to Atrocity Films

The most revealing correlation between totalising enmity narratives and Australian attitudes towards the German people emerged in the aftermath of atrocity revelations in Europe. Atrocity films contained the potential to incite mass, unadulterated enmity at a time when wartime emotions were at their peak. In the initial absence of DOI sanctioned newsreels, grassroots and private organisations sought to reinforce the full page atrocity pictorials gracing the pages of the nation’s dailies.¹¹¹⁵ However, after almost one month after their release in Britain and America, two screenings of documentary footage of the camps were cleared by the Commonwealth Film Censorship Board and released simultaneously in the nation’s capital cities on 25 May 1945. Entitled “This is the German” (Fox Movietone Australian News) and “Horror in Our Time” (MGM, Paramount and Gaumont British news companies), these films quickly became a conduit for the broader debate and courted controversy in the correspondence columns regarding their purpose, content and psychological effect on an already war-weary population – particularly the nation’s youth. Notwithstanding this, the arguably deserved appellation of the former – “This is the German” – was indicative of the mutual condemnatory tone and consensus in the major dailies of the Australian press and a widespread attempt to portray the horrors of the camps as an undeniable indictment of the German *ut totum*.¹¹¹⁶

The *Argus*’s editorial response, “This Must be Avenged”, reflected a common focus on the *duty* of Australians to view the films to contextualise their attitudes towards post-war justice.¹¹¹⁷ Since 1943, the *Argus* had praised atrocity films as “visual education”, a new level of horrific “realism” that irrefutable indictment of the German people that allowed Australians to “pass moral judgement” and “see the German for what he is”:

War correspondents may sometimes have to depend on hearsay evidence; the indignant pen may sometimes allow righteous anger to colour factual narrative; but there is no room for misapprehension or exaggeration with the cinema camera.... these are no tales of prejudiced propagandists. **The cold, emotionless celluloid cannot lie.**¹¹¹⁸

The editors did not attempt to hide the *Argus*’ interpretation of the films’ objectives in educating and mobilising public opinion behind a harsh peace settlement; spurning “maudlin sentimentality”,

¹¹¹⁵ For example, see: “Atrocity Pictures Seen Here,” *News*, 30 April 1945, 5.

¹¹¹⁶ Some, such as the *SMH*, did not make a big deal of the films when they were first release. “Thousands See Film,” *SMH*, 26 May 1945, 9.

¹¹¹⁷ “This Must Be Avenged,” *Argus*, 25 May 1945, 2.

¹¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*; “Give Us the Whole Film.”

“fastidiousness and squeamishness” and refuting those “who plead, with false logic and spurious humanitarianism, that Germans be given a ‘soft peace’.”¹¹¹⁹

The *News*’ Jack Edmonds reflected the almost unanimous promotion of the films by editors, commentators and film reviewers across the nation as essential viewing for all adult Australians. Edmonds was not alone in calling for Government subsidies to bolster semi-official and grassroots screenings outside of Australia’s major urban centres.¹¹²⁰ Edmonds noted that the films were necessary viewing for “ostrich citizens” who could not accept the realities of the war crimes, continued to defend the vast portion of the German population and promote a lenient settlement with Germany:

These films establish the guilt of the German people, a people who didn’t care what happened to anyone else, who in their greed surrendered honor [sic] and decency...Go and see for yourself what evil men and women will do if they are left unchecked.¹¹²¹

The *Advertiser* also strongly promoted the films and noted, alongside the terrible indictment of the film’s horrific imagery, the adjoining discussion of the longstanding problem of “German militarism” and the historical continuity of the German problem.¹¹²² The horror of the films was punctuated by sensationalised AAP cables and special reports emanating from Europe that German civilians in occupied territories were, at best, labelling the films Allied “propaganda” and weeping with insincere pity and, at worst, laughing at the films in spite of their supposed educative function.¹¹²³

The *News* editorial team, one of the most vocal supporters of Menzies’ “no quarrel” rhetoric in September 1939,¹¹²⁴ now openly criticised the complicity and culpability of the German people with the crimes, ambitions and arrogance of the regime. They feared that the Germans would escape the “heavy punishment that it had earned for itself.” National Socialism was the “expression of the desires of the German people”. They were not “victims” as some “disingenuous” commentators and “sentimentalists” had suggested.¹¹²⁵ However, in line with the *tough, yet measured* attitudes of the APOP polls, the *News*’s “vox-pop” interviews with audiences of the premier screenings interestingly did not appear to reinforce the collective guilt of the German people to the same extent as its editorial

¹¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹¹²⁰ Jack Edmonds, “Everyone Should See Horror Films,” *News*, 25 May 1945, 5.; “Atrocity Pictures to Be Seen Here,” *News*, 30 April 1945, 5.

¹¹²¹ Ibid.

¹¹²² “German Horrors Films: Release in Adelaide Today,” *Advertiser*, 25 May 1945, 8.

¹¹²³ “Horror Films Ineffective,” *DT*, 13 July 1945, 3.; “Nazis Laugh at Horror Films: Circulation Withdrawn,” *Advertiser*, 13 July 1945, 6.; “Germans Laugh at Horror,” *Sunday Mail*, 15 July 1945, 2.

¹¹²⁴ See p. 39.

¹¹²⁵ “That Wicked Man...”, *News*, 2 May 1945, 2.; “Hitler: From Boy Duncie to World Wrecker,” *News*, 2 May 1945, 2.; Quayle, “He Wanted the Earth – He’s Got It!”, *News*, 2 May 1945, 2.

content.¹¹²⁶ Most interviewees noted the educational function of the films for adults, the unsuitability of the film for children, shock and disbelief at the scope and “cruelty” of the crimes, the power of the medium to “bring home” the terrifying reality of the atrocities and a common emphasis on swift, exacting and severe, albeit proportionate and just, punishment for those directly responsible. Only one of the nine interviewees, the Port Pirie based officer in the Merchant Navy M. Strachan, attempted to frame the atrocities beyond direct perpetrators and utilise the atrocity films to promote collective guilt and harsh punishment: *“I’ve always thought the same about the Germans. They should get the same as they gave others.”*¹¹²⁷ The undesirability to connect the atrocities to the German people was reinforced in the *News*’ attempts to mobilise veteran opinion behind totalising enmity on the basis of several resolutions by several RSSAILA branches. The published surveys of five returned servicemen and a returned sister reflected an almost unanimous promotion of qualified tolerance in the post-war treatment of the German people. Only Mr. D’Arcy Cox, a member of the Farmer’s Union, perpetuated enmity against the entire nation – *“Shoot ‘em, hang ‘em, starve ‘em to death.”*¹¹²⁸ Again, a disjuncture appeared between the totalising enmity promoted by the *News* and the relative tolerance of its readership.

Even though extreme viewpoints remained an isolated minority, the largely measured responses in the *News*’ vox-pop were not repeated in other papers. The Sydney *Sun*, a paper whose hard editorial stance has been explored throughout this thesis, published a collection of opinions from leading Sydney citizens who had witnessed a preview screening of “This is the German”.¹¹²⁹ The common reaction of those leaving the private screening of the British newsreel, it noted, was “I hate the Hun” [Image 49]. In fact, the use of the term “Hun” appeared so frequently in the responses that one could not escape the respondents’ discursive connection to the atrocity stories of the previous war. After noting the mobilising potential of the film, the Deputy Administrator of the Australian Comforts Fund, R. G. Clark, affirmed that the “Hun stands stripped bare in his bestiality”. Harry Yates, presenter of 2UE’s “Digger session”, argued that the questions of the authenticity and denial of atrocity reports from the previous war (by leading men such as Charles Bean) could not be levelled at the current reports. He affirmed the views of many others at the screening that the reputation of the “Hun” would be forever tarnished by the indisputable visual evidence. Most responses related the films to the treatment of Germany, including those of K.B. Thompson, P.S. MacDermott, Heather Nelson and C. Yates. Thompson, a business executive, noted that “only harsh resolute action [could] prevent a repetition by the Huns of this ghastly, grisly business”, even though conceding the Nazi “oppression”

¹¹²⁶ “Adelaide Horror at Atrocities,” *News*, 26 May 1945, 3.

¹¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹¹²⁸ “S.A. Suggestions on Fate for Germans,” *News*, 25 April 1945, 5.

¹¹²⁹ “We Saw the Nazi Horror Film,” *Sun*, 24 May 1945, 3.

of the German people. Yates, another businessman, was far more adamant that the film would break down remaining arguments for “kid glove” treatment of those primarily, and importantly, “secondarily”, responsible for the crimes. Journalist Heather Nelson concluded that German mothers should shudder at their role in bringing such monsters into the world, embroiling women in the narrative of collective guilt.¹¹³⁰



Image 49.

Understandably hyperbolic opinions were also presented in *Truth's* own survey of opinion, one means of many in the magazine's attempt to mobilise totalising enmity. In this, the paper surpassed the hysterical, sensationalistic tones of contemporaries such as the *Bulletin* and *Smith's Weekly*. Kensington resident Jean Piggott's demand to "sterilise them all [because] they might do it again", Mrs. Quinn's reference to do "the same", and Clifford Searle's view that the film vindicated a policy of "hamstringing Germany for all time" clearly conformed to the tone of a review by Elisabeth Kathleen Dulcie Deamer. This Sydney-based polemicist, "Queen of Bohemia" and freelance journalist, was a regular contributor to *Truth*, *SMH*, *Australian Woman's Mirror* and the *Bulletin*.¹¹³¹ Deamer argued that the propaganda films were some of the most "necessary" of the war because of the potential of images of "tottering dehumanised living skeletons" and "contorted flamed seared bodies" to incite totalising enmity. From a number of interviews with audience members, Deamer noted that:

¹¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹¹³¹ Dulcie Deamer, "Hell-Pits Shriek for Vengeance: Grim Truth in Newsreel," *Truth*, 27 May 1945, 21.; Martha Rutledge, Deamer, Mary Elizabeth Dulcie (1890-1972), ADB, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/deamer-mary-elizabeth-kathleen-dulcie-5928> (accessed, 07/06/2019).

No one who has seen it [the film] will prattle of an easy peace for Germany, or mere 're-education', or of any nauseating, sentimental twiddle waddle of the 'forgive and forget' variety.¹¹³²

It is clear from these limited examples that the camp atrocities continued to influence discussions of German treatment over the coming months. Further exchanges, like those between F. Purchas, A.E. Fox and George Andreschon in the *Mercury*, revealed continued disagreement on the applicability of the camps to the German Question despite the newspaper's best attempts to present the films as an indictment of the German people.¹¹³³ The examples in *Truth* and the *Sun* also go some way to explaining the 57 per cent of interviewees advocating a "harsh" or "severe" peace within the APOP polls.

The Australian Churches: Concessions to Totalising Enmity?

The only real overt opposition in Australian public discourse to the films being utilised to propagate totalising enmity against the German people emanated from the Leftist and religious press.¹¹³⁴ In the final year of the war, the problem for Australian Churches and religious organisations remained asserting the relevancy and authority of their unchanged anti-enmity agenda in Australian public war discourse increasingly susceptible to the rhetoric of punishment, reprisal and vengeance.¹¹³⁵ Church leaders had expressed ecumenical concerns about the legacy of totalising enmity in the development of post-war policy and the achievement of victory through the means of totalising violence. The dangerous causal relationship between totalising violence, the logic behind "unconditional surrender", and an unstable international post-war reconstruction, was extensively criticised by religious commentators across the final years of the war.¹¹³⁶

The framework of "spiritual reconstruction" and Christian tolerance had shifted little between 1939 and 1945. While the unanimous doctrinal opposition to totalising enmity discussed in Chapter Five remained unchanged in 1944-45, some religious commentators were forced to make some concessions to the totalising logic of the war and its consequences for the Nazi/German distinction.¹¹³⁷ Catholic intellectual D.G.M. Jackson's analysis of the issue exemplified the general trends in cross-

¹¹³² Ibid.

¹¹³³ F. Purchas, "Letters to the Editor: Future of Germans," *Mercury*, 4 June 1945, 3.; George Andreschon, "Letters to the Editor: Treatment of Germans," *Mercury*, 8 June 1945, 13.; Purchas, "Letters to the Editor: Germany's Future," *Mercury*, 9 June 1945, 3.; Andreschon, "Letters to the Editor: Treatment of Germans," *Mercury*, 12 June 1945, 3.

¹¹³⁴ "Horror Film Criticised," *NMH*, 23 June 1945, 4.; "Appeal to Fear," *Southern Cross*, 8 June 1945, 6. On the Leftist press, see: The Nipper, "Crib-Time: Horror Camps," *WW*, 25 May 1945, 4.

¹¹³⁵ A problem summarised by outspoken Newcastle Anglican Bishop F. de Wit Batty in "Ourselves and Our Enemies", *Australian Quarterly*, 17, No. 4, (Dec, 1945), 31.

¹¹³⁶ "The Need of Peace," *Advocate*, 2 December 1943, 2.

¹¹³⁷ "The Future of Germany," *Catholic Weekly*, 26 April 1945, 4.

denominational religious discourse throughout the later stages of the war. He also reflected a vein of realism the religious intellectuals now seemed to be professing.¹¹³⁸

Jackson argued that the disjuncture between Soviet-sponsored peace policies and the Western Allies had largely rendered the “German problem” a piecemeal, “prophylactic” action plan for “hard peace” limited to occupation zones and rooted solely in *realpolitik* assumptions around the inevitability of resurgent German aggression.¹¹³⁹ Jackson agreed in principle that drastic measures were needed in the re-education of German youth – brutalised “young Viking [sic] savages” who would require years of re-education.¹¹⁴⁰ Despite now standardised warnings about the spectre of Versailles in religious periodicals, Jackson also agreed with widely accepted methodologies for the reconstruction project being promoted in the secular press. Like many within the *Advocate*, he argued for a sustained period of occupation, disarmament and war crimes tribunals concurrent with the vigilant return to German self-government aided by key industrial, communications and infrastructure projects. This was predicated on the stable and cooperative economic and social restructuring of the state, under the watchful eye of a central committee of European powers.¹¹⁴¹ In a discussion of war crimes and punishment, Jackson even qualified his criticism of totalising enmity by emphasising the variations of “moral responsibility” and culpability for the crimes reported in the secular media and recognising that a “large number of Germans” would necessarily be punished proportionate to their crimes.¹¹⁴² However, Jackson also exemplified ecumenical criticism of secular narratives undermining or neglecting the “moral resistance” of the Catholic and Confessional Churches within the Reich.¹¹⁴³ The focus on the negative aspects of post-war policy in the Australian media which largely rested on punitive collective punishment, in Jackson’s view, was alienating anti-Nazi elements from co-operative reconstruction.

The *Advocate* was particularly disturbed by the exhibition of horror and the resulting discourse surrounding the atrocity films in the Melbourne press.¹¹⁴⁴ The “pernicious” and false Vansittartist argument that the “infamies of Germany” were uniquely German was of particular concern. The *Advocate* pessimistically argued that positive self-reflection on the universal threat posed by

¹¹³⁸ P.F.M., “Post-War Reconstruction Must Be Spiritual: Hate Engendered by Prolonged Wars a Barrier to Peace,” *Advocate*, 16 August 1944, 18.; Jackson (Sulla), “As The Earth Turns: Commentary on World Affairs: ‘Beware of Pity’,” *Advocate*, 6 September 1944, 2.

¹¹³⁹ “As The World Turns: Commentary on World Affairs: Future of Germany,” *Advocate*, 2 May 1945, 2.

¹¹⁴⁰ “Editorial: The Future of Germany,” *Catholic Weekly*, 26 April 1945, 4.

¹¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*; “‘Beware of Pity’.”

¹¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴³ P.F.M., “Post-War Reconstruction Must Be Spiritual: Hate Engendered by Prolonged Wars a Barrier to Peace.”; “Editorial: The Future of Germany.”

¹¹⁴⁴ “Thoughts on a Horror Film,” *Advocate*, 30 May 1945, 6. The editor was referring to Brass’ review of the film. Douglas Brass, “Nazi Camp Horrors Shown in Official Film,” *Herald*, 24 May 1945, 4.

totalitarianism, rather than a uniquely “German problem”, was neither intended by their creators, publishers and the DOI, nor could constructively be translated to Australian audiences in a climate of totalising enmity. The writer’s cynical view about the unjustifiability of atrocity films in the Australian context is worth quoting in detail:

The apparent aim [of the films] is to bring the public mind to such a state that there will be no danger of a reaction of pity and human feeling towards the defeated, which might interfere with the policy of hard ruthlessness upon which leaders of the victorious allied have decided. We must be convinced that not only the German leaders, **but the Germans as a whole**, deserve no mercy – that if they are rounded up in slave-gangs to labour for years in foreign lands, if they are driven in masses from regions which are to be ‘cleared’ for other nations, all this is no more than they deserve.¹¹⁴⁵

Whereas the secular Melbourne Press applauded the mobilizational factor of truthful, objective atrocity propaganda in combating “soft” peace, the *Advocate* proposed that the “negative” spin on post-war discourse was a product of the mass cynicism about “positive” images of post-war international security and law. The Australian media was

persuading people to think more and more that this [the unconditional surrender and submission of Germany] has been the main object, and that it must now be pursued vengefully to the utmost degree against the whole German nation. Hence the line of propaganda ‘education’ is to drown in idealism which has been betrayed in a torrent of hatred induced by horror – and to keep men’s eyes glued upon ‘the German menace’ that they may not see the new menace...¹¹⁴⁶

The atrocity films reflected that this form of moral exclusion, what the *Advocate*’s editorial team intermittently referred to as “cruelty” and “hard-heartedness”, would continue into the post-war world if the victors themselves continued to reverse wrongs and oppression through “terrorism and massacre” (the mechanisms of totalising violence) and retribution (a punitive post-war settlement).¹¹⁴⁷ Alluding to moral exclusion, the *Advocate* added that if the secular process of totalising enmity persisted in:

...excluding from our practical humanity those whom we dislike or those whose claims we find inconvenient: the same ruthlessness of ‘total war’ which governs our attitudes

¹¹⁴⁵ “Thoughts on a Horror Film.” Emphasis mine.

¹¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁷ “Hardness of Heart,” *Advocate*, 10 October 1945, 6.; “The Cure for Cruelty,” *Advocate*, 6 September 1944, 6.

towards external foes will begin to infect our view of opponents within our own household [ie. within Australia]... willing to crush 'irreconcilables' in the name of the State as the most ruthless of our totalitarian enemies.¹¹⁴⁸

The proliferation of totalising enmity, according to this key organ of Australian Catholic opinion which personified ecumenical religious dialogue across the nation, would incur post-war repercussions from which Australians would not be immune. The essentialising enmity it engendered, the moral exclusion it promoted, and the explicit and rigid demarcations between Self and Other based on arbitrary formulations, revealed a dangerous tendency in Australian public discourse which could be aimed inward in reflexive expressions of post-total war.

Conclusion

An analysis of Australian Gallup polls from the final years of the conflict evidences the hardening of attitudes towards the German people insofar as post-war treatment was concerned. It also tentatively reveals continued contestation and disagreement in responses to the German Question even in the light of large-scale atrocities. Australian attitudes to the treatment of the German people, on the basis of these polls, can be described as *tough, but measured*. However, statistics from Gallup polls have their weaknesses, given the limited contextual information provided. This reinforces a need for qualitative analysis of the narratives of enmity influencing Australian attitudes towards Nazi Germany which has been undertaken in this and previous chapters.

Within the polar extremes of vindictiveness and punitiveness and rationality and tolerance, most Australian commentators from mid-1944 to the revelation of the camps in April-May 1945 sat in a "middle-ground", what can be correlated with the "moderate" and "severe" categories of the May 1945 APOP poll. They advocated resolute treatment of the German nation that avoided the narrow implications and extremes of "hard" and "soft" peace. A common acceptance of the so-called five "Ds" in Australia – *denazification, decentralisation, deindustrialisation, demilitarisation* and *democratisation* – meant that most recognised Germany's potential for reintegration in a renewed comity of nations. Even the most vindictive and drastic examples promoting retribution conceded somewhat to the practical requirements of post-war reconstruction.

Unequivocal in Australian discussions of the post-war treatment of Germany was the widespread acceptance of Germany's collective guilt and complicity, something which had been far more contested in the earlier stages of the conflict. This chapter has clearly demonstrated an explicit and widespread breakdown of the Nazi/German distinction in Australia that was directly influenced by

¹¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

totalising enmity narratives purveyed across the Australian media landscape. Australian newspapers which had previously upheld the Nazi/German distinction found it increasingly difficult to avoid issues of German complicity. In between expressions of moderation, totalising representations appeared with greater frequency in newspapers such as the *Daily Telegraph*. Those who had extensively criticised the Nazi/Germany distinction earlier in the conflict, such as the *Sun*, *Argus* and *Mercury*, approached the German Question with renewed vigour, attempting to exacerbate totalising narratives to advocate severe punishment for the German people.

Although foreign correspondents reinforced an increasingly negative view of the enemy, consistent, albeit qualified, reference to German victimhood, suffering and even exemplars of “good” Germany such as the Hellbrechts emerged in reports. Positive, humanising images were rarely published without caveats, usually aspersions about the motivations and objectives of German acquiescence, cooperation and friendliness. Such representations were also tempered by consistent examples of the remorselessness and lack of war guilt expressed by the Germans they met, or emphasis on German self-interest in superficial expressions of friendliness or attempts to establish anti-Nazi credentials. Following editorial treatment, the published form of analyses emphasising German heterogeneity through personal experience with individual Germans at ground zero tended to homogenise the German and emphasise the negative empirical observations in reports. The treatment of reports from Wilkie, Blunden, Matheson and Austin are strong evidence of this trend in the Australian press.

As in Britain, recognition of the limitations in exacting collective punishment (ie. the extent to which the German people should be punished for their complicity with Nazism) was not deemed incompatible with widespread acceptance that most, if not all Germans, would necessarily suffer the consequences of defeat, whether it be through the experience of indiscriminate violence or post-war occupation.¹¹⁴⁹ Drawing parallels with Australian discourse surrounding the strategic bombing offensive, the moral pressures and collective cognitive dissonance between justifiable Allied policies in enacting unconditional surrender and examples of German victimhood (destruction of cities, starvation, reparations etc.) were relieved to an extent through the notion of collective guilt assumed in totalising enmity narratives. *Pix*’s shifting responses to Vansittartism and representations of German *kinder* exemplified this trend in the Australian media.

The concern with Germany can of course partly be construed as symptomatic of fears that a soft peace against one Axis power would translate into a similar leniency against Japan, leaving isolated Australia open to further aggression exemplified by the re-emergent aggressive and expansionist Nazi Germany. Notwithstanding Australia’s “subordinate status” in the tumultuous, discordant and contradictory

¹¹⁴⁹ Kertesz, 142.

decision-making process of the “Big Three” powers (Great Britain, USA and Soviet Union) and the immediacy of concerns with its Pacific Axis partner, Japan, Australian commentators were eager to establish public discussion on the treatment of Germany in line with broader domestic concerns about post-war reconstruction, collective security and how such imperatives would be balanced with reformation and justice.¹¹⁵⁰ It is not a stretch to suggest that many commentators, like many interviewed by the *Sun* after viewing “This is the German”,¹¹⁵¹ saw the treatment of Germany as a road-map and indication of how Japan would be treated and how imperatives of security, reformation and justice would be balanced by the newly formed United Nations.

Aside from isolated criticism in elements of the Left and religious periodicals, most utilised the Atrocity films in May 1945 to support narratives of totalising enmity which encapsulated the German people in an all-encompassing collective guilt and responsibility. Analysis of the correspondence column, however, suggests that alongside the emotional outbursts of anger, the attitudes of many other Australian were tempered by rationality and a continued, if begrudging, belief in the rehabilitation and reintegration of a post-Nazi Germany into the comity of nations. This was despite the best efforts of many mainstream newspapers to mobilise enmity through the films, demonstrated by the *Adelaide News*. Isolated in their criticism of the totalising logic behind the films, Australia’s religious commentators were concerned by the enmity-provoking agenda of the Australian media and the repercussions of totalising enmity in post-war reconstruction, both domestically and abroad.

¹¹⁵⁰ Stuart Macintyre, *Australia's Boldest Experiment: War and Reconstruction in the 1940s* (Sydney, N.S.W: NewSouth Publishing, 2015), 371-76.; Michael Carrel, "Australia's Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals: Stimuli and Constraints" (PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 2005), 130.

¹¹⁵¹ “‘We Saw the Nazi Horror Film’.”

Conclusion: The German Question, Narratives of Enmity and Totalising Enmity

As a means of further elucidating the importance of moral, cultural and political choice in enmity formation during the Second World War in light of the inherent “logic” towards totalising enmity theorised in recent scholarship, this thesis has examined Australian narratives of enmity and manifestations of the German Question in Australian public war discourse between 1939 and 1945. Contributing to the transnational research on totalising warfare, it explores novel perspectives, understandings and consequences of one of the three major facets of a peoples’ war, totalising enmity, through analysis of an often-disregarded belligerent power, Australia.¹¹⁵² This thesis has investigated the intersecting relationship between three major themes in Australian war discourse – totalising enmity, narratives of enmity and the German Question – to further historical understanding of Australian experiences and attitudes under the pressures of a totalising peoples’ war.

Narratives of enmity inherently contain the potential to incite, justify and normalise violent conflict. Despite the powerful potential towards totality in all facets of the Second World War, the researcher of enmity invariably must account for the limitations, constraints and factors of choice, deliberation and contingency evident in Australian wartime democracy. This thesis has, consequently, highlighted the contested nature and ambiguity of Australian representations of the German people and their relationship with unanimously loathed ideological enemies – Nazism, Fascism and rampant militarism. The waging of war against the latter in Australia was largely unproblematic through the maintenance of the Allied “good” war narrative. However, the nature of a totalising peoples’ war – contemporary visions of “total war”, the exigencies of mass industrialised warfare, and the total mobilisation of the forces of society, economy and culture which rendered every German man, woman and child complicit in and legitimate targets of military violence – necessitated rationalising, defining and situating the German people within developing Australian enmity narratives. This explains why the German Question, and in particular the tenability of a Nazi/German distinction, was so powerfully connected to contemporary debates about, and experience of, “total war”.

Through qualitative analysis of Australian public discourse, predominantly Australian print media, this thesis has proposed that totalising narratives encompassing the German people were far more pronounced in Australian wartime discourse than previously accounted for and grew exponentially as the war progressed. Ian Harmstorf’s claims that a “definite distinction was made between Germans

¹¹⁵² Geyer and Tooze, 3.

and Nazis” cannot be sustained when applied to a multifaceted analysis of Australian enmity narratives.¹¹⁵³

The absence of unreserved, overt, and officially sanctioned hate campaigns against the German people reflected a broader aversion to jingoistic expressions of hatred within Australian wartime discourse. The historiography thus provides evidence of the limits and constraints in which liberal and democratic wartime governments could harness enmity in mobilising societies for war and warrants an exploration of these in the context of Germany.¹¹⁵⁴ This can also be construed as evidence that some lessons were drawn from First World War which, for many, exemplified how the volatile line between war time exigency and civil liberties in a totalising war could easily provoke Governmental overreaction and overreach. This context is essential in explaining why the Menzies Government, the Australian media, and the Australian public more broadly, were reticent to revert to unbridled anti-Germanism in the first stages of the conflict. Most approached the German Question with greater nuance, qualification and implicitness that conformed with Australian norms and expectations surrounding hate propaganda. Broadly speaking, such constraints emanating from Australia’s “moral economy” dissolved to a great extent by the final years of the war if we compare the explicitness of totalising enmity narratives in the Australian press during the Phoney War to examples from 1944-45. They did not, however, entirely erode, justifying the descriptor “totalising” over “total” enmity.

The development of Australian totalising enmity narratives between 1939 and 1945 largely conformed to Anglo-American patterns. The key stages of *totalisation* in terms of the evolution of the conflict – including the initial leniency and tolerance of the first months of the Phoney War; the hardening of attitudes in mid-1940-1941; the coarsening of attitudes throughout the strategic bombing war; and the peak breakdown of Nazi/German distinctions linked to belated reporting on the concentration camps – largely conform to the various “stages” of British narratives conceptualised by Kertesz.¹¹⁵⁵ However, this does not undermine the need to study the various frameworks through which Australians on the home front created and sustained enmity narratives in relation to their unique experience of the war. Anglo-American (and particularly British) narratives undeniably exerted a powerful influence over images, themes, and ideas about the German people in Australia between 1939 and 1945. However, these external imported debates, commentary, and ideas were generally synthesised, reconceptualised and recontextualised by Australian commentators in light of perceived local concerns and interests. Australian commentators – ranging from politicians and news commentators to the local correspondence column writers – expressed their own agendas and

¹¹⁵³ Harmstorf, ‘World War II: South Australia’s Germans’.

¹¹⁵⁴ Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, 111.

¹¹⁵⁵ Kertesz, 214-16.

objectives, even if these often aligned or directly opposed the international arguments and ideas each was referencing. For instance, despite the mutual admiration shared for Vansittart, Australia's loose coalition of voices rejecting the Nazi-German distinction from the outset of war did not require the kindle of *Black Record* to ignite fierce debate in Australia before 1941. Australian discourse on the German Question, as an expression of and response to totalising enmity, is better thought of as an active component (albeit a small one which rarely asserted influence beyond Australia) of broader Anglo-American and Allied narratives, rather than a passive product of international discourse.

Conflicts "with, for and against peoples" such as the Second World War exhibit the greatest potential for reductive, unambiguous enmity narratives.¹¹⁵⁶ Yet as Watkin Wynne's *World's News* aptly summarised in 1942, a clear and uncontested definition of the enemy had failed to materialise between 1939 and 1941. Despite the unwavering consensus for action against the evils of the Nazi regime and ideology across Australian wartime society, the role of the German people remained contested:

Are we at war with Nazism only or are we at war with Germany? Strange to say, the question has never been answered. After more than three years of bloody and perilous war, there are still two schools of thought, and they are hotly discussing against whom we are waging war.¹¹⁵⁷

The opening section of this thesis (Chapters Two to Five) has explored this question through various layers of public war discourse between 1939 and 1941 – governmental, intellectual, mainstream media, popular magazines, and the periodicals of the Left and the churches. The various sources discussed within these chapters seem to vindicate the *World's News*' assessment of the German Question. Kertesz's contention that the "fragmented" nature of enemy images is a product of, and contextually dependent on, the interests and objectives of specific groups and individuals helps to explain the various representations of the German within Australian narratives.¹¹⁵⁸ Each group or individual focused on different elements of the German Question and approached the Nazi-German distinction with differing perspectives and objectives.

Prime Minister Robert Menzies' appropriation of "no quarrel" formed an essential reference point for the earliest formations of enmity narratives in the Australian media. The phrase "no quarrel with the German people" summarised the absence of hatred and rampant anti-Germanism in official public statements whilst setting the tone for the official policies of the DOI and the national broadcaster. Broadly speaking, however, this section of the thesis has conceptualised the totalising nature of

¹¹⁵⁶ Barker, 159; Geyer and Tooze, 3, 4.

¹¹⁵⁷ "Whom Are We Fighting in Europe Today?", *World's News*, 12 December 1942, 2.

¹¹⁵⁸ Kertesz, 38.

Australian enmity narratives between 1939 and 1941. It has evidenced a steady move away from the Nazi/German distinction and the moderation symbolised by “no quarrel” in September 1939 to a greater receptiveness to, and expression of, totalising enmity by the end of the Phoney War period. This process continued throughout 1940 and 1941, although totalising enmity remained “contested” in public war discourse.

Despite the logical extension of enmity to the German people *ut totum* in a totalising peoples’ war and increasing concessions to it, an examination of the Australian press between 1939 and 1941 reveals that the issue was disputed ideologically, politically, emotionally and morally. The “logic” behind the extension of enmity to enemy nations and peoples was contested in terms of its effectiveness, utility, purpose and merit (both morally and in contemporary evaluations of truth and objectivity) during the early years of the war. Australian war discourse during the Phoney War era largely took its lead and conformed to British norms of differentiation and tolerance and framing of the war as an ideological struggle against “Hitlerism” and Nazi oppression.¹¹⁵⁹ The strongest consensus of support of “no quarrel” and a composite rejection of totalising enmity appeared in the first weeks of the conflict before differentiation and division set in. Narratives of German victimhood, suppression and coercion by the regime reinforced a false optimism that the Germans-in-plural did not want war. This unanimity also correlates with public discourse in wartime Britain.¹¹⁶⁰

The common rejection of totalising enmity by the Australian Left between 1939-41 was an extension of its qualified support for the conflict as a struggle against a perverse ideology, political system and economic structure in the name of socialism and the international working class. Leading ALP politicians actively supported the Menzian distinction in the first days of the war. Yet concerns about the feasibility of its retention and suspicion of the Government’s purpose revealed in the responses of Eddie Ward, Frank Brennan and Maurice Blackburn reflected the scepticism within the various journals of the diffuse Australian Left discussion in Chapter Five. Their responses also exhibited a contemporary realisation of the capacity of totalising enmity to undermine the fight against the “real” enemy, Fascism and Nazism, by exacerbating national animosities in the service of Capitalism. These journals also took issue with the coarsening of attitudes within the Capitalist mainstream press and its failures to highlight the victimhood, exploitation and suppression of the German working class.

Ecumenical Australian religious discourse remained one of the strongest forces of opposition to totalising enmity throughout the conflict. Religious institutions and leaders understood that the Churches’ unflinching moral opposition to the universal condemnation of the entire German nation

¹¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 24.

¹¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 216.

and biblical inflections to “love thy enemy” were becoming increasingly isolated in coarsening public discourse as the war progressed. The religious community viewed itself as a reactive force to a secular media prone to inciting, exacerbating and reinforcing totalising enmity narratives. This was perhaps best reflected in the Melbourne *Advocate’s* consistent debate with the secular Melbourne press discussed across various chapters within this thesis.

German Christians remained a strong facet of the “good” German narrative throughout the war. This perhaps explains the influence of the German Churches in facilitating the normalisation of Australian-German relations. The Evangelical Church’s divisive acknowledgement of Germany’s collective shame and complicity through the Stuttgart Declaration of October 1945 (led by the archetypal “good” German, Martin Niemöller) and Germany’s invitation to re-join the World Council of Churches certainly aided in the normalisation process.¹¹⁶¹ It was not until Niemöller’s “goodwill” tour between August and November 1949, where the above acknowledgements were reinforced by re-emerging narratives of German victimhood and resistance, that normalization started to become openly evident.¹¹⁶² This process of reconciliation would have been far less successful if such narratives had not been reinforced by Australia’s religious community throughout the conflict as this thesis has shown. Again, however, various responses show that totalising wartime enmity narratives continued to frame Australian attitudes as editorial content provided a cautionary warning about the positive image of Germany being presented in the rousing reception of the Pastor.¹¹⁶³ Vastly contrasting interpretations of the tour in the *SMH* and *Argus* correspondence columns, both framing Australia’s reception of Niemöller as symbolic of Australian attitudes towards the German people, indicates a need for further research on these key points of the Australian-German reconciliation process.¹¹⁶⁴ An in-depth analysis of this tour could be useful in examining the longevity of totalising enmity in future studies.

A minority of Australian commentators rejected the distinction between the German people and the Nazi regime from the earliest stages of the conflict. Most, including conservative politician Archie Cameron, public intellectual Alan Chisholm, and sensationalist media commentator Eric Baume, justified their arguments to varying degrees on the realities, shifting parameters and “logic” of a totalising peoples’ war or, to use the contemporary terminology, “total war”. Such arguments had

¹¹⁶¹ “Nazis’ Guilt: Niemöller’s Charges: Shared By All Germans,” *West Australian*, 22 October 1945, 7.; “Without Faith: German Spiritual ‘Nihilism’: Destructive Effect of Nazi Epoch,” *West Australian*, 9 November 1945, 2.

¹¹⁶² Vee Cee, “As I See It,” *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1949, 22. Tampke, *The Germans in Australia: The Story of the Continent’s German Speaking Communities*, 136; Voigt, 122-4.

¹¹⁶³ “Pastor Niemöller on Germany,” *NMH*, 31 August 1949, 2.

¹¹⁶⁴ “Pastor Niemöller,” *SMH*, 7 September 1949, 2. See the responses of K. Woodside and Francois.; R.E. Stewart, “‘Final Word’ on Niemöller,” *Herald*, 3 September 1949, 5. The *Argus* also noted that Niemöller remained a “controversial figure” in Australia. “Pastor Niemöller,” *Argus*, 26 August 1949, 2.

gained popularity in the mainstream media by the end of 1941, and were particularly useful in facilitating, justifying and normalising totalising violence. The logic of totalising enmity was harnessed to justify and normalise the “means and ends of violence” and weaken peacetime restrictions of the permissibility of violence (Australia’s “moral economy”) in line with the process of “moral exclusion”. The dominant representation of German civilians under the bombs; and the means, arguments and problems raised by the totalising process, coalesced with extant enmity narratives and rendered Germans *ut totum* acceptable, and even worthy, targets of military violence in a peoples’ war. Counter-narratives professing “moral inclusion” were largely sidelined in this process, as analysis of religious and pacifist articles demonstrates.

Narratives could quickly shift or even produce contradictory themes to suit whatever point the protagonist was attempting to convey. Popular distinctions between Nazis and the German people could be matched by seemingly paradoxical references to collective German guilt and punishment within the same narrative.¹¹⁶⁵ The reports of foreign correspondents from late 1944 onwards are the strongest evidence of this trend in the Australian context. Despite a tendency towards reductivity and qualification of any positive depiction emanating from occupied Germany, journalists such as Douglas Wilkie, Geoffrey Tebbutt, Anne Matheson, Osmar White and Godfrey Blunden provided a far more complex picture of the German people, sensitive to German victimhood, heterogeneity and suffering than has previously been accounted for in the historiography.¹¹⁶⁶ This sensitivity, however, was often lost in the publishing process, particularly local editorial decisions in Australian newspapers increasingly prone to totalising representations of the enemy. Despite a notable hardening of attitudes within Australian public discourse in the final years of the conflict, particularly following the camp revelations in April and May 1945, Australian public discourse largely conformed to Anglo-American norms noted by Kertesz and Hoenicke Moore that assumed, despite the breakdown of Nazi/German distinction, that the German people could be reinstated in the international comity of nations through various forms of “re-education”, reintegration and reparations.¹¹⁶⁷ This conformed to a *tough, though measured*, response.

Popular findings by Australian scholars have noted that there was “no sweeping condemnation” of Australian-Germans or their descendants in Australia besides limited, fringe anti-Alien campaigns.¹¹⁶⁸ While the evidence presented within this thesis does not counteract this argument, it remains clear that the atrocity revelations (as one example) did produce some anti-German backlash which was

¹¹⁶⁵ Kertesz, 142.

¹¹⁶⁶ Anderson and Trembath.

¹¹⁶⁷ Hoenicke Moore, 153; Kertesz.

¹¹⁶⁸ Harmstorf, ‘World War II: South Australia’s Germans’.

perpetuated in and via media discourse – not only through editorial space but also in the correspondence column. Correspondence discussions of German complicity and guilt in light of atrocity revelations in the *Adelaide News* from late April to early May 1945, for instance, boasted a heavily anti-German slant that reflected a re-emergence of “fifth column” discourse.¹¹⁶⁹ The findings of this thesis would suggest a need for future research to explore the correlation between totalising enmity narratives and representations of the Australian-German community in media discourse in both national and local contexts.

Although this thesis has not attempted to “measure” totalising enmity for comparative purposes, it does reinforce findings presented in the author’s Honours Thesis. That study introduced the contention that, mirroring its other experiences and manifestations of “totalising war”, Australian manifestations of totalising enmity was far less extreme than other belligerent nations when placed in an international comparative context.¹¹⁷⁰ Australia’s experience of, and concessions to, totalising enmity at the height of its engagement in totalising warfare (insofar as Germany was concerned) paled in comparison to the racial and ideological narratives produced on the Eastern Front or the Pacific War.

Moreover, a comparative study of home front narratives of enmity concerning the Germans, Japanese and Italians in the style of Mark Johnston’s study of AIF and CMF attitudes in *Fighting the Enemy* would be a profitable exercise to build on the findings presented within this thesis.¹¹⁷¹ The scope of such a work would necessitate a focus on particular case studies or collaboration between a body of scholars beyond the scope of this study.¹¹⁷² Of particular importance in this effort will be embedding Australia’s racial narratives concerning the Japanese and synthesising the critical dimension of race into a comparative framework of totalising enmity in the Australian context. This thesis has demonstrated the benefits and needs of analysing totalising enmity narratives across various sites of public discourse (ie. beyond official campaigns such as ‘Know Your Enemy’), an approach which might expand our understanding of Australian attitudes towards the Japanese *ut totum* during the Pacific War.

¹¹⁶⁹ Loeffel, 153, 68-70. A small selection of such letters: P.J. Adey, “Sterilise Them”, *News*, 26 April 1945, 8.; Dulwich, “Letters to the Editor: ‘Back to Germany’”, *News*, 1 May 1945, 6.; “CONSIDER OUR FIGHTING MEN”, “Letters to the Editor: ‘Deport Enemy Aliens’”, *News*, 30 April 1945, 5.; Marjorie E. Thomson, “Letters to the Editor: ‘Disloyal Statements’”, *News*, 8 May 1945, 6.; C. B. Martin, “Letters to the Editor: ‘German Arrogance’”, *News*, 30 April 1945, 5.; “A.I.F. SGT”, “Letters to the Editor: ‘Round Them Up!’”, *News*, 1 May 1945, 6.

¹¹⁷⁰ Duan, 63-66.

¹¹⁷¹ Johnston, 3-6.

¹¹⁷² The author is currently preparing an example of such a work – a comparative analysis of totalising enmity narratives aimed at Germany and Japan respectively within the Australian pictorial *Pix*.

The normalisation of post-war relations and de-escalation of the perceived threat posed by the Axis states invoked an immediate search for a replacement – a redefinition of “the enemy” in Australia.¹¹⁷³ The decay of Western/Soviet relations and Cold War politics has been extensively emphasized in the historiography as a key reason for the rapid normalization of Anglo/American/German relations compared to the First World War. Australia was no different.¹¹⁷⁴ Malleable and transferable, many of the common themes of Australian wartime narratives of enmity shifted seamlessly to the novel “Red” threat. By the end of the decade, Communism had replaced Fascism as the major ideological menace to Western civilisation. Scholars such as Rieber and Kelly have argued that Cold War political ideologies drove a “conceptual wedge” between the people and their government and ideology.¹¹⁷⁵ Sam Keen likewise conceptualises post-“total” war; symmetrical conflicts in which modern states exhibited a normative tendency to separate corrupt, illegitimate leaders from their populations and avoid expressions of hatred against the enemy population.¹¹⁷⁶ This signalled the denouement of the era of the peoples’ war, in this sense at least, despite the indiscriminate potential of nuclear warfare to incite and effectuate totalising violence on an unforeseen scale.

Post-war recognition of the “logic” of totalising enmity demonstrates a tangible concern that Australians would again concede to the enmification of entire peoples in the latest global conflict between Communism and Democracy. The Launceston *Examiner’s* regular columnist wrote in July 1949 of the reductivity, essentialism and homogenisation of emergent narratives of enmity discussing the archetypal “Communist”.¹¹⁷⁷ The columnist even seemed to confirm fears commonly raised by religious intellectuals such as D.G.M. Jackson and the Leftists such as Frank Brennan that totalising enmity narratives could be recalibrated to incorporate Australia’s own citizenry. The columnist noted the integration of over twenty-thousand Australian coal strikers into the expanding anti-Communist definition of “enemy” during the 1949 election year as both Ben Chifley’s Labor government and Menzies’ opposition attempted to ward off political incursions by the Australian Communist Party and the spread of international Communism.¹¹⁷⁸ The writer’s poignant reflection on Australia’s homogenising reconceptualization of the “enemy” throughout the Second World War – the widespread concessions to the totalising “logic” of enmity between 1939 and 1945 – fittingly concludes this thesis. It summarises Australian representations of the German people throughout the

¹¹⁷³ Barker, 155.

¹¹⁷⁴ Tampke, *The Germans in Australia: The Story of the Continent’s German Speaking Communities*, 135.

¹¹⁷⁵ Rieber and Kelly, 26.

¹¹⁷⁶ Keen, 50.

¹¹⁷⁷ “The Padre Says: Defining Our Enemy,” *Examiner*, 9 July 1949, 3.

¹¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*; Phillip Deery, *Labour in Conflict: The 1949 Coal Strike*. (Canberra: Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, 1978).

war, contemporary recognition of the “logic” behind totalising enmity, and fears about its harmful impact on Australian enmity narratives in light of Cold War anti-Communism:

In time of war we are inclined to think of the whole population of the enemy country as being our enemies. In ‘total war’ there is no distinction between combatants and non-combatants; the only distinction is between friend or foe. So we learn to hate all Germans or all Japanese, a result which is neither logical nor just, and certainly not in accordance with Christian teaching. In industrial conflict there is no clear definition...a clear line of demarcation cannot be found.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁹ “The Padre Says: Defining Our Enemy.”

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